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Shan State  is a state of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Shan State borders China (Yunnan) to the north, Laos (Louang Namtha and Bokeo Provinces) to the east, and Thailand (Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Provinces) to the south, and five administrative divisions of Burma (Myanmar) in the west.

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The map of Rakhine State

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The conflict between insurgent groups and Tatmadaw broke out after Myanmar's independence in 1948. The government ignored the differences and uniqueness of ethnic groups in language, religion and culture, and tried to resolve ethnic conflicts through violent suppression.

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The conflict between insurgent groups and Tatmadaw broke out after Myanmar's independence in 1948. The government ignored the differences and uniqueness of ethnic groups in language, religion and culture, and tried to resolve ethnic conflicts through violent suppression.

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In 1982, Myanmar nationality law bans Rohingya people from obtaining citizenship.

In 2012, violent clashes between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists killed 192 people.

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October 2016, ARSA attacked Burmese border posts, leading clearance operations from Burmese government.

August 2017, Rakhine state was attacked again by ARSA, resulting in a large-scale attack by the Burmese army on Rohingya's residential areas.

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It has caused severe humanitarian crises in the past decade, most importantly the genocide attempts which has caused almost 1 million Rohingya to flee from Myanmar. Most have crossed to Bangladesh, while others reached Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.

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Clashes in Buthidaung and Rathedaung between Arakan Army and Tatmadaw in 2018, killed 4 soldiers and an unknown number of AA insurgents. They had earlier clashed in April 2015. On 1 January 2019, AA attacked members of the Border Guard Police (BGP).

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There have been efforts to end the conflicts but seem to no avail.

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After the coup, in March 2021, the military government removed Arakan Army from its list of “terrorist” groups as it has stopped attacks on the military

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The state capital is Loikaw. The state is divided into 2 districts (Bawlakhe in the south and Loikaw in the north) which are divided into 7 townships 

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Map of Karen State

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The Karen conflict is an armed conflict in Kayin State, Myanmar (formerly known as Karen State, Burma). The conflict has been described as one of the world's "longest running civil wars". Karen nationalists have been fighting for an independent state known as Kawthoolei since 1949.

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Skirmishes Between Kachin Independent Army and Myanmar Junta

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Skirmishes Between Kachin Independent Army and Myanmar Junta

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On 29 July 2021 Kachin Independence Army (KIA) attacked two Myanmar military bases in Northern Shan State. The two post that were being attacked are the Nam Hkaing on the Union highway between Kutkai and Namphetka, and Nam Paw, between Namphetka and Muse. The casualties on both sides are yet to be estimated. (Source: https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/kia-attacks-two-junta-military-bases-in-northern-shan-state)

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- Karen National Union, the strongest among armed groups. Enjoy strong support from the community, especially Christians. Widely recognised as legitimate representative of Karen.
-  Kloh Htoo Baw, smaller, former Karen Buddhist Army
- CBOs
- Tatmadaw
- Karen Border Guard Force

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In Kachin, a 17-year ceasefire broke down in 2011, reigniting a decades-long conflict between the KIA and the Tatmadaw.  In northern Shan state, intense fighting has taken place since January 2018 and has worsened since December 2020. In Shan state, there are an estimated seven EAOs, 20 militia groups, and seven Border Guard Forces actively engaged in an armed independence movement, both between one another and against the Myanmar government.  (Source: https://www.acaps.org/country/myanmar/crisis/kachin-and-shan-conflict)

The timeline to the recurring conflict could be divided into few major phases. Those are:
1. in the aftermath of Burma Independence (1948-1962)
2. During Ne Win era (1962-1988)
3. In the event of 8888 Uprising (1988)
4. During the old Junta governance (1988-2011)
5. During civilian group governance (20211-2021)

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19th century and British rule
The Constitution of the Union of Burma in 1947 proclaimed that the three Karenni States be amalgamated into a single constituent state of the union, called Karenni State. It also provided for the possibility of secession from the Union after 10 years.

Independence to 1988
In 1952, the former Shan state of Mong Pai (1901. pop - 19,351) was added to Karenni State, and the whole renamed Kayah State, possibly with the intent of driving a wedge between the Karenni (in Kayah State) and the rest of the Karen people (in Karen State), both fighting for independence.

In 1957, pro-independence groups already active in the area formed the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), backed by its own army, the Karenni Army (KA). Apart from a brief ceasefire in 1995, the KA has been fighting ever since. Rivals to the KNPP include the leftist Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), and the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), both of which are now allied with the Myanmar military.

Post-1988
In 1996, Myanmar's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of stepped up its campaign to crush Karenni independence with a population transfer program, forcibly moving villagers to designated relocation sites to deprive the pro-independence forces of bases of support. The Myanmar government has been accused of massive human rights violations in the region.

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kayah_State

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Kayah State is a state of Myanmar. Situated in eastern Myanmar, it is bounded on the north by Shan State, on the east by Thailand's Mae Hong Son Province, and on the south and west by Kayin State. It lies approximately between 18° 30′ and 19° 55′ north latitude and between 96° 50′ and 97° 50′ east longitude.

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KNPP - Karenni National Progressive Party
KNPLF - Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front
KNLP - Kayan New Land Party
KNG - Kayan National Guard
KNPDP - Karenni National Peace and Development Party
KNSO - Karenni National Solidarity Organisation
KNDP - Karenni National Democratic Party

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- Mining
- Dams and hydropower potential as one of the major electricity supplies in Myanmar

Despite the economic opportunities and resources, residents in Kayah State doubt that they will benefit from it. Businesses along new roads have typically been run by recently arrived migrants from other parts of the country, and new commercial opportunities have been monopolized by outsiders.

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It has been alleged that villagers live under the constant threat of rape, beatings, arbitrary arrest or execution, conscription as slave labor for the Myanmar army, and having their food and possessions taken without compensation.

It has also been alleged that the relocation centers have inadequate access to water, food, medical services, and educational facilities. An estimated 50,000 Karenni people classified as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and thousands more are in refugee camps in Thailand.

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Over 30,000 civilians were newly displaced by fighting in Kachin and Shan States in 2018 (Source: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/myanmar-burma)

34,600 people were temporarily displaced between January 2019–December 2020 because of active conflict – the majority were able to return to their place of origin within a few days. 9,800 people are in protracted displacement and have been living in camp settings since 2011. In south and eastern Shan state, over 9,000 are displaced (https://www.acaps.org/country/myanmar/crisis/kachin-and-shan-conflict).

Indirect Outcomes
Rise in Sex Trafficking (2019). Trafficking of women and girls remains a serious problem in Kachin and northern Shan States, where conflict and economic desperation has made them vulnerable to being lured to China under false promises and sold as “brides.” (Source: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/myanmar-burma)

Food Shortages.  Conflict and movement restrictions have weakened access to food supplies and agricultural production across Kachin and Shan. Farmers are unable to access their fields, and civilians fear going to markets because of the threat of extortion, forced conscription, and arbitrary detention by both the Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups. (Source: https://www.acaps.org/country/myanmar/crisis/kachin-and-shan-conflict)

Landmines.  Landmines and shelling near villages is a severe protection concern, limiting free movement and the ability of people to return to areas of origin. Protracted displacement and disrupted livelihoods also increase the risk of negative coping strategies, such as child marriage, risky migration routes, and recruitment into armed groups.  (Source: https://www.acaps.org/country/myanmar/crisis/kachin-and-shan-conflict)

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Myanmar security forces continued to commit grave abuses against Rohingya Muslims throughout 2018, deepening the humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in Rakhine State. More than 730,000 Rohingya have fled to neighboring Bangladesh since the military campaign of ethnic cleansing began in August 2017. The government denied extensive evidence of atrocities, refused to allow independent investigators access to Rakhine State, and punished local journalists for reporting on military abuses.

In August, a United Nations-mandated fact-finding mission found that the military abuses committed in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan States since 2011 "undoubtedly amount to the gravest crimes under international law," and called for senior military officials, including Commander-in-Chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, to face investigation and prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

The ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) under de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi increasingly stifled dissent using a slew of repressive laws. Democratic space diminished, with the NLD doing little to address the country's weak rule of law, corrupt judiciary, or impunity for security force abuses. The 2008 constitution places the Ministries of Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs under the control of the military.

Over 30,000 civilians were newly displaced by fighting in Kachin and Shan States in 2018, and left increasingly vulnerable by government restrictions on humanitarian access.

Grave Crimes against Rohingya

More than 14,500 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh between January and November 2018 to escape ongoing persecution and violence in Myanmar, joining almost 1 million others from 2017 and previous years in precarious, overcrowded camps. Conditions remain dire for the estimated 500,000-600,000 Rohingya still in Rakhine State. Refugees who arrived in Bangladesh in 2018 reported continuing abuses by Myanmar security forces, including killings, arson, enforced disappearances, extortion, severe restrictions on movement, and lack of food and health care. They also reported sexual violence and abductions of women and girls in villages and at checkpoints along the route to Bangladesh. Returnees to Myanmar faced arrest and torture by authorities. Over 4,500 Rohingya remained stuck in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border "no-man's land," subject to harassment by Myanmar officials and regular threats via loudspeaker to induce them to cross into Bangladesh.

Rohingya refugees who fled in 2018 reported that Myanmar authorities had ordered them to accept the National Verification Card (NVC)-which does not provide citizenship-or leave Myanmar. Successive governments have for decades deprived Rohingya of nationality through systematic and institutionalized marginalization, rendering them stateless.

From January to March 2018, at least 34 villages in Myanmar were completely or partially destroyed, bringing the total number of predominantly Rohingya villages destroyed between August 2017 and March 2018 to 392, most by fire. The government also seized and bulldozed dozens of Rohingya villages, destroying evidence of crimes. Authorities began construction over the demolished villages, including new security force bases.

More than 128,000 Muslims-about 125,000 Rohingya and 3,000 Kaman-remain in detention camps in central Rakhine State, where they have been confined since 2012, arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. The government announced several camp "closures" in 2018, but its plans entail constructing permanent structures in the current camp locations, further entrenching segregation and denying Rohingya the right to return to their original areas of residence or move elsewhere.

The government barred the UN fact-finding mission and special rapporteur on Myanmar from the country. Authorities have repeatedly denied that significant security force abuses took place, setting up successive investigations that lacked independence or credibility. A commission of inquiry with international members was established in July, which the fact-finding mission determined "will not and cannot provide a real avenue for accountability."

Myanmar claimed throughout 2018 that it was ready to accept repatriated refugees, yet showed no willingness to create conditions for safe and dignified returns or address the root causes of the crisis. The government built two "reception centers" and a "transit camp," surrounded by perimeter fences, to process and house returnees, based on a November 2017 agreement with Bangladesh.

In June 2018, UNHCR, the UN Development Programme, and the Myanmar government signed a memorandum of understanding on returns which lacked guarantees of citizenship. The UN agencies began limited assessments in Rakhine State in September.

Bangladesh and Myanmar announced in October that the first round of repatriation of 2,260 Rohingya refugees would begin in mid-November, a proposal opposed by the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) and Rohingya refugee community, neither of which had been consulted. Returns were suspended following widespread opposition; no official repatriations had taken place at time of writing.

Ethnic Conflicts and Forced Displacement

Armed conflicts between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups intensified over the course of 2018 in Kachin, Shan, and Karen States, stoked by large-scale development projects and disputes over natural resources. Civilians were endangered by the military's indiscriminate attacks, forced displacement, and aid blockages. Reports emerged of the military using civilians as human shields. The UN fact-finding mission determined that the military's actions in Shan and Kachin States since 2011 amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In January 2018, clashes broke out between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in several townships in Kachin State, with the military employing aerial bombing and heavy artillery shelling. More than 3,500 civilians attempting to flee the fighting were trapped, some for over two weeks, without access to adequate food or basic supplies. Hostilities in Kachin State resumed in April. Government shelling and airstrikes killed at least 10 civilians and forced approximately 2,000 to flee into the jungle, where they were stranded for nearly a month without access to aid, in dire conditions.

An estimated 106,000 civilians remain in long-term displacement camps in Kachin and northern Shan States, many near areas of active conflict, while more than 30,000 were temporarily displaced in 2018. Thousands were also displaced by fighting in Karen State in March, and in Chin State in May.

Authorities continued throughout 2018 to bar the UN and international organizations from delivering aid in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups. Access was also restricted in government-controlled areas and for local organizations. The resulting shortages of food, medicine, and shelter have had a ruinous effect on displaced populations, contributing to a rise in exploitative practices including portering and trafficking. Aid workers who traveled to a non-government-controlled area in 2018 to provide humanitarian support were threatened with arrest under the Unlawful Associations Act.

In July, following clashes in northern Shan State, the military allegedly detained six female medics from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), who were found dead from gunshot and stab wounds shortly thereafter.

Ongoing fighting has fostered conflict-related sexual violence, with internally displaced women and girls especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse.

Trafficking of women and girls remains a serious problem in Kachin and northern Shan States, where conflict and economic desperation has made them vulnerable to being lured to China under false promises and sold as "brides." The Myanmar government has failed to take sufficient steps to prevent trafficking, recover victims, bring perpetrators to justice, or assist survivors.

In February, authorities in Muse township, Shan State, issued an announcement that wounded ethnic armed group soldiers found by the army should be brought immediately to the nearest military base and not be provided medical treatment, a practice that amounts to torture.

In July, Aung San Suu Kyi presided over the third session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference, the government's peace process forum, which has largely stagnated, failing to gain trust or traction among ethnic armed groups.

Freedom of Speech

The government in 2018 increased its use of overly broad and vaguely worded laws to arrest and imprison individuals for peaceful expression deemed critical of the government or military. Journalists' ability to cover conflict areas steadily declined, while the rise in prosecutions had a chilling effect on the country's media. A September UN report on legal and judicial harassment of reporters in Myanmar concluded that it had become "impossible for journalists to do their job without fear or favour."

In September, a Yangon court sentenced Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo to seven years in prison under the colonial-era Official Secrets Act for their reporting on a military massacre of Rohingya in Rakhine State's Inn Din village. They were arrested in December 2017, in what witness accounts revealed to be a police setup, held incommunicado for two weeks, and subjected to mistreatment during interrogation. The prosecution's case was marked by evidence of police misconduct and conflicting official accounts.

Prosecutions for criminal defamation increased in 2018, particularly under section 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Act, with most complainants state, military, or political party officials; over 60 percent of defendants were journalists, activists, or others addressing matters of public interest. Acquittals were rare. In May, a human rights defender from the Ayeyarwady Region was sentenced to three months in prison under 66(d) for broadcasting a video of a satirical play about armed conflict on Facebook.

In March, authorities sentenced Aung Ko Htwe, a former child soldier, to two years in prison with hard labor for an interview he gave to journalists detailing his forced recruitment into the army at age 14. Two supporters who protested his case were sentenced to one year in prison in September.

Authorities began using section 8(f) of the Privacy Law, enacted in March 2017, to prosecute critics for criminal defamation. In January, a Mon State official sued a man in Thaton under the new law for social media posts deemed critical of the Mon State chief minister; he was sentenced to one year in prison in September.

More than 45 activists were charged in April and May for peaceful protests held throughout the country calling for the protection of civilians displaced by military offensives in Kachin State. Authorities in Yangon attempted to ban a May 12 anti-war protest, citing a November 2017 order prohibiting protests in 11 Yangon townships, even though organizers had notified authorities in advance. Police in riot gear violently dispersed the protest and arrested 17 demonstrators. In Kachin State, a lieutenant colonel filed criminal defamation complaints against three Kachin human rights defenders who had helped organize protests in Myitkyina. The three activists were officially charged in September and sentenced to six months in prison in December.

In July, police violently quelled a demonstration in Karenni State, tasing and baton-charging protesters who were marching against plans to erect a statue of Myanmar's independence leader, General Aung San. Ten Karenni youth activists were arrested and charged with alarming the public and incitement.

In January, police shot and killed seven ethnic Rakhine protesters in Mrauk U, Rakhine State, among a crowd that had converged at a local government building after authorities shut down an annual event.

An estimated 36 political prisoners were serving prison sentences and 269 facing trial in Myanmar as of November 2018.

Land Rights

While the NLD government has made efforts to address the military's legacy of land grabbing, thousands of land claims remain unresolved. Farmers continue to face threats and arrests for protesting unresolved confiscation claims and for farming the land they claim. In May 2018, 33 farmers were found guilty of criminal trespass for farming land near a special economic zone that had been seized in 1996. In September, parliament passed amendments to the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law requiring anyone occupying land classified as "vacant, fallow, or virgin" to apply for permits or face up to two years in prison. The government issued a March 2019 deadline for permit applications.

Key International Actors

Myanmar faced international condemnation in 2018 for military atrocities against the Rohingya. In June, the European Union and Canada sanctioned seven military officials for their involvement in the Rakhine State operations. In August, the United States imposed financial and travel sanctions against four security force commanders and two military units.

The UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution in September, drafted by the EU and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), establishing a mechanism to collect, preserve, and analyze evidence of grave crimes committed in Myanmar, and prepare case files for prosecution. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution on Myanmar in November affirming the establishment of the mechanism and calling for its prompt initiation.

In September, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor launched a full preliminary examination into Myanmar's deportation of the Rohingya, following a panel ruling affirming the court's jurisdiction over the crime on the grounds that it was completed in Bangladesh, an ICC member state. Several countries voiced support for a UN Security Council referral to the ICC, including council members Sweden and the Netherlands, to address the full range of alleged international crimes in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan States.

Myanmar and Bangladesh continued repatriation discussions in 2018 following their November 2017 agreement. Tensions between the countries grew, with repatriation delays and mounting challenges in Bangladesh from the mass influx of refugees. Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina urged international actors, including the Security Council and Islamic Development Bank, to exert pressure on Myanmar.

Facebook was criticized by the UN fact-finding mission and other investigations for its failure to prevent the spread of anti-Muslim hate speech and incitement to violence. In response, the company announced new measures to review Myanmar language content and identify abusive posts. Facebook banned 20 individuals and organizations in August, including Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, and removed a further 10 accounts in October. The company commissioned an assessment of its human rights impact in Myanmar, which found that it had failed to prevent use of the platform to "foment division and incite offline violence."

China continued to shield Myanmar from accountability and scrutiny, obstructing international action and weakening UN measures. While many foreign governments cut funding to Myanmar in 2017 and 2018, China expanded its investment in the country. In September, the two countries signed an agreement on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a development project under China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative linking Yunnan Province to the Indian Ocean. Attempting to compete with China for influence, Japan broke with other democracies and called for the international community to avoid criticizing the Myanmar government.

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women requested in November 2017 that the Myanmar government submit a report on violence against Rohingya women and girls by May 2018-only the fourth time the committee had made an "exceptional report" request-to which the government did not respond. The UN secretary-general included the Myanmar military for the first time in his annual list of parties that have committed sexual violence in armed conflict. Myanmar also remains on the UN's list of parties that use and recruit child soldiers.

In September, the US State Department quietly released the findings from its $1.4 million investigation into the crackdown on the Rohingya, which detailed the military's atrocities but did not reach legal conclusions about the abuses committed. Members of Congress followed up with a call for a legal determination to be made. The State Department downgraded Myanmar in its 2018 Trafficking in Persons report to Tier 3, the lowest tier. It also restored Myanmar to its annual list of governments using child soldiers, following its removal in 2017.

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World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Myanmar

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Myanmar security forces continued to commit grave abuses against Rohingya Muslims throughout 2018, deepening the humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in Rakhine State. More than 730,000 Rohingya have fled to neighboring Bangladesh since the military campaign of ethnic cleansing began in August 2017.

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- Ceasefire between government and Karen rebels 2012
- Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 2015
- NLD won majority seats in 2020
- One of the most active state after the coup. Airstrikes displaced 90% population of Mutraw in May. Karenni People's Defense Force
- Transnational dimension. Thailand's "buffer zone". Refugee flows. "Constructive engagement."

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1. Myanmar Tatmadaw or Ubrmese for the Union Armed Forces
2. Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), including its sub-military wing, Kachin Independence Army.
3. Third Party Ethnic Armed Organizations

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1995 ceasefire
2012 ceasefire
2015 nationwide ceasefire

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While there is a long road to reach peace between the conflicting key actors. The United Wa State Party had been coordinating an effort for Political negotiation back in 2017.

In May 2017, the Party formed the Federal Political Negotiations and Coordination Committee following a conference at its capital Panshang, which the North Alliance attended.

The Peace negotiation however stalled with some EAOs decided to be absent from the Peace conference.

No clear indication of another round of Peace conference to be made as of 2021. (Source: https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/burmas-northern-shan-state-and-prospects-peace)

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Armed conflict between the Burmese Army and various ethnic armed organizations continue to threaten the peace process of the National League for Democracy government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. This Brief focuses on conflict dynamics to provide an overview of resurgent conflict patterns in northern Shan State over the past two years, outlines the armed groups involved, their competing interests, the human rights effects on the civilians in the area, and how the fighting has affected the nationwide ceasefire.

Summary

Increased armed conflict between the Burmese Army and several ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan State threaten the nationwide peace process.

Thousands of civilians have been displaced, human rights violations have been perpetrated by all parties, and humanitarian assistance is being increasingly blocked by Burmese security forces.

Illicit economic activity-including extensive opium and heroin production as well as transport of amphetamine stimulants to China and to other parts of Burma-has helped fuel the conflict.

The role of China as interlocutor between the government, the military, and armed actors in the north has increased markedly in recent months.

Reconciliation will require diverse advocacy approaches on the part of international actors toward the civilian government, the Tatmadaw, ethnic armed groups, and civil society. To facilitate a genuinely inclusive peace process, all parties need to be encouraged to expand dialogue and approach talks without precondition.

Introduction

Even as Burma has transitioned-beginning in late 2010-from decades of civil war and military rule to greater democracy, long-standing and widespread armed conflict has resumed between several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw). Early in 2011, a 1994 ceasefire agreement broke down as relations deterioriated in the wake of the National League for Democracy government's refusal to permit Kachin political parties to participate in the elections that ended the era of military rule in the country. At the same time, tensions over economic interests and territory escalated.

The major EAOs operating in the north of Shan State-which occupies almost a quarter of Burma's land area and juts out to the east, bordering China, Laos, and Thailand-include the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the (ethnic Chinese) Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, and the Kachin Independence Army. ¹ After the end of the ceasefire agreement in 2011, Kachin base areas along the Burma-China border in Kachin State (just to the north) soon became hubs for the formation or remobilization of a host of other EAOs. These included the United League of Arakan or Arakan Army of Kachin State and the reformed TNLA/Palaung State Liberation Front. These groups soon expanded their operations into northern Shan State alongside Kachin allies, where fighting raged well into 2013.

Looming over the entire area is the United Wa State Party, Burma's largest nonstate armed group, which boasts more than twenty-five thousand heavily armed troops and a self-administered zone abutting the China border. A patchwork of government-aligned militias, called Pyithu Sit (People's Militia), operate there, many involved in drug production and smuggling, and some working with Tatmadaw units on operations. ²

Escalating Conflict

The northern Shan State conflict is complex and defies easy classification. The dynamics of the fighting vary from place and time and between groups. Fighting sharply escalated in February 2015 when one faction of the former ceasefire group, the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, attacked the capital city of their former enclave, the border town of Laukkai, displacing tens of thousands of civilians and resulting in extensive government casualties. Multiple Tatmadaw light infantry divisions were deployed to clear the area, resulting in extensive use of heavy artillery and helicopter gunship and jet fighter air strikes. ³ This has produced arguably the most intensive and widespread fighting in the area since the 1980s-a marked shift from the low-intensity counterinsurgency warfare that characterized the civil war for twenty-five years.

The conflict escalated further in November 2016 with coordinated attacks by the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the TNLA, the Arakan Army, and the Kachin Independence Army- formalized as the North Alliance-Burma (or North Alliance)-on the key Burma-China border town of Muse, which resulted in a dozen civilian and security force casualties, thousands of civilians fleeing to China or south, and the suspension of border trade. The fighting spread over several weeks, the rebels seizing and holding the border town of Mong Ko before being driven out by government artillery and air strikes. Hit and run ambushes by North Alliance units are reported to have inflicted significant Tatmadaw casualties, which provoked major multiunit sweeps and civilian suffering or displacement.

Even as Burma has transitioned from decades of civil war and military rule to greater democracy, longstanding and widespread armed conflict has resumed."

Determining the circumstances of reported armed exchanges is difficult. Reasons are typically related to direct military operations, protection or interdiction of economic interests, protection of civilians, or retribution attacks. Another explanation is military pressure to force the EAOs to sign the ceasefire accord. TNLA operations against drug production and smuggling by government-aligned militias in Kutkai township have drawn in Tatmadaw troops to support their militia allies. ⁴

To further complicate matters, armed clashes are on the increase between the TNLA and a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatory, the Restoration Council of Shan State (also known as the Shan State Army-South). These clashes are mostly thought to be over territory and economic interests, but have heightened tensions between Shan and Ta-ang communities across northern Shan State.

More Displacement, Restrictions on Humanitarian Assistance

The conflict has had a devastating effect on civilians. The UN Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates the number of internally displaced people as close to one hundred thousand. ⁵ The exact figure could be higher because OCHA does not enumerate displacement where heavy fighting has been reported. Many civilians are displaced several times a year, which interrupts agricultural cycles and affects livelihoods and food security.

Since early 2016, international and Burmese humanitarian agencies have reported increasingly difficult access to internally displaced people in areas outside government control, aid convoys being turned back or travel authorizations (especially for foreign staff of international agencies) refused. The deteriorating security situation grants the Burma security services license to further restrict travel. In June 2017, three Burmese journalists attending a TNLA drug-burning ceremony were arrested by the Tatmadaw and charged under Section 17(1) of the draconian 1908 Unlawful Associations Act, which could result in a three-year prison term. The arrests evinced widespread concern that the act heralded a crackdown on reporting on nonsignatory EAOs and human rights violations. ⁶

Shan, Ta-ang, and international human rights groups have reported widespread and systematic violations by Tatmadaw troops and their Pyithu Sit allies. These include extrajudicial executions, forced relocations, forced labor to carry supplies, human shielding during operations, and routine torture and ill-treatment of civilians, some of it captured on mobile phones and distributed through social media. ⁷ In mid-2016, the Tatmadaw made a rare admission that its troops tortured and killed five men from a village east of Lashio. Yet the Tatmadaw often refuse to acknowledge or investigate widespread reports of abuses in other parts of Shan State, despite calls from the UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee to visit the areas. EAOs have been routinely accused of perpetrating abuses against civilians-including indiscriminate fire into civilian areas, forced recruitment, forced labor, torture, ill-treatment, and extortion-claims their leaders routinely deny.

Impacts on the Peace Process

Despite early promises of a more inclusive peace process under Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy government, the increased fighting in the north has contributed to more misunderstanding, mistrust, and marginalization of nonsignatory EAOs and their communities (whose combined forces make up more than 80 percent of all nonstate armed groups). The lead-up to the second Panglong 21st Century Conference in May was marked by the government's sharply increased denunciation of the North Alliance and an insistence that attendance must be preceded by signing the NCA. In December, the Shan State regional assembly passed a motion labeling members of the North Alliance as terrorist organizations (a similar attempt in the national parliament was voted down). A series of pro-Tatmadaw civilian rallies were staged soon after. In July, soldiers distributed leaflets in Lashio warning residents of an imminent terrorist attack by the Kachin Independence Army and the TNLA, which the groups strongly denied.

Statements from the Tatmadaw Commander in Chief Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing and the State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi over the last year have been almost indistinguishable. Suu Kyi's first statement as head of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center denounced the use of violence by the Northern Alliance and defended the role of the Tatmadaw. ⁸ In March, she prematurely announced the pledge by five members of the Union Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) to sign the NCA, and warned other groups-meaning the Northern Alliance-to be "extremely careful." This misunderstanding led to the surprise UNFC boycott of the Panglong conference. ⁹ At the last minute, however, facilitated by China, the northern groups attended as special guests.

The increasing efforts by the United Wa State Party to be a coordinating leader of the northern groups is a significant development. Ahead of the Panglong conference in May, it formed the Federal Political Negotiations and Coordination Committee following a conference at its capital Panshang, which the North Alliance attended. The UNFC, formerly the main grouping of nonsignatory EAOs, was blindsided. Its nonattendance at the Panglong conference raised questions of its future role in the process and what the new Wa-led grouping had to offer. Already the Wa State Party has articulated its rejection of the NCA and deplored the dismissive approach of the Tatmadaw to ethnic grievances, signaling that it would pursue a tougher negotiating line and support the northern groups. ¹⁰

China has increased its efforts to include the North Alliance into the peace process, and succeeded, clearly illustrating its growing influence. ¹¹ This may have been a coup for Chinese influence but was otherwise pyrrhic in that EAO representatives did not attend any substantive meetings.

Conclusion

The intensity of the attacks in northern Shan State and the critical rhetoric by government and military leaders against ethnic communities has further eroded trust in an already weak peace process. ¹² Many leaders of EAOs and their civilian support base feel a strong sense of betrayal over the lack of development, minimal political inclusion, and routine human rights abuses. These are deep grievances, dating back decades. The intensity of the growing fighting in northern Shan State is a key element in the dearth of trust in the sincerity of the Aung San Suu Kyi government to pursue peace.

It is important to analyze the flaws and missed opportunities of the ceasefire process so far to inform ongoing discussions and to find ways for international interlocutors to bridge the growing divides between all sides to this complex and growing war. International actors need to be more proactive in urging regular talks with all northern Shan State actors between the government and military, and to pursue routine consultations with a range of civil society actors in the area.

International actors also need to realize that armed conflict has escalated even as a partial ceasefire is being consolidated. These two processes require diverse advocacy approaches toward the civilian government and the Tatmadaw. Support for EAOs and civil society must differ if it is to make a difference. Last, and perhaps most significant, all sides need to be encouraged to seek negotiations without hard preconditions attached.

Notes

1. See "Township Map-Shan State (North)," Myanmar Information Management Unit, February 2015, http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Tsp_Map_Shan-North_MIMU 1251v01_23Feb2015_A3_0.pdf.

2. John Buchanan, Militias in Myanmar (Yangon: Asia Foundation, July 2016).

3. Anthony Davis, "Tatmadaw quietly launches largest war since Myanmar's independence," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 20, 2015.

4. Thu Thu Aung, "TNLA field clearing suspended by air strikes," Myanmar Times, February 26, 2016, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/19197-tnla-field-clearing-suspended-by-air-strikes.html.

5. UNOCHA, "Myanmar: IDP Sites in Kachin and northern Shan states," June 2017, http://reliefweb.int/map/myanmar/myanmar-idp-sites-kachin-and-northern-shan-states-may-2017.

6. David Scott Mathieson, "Gagging the messengers of Myanmar's wars," Asia Times, July 6, 2017, www.atimes.com/article/gagging-messengers-myanmars-wars/.

7. Ta-ang Women's Organization, "Trained to Torture," June 2016, http://en.palaungwomen.com/index.php/82-reports/97-trained-to-torture (No longer available online).

8. Shan Human Rights Foundation, "Torture, extra judicial killing, and use of civilians as human shields by Burma army during new offensive," June 1, 2016, http://shanhumanrights.org/index.php/news-updates/247-torturen-extrajudicial-killing-and-use-of-civilians-as-human-shields-by-burma-army-during-new-offensive; see also "Covering all the Bases," Global New Light of Myanmar, July 21, 1-2.

9. National Reconciliation and Peace Center, "Announcement on Situation of Armed Conflicts in the Northeast Shan State," Announcement no. 1/2016, November 23, 2016, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2016/11/23/announcement-on-situation-of-armed-conflicts-in-the-northeast-shan-state/.

10. "UNFC Position Statement on 21st Century Panglong Second Conference," May 23, 2017.

11. "Process of Wa State's Consultation and Negotiation with the Government of Myanmar on Modification of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, Central Committee of United Wa State Party," April 30, 2017.

12. See Yun Sun, "China and Myanmar's Peace Process," Special Report no. 201 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, March 2017); Bertil Lintner, "China uses carrot and stick in Myanmar," Asia Times, February 28, 2017.

13. Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclusive Burmese Peace Process," Peace Brief no. 223 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 2017).

About this Brief

Focusing on conflict dynamics, this Peace Brief outlines the resurgent patterns of armed violence in the townships of Burma's northern Shan State between 2015 and 2017 in the context of Burma's transition to democratic rule. It is supported by the Asia Center at the United States Institute of Peace. David Mathieson is an independent analyst based in Rangoon working on peace and conflict issues in contemporary Burma. From 2006 to 2016 he was the Senior Researcher on Burma for Human Rights Watch.

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Burma's Northern Shan State and Prospects for Peace

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This Brief focuses on conflict dynamics to provide an overview of resurgent conflict patterns in northern Shan State over the past two years, outlines the armed groups involved, their competing interests, the human rights effects on the civilians in the area, and how the fighting has affected the nationwide ceasefire.