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The topic I will be covering is race and college admissions. This topic is directed at college admissions personnel to familiarize the legal laws relating to race and college admissions. I chose this topic as I am hoping to work within an international education office at a college or higher education institution. I have a passion for diversity and cultural acceptance, and as a future leader in education, I strive to provide a welcoming and inclusive environment for all students.

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Work to promote inclusivity and diversity within your campus.

Monitor the admissions criteria closely to insure you adhere to the legal requirements.

Familiarize with professional associations that provide resources, such as grants, that help promote racial equity.

Stay current in relevant news and movements, such as the Black Lives Matter movement, that directly impact college campuses and its' students.

Make cultural awareness a priority on campus, and seek to offer a variety of activities, organizations and events for all.

Hold regular admissions personnel meetings to discuss progress and future change for racial justice and inclusivity on campus and within the admissions process.

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Book: Confronting Racism in Higher Education

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Book: Confronting Racism in Higher Education

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This book provides information about higher education institutions and the efforts, and lack thereof, promoting inclusivity and a change of culture within universities. This book includes strategies and possibilities to help combat this devastating reality that unfortunately still exists today, and provides interesting perspectives that explore the root causes of racism in our history.

Reference: Books, J. S. (2013). Confronting racism in higher education. Retrieved from

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Texas Educator Code of Ethics Standard 3.4

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Texas Educator Code of Ethics Standard 3.4

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The educator shall not exclude a student from participation in a program, deny benefits to a student, or grant an advantage to a student on the basis of race, color, gender, disability, national origin, religion, family status, or sexual orientation (19 T.A.C. § 247.2). This applies to race and admissions, as educators must not exclude a student from a program based on race or color. This is beneficial when educators fail to meet this standard.

Reference:
Educators' Code of Ethics, 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 247.2.

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Enforceable Standards.
(1) Professional Ethical Conduct, Practices and Performance. (A) Standard 1.1. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engage in deceptive practices regarding official policies of the school district, educational institution, educator preparation program, the Texas Education Agency, or the State Board for Educator Certification (SBEC) and its certification process. (B) Standard 1.2. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misappropriate, divert, or use monies, personnel, property, or equipment committed to his or her charge for personal gain or advantage. (C) Standard 1.3. The educator shall not submit fraudulent requests for reimbursement, expenses, or pay. (D) Standard 1.4. The educator shall not use institutional or professional privileges for personal or partisan advantage. (E) Standard 1.5. The educator shall neither accept nor offer gratuities, gifts, or favors that impair professional judgment or that are used to obtain special advantage. This standard shall not restrict the acceptance of gifts or tokens offered and accepted openly from students, parents of students, or other persons or organizations in recognition or appreciation of service. (F) Standard 1.6. The educator shall not falsify records, or direct or coerce others to do so. (G) Standard 1.7. The educator shall comply with state regulations, written local school board policies, and other state and federal laws. (H) Standard 1.8. The educator shall apply for, accept, offer, or assign a position or a responsibility on the basis of professional qualifications. (I) Standard 1.9. The educator shall not make threats of violence against school district employees, school board members, students, or parents of students. (J) Standard 1.10. The educator shall be of good moral character and be worthy to instruct or supervise the youth of this state. (K) Standard 1.11. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent his or her employment history, criminal history, and/or disciplinary record when applying for subsequent employment. (L) Standard 1.12. The educator shall refrain from the illegal use, abuse, or distribution of controlled substances, prescription drugs, and toxic inhalants. (M) Standard 1.13. The educator shall not be under the influence of alcohol or consume alcoholic beverages on school property or during school activities when students are present. (2) Ethical Conduct Toward Professional Colleagues. (A) Standard 2.1. The educator shall not reveal confidential health or personnel information concerning colleagues unless disclosure serves lawful professional purposes or is required by law. (B) Standard 2.2. The educator shall not harm others by knowingly making false statements about a colleague or the school system. (C) Standard 2.3. The educator shall adhere to written local school board policies and state and federal laws regarding the hiring, evaluation, and dismissal of personnel. (D) Standard 2.4. The educator shall not interfere with a colleague's exercise of political, professional, or citizenship rights and responsibilities. (E) Standard 2.5. The educator shall not discriminate against or coerce a colleague on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, age, gender, disability, family status, or sexual orientation. (F) Standard 2.6. The educator shall not use coercive means or promise of special treatment in order to influence professional decisions or colleagues. (G) Standard 2.7. The educator shall not retaliate against any individual who has filed a complaint with the SBEC or who provides information for a disciplinary investigation or proceeding under this chapter. (H) Standard 2.8. The educator shall not intentionally or knowingly subject a colleague to sexual harassment. (3) Ethical Conduct Toward Students. (A) Standard 3.1. The educator shall not reveal confidential information concerning students unless disclosure serves lawful professional purposes or is required by law. (B) Standard 3.2. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly treat a student or minor in a manner that adversely affects or endangers the learning, physical health, mental health, or safety of the student or minor. (C) Standard 3.3. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent facts regarding a student. (D) Standard 3.4. The educator shall not exclude a student from participation in a program, deny benefits to a student, or grant an advantage to a student on the basis of race, color, gender, disability, national origin, religion, family status, or sexual orientation. (E) Standard 3.5. The educator shall not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engage in physical mistreatment, neglect, or abuse of a student or minor. (F) Standard 3.6. The educator shall not solicit or engage in sexual conduct or a romantic relationship with a student or minor. (G) Standard 3.7. The educator shall not furnish alcohol or illegal/unauthorized drugs to any person under 21 years of age unless the educator is a parent or guardian of that child or knowingly allow any person under 21 years of age unless the educator is a parent or guardian of that child to consume alcohol or illegal/unauthorized drugs in the presence of the educator. (H) Standard 3.8. The educator shall maintain appropriate professional educator-student relationships and boundaries based on a reasonably prudent educator standard. (I) Standard 3.9. The educator shall refrain from inappropriate communication with a student or minor, including, but not limited to, electronic communication such as cell phone, text messaging, email, instant messaging, blogging, or other social network communication. Factors that may be considered in assessing whether the communication is inappropriate include, but are not limited to: (i) the nature, purpose, timing, and amount of the communication; (ii) the subject matter of the communication; (iii) whether the communication was made openly, or the educator attempted to conceal the communication; (iv) whether the communication could be reasonably interpreted as soliciting sexual contact or a romantic relationship; (v) whether the communication was sexually explicit; and (vi) whether the communication involved discussion(s) of the physical or sexual attractiveness or the sexual history, activities, preferences, or fantasies of either the educator or the student.

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"Are Colleges Really Falling Short on Racial Justice?"

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"Are Colleges Really Falling Short on Racial Justice?"

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In this article, Black scholars discuss the common shortcomings within colleges related to racial justice.

While some forms of racial injustice are more noticeable, some come in areas of socialization on campuses that hinder the experiences of individuals. Inferiority and hierarchy in relation to race still exist today in U.S. colleges, as well as many workplaces.

In this article, possible solutions are discussed to encourage racial justice and equality at the higher education level.

Reference: Chronicle staff. (2020). Are colleges really falling short on racial justice. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from https://www.chronicle.com/article/are-colleges-really-falling-short-on-racial-justice

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"Virginia Commonwealth to Rename Buildings Honoring Confederates"

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"Virginia Commonwealth to Rename Buildings Honoring Confederates"

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In response to the Black Lives Matter movement, Virginia Commonwealth University, along with many other higher educational institutions across the country, are working to rename buildings or historical monuments that promote or support racism.

The response from universities such as Virginia Commonwealth, show that they do not support racism and want to be a part of the solution in ending this division.

Reference: Burke, L. (2020). Virginia Commonwealth to rename buildings honoring confederates. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/09/21/virginia-commonwealth-rename-buildings-honoring-confederates

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Virginia Commonwealth University's Board of Visitors has approved resolutions to de-commemorate six campus buildings named for members of the Confederacy. The resolution also calls for continued work with the city of Richmond to remove statues and monuments honoring people with ties to the Confederacy.

The de-commemorated buildings include McGuire Hall, Baruch Auditorium, the Ginter House, the Jefferson Davis Memorial Chapel, the Tompkins-McCaw Library and the Wood Memorial Building.

The resolution is a result of work and recommendations from working groups and committees charged with examining symbols, memorials and commemorations on campus.

The Board of Visitors also approved a resolution to allow the Department of African American Studies to rename its building.

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Virginia Commonwealth to Rename Buildings Honoring Confederates

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Virginia Commonwealth University's Board of Visitors has approved resolutions to de-commemorate six campus buildings named for members of the Confederacy. The resolution also calls for continued work with the city of Richmond to remove statues and monuments honoring people with ties to the Confederacy.

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The National Education Association has recently created a grant for state and local affiliates to apply for in the hopes of spreading awareness for social and racial justice. The grant works to eliminate discrimination and racial inequalities by encouraging more leadership in people of color as well as establishes activities that work to build inclusiveness across campuses.

Citation: National Education Association, 2020).
Reference:
National Education Association. (2020, September 18). Center for social justice- racial justice in education grant. Retrieved from https://www.nea.org/resource-library/center-social-justice-racial-justice-education-grant

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OVERVIEW

For Affiliates to explicitly address racial equity and justice (fairness and justice across racial groups) and the elimination of racism (racial inequities, disparities and bias) in its goals and plans.

Deliberate strategies to develop and expand the leadership of people of color, including new teachers of color and other stakeholders of color.

Specific activities that build connections and solidarity across different racial groups-- internally and externally--to expand multiracial unity and power.

Organizational change, development and transformation strategies and activities.

Rolling applications - October 1, 2020-May 31, 2021
State and Local Affiliates of NEA may apply for Racial Justice in Education Grants. All grantees will be expected to participate in a grant reporting and evaluation process during and at the close of the funding cycle (with continued funding contingent upon satisfactory progress reporting). In order to be considered, each grant proposal should include; detailed planning and supporting documents, narrative and budgetary information (with budget data tied directly to the proposed activities). Typically, funded grant requests range from $10,000 to $75,000 over a 1-year period. We will also consider multi - year grant requests.

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Center for Social Justice - Racial Justice in Education Grant | NEA

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The NEA Human and Civil Rights (HCR) Department coordinates and administers the Center for Social Justice (CSJ) funding grants to state and local affiliates to further drive the core strategies of the racial justice in education work: Awareness, Capacity-Building, and Action.

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The topic of diversity and racial equality is an ongoing situation that impacts everyone. While this guide is directed towards college and higher education admissions personnel, the world is experiencing more inequality and division than ever before. This topic is critical for education as every student should have an equal opportunity to a quality education, regardless of race, national origin, religion or sex.
An emerging issue that relates to this topic is the Black Lives Matter movement. Recently, this movement has impacted many higher education institutions across the country by examining how individuals are being treated and more specifically, what needs to be changed on campuses to meet the needs of all students. This movement will continually impact schools and the admissions process, as more schools look to analyze how they can become more inclusive.

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Angelo State University: Undergraduate Student Admissions Policy

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Angelo State University: Undergraduate Student Admissions Policy

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Angelo State University does not tolerate discrimination of any kind, including race, religion, sex, national origin or age. The university states that all who meet the listed criteria may reasonably be admitted to the university, however some additional criteria may also be used to make a student's admission decision.

Citation: Angelo State Student Handbook, 2020)

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McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education

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McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education

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This court case established that it was unlawful to have George McLaurin, an African American student, be separated during his doctoral program. This impacted race and college admissions by allowing students of different races to be admitted and taught within the same program as one another.

Citation: McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education, 1950).

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Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Vinson, Fred Moore, and Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. 1949. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep339637/.

APA citation style:

Vinson, F. M. & Supreme Court Of The United States. (1949) U.S. Reports: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. [Periodical] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep339637/.

MLA citation style:

Vinson, Fred Moore, and Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. 1949. Periodical. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <www.loc.gov/item/usrep339637/>.

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U.S. Reports: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).

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Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate. Vinson, Fred Moore, and Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. 1949. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep339637/. Vinson, F. M. & Supreme Court Of The United States.

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This court case impacted many law school's graduate admission policies, as they began accepting African American students to enroll following this case. Murray met the requirements to attend University of Maryland's law school, however, was denied due to his race. This court case was later a building block for Brown v. Board of Education.

Citation: (Pearson v. Murray, 1936).

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Pearson, et al

182 A. 590, 169 Md. 478, 103 A.L.R. 706
No. 53.

Jan. 15, 1936

Argued before Bond, C. J., and Urner, Offutt, Parke, Sloan, Mitchell, Shehan, and Johnson, JJ.

Charles T. LeViness, 3d, and Wm. L. Henderson, Asst. Attys. Gen. (Herbert R. O'Conor, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants.

Thurgood Marshall, of Baltimore, and Charles H. Houston, of Washington, D. C. (William I. Gosnell, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Bond, Chief Judge.

The officers and governing board of the University of Maryland appeal from an order for the issue of the writ of mandamus commanding them to admit a young negro, the appellee, as a student in the law school of the university. The appellee and petitioner, Murray, graduated as a bachelor of arts from Amherst College in 1934, and met the standards for admission to the law school in all other respects, but was denied admission on the sole ground of his color. He is twenty-two years of age, and is now, and has been during all his life, a resident of Baltimore City, where the law school is situated. He contests his exclusion as unauthorized by the laws of the state, or, so far as it might be considered authorized, then as a denial of equal rights because of his color, contrary to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The appellants reply, first, that by reason of its character and organization the law school is not a governmental agency, required by the amendment to give equal rights to students of both races. Or, if it is held that it is a state agency, it is replied that the admission of negro students is not required because the amendment permits segregation of the races for education, and it is the declared policy and the practice of the state to segregate them in schools, and that although the law school of the university is maintained for white students only, and there is no separate law school maintained for colored students, equal treatment has at the same time been accorded the negroes by statutory provisions for scholarships or aids to enable them to attend law schools outside the state. A further argument in defense is that if equal treatment has not been provided, the remedy must be found in the opening of a school for negroes, and not in their admission to this particular school attended by the whites.

The University of Maryland Law School was a private institution until the year 1920, when by statute, Acts 1920, c. 480, it was consolidated with the Maryland State College of Agriculture, then an institution of the state government. Regents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 31 Am .Dec. 72; Appeal Tax Court v. Regents of University of Maryland, 50 Md. 457. The agricultural college, during most of its career since the middle of the last century, had been a private institution, but later in that century, and during the early part of the present one, it was supported entirely from state funds, and the state owned an undivided half of its property, and after 1902 held a mortgage on the other half. A legislative enactment for the foreclosure of the mortgage of the college, "so that it become entirely a State institution," was passed in 1914 (chapter 128), and an Act of 1916 (chapter 372) provided a new corporation, to be known as the Maryland State College of Agriculture, to take the college over. All former property and powers were bestowed on the new corporation, and in accordance with the governmental character of it, the trustees were thenceforth to be appointed by the Governor of the State, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, powers were given and duties were prescribed by the act for them and their officers, and they were required to make to the General Assembly at each session a report of the condition of the college and the property, and of their receipts and expenditures. The Attorney General of the state was designated as their adviser and attorney. That the corporation thus created is an instrumentality or agency of the state is plain, and we do not understand it to be disputed. "When the corporation is said, at the bar, to be public, it is not merely meant, that the whole community may be the proper objects of the bounty, but that the government have the sole right, as trustees of the public interests, to regulate, control and direct the corporation, and its funds and its franchises, at its own good will and pleasure." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 671, 4 L. Ed. 629; Regents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365, 397, 31 Am. Dec. 72; Finan v. Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 564, 141 A. 269.

The consolidating act of 1920, chapter 480, made the University of Maryland with its law school, and the College of Agriculture, one corporation, which under the name of the University of Maryland was to be governed by the board of trustees provided for the College of Agriculture by the act of 1916. "The government of the University of Maryland, after said consolidation shall become effective, as hereinafter provided, shall be vested in the Board of Trustees provided for by Section 2 of said Act of 1916, Chapter 372, which Board shall thereafter be known as the Regents of the University of Maryland." Acts 1920, c. 480. It was further provided, however, that the board might, until they thought it expedient to order otherwise, permit any of the previously existing faculties of the University of Maryland to govern themselves in whole or in part, to appoint teachers, and provide for their compensation, and for the expenses of the department, out of any available funds, including the tuition fees from students.

The consolidation was completed. And from the fact of consolidation with a state agency, under one and the same board of trustees appointed and controlled by the state, it would seem to follow inevitably that the law school maintained is a state agency, or part of one. The one corporation could not be both a public and a private one. It is argued that the school is "in the nature of a private corporation" because it receives the greater part of its support from the students' tuition fees, and therefore its freedom of selection and accommodation of students is not subject to the restriction by the Fourteenth Amendment. But a distinction between agencies which do and those which do not collect fees from individual users of their facilities would not support a distinction between private and public character. It is common practice for unquestionably public corporations to collect pay. Hospitals, and the various municipal corporations or agencies which make charges for utilities supplied, often with a margin of profit over expenses, remain none the less public in character. 1 Farnham, Waters, § 162; Dinneen v. Rider, 152 Md. 343, 363, 136 A. 754; Purnell v. McLane, 98 Md. 589, 56 A. 830; Twitchell v. Spokane, 55 Wash. 86, 104 P. 150, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 290, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1021; Wagner v. Rock Island, 146 Ill. 139, 34 N.E. 545, 21 L.R.A. 519; note with review of decisions, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 290. There is no escape from the conclusion that the school is now a branch or agency of the state government. The state now provides education in the law for its citizens. And in doing so it comes under the constitutional mandates applicable to the actions of the states. The fact that the school, in its career as a private institution, was maintained for white students exclusively, would have no bearing on a question of compliance at this time. With respect to constitutional mandates it is in the situation of a new institution opened by the state. Compare State v. Board of Trustees, 126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E. 196; Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Cal. 28; Lewis v. Whittle, 77 Va. 415.

As a result of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state is required to extend to its citizens of the two races substantially equal treatment in the facilities it provides from the public funds. "It is justly held by the authorities that 'to single out a certain portion of the people by the arbitrary standard of color, and say that these shall not have rights which are possessed by others, denies them the equal protection of the laws.' * * * Such a course would be manifestly in violation of the fourteenth amendment, because it would deprive a class of persons of a right which the constitution of the state had declared that they should possess." Clark v. Maryland Institute, 87 Md. 643, 661, 41 A. 126, 129. Remarks quoted in argument from opinions of courts of other jurisdictions, that the educational policy of a state and its system of education are distinctly state affairs, have ordinarily been answers to demands on behalf of non-residents, and have never been meant to assert for a state freedom from the requirement of equal treatment to children of colored races. "It is distinctly a state affair. * * * But the denial to children whose parents, as well as themselves, are citizens of the United States and of this state, admittance to the common schools solely because of color or racial differences without having made provision for their education equal in all respects to that afforded persons of any other race or color, is a violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926, 928; Board of Education v. Foster, 116 Ky. 484, 76 S.W. 354, 3 Ann. Cas. 692; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405.

The requirement of equal treatment would seem to be clearly enough one of equal treatment in respect to any one facility or opportunity furnished to citizens, rather than of a balance in state bounty to be struck from the expenditures and provisions for each race generally. We take it to be clear, for instance, that a state could not be rendered free to maintain a law school exclusively for whites by maintaining at equal cost a school of technology for colored students. Expenditures of this state for the education of the latter in schools and colleges have been extensive, but, however they may compare with provisions for the whites, they would not justify the exclusion of colored citizens alone from enjoyment of any one facility furnished by the state. The courts, in all the decisions on application of this constitutional requirement, find exclusion from any one privilege condemned. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 713; Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 6 P. 129; Marion v. Territory, 1 Okl. 210, 32 P. 116; State v. Board of Trustees, 126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E. 196; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198; People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; Wong Him v. Callahan (C.C.) 119 F. 381; Puitt v. Gaston County Commissioners, 94 N.C. 709, 55 Am. Rep. 638; Bonitz v. Board of Trustees, 154 N.C. 375, 70 S.E. 735. See notes reviewing decisions: 32 Law Notes, 147, 149; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 482.

Equality of treatment does not require that privileges be provided members of the two races in the same place. The state may choose the method by which equality is maintained. "In the circumstances that the races are separated in the public schools, there is certainly to be found no violation of the constitutional rights of the one race more than of the other, and we see none of either, for each, though separated from the other, is to be educated upon equal terms with that other, and both at the common public expense." Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 51, 17 Am. Rep. 405; Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198; People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198.

Separation of the races must nevertheless furnish equal treatment. The constitutional requirement cannot be dispensed with in order to maintain a school or schools for whites exclusively. That requirement comes first. See review of decisions in note, 13 Ann. Cas. 342. And as no separate law school is provided by this state for colored students, the main question in the case is whether the separation can be maintained, and negroes excluded from the present school, by reason of equality of treatment furnished the latter in scholarships for studying outside the state, where law schools are open to negroes.

In 1933, an Act of Assembly, chapter 234, provided that the Regents of the University of Maryland might set aside part of the state appropriation for the Princess Anne Academy, an institution of junior college standing for negro students, now an eastern branch of the university, to establish partial scholarship at Morgan College in the state, or at institutions outside the state, for negroes qualified to take professional courses not offered them at Princess Anne Academy, but offered for white students in the university. Morgan College has no law school. None of the money necessary was appropriated for distribution under that act. By an Act of 1935, chapter 577, a Commission on Higher Education of Negroes was created and directed to administer $10,000 included in the state budget for the years 1935-1936 and 1936-1937, for scholarships of $200 each to negroes, to enable them to attend colleges outside the state, mainly to give the benefit of college, medical, law, and other professional courses to the colored youth of the state for whom no such facilities are available in the state. The allowance of $200 was to defray tuition fees only. This latter act went into effect on June 1, 1935, and it appeared from evidence that by June 18, when this case was tried below, 380 negroes had sought blanks for applying for the scholarships, and 113 applications had been filled in and returned. Only 16 had then sought opportunities for graduate or professional study, only one of them for study of the law. Applications were to be received during twelve more days. That any one of the many individual applicants would receive one of the 50 or more scholarships was obviously far from assured. For a large percentage of them there was no provision. And if the petitioner should have received one there would have been, as he argues, disadvantages attached.

Howard University, in Washington, District of Columbia, provides the law school for negroes nearest to Baltimore. The yearly tuition fee there is $135, as compared with a fee of $203 in the day school of the University of Maryland, and $153 in its night school. But to attend Howard University the petitioner, living in Baltimore, would be under the necessity of paying the expenses of daily travel to and fro, with some expenses while in Washington, or of removing to Washington to live during his law school education, and to pay the incidental expenses of thus living away from home; whereas in Baltimore, living at home, he would have no traveling expenses, and comparatively small living expenses. Going to any law school in the nearest jurisdiction would, then, involve him in considerable expense even with the aid of one of the scholarships should he chance to receive one. And as the petitioner points out, he could not there have the advantages of study of the law of this state primarily, and of attendance on state courts, where he intends to practice.

The court is clear that this rather slender chance for any one applicant at an opportunity to attend an outside law school, at increased expense, falls short of providing for students of the colored race facilities substantially equal to those furnished to the whites in the law school maintained in Baltimore. The number of colored students affected by the discrimination may be comparatively small, but it cannot be said to be negligible in Baltimore City, and moreover the number seems excluded as a factor in the problem. In a case on discrimination required by a state between the races in railroad travel, the Supreme Court of the United States has said: "This argument with respect to volume of traffic seems to us to be without merit. It makes the constitutional right depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal one. * * * It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which, under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded." McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 160, 35 S. Ct. 69, 71, 59 L. Ed. 169. Whether with aid in any amount it is sufficient to send the negroes outside the state for like education is a question never passed on by the Supreme Court, and we need not discuss it now.

As has been stated, the method of furnishing the equal facilities required is at the choice of the state, now or at any future time. At present it is maintaining only the one law school, and in the legislative provisions for the scholarships that one school has in effect been declared appropriated to the whites exclusively. The officers and members of the board appear to us to have had a policy declared for them, as they thought. No separate school for colored students has been decided upon and only an inadequate substitute has been provided. Compliance with the Constitution cannot be deferred at the will of the state. Whatever system it adopts for legal education now must furnish equality of treatment now. "It would, therefore, not be competent to the Legislature, while providing a system of education for the youth of the State, to exclude the petitioner and those of her race from its benefits, merely because of their African descent, and to have so excluded her would have been to deny to her the equal protection of the laws within the intent and meaning of the Constitution." Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 51, 17 Am. Rep. 405. And as in Maryland now the equal treatment can be furnished only in the one existing law school, the petitioner, in our opinion, must be admitted there.

We cannot find the remedy to be that of ordering a separate school for negroes. In the case of Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S. Ct. 197, 201, 44 L. Ed. 262, cited by the appellant, the question was whether a board with authority to establish separate schools, but with a limited fund available, could establish a high school for white children while expending the portion for colored children on primary schools of which the people of that race were in greater need, suspending the erection of a separate high school for them. The Supreme Court denied the remedy of suppressing the white school meanwhile, and added: "If, in some appropriate proceeding instituted directly for that purpose, the plaintiffs had sought to compel the board of education, out of the funds in its hands or under its control, to establish and maintain a high school for colored children, and if it appeared that the board's refusal to maintain such a school was in fact an abuse of its discretion and in hostility to the colored population because of their race, different questions might have arisen in the state court." But in Maryland no officers or body of officers are authorized to establish a separate law school, there is no legislative declaration of a purpose to establish one, and the courts could not make the decision for the state and order its officers to establish one. Therefore the erection of a separate school is not here an available alternative remedy. We do not understand that the Supreme Court was expressing any opinion on the problem as it is presented by the petitioner. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172.

The case, as we find it, then, is that the state has undertaken the function of education in the law, but has omitted students of one race from the only adequate provision made for it, and omitted them solely because of their color. If those students are to be offered equal treatment in the performance of the function, they must, at present, be admitted to the one school provided. And as the officers and regents are the agents of the state entrusted with the conduct of that one school, it follows that they must admit, and that the writ of mandamus requiring it would be properly directed to them. There is identity in principle and agents for the application of the constitutional requirement. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 25 L. Ed. 676.

Order affirmed.

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182 A. 590, 169 Md. 478, 103 A.L.R. 706 No. 53. Jan. 15, 1936 Argued before Bond, C. J., and Urner, Offutt, Parke, Sloan, Mitchell, Shehan, and Johnson, JJ. Charles T. LeViness, 3d, and Wm. L. Henderson, Asst. Attys. Gen. (Herbert R. O'Conor, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants.

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This law states that postsecondary educational institutions cannot deny a person participation or benefits from a federally assisted program due to race or national origin.

Citation: (42 U.S.C. § 2000d).

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§2000d. Prohibition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination under federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or national origin

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

( Pub. L. 88-352, title VI, §601, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 252.)

Coordination of Implementation and Enforcement of Provisions

For provisions relating to the coordination of implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this subchapter by the Attorney General, see section 1-201 of Ex. Ord. No. 12250, Nov. 2, 1980, 45 F.R. 72995, set out as a note under section 2000d-1 of this title.

Ex. Ord. No. 13160. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race, Sex, Color, National Origin, Disability, Religion, Age, Sexual Orientation, and Status as a Parent in Federally Conducted Education and Training Programs

Ex. Ord. No. 13160, June 23, 2000, 65 F.R. 39775, provided:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 921-932 of title 20, United States Code; section 2164 of title 10, United States Code; section 2001 et seq., of title 25, United States Code; section 7301 of title 5, United States Code; and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and to achieve equal opportunity in Federally conducted education and training programs and activities, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Statement of policy on education programs and activities conducted by executive departments and agencies.

1-101. The Federal Government must hold itself to at least the same principles of nondiscrimination in educational opportunities as it applies to the education programs and activities of State and local governments, and to private institutions receiving Federal financial assistance. Existing laws and regulations prohibit certain forms of discrimination in Federally conducted education and training programs and activities-including discrimination against people with disabilities, prohibited by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., as amended, employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion, prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17 [42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.], as amended, discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or religion in educational programs receiving Federal assistance, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d [et seq.], and sex-based discrimination in education programs receiving Federal assistance under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Through this Executive Order, discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, disability, religion, age, sexual orientation, and status as a parent will be prohibited in Federally conducted education and training programs and activities.

1-102. No individual, on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, disability, religion, age, sexual orientation, or status as a parent, shall be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in, a Federally conducted education or training program or activity.

2-201. "Federally conducted education and training programs and activities" includes programs and activities conducted, operated, or undertaken by an executive department or agency.

2-202. "Education and training programs and activities" include, but are not limited to, formal schools, extracurricular activities, academic programs, occupational training, scholarships and fellowships, student internships, training for industry members, summer enrichment camps, and teacher training programs.

2-203. The Attorney General is authorized to make a final determination as to whether a program falls within the scope of education and training programs and activities covered by this order, under subsection 2-202, or is excluded from coverage, under section 3.

2-204. "Military education or training programs" are those education and training programs conducted by the Department of Defense or, where the Coast Guard is concerned, the Department of Transportation, for the primary purpose of educating or training members of the armed forces or meeting a statutory requirement to educate or train Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement officials pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Chapter 18.

2-205. "Armed Forces" means the Armed Forces of the United States.

2-206. "Status as a parent" refers to the status of an individual who, with respect to an individual who is under the age of 18 or who is 18 or older but is incapable of self-care because of a physical or mental disability, is:

(a) a biological parent;

(b) an adoptive parent;

(c) a foster parent;

(d) a stepparent;

(e) a custodian of a legal ward;

(f) in loco parentis over such an individual; or

(g) actively seeking legal custody or adoption of such an individual.

Sec. 3. Exemption from coverage.

3-301. This order does not apply to members of the armed forces, military education or training programs, or authorized intelligence activities. Members of the armed forces, including students at military academies, will continue to be covered by regulations that currently bar specified forms of discrimination that are now enforced by the Department of Defense and the individual service branches. The Department of Defense shall develop procedures to protect the rights of and to provide redress to civilians not otherwise protected by existing Federal law from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, disability, religion, age, sexual orientation, or status as a parent and who participate in military education or training programs or activities conducted by the Department of Defense.

3-302. This order does not apply to, affect, interfere with, or modify the operation of any otherwise lawful affirmative action plan or program.

3-303. An individual shall not be deemed subjected to discrimination by reason of his or her exclusion from the benefits of a program established consistent with federal law or limited by Federal law to individuals of a particular race, sex, color, disability, national origin, age, religion, sexual orientation, or status as a parent different from his or her own.

3-304. This order does not apply to ceremonial or similar education or training programs or activities of schools conducted by the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, that are culturally relevant to the children represented in the school. "Culturally relevant" refers to any class, program, or activity that is fundamental to a tribe's culture, customs, traditions, heritage, or religion.

3-305. This order does not apply to (a) selections based on national origin of foreign nationals to participate in covered education or training programs, if such programs primarily concern national security or foreign policy matters; or (b) selections or other decisions regarding participation in covered education or training programs made by entities outside the executive branch. It shall be the policy of the executive branch that education or training programs or activities shall not be available to entities that select persons for participation in violation of Federal or State law.

3-306. The prohibition on discrimination on the basis of age provided in this order does not apply to age-based admissions of participants to education or training programs, if such programs have traditionally been age-specific or must be age-limited for reasons related to health or national security.

Sec. 4. Administrative enforcement.

4-401. Any person who believes himself or herself to be aggrieved by a violation of this order or its implementing regulations, rules, policies, or guidance may, personally or through a representative, file a written complaint with the agency that such person believes is in violation of this order or its implementing regulations, rules, policies, or guidance. Pursuant to procedures to be established by the Attorney General, each executive department or agency shall conduct an investigation of any complaint by one of its employees alleging a violation of this Executive Order.

4-402. (a) If the office within an executive department or agency that is designated to investigate complaints for violations of this order or its implementing rules, regulations, policies, or guidance concludes that an employee has not complied with this order or any of its implementing rules, regulations, policies, or guidance, such office shall complete a report and refer a copy of the report and any relevant findings or supporting evidence to an appropriate agency official. The appropriate agency official shall review such material and determine what, if any, disciplinary action is appropriate.

(b) In addition, the designated investigating office may provide appropriate agency officials with a recommendation for any corrective and/or remedial action. The appropriate officials shall consider such recommendation and implement corrective and/or remedial action by the agency, when appropriate. Nothing in this order authorizes monetary relief to the complainant as a form of remedial or corrective action by an executive department or agency.

4-403. Any action to discipline an employee who violates this order or its implementing rules, regulations, policies, or guidance, including removal from employment, where appropriate, shall be taken in compliance with otherwise applicable procedures, including the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 [see Tables for classification].

Sec. 5. Implementation and Agency Responsibilities.

5-501. The Attorney General shall publish in the Federal Register such rules, regulations, policies, or guidance, as the Attorney General deems appropriate, to be followed by all executive departments and agencies. The Attorney General shall address:

a. which programs and activities fall within the scope of education and training programs and activities covered by this order, under subsection 2-202, or excluded from coverage, under section 3 of this order;

b. examples of discriminatory conduct;

c. applicable legal principles;

d. enforcement procedures with respect to complaints against employees;

e. remedies;

f. requirements for agency annual and tri-annual reports as set forth in section 6 of this order; and

g. such other matters as deemed appropriate.

5-502. Within 90 days of the publication of final rules, regulations, policies, or guidance by the Attorney General, each executive department and agency shall establish a procedure to receive and address complaints regarding its Federally conducted education and training programs and activities. Each executive department and agency shall take all necessary steps to effectuate any subsequent rules, regulations, policies, or guidance issued by the Attorney General within 90 days of issuance.

5-503. The head of each executive department and agency shall be responsible for ensuring compliance within this order.

5-504. Each executive department and agency shall cooperate with the Attorney General and provide such information and assistance as the Attorney General may require in the performance of the Attorney General's functions under this order.

5-505. Upon request and to the extent practicable, the Attorney General shall provide technical advice and assistance to executive departments and agencies to assist in full compliance with this order.

Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements.

6-601. Consistent with the regulations, rules, policies, or guidance issued by the Attorney General, each executive department and agency shall submit to the Attorney General a report that summarizes the number and nature of complaints filed with the agency and the disposition of such complaints. For the first 3 years after the date of this order, such reports shall be submitted annually within 90 days of the end of the preceding year's activities. Subsequent reports shall be submitted every 3 years and within 90 days of the end of each 3-year period.

Sec. 7. General Provisions.

7-701. Nothing in this order shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to provide for the coordinated enforcement of nondiscrimination requirements in Federal assistance programs under Executive Order 12250 [42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 note].

8-801. This order is not intended, and should not be construed, to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or its employees. This order is not intended, however, to preclude judicial review of final decisions in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, et seq.

William J. Clinton.

Ex. Ord. No. 13899. Combating Anti-Semitism

Ex. Ord. No. 13899, Dec. 11, 2019, 84 F.R. 68779, provided:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy. My Administration is committed to combating the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic incidents in the United States and around the world. Anti-Semitic incidents have increased since 2013, and students, in particular, continue to face anti-Semitic harassment in schools and on university and college campuses.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance. While Title VI does not cover discrimination based on religion, individuals who face discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin do not lose protection under Title VI for also being a member of a group that shares common religious practices. Discrimination against Jews may give rise to a Title VI violation when the discrimination is based on an individual's race, color, or national origin.

It shall be the policy of the executive branch to enforce Title VI against prohibited forms of discrimination rooted in anti-Semitism as vigorously as against all other forms of discrimination prohibited by Title VI.

Sec. 2. Ensuring Robust Enforcement of Title VI. (a) In enforcing Title VI, and identifying evidence of discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, all executive departments and agencies (agencies) charged with enforcing Title VI shall consider the following:

(i) the non-legally binding working definition of anti-Semitism adopted on May 26, 2016, by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), which states, "Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities"; and

(ii) the "Contemporary Examples of Anti-Semitism" identified by the IHRA, to the extent that any examples might be useful as evidence of discriminatory intent.

(b) In considering the materials described in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of this section, agencies shall not diminish or infringe upon any right protected under Federal law or under the First Amendment. As with all other Title VI complaints, the inquiry into whether a particular act constitutes discrimination prohibited by Title VI will require a detailed analysis of the allegations.

Sec. 3. Additional Authorities Prohibiting Anti-Semitic Discrimination. Within 120 days of the date of this order [Dec. 11, 2019], the head of each agency charged with enforcing Title VI shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, identifying additional nondiscrimination authorities within its enforcement authority with respect to which the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism could be considered.

Sec. 4. Rule of Construction. Nothing in this order shall be construed to alter the evidentiary requirements pursuant to which an agency makes a determination that conduct, including harassment, amounts to actionable discrimination, or to diminish or infringe upon the rights protected under any other provision of law.

Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Donald J. Trump.

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[USC02] 42 USC 2000d: Prohibition against exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination under federally assisted programs on ground of race, color, or national origin

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No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ( Pub. L. 88-352, title VI, §601, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat.

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The 14th amendment provides equal protection for all and due process for law. This applies to race in college admissions by protecting prospective students from discrimination and allowing everyone a fair and equal opportunity.

Citation: (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).