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021122 Academic Research and Publishing Skills - Philosophy  - Mark Perkins

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012122 Academic Writing Skills - Philosophy

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Philosophy of science and technology-lecture3

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Philosophy of sicence and technology-Transcript1

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Philosophy of science and technology - Lecture2

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Philosophy of science and technology-Transcript4

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Essay Question: What is the problem of demarcation and how does Karl Popper resolve it? Is Popper’s solution successful?.

Guiding subquestions:

What is the significance of the problem of demarcation, is it important currently in our society, what broader implications does it have beyond being a philosophical question?

What was Popper’s motivation for offering a solution to this problem? What is his main proposal?

What are the main weaknesses of Popper’s proposal? Are they strong enough to undermine his thesis?

Are there alternative solutions to the problem of demarcation that are more plausible? Which solution do you think most successfully gives us an answer to this question?

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Essay question: ‘If scientific revolutions exhibit Kuhnian incommensurability, science cannot attain truth about the natural world.’ Discuss.

Guiding subquestions:

What are Kuhn’s aim in his work?

Introduce the vocabulary that Kuhn introduces - what is a paradigm, what is a puzzle, an anomaly, a crisis scientific revolution? Try to illustrate this with an example from science.

Describe how Kuhn construed theory change and how incommensurability occurs.

Does incommensurability entails that our theories cannot track the nature of reality?

Can we compare theories if we employ different values, or, can we communicate and establish the rational transition between theories of the meaning of terms changes?

Evaluate the plausibility of Kuhn’s thesis on theory choice.

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Essay question: 'If scientific practise is driven by bias and stereotypes, science cannot be objective.' Do you agree?

Guiding subquestions:

What is the accepted orthodoxy about science that feminist philosophers challenge?

If science is influenced by bias and stereotypes, can it be an objective and rational enterprise?

What methodological criteria have feminist philosophers proposed to minimise the effects of bias in science?

What are the broader implications of the feminist critiques of science for scientific objectivity?

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Essay Question: What is the argument from the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’? Does it undermine scientific realism?

Guiding subquestions:

What is scientific realism?

What is the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI)?

How does PMI challenge the realist?

How have scientific realists responded to the PMI?

Choose a realist response to theory change and what happens to past theoretical terms (Psillos’s ‘divide and concur’ strategy, Harding and Rosenberg's argument for continuity of reference) and explain how it is meant to block the PMI

Do you find this realist response convincing?

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You can ask any question or share your ideas here!

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Some notes and summaries about The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical MaleFemale Roles written by Emily Martin:

Part 1: Egg and sperm: A scientific fairy tale

There is an attitudinal difference between the description of male and female germ cells in biology textbooks. Female germ cells are generally regarded as a negative role. Some negative words like "dying", "losing", or "denuding" are used to describe menstruation. Martin used many examples from biology books to show this difference in attitudes. And she combines this difference with the gender stereotypes in society. In most of the books, sperm are portrayed as aggressive, active, and possessing the power to penetrate the egg cell. People give “personhood” to the sperm and the egg cell, which paints the picture that the egg cell is like a princess in distress and the sperm is the heroic warrior who comes to the rescue of the egg cell.

She wants to emphasize that in this sence biology is constructed in cultural terms. Maybe she also wants to say that scientific descriptions contain biases and stereotypes.

Part 2: New research, old imagery

The new biological findings do not change the overall picture.

The new findings suggest that sperm do not penetrate the surface of the oocyte mechanically, but enter by enzymes on the surface that break down the material on the surface of the oocyte. The egg cell surface also has substances that stick to the sperm and prevent them from swimming away. The tail of the sperm swings from side to side, but the fact that its head sticks to the egg cell causes it to move in the forward direction.

This new picture seemed to shatter cultural expectations, but scientists saw the sperm as still the active party, only to a lesser extent. Three years later, they reorganized the concept to depict the egg cell as an aggressive sperm hunter.

Now, instead of being passive and receptive, the egg cell has an active behavior. There is a clear interaction between the sperm and the egg cell, and they are active partners.

However, Gerald Schatten and Helen Schatten later described the process of molecular adhesion between sperm and egg cell as a sperm launching a "harpoon", an analogy that Martin argued was biased and could have been used as a bridge or a thread, which would have placed sperm and egg cell on an equal footing. The harpoon analogy places the sperm on an equal footing with the egg cell, while the harpoon analogy places more emphasis on the active nature of the sperm.

Other Johns Hopkins researchers have used terms such as "recognizing each other" and "interacting" to describe the fertilization process, but the Scientific American journal links the new findings to past discoveries, again referring to sperm piercing the egg cell, thus putting the initiative of the sperm up.

Wassarman refers to a molecular structure on the egg cell as a "sperm receiver". This implies that the oocyte is a passive, waiting actor. Martin questioned why it could not be the other way around, where the egg cell is the key and the sperm is the lock. We could have a description that puts the two on an equal footing, for example by considering them as two halves of a small box, or by considering the whole process of fusion as an action that opens fertilization.

Also, Wassarman reverses the role of “receptor” and “ligand” in the description of fertilization. Typically, molecules on the sperm would be called receptors and molecules on the egg would be called ligands. But Wassarman chose to name ZP3 on the egg the receptor and to create a new term, "the egg-binding protein," for the molecule on the sperm that otherwise would have been called the receptor.

Another way that Wassarman makes less of the egg's activity is by describing components of the egg but referring to the sperm as a whole entity. In his words, the various components of the oocyte correspond to functions, while the behavior of the sperm is described as having purposes that given by itself.

In short, what Martin hopes to show is that new scientific advances do not allow people to treat sperm and egg cells with parallel descriptions. Some descriptions will still tend to portray the sperm as the active party, while the egg cell is either the passive party or an aggressive and dangerous threat.

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One question about The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical MaleFemale Roles written by Emily Martin.

In page 498 Martin says:

These images grant the egg an active role but at the cost of appearing disturbingly aggressive. Images of woman as dangerous and aggressive, the femme fatale who victimizes men,are widespread in Western literature and culture.More specific is the connection of spider imagery with the idea of an engulfing, devouring mother.New data did not lead scientists to eliminate gender stereotypes in their descriptions of egg and sperm.

Is there some overreaction here? I think the understanding of the role of the oocyte as an aggressive threat is a bit exaggerated here. It seems to me that the material that appears on the surface of the egg cell that makes the sperm stick is actually there to make it easier to interact with it, and not to the extent of a hunter. It seems to me that this is a way for the two cells to complement each other, with the sperm being flexible and fast, and the egg cell making sure that the sperm does not miss it in this way. It is hard for me to associate this with the female being an aggressive, dangerous threat.

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Summaries and some notes about A CONFUTATION OF CONVERGENT REALISM written by Larry Laudan:

Larry Laudan systematically argues against the arguments of two positivists. One is about the connection between approximate truth, empirical success, and genuinely refer; the second is about reservation in the change of scientific theories.

Part 1

In the criticism of the first argument, Laudan's strategy is broadly to seek support from the history of science for examples that show there is no necessary connection between the approximate truth of a theory, its empirical success, and whether the central terms genuinely refer. Specifically, there are theories in the history of science that are empirically successful but have no references to the central terms, and there are theories that its central terms genuinely refer but are not successful (at a given time).

Part 2

In the criticism of the second argument, Laudan also seeks support from the history of science. He points out that our current successful theories have not always been able to contain previous theories as a limit case. Specifically, the conditions for achieving the goal of contain previous theories as a limit case are demanding. Firstly, they need to overlap (maybe not completely) at the ontological level, and secondly, the central terms of both need to have the similar reference. Laudan also states that a new theory does not have the mission to explain the success or failure of previous theories. Its central terminology can be completely different from that of the previous theory. There is no obligation to inherit and retain even the parts of the previous theory that are confirmed. A scientist does not feel guilty about rejecting an old theory completely, as long as the new theory “reveal itself in greater accuracy at the experimental level”, that is, accepted and applied on a practical level.

Part 3 My Ideas
I generally agree with Laudan's views, with some minor disagreements. I strongly agree with Laudan's approach of seeking examples from the history of science, and while many philosophers of science do this, the number of examples Laudan cites is large, and he often juxtaposes a series of examples to support his ideas. This approach sometimes makes for a very strong argument, but it also has disadvantages, which I will elaborate on in the section that raises questions. In terms of argumentative method, I prefer the one used by Lakatos. He will pick one or a few examples from the history of science, (not too many) carefully analyze the details in each case, and through this detailed analysis and reflection, provide support for his argument. A specific analysis of an example seems to me to be a much stronger way of arguing, because the reader gets the full picture of the event. Also, a detailed grasp of the story can provide more depth of thought that listing multiple examples cannot.

Laudan's criticism of the first argument is, in my opinion, successful. He uses numerous examples to show that there is no necessary connection between whether the central terms of the theory refer, whether the theory is empirically successful, and whether the theory is approximately true, even if positivists wish they were. I note that Clyde I. Hardin and Alexander Rosenberg have responded to Laudan's critique, and I look forward to seeing some interesting perspectives.

By the way, much of Laudan's criticism aims at Putnam's views, but it seems that some positivists of realism, such as Alexander Bird, do not quite agree with Putnam's defense of positivism at this point.

I think Laudan's criticism of the second argument has an instrumentalist tendency, as can be seen in his conclusion 6, too. For according to Laudan, even if a theory has no connection to a prior theory, people will accept it as long as it is better on a practical level. However, such new theories with no connection to previous theories are difficult to be risen, because scientists are in a community with some basic consensus, like Kuhn's paradigm. Even if scientists can innovate, they will not completely reject the previous theories, that is, they will not completely abandon the basic consensus of scientists at the current stage. Taking a step back, even if such a theory emerges, it is even better at the practical level, but has nothing to do with the previous theory, and people, although they may apply it, will still have doubts about this inexplicability. It is not only scientists, but anyone who has high hopes for the scientific enterprise, who wants our knowledge to be an interconnected web that gives a holistic grasp of present and past theories. While this cannot be said to be the obligation of every new theory, theories that do so are more readily accepted. Thus, such a new theory, completely divorced from previous theories, is not guaranteed to gain majority acceptance, and people may continue their exploration of it, seeking to find its connection to previous theories.

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Some questions about A CONFUTATION OF CONVERGENT REALISM written by Larry Laudan

Question 1
As Laudan says, there is no clear statement on approximatively true. Then he asserts that a theory cannot be approximately true when its central terms didn’t genuinely refer. But he doesn’t explain this specially.

To see why, we need to explore briefly one of the connections between 'genuinely referring' and being 'approximately true'. However the latter is understood, I take it thata realist would never want to say that a theory was approximately true if its central theoretical termsfailed to refer. （Page 33）

While it may seem self-evident for Laudan, is this assertion really sound?

I found a counterexample for this assertion:

A CER positivist might well argue that Maxwell's theory of electromagnetic waves is approximately true, even though it assumes the existence of the Ether, a substance that does not appear to exist today.

Question 2
Laudan argues that accuracy at the phenomenal level does not seem to be directly related to the optimization of deep structure.

More generally, the realist needs a riposte to the primafacie plausible claim that there is no necessary connection between increasing the accuracy of our deep-structural characterizations of nature and improvements at the level of phenomenological explanations, predictions and manipulations.
（page 35）

This argument follows a list of theories in which the central terminology does refer but fails to be very successful. I argue that these examples can support the view that there is no necessary connection between the approximate truth of a theory and explanatory success, but can this view be derived directly from these examples? I think not, but have not yet found a concrete way to refute it.

Question 3
Finally, there is the point about my claim that Laudan's way of arguing has some drawbacks. He cites many examples form the history of science but does not carefully analyze why these examples support his point of view. And these examples themselves do not quite simply support his point of view, but rather some aspects of them support his opponents. That is, by emphasizing different aspects of these examples, they can serve as evidence for both Laudan and his opponents. The following is an example I found.

Some of the later theories do not fully contain the statements made by the earlier theories, but it is undeniable that the later theories do contain some (perhaps few) of the statements made by the older theories, which is why Laudan repeatedly uses “not all”. This series of sentences seems convincing but is not actually convincing. It seems that Laudan wants the readers focus only on those cases that are not included in the new theories. In fact, these facts may also be a support for Putnam and Watkins' idea, because the old theories do be included (perhaps not that much) in parts of the new theories.

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I found only the abstract and contents of this article in the file Kahlo gave us, so I found the full article myself and share it here.

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Duhem and Holism (Elements in the Philosophy of Science) by Milena Ivanova (z-lib.org)

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Some notes about SCIENCE: CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS written by Karl R. Popper：

This article looks like a transcript of a lecture. Even though this may not be a formal paper, I think Popper's analysis is still clear. He begins by telling us why he thought about the problem of demarcation (although I have seen people's descriptions of Popper's thought process in textbooks before, reviewing it in his own words also makes me think of Popper as an admirable thinker). The differences between the three social science theories and the physical theory were keenly perceived by Popper. The former can find many examples that can support them, while the latter needs certain specific examples to fulfill its predictions. The point is that there is little that cannot be explained to the social sciences. This has been shown to us by psychoanalysis and individual psychology. The proponents of Marxism, on the other hand, will get them to agree by reinterpreting theories and counterexamples. It is almost impossible for us to see an example that can knock down a social science theory. And if scientists are unable to observe the astronomical phenomena predicted by relativity, then the plausibility of relativity will be in great jeopardy. Once this happens, proponents of relativity will likely have nothing to say, because the conditions for falsifying relativity, according to Popper, are raised by their own.

Popper then turned to the study of the problem of induction. In fact he argued that the induction problem and the partition problem are actually of the same theme. Many people, including some scientists, would regard the inductive method as the code of science, even though they know that induction is not guaranteed to be valid in either logical or empirical terms. Popper drew on the theoretical merits of Hume and Kant. He strongly agrees with Hume's critique of the inductive method, but is only dissatisfied with the solution he proposes (custom and habit likewise produce the problem of infinite regress); Popper also acknowledges Kant's claim that people impose what they think are laws on nature rather than extracting them from observation. Here Popper offers his own view that the solution to the problem of the "unreliability of inductive methods" requires not only an explanation of why science has been able to use induction with success, but also why we have knowledge. Popper believed that it is because we already have a certain hypothesis in mind before we observe. It may be a myth, it may be just a pie-in-the-sky conjecture. With this conjecture in mind, we then observe and use the results of our observations to determine whether our conjecture is correct. On the surface, we finally establish the theory through observation, but in fact, the theory is always proposed before the observation, and the result of the observation only helps us to modify the theory or propose a new hypothesis. In this way we do not encounter the problems faced by the inductive approach, because the trial-and-error method we use is logically valid.
This trial-and-error approach is also an answer to the problem of demarcation, which is that pseudoscience usually maintains its correctness through a variety of explanations, and that proponents of pseudoscience are reluctant to abandon the original dogma, while proponents of science are always critical, always believing that the theory they currently support will be refuted and rejected in the future, and that they will decide whether to they will decide in response to this anomaly whether or not to adhere to the theory again.

In fact, Lakatos points out that Popper's idea is not consistent with the history of science, because scientists themselves do not easily abandon their theories; rather, it is the opponents of a theory who suggest ways in which a theory can be falsified, such as the discovery of Poisson's bright spots. Scientists add some auxiliary hypotheses of their own to refine their own theory and preserve it from attack. Lakatos' criticism, though valid, is not something I think is appropriate to expand on here. I have generated some other questions about Popper through my own thinking, and I will write them down in the questions section.

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Some doubts about SCIENCE: CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS written by Karl R. Popper：

One detail of Popper's attitude makes me have some doubts, and that is about the relationship between theory and practice. Popper acknowledges that some theories have been falsified, but they have an irreplaceable place in applications, and people continue to work and predict with them. What we seek is theoretical truth, and therefore the constant formulation of conjectures and their refutation is always a work in progress. Yet Popper himself mentions that what we are asking for is explanation, that is, the search for a robust but impossible theory. This seems to suggest that we will never find the ultimate theory, and we will never really reach TRUTH. since this is the case, how can we know that the new theory is more explanatory? The answer might be that the new theory passes more tests, but this answer takes us back from the realm of theory to the realm of practice. It is important to note that Popper made a deliberate distinction earlier between the practical and the theoretical realms, because in the practical realm we can accept partially falsified theories, while in the theoretical realm we cannot. But now it seems to me that the two domains are not distinctly distinguished, but are intertwined. This raises the question of where our motivation to propose new theories actually comes from. If a theory is widely used in practice and continues to provide support for new technologies, will proponents of science choose to abandon it, even if it is still deficient at the theoretical level? Will scientists give up the quest for new theories and instead do some work to perfect it？Will the cycle of conjecture and refutation thus come to an end?

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Some notes and questions about Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge written by Popper.
In this article, Popper was going to draw a line between science and pseudo-science. Some theories such as the Marxist theory of history, psychoanalysis, and individual psychology act like science, but it can't play the whole function of scientific theory. Be more specific, they can explain all phenomena in related fields, but it can't make a prediction that matches its explanatory power. So, according to Popper, “ the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its  falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. ”

My question is ,why Popper said that using probability is not a good solution of induction problem? As shown in statistics, induction is essentially a sampling survey. Because we can't exhaust all the samples, we can't get a perfect conclusion. But the more samples, the more accurate the conclusion will be. Why can't this be regarded as a mild response to inductive questions

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Some notes and questions about The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male Female Roles written by Emily Martin.
In this article, Emily was going to show us how “ the picture of egg and sperm drawn in popular as well as scientific accounts of reproductive biology relies on stereotypes central to our cultural definitions of male and female.” In her words, Eggs are either described as passive or aggressive femme fatale.
I can acknowledge what she said is truth, but I also confuse what did she expect from the scientific statement. When people describe eggs too negative, she thinks that it is from a gender stereotype which will hurt female ; when people try to describe eggs in a more positive way, she says it is an aggressive description of vilifying women. However, if eggs are passive,isn't it a vilification of men to think that "sperm are aggressive"? If eggs are positive, isn’t it a vilification of men to think that "sperm are weak"? If she expects to describe the fertilization process in a neutral manner,this proves that there is no obvious active and passive side in the process of fertilization. If this is the case, the problem with the description of eggs is not because of gender stereotypes, but because it does not accord with scientific facts.

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Some ideas and questions about Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a guide to Theory Choice written by Milena Ivanova：

Part 1 : ideas
Ivanova summarizes Duhem's theory of good sence in great detail. It is through her description that I believe that this good sence is actually not fundamentally different from a particular scientist's own intuition. Duhem lists a number of criteria that scientists consider when faced with a theory choice, and the weight of these criteria is determined by the specific scientist facing the problem. I think (perhaps wrongly) that scientists rely heavily on their own intuition when making such decisions. And that intuition, unfortunately, cannot be separated at all from the personal interests and passions of the scientist. I think the most important work Duhem needs to do if he wants to reach the ideal state he has in mind, where the scientist abandons his own interests and passions when making decisions, is to distinguish the difference between good sence and the scientist's intuition with an exhaustive analysis, yet I do not see this distinction in this article.
Duhem's motivation for proposing good sence is clearly summarized by Ivanova: on the one hand, he does not want to make an absolute standard for scientists to follow (which is actually unrealistic), and on the other hand, he wants to avoid relativism, so he needs to propose some loose standard to prevent him from going into relativism. In my opinion, Duhem's refusal to make a general rule is a very wise decision, because the history of science tells us that scientists do not refer to a uniform standard when making theory choices. In specific problems, generalized criteria would limit our thinking and make our choices rigid, which would certainly conflict with the innovative nature of scientific work. Thus, I think that Duhem is trying to suggest, through good sence, that we should leave the choice of criteria to the discretion of the scientist who is confronted with the specific problem of theoretical choice. This solution by Duhem steps out of a tradition, perhaps a philosophical one, that is the expectation of setting universal criteria and making general descriptions.

Part 2：Questions
1. Is it consistent with the history of science for scientists to leave their self-interest and passion aside in their research?

Here I have a specific question for Duhem, who believes that scientists should “leaving their interests and passions aside”, which I don't think is appropriate. A scientist's passion greatly facilitates their research. For example, Edison tried many materials for filaments for his invention, and without his passion for the invention, it is hard to imagine what kept him going for so long. Similarly, Morgan experienced numerous failures while conducting experiments on drosophila hybridization, and I believe his desire for knowledge of genetics and his passion for this work played a key role in inspiring him. Thus, contrary to Dion, I strongly agree that scientists have a passion and interest in their work that will facilitate their research and inspire them to persevere with their research. As to whether their theories will succeed, I share Duhem's view that we are waiting for experiments to test them.

2.Is the concept of the perfect scientist really appropriate?

There is also a questioning of Ivanova's claims. Perhaps this challenge may be considered wrong after deeper discussion and reflection, but for the moment I believe that it is reasonable:
Ivanova proposes the abstract concept of the perfect scientist in an attempt to refine Duhem's theory of good sence, but it seems to me that she does not inherit the valuable part of Duhem's theory, which is the abandonment of making general rules and general descriptions. Although the theory of the perfect scientist remains loose, the theory still attempts to guide the behavior of scientists by formulating a general image, which is the exact opposite of Duhem's solution. More importantly, the good sence held by scientists is unique, not shared. But the concept of the perfect scientist assumes that it is possible to find commonalities among good sence. In fact, I think that the good sence proposed by Duhem is a private thing, so I doubt very much that the concept of the perfect scientist really has any practical meaning. Each of us likes different colors, and the reason for this difference is that each of us has a completely private preference for color. It would be absurd for someone to suggest that the color that the “perfect person” prefers is blue. I think the concept of the ”perfect scientist” and the ”perfect person” I mentioned are similar in that both mistakenly see something private as something public.

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reading notes
SCIENCE: CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS

I Question： “When should a theory be ranked as scientific?” or “Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?”

science and pseudoscience: science often errs and pseudo-science may happen to stumble on the truth.

Introduction:

① the most widely accepted answer: differentiating by its empirical method, which is essentially inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment × what should be done is to distinguish between a genuinely empirical method and a nonempirical or even a pseudo-empirical method

② My problem perhaps first took the simple form, 'What is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different from physical theories, from Newton's theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?'

· truth

· exactness

· measurability

·explanatory power: It was precisely this fact--that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed--which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.

'conventionalist twist' or a 'conventionalist stratagem': Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers--for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation.

--the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.

II Question: whether they are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudo-scientific?

Einstein's theory of gravitation √【falsifiability】

Astrology ×【non-testable】

The Marxist theory of history【'conventionalist twist'】

Freud's psycho-analysis and Alfred Adler's so-called 'individual psychology' ×【 non-testable, Irrefutable】

--It was the problem of drawing a line (as well as this can be done) between the statements, or systems of statements, of the empirical sciences, and all other statements.

III Question: what are the Wittgenstein’s ideas about pseudoproblem of meaning

Wittgenstein: all so-called philosophical or metaphysical propositions were actually nonpropositions or pseudopropositions: that they were senseless or meaningless. meaningful propositions were fully reducible to elementary or atomic propositions which were simple statements describing possible states of affairs, and which could in principle be established or rejected by observation.('observation statement' ) → science propositions which can be verified by true observation statements.

The author’s opinion: For Wittgenstein's criterion of demarcation--to use my own terminology in this context--is verifiability, or deducibility from observation statements. But this criterion is too narrow (and too wide): it excludes from science practically everything that is, in fact, haracteristic of it (while failing in effect to exclude astrology). No scientific theory can ever be deduced from observation statements, or be described as a truth-function of observation statements.

↓

pseudoproblem of meaning ≠ problem of demarcation

testability is being widely accepted as a criterion of demarcation.

IV Question: why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience？In other words, how we get knowledge?

Hume: induction cannot be logically justified.

The central idea of Hume's theory is that of repetition, based upon similarity (or 'resemblance') to justify the practice of induction by an appeal to experience must lead to an infinite regress.

--psychological theory of induction× impose regularities upon the world√

V keywords：valid a priori, psychologically and genetically a priori

Observation is always selective. Any particular hypothesis we choose will have been preceded by observations--the observations

Thus we are born with expectations; with 'knowledge' which, although not valid a priori, is psychologically or genetically a priori

VI keywords：dogmatic and the critical attitude

Our propensity to regularities, background noise and expectations

It is clear that this dogmatic attitude, which makes us stick to our first impressions, is indicative of a strong belief; while a critical attitude, which is ready to modify its tenets, which admits doubt and demands tests, is indicative of a weaker belief.

VII

The relationship between dogmatic and the critical attitude: A critical attitude needs for its raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less dogmatically.

The critical attitude is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality.

the method of trial and error--of conjecture and refutation: The method of trial and error is not, of course, simply identical with the scientific or critical approach--with the method of conjecture and refutation.

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My question:
I still don't know the difference between the method of trial and error and the method of conjecture and refutation. Perhaps the difference lies in the critical attitude. The former does not stick to the critical attitude but the latter does.

Why does Popper insists that the probability of a statement (or set of statements) is always the greater the less the statement says?

How to solve the problem of  induction?
Maybe when we do not regard the use of inductive methods as a criterion to distinguish science and pseudoscience, the problem of induction can be solved. That is to say, we should insist these points as following:
All laws and theories are conjectures, or tentative hypotheses (a position which I have sometimes called 'hypotheticism'); and that we may reject a law or theory on the basis of new evidence, without necessarily discarding the old evidence which originally led us to accept it. The fate of a theory, its acceptance or rejection, is decided by observation and experiment --by the result of tests. It is not possible to infer a theory from observation statements; but this does not affect the possibility of refuting a theory by observation . The full appreciation of this possibility makes the relation between theories and observations perfectly clear.

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key parts
What are the characteristics of scientific theory?
--accurate/ consistent/ broad scope/ simple/ fruitful

Competing theory depends on individual biography and personality.
--maxim/values and norms

Subjective -opposites to “objective”

-judgemental≠personal tasty