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CrisisWatch: May Alerts and April Trends 2022

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The International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation committed to preventing and resolving deadly conflict

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Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen

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Cold War in the Islamic World Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy (Dilip Hiro) (z-lib.org)

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Middle East Policy - 2022 - Malla - China s Approach to the Iran%E2%80%90Saudi Arabia Rivalry

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Highlights

Hunger rises in Yemen as WFP forced to cut assistance, warns of impact

2021 in review

Needs persist along Red Sea while hostilities subside

Childbirth a matter of life and death for Yemen's women and girls

COVID-19 vaccination campaign for migrants

Health workers give children the oral polio vaccine during the UNICEF-supported immunization campaign in the Community College IDP camp in Ma'rib City in November 2021. Photo: UNICEF.

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Hunger rises in Yemen as WFP forced to cut assistance, warns of impact 2021 in review Needs persist along Red Sea while hostilities subside Childbirth a matter of life and death for Yemen's women and girls COVID-19 vaccination campaign for migrants

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Country Dashboard | Fragile States Index

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Context and Impact of the Crisis

More than seven years of armed conflict in Yemen has caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties and displaced over 4 million people, making Yemen one of the world's largest humanitarian crises and aid operations. Intensifying clashes over the past year increased the number of active front lines in Yemen from 49 in 2020 to 51 by mid-2021,1 and early estimates indicate that two of the highest monthly civilian casualty rates since December 2019 occurred in October and December 2021. At least 286,700 people are estimated to have been displaced in 2021.2 Substantial devaluation of the Yemeni rial (YER) contributed to the further worsening of Yemen's economy in 2021, driving up the prices of essential goods and services including food, fuel and healthcare.

The rial fell by some 57 per cent between January and December in Government of Yemen (GoY) areas, reaching successive historical lows in the process. In areas under Ansarullah control, severe fuel shortages have driven price increases even as the exchange rate has remained more stable. Consequently, public services have been further degraded and the authorities face even greater challenges to paying regular salaries and pensions to public employees. With the livelihoods situation remaining largely unchanged across the country, the average person's purchasing power is being substantially eroded, incentivizing increased adoption of harmful coping strategies.
Natural hazards continue to aggravate the crisis, with torrential downpours and recurrent flooding in 2021 causing deaths, injuries and displacements as well as inducing widespread damage to essential infrastructure, affecting at least 240,000 people. Other natural hazards also remain a threat, including desert locust infestations and the depletion of natural water sources, while the floating and storage offloading vessel (FSO) Safer continues to imperil the ecosystem of the Red Sea as well as the lives and livelihoods of millions of people in Yemen and its neighboring countries, especially in coastal areas.

COVID-19 also remains a serious health threat in Yemen, with nearly 11,000 confirmed cases and close to 2,000 associated deaths recorded in 2021. This is likely a severe underestimation of the disease's actual prevalence in the country, as COVID-19 cases are only systematically tracked in areas under the Government of Yemen, and resources for tracking are insufficient.

While vaccinations against COVID-19 began on 20 April 2021, a mere 2.1 per cent of Yemen's population had been at least partially vaccinated by 31 December 2021.

Beyond the direct health and mortality risks posed by COVID-19, fears and stigma associated with the disease are reportedly also discouraging people from seeking treatment for other health concerns and from accessing other services, while measures introduced to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 have caused interruptions to various vital services, including for nutrition, protection and education.

The impact of the crisis is most visible in the pervasiveness of malnutrition, disease outbreaks, and civilian casualties and displacements in Yemen, as well as in the collapsing economy, looming famine and the reversal of the country's past development gains. While humanitarian partners reached an average of 11.6 million people a month with humanitarian and protection assistance in 2021, the operating environment remains restricted and characterized by extensive access challenges and insecurity. Some 10.9 million people live in areas of Yemen where bureaucratic and logistical impediments, as well as armed conflict and insecurity, represent major challenges for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Scope of the analysis
All 333 districts of Yemen are covered by this Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), with analysis particularly focusing on the needs of internally displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. Specific attention is also provided to population groups that experience heightened vulnerabilities, including children, women, people with disabilities, older persons, and marginalized communities such as the Muhamasheen.

For the second consecutive year, assessments of needs in this HNO are informed by the enhanced global Humanitarian Planning Cycle (HPC) approach and the corresponding Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Joint Inter-sector Analysis Framework (JIAF) global guidance. This approach holistically measures the severity of needs in Yemen against 24 intersectoral indicators. While comparisons with regard to peoplein need (PiN) can be made between the 2021 and 2022 HNOs, PiN assessments in this HNO cannot be juxtaposed with preceding years, as the JIAF approach had not yet been adopted, and changes in the figures reflect the shift in methodology rather than any change in the situation.

According to the 2022 HNO analysis, 23.4 million people in Yemen are estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2022, of whom 12.9 million people are assessed to be in acute need. The main instigators of the number of people in need are food insecurity and malnutrition, health, water and sanitation needs and protection. Some 19 million people require food assistance in 2022, including 7.3 million in acute need. In addition, 21.9 million people need support to access critical health services, while some 17.8 million people will require support to access clean water and basic sanitation needs. Some of the highest levels of vulnerability are concentrated in displacement hosting sites where very few services are available, and protection needs continue to be high across Yemen especially as the deteriorating humanitarian context incentivizes rising adoption of negative coping strategies.
Expected context evolution in 2022
Humanitarian needs in Yemen are expected to increase and intensify in 2022 as the context deteriorates further, at least in the absence of a deescalation of the conflict and significant improvements to the economy as well as funding for humanitarian and development partners.

Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law are likely to continue to cause additional harm to civilian populations and infrastructure. A nationwide ceasefire - and in the long-term a political agreement - is urgently needed to create the conditions for recovery and long-term peace.

Constraints on the humanitarian response will likely continue to be compounded by armed violence and bureaucratic challenges, while protracted displacement is set to further erode people's resilience and exacerbate vulnerabilities in displaced as well as host communities. As people increasingly resort to negative coping strategies, women and girls will face increased risk of gender-based violence (GBV) and other risks, while children will encounter diminished access to education and greater instances of family separation, child recruitment, child marriage, child trafficking, and exploitative forms of labour. Other groups such as displaced people, refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, people with disabilities and older persons are also likely to see their vulnerability increase.

Yemen's socioeconomic environment is also expected to continue its deterioration in 2022, as a result of shrinking access to income, fuel supply shortages and further depreciation of the rial. Food supply challenges are also possible as a result of the war in Ukraine, given that Yemen imports a large share of wheat from Russia and Ukraine. These factors will continue to affect the availability, affordability and accessibility of essential goods and services throughout the country.

Seasonal rainfall and flooding will persist in 2022, while other natural hazards also remain threats. The presence of, and capacity to respond to, epidemics and other health risks - including COVID-19 - are expected to continue along similar trends as in 2021, with serious consequences for the physical and mental wellbeing of people across the country. This will compound the impacts of rising food insecurity and inadequate water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services on the prevalence of preventable diseases and malnutrition, which are projected to keep rising in 2022, and which will especially affect women and children.

To prioritize the critical needs identified in this HNO, humanitarian partners are currently finalizing the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which is centered on three key strategic objectives: (i) reducing morbidity and mortality; (ii) improving resilience and living standards; and (iii) preventing and mitigating protection risks.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

To learn more about OCHA's activities, please visit https://www.unocha.org/.

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Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022 (April 2022) - Yemen

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Context and Impact of the Crisis More than seven years of armed conflict in Yemen has caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties and displaced over 4 million people, making Yemen one of the world's largest humanitarian crises and aid operations.

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https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/15357

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Where is AQAP Now? - Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies

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AQAP’s current decline is the result of a barrage of challenges that the jihadis have faced, both external and internal.

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https://www.arabnews.com/node/1612471

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Council of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to play critical role

The foreign ministers of eight Arab and African countries attend a meeting to sign the Charter of the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in Riyadh. (Reuters)

Last week in Riyadh, the foreign ministers of eight countries overlooking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden signed the charter of a new organization: The Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Countries. Its main objective is to enhance political, economic and security cooperation between its membership. In December 2018, Saudi Arabia launched this initiative to great applause, and the signing of the charter formalizes this gathering.

At the Riyadh meeting on Jan. 6, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan stressed that the new organization will prioritize work to address "the threats and challenges facing our region, and safeguard the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden."

The safety of the two waterways and environmental protection are expected to figure highly in the new gathering's scope of work.

The new organization, with such a wide mandate, is an important step forward to safeguard the security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which has not received the attention it requires.

About 230 million people live in the littoral states of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They occupy about 6.4 million square kilometers, larger than the area of the EU. However, their combined gross domestic product is only about $1.2 trillion, with Saudi Arabia contributing more than 60 percent of that total.

The new bloc's member countries have traded for thousands of years, but trade between them has recently shrunk and investment has suffered. Some are fragile states that have experienced wars, internal conflicts, poverty and an acute governance deficit. Economic development has been negatively affected by those challenges, and investors have fled. As a result, terrorists, pirates and organized crime have taken advantage of the power and economic vacuums prevailing in some parts of the region.

The Red Sea stretches between two important narrow passageways - the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the Suez Canal, through which about 10 percent of world trade and 4 million barrels of oil pass daily. But they also represent possible chokepoints, especially the former, should they be blocked.

Security threats to the region include drugs and human trafficking and arms smuggling, especially by Iran and its proxies. Those threats are magnified by the presence of many ungoverned spaces and the limited capacity of security forces because of a lack of resources and technical expertise to deal with emerging threats.

Promoting trade and investment between the Red Sea's two shores should be a priority. Although about a tenth of world trade passes through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, relatively limited trade takes place between the countries overlooking them.

Only investment can create jobs and provide the youth with viable alternatives to illegal activities, but promoting investment faces formidable governance challenges, which need to be addressed candidly and robustly.

International aid donors give generously, but there is very little coordination between them to focus aid on addressing technical capacity limitations and governance. Development aid should work to help local communities build a more hospitable business environment, but should not be looked at as an alternative to private investment.

There needs to be better coordination between humanitarian aid providers to target the most vulnerable communities and deprive terrorists of the ability to control aid or direct it to serve their objectives.

All these challenges and the task of meeting them await the new council. And there are surely more. As a new regional organization, it should start slowly and decide on key priorities. It should also take advantage of willing partners in the region and beyond.

Regionally, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is best placed to play a key role in supporting the new group, at least by providing a model and instruments of integration, and possibly more. Most of the members of the new group are members of either the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) or both and could facilitate cooperation with these two important regional organizations.

The EU, UN and World Bank are all keenly interested in this region and the new group could enhance its effectiveness by including them as observers or strategic partners.

Over the past year, international and regional think tanks have taken an interest in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region and could provide practical ideas for the new organization to consider.

Saudi Arabia has, for some time, advocated greater cooperation between the Gulf region and the countries overlooking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. At the GCC, Saudi Arabia was pivotal in the adoption of a wide-ranging framework for engagement between the two regions, which includes political, security, economic and cultural dimensions.

Promoting trade and investment between the Red Sea's two shores should be a priority.

Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

The new organization should leverage the interest of regional and international organizations to create new and workable programs. On the political and security tacks, for example, the new council should build on the inroads made by Saudi Arabia to reconcile Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as Eritrea and Djibouti, and the case of Sudan, where economic and political support have helped the country to stabilize.

Greater trade and investment flows are obviously the key requirement for long-term stability, peace and prosperity. The new organization should utilize trade facilitation instruments, which have been highly developed by international and regional organizations. To attract investment, countries need to improve governance, fight corruption and provide a more consistent legal environment.

And the new organization's focus on the environment will be met with enthusiasm by international and regional organizations concerned by marine pollution and climate change. They would be willing to provide support in this area.

Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the Gulf Cooperation Council's assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation, and a columnist for Arab News. The views expressed in this piece are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the GCC. Twitter: @abuhamad1

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point of view

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hajj،عرب نيوز

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Council of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to play critical role

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The foreign ministers of eight Arab and African countries attend a meeting to sign the Charter of the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in Riyadh.

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United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime

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With the longest coastline in mainland Africa and a position adjacent to some of the world's busiest shipping routes, Somalia's maritime space is set to be a strong drive in the country's social and economic development. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is, however, concerned over the lack of capacity to manage Somali maritime space effectively, whose vulnerability has been highlighted by piracy. Today piracy is still seen by many as a dormant threat rather than a fully suppressed one and this is in part attributed to problems with unregulated fishing by foreign vessels in Somali waters. While the presence of international navies off the Horn of Africa has greatly contributed to repressing it, it has had little impact on other aspects of maritime security. Somalia continues to have a reputation as the launching point for terrorism, piracy, people trafficking and smuggling operations which obstructs efforts to commercialize Somali marine resources and hinder effective stabilization.

Somalia's geographical proximity to Yemen in conjunction with the lack of maritime domain awareness and properly equipped maritime security forces have led to an increase in the illicit activities taking place in the area. Illicit trafficking activities in Yemen pose a significant problem, involving not only firearms and explosive materials but also weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components and precursors. Proceeds from smuggling of Somali charcoal and sugar by sea are seen to fuel terrorism. Meanwhile, the inability of both states to successfully patrol the area and suppress the crimes committed is consistently seen as one of the underlying causes of instability.

The Gulf of Aden and Red Sea sub-programme of UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP GARS) assists Somalia and Yemen in addressing maritime crime. Under the programme, UNODC delivers support to the Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) authorities and is one of very few programmes that are actively engaged with Yemeni and Somali Law Enforcement on the waterfront. In Mogadishu, mentors work with the Somali Police Force's Maritime Police Unit (MPU), in Bosasso, Puntland, with Port Police (BPP), in Berbera, Somaliland, with the Somaliland Coast Guard (SLCG), in Galmudug with the Galmudug Maritime Police Unit, and in Hobyo with the Coast Guard (GMPU/CG). In Yemen, HoA GMCP supports rebuilding the Yemen Coastguard (YCG). National teams consisting of national programme officers, interpreters, and drivers further support the mentors in each of the regions.

GMCP GARS's success has been derived from the delivery of sustainable capacity building through the placement of experts in seamanship, marine engineering, maritime law enforcement, and communications with regional maritime law enforcement authorities in Somalia as full-time in-country mentors. A crucial part of this mentorship involves advanced Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) training, as well as the undertaking of on-water emergencies and search and rescue operations.

In addition, the programme supports Somali custodial authorities to ensure that detention of maritime crime suspects is in accordance with the Nelson Mandela Rules, which set the international human rights framework on detention, and establishes sustainable prison management practices.

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With the longest coastline in mainland Africa and a position adjacent to some of the world's busiest shipping routes, Somalia's maritime space is set to be a strong drive in the country's social and economic development. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is, however, concerned over the lack of capacity to manage Somali maritime space effectively, whose vulnerability has been highlighted by piracy.

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Tucked in between the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula lies the Gulf of Aden. It connects to the Red Sea in the West and the Arabian Sea in the East.

The countries that lie along its coastline include Yemen to the North, Somalia and Somaliland to the South, and Djibouti to the East. The Gulf is connected to the Red Sea via the straits of Bab el Mandeb.

In the West, it narrows into the Gulf of Tadjoura near Djibouti. It is demarcated from the Arabian Sea by the Horn of Africa and the Yemeni Socotra islands. The Guardafui channel near these islands is also linked to the Gulf of Aden.

The Gulf has had a long and exciting history, with numerous wars fought in the region. In this article, we will look at the many reasons why it plays a major role in the global economy. From trade and shipping to the piracy that plagues it, we cover every aspect of the Gulf that you should know.

1. The etymology behind the Gulf of Aden spans back to the early Greek era

While we know the Gulf of Aden by its modern name, this is a fairly new term given to it. Aden refers to the major port city on the coast of Yemen.

During the Greek conquests to Persia and the Indian subcontinent, the Gulf was discovered as a convenient route to access these regions.

The area was included in the Erythraean Sea along with the Gulf of Tadjoura and the Red Sea. Several small islands within the Gulf still bear colloquial versions of the Greek names given to them.

Conquerors such as Darius of Persia and Alexander the Great of Macedonia sailed this route, and maps from their era mentioned the Gulf as an extension of the Erythraean Sea.

Later, the major port city of Berbara in modern-day Somaliland became a hub for trade between the Arab nations, India and the Far-East, and Europe. This led to the Gulf being named the "Gulf of Berbara" by Arabic geographers and explorers such as Abu'l-Fida and Ibn Majid. Gradually, as Aden became the largest port on the coastline, the Gulf was renamed.

Even today, Berbara is a prominent harbour.

2. The Gulf of Aden is a shallow body of water spread over a large region

The geography of the Gulf of Aden differs from the surrounding topography in certain aspects. The average depth of the Gulf of Aden is around 500 meters, while the deepest point is 5.5 kilometres at the Alula Fartak Trench.

It is visible that despite such a deep underwater valley, the average depth is low, much like the neighbouring Red Sea (490 meters average depth). The main reason behind this is because the seabed of the Gulf was above the sea-level till a few million years ago. Over time with the rising water levels associated with the Ice Ages ending, the area was gradually submerged.

The seabed of the Gulf is dominated by the Sheba Ridge which runs along its length. As part of the Indian Ocean Ridge System that runs near the Arabian Sea, the ridge forms the backbone of many regional water bodies.

The neighbouring Red Sea has the Suakin Trough that also runs along its length. The deepest point in the Gulf (at Fartak), is part of the Ridge and is a continental fault. The surrounding basins have a depth of 3.9 kilometres and run along the Ridge.

As the Gulf narrows into the Tadjoura Trench, it becomes very shallow.

3. The Gulf of Aden lies within the territories of 3 different nations

The Gulf of Aden is majorly shared between 3 neighbouring nations- Djibouti to the East, Somalia to the South, and Yemen to the North. The Western front is open water demarcated by a continental shelf system. The Gulf spans over 410,000 square kilometres and is divided between these 3 nations on the basis of coastline length along the Gulf.

The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of these nations extend into the Gulf, and inter-governmental agreements have been drawn up to ensure the fair and legal division of the area. Somalia covers over 800,000 square km, with Yemen at just above 500,000 square km, and Djibouti at under 10,000 square km.

The Gulf is filled with numerous islands belonging to Yemen and Somalia. The islands near Djibouti are few since the region is very shallow. The Tadjoura Gulf is the main EEZ that belongs to Djibouti and is narrow.

Further North lies the Bab el Mandeb straits that lie between Djibouti and Yemen. This represents the North-West frontier of the Gulf of Aden. The Guardafui Channel, Socotra islands of Yemen, and the Somali Puntland form the Western Front of the Gulf of Aden.

4. The Gulf of Aden is considered to be an extension of the Red Sea, but has demarcated boundaries

The Gulf of Aden was viewed for several centuries as an extension of the Red Sea, beginning from the time of ancient Greek and Roman voyagers.

Prior to this by several millions of years, the Bab el Mandeb used to be wider, and both bodies of water were considered as one. However, with constant sedimentation and silt deposits on the coastline as the water currents turned at the straits, the landmass grew while the water connection became narrower.

The official geographic and hydrographic boundary placed on the Gulf of Aden is as follows:

1. East - the Arabian Sea, coupled with the Kuria Muria continental shelf near Yemen,

2. North West - The line joining Husn Murad to the North and Ras Siyyan to the East,

3. West - The entrance to the Gulf of Tadjoura between Obock and Lawyacado.

The hydrography of the Gulf of Aden is different in some aspects to the neighbouring Red Sea. The average annual temperature is lower, usually ranging between 28⁰C in summer to 15⁰C in winter.

The exact temperature is heavily dependent on the arrival of the monsoon season in the region. The rate of evaporation is an estimated 210 centimetres annually, resulting in a slightly elevated salinity. The oxygen content generally ranges between 4.0 to 5.0 milligrams/litre.

5. The Gulf was and continues to be a major global trade route

From the times of the Greeks and Romans who sailed to the East to expand their domains, the Gulf of Aden has played a major role in global trade and history as we know it.

It was the route taken by Arab and African traders to India and the Far East. Before that, the ancient Egyptians also sailed the Gulf as part of an expansion. This included trade mainly with India and Han China.

There are an estimated 21,000 ships passing through the Gulf annually, making it one of the busiest bodies of water. The main commodity here is oil from the Persian Gulf region.

In fact, an estimated 11% of seaborne petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden en route to the Mediterranean or Arabian Seas. There also refineries along the coastline that process this oil.

Certain nations have large volumes of trade in the region. For instance, countries in Europe and the Americas purchase oil from countries along the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia.

India annually ships around USD 50 billion in imports and USD 60 billion in exports through the Gulf. For this reason, both nations have naval crafts deployed in the region to provide safe passage to their respective vessels.

6. There are several major ports along the Gulf that result in large trade volumes

The port of Aden in Yemen is a major harbour along the North of the Gulf's coastline. Since the early 2010s, Aden has become the de facto capital of Yemen owing to civil strife. A large volume of oil and general cargo is shipped annually through Aden. There is also a separate container facility known as ACT, and a refinery terminal nearby.

There are other large ports along the Northern Gulf coastline, including Zinjibar, Shuqrah, Mukalla, and Ahwar in Yemen. Ras Isa Oil Terminal is another port that is partly owned by the Hunt Oil Group (based out of Texas) and is connected to the Marib Oil Fields.

Al Hodeidah is close to Ras Isa Harbor and is a hub of humanitarian aid shipments to Yemen. It also handles smaller container vessels and grain vessels. Al Makha is another major port that specializes in large coffee exports.

In fact, the world-famous Mocha coffee comes from the region surrounding Al Makha Harbor, hence the name. Other ports are Saleef, Ahwar, and Ma'alla (which is now known as the Aden World Port Zone).

Further South-West lies Djibouti harbour on the Gulf of Tadjoura. Djibouti port is well-known as a refuelling and bunkering harbour that services vessels plying along the busy route.

It is also known as a transhipment hub, with numerous companies running operations out of the port. The port also acts as an import and export harbour for Ethiopia which accounts for nearly 70% of cargo thoroughfare.

Further East of Djibouti lies Somalia and the self-declared independent region of Somaliland. The major ports in this region are Berbara in Somaliland, and Bosaso in Somalia. Berbara was a major port and served as the capital of the British protectorate of Hargeisa.

Bosaso lies in the Bari province and is the commercial capital of the autonomous Puntland region.

7. The average salinity in the Gulf is much less than the neighbouring Red Sea

Compared to the neighbouring Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden has a lower saline content. The salinity ranges between 35.5‰ along the coastlines to 37.3‰ at the centre.

On the other hand, the Red Sea has an average salinity of over 40‰. Note, the unit or symbol "‰" indicates per mille, or parts per thousand.

The conversion to the standard percentage is by reducing a factor of 10. So, the salinity in the Gulf of Aden ranges between 3.55% and 3.73% PSUs (Practical Salinity Units).

So why does this difference in salinity exist despite being connected to bodies of water? The answer to this is the currents and weather pattern in the Gulf.

While the Red Sea is closed in on all sides with only the Suez Canal and the Bab el Mandeb straits for circulation, the Gulf has a much wider set of inlets and outlets.

Water flows via the Mandeb straits into the Gulf and reduces the impact of the high evaporation rate (over 200 cms annually). Moreover, currents are created by the wide opening to the Arabian Sea, ensuring that the effects of evaporation are not felt. Lastly, there is a much higher rate of precipitation in the Gulf's region.

Some of the factors that affect salinity in the Gulf are the monsoon winds and sea currents. The constant circulation prevents the salt content from drastically increasing. It is interesting to note that the water's surface has a higher salinity than its depths. This is mainly due to sub-surface currents that create circulation below the surface.

8. Unfortunately, the Gulf of Aden is a hotbed for piracy and related incidents

Despite being a busy and thriving trade route for vessels across the globe, not all regions of the Gulf of Aden are safe or easily accessible.

Piracy has been a major concern for nations that send ships via this route since the 2000s, and it is only recently that there has been a significant decline in these occurrences. Piracy has mainly originated from Somalia and affects the Gulf of Aden, the Guardafui Channel, the islands near Socotra, and the Somali Sea.

Post the 2000 collapse of the Somalian government, there were cases of rampant illegal fishing by foreign vessels. Without the protection of their territorial waters by the disbanded Somalian Navy, coastal villages took to arms to keep their areas protected.

However, this turned into a lucrative venture, with ransoms bringing in enormous amounts of wealth into the nation. Very soon, this region became a hotbed for piracy and hijackings. Over time, the level of technology and planning with which these hijackings have taken place has been a cause for concern.

Some significant hijackings in the region include:

1. The murder of a Chinese sailor in the late 2000s because ransom demands were not met. This led to the United Nations adopting a resolution that allowed and authorized nations that sailed in the region to collaborate and "repress acts of piracy". This was over and beyond the absolute embargo on Somalia.

2. By late 2008, the hijackings began to spread outside the Gulf of Aden and encompassed larger vessels. The Indian Navy received UN authorization to conduct anti-piracy operations freely in the region.

3. The Maersk Alabama was hijacked by 4 Somali pirates, which led to a stand-off with the United States Naval forces. Ultimately, the vessel was freed and the captain taken hostage was released. This hijacking of a large vessel that was carrying relief aid to Somalia created public awareness of the dangers of sailing to the region.

4. Thereafter, international efforts against piracy rapidly increased, with more successful operations by naval forces. Russian Special Forces freed an oil tanker in 2010, the Navy SEALs of Korea rescued a Maltese chemical carrier, and the Indian Navy captured multiple pirate motherships over the years.

5. After a lull of almost 5 years, the Aris 13 Tanker was hijacked en route to Mogadishu from Djibouti in 2017. The hijacking occurred off the Somali coast, and the crew were released a few days later.

9. Owing to piracy, the Gulf has struggled to overtake the Cape of Good Hope in terms of cargo and passenger thoroughfare

There are 2 major routes for shipping between the Western and Eastern hemispheres:

1. The Suez route, between the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas, via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.

2. The Cape of Good Hope route, between the Southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans, via the Southernmost tip of Africa.

In most cases, the Cape route is much longer for ships. However, the period from 2003 - 2015 saw an increase in the number of shipping carriers preferring this route over the Suez route.

This was attributed to the rise in piracy-related incidents on the Somali coast. This severely impacted global supply chains and logistics, since vessels now had to account for a much longer journey. This also led to inevitable delays in the delivery of goods over the world.

The major source of piracy that shifted trade routes originated from the Southern conflict areas of Somalia. This was rampant until the formation of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) to prevent hijackings.

The estimated cost to the global economy from piracy was over USD 58 million in 2009, and then a drastic increase to USD 238 million in 2010. However, this reduced to USD 160 million in 2011, following extensive anti-piracy operations.

The loss to Egypt due to the lack of trade along the Suez coast cost approximately USD 642 million in 2010. The overall cost of piracy, including insurance, protection forces, legal matters, reroutes, and insurance came to around USD 6.9 billion as per a study by the Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) organization.

10. There is a global coalition of 33 countries that coordinate the efforts against piracy in this region!

With acts of piracy and hijackings on the rise, the United Nations Security Council was forced to step in and authorize some nations to deploy their warships in the region.

The Somalian Navy was disbanded following the second phase of the civil war, and this left the entire region open to piracy. It started with the UN allowing India and a few other countries that plied in the area to deploy warships under the UN Peacekeeping Force.

Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) was designated as the regional coalition task force intended to enforce law and order. It was originally a US Naval Command that operated in the Horn of Africa post 9/11. The command was transitioned from the US to Germany for the coalition forces in 2002.

The major members are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Pakistan, Japan, Germany, the UK, and the US. Several other nations have also deployed their warships with CTF-150 including India, Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey. The headquarters of the CTF is in the Middle-Eastern island nation of Bahrain, under the Combined Maritime Force (CMF), which is a 33-member nation coalition.

Over the past several years, CTF-150 has captured, arrested, and handed over countless pirates to the Somali coast guard. Large caches of weapons and drugs have also been seized during smuggling operations. Under UN laws, the Force has permission to execute a Visit, Board, Search, and Seize (VBSS) operation in order to maintain maritime peace in the area.
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Tucked in between the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula lies the Gulf of Aden. It connects to the Red Sea in the West and the Arabian Sea in the East. The countries that lie along its coastline include Yemen to the North, Somalia and Somaliland to the South, and Djibouti to the East.

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https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia

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December 21, 2021

The Issue
The number of Houthi attacks against predominantly civilian targets in Saudi Arabia doubled over the first nine months of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020, according to new CSIS analysis. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah have played a critical role in providing weapons, technology, training, and other assistance to the Yemen-based Houthis. In response, the United States needs to provide Saudi Arabia additional aid to defend the country against stand-off attacks.
While these incidents are concerning, there has been little data analysis about trends over time. To better understand the Houthi campaign, this CSIS Brief asks several questions. What are the primary military capabilities of Houthis and their security partners, especially Iran, to conduct attacks against Saudi Arabia and other targets, and how have these capabilities evolved? Has there been a change in the number or sophistication of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and other targets? What are the main policy implications, including the use of specific countermeasures to defend against stand-off attacks? To answer these questions, CSIS analyzed 4,103 Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, within Yemen and against other targets, such as maritime targets, in the Gulf between January 1, 2016, and October 20, 2021.

Based on the data, this analysis has several primary findings. First, the Houthis are orchestrating an increasingly intense irregular warfare campaign against Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf using sophisticated cruise and ballistic missiles, UAVs, and other stand-off weapons. These actions are occurring in the context of escalating violence in Yemen between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. The number of Houthi attacks per month doubled against Saudi Arabia and other targets over the first nine months of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020. ⁵ Second, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force has provided the Houthis with training and a growing arsenal of sophisticated weapons and technology for anti-tank guided missiles, sea mines, explosive-laden UAVs, ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), and other weapons and systems. The Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah have improved Houthi capabilities at a relatively low cost, especially compared to Saudi expenditures on air defense to protect its territory. ⁶ Third, the United States and its partners should conduct a more aggressive campaign to publicly highlight Iranian and Houthi actions and provide additional security assistance to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

The rest of this brief is divided into four main sections. First, it summarizes Iranian and Houthi objectives and strategies to provide context on the regional conflict in the Gulf. Second, it assesses the evolving military capabilities of Iran and the Houthis, with emphasis on extraterritorial capabilities. Third, it provides an overview of the irregular campaign by Iran and the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and other countries to assess attack trends and patterns. Fourth, it outlines policy implications, including for the United States and its partners.

Figure 1a: Pre-strike Satellite Imagery of Jazan Attack, February 2021

Figure 1b: Post-strike Satellite Imagery of Jazan Attack, April 2021

Figure 1c: Post-strike Close-Up Satellite Imagery of Jazan Attack, April 2021

Objectives and Strategies

This section begins by examining Iranian and Houthi objectives and strategies.

Iran: Over the past several years, Iran has increasingly resorted to irregular warfare as an important means of expanding its influence. Rather than conducting attacks directly against its adversaries, Iran operates indirectly through partners and proxies for several reasons.

First, the United States and other Iranian adversaries-including Saudi Arabia and Israel-enjoy a substantial advantage in conventional military power. Iran's aging inventory of conventional ground, air, and maritime capabilities lags well behind the United States and some U.S. partners in the region. A significant portion of Iran's aging air force inventory consists of U.S.-supplied aircraft that predates the 1979 revolution. ⁷

Second, most of Iran's adversaries are vulnerable to an irregular warfare campaign, which is difficult to defend against. With Saudi Arabia, for example, the oil and gas sectors account for roughly 50 percent of the country's gross domestic product. ⁸ Oil and gas facilities are susceptible to disruption by cyberattacks and stand-off weapons. Over the past two decades, Iranian-linked groups have conducted a substantial number of stand-off attacks against Israel from Lebanon, Syria, and Palestinian territory; against U.S. forces in Iraq; and against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Quds Force has also provided aid to such groups as the Houthis in Yemen, Lebanese Hezbollah, Shia militias in Syria, the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) in Iraq, local militias in Afghanistan, and groups from Pakistan, Palestinian territory, and other locations.

Third, irregular warfare is an efficient way to fight without expending significant resources and without risking escalation to conventional war. For Iran, the Quds Force has considerable experience in waging irregular warfare, with a long history of supporting non-state actors throughout the Middle East. ⁹

The Houthi Movement: Houthi military strategy has evolved since 2014, but its overall political objective has remained constant: gain international recognition of a Houthi-led government in Yemen. The Houthis have adapted their strategy partly due to tactical and operational successes and partly due to technological advancements. In 2015, the Houthis began directing their military efforts at Saudi and coalition military targets using stockpiles of ballistic missiles acquired by Yemen before the crisis and seized from Yemeni military stockpiles by the Houthis during the 2014-15 coup d'état. In 2016, the Houthis shifted to a strategy that increasingly targeted critical infrastructure, designed to undermine the Saudi-led coalition. Around the same time, the Houthis also began targeting civilian maritime assets near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key maritime choke point.

From 2017 to 2020, the Houthis increasingly leveraged improvements in UAV technology, advanced Iranian munitions, UMVs, and land and naval mine warfare. The Houthis also targeted other states participating in the Saudi military coalition, such as the United Arab Emirates. ¹⁰ While the Houthis have attacked coalition partners, their main target remains Saudi Arabia. They have expanded targeting of Saudi oil tankers, seeking to disrupt the Saudi supply chain and impact the flow of oil. As highlighted in the next section, the Houthis continue this strategy today since it has proven highly effective. Throughout the civil war, the Houthis have designed their objectives around an attrition strategy designed to force an end to Saudi coalition military activities in Yemen while sidelining potential political competitors to the Houthis.

In the short term, the Houthis want to maintain their influence and power within Yemen and on the international stage. They want to continue building legitimacy through engagement with various UN envoys and agencies while continuing to attrit coalition forces. ¹⁵ In the long term, the Houthis seek the establishment of a theocratic Yemen under Houthi leadership.

Military Capabilities

Around 2014, Iran began increasing its aid to the Houthis as the war in Yemen intensified. Led by the Quds Force, Iran has provided numerous types of weapons and systems to the Houthis, as highlighted in more detail below. ¹⁶ The Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah have also provided training to Houthi fighters, including to improve their military tactics and to help in the assembly, use, and maintenance of missiles, UAVs, and other weapons and systems. While the Quds Force cannot rely on air and land bridges to transport weapons and materiel to Yemen-which it can for its partners in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan-it uses several maritime smuggling routes. Iran frequently disassembled weapons systems, placed them on boats, and moved them through Omani and Yemeni ports such as Nishtun and Al-Ghaydah in Al-Mahrah Governorate. ¹⁷

The rest of this section is divided into three main subsections that cover Iranian and Houthi capabilities: missiles and other stand-off weapons, cyber capabilities, and maritime anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Missiles and Other Stand-Off Weapons

Figure 2: Satellite Imagery Analysis of Abqaiq Oil Processing Plant, November 2021

The Houthis have publicly showcased new UAV models, such as the Samad-4, which can be used to drop ordnance on targets, enabling their reuse in multiple attacks. ²⁶ The ability to reliably target infrastructure that was previously out of range when launching UAVs from Yemen could make Houthi targeting less predictable and further stress Saudi air defenses by increasing the number of sensitive sites that must be protected.

The UAV threat to Gulf countries extends beyond the Houthis, as Iran has also made significant use of the technology. Iran has trained Houthi fighters in the use of UAVs within its borders, including at the Kashan base near the city of Esfahan. ²⁷ A delta-wing UAV with a wingspan of approximately two meters was seen on a launch vehicle at Kashan in April 2020. ²⁸ On July 30, 2021, Saudi Arabia intercepted a UAV intended to target a Saudi commercial vessel in the southern Red Sea, near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. ²⁹ Iran has also conducted UAV strikes against Israeli maritime targets. On July 29, 2021, for example, multiple UAVs struck the tanker MT Mercer Street northeast of Oman's Duqm port, outside Omani territorial waters. The Liberian-flagged vessel was managed by an Israeli-owned shipping company, Zodiac Maritime. ³⁰

In addition to technology and capability transfers to the Houthis, Iran maintains the largest ballistic and cruise missile force in the Middle East, which poses a serious threat to Saudi Arabia and other countries. Iranian missiles are continually improving in range, speed, flight profile, and destructiveness. ³¹ Iran's ballistic missile inventory was procured with notable Chinese, Russian, and North Korean assistance. Iran possesses a family of liquid-fueled propellant missiles (the Shahab series), based on former Soviet Scud technology, and has also produced indigenously designed solid-propellant missiles (the Fateh series), based on Chinese technology. In addition, Iran possesses land-attack cruise missiles such as the Soumar/Meshkat with a range of approximately 2,000 kilometers. As Figure 3 highlights, Iran could likely develop the technology to expand its missile ranges over the next decade. ³²

Cyber Capabilities

Moving forward, Iran and Iranian-linked groups will likely use offensive cyber operations as a major instrument against Saudi critical infrastructure in the Gulf, such as oil facilities. In the event of an escalation in hostilities, however, Iran and Iranian-linked groups also have the capability to target desalination facilities, the electrical grid, SCADA systems, and other critical infrastructure using offensive cyber operations. Potential applications of these cyber capabilities include an attempted April 2020 cyberattack on Israeli water treatment plants. ³⁷ These cyber capabilities allow Iran to support the Houthis in areas where the Houthis do not possess notable indigenous capabilities. Particularly when combined with the Houthi threat to Saudi critical infrastructure, Iranian cyberattacks have the potential to cause major disruptions across multiple infrastructure sectors.

Maritime Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities

Iran also has layered area denial and anti-surface warfare capabilities, including naval mining (e.g., moored contact, drifting contact, and limpet mines), UAVs, small boat swarming tactics, and coastal defenses. ³⁸ Iran employs a range of other irregular weapons and tactics to threaten critical infrastructure transiting strategic waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Iranian mobile coastal-defense cruise missile launchers can readily be deployed along the Iranian coast, on Iranian-claimed islands in the Gulf, and potentially even on oil platforms. ³⁹ Iran has expanded its inventory of coastal-defense cruise missiles from Chinese C802 and C700 series cruise missiles to domestically produced variants, such as the Noor, Ghader, and Ghadir. ⁴⁰ Iran's coastal-defense cruise missile threat is also extraterritorial. ⁴¹ Iran is the only Gulf country that possesses submarines. Iran's submarine force consists of three Kilo-class submarines capable of laying mines and launching torpedoes, as well as other imported and domestically produced midget-class submarines. ⁴² As part of its naval doctrine, which emphasizes irregular warfare, Iran employs smaller vessels that emphasize speed and mobility. Iran could employ fast-attack vessels to fire on oil tankers, lay mines, or conduct swarming tactics to isolate and overwhelm targets. ⁴³ Iranian acquisition of the Houdong-class missile boats, C-14-class missile boats, and MK 13-class patrol craft (all from China) further highlights its focus on irregular capabilities. ⁴⁴ Iran also produces domestic variants, such as the Peykaap I-/II-class patrol craft and missile boats. ⁴⁵

In sum, Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia need to be understood as part of a broader Iranian irregular warfare campaign that includes offensive cyber operations and maritime A2/AD capabilities.

An Irregular Warfare Campaign

The pace of Houthi attacks has increased in recent months, indicating an intensification of the conflict in the Arabian Peninsula. To better understand historical patterns, CSIS analyzed 4,103 Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, in Yemen, and against other targets in the Gulf between January 1, 2016, and October 20, 2021. It is possible-and perhaps likely-that this data underreports the actual number of attacks, since some were not publicly reported by Saudi Arabia or were unclaimed by the Houthis. ⁴⁶ In addition, the Houthis falsely claimed some attacks, such as the September 19 strikes against Abqaiq and Khurais in Saudi Arabia highlighted in Figures 4a and 4b, which were perpetrated in part by Iran. Nevertheless, this data is likely the most comprehensive and accurate overview of Houthi attacks.

Figure 4a: Broad Satellite Imagery of Attack against Abqaiq, September 2019
Source: U.S. government/Digital Globe.
Figure 4b: Close-Up Satellite Imagery of Attack against Abqaiq, September 2019
Source: U.S. government/Digital Globe.
During the first nine months of 2020, Houthi forces executed a monthly average of 38 attacks. ⁴⁷ During the same period in 2021, that number rose to an average of 78 attacks per month, for a total of 702 attacks across the total nine-month period. ⁴⁸ This increase was largely driven by the Houthi offensive in Marib, where 199 attacks took place during the first nine months of 2021. ⁴⁹ Houthi forces also carried out 133 total attacks in August 2021 alone-the highest single-month tally since at least January 2016. These attacks, however, were not equally distributed across geographic areas.

The attacks had been trending downward but rose in 2021. The number of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia were highest in 2016 and 2018, declined in 2019 and 2020, and then increased in 2021. ⁵⁰ In fact, the total number of attacks in the first nine months of 2021 were higher than the entire year of 2020. Recent trends are disturbing for several reasons. First, the increase in attacks from 2020 to 2021 shows that Houthi forces retain the ability and desire to conduct stand-off attacks. Second, the Houthis are utilizing more advanced weapons, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, which suggests that their capabilities are improving. Third, the Houthis continue to complement their actions in Saudi Arabia with military offensives in some areas of Yemen, including in Marib Province.

Over the first nine months of 2021, the Houthis conducted 33 attacks against Saudi Arabia-a monthly average of 3.7 attacks, as shown in Figure 5. By comparison, the Houthis orchestrated 14 attacks over the same period in 2020, for a monthly average of 1.6 attacks. ⁵¹ This increase in attacks, while largely driven by relatively large single-month attack totals in February and August 2021, is notable for its demonstration of Houthi resilience and ability to translate qualitative improvements in weapons and capabilities into quantitative increases in attacks. The Houthis' recent ability to ramp up attacks indicates that they pose an enduring threat to Saudi Arabia.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have been concentrated in the country's southwest provinces and along the Red Sea, particularly in the provinces of Asir, Jazan, and Najran, as highlighted in Figure 6. Together, these three provinces accounted for more than 80 percent of Houthi attacks within Saudi Arabia from January 2016 to September 2021, with Jazan alone accounting for approximately 38 percent of attacks. ⁵² These three Saudi provinces share a land border with the Yemen's Saada Governorate, a Houthi stronghold and home to a large number of Houthi ballistic missile launch sites. ⁵³ Given the close geographic proximity between Houthi-controlled provinces in Yemen and Azir, Jazan, and Najran, these Saudi provinces are likely to remain under continued threat of Houthi missile and UAV attacks. The proximity of these provinces to Yemen also limits the reaction time of Saudi air defense systems.

In addition to attacks against land-based targets in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Houthi forces have attacked maritime targets such as oil tankers. One recent data analysis found that Houthi forces executed 24 successful or attempted maritime UAV attacks from January 2017 to June 2021, with a majority of those attacks clustered around Yemeni ports such as al-Hudaydah and as-Salif and directed at commercial vessels such as oil tankers. ⁵⁸ There are other emerging tactics, such as the use of unmanned explosive-laden UMVs against commercial vessels. On March 3, 2020, remotely controlled skiffs bearing military-grade explosives attempted to attack the Saudi-flagged ship Gladiolus approximately 90 nautical miles off the Yemeni coast. ⁵⁹ In a subsequent letter to the United Nations, the Saudi government alleged that the Houthis orchestrated the attempted attack. ⁶⁰

Despite these actions, Houthi attacks have had mixed strategic, political, and economic effects. The attacks have not significantly impacted global oil markets or domestic oil production in Saudi Arabia despite some acute price shocks, such as when oil prices rose to more than $70 per barrel following a March 2021 attack on the Ras Tanura oil refinery. ⁶¹ Furthermore, only a limited number of ballistic missile attacks have resulted in losses among the Saudi-led coalition. ⁶² Saudi ground and air forces have shot down roughly 90 percent of UAVs and missiles launched from Yemen. ⁶³

Policy Recommendations

Despite Saudi successes in shooting down Houthi missiles and drones, Iran and the Houthis have demonstrated a persistent ability to threaten Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf. The sustained campaign has forced the Saudi coalition to devote valuable military resources to tracking and targeting Houthi missile sites, storage facilities, and assembly locations. Houthi attacks against civilian infrastructure have also raised the pressure on the Saudi government to end the conflict. ⁶⁴ Attacks on Saudi infrastructure, particularly with UAVs, represent an effective way to impose maximum economic and reputational consequences for the Saudi government at a relatively low cost. Patriot interceptors can cost over $1 million, while Houthi UAVs may cost only a few hundred dollars. ⁶⁵ Consequently, there is a growing need to provide Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states with several types of assistance.

First, the United States and other partners should more aggressively highlight the Houthi and Iranian military campaign against Saudi Arabia. Not only has there been a rise in the number of attacks against Saudi Arabia over the past year, but Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah continue to provide the Houthis with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems. The Houthis now have a growing assortment of cruise and ballistic missiles, UAVs, and other stand-off weapons capable of striking targets throughout the Gulf-and beyond. Yet there has been little systematic media coverage or sustained public condemnation. The U.S. State Department has periodically condemned specific incidents. In August 2021, for example, the Houthis fired a missile at a civilian airport in Abha, wounding eight civilians. The U.S. State Department strongly condemned the strikes, noting that "Houthi attacks are perpetuating the conflict, prolonging the suffering of the Yemeni people, and jeopardizing peace efforts at a critical moment." ⁶⁶ But the United States and other governments have not adequately highlighted the extent of the problem.

Growing public awareness of the extent of Iranian support for the Houthis could also put pressure on multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, to condemn Iranian intervention more forcefully in the conflict and demand that the Houthis renounce Iranian support as a part of peace negotiations. Growing public awareness could be helpful with the U.S. Congress, where arms sales to Saudi Arabia have come under criticism. A better understanding of the Houthi and Iranian campaign in the Gulf also has implications for other U.S. partners, such as Israel, which face a significant stand-off threat from Iranian-linked groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Palestinian territory.

Second, the United States and its partners should provide additional security assistance to Saudi Arabia to defend itself-including airports, oil and gas facilities, and other critical infrastructure targets-against these attacks and to counter Iranian actions in Yemen. In November 2021, for example, the United States authorized the sale of 280 AIM-120C-7/C-8 variant air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia, in addition to spare parts, support, and training. AIM-120C missiles, deployed from Saudi aircraft, have been instrumental in intercepting persistent UAV attacks against Saudi Arabia, where both Saudi civilians and foreign nationals are at risk of harm in such attacks. ⁶⁷ Broader arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been controversial because some U.S. weapons have been used to conduct airstrikes in Yemen that have killed civilians. While previous criticism of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia has centered on the risk for civilian harm in air-to-ground strikes, these air-to-air missile capabilities provide Saudi Arabia a valuable resource for defending civilian populations and infrastructure without the same humanitarian risks.

Patriot missile batteries remain critical, as Saudi surface-to-air missiles intercept a significant number of attempted missile strikes on Saudi Arabia. ⁶⁸ But the United States removed some of its Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia in 2020 and pulled additional Patriot batteries from the country in 2021, raising concerns across the Gulf about U.S. commitment to the region. ⁶⁹ Since Saudi Arabia has run dangerously low on ammunition it uses to defend against Houthi attacks, the United States should consider providing Saudi Arabia additional supplies of Patriot interceptors. ⁷⁰ In addition, the United States should provide additional counter-UAV technology, since Patriot systems have limited utility against small UAVs. Examples might include Coyote UAVs, which can be used in counter-UAV campaigns; Phaser high-power microwave systems; and high-energy laser systems to counter stand-off weapons.

The United States can also help provide actionable intelligence on the location of Houthi stand-off infrastructure in Yemen. Identifying and conducting precision strikes against the locations where the Houthis are launching, storing, and assembling cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, explosive-laden UAVs, and other stand-off weapons requires all-source intelligence and analysis.

Third, the United States and its partners should continue aggressive interdiction efforts against Iranian weapons and components to Yemen. There are several routes used by Iran and Iranian-linked smuggling networks. The first follows the coastlines of Oman and Yemen and is used to smuggle high-value military cargo, such as missile components, anti-tank guided missile containers, and UAV and UMV components. A second route involves transshipment at sea off the coast of Somalia and seems to mostly supply small arms and light weapons. A third route goes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. ⁷¹ Previous U.S. interdiction efforts have yielded some successes, such as a May 2021 seizure at sea of Iranian illicit arms, likely bound for Yemen, by a U.S. Coast Guard Advanced Interdiction Team working from a U.S. Navy ship. ⁷²

In December 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the seizure of 171 surface-to-air missiles, eight anti-tank missiles, and over 1.1 million barrels of petroleum products from six separate at-sea boardings in 2019 and 2020. ⁷³ While the seizures from these boardings are significant, the Department of Justice provided valuable credibility to the counter-smuggling actions by verifying the sources and intended destinations of these shipments as coming from Iran and bound for such organizations as the Houthis. The United States should continue to dedicate Department of Justice resources to publicly validate any future weapons or materiel seizures, which helps strengthen international legal norms and rules while publicly exposing and condemning the role Iran plays in supporting the Houthis and other foreign terrorist groups.

United States Central Command has utilized the Coast Guard's deployable Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT) for opposed boardings in the Arabian Sea and Northern Arabian Gulf; however, the targets of opportunity for boardings are greater than the number of MSRTs available for such operations at any given time. Additionally, six new 154-foot Coast Guard Fast Response Cutters (FRC) are intended to replace the aging 110-foot Patrol Boats (WPBs) in Bahrain to support U.S. Central Command, with the fourth of six being commissioned in October 2021. ⁷⁴ Given the increased capabilities of the FRCs over the legacy WPBs, U.S. Central Command could use these vessels as effective counter-smuggling assets further south in the Arabian Gulf, targeting traditional smuggling transit zones.

Despite seizure successes using organic and deployed ships and boarding teams, these efforts have not been commensurate with the scale and scope of the weapons smuggling problem. The United States and its partners should devote additional resources to collect and analyze intelligence on Iranian smuggling routes, as well as conduct maritime and air patrols to interdict weapons shipments to the Houthis. An important component of these efforts could be renewed bilateral security assistance to build the capacity of the Yemeni coast guard, which works to counter smuggling and other illicit activities under the auspices of the internationally recognized government.

Iran and the Houthis have demonstrated a persistent ability to threaten Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf. With the use of relatively cheap stand-off weapons such as UAVs, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, Houthi forces can impose political and financial costs on Saudi Arabia. The Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah have played a critical role in improving Houthi capabilities. This irregular warfare campaign is occurring in a broader context in which Iran is increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium, supporting a growing number of non-state partners in the region, and developing longer-range and more accurate missiles. Without a more effective campaign to publicly highlight and counter these attacks and help Saudi Arabia defend itself, however, Iran and the Houthis will continue to destabilize the region.

Seth G. Jones is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and author most recently of Three Dangerous Men: Russia, China, Iran, and the Rise of Irregular Warfare (W.W. Norton, 2021). Jared Thompson is a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS. Danielle Ngo is a military fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. Brian McSorley is a military fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is senior fellow for imagery analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at CSIS.
The authors give special thanks to Jon Alterman, Chris Bernotavicius, Catrina Doxsee, Kateryna Halstead, Grace Hwang, Tom Karako, Michelle Macander, Norman Roule, Shaan Shaikh, and Matthew Strohmeyer for their comments on the draft. Thanks also to Jennifer Jun for her assistance with the satellite imagery analysis. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief. CSIS Briefs© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Please consult the PDF for references. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia

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Download the Brief The Issue The number of Houthi attacks against predominantly civilian targets in Saudi Arabia doubled over the first nine months of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020, according to new CSIS analysis. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah have played a critical role in providing weapons, technology, training, and other assistance to the Yemen-based Houthis.

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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/20/houthis-launch-attacks-on-saudi-energy-desalination-facilities

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Houthis launch ‘barrage of attacks’ on multiple Saudi sites

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Saudi-led coalition says the barrage of drone and missile attacks by the Yemeni group did not cause any casualties.

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As the conflict in Yemen enters its seventh year, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that it has caused the deaths ofnearly a quarter of a million people. Millions of Yemenis continue to face the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, with more than half the population facing acute levels of food insecurity. Yemen depends on imports of almost all its food and essential commodities, and the collapse of its currency has led to skyrocketing food and other commodity prices and reduced households' purchasing power. Millions of people cannot afford to meet their basic needs.

The conflict intensified in 2021 with 49 districts in Yemen directly affected by active front lines, up from 35 at the start of 2020. Marib governorate was the site of heavy fighting between Yemeni government forces and the Houthi armed group. Over 4 million people are internally displaced due to the conflict. The Covid-19 pandemic worsened the humanitarian crisis.

Civilians across the country suffered from worsening economic conditions and lack of basic services. Southern Yemen witnessed protests over deteriorating economic conditions and basic services. Torrential rains and flooding in May 2021 killed scores of people and damaged homes and infrastructure across the country. The UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts (GEE) on Yemen and other rights groups documented how parties to the conflict continue to commit serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including violations that likely amount to war crimes. Nevertheless, under heavy pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the UN Human Rights Council narrowly voted in October 2021 to end the mandate of the UN Group of Eminent Experts, shuttering the only international, independent body investigating abuses by all parties to the conflict in Yemen.

Houthi authorities in 2021 continued to block UN experts from securing the Safer oil tanker off the coast of Hodeida, leaving Yemen at risk of an environmental disaster if the ship's 1.1 million barrels of oil leak into the Red Sea.

Covid-19

In late 2021 Yemen experienced a third wave of Covid-19 infections. As of August 2021, confirmed cases of Covid-19 had reached 8,265, with 3,252 associated deaths according to the World Health Organization, but the true numbers are likely much higher. The Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access Program (COVAX) promised 4.2 million vaccine doses to Yemen but by the middle of 2021 had only delivered 511,000 according to Oxfam. By late September 2021, authorities across the country had administered only 322,934 Covid-19 vaccine doses.

In June 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that Houthi authorities have suppressed information about the dangers and impact of Covid-19 and undermined international efforts to provide vaccines in areas under their control. Health workers in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen said that they faced significant barriers to obtaining vaccines imposed by Houthi authorities, subjecting them to unnecessary risk, and further damaging the country's healthcare system.

Unlawful Attacks

In 2021, the Houthi armed group indiscriminately fired artillery and missiles into heavily populated areas in Marib governorate, killing and wounding civilians. Sirwah district in Marib was the main focus of the Saudi and UAE-led coalition's airstrikes in 2021 as coalition forces attempted to prevent Houthi forces from advancing into Marib city. Houthi forces fired mortars, rockets, and other missiles indiscriminately into other heavily populated areas including attacks into Taizz, Hodeidah, and Mocha, and continued launching ballistic missiles indiscriminately toward populated areas in Saudi Arabia.

The Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, a monitoring mechanism under the United Nations Protection Cluster for Yemen, reported that 2,087 civilians were killed in armed violence in 2020. In September, the Yemeni human rights group Mwatana and Global Rights Compliance concluded that conduct by the coalition and Houthis severely impeded civilians' access to food and water, effectively using starvation as a weapon of war, in violation of international humanitarian law.

Throughout the conflict, the Saudi and UAE-led coalition and the Houthis have committed unlawful attacks against civilian objects, such as residential homes, hospitals, and schools.

Children and Armed Conflict

More than half the 20.7 million Yemenis in dire need of humanitarian assistance or protection are children. In 2021, Save the Children reported that between 2018 and 2020 a quarter of all civilian casualties were children. More than 1.5 million of Yemen's 4 million displaced people are children, and hundreds of thousands of children have become migrants or sought asylum abroad.

UNICEF and other groups warned in 2021 that children were facing the highest levels of severe acute malnutrition recorded in Yemen since the escalation of the conflict in 2015, with 2.3 million children acutely malnourished and nearly 400,000 children under five at imminent risk of death.

UNICEF stated in August that 2 million children were out of school and that one in six schools could no longer be used due to war damage. Parties to the conflict continued to utilize schools for military purposes. The UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen reported in 2021 that the Houthis, the Saudi and UAE-led coalition, and the Yemeni government had​​ recruited children, used children in hostilities, and detained children.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for the second consecutive year failed to include the Saudi and UAE-led coalition from his "list of shame" of parties responsible for grave violations against children during conflict, despite attacks that killed and maimed children.

Landmines

According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) have caused approximately 9,000 civilian casualties since the beginning of the conflict and 284 civilian casualties in 2020, including 55 children. Houthi forces have used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, to which Yemen is a party.

The GEE in 2021 reported that Houthi forces have used anti-personnel landmines, which may amount to war crimes. Houthi forces' use of mines against objects critical for survival has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and caused the starvation of civilians, an investigation by Mwatana showed.

Arbitrary Detentions, Torture, and Enforced Disappearances

Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other rights groups produced mounting evidence of widespread arbitrary detention, forced disappearances, and ill-treatment and torture in detention by parties to the conflict.

On September 18, Houthi forces executed a group of 9 people, reportedly including a 17 year old, in Sana'a's Tahrir Square. They had been accused of facilitating an airstrike that killed a Houthi leader in 2018. The UN high commissioner for human rights said in September 2021 that "​​the defendants were sentenced to death in a judicial process that violated their constitutional rights and did not comply with fair trial standards under international law."

Houthi authorities in 2021 continued to persecute the Baha'i religious minority group. In 2021, The Independent reported that Houthi authorities detained at least 1,000 women between 2017 and 2020. Since 2015, Houthi authorities detained journalists and individuals exercising their right to expression, according to a 2021 report by Amnesty International.

A 2021 report by Mwatana stated that Houthi forces, Yemeni government-backed forces, and UAE-backed forces tortured to death detainees in secret prisons they have controlled since the start of the conflict.

Human Rights Watch reported in 2021 that the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces arbitrarily detained and tortured a journalist apparently for his critical reporting. The Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government, the STC, and the Houthi forces continued to commit egregious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced disappearances and torture, according to a 2021 UN report.

Blocking and Impeding Humanitarian Access

In areas they each control, Houthi authorities and the Yemeni government imposed restrictions against humanitarian organizations, humanitarian workers, and the flow of humanitarian aid. As a result, 87 humanitarian projects proposed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) went unimplemented due to lack of approvals by Houthi authorities and the Yemeni government. Abusive practices by the ​​parties dispossessed civilians from objects that were essential to their survival and caused their starvation, in some cases their death.

In late 2020, Human Rights Watch documented severe restrictions by the Houthi authorities, the Yemeni government and affiliated forces, and the UAE-backed STC on the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid. While aid funds are also in short supply, Human Rights Watch found that the obstruction of aid is exacerbating the country's dire humanitarian situation and weakening its response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Saudi and UAE-led coalition has forced Sana'a International Airport to remain closed since August 2016, which has severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine to civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law. In March 2021, Saudi Arabia announced a peace initiative that included the potential reopening of the airport, but it remained shuttered as of October 2021.

Women's Rights

In February, Houthi authorities arrested a Yemeni model and two other women and subjected them to an unfair trial for allegedly committing an indecent act and drug possession. In November, Houthi-controlled court in Sana'a sentenced the model to five years in prison. In September, the UN Group of Experts reported widespread gender-based violence and sexual violence by the Houthi forces and the UAE-backed forces.

In April, the UN OCHA reported that Yemeni women faced restrictions on movement in Al-Hudaydah and Hajjah, areas under Houthi control, where authorities required them to be accompanied by a mahram (male relative) in order to travel. In 2019, local media reported that Houthi authorities issued directives to local transportation bus companies requiring that women be escorted by a mahram when traveling between cities in Yemen. Women also reported to local media that bus drivers have refused to take them because they do not have a mahram, or that it cost them more money to travel since they must pay for the mahram's ticket. Women are also not allowed to stay in hotels except with a mahram, particularly cities like Aden and Taiz. In addition, authorities continued to require woman to show guardianship permission and have their guardian present-a father, brother, husband, or son-to obtain or renew personal identity cards or passports, despite the law not requiring such conditions. Women's lack of access to legal documentation restricted their ability to travel abroad.

Reproductive health services were limited or nonexistent for the five million Yemeni women and adolescent girls of child-bearing age. The UN Fund for Population (UNFPA) reported in September 2021 that in Yemen one woman dies every two hours during childbirth. UNFPA reported that child marriage is increasing as a coping mechanism by impoverished families as the conflict continues. There is no minimum age for marriage in Yemen.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Yemen's penal code prohibits same-sex relations. Article 264 punishes anal sex with 100 lashes and one year in prison if participants are not married. If married, the same article prescribes death by stoning. Article 268 punishes sex between women with up to three years in prison.

Articles 273 and 274 punish any act "indicating a breach of modesty and contrary to etiquette" with up to six months in prison.

Human Rights Watch is aware of multiple cases where transgender men and women have faced threats and harassment in Yemen. In one case in 2020, Yemeni authorities arbitrarily detained a transgender woman for eight months on charges of sodomy and "indecent practices." Police and prison guards subjected her to severe abuse and torture, including a forced anal exam.

Abuses against Migrants

Scores of African migrants died at a detention center in Sana'a in March 2021 after Houthi security forces launched unidentified projectiles into the center, causing a fire. The GEE reported in September that Houthi authorities had arrested 11 Houthi soldiers in connection with this incident.

The International Organization on Migration (IOM) reported in July 2021 that thousands of migrants were estimated to be stranded across the country, with many held in inhumane conditions without adequate access to basic services and food.

Key International Actors

Despite years of documentation of unlawful attacks, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Spain, Germany, Australia, and other countries continued to license the sale of weapons and military equipment to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other coalition members. Iran continued to support Houthi forces militarily. Italy blocked arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in January 2021 over concerns that weapons could be used against civilians, but later eased restrictions amid diplomatic tensions.

The GEE, the UN panel of experts on Yemen, and other rights groups reiterated their call for countries to address the lack of accountability for serious crimes, including probable war crimes, committed in Yemen. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, members of the UN Human Rights Council narrowly voted to end the GEE's mandate in October. More than three dozen states at the UN General Assembly subsequently called for the international community to "actively explore further alternative mechanisms to monitor the human rights situation in Yemen and ensure accountability."

In 2021, the US appointed a new special envoy for Yemen, Timothy Lenderking. The new UN special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, began his role in September 2021. The UN, the US, and Oman led negotiations between the Houthi armed group, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemeni government but made little progress. The UN Security Council continued to enforce the UN sanctions regime against just one party, the Houthis, despite numerous violations of the laws of war by the Saudi and UAE-led coalition.

In February, the European Parliament reiterated its longstanding concerns over the conflict in Yemen, deplored violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties involved, and urged arms exports bans against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In March, the EU urged an investigation into the tragic death of migrants in a detention center in Sana'a. Over the year, the EU condemned abuses in Yemen and the continued attacks by all parties to the conflict, and intensified diplomatic efforts towards a ceasefire and a political solution.

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World Report 2022: Rights Trends in Yemen

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As the conflict in Yemen enters its seventh year, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that it has caused the deaths ofnearly a quarter of a million people. Millions of Yemenis continue to face the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, with more than half the population facing acute levels of food insecurity.

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Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in Syria and Yemen (Amanda Guidero, Maia Carter Hallward) (z-lib.org) (verschoben) 4

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Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in Syria and Yemen (Amanda Guidero, Maia Carter Hallward) (z-lib.org) (verschoben) 3

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Global Responses to Conflict and Crisis in Syria and Yemen (Amanda Guidero, Maia Carter Hallward) (z-lib.org) (verschoben) 2

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Yemen What Everyone Needs to Know® (Asher Orkaby) (z-lib.org) (verschoben) 2

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Yemen What Everyone Needs to Know® (Asher Orkaby) (z-lib.org) (verschoben)