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Brown was a group of law suits from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware that denied African American students their constitutional rights under the 14th amendment to attend segregated schools. The decision ruled by the supreme court was to end "separate but equal". This case started the litigation base for educational services and provided basis for future rulings that children with disabilities cannot be excluded from public schools (Murdrick 2014)
Picture: (Jasperado, 2017)

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Brown vs Board of Education National Historic Site

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1965- Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 

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1965- Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 

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(renamed NCLB) 2002, then ESSA 2015
ESEA was the original federal commitment to improving education for elementary and secondary age students identified as "educationally disadvantaged". it was written to provide something for everyone authorizing an initial budget of $1.3 billion for programs to assist disadvantaged children (Murdrick 2014)

Picture: (Pennsylvania Department of Education, 2021).

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1972 - PARC vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

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1972 - PARC vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

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in 1971 The Pennsylvania Retarded Children's Association PARC's case against the state resulted in a legal decision that was the new period of special education services. (Murdrick 2014)

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This act authorized federal support for rehabilitation and training of persons with intellectual services. The goal of these services were to assist the individual with disabilities in obtaining employment and full participation in society with no discrimination (Murdrick 2014).

Picture: (Slowinski,2021)

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1974- Education of the Handicapped Act Amendment 

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1974- Education of the Handicapped Act Amendment 

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President Ford signed the (EHA 1970), in 1974. The amendments affected a huge variety of aspects of education. Plans for this act included creating time tables towards providing fuel educational opportunities with with disabilities  and re quired safe guards for children for identification and placement purposes (Murdick 2014).
This image displays section 88 P.L. 93-380

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1975- Education for all Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)

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1975- Education for all Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)

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Renamed IDEA 1990, added PBIS 1997, reauthorized & renamed IDEIA 2004
Ensured that all students with disabilities received proper education for free. This law protects students with disabilities rights and their parents. This video states all of the renaming and history of the original EAHCA 1975.

Video: (Miller,2018)

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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)

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When EAHCA was passed in 1975 it did not contain any provision for the awarding of attorney fees. In this case the Supreme Court found that because granting of attorney fees was not noted in the act it was not allowed. The court considered whether plaintiffs who sued to secure a free and appropriate education (FAPE) for a child with disabilities under IDEA could recover attorney fees. The court concluded that IDEA was a comprehensive scheme resulting in plaintiffs not being recovered attorney fees under any other legal theories that provided for such reward (Murdrick 2014).

This link is the 468 U.S. 992 (1984), 82-2120, Smith v. Robinson Case

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104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746

United States Supreme Court

Argued March 28, 1984

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Syllabus

When the Superintendent of Schools in Cumberland, R.I., informed petitioner parents of petitioner child, who suffers from cerebral palsy and other handicaps, that the School Committee no longer would fund the child's placement in a special educational program, the parents, in addition to appealing the Superintendent's decision to the School Committee and thereafter through the state administrative process, filed an action in Federal District Court against the School Committee and, subsequently, against certain state school officials. They asserted, at various points in the proceedings, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on state law, on the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and, with respect to certain federal constitutional claims, on The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, since the action and relief granted fell within the reach of the EHA, which establishes a comprehensive federal-state scheme for the provision of special education to handicapped children but does not provide for attorney's fees, the District Court had to look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court held that the child was entitled, as a matter of state law, to a free appropriate special education paid for by the School Committee, and that it was therefore unnecessary and improper to reach petitioners' federal statutory and constitutional claims. By agreement between the parties, the court awarded attorney's fees against the School Committee. Petitioners then requested attorney's fees against the state defendants. The District Court held that petitioners were entitled to such fees for the hours spent in the state administrative process both before and after the date the state defendants were named as parties, reasoning that, because petitioners were required to exhaust their EHA remedies before asserting their § 1983 and § 504 claims, they were entitled to fees for those procedures. The Court of Appeals concluded that, even if the unaddressed § 1983 claims were substantial enough to support federal jurisdiction so as generally to warrant an award of attorney's fees, nevertheless, given the comprehensiveness of the EHA, Congress could not have intended its omission of attorney's fees relief in that statute to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act for such fees.

Held:

1. Petitioners were not entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988. Pp. 1006-1016.

(a) The fact that petitioners prevailed on their initial claim that the School Committee violated due process by refusing to grant petitioners a full hearing before terminating funding of petitioner child's special education program does not, by itself, entitle petitioners to attorney's fees for the subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings. That due process claim was entirely separate from the claims made in the subsequent proceedings, and was not sufficiently related to petitioners' ultimate success to support an award of fees for the entire proceeding. Pp. 1008-1009.

an award of attorney's fees. Where, as here, whatever remedy might be provided under § 504 -- which prevents discrimination on the basis of a handicap in any program receiving federal financial assistance -- is provided with more clarity and precision under the EHA, a plaintiff may not circumvent or enlarge on the remedies available under the EHA by resort to § 504. Pp. 1016-1021.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 1021.

BLACKMUN, J., lead opinion

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents questions regarding the award of attorney's fees in a proceeding to secure a "free appropriate public education" for a handicapped child. At various stages in the proceeding, petitioners asserted claims for relief based on state law, on the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 394, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 29 U.S.C. § 794, and on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit concluded that, because the proceeding, in essence, was one to enforce the provisions of the EHA, a statute that does not provide for the payment of attorney's fees, petitioners were not entitled to such fees. Petitioners insist that this Court's decision in Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 703 F.2d 4 (1983). Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 [104 S.Ct. 3460] (1980), compels a different conclusion.

I

The procedural history of the case is complicated, but it is significant to the resolution of the issues. Petitioner Thomas F. Smith III (Tommy), suffers from cerebral palsy and a variety of physical and emotional handicaps. When this proceeding began in November, 1976, Tommy was eight years old. In the preceding December, the Cumberland School Committee had agreed to place Tommy in a day program at Emma Pendleton Bradley Hospital in East Providence, R.I., and Tommy began attending that program. In November, 1976, however, the Superintendent of Schools informed Tommy's parents, who are the other petitioners here, that the School Committee no longer would fund Tommy's placement because, as it construed Rhode Island law, the responsibility for educating an emotionally disturbed child lay with the State's Division of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (MHRH). App. 25-26.

Petitioners took an appeal from the decision of the Superintendent to the School Committee. In addition, petitioners filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the members of the School Committee, asserting that due process required that the Committee comply with "Article IX -- Procedural Safeguards" of the Regulations adopted by the State Board of Regents regarding Education of Handicapped Children (Regulations) and that Tommy's placement

in his program be continued pending appeal of the Superintendent's decision.

On May 10, 1978, petitioners filed a first amended complaint. App. 49. By that time, petitioners had completed the state administrative process. They had appealed the Superintendent's decision to the School Committee and then to the State Commissioner of Education, who delegated responsibility for conducting a hearing to an Associate Commissioner of Education. Petitioners had moved that the Associate Commissioner recuse himself from conducting the review of the School Committee's decision, since he was an employee of the state education agency, and therefore not an impartial hearing officer. The Associate Commissioner denied the motion to recuse.

All the state officers agreed that, under R.I.Gen.Laws, Tit. 40, ch. 7 (1977), the responsibility for educating Tommy lay with MHRH. The Associate Commissioner acknowledged petitioners' argument that, since § 40.1-7-8 would [104...

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1990- Americans with Disability Act (ADA)

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1990- Americans with Disability Act (ADA)

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After the Rehabilitation Act 1973, congress continued to expand the pieces of legislation to create more means of protection with people with disabilities. ADA purpose is to provide a clear understanding for the need to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities (Murdrick 2014).

Video: (GregU,2016)

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renamed Every Student Succeed 2015
NCLB required schools to prepare and distribute Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) reports. These specific reports included overall progress of the school and their progress educating various groups such as students with disabilities (Murdrick 2014). This video goes into depth of NCLB and the pros and cons of the Act.

Video: (No Child Left Behind, 2017)

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No Child Left Behind: Explained & Summarized

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President Barack Obama signed the bill S.2781 into federal law. This law removes term "mental retardation" and "mentally retarded" from federal health, education, and labor policies; It is now "individual with intellectual disability" or "intellectual disability" (Murdrick 2014)