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In this 1969 address, Nixon introduces the Vietnamization policy to the American public: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/richard-milhous-nixon/vietnamization-speech-1969.php.

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Vietnamization Speech, November 3, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans: - Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world - the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

The war had been going on for 4 years.

31,000 Americans had been killed in action.

The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.

540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office.

I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers.

Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others - I among them - have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation - and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: "... we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence."

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace - in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace - initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh [President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now.

Dear Mr. President

I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one - least of all the people of Vietnam....

The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth - the bad news as well as the good news - where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace - a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine - a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business not just America's business.

And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.

In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam - including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took once.

Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

Most important - United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must - in all candor - leave one note of caution.

If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary - a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace - not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight - to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans - l ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed, for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man. Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated - the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

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Good evening, my fellow Americans: - Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world - the war in Vietnam.

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This was reported on May 5, 1970, one day after the Kent State Shooting: https://www.nytimes.com/1970/05/05/archives/4-kent-state-students-killed-by-troops-8-hurt-as-shooting-follows.html.

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Credit... The New York Times Archives

This is a digitized version of an article from The Times's print archive, before the start of online publication in 1996. To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, The Times does not alter, edit or update them.

Occasionally the digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; we are continuing to work to improve these archived versions.

KENT, Ohio, May 4-Four students at Kent State Univer sity, two of them women, were shot to death this afternoon by a volley of National Guard gun fire. At least 8 other students were wounded.

The burst of gunfire came about 20 minutes after the guardsmen broke up a noon rally on the Commons, a grassy campus gathering spot, by lob bing tear gas at a crowd of about 1,000 young people.

In Washington, President Nixon deplored the deaths of the four students in the follow ing statement:

"This should remind us all once again that when dissent turns to violence it invites tragedy. It is my hope that this tragic and unfortunate in cident will strengthen the de termination of all the nation's campuses, administrators, fac ulty and students alike to stand firmly for the right which exists in this country of peace ful dissent and just as strongly against the resort to violence as a means of such expres sion."

In Columbus, Sylvester Del Corso, Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, said in a statement that the guardsmen had been forced to shoot after a sniper opened fire against the troops from a nearby rooftop and the crowd began to move to encircle the guardsmen.

Frederick P. Wenger, the As sistant Adjutant General, said the troops had opened fire after they were shot at by a sniper.

"They were under standing orders to take cover and re turn any fire," he said.

This reporter, who was with the group of students, did not see any indication of sniper fire, nor was the sound of any gunfire audible before the Guard volley. Students, con ceding that rocks had been thrown, heatedly denied that there was any sniper.

Gov. James A. Rhodes called on J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investi gation, to aid in looking into the campus violence. A Justice Department spokesman said no decision had been made to in vestigate.

At 2:10 this afternoon, after the shootings, the university president, Robert I. White, or dered the university closed for an indefinite time, and officials were making plans to evacuate the dormitories and bus out of‐state students to nearby cities.

Robinson Memorial Hospital identified the dead students as Allison Krause, 19 years old, of Pittsburgh; Sandra Lee Scheuer, 20, of Youngstown, Ohio, both coeds: Jeffrey Glenn Miller, 20, of 22 Diamond Drive, Plain view, L. I., and William K. Schroeder, 19, of Lorain, Ohio.

At 10:30 P.M. the hospital said that six students had been treated for gunshot wounds. Three were reported in critical condition and three in fair con dition. Two others with super ficial wounds were treated and released.

Students here, angered by the expansion of the war into Cambodia, have held demon strations for the last three nights. On Saturday night, the Army Reserve OOfficers Train ing Corps building was burned 10 the ground and the Guard was called in and martial law was declared.

Today's rally, called after night in which the police and guardsmen drove students into their dormitories and made 69 arrests, began as students rang the iron Victory Bell on the commons, normally used to herald football victories.

A National Guard jeep drove onto the Commons and an of ficer ordered the crowd to dis perse. Then several canisters of tear gas were fired, and the students straggled up a hill that borders the area and retreated into buildings.

A platoon of guardsmen, armed-as they have been since they arrived here with loaded M‐1 rifles and gas equipment- moved across the green and over the crest of the hill, chas ing the main body of pro testers.

The youths split into two groups, one heading farther downhill toward a dormitory complex, the other eddying around a parking lot and girls' dormitory just below Taylor Hall, the architecture building.

The guardsmen moved into a grassy area just below they parking lot and fired several canisters of tear gas from their short, stubby launchers.

Three or four youths ran to the smoking canisters and hurled them back. Most fell far short, but one landed near the troops and a cheer went up from the crowd, which was chanting "Pigs off campus" and cursing the war.

A few youths in the front of the crowd ran into the park ing lot and hurled stones or small chunks of pavement in the direction of the guardsmen. Then the troops began moving back up the hill in the direction of the college.
Students Cheer
The students in the parking lot area, numbering about 500, began to move toward the rear of the troops, cheering. Again, a few in front picked up stones from the edge of the parking lot and threw them at the guardsmen. Another group of several hundred students had gathered around the sides of Taylor Hall watching.

As the guardsmen, moving up the hill in single file, reached the crest, they suddenly turned, forming a skirmish line and opening fire.

The crackle of the rifle volley cut the suddenly still air. It appeared to go on, as a solid volley, for perhaps a full min ute or a little longer.

Some of the students dived to the ground, crawling on the grass in terror. Others stood shocked or half crouched, ap parently believing the troops were firing into the air. Some of the rifle barrels were pointed upward.

Near the top of the hill at the corner of Taylor Hall, a stu dent crumpled over, spun side ways and fell to the ground, shot in the head.

When the firing stopped, slim girl, wearing a cowboy shirt and faded jeans, was lying face down on the road at the edge of the parking lot, blood pouring out onto the macadam, about 10 feet from this reporter.
Too Shocked to React
The youths stood stunned, many of them clustered in small groups staring at the bodies. A young man cradled one of the bleeding forms in his arms. Several girls began to cry. But many of the stu dents who rushed to the scene seemed almost too shocked to react. Several gathered around an abstract steel sculpture in front of the building and looked at a .30‐caliber bullet hole drilled through one of the plates.

The hospital said that six young people were being treat ed for gunshot wounds, some in the intensive care unit. Three of the students who were killed were dead on arrival at the hospital.

One guardsman was treated and released at the hospital and another was admitted with heat prostration.

In early afternoon, students attempted to gather at various area of the Commons but were ordered away by guardsman and the Ohio Highway Patrol, which moved in as reinforce ments.

There were no further clashes, as faculty members, graduate assistants and stu dents leaders urged the crowd to go back to the dormitories.

But a bizarre atmosphere hung over the campus as Guard helicopter hovered over head, grim‐faced officers ma neuvered their men to safeguard the normally pastoral campus and students, dazed, fearful and angry, struggled to comprehend what had happened and to find something to do about it.

Students carrying suitcases and duffel bags began leaving the campus this afternoon. Early tonight the entire campus was sealed off and a court in junction was issued ordering all students to leave.

A 5 P.M. curfew was de clared in Kent, and road blocks were set up around the town to prevent anyone from enter ing. A state of emergency was also declared in the nearby towns of Stow and Ravenna.
Statement by General
KENT, Ohio, May 4 (UPI)- Brig. Gen. Robert Canterbury, the commander of Guard troops on the Kent State campus, said today that no warning had been given to the students that the troops would shoot.

General Canterbury, at campus news conference, said in reply to questioning that no official order had been given to open fire.

"The situation did not allow it," he said. "The emotional atmosphere was such that any thing could have happened. It was over in two to three seconds."

He said a guardsman "always has the option to fire if his life is in danger."

"A crowd of about 600 stu dents had surrounded a unit of about 100 guardsmen on three sides and were throwing rocks at the troops," he said. "Some of the rocks were the size of baseballs. The troops had run out of tear gas."

Governor Rhodes, who had ordered the National Guards men onto the campus Saturday after students began looting; stores and breaking windows in the downtown area, said "a complete investigation" would be made into the shootings.

Dr. White, the university president, said:

"Everyone without exception is horror‐struck by the tragedy of the last few hours. Unfortun ately, no one is able yet to say with certainty what the facts of the situation are.

"There are many unconfirmed reports of gunfire from various sources," he went on. "We are asking for every possible ap propriate investigation, which we shall undertake to pursue to the limit."
Father Is Printer
One of the dead victims at Kent State, Jeffrey Glenn Miller, was the son of Bernard Miller, a linotype operator who works in the composing room of The New York Times.

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4 Kent State Students Killed by Troops (Published 1970)

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This is a digitized version of an article from The Times's print archive, before the start of online publication in 1996. To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, The Times does not alter, edit or update them. Occasionally the digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; we are continuing to work to improve these archived versions.

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A Defense Counsel, Ron Allen, was interviewed on his experience during the My Lai Massacre: https://sites.lib.jmu.edu/sc-interviews/2021/03/14/interview-with-ron-allen-history-150h-spring-2021-conducted-by-mark-myers-march-14-2021/.

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https://sites.lib.jmu.edu/sc-interviews/files/2021/03/interviewseventh.mp3

Interview with Ron Allen, First Hand Account of the Mỹ Lai Massacre from a Defense Counsel, History 150H Spring 2021, Conducted by Mark Myers, March 14, 2021
Introduction to Interview:
In March of 1968, word of a mass killing of Vietnamese citizens by US troops got out to the American public. They called it The Mỹ Lai Massacre. Late into the Vietnam War, frustration from being in this prolonged conflict started to build. Public approval for the war was dropping drastically and large numbers of soldiers were dying every day. The American generals felt like they had to turn to drastic measures. They told their men to shoot their way through the city of Mỹ Lai. They ignored all feelings of wrong doing as they murdered innocent men, women, and children. It was truly an awful tragedy. It is widely considered that the men who were most involved in this were let off easy as they were discharged from the army and not tried in court. Some men who were also left to be punished for crimes they did not commit.

Today, tragedies like this still occur more often than they should. Nonetheless, social change has come a long way in trying to prevent these incidents and providing better responses for when they do happen. Ron Allen was an army lawyer at the time of the incident and was tasked with defending one of the remaining generals. In this interview, Ron speaks about the incident and how he feels it could have been avoided. He provides his opinion on the growth of society since that point and how an incident like The Mỹ Lai Massacre may play out today. It is so important to think about humanity's past mistakes so that they are prevented in the future.

Biography: My grandfather, Ron Allen, went to law school at the University of Alabama and used his degree in many important facets of law. Ron worked as a lawyer for the military, the EPA, Monsanto, and others. Through his work, Ron has met countless people and has so many stories to tell. However, his most interesting is most likely his role in the Mỹ Lai Massacre. The Mỹ Lai Massacre was an event that took place during the United States involvement in the Vietnam War. He was the first defense counsel for Captain Eugene Kotouc, and appeared in the press and on national television twice. After only being out of law school for one year, Ron was thrown in the fire and was asked to defend a man that was supposedly involved in one of the United States' most hated events.
MM:
Okay, this the interview with Ron about his experiences with the Mỹ Lai Massacre and as an army lawyer. Hi, Ron, how are you today?
Ron:
Fine, how are you doing Mark?
MM:
Good. Thank you.
Ron:
Do I know you Mark? Have I ever met you?
MM:
[Laughs] Yes many times many times. I'm excited to hear more of your stories. Okay. Will you briefly describe your experience in law school and about what schools you attended and that kind of stuff?
Ron:
Yes, I attended the University of Alabama law school, graduated top 25% with a B average. I entered the army immediately thereafter, serving two years as a Quartermaster Officer, and a lawyer. I became the lawyer for Headquarters Command at Fort Carson, Colorado. And while there I trained non-lawyers to handle prosecution, and defense in AWOL [Absent With Out Leave] cases. I handled some of those myself. I investigated The NCO club [Non-Commissioned Officer clubs are organizations for NCOs and their families to talk and share ideas], and I represented Captain Eugene Kotouc, who was the executive officer for Headquarters Command at Fort Carson, Colorado [for activities during and after the My Lai Massacre]. He asked me to represent him on potential murder charges because he had seen me in action, being my executive officer, and I'd seen him every single day and he trusted me. When he asked me to do it, I was very nervous about it because I had only been out of law school about one year, I had absolutely no experience in criminal law, but I agreed to represent him. We then went before General Peers' committee on the cover up, a congressional subcommittee, back to General Peers' Committee. And after that, I left the service. I got a master's in tax law at George Washington University, which I have never used. I became an environmental lawyer with EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], in Atlanta, Georgia for 10 years, became an environmental lawyer for Monsanto [a Agrochemical company] in St. Louis, and then went to Georgia-Pacific in Atlanta for another 18 years as an environmental attorney.
MM:
Can you describe what it was like to be an army lawyer specifically, what's the differences between civilian lawyers and military lawyers?
Ron:
Yes, the main difference between civilian lawyers and military lawyers is experience in the courtroom. Most lawyers straight out of law school, go to medium size or a larger law firm, will do research, write memos, briefs, etc, may question witnesses occasionally, but normally, they will not be in the courtroom for at least three years. In the army you're thrown in the courtroom the first day, and you either make it or you don't. And you had a lot of various experiences that you don't get in civilian life, and that experience, of course, helps you in your career and getting a job in civilian life.
MM:
Can you give a brief description about the Mỹ Lai Massacre and how you got involved?
Ron:
The massacre occurred in 1968 before I went into the service. It hit the press in 69 when pictures [of the massacre] appeared in either Look, or Life magazine. My executive officer Captain Kotouc had given the briefing the night before, as he was the intelligence officer for the brigade. The women, children, elderly would not be there as they would be at the market[They would go to the market early in the morning because they had no refrigeration.] So anybody you saw, you could assume were Vietcong. And so I represented him. He was not involved in the actual massacre. But being his defense counsel, I got to read all the reports that General Peers and others generated [Over 20,000 pages]. And so I had very detailed knowledge of the massacre: what happened, what caused it, and all other information concerning the massacre.
MM:
Was there anything in the files that you read about, either about before the massacre or during the massacre that you used to help defend your client Captain Kotouc in the trial? [Note that the interviewer misspoke and the transcript shows the correct title for Captain Kotouc.]
Ron:
Now what happened was, after the massacre, Captain Kotouc joined up with the unit that had already left Mỹ Lai, and they were away from there. And he and Captain Medina were interrogating two South Vietnamese, no, I'm sorry, two Viet Cong prisoners. And Captain Kotouc said to one of them, "you're going to talk or else" and pulls out his bowie knife, which he was famous for. The guy wouldn't talk so he slammed down the knife. He accidentally cut off the tip of the little finger. Now that is conduct Unbecoming an Officer and that's Maiming, no ifs, buts, and doubts. The prisoner still would not talk, so he [Captain Kotouc] and Captain Medina went to the side of the clearing. I do not know how big the clearing was. The South Vietnamese police who were there took the two prisoners on the far side of the clearing. And the evidence shows, it was Captain Kotouc's own interpreter, who said Captain Kotouc raised his finger, and the South Vietnamese police took the two prisoners into the woods and shot them. Now the problem with that Mark, is raising your finger is not an order. There is no way in living hell that I can think of it would be an order. And secondly, I have been told by so many people that have served in Vietnam, that you didn't give orders to South Vietnamese police, they did what they wanted to do. So on that basis, I determined and Captain McDonald, who was the JAG Captain [Kotouc retained later] concluded, there was no basis for a murder charge. General Rogers, Commanding General at Fort Carson, concurred. General Rodgers did not refer the matter to an Article 32 investigation, which is similar to a grand jury in civilian life. An officer would have called all witnesses and written up a report and made a recommendation about a court-martial. And General Rodgers didn't even do that, because he thought there was absolutely no basis for a murder charge. So the army transfers Captain Kotouc to Fort McPherson in Atlanta, Georgia, which is, in my opinion, totally despicable, unfair, unwarranted, unnecessary. But the Commanding General at Fort McPherson, which is M-c-P-h-e-r-s-o-n in Atlanta, Georgia. The commanding general there already had Medina, he wanted another star. So he said, send him down. We'll take care of this guy. And they did have an Article 32. And they did recommend court-martial and they did court-martial him after I got out of service. Now I have never heard of, nor had anyone of the other officers who I met who were defending other people, had ever heard the army doing that, after the commanding general says no prosecution. They sent Kotouc to Atlanta without his family, without his lawyers. Captain McDonald and I stayed at Fort Carson. So we had to go to Fort McPherson occasionally for briefingsand whatever, and so it was totally unfair. It was prejudicial. It shouldn't have happened. And Kotouc should never have been charged. And that's what got us so ticked off. Now, when he was court-martialed, the judge who was a JAG Colonel [Judge Advocate General's Corps] if I remember right, dismissed most of the case and the officers of the court-martial board found him not guilty of everything else. And they should have.
MM:
With all that information, do you think you could have defended one of the other soldiers who actually committed the murder or how would you have dealt with that?
Ron:
Well I knew Captain Kotouc, as far as I was concerned, was not guilty of murder. Could I have represented one of the others? I think I could have in good faith because lawyers are like doctors, whoever comes in you're supposed to represent them. Lieutenant Calley who was charged with killing 35 to over 150 civilians and then who in the evidence did in fact kill I would say over 100, I'm not sure I could have represented him. It was when I read the reports, when I saw the pictures, I was nauseated, it was just horrible what he [and others] did.
MM:
One more thing, how do you think an event like this would play out today? And what do you think? What does that say about the social change that happened since that time? Like with technology, and that kind of like media, that kind of deal? Do you have any thoughts on that?
Ron:
Going back to 69, when it hit the press, it was national in scope. In fact, it was worldwide in scope, because no American unit had ever been accused of killing between 350 and 500 totally innocent civilians. And that's including babies, young kids, mothers, grandmothers, grandfathers. And could it happen today? I think maybe small numbers. It could happen but not anything major. The army has done a lot to train the soldiers on the rules. And that Geneva Convention and all the things you're supposed to do or not do with prisoners, and there's always one or two isolated incidents, but I don't think it could happen today. One of my problems with what the army did in the Mỹ Lai Massacre and who they prosecuted and did not prosecute, was the fact that some of those soldiers who committed murder, were out of the service. They had already been discharged. Their time of service was up. The army did not make an attempt to call them back into active service and prosecute them because they concluded they didn't have the legal means to do it. I personally doubt that very much. And I thought it was totally unfair for a few people, a few soldiers still in the service, being charged with murder and being subject to possibly life in prison or death penalty. And not go after all of them. I just didn't think it was fair.
MM:
Absolutely. Makes sense. Real quick, do you have any final thoughts or anything you want to add to what happened and how you felt about the incident?
Ron:
Yeah, it was, when I first heard about it. I just couldn't believe that American soldiers could kill people in cold blood, the way they did it. And I was horrified. But as one learns about Vietnam and the way it was fought, body count, free fire zones, innocent killing of civilians by both sides, North Vietnamese intentionally killing civilians and prisoners, etc. The way after the war was over North Vietnam killed over 2 million South Vietnamese citizens. Because North Vietnam was a communist country and that's the way they act. I understood why some of them [American Soldiers] did what they did. And one additional thought the question became, what kind of order did Captain Medina, The Company Commander, give the night before about killing innocent civilians? I've read the order. I have talked to Captain Medina, I read all the reports, I read General Peers' investigation, and nowhere in that order did he say kill innocent civilians. They did say as Captain Kotouc my client said as the intelligence officer the night before, his information was the women, children, and elderly would be at the market and would not be there, so anyone who you saw was a Vietcong. Now as the platoons, the three platoons, went through Mỹ Lai and found there was really nobody shooting at them, there was an occasional shot and somebody was killed. But Lieutenant Calley, who was in my opinion, totally unfit to be an officer, totally way out of his league, totally had no self confidence, no ability, was not liked by his men, not respected by Captain Medina and the other officers. Once he got word from Medina, "get through that village because we're taking too much time." He started shooting the innocent civilians, and told his men to shoot, and a number of them did. If Lieutenant Calley had not been there, I don't think the massacre would have ever occurred. And Medina's order, in my opinion, was totally legal and totally appropriate. And the man [Calley]went totally insane.

Transcribed by https://otter.ai
Research:
For the historical context of my interview, I felt like the best topic of research would be the Mỹ Lai Massacre itself. Luckily, the JMU databases have journals on this that were helpful in giving myself a background into what my grandfather had experienced. Ron was also nice enough to give me a significant amount of background before the interview was conducted in order to make sure that I had a good understanding. A few sources (included in my bibliography below) gave me great insight into the massacre and how truly awful it was. Without knowing about the massacre and how the United States military handled this, it would not be possible to interpret the interview as it should be. The Military History Journal from Fred Borch did a fantastic job of conveying the feelings of the horrible event even as it happened many years before the journal was published. Another source had more information about the Vietnam War and the protestors that came with it. I felt like it was important to broaden my research away from the massacre in order to understand the big picture. It was easy to see after reading that journal how the Mỹ Lai Massacre caused the protests to erupt even further.
Bibliography:
Borch, Fred L. "My Lai at Fifty: A History of Literature on the 'My Lai Incident' Fifty Years Later." Journal of Military History, vol. 82, no. 2, Apr. 2018, pp. 551-564. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,athens,shib&db=mth&AN=128577712&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Cunningham, Michael H. "My Lai's Ghostly Footprints." Vietnam, vol. 31, no. 6, Apr. 2019, pp. 14-16. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,athens,shib&db=mth&AN=134287557&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Investopedia. "Monsanto's Main Competitors." Investopedia, Investopedia, 28 Aug. 2020, www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/120314/who-are-monsantos-main-competitors.asp.

"Our Mission and What We Do." EPA, Environmental Protection Agency, 23 Sept. 2020, www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do#:~:text=United%20States%20Environmental%20Protection%20Agency.

Perrotta, Katherine. "FBI Surveillance of the War Resisters League during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973." Peace & Change, vol. 46, no. 1, Jan. 2021, pp. 52-70. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1111/pech.12439.

Rob. "Article 32 Investigation." US Military Law Lawyer Philip D. Cave, 2021, www.court-martial.com/article-32-investigation.html.

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First Hand Account of the Mỹ Lai Massacre from a Defense Counsel

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https://sites.lib.jmu.edu/sc-interviews/files/2021/03/interviewseventh.mp3 Interview with Ron Allen, First Hand Account of the Mỹ Lai Massacre from a Defense Counsel, History 150H Spring 2021, Conducted by Mark Myers, March 14, 2021 Introduction to Interview: In March of 1968, word of a mass killing of Vietnamese citizens by US troops got out to the American public.

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The excerpts provided explain some of the agreements from the 1973 Paris Peace Accords: https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/excerpts-paris-peace-accords-1973/.

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" Article I

...The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Gencease-fireents on Vietnam...
Article 2
A cease fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-Nam as of 2400 hours GMT on January 27th 1973. At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbours, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbours, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect. The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time...
Article 4
The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.
Article 5
Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organisations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.
Article 6
The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement...
Article 8
(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The Parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains...
Article 11
Immediately after the ceasefire, the two South Vietnamese parties will achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organisations that have collaborated with one side or the other... ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organisation, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise...
Article 15
The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam...
Article 21
The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.
Article 22
The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect of each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."

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Excerpts from the Paris Peace Accords (1973)

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" Article I ...The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognised by the 1954 Gencease-fireents on Vietnam... Article 2 A cease fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-Nam as of 2400 hours GMT on January 27th 1973.