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This article is about a controversy in Milwaukee, WI USA where white residents of a wealthy area opposed the building of a train line to a poorer, Blacker neighborhood because they didn’t want Black people coming to their neighborhood. How would Stuart Hall study this case?

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The Associated Press recently reported that spiking gas prices have brought double-digit ridership increases this year on light rail trains in Baltimore, Minneapolis, San Francisco and St. Louis.

Even small cities such as Norfolk, Va., are building light rail lines with their signature short, sleek electric trains, while other cities are showing solid ridership gains on longer-distance commuter rail lines using bigger trains.

Though a Kenosha-Racine-Milwaukee commuter line remains under study, Milwaukee is still among the few major American cities without light rail or commuter rail.

A starter light rail system was recommended for Milwaukee County in a major state-funded regional transportation study in the 1990s that had considerable public and private sector support.

But conservative AM talk radio and opposition in Waukesha County blocked further study of light rail for Milwaukee, even though $241 million in federal funds was set aside specifically for transit improvements in Milwaukee County.

Had plans unfolded on schedule, the starter light rail, with an estimated 21,000 riders on weekdays, would have opened in 2006 and run about 10 miles from the Third Ward to Summerfest, downtown, Miller Park, the Milwaukee County Zoo and the County Grounds.

Talk about a missed opportunity. It would have provided Milwaukeeans with a spiffy transit option in the face of $4-a-gallon gasoline, with higher eventual prices predicted.

The system would have benefited from the city's condo-and-loft boom, a resurgent Milwaukee Brewers' ballclub, the successful Potawatomi Bingo Casino and an expanding Milwaukee Regional Medical Center.

Extensions to Milwaukee's north side and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee would have generated support, and light rail could have assisted Waukesha County commuters because years of Zoo Interchange and I-94 reconstruction are planned west of Milwaukee.

The plan

But back to 1997: That's when five years of research and hearings managed by the state Department of Transportation and a consultant finally produced a draft plan with three key elements:

* Highways: Marquette Interchange and east-west corridor reconstruction with special carpool and bus lanes from downtown Milwaukee to Highway J in Waukesha County: $1.32 billion.

* Light rail: The starter line in Milwaukee County: $330 million.

* Buses: Greatly expanded bus service connecting Waukesha and Milwaukee counties: $90 million.

In late January 1997, then-Gov. Tommy Thompson and aides showed the two-county transportation plan to local officials and asked them to support the package even if they disliked one or another element. As policy director to then-Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist, I attended the meeting at which Thompson made his pitch. Though opposed to special lanes, Norquist agreed not to attack the plan.

Light rail already was controversial: The late business leader George Watts said publicly in late 1996 that light rail could deliver 'strangers' into unsuspecting communities and threaten their property and children - a remark some felt was racist. And 'light rail' was and continues to be aimed as a partisan, fear-laden phrase against Milwaukee and its urban, Democratic majority on conservative talk radio and in some Republican-dominated suburbs.

Sensing a backlash in Thompson's base, an administration spokesman told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel for a Feb. 1, 1997 article - just days after Thompson's presentation to Norquist - that not 'a nickel' of state money would be spent on light rail in Milwaukee. Nevertheless, the $1.76 billion plan, including the light rail element at an estimated 20% of the package's cost, was presented to the Waukesha County and Milwaukee County boards for their mutual consideration.

Both boards, practicing enlightened regional cooperation, passed their resolutions in April 1997 to accept and acknowledge the plan but not to formally approve it.

The resolutions' intents were to trigger up to two more years of studies, preliminary engineering and detailed planning - and, no doubt, disputes and compromises - for eventual implementation.

But Daniel Finley, a Republican then-Waukesha County executive, vetoed his board's resolution over the light rail element, even though the proposed line didn't extend into Waukesha County.

The Waukesha County Board approved a substitute resolution in May 1997 that supported the plan's highway and bus elements but specifically said light rail should not be located in or financed by Waukesha County.

As the light rail option in Milwaukee was being crippled, the national average price of regular unleaded gasoline in May 1997 was $1.21 a gallon, the authoritative Lundberg Study showed.

Four months later, as part the state budget process, the Thompson administration pledged, in writing, that no state or federal funds would be used to build or study Milwaukee light rail.

Then-Rep. Scott Jensen (R-Town of Brookfield) declared 'light rail is dead,' and the highways/rail/bus package was not implemented.

(For this op-ed, efforts to reach Thompson by e-mail were unsuccessful. Finley, now president of the Milwaukee Public Museum, declined to comment.)

Where to go from here

In subsequent years, more than 60% of the federal $241 million was spent on Milwaukee transportation projects after Thompson and Norquist agreed to divide the money into equal $120.5 million shares and prevent its reallocation by Congress.

The state controlled one share, and the Milwaukee city and county governments jointly controlled the other. With varying contributions from the shares, the Park East Freeway spur was torn down, and a new Sixth Street Bridge was built. Both projects provided new street connections and land for development.

The special carpool lanes weren't built, and a large piece of the state's $120.5 million went to rebuild the Marquette Interchange. The interchange reconstruction was the first phase of a seven-county, $6.3 billion regional freeway reconstruction plan that will add 127 miles of new lanes.

There is still an intact $91.5 million from the original federal transportation funding in the share controlled by Milwaukee's city and county governments. The money could go to the KRM commuter line; an effort to invest it in a downtown electric guided bus system fell through a few years ago, and politics continues to keep the funds frozen.

A Milwaukee County pension scandal forced the 2002 removal of County Executive F. Thomas Ament, a light rail supporter.

County Executive Scott Walker, a former Republican state legislator from Wauwatosa and an outspoken opponent of light rail, remains the post-Ament incumbent. An ally of conservative talk radio and opponent of urban rail alternatives, Walker is battling with Tom Barrett, a Democrat and Milwaukee's mayor since 2004, over how to spend that $91.5 million.

Walker wants the money for express bus service. Barrett has proposed splitting the money between express buses and downtown streetcars.

Though Waukesha County and Walker keep light rail shelved, and Ament's demise helped derail it, it's technically not dead: It survives as a potential transit alternative that could link Waukesha to downtown Milwaukee, according to a key document: the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission's 2035 Regional Transportation Plan.

Citizens concerned about dirty air, failing transit and excessive regional highway spending should demand that officials activate that light rail alternative and get busy with an updated, comprehensive and balanced transportation study.

People should organize against opinion-makers and elected officials who limit choices, job opportunities and our region's development by crying 'light rail, light rail!' It's time to end the train blockade in our state's largest city.
James Rowen is a local writer and consultant who blogs at thepoliticalenvironment.blogspot.com

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The Associated Press recently reported that spiking gas prices have brought double-digit ridership increases this year on light rail trains in Baltimore, Minneapolis, San Francisco and St. Louis. Even small cities such as Norfolk, Va., are building light rail lines with their signature short, sleek electric trains, while other cities are showing solid ridership gains on longer-distance commuter rail lines using bigger trains.

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In China, the household registration system, called Hoku, is a state administrative system to manage population migration and affects individuals' social status, access to resources and urban and rural identity. How would Stuart Hall study this system?

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Hukou ( Chinese: 户口; 'household individual') is a system of household registration used in mainland China. The system itself is more properly called " huji" ( Chinese: 户籍; 'household origin'), and has origins in ancient China; hukou is the registration of an individual in the system ( kou literally means "mouth", which originates from the practise of regarding family members as "mouths to feed", similar to the phrase " per head" in English). A household registration record officially identifies a person as a permanent resident of an area and includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse and date of birth. A hukou can also refer to a family register in many contexts since the household register ( simplified Chinese: 户口簿; traditional Chinese: 戶口簿; pinyin: ) is issued per family, and usually includes the births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and moves, of all members in the family.

The system descends in part from ancient Chinese household registration systems. The hukou system also influenced similar systems in neighboring East Asian countries-such as one within the public administration structures of Japan ( koseki) and Korea ( hoju), as well as Vietnam ( hộ khẩu). In South Korea, the hoju system was abolished in January 2008. While unrelated in origin, propiska in the Soviet Union and resident registration in Russia had a similar purpose and served as a model for modern China's hukou system.

Due to its connection to social programs provided by the government, which assigns benefits based on agricultural and non-agricultural residency status (often referred to as rural and urban), the hukou system is sometimes likened to a form of caste system. It has been the source of much inequality over the decades since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, as urban residents received benefits that ranged from retirement pension to education to health care, while rural citizens were often left to fend for themselves. In recent years, the central government has begun to reform the system in response to protests and a changing economic system, while some Western experts question that these changes have been of substance.

The formal name for the system is " huji". Within the huji system, a " hukou" is the registered residency status of a particular individual in this system. However, the term " hukou" is used colloquially to refer to the entire system, and it has been adopted by English-language audiences to refer to both the huji system and an individual's hukou.

The hukou system has origins in China that date back to ancient times, but the system in its current form came into being with the 1958 People's Republic of China Hukou Registration Regulation. Until very recently, each citizen was classified in an agricultural or non-agricultural hukou (commonly referred to as rural or urban) and further categorized by location of origin. This two-fold organization structure was linked to social policy, and those residents who held non-agricultural (i.e. urban) hukou status received benefits not available to their rural counterparts. Internal migration was also tightly controlled by the central government, and only in the past few decades have these restrictions been loosened. While this system has played a major role in China's fast economic growth, hukou has also promoted and aggravated social stratification and contributed significantly to the deprivation of many of China's rural workers. In recent years, steps have been taken to alleviate the inequalities promulgated by the hukou system, with the most recent major reforms announced in March and July 2014, which included a provision that eliminated the division between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou status.

In its original legislation, the hukou system was justified as created to

"...maintain social order, protect the rights and interests of citizens and to be of service to the establishment of socialism."

The central government asserted that because rural areas had greater capacity to absorb and use excess labor, the majority of the population should be concentrated in these regions. Furthermore, free movement of people was considered dangerous, as it would lead to overpopulation of cities and could threaten agricultural production. Under the hukou system, the rural population was structured to serve as support for urban industrialization, both in agricultural production and workers for state owned businesses.

In reality, the hukou system served other motives as well. After establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party enacted policies based on the notions of stability and rapid modernization, and the hukou system was no exception. Urban areas have historically been where authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable: to combat this, the central government gave preferential treatment to city residents, hoping to prevent uprisings against the state, particularly in the early years when it was especially susceptible to rebellion. The structure of the hukou system also bolstered the power of the central government over its urban citizens: by making city residents dependent upon the government for all aspects of daily life, the central government could force obedience from problematic individuals.

The central government's efforts to contain migration has been a major factor in the rapid development of the Chinese economy. Their tight check on migration into urban areas has helped prevent the emergence of a number of problems faced by many other developing countries. For example, the appearance of slums outside of urban areas due to a massive influx of individuals searching for work has not been an issue, nor have poor health conditions due to high population density. And regardless of its other imperfections, the hukou system's ability to maintain stability has contributed to China's economic rise.

The legacy of the Chinese hukou system may be traced back to the pre-dynastic era, as early as the 21st century BC. In its early forms, the household registration system was used primarily for the purposes of taxation and conscription, as well as regulating migration. Two early models of the hukou system were the xiangsui and baojia systems. The xiangsui system, established under the Western Zhou Dynasty (circa 11th-8th centuries BC) was used as a method of organizing and categorizing urban and rural land. The function of the baojia system, propagated by Lord Shang Yang of the 4th century BC, was to create a system of accountability within groups of citizens: if one person within the group violated the strict rules in place, everyone in the group suffered. This structure was later utilized and expanded upon during the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BCE) for the purposes of taxation, population control, and conscription.

According to the Examination of Hukou in Wenxian Tongkao published in 1317, there was a minister for population management during the Zhou Dynasty named Simin (Chinese: 司民), who was responsible for recording births, deaths, emigrations and immigrations. The Rites of Zhou notes that three copies of documents were kept in different places. The administrative divisions in Zhou Dynasty were a function of the distance to the state capital. The top division nearest the capital was named Dubi (Chinese: 都鄙), top division in more distant areas were named Xiang (Chinese: 鄉) and Sui (Chinese: 遂). Families were organized under the Baojia system.

Guan Zhong, Prime Minister of the Qi state 7th century BCE, imposed different taxation and conscription policies on different areas. In addition, Guan Zhong also banned immigration, emigration, and separation of families without permission. In the Book of Lord Shang, Shang Yang also described his policy restricting immigrations and emigrations.

Xiao He, the first Chancellor of the Han Dynasty, added the chapter of Hu (Chinese: 户律, "Households Code") as one of the nine basic law codes of Han (Chinese: 九章律), and established the hukou system as the basis of tax revenue and conscription.

The first formal codification of the hukou system arose at the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) with the 1911 Huji Law. Although movement was nominally free under this statute, registration of individuals with the government was required, and it was used by the government to pursue communist forces and as a basis for taxation for the funding of wars. The law also expanded upon the baojia system, and was intended to establish a sense of stability.

In the period following the fall of the Qing Dynasty, China was ruled by various actors, each of which employed some system of household or personal identification. During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese employed a system used to identify those under their rule and to fund their war effort. Similarly, the Kuomintang utilized the system to monitor the activities of their opponents, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese Communist Party in turn used a system called lianbao, which bundled families into groups of five to aid tracking and impede counterrevolutionaries.

At the time of its founding in 1949, the People's Republic of China was a highly agricultural nation. About 89% of its citizens lived in rural areas - about 484 million resided in the countryside, versus about 58 million in the city. However, as efforts to industrialize increased, more and more rural residents flocked to the cities in search of better economic opportunities: between 1957 and 1960, there was a 90.9% increase in the urban labor force.

From the establishment of the People's Republic of China until Chairman Mao 's death in 1976, the central government tightened its control over migration, and by 1978, intranational movement was controlled entirely by the government. Because living "outside the system" was virtually impossible, nearly all movement of people was state-sponsored.

However, with Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in 1978 came the initiation of reforms that steadily began to alleviate some of the disparity between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders. Restrictions have been loosened on movement from rural areas to smaller cities, although migration to large cities such as Beijing and Tianjin are still heavily regulated. Greater autonomy has also been ceded to local governments in deciding quotas and eligibility criteria for converting hukou status. Legislation has been enacted that allow migrant workers to obtain temporary residency permits, although these permits do not allow them access to the same benefits as possessed by urban residents. However, with living outside the system now much more practical than it used to be, a number of migrant workers don't acquire the temporary residency permits - primarily because they don't have the resources or concrete employment offers to do so - and as such live in danger of being forced to return to the countryside. And in 2014, the central government announced reform that among other things eliminated the division between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou status.

Under the hukou system implemented by the central government in 1958, while holders of the non-agricultural hukou status were given ration cards for everyday necessities, including food and textiles, rural residents were forced to produce everything themselves. Whereas the state provided housing in the city, individuals had to construct their own homes. The state invested in education, arranged employment, and provided retirement benefits for city residents, and provided none of these services for their rural citizens. These disparities have left the rural populace highly disadvantaged, and tragedies such as the famine of the Great Leap Forward primarily ravaged rural Chinese citizens.

During the Great Chinese Famine from 1958 to 1962, having an urban versus a rural hukou could mean the difference between life and death. During this period, nearly all of the approximately 600 million rural hukou residents were collectivized into village communal farms, where their agricultural output - after state taxes - would be their only source of food. With institutionalized exaggeration of output figures by local Communist leaders and massive declines in production, state taxes during those years confiscated nearly all food in many rural communes, leading to mass starvation and the deaths of more than 65 million Chinese.

The 100 million urban hukou residents, however, were fed by fixed food rations established by the central government, which declined to an average of 1500 calories per day at times but still allowed survival for almost all during the famine. An estimated 95% or higher of all deaths occurred among rural hukou holders. With the suppression of news internally, many city residents were not aware that mass deaths were occurring in the countryside at all. This was essential to preventing organized opposition to Mao's policies.

During China's transition from state socialism to market socialism (1978-2001), migrants, most of whom were women, worked in newly created export-processing zones in city suburbs under sub-standard working conditions. There were restrictions upon the mobility of migrant workers that forced them to live precarious lives in company dormitories or shanty towns where they were exposed to abusive treatment.

The impact of the hukou system upon migrant labourers became onerous in the 1980s after hundreds of millions were ejected from state corporations and cooperatives. Since the 1980s, an estimated 200 million Chinese live outside their officially registered areas and under far less eligibility to education and government services, living therefore in a condition similar in many ways to that of illegal immigrants or to black people living in "white" regions under Apartheid. The millions of peasants who have left their land remain trapped at the margins of the urban society. They are often blamed for rising crime and unemployment and under pressure from their citizens, the city governments have imposed discriminatory rules. For example, the children of farm workers (Chinese: 农民工; pinyin: nóngmín gōng ) are not allowed to enroll in the city schools, and even now must live with their grandparents or other relatives to attend school in their hometowns. They are commonly referred to as the home-staying children. There are around 130 million such home-staying children, living without their parents, as reported by Chinese researchers.

As rural workers provide their workforce in the urban areas, which also profit from the respective taxes, while their families use public services in the rural areas (e.g. schools for their children, health care for the elderly), the system leads to a wealth transfer to the wealthier urban regions from the poorer regions on the public sector level. Intra-family payments from the working-age members to their relatives in the rural areas counteract that to some extent.

With the loosening of restrictions on migration in the 1980s came a large influx of rural residents seeking better opportunities in the cities. However, these migrant workers have had to confront a number of challenges in their pursuit of financial security. Urban residents received priority over migrants when it came to employment opportunities, and when migrant workers did find jobs, they tend to be positions with little potential for growth. While urban workers were supported by employment benefits and laws that favored them over their employers in case of disputes, rural hukou holders were not privy to such substantial protections. And because city officials' performance was evaluated based on the prosperity of local residents and the local economy, they had little incentive to improve the quality of life of migrant workers.

In 2008, the central government passed the Labor Contract Law, which guaranteed equal access to jobs, established a minimum wage, and required employers to provide contracts to full-time employees that included employment benefits. However, a 2010 study revealed that rural workers earned 40% less than urban workers, and only 16% receive employment benefits. Migrant workers' labor rights are also frequently violated - they work excessively long hours in poor conditions, and face physical and psychological harassment.

Migrant workers are also disproportionately affected by wage arrears, which occurs when employers either fail to pay employees on time or in full. Although such incidences are technically illegal and punishable by seven years' jail time, wage arrears still occur, and labor contracts and pensions may be disregarded. In a study conducted at the end of the 1990s, 46% of migrant workers were missing three or more months of pay, and some workers hadn't been paid in a decade. Fortunately, over the past couple of decades the prevalence of wage arrears have decreased, and in a study conducted from 2006 to 2009, it was found that 8% of migrant workers had experienced wage arrears.

In subsequent years, the central government has enacted a number of reforms, with limited impact. In 2001, it asserted that public schools should be the primary form of education for the nation's children, but didn't specify how it would financially support schools in enrolling more migrant children, resulting in little change. Similarly, in 2003, the government called for lower fees for migrant children, but again failed to detail how it would help schools pay for this. And in 2006, the government created the New Compulsory Education Act with asserted equal rights to education and ceded responsibility for enrolling migrant children to provincial governments. However, this too failed to improve the lot of migrant children. Students with non-local hukou had to pay inflated admission fees of 3,000 - 5,000 yuan - out of an average annual household income of 10,000 yuan - and are required to take The National College Entrance Examination ( Gaokao) at their hukou locality, where it is often harder to get into college. Since 2012, some regions began to relax the requirements and allow some children of migrants to take College Entrance Exam in the regions. By 2016 Guangdong's policies are the most relaxed. A child of migrants can take Entrance Exam in Guangdong if he or she has attended 3 years of highschool in the province, and if the parent(s) have legal jobs and have paid for 3 years of social insurance in the province.

The difficulties faced by migrant children cause many to drop out, and this is particularly common in the middle school years: in 2010, only 30% of migrant children were enrolled in secondary education. Migrant children also disproportionately deal with mental health issues - 36% versus 22% among their local hukou counterparts - and 70% experience academic anxiety. They frequently face stigmatization and discrimination based on differences in how they dress and speak, and have difficulty interacting with other students.

Not only has the mass exodus of rural residents from the countryside in search of work impacted the children of migrant workers, it has also affected the elderly left behind. With the institution of the one-child policy in the 1970s, the average age in China has undergone an upward shift: 82% of migrant workers were between the ages of 15-44 in 2000. This has called into question the traditional custom of filial piety, and while retired urban workers are supported by government retirement programs, rural workers must rely on themselves and their families. It appears that the effects of migration on left behind elderly is ambiguous: while parents of migrant children are often better off financially and are happy with their economic situation, they also tend to report lower life satisfaction than do elderly without migrant children. Like the children of migrant workers, parents are known to experience psychological issues such as depression and loneliness, and those who take care of their grandchildren may feel burdened by this responsibility.

Over the past few decades since the economic reform in 1978, the state of the People's Republic of China has taken steps toward reforming the hukou system by implementing a variety of reform policies. 1979-1991 can be identified as the first reform period. Specifically, in October 1984, the state issued a document called "A Document on the Issue of Peasants Settling Down in Cities," which required local governments to integrate rural migrants as part of their urban population and to enable rural migrants to register in their migrant cities. In 1985, the state also implemented a policy called "Interim Provisions on the Management of Transient Population in Cities," which allowed rural migrants to stay in their migrant cities even if they had neither changed their hukou status nor returned to their original rural residency. In the same year, the state also published a document called "The Regulations on Resident Identity Card," which enabled rural migrants to work in cities even if they did not carry an identity card of urban status. However, what followed these policies was not only a 30 million rural-to-urban migration, but also a phenomenon in which many false urban identity cards were sold to rural migrants for gaining urban benefits. It hence stimulated the state to implement another policy, "A Notice on Strictly Controlling Excessive Growth of 'Urbanization,'" in 1989 for regulating rural-to-urban migration. Under this policy, rural migrants were monitored again.

1992-2013 can be identified as the second hukou reform period. There were various kinds of reform implemented by the state. Beginning in the late 1980s, one was to offer a "lan yin," or "blue stamp," hukou to those who possessed professional skills and/or ability to make some sort of investments (at least 100 million Renminbi yuan) in specific cities (usually the big cities such as Shanghai), allowing them to live in cities and enjoy urban welfare entitlements. This "blue stamp hukou" was then been conducted by many other big cities (including Nanjing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) in 1999. The second kind was not applied to big cities but to certain selected towns and small cities. In 1997, the state implemented a policy that granted urban hukou to the rural migrants who had a stable job in their newly resided towns and small cities. Meanwhile, according to two 1997 government documents, the "Pilot Scheme for Reform of the Hukou System in Small Towns" and "Instructions on Improving the Management of Rural Hukou System," rural migrant workers could register as permanent residents with equal access to urban privileges in certain small towns. These policies were then made official in 2012 with the state document "Notice on Actively Yet Prudently Pushing Forward the Reform of Hukou System Management." Moreover, in 1999, the state also allowed more groups of people to gain urban hukou, including children whose parent(s) had urban hukou, and the elderly whose child(ren) had been granted urban hukou. The third kind was applied to the special economic zones and districts that were established particularly for economic growth (such as Shenzhen). Specifically, in 1992, the state allowed all people living in the special economic zones and districts to carry two hukous: Their original hukou and another hukou related to their job in the special zones and districts. This policy hence made it easier for rural migrants to gain access to different urban opportunities in the special zones and districts. However, in 2003, state published the "Administrative Permit Laws," which sent rural migrants back to their original residency in rural areas. Under this policy, rural migrants' life chances were once again determined by their hukou status.

It has been brought into question whether the reforms mentioned above apply to the majority of rural-to-urban migrants. Specifically, many reform policies, especially those during the first and second periods, appear to require rural migrants to possess some sort of capital, either human capitals (such as professional skills and titles) or property-related capital (such as the ability to become an urban homeowner) or both. Some scholars hence also call some reform policies as ways of "selling" hukou. Meanwhile, many migrants have claimed that their lack of social networks (part of what is called " guan xi")-which in some sense is also accumulated with wealth-also has made it harder for them to find a stable job, let alone a lucrative job. Hence, if wealth is a precondition to change from rural hukou to urban hukou, many rural migrants indeed are unable to gain that access, as many are "unskilled" (because many's skills, such as farming, are not categorized as professional skills) and poor. However, in some large cities, even if a rural migrant does carry certain professional skills, it is not a guarantee that one will be granted with urban hukou. This situation is particularly revealed from many highly educated migrants. Despite of their education background, many would not be granted with urban hukou unless they become a homeowner. However, given the high price of real estate in many large cities (such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou), many are unable to do so even if some cities do offer housing subsidies to migrants. Given their lack of urban hukou, many not only face the difficulty of purchasing an apartment-let alone purchasing a house-but also the disadvantage of being a renter. Because of the lack of rent control in many large cities, even if one rents a room-or rarely, an apartment-one can face the possibility of being asked to leave. Many those educated migrant youths hence are also called "yi zu," literally "a group of ants," as many do not have their own room and have to live in a tiny room with many others.

It hence is worth asking the question whether or not the hukou system has been sufficiently improved to a more people-centered system. In fact, many large cities are still strict about granting rural migrants with urban hukou and about using the hukou system to determine whether or not one should be granted with welfare entitlements. Even if the "National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020)" and the "Opinions on Further Promoting the Reform of the Hukou System" implemented in the third reform period intend to create a more people-centered system, they claim that larger cities should have different hukou registration systems from the smaller cities and towns; and that the hukou regulation will continue to be stricter in larger cities. However, the very large cities (such as Beijing) are usually the ones that attract rural migrants the most, given their extensive job opportunities. In this case, although the state has actively implemented many reform policies, the hukou rural/urban division still functions and represents a division system of life chances. Some scholars hence have argued that the hukou reforms indeed have not fundamentally changed the hukou system but have only decentralized the powers of hukou to local governments; and it still remains active and continues to contribute to China's rural and urban disparity. Meanwhile, others have also argued that by concentrating on cities, the hukou reforms have failed to target the poorer regions, where social welfares such as education and medical care are often not offered to the residents. Still, others seem excited, remarking that some cities have been offering a condition that encourages more migrant parents to bring their children along. In short, the majority of rural migrants thus are still largely overlooked due to their lack to urban hukou, which is often seen as starting point for gaining access to life well-beings.

Hukou is not employed in the Special administrative regions of China, e.g. Hong Kong and Macau, though identification cards are mandatory for residents there. Instead, both SARs grant right of abode to certain persons who are allowed to reside permanently in the regions.

When a person with a household registration in mainland China is settling in the Hong Kong or the Macau by means of a One-way Permit, they must relinquish their household registration, therefore losing citizen rights in mainland China. However, they can settle in the SAR for seven years to be eligible for permanent resident status (which is associated with citizen rights) in the SAR. Therefore, in the period before they get permanent resident status, though still a Chinese citizen, they can't exercise citizen rights anywhere (like voting in elections, getting a passport) and are considered second-class citizens.

The People's Republic of China (Mainland China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) each claim the territories under the other's control as part of their respective state. Thus, legally, each treats the people on the other side's territory as their citizens. However, citizenship rights are only available to the people under their own control respectively - this is defined by law as holding household registration in Taiwan Area (in the Republic of China) or in Mainland Area (in the People's Republic of China).

The Government of the Republic of China considers ethnic overseas Chinese as its nationals,[citation needed ] and issues Taiwan passports to them. However, this does not grant them the right of abode or any other citizen rights in Taiwan; those rights require household registration in Taiwan. Persons without household registration are subject to immigration control in Taiwan, but after they settle in Taiwan they can establish a household registration there to become a full citizen.

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6. Chan, K. W. (2015). Five Decades of the Chinese Hukou System. In Handbook of Chinese Migration: Identity and Wellbeing (pp. 23-47). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

7. Luard, Tim. "China rethinks peasant 'apartheid'", , 10 November 2005.

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11. "Chinese apartheid: Migrant labourers, numbering in hundreds of millions, who have been ejected from state concerns and co-operatives since the 1980s as China instituted market capitalism, have to have six passes before they are allowed to work in provinces other than their own. In many cities, private schools for migrant labourers are routinely closed down to discourage migration." "From politics to health policies: why they're in trouble", The Star, 6 February 2007.

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Wang, Fei-Ling (2014). "The Hukou (Household Registration) System". in Oxford Bibliography in Chinese Studies. Ed. Tim Wright. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Hukou ( Chinese: 户口; 'household individual') is a system of household registration used in mainland China. The system itself is more properly called " huji" ( Chinese: 户籍; 'household origin'), and has origins in ancient China; hukou is the registration of an individual in the system ( kou literally means "mouth", which originates from the practise of regarding family members as "mouths to feed", similar to the phrase " per head" in English).

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The Red Square, in Moscow is an evident state project of nation and memory building. How would Stuart Hall study this project?

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Outstanding Universal Value

At the geographic and historic centre of Moscow, the Moscow Kremlin is the oldest part of the city. First mentioned in the Hypatian Chronicle in 1147 as a fortification erected on the left bank of the Moskva river by Yuri Dolgoruki, Prince of Suzdal, the Kremlin developed and grew with settlements and suburbs which were further surrounded by new fortifications - Kitaigorodsky Wall, Bely Gorod, Zemlyanoy Gorod and others. This determined a radial and circular plan of the centre of Moscow typical of many other Old Russian cities.

In 13th century the Kremlin was the official residence of supreme power - the center of temporal and spiritual life of the state. The Kremlin of the late 15th - early 16th century is one of the major fortifications of Europe (the stone walls and towers of present day were erected in 1485-1516). It contains an ensemble of monuments of outstanding quality.

The most significant churches of the Moscow Kremlin are situated on the Cathedral Square; they are the Cathedral of the Dormition, Church of the Archangel, Church of the Annunciation and the bell tower of Ivan Veliki. Almost all of them were designed by invited Italian architects which is clearly seen in their architectural style. The five-domed Assumption Cathedral (1475-1479) was built by an Italian architect Aristotele Fiorvanti. Its interior is decorated with frescos and a five-tier iconostasis (15th-17th century). The cathedral became the major Russian Orthodox church; a wedding and coronation place for great princes, tsars and emperors as well as the shrine for metropolitans and patriarchs.

In the same square another Italian architect, Alevisio Novi, erected the five-domed Church of the Archangel in 1505-1508. From the 17th to 19th century, its interior was decorated by wonderful frescos and an iconostasis. In this church many great princes and tsars of Moscow are buried. Among them are Ivan I Kalita, Dmitri Donskoi, Ivan III, Ivan IV the Terrible, Mikhail Fedorovich and Alexei Mikhailovich Romanovs.

The Cathedral of the Dormition was built by Pskov architects in 1484-1489. Inside the cathedral some mural paintings of 16th-19th century have been preserved and the icons of Andrei Rublev and Theophanes the Greek are part of the iconostasis.

In 1505-1508 the bell tower of Ivan Veliki was built. Being 82 metres high it was the highest building in Russia which became the focal point of the Kremlin ensemble.

Among the oldest civil buildings of the Moscow Kremlin, the Palace of the Facets (1487-1491) is the most remarkable. Italian architects Marco Fryazin and Pietro Antonio Solario built it as a great hall for holding state ceremonies, celebrations and for receiving foreign ambassadors. The most noteworthy civil construction of the 17th century built by Russian masters is the Teremnoi Palace.

From the early 18th century, when the capital of Russia moved to St. Petersburg, the Kremlin mainly played a ceremonial role with religious functions. By the end of the century the architectural complex of the Kremlin expanded with the Arsenal reconstructed after the Fire of 1797 by Matvei Kazakov. The Senate was built in 1776-1787 according to the plans of the same architect as the home of the highest agency of State power of the Russian Empire - the Ruling Senate. Today it is the residence of the President of Russia.

From 1839 to 1849 a Russian architect K.A. Thon erected the Great Kremlin Palace as a residence of the imperial family which combined ancient Kremlin buildings such as the Palace of the Facets, the Tsarina's Golden Chamber, Master Chambers, the Teremnoi Palace and the Teremnoi churches. In the Armory Chamber built by K.A. Thon within the complex of the Great Kremlin Palace, there is a 16th century museum officially established by the order of Alexander I in 1806.

Red Square, closely associated with the Kremlin, lies beneath its east wall. At its south end is the famous Pokrovski Cathedral (Cathedral of St Basil the Blessed), one of the most beautiful monuments of Old Russian church architecture, erected in 1555-1560 to commemorate the victory of Ivan the Terrible over the Kazan Khanate. In the 17th century the cathedral gained its up-to-date appearance thanks to the decorative finishing of the domes and painting both inside and outside the cathedral. The construction of Red Square was finished by the late 19th century together with the erection of the Imperial Historic Museum (today the State Historical Museum), the Upper Trading Rows (GUM) and the Middle Trading Rows. In 1929, , Lenin's Mausoleum, designed by A.V. Shchusev and an outstanding example of the Soviet monumental architecture, was finished.

Criterion (i): The Kremlin contains within its walls a unique series of masterpieces of architecture and the plastic arts. There are religious monuments of exceptional beauty such as the Church of the Annunciation, the Cathedral of the Dormition, the Church of the Archangel and the bell tower of Ivan Veliki; there are palaces such as the Great Palace of the Kremlin, which comprises within its walls the Church of the Nativity of the Virgin and the Teremnoi Palace. On Red Square is Saint Basil the Blessed, still a major edifice of Russian Orthodox art.

Criterion (ii): Throughout its history, Russian architecture has clearly been affected many times by influences emanating from the Kremlin. A particular example was the Italian Renaissance. The influence of the style was clearly felt when Rudolfo Aristotele Fioravanti built the Cathedral of the Dormition (1475-79) and grew stronger with the construction of the Granovitaya Palace (Hall of the Facets, 1487-91) by Marco Fryazin and Pietro Antonio Solario. Italian Renaissance also influenced the towers of the fortified enceinte, built during the same period by Solario, using principles established by Milanese engineers (the Nikolskaya and the Spasskaya Towers both date from 1491). The Renaissance expression was even more present in the classic capitals and shells of the Church of the Archangel, reconstructed from 1505 to 1509 by Alevisio Novi.

Criterion (iv): With its triangular enceinte pierced by four gates and reinforced with 20 towers, the Moscow Kremlin preserves the memory of the wooden fortifications erected by Yuri Dolgoruki around 1156 on the hill at the confluence of the Moskova and Neglinnaya rivers (the Alexander Garden now covers the latter). By its layout and its history of transformations (in the 14th century Dimitri Donskoi had an enceinte of logs built, then the first stone wall), the Moscow Kremlin is the prototype of a Kremlin - the citadel at the centre of Old Russian towns such as Pskov, Tula, Kazan or Smolensk.

Criterion (vi): From the 13th century to the founding of St Petersburg, the Moscow Kremlin was directly and tangibly associated with every major event in Russian history. A 200-year period of obscurity ended in 1918 when it became the seat of government again. The Mausoleum of Lenin on Red Square is the Soviet Union's prime example of symbolic monumental architecture. To proclaim the universal significance of the Russian revolution, the funerary urns of heroes of the revolution were incorporated into the Kremlin's walls between the Nikolskaya and Spasskaya towers. The site thus combines in an exceptional manner the preserved vestiges of bygone days with present-day signs of one of the greatest events in modern history.
Integrity
From the date of including the Moscow Kremlin and Red Square on the World Heritage List all the components representing the Outstanding Universal Value of the property are within its boundaries. The territory and the integrity of the World Heritage property have also remained unchanged. Within its boundaries the property still comprises all the elements that it contained at the date of nomination. The biggest threat, however, is unregulated commercial development of the adjacent areas.
Authenticity
The history of the Moscow Kremlin and Red Square is reflected in the archival documents of 12th-19th century, for example in medieval chronicles, cadastral surveys, estimated construction books, painted lists, inventories, foreign notes and in graphic matters such as manuscripts, chronicles, plans, drafts, engravings, lithographs, sketches of foreign travelers, paintings and photographs. These documents are exceptionally valuable information sources. Comparison of the data received from archival documents and those obtained in the process of field study gives the idea of authenticity of the property and its different elements. This comparison also serves as the basis for project development and for the choice of the appropriate methods of restoration that may preserve the monuments' authenticity.

On the border of the ensemble a number of monuments destroyed in the 1930s were reconstructed according to measured plans.
Protection and management requirements
The statutory and institutional framework of an effective protection, management and improvement of the World Heritage property "Kremlin and Red Square, Moscow" has been established by laws and regulations of the Russian Federation and the city of Moscow.

According to the decree of the President of RSFSR of 18 December 1991 № 294, the Moscow Kremlin was included among especially protected cultural properties of nations of Russia - the highest conservation status for cultural and historical monuments in Russian legislation.

"Kremlin and Red Square, Moscow" is a Cultural Heritage Site of federal importance. State protection and management of federal sites is provided by Federal Law of 25.06.2002 № 73-FZ "On cultural heritage sites (historical and cultural monuments) of nations of the Russian Federation". The federal executive body responsible for protection of the cultural property is the Department for Control, Supervision and Licensing in the Cultural Heritage Sphere of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.It is in charge of all methodological and control functions concerning restoration, usage and support of cultural heritage sites and the territories connected.

The World Heritage property is situated in the urban environment of Moscow. The city policy regarding cultural heritage protection and town-planning regulation is the responsibility of Moscow City Government, represented by the Department of Cultural Heritage, the Department of Urban Development and the Committee for Urban Development and Architecture of Moscow. In 1997 the boundaries of the protective (buffer) zone were approved in order to preserve the property, and to maintain and restore the historical architectural environment as well as the integral visual perception of the property.. There is a need to ensure the creation of an appropriate buffer zone and to develop close liaison between all stakeholders, including the Moscow City authorities, to ensure that constructions around the property do not impact adversely on its Outstanding Universal Value.

The World Heritage property is used by the following organizations: FGBUK (Federal Government Budgetary Institution of Culture), the State Historical and Cultural Museum-preserve "The Moscow Kremlin", the Administrative Department of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation and OJSC "GUM Department Store".

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Outstanding Universal Value At the geographic and historic centre of Moscow, the Moscow Kremlin is the oldest part of the city. First mentioned in the Hypatian Chronicle in 1147 as a fortification erected on the left bank of the Moskva river by Yuri Dolgoruki, Prince of Suzdal, the Kremlin developed and grew with settlements and suburbs which were further surrounded by new fortifications - Kitaigorodsky Wall, Bely Gorod, Zemlyanoy Gorod and others.

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Harlem (a district in New York City) is an example of an area in which there is a high over-representation of racial minorities - 55% of population is Black and 23% is Hispanic. Harlem is the crucial area for African American people for their cultural identity. What might be important, for Stuart Hall, in the stuy of Harlem?