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It talks about how there was a Taiwan crisis and Chinaś low tech military was badly outmatched by U.S forces....

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The last time tensions soared between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan, the U.S. Navy sent warships through the Taiwan Strait and there was nothing China could do about it.

Those days are gone.

China's military has undergone a transformation since the mid-1990s when a crisis erupted over Taiwan's president visiting the U.S., prompting an angry reaction from Beijing.

"It's a very different situation now," said Michele Flournoy, a former undersecretary of defense for policy in the Obama administration. "It's a much more contested and much more lethal environment for our forces."

Chinese President Xi Jinping, unlike his predecessors, now has serious military power at his disposal, including ship-killing missiles, a massive navy and an increasingly capable air force. That new military might is changing the strategic calculus for the U.S. and Taiwan, raising the potential risks of a conflict or miscalculation, former officials and experts say.

During the 1995-96 crisis, in an echo of current tensions, China staged live-fire military drills, issued stern warnings to Taipei and launched missiles into waters near Taiwan.

But the U.S. military responded with the largest show of force since the Vietnam War, sending an array of warships to the area, including two aircraft carrier groups. The carrier Nimitz and other battleships sailed through the narrow waterway that separates China and Taiwan, driving home the idea of America's military dominance.

"Beijing should know the strongest military power in the western Pacific is the United States," said the then-defense secretary, William Perry.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) back then was a low-tech, slow-moving force that was no match for the U.S. military, with a lackluster navy and air force that could not venture too far from China's coastline, former and current U.S. officials said.

"They realized they were vulnerable, that the Americans could sail aircraft carriers right up in their face, and there was nothing they could do about it," said Matthew Kroenig, who served as an intelligence and defense official in the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations.

The Chinese, taken aback by the U.S. military's high-tech display in the first Gulf War, "went to school on the American way of war" and launched a concerted effort to invest in their military and - above all - to bolster their position in the Taiwan Strait, Kroenig said.

Beijing drew a number of lessons from the 1995-96 crisis, concluding it needed satellite surveillance and other intelligence to spot adversaries over the horizon, and a "blue water" navy and air force able to sail and fly across the western Pacific, according to David Finkelstein, director of China and Indo-Pacific security affairs at CNA, an independent research institute.

"The PLA Navy has made remarkable progress since 1995 and 1996. It's actually mind-staggering how quickly the PLA Navy has built itself up. And of course in '95-96, the PLA Air Force almost never flew over water," said Finkelstein, a retired U.S. Army officer.

Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has described China's dramatic rise as a military power as a strategic earthquake.

"We're witnessing, in my view, we're witnessing one of the largest shifts in global geostrategic power that the world has witnessed," Milley said last year.

The Chinese military now is "very formidable especially in and around home waters, particularly in the vicinity of Taiwan," said James Stavridis, a retired four-star admiral and former commander of NATO.

China's navy now has more ships than the U.S., he said. Although U.S. naval ships are larger and more advanced, with more experienced crews and commanders, "quantity has a quality all its own," said Stavridis, an NBC News analyst.

China is currently building amphibious vessels and helicopters to be able to stage a possible full-scale invasion of Taiwan, experts say, though whether the PLA is capable of such a feat remains a matter of debate.

During the 1995-96 crisis, China lost communication with one of its missiles, and came away determined to wean itself off global positioning systems linked to the U.S., said Matthew Funaiole, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. "It got them thinking that 'we can't rely on technology from other countries,'" he said.

Officials in the U.S. and Taiwan now have to take into account a much more lethal and agile Chinese military that can deny America the ability to deploy warships or aircraft with impunity, and even to operate safely from bases in the region, Funaiole and other experts said.

"The game has changed in terms of how stacked the deck is for the U.S. It's much more of an even game. Whatever the U.S. does, China has options," Funaiole said.

Outraged by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan this week, China has launched large-scale, live-fire military exercises, including ballistic missile launches, that have surpassed the drills carried out in the 1995-96 standoff. The exercises are located in waters surrounding Taiwan to the north, east and south, with some of the drills within about 10 miles of Taiwan's coast. China once lacked the capability to conduct a major exercise in waters east of Taiwan, experts said.

China on Thursday fired at least 11 ballistic missiles near Taiwan, with one flying over the island, according to officials in Taipei. Japan said five missiles landed in its economic exclusion zone, near an island south of Okinawa.

This time, the U.S. government has made no announcements about warships moving through the Taiwan Strait. "Biden could try to do that, but China could put them on the bottom of the strait. That's something they couldn't do in 1995," Kroenig said.

The White House said Thursday that the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier would remain in the region as China carries out its exercises around Taiwan to "monitor the situation." But National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said that a previously scheduled ICBM test had been postponed to avoid any misunderstanding.

Despite the tough rhetoric between the two powers and the mounting tensions, China is not looking to start a war over Pelosi's visit and is seeking to stage a show of force, not an invasion of Taiwan, former U.S. officials and experts said.

For the moment, Chinese President Xi is focused on shoring up his country's sluggish economy and securing an unprecedented third term at the next Communist Party congress later this year. But China's newfound military might prompt overconfidence in Beijing's decision-making or lead to a cycle of escalation in which each side feels compelled to respond to show resolve, former officials said.

There is a risk that Xi could underestimate U.S.'s resolve, and that he believes there is a window of opportunity to seize or blockade Taiwan in the next few years before American investments in new weapons alter the military balance, said Flournoy, now chair of the Center for a New American Security think tank.

"I worry about China miscalculating because the narrative in Beijing continues to be one of U.S. decline, that the U.S. is turning inward," Flournoy said. "That's very dangerous, if you underestimate your potential adversary."

To prevent such an outcome, Flournoy argues both Taiwan and the U.S. need to bolster their military forces to deter Beijing and raise the potential cost of any possible invasion or intervention against Taiwan.

Finkelstein said he worries about an "action-reaction" chain of events that could lead to a conflict no one wants, and that the risk of miscalculation in Beijing, Taipei and Washington is "going sky-high."

To keep a lid on the tensions, the U.S. and China need to pursue an intense dialogue to lower the temperature, he said. "We need to be talking to each other constantly."

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During the last Taiwan crisis, China's military was outmatched by U.S. forces. Not now.

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The last time tensions soared between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan, the U.S. Navy sent warships through the Taiwan Strait and there was nothing China could do about it. Those days are gone. China's military has undergone a transformation since the mid-1990s when a crisis erupted over Taiwan's president visiting the U.S., prompting an angry reaction from Beijing.

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In Afghanistan, we tried to "Avoid a collapse of the Afghan economy without benefiting the Taliban."

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More information about Afghanistan is available on the Afghanistan Page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet. U.S.-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS
The United States established diplomatic ties with Afghanistan in 1935. In 2012, the United States and Afghanistan concluded the Strategic Partnership Agreement to strengthen our bilateral relationship, support Afghanistan's capabilities as a partner, and improve the lives of the Afghan people. On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed the Doha Agreement, which led to the August 30, 2021, withdrawal of U.S. and Allied forces from Afghanistan. Since the forcible takeover by the Taliban in August 2021, culminating in the fall of Kabul on August 15, the United States has shifted to a position of pragmatic engagement in Afghanistan. The United States has not yet made a decision as to whether to recognize the Taliban or any other entity as the Government of Afghanistan or as part of such a government. The U.S. has undertaken significant efforts in coordination with the international community to assist the Afghan people during a period of humanitarian and economic catastrophe.
U.S. Counterterrorism Concerns
The Doha Agreement memorialized the United States' commitment to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, as well as commitments from the Taliban to prevent any group or individual, including Al Qa'ida, from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies as well as a pledge by the Taliban to engage in intra-Afghan negotiations with other Afghan groups to form a post-settlement government. The United States continues to engage with the Taliban to ensure they fully abide by these commitments.
U.S. Assistance to the Afghan People
Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the United States has stopped providing assistance for the purpose of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The United States has changed the nature and scope of its activities in Afghanistan to focus instead on humanitarian aid and targeted assistance to help meet basic human needs and avoid a complete and imminent economic collapse. As part of these efforts, the United States has led the international response to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people working through UN agencies and NGOs, providing $775 million in such assistance as of July 2022. The United States has advanced efforts to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance and help fulfill the basic needs of Afghans in the priority areas of food security/agriculture, health, and education. Beyond basic needs, the United States has also supported programs designed to improve human rights in Afghanistan, particularly those of women, girls, and minority communities. The United States remains the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.
Economic Relations
The United States has made significant efforts, in coordination with other members of the international community, to avoid a collapse of the Afghan economy without benefiting the Taliban. These efforts have boosted financial sector liquidity and helped Afghan banks retain access to the international financial system.
Political Relations
The United States engages with Taliban representatives to urge the establishment of a credible process to form an inclusive government that fully reflects Afghanistan's rich diversity, including meaningful representation of women and minority communities. The Doha Agreement provided a pathway for the Taliban to participate in intra-Afghan negotiations to create a post-settlement government. The United States continues to support such efforts.
Afghanistan's Membership in International Organizations
Afghanistan and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Afghanistan also is a Partner for Cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and joined the World Trade Organization in 2016. However, none of these organizations have accepted credentials from Taliban representatives on behalf of Afghanistan.
Bilateral Representation
The Department of State suspended operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul, effective August 31, 2021, and in February 2022, established the Afghanistan Affairs Unit (AAU) in Doha, Qatar as the U.S. diplomatic mission to Afghanistan. The AAU manages our diplomacy with Afghanistan, including consular affairs, administering humanitarian assistance, and working with allies, partners, and regional and international stakeholders to coordinate our engagement and messaging to the Taliban. As of December 2021, Qatar serves as the United States' protecting power in Afghanistan and may provide consular and other services to U.S. citizens in Afghanistan. The Afghan Embassy and two consulates in the United States ceased operations on March 23, 2022.
USAID Afghanistan Mission Page
History of U.S. Relations With Afghanistan
U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics
Library of Congress Country Studies
Travel Information

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U.S. Relations With Afghanistan - United States Department of State

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More information about Afghanistan is available on the Afghanistan Page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet. U.S.-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS The United States established diplomatic ties with Afghanistan in 1935. In 2012, the United States and Afghanistan concluded the Strategic Partnership Agreement to strengthen our bilateral relationship, [...]

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When international leaders proposed creating a new global organization (The United Nations) to maintain peace and avoid the abuses of war after WWII

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The United Nations (U.N.) is a global diplomatic and political organization dedicated to international peace and stability. The U.N. was officially established in 1945 following the horrific events of World War II, when international leaders proposed creating a new global organization to maintain peace and avoid the abuses of war. The U.N. initially had just 51 member states; today, the organization, which is headquartered in New York City, has 193 members. Major U.N. initiatives include preventing conflict by exploring options to ensure peace, providing food and medical assistance in emergencies, and offering humanitarian support to millions of people around the world. While the United Nations is sometimes criticized for its policies, bureaucracy and spending, the organization has accomplished hundreds of successful peacekeeping missions.

Atlantic Charter

After World War I, an international group developed the League of Nations to solve disputes between countries. When World War II started, the initiative failed but highlighted the need for a new, reformed organization that could promote global peace.

In August 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill held a secret meeting where they discussed the possibility of starting an international peace effort. They came up with a declaration called the Atlantic Charter, which outlined ideal goals of war and paved the way for the development of the U.N.

The United States joined the war in December 1941, and the title "United Nations" was first adopted to identify the countries that allied against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Representatives from 26 Allied nations met in Washington, D.C. on January 1, 1942 to sign the Declaration of the United Nations, which essentially described the war objectives of the Allied powers. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union led the charge.

U.N. Charter

Over the next few years, several meetings took place to draft a post-war charter that would decisively describe the roles of the U.N.

The main principles and structure of the United Nations Charter were determined by leaders at the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) in San Francisco on April 25, 1945.

After the war ended, the official United Nations Charter was ratified by 51 members on October 24, 1945.

United Nation's Four Main Goals

The organization's purpose and principles are outlined in the U.N. Charter. According to the document, the United Nations' four main purposes are to:

Maintain international peace and security;

Develop friendly relations among nations;

Achieve international cooperation in solving international problems; and

Be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

U.N. Bodies

The U.N. is divided into different bodies, including the following:

General Assembly: The General Assembly is the main policymaking body of the U.N. that votes on decisions the organization makes. All 193 members are represented in this branch.

Security Council: This 15-member council oversees measures that ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council determines if a threat exists and encourages the parties involved to settle it peacefully.

Economic and Social Council: The Economic and Social Council makes policies and recommendations regarding economic, social and environmental issues. It consists of 54 members who are elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms.

Trusteeship Council: The Trusteeship Council was originally created to supervise the 11 Trust Territories that were placed under the management of seven member states. By 1994, all the territories had gained self-government or independence, and the body was suspended. But that same year, the Council decided to continue meeting occasionally, instead of annually.

International Court of Justice: This branch is responsible for settling legal disputes submitted by the states and answering questions in accordance with international law.

Secretariat: The Secretariat is made up of the Secretary-General and thousands of U.N. staffers. Its members carry out the daily duties of the U.N. and work on international peacekeeping missions.

U.N. Members

What started as a group of 51 states has grown increasingly over the years. War, independence movements and decolonization have all helped boost membership in the U.N.

Currently, there are 193 members, representing countries from all over the world.

New members must be recommended by the United Nations' Security Council and accepted by a two-thirds vote from the General Assembly.

The U.N. states that membership in the organization is "open to all peace-loving States that accept the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able to carry out these obligations."

U.N. Successes

Since its inception, the United Nations has performed numerous humanitarian, environmental and peace-keeping undertakings, including:

Providing food to 90 million people in over 75 countries

Assisting more than 34 million refugees

Authorizing 71 international peacekeeping missions

Working with 140 nations to minimize climate change

Assisting about 50 countries per year with their elections

Providing vaccinations for 58 percent of children in the world

Helping about 30 million women a year with maternal health efforts

Protecting human rights with 80 treaties and declarations

United Nations Criticisms

Over the years, the role of the U.N. has expanded from an organization that focused on peace and security to one that includes a wide range of global concerns. Today, the U.N. provides solutions for problems related to healthcare, the environment, criminal justice, refugee dilemmas and more.

Though many support including these extended responsibilities, others believe the organization may be overstepping its boundaries.

The U.N. has also faced criticism for promoting globalization, not being effective enough, backing provocative policies, providing controversial health options, being too bureaucratic, giving certain countries more power than others and spending too much money.

U.N. Failures

Some of the more well-known U.N. efforts that ended in failure or a publicized scandal include:

The 1994 Rwanda Mission: During this undertaking, the U.N. tried to stop the Rwandan genocide, but the Hutus slaughtered nearly a million members of the Tutsi minority.

Cholera in Haiti: After the 2010 earthquake, U.N.-led Nepali aid workers were blamed for spreading cholera throughout Haiti. More than 10,000 people died from the outbreak.

Oil for Food Program: This initiative was designed to allow Iraq to sell oil through the U.N. in exchange for food and medicine. But, accusations surfaced that much of the money was funneled to the Iraqi government and to U.N. officials.

Sexual abuse allegations: In early 2005, U.N. peacekeepers were accused of rape or paying for sex in the Republic of Congo. Similar allegations of sexual misconduct were also reported in Cambodia, Haiti and other countries.

Crisis in South Sudan: A U.N. peacekeeping mission, which was established in 2011, was unsuccessful at protecting civilians from death, torture or rape in South Sudan.

While every organization has its flaws and shortcomings, the majority of international leaders and experts agree that the U.N. continues to play a critical role in securing peace, stability and prosperity throughout the world.

Sources

History of the United Nations, United Nations.
Main Organs, United Nations.
The Formation of the United Nations, Department of State United States of America.
What We Do, United Nations.
A Brief History of the United Nations, GOOD.
20 Facts About the United Nations, The Borgen Project.
United Nations Fast Facts, CNN.
UN at 70: Five Biggest Successes and Failures, The Telegraph.
UN admits role in Haiti's deadly cholera outbreak, BBC.
UN failed to protect civilians in South Sudan, report finds, The Guardian.

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The United Nations (U.N.) is a global diplomatic and political organization dedicated to international peace and stability. The U.N. was officially established in 1945 following the horrific events of World War II, when international leaders proposed creating a new global organization to maintain peace and avoid the abuses of war.

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The US helps aid foreign countries while they endure natural disasters and other devastating tragedies, one example being, in 2015 the US sent out aid to the people of Nepal after suffering from a deadly earthquake that killed roughly 9,000 people.

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Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance | USAID Organization | U.S. Agency for International Development

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The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for leading and coordinating the U.S. Government’s response to disasters overseas.

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It unlocks opportunities for people that dont have jobs and protects workers rights. It provides economic growth for the U.S and Dominican Republic.

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The Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) is the first free trade agreement between the United States and a group of smaller developing economies: our Central American neighbors Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, as well as the Dominican Republic. The CAFTA-DR promotes stronger trade and investment ties, prosperity, and stability throughout the region and along our Southern border.

Combined, the countries in the CAFTA-DR would represent the United States' 18th largest goods trading partner, with $57.4 billion in total (two way) goods trade during in 2018. Exports totaled $32.2 billion while imports totaled $25.2 billion. The U.S. goods trade surplus with CAFTA-DR countries was $7 billion in 2018. According to the Department of Commerce, U.S. goods exports to CAFTA-DR supported an estimated 134 thousand jobs in 2014.

Some Facts on the CAFTA-DR and...

CAFTA-DR and Regional Manufacturing

Trade under CAFTA-DR supports Made-in-America jobs and unlocks opportunities for well-paying work as goods flow across borders and are manufactured into final products. Working together, our region can compete better.

CAFTA-DR is strengthening workers' rights and conditions in the region, through enforcement of labor protections to which its workers are entitled under countries' national laws. This includes through the first labor dispute under any free trade agreement to ensure Guatemalan workers can exercise their rights under Guatemalan law. We remain committed to helping Guatemala achieve that outcome and earn the benefits that come with enforcing the law to uphold internationally recognized labor rights.

CAFTA-DR and Creating Opportunities in the Region

Trade and economic growth promotes prosperity and stability and opportunities for citizens within their home country. CAFTA-DR requirements for rule of law and transparent and fair procedures in government actions create a better climate for investment and business. A better economic environment builds communities where citizens can thrive and youth have opportunity for a productive future at home.

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On August 5, 2004, the United States signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic. The CAFTA-DR is the first free trade agreement between the United States and a group of smaller developing economies.

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An example of free and Open trade is the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which covers U.S ,Canada, and Mexico which means all tariffs between them are removed.

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Regional trade agreements are between countries in a specific region. The most powerful are those that encompass a few countries covering a wide and contiguous geographic area. These include the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement and the European Union. That's usually because the countries involved share a similar history, culture, and economic goals. Regional trade agreements are hard to create and enforce when the countries are very diverse. An example of this is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, whose countries share the Pacific Ocean as a common denominator.

Here is a summary of the most important regional trade agreements that the United States has either entered or negotiated. America also has a lot of bilateral trade agreements with specific countries. Also, the United States is a member of the World Trade Organization. It incorporates the most important multilateral trade agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Examples of Agreements

NAFTA or North American Free Trade Agreement: NAFTA is the world's largest free trade area. It covers Canada, the United States, and Mexico. As of January 1, 2008, all tariffs between the three countries were eliminated. Between 1993 and 2009, trade tripled from $297 billion to $1.6 trillion. An in-depth look into the facts about NAFTA can reveal how the trade agreement has affected the three participating nations.

Trans-Pacific Partnership: The TPP would have replaced NAFTA as the world's largest agreement. In 2017, President Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement. It would have been between the United States and 11 other countries bordering the Pacific. These are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Leaders of these countries signed the agreement in 2016. It was in process of being ratified by the members' legislatures. Its goal is to enhance trade and investment. It promotes innovation, economic growth, and development. It supports job creation and retention. The TPP requires compatible regulations and support of small businesses. It's in keeping with the work of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.

Trump's decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership could pave the way for China's membership. It could shift the balance of power in Asia.

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would link two of the world's largest economies, the United States and the EU. Once ratified, it would replace NAFTA and the TPP as the world's largest free trade area. It would apply to over one-third of the world's total economic output. The biggest obstacle is agri-business in both the United States and EU. Both trading partners heavily subsidize their food industries. The EU prohibits the use of genetically modified organisms and the addition of antibiotics and hormones in animals raised for food. These practices are common in U.S. agribusiness. If these obstacles can be overcome, ratification of the TTIP will boost U.S. economic power.

FTAA or Free Trade Area of the Americas: Since the Reagan Administration, the United States has been trying to get a free trade agreement with all the countries of North, Central, and South America, as well as the Caribbean. At first, 34 countries agreed to negotiate an agreement that would expand NAFTA's success throughout the hemisphere. But by 2005, the effort had failed. Many South American countries, like Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador were afraid that eliminating tariffs would allow U.S.-subsidized agribusiness to put their local farmers out of work and force their people to work for U.S. corporations. Other countries went on to enter into bilateral agreements with the United States, including Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Since the FTAA was abandoned in 2004, a much smaller trade agreement resulted between the United States and six other countries.

CAFTA-DR or Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement: CAFTA was signed on August 5, 2004, by the United States and six countries. These nations were Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. It eliminated tariffs on more than 80 percent of U.S. exports. By 2008, these exports grew to $26.3 billion. It opened U.S. trade restrictions for Central American sugar, textiles, and apparel imports. That reduced costs on these products for American consumers. Total trade between the U.S. and CAFTA signatories was $60 billion in 2013.

ASEAN Initiative: ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It includes 10 nations in Southeast Asia. It promotes the economic growth of its member countries to provide a balance of power to China and Japan. Members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. U.S. trade with ASEAN countries grew to $182 billion in 2008. The ASEAN Initiative seeks to establish bilateral trade agreements with all ASEAN members of the WTO. The United States has successfully negotiated agreements with them all, except Laos and Myanmar.

APEC or Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: APEC includes countries in Asia and the Americas that border the Pacific Ocean. Its members are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Its purpose is to increase negotiations between all member nations concerning common trade issues. The APEC economies comprise 44 percent of world trade and 54 percent of global gross domestic product. In 2010, nine of the top markets for the United States were APEC members. They accounted for 60 percent of U.S. exports.

MEFTI - Middle Eastern Trade Initiative: MEFTI works with peaceful Middle Eastern countries to help them attain three goals. First, obtain membership in the World Trade Organization. Second, facilitate bilateral trade agreements. Third, help them enter into Trade and Investment Action Plans that encourages investment. The countries that are seeking membership in the WTO include Algeria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The United States has entered bilateral agreements with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman.

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What Trade Agreements Do We Have With Our Neighbors?

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Regional trade agreements are between countries in a specific region. The most powerful are those that encompass a few countries covering a wide and contiguous geographic area. These include the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement and the European Union. That's usually because the countries involved share a similar history, culture, and economic goals.

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This news article talks about how they're caught in a crossfire between Russian and Ukrainian troops.

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Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, built during the Soviet era and one of the 10 biggest in the world, has been engulfed by fighting between Russian and Ukrainian troops in recent weeks, fueling concerns of a nuclear catastrophe.

Here is a look at the current situation:
WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW
The plant has six reactors, only one of which was operational as of Saturday.

The shelling so far hasn't damaged the plant's reactors or spent nuclear fuel storage, but has repeatedly struck some auxiliary equipment.

On Monday, the plant was knocked off Ukraine's electricity grid after its last transmission line was disconnected because of a fire caused by shelling.

Pending repairs, the plant's only operational reactor was generating the power the plant needs for its own safety in so-called "island mode."

Two inspectors from the U.N.'s atomic watchdog have remained at the plant following a visit by a larger team last week.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL THREATS
Fighting near the plant has fueled fears of a disaster like the one at Chernobyl, where a reactor exploded and spewed deadly radiation, contaminating a vast area in the world's worst nuclear accident.

Nuclear experts say while the buildings housing Zaporizhzhia's reactors are protected by reinforced concrete that could withstand an errant shell or rocket, a disruption in the electrical supply could knock out cooling systems essential for the reactors' safety. Emergency diesel generators can be unreliable.

"If power is lost in the fog of war, then we are in unchartered territory," says Paul Dorfman, a nuclear safety expert at the University of Sussex in England.
WHAT IS "ISLAND MODE"
Functioning in "island mode" supplies power for the residual heat removal of the reactor cores and the spent fuel pools.

Experts say it is very unreliable.

Mycle Schneider, an independent policy consultant and coordinator of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report, said if the diesel generators fail, a core meltdown could occur within hours.

If the reactor is already turned off, the risk depends on the time since shutdown. The less time has passed, the more cooling is required, said Schneider.

While the pool containing Zaphorizhzha's spent fuel is located inside the plant's containment area, a serious reactor accident would likely affect the pool as well.

"Irradiated fuel overheats and catches fire spontaneously if it exposed to air and not cooled anymore," said Schneider.

___

This story was corrected to show that the plant has had only one reactor operational since Saturday, not Monday.

Copyright © 2022 The Washington Times, LLC.

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What's happening with Ukraine's threatened nuclear plant

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Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, built during the Soviet era and one of the 10 biggest in the world, has been engulfed by fighting between Russian and Ukrainian troops in recent weeks, fueling concerns of a nuclear catastrophe.

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The Department of State works with democratic partners, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations and engaged citizens to support those seeking freedom.

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The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Supporting democracy not only promotes such fundamental American values as religious freedom and worker rights, but also helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global arena in which the United States can advance its national interests. In addition, democracy is the one national interest that helps to secure all the others. Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold human and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, improve the global environment, and protect human health.

The United States uses a wide range of tools to advance a freedom agenda, including bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and economic sanctions. The Department of State works with democratic partners, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and engaged citizens to support those seeking freedom.

Read more about what specific bureaus are doing to support this policy issue:

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL): DRL leads U.S. efforts to promote democracy, to protect human rights and international religious freedom, and to advance labor rights globally. Read more about DRL

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Human Rights and Democracy - United States Department of State

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The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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This article talks about how Russia is buying weapons from North Korea for the Ukraine war, and the huge effect this has had on the war.

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this link helps us get a very clear idea of how democracy works by benefiting citizens all around the world and spreading democracy helps complete america's mission which creates national peace which serves the U.S interest

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Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

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This paper argues that the United States should make promoting democracy abroad one of its central foreign-policy goals. Democracy is not an unalloyed good and the United States should not blindly attempt to spread democracy to the exclusion of all other goals, but U.S. and global interests would be advanced if the world contained more democracies. It often will be difficult for the United States and other actors to help countries to become democracies, but international efforts frequently can make a difference. The United States can promote democracy. In many cases it should.

I develop the argument for promoting democracy in three parts. The first section of this paper defines democracy and the closely related concept of liberalism. It distinguishes between democratic procedures of government and the political philosophy of liberalism, but also explains how the two are closely linked.

The second section outlines the main arguments for why spreading democracy benefits the inhabitants of newly democratizing states, promotes peace in the international system, and advances U.S. interests. This section presents logic and evidence that demonstrates that the spread of democracy consistently advances many important values, including individual freedom from political oppression, deadly violence, and hunger. It also will show how the spread of democracy promotes international peace and stability, and helps to ensure the security and prosperity of the United States.

The third section summarizes and rebuts some of the most prominent recent arguments against promoting democracy. These arguments include criticisms of the democratic peace hypothesis, the proposition that the process of democratization actually increases the risk of war, claims that in many countries democratic elections are at best irrelevant and at worst harmful, and the argument that the emergence of the "Asian model" of political and economic development demonstrates that liberal democracy is neither appropriate nor necessary in many countries.

I. Defining Democracy and Liberalism

A. Defining Democracy

"Democracy" is notoriously difficult to define. Some writers have simply defined it by what it is not: "Democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and, therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power." 7 Other scholars have offered a variety of definitions. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl offer the following definition: "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives." 8 Joseph Schumpeter's influential 1942 definition saw the "democratic method" as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." 9 Samuel Huntington "defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote." 10 The plethora of definitions of democracy has stimulated many scholars to analyze and compare how the term is defined. 11

Attempts to define democracy are further complicated by the differences between the democracy of ancient Greece and contemporary democracy. Classical Athenian democracy was based on the ideals of full political participation of all citizens, a strong sense of community, the sovereignty of the people, and equality of all citizens under law. 12 Modern democracy, on the other hand, relies on elected representatives and tends to draw a distinction between the public and private spheres, thereby eroding the bonds of community and fostering individualism. Because most writers use the term democracy to apply to modern, representative political systems, I will call such regimes democracies even if they fall short of the ancient Greek ideal of direct participatory democracy.

Most contemporary definitions of democracy have several common elements. First, democracies are countries in which there are institutional mechanisms, usually elections, that allow the people to choose their leaders. Second, prospective leaders must compete for public support. Third, the power of the government is restrained by its accountability to the people. These are the essential characteristics of political democracy.

Some writers add additional criteria to the list of what makes a polity a democracy. Larry Diamond argues that a democracy must have "extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations)." 13 Samuel Huntington recognizes that democracy "implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns." 14

These attempts to expand the criteria for democracy reveal that it makes more sense to talk about degrees of democracy instead of neatly dividing states into democracies and nondemocracies. Some states may be more democratic than others; drawing the line between democracy and nondemocracy will usually be a matter of judgment. They also highlight the importance of the distinction between democracy and liberalism.

B. Liberalism and Democracy

Democracy can be defined as a set of political procedures involving participation and competition, but liberalism is a political philosophy that is based on the principle of individual freedom. As one scholar puts it, "liberalism's ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration." 15 Liberalism calls for guarantees of the rights of the individual, including freedom from arbitrary authority, freedom of religion, the right to own and exchange private property, rights to equal opportunity in health care, education, and employment, and the rights to political participation and representation. 16 Only the last category of rights is necessarily guaranteed in polities that meet the procedural definition of democracy.

Most democracies are liberal democracies to some degree. The Western industrial countries combine procedural democracy with guarantees of civil liberties. Any state that embraces liberal principles is likely to become a democracy, because political participation, competition, and accountability are perhaps the best guarantees that individual freedoms will be preserved. Thus the terms "liberal" and "democracy" often go hand in hand. It is possible, however, that a country could be an illiberal democracy. For example, states with official racialist or nationalist ideologies might choose their leaders in elections but deny liberty to members of particular minority groups. Serbia and Iran are contemporary illiberal democracies. It is also possible-although unlikely-that a country could be a liberal state without being a democracy. 17 The political philosopher Michael Walzer makes this point: "Even in the absence of free elections, it is possible to have a free press, religious freedom, associational pluralism, the right to organize unions, the right to move freely, and so on." 18 In the 19th century Britain embraced liberal principles before it extended the franchise and became a democracy. In theory, a polity governed by a benevolent despot could respect most or all of the individual liberties associated with liberalism. In practice, relatively few contemporary states are liberal without being democratic.

C. America's Goal: Liberal Democracy

Given the variety of definitions of democracy and the distinction between democracy and liberalism, what type of government should the United States attempt to spread? Should it try to spread democracy, defined procedurally, liberalism, or both? Ultimately, U.S. policies should aim to encourage the spread of liberal democracy. Policies to promote democracy should attempt to increase the number of regimes that respect the individual liberties that lie at the heart of liberalism and elect their leaders. The United States therefore should attempt to build support for liberal principles-many of which are enshrined in international human-rights treaties-as well as encouraging states to hold free and fair elections.

Supporting the spread of liberal democracy does not, however, mean that the United States should give the promotion of liberalism priority over the growth of electoral democracy. In most cases, support for electoral democracy can contribute to the spread of liberalism and liberal democracy. Free and fair elections often remove leaders who are the biggest impediments to the spread of democracy. In Burma, for example, the people would almost certainly remove the authoritarian SLORC regime from power if they had a choice at the ballot box. In South Africa, Haiti, and Chile, for example, elections removed antidemocratic rulers and advanced the process of democratization. In most cases, the United States should support elections even in countries that are not fully liberal. Elections will generally initiate a process of change toward democratization. American policy should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by insisting that countries embrace liberal principles before holding elections. Such a policy could be exploited by authoritarian rulers to justify their continued hold on power and to delay elections that they might lose. In addition, consistent U.S. support for electoral democracy will help to bolster the emerging international norm that leaders should be accountable to their people. Achieving this goal is worth the risk that some distasteful leaders will win elections and use these victories at the ballot box to legitimize their illiberal rule.

The United States also should attempt to build support for liberal principles, both before and after other countries hold elections. Policies that advance liberalism are harder to develop and pursue than those that aim to persuade states to hold free and fair elections, but the United States can promote liberalism as well as electoral democracy, as I argue below.

II. The Benefits of the Spread of Democracy

Most Americans assume that democracy is a good thing and that the spread of democracy will be beneficial. Because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and considered. Democracy is not an unalloyed good, so it is important not to overstate or misrepresent the benefits of democratization. Nevertheless, the spread of democracy has many important benefits. This section enumerates how the spread of democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national interests of the United States.

A. Democracy is Good for the Citizens of New Democracies

The United States should attempt to spread democracy because people generally live better lives under democratic governments. Compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. Skeptics will immediately ask: Why should the United States attempt to improve the lives of non-Americans? Shouldn't this country focus on its own problems and interests? There are at least three answers to these questions.

First, as human beings, American should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. The bonds of common humanity do not stop at the borders of the United States. 19 To be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system. In a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism. The human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. But there are many possibilities for action motivated by concern for individuals in other countries. In the United States, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that Americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. The emergence of the so-called "CNN Effect"-the tendency for Americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. If Americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end.

Second, Americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty. The United States was founded on the principle of securing liberty for its citizens. Its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. Among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is Samuel Huntington, who argues that America's "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values." 20 As I argue below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty. Given its founding principles and very identity, the United States has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has argued: "The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in Britain's 13 American colonies-and that to secure the 'unalienable rights' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed.'" 21

Third, improvements in the lives of individuals in other countries matter to Americans because the United States cannot insulate itself from the world. It may be a clichÃ© to say that the world is becoming more interdependent, but it is undeniable that changes in communications technologies, trade flows, and the environment have opened borders and created a more interconnected world. These trends give the United States a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage that will affect Americans. As I argue below in my discussion of how promoting democracy serves U.S. interests, the spread of democracy will directly advance the national interests of the United States. The growing interconnectedness of international relations means that the United States also has an indirect stake in the well-being of those in other countries, because developments overseas can have unpredictable consequences for the United States.

For these three reasons, at least, Americans should care about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries.

1. Democracy Leads to Liberty and Liberty is Good

The case for the maximum possible amount of individual freedom can be made on the basis of utilitarian calculations or in terms of natural rights. The utilitarian case for increasing the amount of individual liberty rests on the belief that increased liberty will enable more people to realize their full human potential, which will benefit not only themselves but all of humankind. This view holds that greater liberty will allow the human spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately benefit all of humankind. The rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. This argument is most memorably expressed in the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ..."

The virtues of greater individual liberty are not self-evident. Various political ideologies argue against making liberty the paramount goal of any political system. Some do not deny that individual liberty is an important goal, but call for limiting it so that other goals may be achieved. Others place greater emphasis on obligations to the community. The British Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb, for example, articulated this view clearly: "The perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine." 25 To debate these issues thoroughly would require a paper far longer than this one. 26 The short response to most critiques of liberty is that there appears to be a universal demand for liberty among human beings. Particularly as socioeconomic development elevates societies above subsistence levels, individuals desire more choice and autonomy in their lives. More important, most political systems that have been founded on principles explicitly opposed to liberty have tended to devolve into tyrannies or to suffer economic, political, or social collapse.

2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.

There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects." 30 (2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents. 31

3. Democracy Enhances Long-Run Economic Performance

A third reason for promoting democracy is that democracies tend to enjoy greater prosperity over long periods of time. As democracy spreads, more individuals are likely to enjoy greater economic benefits. Democracy does not necessarily usher in prosperity, although some observers claim that "a close correlation with prosperity" is one of the "overwhelming advantages" of democracy. 32 Some democracies, including India and the Philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few years. Others are among the most prosperous societies on earth. Nevertheless, over the long haul democracies generally prosper. As Mancur Olson points out: "It is no accident that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic performance across generations are all stable democracies." 33

Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run. Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population. 37 A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was
0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%. 38 Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies.

Second, democracies that embrace liberal principles of government are likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals will only make long-term investments when they are confident that their investments will not be expropriated. These and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary." 39 These conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. Mancur Olson thus points out that "the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. ... the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights." 40 Thus liberal democracy is the basis for long-term economic growth.

A third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms. 41 This factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions India and the Philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms. 42

4. Democracies Never Have Famines

Fourth, the United States should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press." 43 This striking empirical regularity has been overshadowed by the apparent existence of a "democratic peace" (see below), but it provides a powerful argument for promoting democracy. Although this claim has been most closely identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins, for example, argues that: "Wherever political rights for all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy." 44 Most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world's least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy.

Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity." 45 On the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents.

The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. These factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines.

The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically. Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls. Botswana's food production fell by 17% and Zimbabwe's by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas Sudan and Ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not. 49 If, as I have argued, democracies enjoy better long-run economic performance than nondemocracies, higher levels of economic development may help democracies to avoid famines. But the absence of famines in new, poor democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines.

The case of India before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in 1947, India suffered frequent famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of 1943 killed 2-3 million people. Since India became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine. 50

B. Democracy is Good for the International System

In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations." 51 One scholar argues that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." 52 If the number of democracies in the international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace."

1. The Evidence for the Democratic Peace

Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states. 53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another." 54 Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance. 55 Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another. 56

Most studies of the democratic-peace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go to war with nondemocracies. 57 There are, however, several scholars who argue that democracies are inherently less likely to go to war than other types of states. 58 The evidence for this claim remains in dispute, however, so it would be premature to claim that spreading democracy will do more than to enlarge the democratic zone of peace.

2. Why there is a Democratic Peace: The Causal Logic

Two types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent democracies from fighting one another. The second claims that institutional (or structural) constraints make it difficult or impossible for a democracy to wage war on another democracy.

a. Normative Explanations

The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies. 59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully. 60

b. Institutional/Structural Explanations

Institutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully. 61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars. 62

c. Combining Normative and Structural Explanations

Some studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace. 63 It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under different conditions. For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace. 64 Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist (systemic) predictions.

C. The Spread of Democracy is Good for the United States

The United States will have an interest in promoting democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and contributes to a more peaceful international system. To the extent that Americans care about citizens of other countries and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy. Spreading democracy also will directly advance the national interests of the United States, because democracies will not launch wars or terrorist attacks against the United States, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the United States, and will tend to ally with the United States.

1. Democracies Will Not Go to War with the United States

First, democracies will not go to war against the United States, provided, of course, that the United States remains a democracy. The logic of the democratic peace suggests that the United States will have fewer enemies in a world of more democracies. If democracies virtually never go to war with one another, no democracy will wage war against the United States. Democracies are unlikely to get into crises or militarized disputes with the United States. Promoting democracy may usher in a more peaceful world; it also will enhance the national security of the United States by eliminating potential military threats. The United States would be more secure if Russia, China, and at least some countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds became stable democracies.

2. Democracies Don't Support Terrorism Against the United States

Second, spreading democracy is likely to enhance U.S. national security because democracies will not support terrorist acts against the United States. The world's principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Sudan. 65

Some skeptics of the democratic-peace proposition point out that democracies sometimes have sponsored covert action or "state terrorism" against other democracies. Examples include U.S. actions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973. 66 This argument does not undermine the claim that democracies will not sponsor terrorism against the United States. In each case, the target state had dubious democratic credentials. U.S. actions amounted to interference in internal affairs, but not terrorism as it is commonly understood. And the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the United States itself, which suggests that the United States has little to fear from other democracies.

3. Democracies Produce Fewer Refugees

Third, the spread of democracy will serve American interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the United States. The countries that generate the most refugees are usually the least democratic. The absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of which encourage the flight of refugees. 67 The spread of democracy can reduce refugee flows to the United States by removing the political sources of decisions to flee.

The results of the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti demonstrate how U.S. efforts to promote democratization can reduce refugee flows. The number of refugees attempting to flee Haiti for the United States dropped dramatically after U.S. forces deposed the junta led by General Raoul Cedras and restored the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, even though Haiti's economic fortunes did not immediately improve. 68

In addition to reducing the number of countries that generate refugees, the spread of democracy is likely to increase the number of countries that accept refugees, thereby reducing the number of refugees who will attempt to enter the United States. 69

4. Democracies will Ally with the United States

Fourth, the global spread of democracy will advance American interests by creating more potential allies for the United States. Historically, most of America's allies have been democracies. In general, democracies are much more likely to ally with one another than with nondemocracies. 70 Even scholars who doubt the statistical evidence for the democratic-peace proposition, agree that "the nature of regimes ... is an important variable in the understanding the composition of alliances ... democracies have allied with one another." 71 Thus spreading democracy will produce more and better alliance partners for the United States.

5. American Ideals Flourish When Others Adopt Them

Fifth, the spread of democracy internationally is likely to increase Americans' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions. Part of the impetus behind American attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that American democracy will be healthier when other countries adopt similar political systems. To some extent, this belief reflects the conviction that democracies will be friendly toward the United States. But it also reflects the fact that democratic principles are an integral part of America's national identity. The United States thus has a special interest in seeing its ideals spread. 72

6. Democracies Make Better Economic Partners

Finally, the United States will benefit from the spread of democracy because democracies will make better economic partners. Democracies are more likely to adopt market economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. The United States generally will be able to establish mutually beneficial trading relationships with democracies. And democracies provide better climates for American overseas investment, by virtue of their political stability and market economies.

III. Responses to Criticisms of U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy

A. The Controversy Over the Democratic Peace

Although many political scientists accept the proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another, several critics have challenged claims of a democratic peace. By the late 1990s, proponents and critics of the democratic peace were engaged in a vigorous and sometimes heated debate. 73 Participants on both sides claimed that their opponents had been blinded by ideology and refused to view the evidence objectively. 74 Because of this intense and ongoing controversy, establishing the case for the democratic peace now requires rebutting some of the most prominent criticisms.

Critics have presented several important challenges to the deductive logic and empirical bases of the democratic peace proposition. They have argued that there is not a convincing theoretical explanation of the apparent absence of war between democracies, that democracies actually have fought one another, that the absence of wars between democracies is not statistically significant, and that factors other than shared democratic institutions or values have caused the democratic peace.

The critics of the democratic peace have presented vigorous arguments that have forced the proposition's proponents to refine and qualify the case for the democratic peace. These criticisms do not, however, refute the principal arguments for the democratic peace. As I argue below, there is still a compelling deductive and empirical case that democracies are extremely unlikely to fight one another. Moreover, the case for spreading democracy does not rest entirely on the democratic-peace proposition. Although those who favor promoting democracy often invoke the democratic peace, the debate over whether the United States should spread democracy is not the same as the debate over the democratic peace. Even if the critics were able to undermine the democratic-peace proposition, their arguments would not negate the case for spreading democracy, because there are other reasons for promoting democracy. More important, the case for promoting democracy as a means of building peace remains sound if the spread of democracy merely reduces the probability of war between democracies, whereas "proving" the democratic peace proposition requires showing that the probability of such wars is at or close to zero.

1. Criticisms of the Deductive Logic of the Democratic Peace

Several criticisms of the democratic peace proposition fault the logic that has been advanced to explain the apparent absence of war between democracies. These arguments do not rest on an assessment of the empirical evidence, but instead rely on analyses and critiques of the internal consistency and persuasiveness of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace. Critics have offered four major challenges to the logic of the democratic peace: (a) there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms that keep democracies at peace: (b) the possibility that democracies may turn into nondemocracies means that even democracies operate according to realist principles; (c) the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is flawed, not least because its logic also would predict that democracies are less likely to be involved in any wars, not just wars with other democracies; and (d) the normative explanation of the democratic peace is unpersuasive.

a. Absence of Consensus on what Explains the Democratic Peace

The Argument: The first, and most general criticism of the deductive logic of the democratic peace proposition holds that the lack of agreement on what causes democracies to avoid war with one another calls the proposition into question. 75 This argument suggests that scholars cannot be confident in an empirical finding when they cannot agree on its causes.

Response: The fact that several theories have been advanced to explain the democratic peace does not mean that we cannot be confident that democracies are unlikely to fight one another. There is no reason to assume that a single theory explains all the cases in which democracies have avoided war with one another. It is possible to be confident in an empirical finding even when many different explanations account for it. For example, it is empirically true that all human beings eventually die. (The discovery of evidence to refute this proposition would have profound biological, philosophical, and theological implications, not to mention its effects on retirement planning and the future of the Social Security system.) But there are many causes of death, each of which rests on a different logic of explanation. People die in wars, accidents, and violent crimes, as well as from AIDS, heart disease, numerous types of cancer, and Alzheimer's Disease, among many other factors. In some cases, the causal logic of the explanation of death is very clear. It is well understood how a bullet through the heart leads to death. In other cases, including many infectious and chronic diseases, the precise biological and physiological processes that cause death are not fully understood. Nevertheless, the variety of causal mechanisms and our incomplete understanding of many of them do not lead us to the conclusion that some human beings will not die.

Accounting for the absence of wars between democracies is somewhat similar to explaining why people die. Several causal mechanisms explain the absence of wars between democracies. In some cases, democracies avoid war because the distribution of power in the international system gives them strong incentives to remain at peace. In at least some of these cases, democratic decision-making processes may make democracies "smarter" and better able to recognize systemic incentives. When states share liberal values, they are unlikely to go to war because fighting one another would undermine liberal values such as respect for individual freedom. As John Owen has argued, democratic institutions may reinforce the incentives for peace provided by shared liberal principles. 76 And there are probably additional explanations for why at least some democratic dyads have remained at peace. Proponents of the democratic peace need to refine the logic of each explanation and identify the conditions under which they apply, but the multiplicity of explanations does not mean that the democratic peace is invalid.

b. Democracies may Revert to Autocracy

The Argument: A second criticism of the logic of the democratic peace argues that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace among themselves because there is always a possibility that a democratic state will become nondemocratic. This possibility means that even democracies must be concerned about the potential threat posed by other democracies. John Mearsheimer argues that: "Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative power among themselves, which is tantamount to saying that each has an incentive to consider aggression against the other to forestall future trouble." 77 In other words, the realist logic of anarchy, which posits that states exist in a Hobbesian world of fear, suspicion and potential war, applies even to relations between democracies. 78

Response: There are four reasons for rejecting claims that fears of democratic backsliding compel democracies to treat other democracies as they would treat any nondemocratic state. First, the historical record shows that mature, stable democracies rarely become autocracies. 79

Second, democracies are able to recognize and respond to states that are making a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. Democratic states thus can pursue a policy of accommodation toward other democracies, hedge their bets with more cautious policies toward unstable or uncertain democracies, and abandon accommodation when democracies turn into nondemocracies. There is no reason to assume that democracies will become autocracies overnight and then immediately launch attacks on democracies.

Third, like some other realist arguments, the claim that states must give priority to preparing for an unlikely dangerous future development rests on flawed logic. It assumes that states must base their foreign policies almost entirely on worst-case scenarios. Similar logic would imply that, for example, citizens in any country should act on the basis of the assumption that domestic law and order might collapse into anarchy and violence.

Fourth, the claim that democracies must worry about the relative power of other democracies (which may become autocracies) relies on the same shaky logic that predicts that states cannot cooperate because they need to worry about the relative gains achieved by other states. The relative-gains argument holds that in international politics, cooperation is rare because it often gives greater gains to one state, and these relative disparities in gains can be turned into advantages in power than can be used to threaten the state that gains less. 80 The relative-gains argument sometimes assumes that states have high and constant concerns about relative gains. In practice, however, relative-gains concerns vary and are often almost nonexistent. 81

c. Criticisms of the Structural-Institutional Explanation

The Argument: Critics of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace make the following arguments. First, the structural-institutional model fails to explain why democracies go to war with nondemocracies, even though they do not fight other democracies. If leaders of democracies are constrained from going to war by the public, this constraint would also prevent democracies from fighting nondemocracies. 82 Many studies report, however, that democracies have the same rate of war involvement as nondemocracies.

Second, critics argue that the public is often just as warlike as the leaders that they are supposed to constrain. Public jingoism and enthusiasm for war accompanied the outbreak of World War One and helped cause the Spanish-American War. The structural-institutional model thus erroneously assumes that the people are usually more pacific than their leaders. 83 A related argument suggests that recent extended intervals of peace may have led publics to forget the horrors of war. The end of conscription in many countries and the tendency for wars to be fought by volunteer professional armies may further erode public opposition to the use of force. 84

Response: The criticisms of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace are not persuasive, for four reasons. First, this explanation can account for why democracies only avoid wars with other democracies, because democracies may behave differently toward states (i.e., democracies) with domestic institutions that constrain their ability to go to war quickly. Democracies may distinguish between states on the basis of their political institutions, and pursue different policies toward those that are constrained by democratic institutions. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman argue that "some political institutions help foster beliefs ... about the dovish inclinations of certain states. Democratic institutions are visible signs that the state in question is likely to face high political costs for using force in its diplomacy." 85 A slightly different form of the argument suggests that the constraints of democratic decision-making become much more severe when the government of a democracy attempts to mobilize the country for war against a fellow democracy. Thus the institutional argument does not actually predict that democracies will pursue peaceful policies toward all types of states.

Second, the institutional-structural explanation, properly formulated, need not rest on the assumption that the public is peace-loving while leaders are eager to go to war. Some proponents of the democratic peace proposition, including Immanuel Kant, have assumed that the people are less eager to favor war, because they will ultimately be forced to pay its costs. 86 The logic of the theory, however, can be recast in terms of checks and balances. In a democracy, the executive branch, legislative branch, and the public all constrain each other's ability to make rash and hasty decisions for war.

Third, the critics overlook how the existence of domestic constraints in a pair of democratic states can enable a democratic dyad to spend more time seeking a peaceful settlement of a conflict than a dyad with one or no democracies. If both states in a crisis are unable to mobilize quickly, they will have more time to resolve the crisis without war. Bruce Russett argues: "If another nation's leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. They will expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement." 87

Finally, critics of the institutional-structural explanation have not addressed the claim that democratic institutions endow democracies with better information-processing capabilities that enable democracies to limit the myths that cause war and to avoid wars when international circumstances render war unwise.

d. Criticisms of the Normative Explanation

Response: Proponents of the democratic peace counter that the involvement of the United States in Chile in 1973 is usually the only example of covert intervention by a democracy in another democracy and that democracies as a group are actually less likely to engage in covert or overt interventions. 91 More generally, they argue that the normative explanation is not undermined by hostilities short of war. If democracies (or liberal states) fail to recognize one another or temporarily adopt illiberal policies, they may find themselves at odds with other democracies (or liberal states). But as crises develop between liberal democracies, they tend to act on the basis of their shared norms and draw back from the brink of war. 92

2. Empirical Criticisms

a. Democracies Sometimes Fight

The Argument: Critics of the democratic peace point to apparent wars between democracies as evidence that there is no democratic peace. They frequently cite the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, Finland's decision to align with Germany against the Western powers and the Soviet Union during World War Two, the American Civil War, World War One, and the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. At least 17 conflicts have been cited as potential wars between democracies. 93

Responses: There are three reasons to reject the claim that the democratic peace proposition is invalid because democracies may have fought some wars. First, the democratic peace propositionCcorrectly formulated-holds that democracies rarely fight, not that they never fight. In social science it is probably impossible to generate laws with 100% accuracy. Thus the correct formulation of the democratic peace proposition is the statement that democracies almost never go to war with one another. 94

Second, many of the cases cited do not qualify as "wars" between "democracies." A closer examination of the conflicts in question reveals that the apparent exceptions do not refute the democratic peace proposition. In some cases, one of the participants was not a democracy. In 1812, Britain was not a democracy. Spain's democratic credentials in 1898 were dubious. Germany in 1914 was not governed by liberal principles and its foreign policy was directed by the Kaiser, not the elected Reichstag. 95 In other cases, no international war took place. The American Civil War was not an international war. Finland engaged in virtually no direct hostilities with the Western allies during World War Two; it fought almost entirely against communist Russia. 96

Third, the criticism that democracies have fought one another is irrelevant to deciding whether the United States should export democracy. The spread of democracy makes sense as long as democracies are significantly less likely to go to war with one another. A policy of spreading democracy would be justified if democracies have, for example, avoided war 99.9% of the time; we can decide to spread democracy without debating whether the figure is 99.9% or 100%.

b. The Absence of War is not Statistically Significant

The Argument: Statistical critiques of the evidence for the democratic peace proposition generally argue that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the absence of wars between democracies is statistically significant. There are two underlying logics behind most of these quantitative arguments. The first suggests that wars between a given pair of states are relatively rare in international politics, so the absence of wars between democracies might be a coincidence. 97 The second argument claims that the absence of war between democracies is only statistically significant after World War II, and that the democratic peace since 1945 has been a product of the alignment of most democracies against the Soviet Union. 98

The second argument also is unpersuasive, because Farber and Gowa make an arbitrary decision to slice up the data into different periods and categories. Moreover, Maoz is unable to replicate their results. Farber and Gowa appear to have miscounted the total number of dyads. 102

c. Other Causes Account for the Apparent Democratic Peace

An additional set of arguments suggests other factors besides shared democracy have caused democracies to remain at peace with one another. Such claims are implicit in some critiques of the logic and evidence, but not all such critiques identify the factors that are alleged to count for the absence of wars between democracies.

(1) Alliances Against Common Threats Cause Democratic Peace

The Argument: Several critics of the democratic peace proposition claim that the absence of war among democracies can be explained by the fact that democracies often have allied against common threats. Democracies have avoided wars with one another not because they share democratic forms of government, but because they have had a common interest in defeating a common enemy. Thus the realist logic of balancing against threats explains the democratic peace. 103

Responses: There are three responses to the claim that allying against common threats is a more important cause of peace among democracies. First, those who make this argument overlook the fact that threat perceptions and alliance choice often reflect shared values and political principles. These critics assume that alliance formation proceeds in strict accordance with realist logic and that regime type plays no role. Democracies, however, may have found themselves allied to one another against nondemocracies because they share a commitment to democratic values and want to defend them against threats from nondemocracies. Indeed, if the democratic peace proposition is only partially valid and if it is at least dimly understood by decisionmakers, democracies will find other democracies less threatening than nondemocracies and therefore will tend to align with them against nondemocracies. This argument is consistent with Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory, which identifies offensive intentions as element of threat. 104 If democracies regard one another as having no offensive intentions toward democracies, they are likely to align against nondemocracies.

Second, the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is further evidence of the special characteristics of democratic foreign policy. 105 The normative explanation for the democratic peace would predict that democracies would be more likely to form alliances. Instead of being a refutation of the democratic peace, the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is actually an additional piece of confirming evidence.

Third, Maoz does an interesting test, examining whether states were allied before they became democracies or allied only after they became democracies. He finds that "Non-aligned democracies are considerably less likely to fight each other than aligned non-democracies." 106 This finding suggests that shared democracy-not alignment against a common threat-has the most explanatory power in accounting for the absence of wars between democracies.

(2) Democracies Have not had much Opportunity to Fight

The Argument: Some critics of the democratic peace proposition claim that democracies have not fought one another because they have not had the opportunity. Until recently, there were relatively few democracies in the international system. Many were geographically remote from each other. 107

Response: The most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace. 108

(3) Process-Tracing does not Reveal Evidence of Democracy as a Cause of the Democratic Peace.

The Argument: Skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. For example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in democracies did not want war with other democracies, that leaders did not make military threats against other democracies, and that democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies. 109 Examination of historical crises, however, reveals that democratic decisionmakers avoided war because they feared defeat or that their states would be weakened in a conflict. 110

Response: Proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states. 111 In the anarchic and competitive realm of international politics, democracies cannot avoid making such calculations. Thus evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition.

In addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how democracies will avoid war. More comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises. Such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs. John Owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition. 112

B. The Democratization Process Increases the Risk of War

The Argument: One of the most important arguments against U.S. efforts to promote democracy is the claim that countries engaged in transitions to democracy become more likely to be involved in war. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war. They suggest that several causal mechanisms explain why democratization tends to lead to war. First, old elites play the nationalist card in an effort to incite conflict so that they can retain power. Second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures. 113 This type of electoral competition increases the risk of internal and international conflict.

The argument that democratization causes war does not directly challenge the usual form of the democratic peace proposition. Mansfield and Snyder recognize that "It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States." 114 Instead, the arguments suggests that attempts to spread democracy have significant risks, including the risk of war.

Responses: Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. Taken to extremes, the Mansfield/Snyder argument would amount to a case for opposing all political change on the grounds that it might cause instability. Promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy.

First, there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. Other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of Mansfield and Snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes. 115 In particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars-the same causal mechanisms that Mansfield and Snyder claim are at work in democratizing states. Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies. 116 In addition, very few of the most recent additions to the ranks of democracies have engaged in wars. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia. 117 Russia has been involved in a number of small wars on or near its borders, but so far it has undergone a dramatic transition toward democracy without becoming very warlike. 118 There is little evidence of international war in Latin America, which also has witnessed a large-scale transition to democracy in recent years. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. The new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all.

All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest. These factors will not lead today's new democracies into war. Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies.

C. Promoting Elections may be Harmful or Irrelevant

Responses: These criticisms of electoral democracy are important reminders that democracy is imperfect and so are democracies. They also call attention to the need to promote the spread of liberal principles, as well as democratic electoral procedures. They do not, however, amount to a persuasive case against U.S. support for elections in other countries, for the following reasons. First, Zakaria overstates the extent to which new democracies are illiberal or are becoming so. He argues that the Freedom House ratings show that 50% of democratizing countries are illiberal democracies. He classifies countries as "democratizing" if their combined Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties (each measured on a 7-point scale with 1 denoting the most freedom and 7 the least) fall between 5 and 10. He regards countries as illiberal if they have a greater degree of political freedom than civil liberties. Zakaria's claim that there is a growing number of illiberal democracies may be correct. After all, there are now more emerging democracies. But whether states have fewer civil liberties than political rights is a problematic way to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies. In 65% of the states classified as illiberal democracies by Zakaria, the difference between civil liberties and political rights is only one point on the 7-point Freedom House scale. In no case is the difference greater than 2 points. Moreover, classifying countries as illiberal on the basis of whether they have more civil liberties than political rights leads to some absurd distinctions. For example, Zakaria's criteria would classify France as an illiberal democracy because it scores higher on political rights (1) than civil liberties (2), and Gabon as a liberal democracy because its civil liberties score (4) is higher than its political rights (5). Zakaria notes that he does not rely on Freedom House for classifications of individual states, only for overall statistical measures. Freedom House's 1997 ratings show that civil liberties have improved in 10 of the countries Zakaria identifies as "democratizing" and fallen in only 4. The most recent Freedom House ratings also show that 81 of 117 democracies are now classified as "free" whereas only 76 of 117 were "free" in 1995. Thus there actually seems to be a slight trend toward liberalization, even as the overall number of democracies remains constant. 125 In light of the absence of democratic and liberal traditions in many new democracies (particularly in the former Soviet Union and Africa), it is remarkable that freedom continues to flourish to the extent that it does. 126

Second, Zakaria and Kaplan overlook the extent to which the holding of elections is (a) an important way of removing authoritarian leaders, and (b) part of the process of encouraging the growth of liberal values. The principle that leaders should be selected in free and fair elections can become an international norm that can be used to persuade authoritarian leaders to step aside, sometimes gracefully. Marcos in the Philippines and Pinochet in Chile were removed from power largely because of the growing international belief in the electoral principle. It is hard to imagine that elections in Burma, for example, could produce an outcome worse than the current SLORC regime. Elections do not only remove unpopular authoritarians, however; they also encourage the development of liberal habits and principles such as freedom of speech and of the press. Holding a free and fair election requires that these principles be followed. Elections alone do not guarantee that constitutional liberalism and the rule of law will be adopted, but they do focus the attention of the voting public on the process of freely electing their governments.

Fourth, Kaplan and, to a lesser extent, Zakaria, exaggerate the degree to which elections per se are responsible for the problems of new democracies, many of which had the same problems before elections were held. In the area of ethnic conflict, for example, democratic elections may ameliorate existing conflicts instead of exacerbating them. The evidence is mixed, but the need to build electoral coalitions and the liberal practices of free speech and freedom of association necessary to hold elections may promote ethnic accommodation, not hostility. 130

These arguments suggest that Zakaria, Kaplan, and other critics of electoral democracy have taken the valid point that "elections are not enough" too far. The United States should support democracy and liberalism; supporting only the latter risks not achieving either.

D. The Challenge from "Asian Values"

Asian "soft authoritarianism" merits attention for two reasons. First, it is emerging as the most prominent, articulate, and comprehensive critique of liberal democracy. Second, the countries that advocate it were, at least until the second half of 1997, among the most dynamic economies in the world. Singapore, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, and other Asian economies achieved annual growth rates of 10% or higher in the 1980s and most of 1990s. Their growing economic power has increased their influence in international affairs. Their recent economic turmoil is probably only a temporary setback, and the fact that it disrupted financial markets around the world testifies to the growing economic importance of these countries.

Asian attempts to articulate a distinctive "Asian way" and to criticize liberal democratic principles have provoked broader debates on the difference between Asian and Western cultures, whether there is a uniquely Asian approach to politics and economics, and the international implications of East Asia's rise. 134 Many of these questions are beyond the scope of this paper, so I will focus on the East Asian arguments against U.S. attempts to spread democracy.

The Arguments: East Asian critics of democracy make the following arguments for why the spread of democracy-particularly to East Asia-is not desirable. First, Western democracy allows for too much liberty, and this excessive individual freedom causes moral decline and social collapse. U.S. divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births, and crime rates, are evidence of liberty run wild. 135 Second, some Asians argue that the spread democracy would aggravate ethnic tensions and increase ethnic conflict within Asian countries. Third, and most generally, some East Asians claim that liberal democracy is not a suitable form of government for Asian countries, because Asia has a different set of cultural values that include a strong emphasis on communalism.

Responses: Each of these arguments for the undesirability of democracy is seriously flawed. The first argument-that democracy causes moral decline and social disintegration-is not persuasive, because not all liberal democracies suffer such ills. Canada and most European countries demonstrate that liberal democracy does not cause social collapse. These countries are indisputably democratic, but they are far less violent than the United States, and they do not have America's social problems. In 1995, the Population Reference Bureau reported that Americans kill each other at a rate 17 times higher than in Japan and Ireland, 10 times the rates in Germany and France, and five times the rate in Canada. The United Nations Demographic Yearbook shows homicide rates per 100,000 population for several countries in 1991, the most recent year available. Canada's was 2.2, Japan's 0.6, Austria's 1.3, the Netherlands' 1.2, and Norway's 1.9. Portugal and Spain came in at 1.6 and 0.9, respectively, while Italy's was 2.9 The United Kingdom's was 4.8 versus 10.4 for the United States. 136 These differences between the United States reflect deep-seated cultural differences. The American culture of individualism, not more universal liberal and democratic values, is responsible for many U.S. social problems.

The argument that democracy exacerbates ethnic tensions also is unpersuasive. Managing ethnic tensions in multiethnic societies isn't easy, but democratic approaches may be at least as successful as authoritarian ones. Authoritarian states that appeared to control ethnic tensions often did so at a high price in human life. The Soviet Union avoided ethnic civil war, but under Stalin it decimated or deported many ethnic minorities. Tito's Yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of suspected separatists were killed on Tito's orders, particularly in the late 1940s. Considerable evidence indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation, and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability.

The third argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with East Asian values is belied by the relatively successful growth of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and, more recently, Taiwan and the Philippines. These states have not emulated the Western model of democracy in all respects, but they are almost universally classified as democracies. In addition to conducting multiparty elections and maintaining civil liberties, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all have impressive economic records. Some East Asians point to the Philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent years. In addition, the Korean and Japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in hand. The former problems of the Philippines may be attributable to the Spanish colonial legacy, not the flaws of democratic political systems.

The economic and financial crises that swept across many Asian countries in 1997 and 1998 have muted many of the loudest voices that argued for "Asian values" and "soft authoritarianism." Many commentators have argued that the answer to Asia's economic difficulties would be greater acceptance of democratic values. 137 Claims that the Asian model is in a crisis and will be abandoned are probably overstated, just as Asian leaders tended to overstate the virtues of their approach when their economies were flourishing. Nevertheless, it seems likely that proponents of "Asian values" will offer a less strident challenge to liberal and democratic values in the future and that Asian countries will pursue political liberalization as part of their economic reforms. At least some of the current economic difficulties in Asian countries can be attributed to a lack of public accountability.

Conclusion

The recent critiques of U.S. efforts to promote democracy have not presented a convincing case that spreading democracy is a bad idea. The international spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the United States. The democratic peace proposition appears robust, even if scholars need to continue to develop multiple explanations for why democracies rarely, if ever, go to war. The evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. The problem of "illiberal democracy" has been exaggerated; democratic elections usually do more good than harm. The United States should, however, aim to promote liberal values as well as electoral democracy. And the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the Asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "Asian values."

Establishing that promoting democracy is beneficial does not, however, resolve all the questions that surround U.S. attempts to spread democracy. These questions include: Can the United States encourage the spread of democracy or must democracy always develop indigenously? How can the United States promote democracy in other countries? Which policies work and under what circumstances do they work? Any comprehensive case for why the United States should promote democracy must address these questions. 138

Notes

Note 1: See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 138; Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy, No. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25-46; and Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991).

Note 2: See Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 111-127.

Note 3: Quoted in Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 239.

Note 4: See Robert Kagan, "Democracies and Double Standards," Commentary, August 1997, pp. 19-26 for the argument that the Clinton administration is showing less enthusiasm for promoting democracy, and for a summary and critique of recent arguments against promoting democracy. At least some members of the Clinton administration continue to argue for promoting democracy. See Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996), pp. 47-63.

Note 5: Robert D. Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, pp. 55-80.

Note 6: Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 22-43.

Note 7: Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987), p. 206.

Note 8: Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is ... and Is Not," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, second edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 50.

Note 9: Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 269.

Note 10: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 7.

Note 11: See, for example, James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 89-102; and David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 430-451.

Note 12: For discussions of the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of democracy, see M.I. Finley, Democracy: Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973); David Stockton, Classical Athenian Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick, eds., Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1996). I am indebted to Bradley A. Thayer for reminding me of this important distinction.

Note 13: Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1995, p. 10.

Note 14: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 7

Note 15: John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 123.

Note 16: Although the term "liberal" has become an epithet hurled at those on the left of the American political spectrum, virtually all American politicians and most of those in Europe embrace the basic principles of liberalism. Liberalism is most closely associated with the political thought of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, although Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith also contributed to its development. For discussions of liberty and liberalism, see "Liberalism Defined: The Perils of Complacency," The Economist, December 21, 1996; Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; and Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 3-4.

Note 17: Some liberals, however, regard electoral democracy as one of the "core norms" of liberalism. See, for example, Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, p. 4

Note 18: Michael Walzer, "Vote Early," The New Republic, October 28, 1996, p. 29.

Note 19: Many political and moral philosophers have addressed this issue and it would be impossible to do full justice to their arguments in this essay. Two good places to start exploring these issues are Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981). For a brief overview and evaluation of the contending positions in the debate over whether there are moral obligations to foreigners, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: The Free Press, 1986), chap. 3.

Note 20: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 30.

Note 21: Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," pp. 49-50.

Note 22: For definitions of liberty and classic discussions of the topic, see the writings of Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and the Federalist papers. Recent important discussions of liberty include Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty; and Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

Note 23: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 28.

Note 24: Adrian Karatnycky, "Freedom on the March," in Freedom Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January-February 1997), pp. 7, 11.

Note 25: Quoted in Geoffrey Wheatcroft, "The Paradoxical Case of Tony Blair," The Atlantic Monthly, June 1996, pp. 22-40 at 26.

Note 26: For some discussions of liberalism and its critics, see Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism; and Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Note 27: More generally, democracies are more likely to enjoy political stability. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 28-29.

Note 28: R.J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1997), pp. 87-88. Rummel presents his definition explicitly: "By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least two-thirds of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights." (p. 11) On p. 86 of Power Kills, Rummel lists additional studies that confirm the proposition that democracies have the least internal violence, but it is not clear whether those studies considered all democracies or only states that Rummel classifies as liberal democracies.

Note 29: See Rudolph J. Rummel, "Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 1-10. Rummel calls genocide and mass murder "democide," and distinguishes such killings from battle deaths. He reports that between 1900 and 1987 over 169 million people died in democides, compared to about 34 million battle death in wars. See also Rummel, Power Kills, chap. 6.

Note 30: Rummel, "Power, Genocide and Mass Murder," p. 8. Emphasis in original. For a more detailed elaboration of Rummel's explanation, see Power Kills, especially chapter 11.

Note 31: See Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 28-29.

Note 32: "The Politics of Peace," Economist, April 1, 1995, p. 18.

Note 33: Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 572-573.

Note 34: Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," p. 572.

Note 35: Barbara Crosette, "The 21st Century Belongs to ..." New York Times, October 19, 1997, Week in Review section, p. 3.

Note 36: See Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, Adelphi Paper No. 287 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1994); and Jack A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy, No. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 35-52.

Note 37: Joshua Gordon, "Asian Growth Needs Democracy," Wall Street Journal, Interactive Edition,, August 12, 1996.

Note 38: Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick, "Freedom and Growth," Wall Street Journal, Interactive Edition, December 16, 1996.

Note 39: Quoted in Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 34.

Note 40: Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," p. 572. Emphasis in original.

Note 41: Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," p. 51;

Note 42: Adrian Karatnycky, "Still the Bedrock of a Better World," Washington Post, December 29, 1997, p. A17.

Note 43: Amartya Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," The New Republic, January 10 and 17, 1994, p. 34. See also Jean DrÃ¨ze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Sen makes it clear that democracy may not be a necessary condition for preventing famines, it does appear to be sufficient. See Amartya Sen, "War and Famines: On Divisions and Incentives," Discussion Paper No. 33, The Development Economics Research Programme, London School of Economics, October 1991, p. 19 note 28.

Note 44: Joseph Collins, "World Hunger: A Scarcity of Food or a Scarcity of Democracy?" in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., World Security: Challenges for a New Century, 2nd edition (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), p. 368.

Note 45: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," pp. 35, 36. Sen points out that the democratic political processes that prevent famines may be less effective in avoiding less urgent problems such as nonextreme hunger, illiteracy, and gender discrimination. Ibid., p. 35.

Note 46: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 34. A considerable body of opinion suggests that famines and hunger are not caused by a global or country-by-country shortage of food but by the failure to distribute food to those who most need it. See Collins, "World Hunger," pp. 357-360; and Amartya Sen, Food, Economics and Entitlements (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economic Research, 1986).

Note 47: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 34.

Note 48: Amartya Sen, "The Economics of Life and Death," Scientific American, May 1993, pp. 40-47. See also Mohiuddin Alamgir, Famine in South Asia: Political Economy of Mass Starvation in Bangladesh (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschalger, Gunn and Hain, 1980).

Note 49: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 35. For additional data, see Amartya Sen, "The Economics of Life and Death," Scientific American, May 1993, pp. 40-47; and DrPze and Sen, Hunger and Public Action.

Note 50: Sen, "Freedoms and Needs," p. 34. Many Indians have, however, suffered from hunger and malnutrition since 1947, but the country has avoided the catastrophic famines that previously plagued it.

Note 51: Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 123.

Note 52: Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88.

Note 53: Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Fall 1983). Reprinted in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 3-57.

Note 54: Ibid., p. 10. Emphasis in original.

Note 55: See Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993), pp. 231-249; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617-648; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35; Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 649-664; and Weede, "Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 377-383.

Note 56: Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1992), pp. 245-267.

Note 57: For one of the earliest statements of this finding, see Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69.

Note 58: R.J. Rummel, for example, claims that libertarian states, which tend to be more democratic than others, are less likely to resort to international violence. Such states will at least inflict fewer casualties in wars, even if they go to war as often as other types of states. See Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27-71; and Rummel, "Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 457-479. Some studies find that disputes between democracies and nondemocracies are less likely to escalate to war that disputes between nondemocracies, See Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35. For a reconsideration of the claim that democracies are as war-prone as other types of states, see James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 17-21.

Note 59: This type of argument appears in Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 10, 20-27; and Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," pp. 122-125.

Note 60: For examples of this argument, see Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30-38; and William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14-32.

Note 61: For examples of institutional/structural arguments, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and Institutional Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); T. Clifton Morgan and Sally H. Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 187-211; and Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235-269.

Note 62: Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, expanded edition (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 213. David Lake also suggests that democracies have advantages in the conduct of international politics, but concludes that this advantage makes democracies more likely to win wars. See David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.

Note 63: See Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638. Russett and Maoz find that the normative model is more powerful.

Note 64: See Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace."

Note 65: Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, pp. 4-5.

Note 66: David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 1992), pp. 385-395.

Note 67: Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, p. 5. For the argument that population growth is higher in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their level of wealth, see Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Democracy and Development," paper presented to the Nobel Symposium on Democracy's Victory and Crisis, Uppsala University, Sweden, August 27-30, 1994, pp. 9, 10, and 18, cited in Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, p. 69 note 4. For a survey of the causes of refugee flows that emphasizes that refugees flee mainly for political, not economic reasons, see Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 5-42.

Note 68: See Robert I. Rotberg, "Clinton Was Right," Foreign Policy, No. 102 (Spring 1996), pp. 135-141.

Note 69: I am indebted to Sumit Ganguly for bringing this point to my attention.

Note 70: Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 285-306.

Note 71: David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 231.

Note 72: Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 30; and John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 89-125.

Note 73: See the essays by Layne, Spiro, Farber and Gowa, and Oren in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace; Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that Democracies do not Fight One Another," Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (August 1994), pp. 207-224; Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass. The MIT Press, 1997); Scott Gates, et al., Democracy and Peace: A More Skeptical View," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 1-10; Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 511-522; Arie M. Kacowicz, "Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers?" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 265-276; Susan Peterson, "How Democracies Differ: Public Opinion, State Structure, and the Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), 3-37; Bruce D. Porter, "Is the Zone of Peace Stable? Sources of Stress and Conflict in Industrial Democracies of Post-Cold War Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 520-551; William R. Thompson, "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?" International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 141-174; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective." PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 667-670.

Note 74: Compare, for example, Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 179, and Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830-48," in Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?, p. 99.

Note 75: An earlier criticism claimed that proponents of the democratic peace had failed to develop a theoretical explanation of the empirical finding that democracies do not fight each other. This criticism is no longer valid, because there is no longer any shortage of explanations. Instead, proponents of the democratic peace have advanced several explanations and they continue to explicate and refine the logic of each.

Note 76: See Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace."

Note 77: John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Lynn-Jones and Miller, eds., The Cold War and After, p. 186.

Note 78: For this variant of realism, see Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." Some realists do not paint such a stark picture of the implications of international anarchy. See, for example, Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90. On balance, realist theories lead to the conclusion that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace, not that democracies often will be at war. Recently, some scholars have combined realist theories with elements of explanations of the democratic peace. See, for example, Andrew Kydd, "Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155.

Note 79: See Huntington, The Third Wave, especially pp. 259-263.

Note 80: For contending perspectives on relative gains, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For a pessimistic realist view of how concern over relative gains inhibits cooperation, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 19-24.

Note 81: See Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism; John C. Matthews, III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 112-146; and Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains." in ibid., pp. 147-175.

Note 82: See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 185; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, p. 164; Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," p. 205; Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace," p. 243; Gates, et al., "Democracy and Peace," p. 4; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies: A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Democratic Peace," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 491-517 at 498-499. Note that proponents of the institutional-structural explanation agree that the logic of the model predicts that democracies will be less belligerent toward all types of states. See Morgan and Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies," p. 318.

Note 83: Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 185; Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 164.

Note 84: "The Politics of Peace," Economist, April 1, 1995, p. 17.

Note 85: Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason p. 272.

Note 86: Kant argued: "If the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game." Quoted in "The Politics of Peace," p. 17.

Note 87: Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 39.

Note 88: Layne, "Kant or Cant," p. 165; Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," p. 205.

Note 89: See Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action"; and Patrick James and Glenn E. Mitchell, II, "Targets of Covert Pressure: The Hidden Victims of the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 1 (July 1995).

Note 90: On the weaknesses of the normative explanation more generally, see Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, pp. 34-37.

Note 91: Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," p. 179.

Note 92: See Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace."

Note 93: See Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, chap. 3. In addition to above cases, others that are mentioned frequently include: Lebanon-Israel, 1948; Germany in the 1930s; and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

Note 94: See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 169 (note 2), and Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, "Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives," Review of International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), pp. 319 (note 2) and 322.

Note 95: Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs."

Note 96: See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; and James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.

Note 97: Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace"; and Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, pp. 27, 152-153, 159.

Note 98: See Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace."

Note 99: See, for example, Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace: And Yet it Moves," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 337-350.

Note 100: Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," especially pp. 164-173

Note 101: Ibid., pp. 165-166. See Zeev Maoz, Domestic Sources of Global Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), chap. 2, appendix, for his current coding rules.

Note 102: See Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," p. 167.

Note 103: See Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace"; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," pp. 186-187.

Note 104: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

Note 105: See Siverson and Emmons, "Birds of a Feather," and Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-139. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," also finds that democracies have a strong tendency to ally with other democracies.

Note 106: Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," p. 176.

Note 107: See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 186.

Note 108: See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, and Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace" for summaries of these studies.

Note 109: See Layne, "Kant or Cant," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 165-166.

Note 110: Ibid., pp. 168-190.

Note 111: See Russett, "And Yet it Moves," p. 350.

Note 112: See Owen, "How Liberalism Causes Democratic Peace"; and Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Note 113: Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, pp. 301-334.

Note 114: Ibid., p. 301.

Note 115: The most important challenge to Mansfield and Snyder is Michael D. Ward and Kristian Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 51-61. Ward and Gleditsch find that democratization reduces the probability of war by about 50%. See also Andrew J. Enterline, "Driving While Democratizing," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 183-196. Mansfield and Snyder reply in ibid., pp. 199-207. Mansfield and Snyder object to Enterline's focus on militarized international disputes (MIDs) instead of wars, but a strong case can be made for this choice. Wars usually come out of MIDs, which create the opportunity for leaders to play nationalist cards and to otherwise behave and Mansfield and Snyder fear. Mansfield and Snyder are working on a book (forthcoming from The MIT Press in the BCSIA Studies in International Security series) that will present their arguments more comprehensively and with additional data and case studies.

Note 116: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 332.

Note 117: See Reinhard Wolf, "Correspondence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 176-180.

Note 118: For a discussion of Russia that takes the Mansfield/Snyder thesis into account and explains why Russia's democratization has not cause much war, see Michael McFaul, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics and the Making of Russian Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 5-35.

Note 119: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," pp. 332-333.

Note 120: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 333. See also Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-40.

Note 121: Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 334.

Note 122: Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 22.

Note 123: Ibid., p. 35; and Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", pp. 60-61.

Note 124: Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", pp. 64-69.

Note 125: See Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," pp. 23-24; Karatnycky, "Freedom on the March," pp. 21-22; and Karatnycky, "Still the Bedrock of a Better World."

Note 126: Kagan, "Democracies and Double Standards," p. 24.

Note 127: Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 42.

Note 128: Marc F. Plattner and Carl Gershman, "Democracy Gets a Bum Rap," Wall Street Journal, Interactive Edition, January 26, 1998.

Note 129: Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," p. 27.

Note 130: The relationship between liberalism, democracy, and ethnic conflict is complex. See Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 19-20, 577, and 609; Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, pp. 5-6; Donald L. Horowitz, "The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990); Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict and World Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Note 131: Historically, of course, democracy has faced ideological challenges from Marxism, Fascism, and Monarchism. None of these is a significant force in contemporary world politics, so I have focused on the challenge from proponents of "Asian Values."

Note 132: For examples of these views, see Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 109-126; Kishore Mahbubani, "`The Pacific Impulse,'" Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 105-120; Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard," Foreign Policy, No. 92 (Fall 1993), pp. 24-41; and Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 75-85.

Note 133: Howard W. French, "Africans Look East for a New Model," New York Times, February 4, 1996.

Note 134: Alan Dupont, "Is There An 'Asian Way'?" Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 13-33.

Note 135: See, for example, Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew," pp. 111-112.

Note 136: Gregory Kane, "Violence as a Cultural Imperative," Boston Globe, October 6, 1996, p. D2.

Note 137: See, for example, Steve Lohr, "Business, Asian Style: A Revaluing of Values," New York Times, February 7, 1998, pp. A17-A19.

Note 138: I attempt to answer these questions in my contribution to Christopher Layne and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Should America Spread Democracy? A Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, forthcoming 1998). For some other attempts, see Muravchik, Exporting Democracy; Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s; Graham T. Allison, Jr., and Robert P. Beschel, Jr., "Can the United States Promote Democracy?" Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 81-98; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 3-13.
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Why the United States Should Spread Democracy

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After the Cold War ended, promoting the international spread of democracy seemed poised to replace containment as the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy. Scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratization could become America's next mission. In recent years, however, critics have argued that spreading democracy may be unwise or even harmful.

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its a trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the United states. replaces the North America free trade agreement. allows imports with the certification of origin to include the nine required elements from the 3 countries

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Overview

The U.S. - Mexico - Canada Agreement (USMCA) is a trade agreement between the named parties. The USMCA replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has launched a USMCA Center to serve as a one stop shop for information concerning the USMCA. The USMCA Center coordinates CBP's implementation of the USMCA Agreement, ensuring a smooth transition with consistent and comprehensive guidance to our internal and external stakeholders.
USMCA Resource Center and Automotive Certification Portal
Entry-into Force

The USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020. NAFTA preferential treatment cannot be claimed on July 1, 2020 or afterwards.

For merchandise entered into commerce on or before June 30, 2020, NAFTA rules will continue to apply.

CSMS #45309245 - USMCA - Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021 & End of Restrained Enforcement - On December 27, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 [H.R.133 - 116th Congress (2019-2020)] was signed into law. The Act contains technical corrections for the USMCA, including on merchandise processing fee refunds for post-entry claims (including for 520(d) and reconciliation claims) and on foreign trade zones. These technical corrections are retroactive to July 1, 2020.

On April 20, 2020, CBP published interim implementing instructions. These interim implementing instruction have been subsequently updated to reflect the published uniform regulations and General Note 11.

CSMS #43062320 - US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Updated Interim Implementation Instructions - On June 16, 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative published Updated Uniform Regulations for the USMCA's Chapter 4 (Rules of Origin) and Chapter 5 (Origin Procedures). This version of the document replaces the Interim Implementing Instructions issued on April 20, 2020.

CSMS #43215543 - US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Implementing Instructions (Final) - On June 30, 2020, the U.S. International Trade Commission published General Note 11, incorporating the USMCA into the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, and accordingly, CBP updated our USMCA Implementing Instructions. This version of the document replaces the Interim Implementing Instructions issued on June 16, 2020.

On December 27, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriation Act (Pub. Law No. 116-260) was signed into law, including several changes to the implementation of the USMCA. These changes are detailed in a January 12, 2020 addendum to the USMCA Implementing Instructions. Available in Spanish and French Translations.

Compliance Guidance

CBP will use this webpage to post informational links, compliance guidance materials, points of contact, and Frequently Asked Questions. Additional guidance on USMCA compliance for the trade community will be posted here as developed. This webpage will be continually updated.

CBP has recorded a webinar regarding USMCA compliance for the private sector. Please visit CBP's Trade Outreach via Webinar webpage for more information.

CBP urges the import/export community to monitor CBP.gov/Trade, the Cargo System Messaging Service, and @CBPTradeGov on Twitter for updates on USMCA implementation dates; regulatory drafting; Frequently Asked Questions and other compliance resources.

The USMCA contains provisions relating to the prohibition of the importation of goods sourced from forced labor. For additional information on CBP's enforcement against this prohibition, please visit our Forced Labor webpage.

Any format is acceptable, provided it contains nine (9) minimum data elements set out in the USMCA, Annex 5-A.  To facilitate compliance, CBP has created a suggested template for the USMCA and other free trade agreements.  Please note: this PDF does not work on all Internet Browsers.  The form will work best on Internet Explorer.

Additional information on how to make USMCA preferential treatment claims can be found on this website, including an instructional video (" How to Make a USMCA Claim ").

For CBP related questions on USMCA, please contact the offices listed below for assistance:

Additional Resources

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U.S. - Mexico - Canada Agreement (USMCA)

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The U.S. - Mexico - Canada Agreement (USMCA) is a trade agreement between the named parties. The USMCA replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has launched a USMCA Center to serve as a one stop shop for information concerning the USMCA.

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https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/67/12/1026/4605229
twenty five years ago independent scientists have discovered and been warning humanity over the years of the potential damages that can occur over the years to come. They are concerned about how fast we are approaching many of the limits.

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World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice

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Twenty-five years ago, the Union of Concerned Scientists and more than 1700 independent scientists, including the majority of living Nobel laureates in the scie

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U.S. Embassy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Tuesday, September 6, 2022, Washington, USA - The United States government announced an additional $13 million, in addition to its current election support of $10.65 million, to support transparent, credible, and inclusive political processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This $3 million from USAID's Complex Crises Fund, and $1 million in new funding from the Department of State's Africa Regional Democracy Fund, and will support international and local observation of the DRC's 2023 presidential and legislative elections by qualified, non-partisan observers.

Timely and accurate reporting on the DRC's electoral process by independent, impartial observers will help citizens understand, participate in, and trust their elections. The Biden-Harris Administration welcomes President Tshisekedi's commitment, which he reinforced at the Summit for Democracy, to hold elections on time and his invitation for electoral observers. Support for strengthened elections and political processes will contribute to freer, fairer, and more inclusive elections in the DRC and further establish a culture of democratic electoral reform.

The United States has also committed an additional $7 million to strengthen voter education, support inclusive and peaceful electoral processes, counter disinformation, and provide technical assistance ahead of the DRC's 2023 election.

These funds are in addition to USAID's existing $9 million DRC Elections Integrity Activity, which will continue to support the DRC's Independent National Electoral Commission and civil society organizations through November 2024. This activity trains, coaches, and develops organizational resources for electoral staff and poll workers, provides post-election observation and analysis. USAID also supports civil society organizations to provide civic education and strengthen the participation of women, youth, and marginalized communities in electoral processes, and will support civil society and media in their efforts to raise awareness and counter misinformation about electoral and political processes.

The United States will continue to stand in partnership with the Congolese people as they prepare to participate in transparent, credible, and inclusive elections to select their national leaders.
About USAID
USAID is the international development agency of the government of the United States. USAID's Democracy, Human Rights and Governance programming in the Democratic Republic of the Congo works in partnership with the Congolese people to develop democratic systems, empower civil society to participate in governance, support the media and free press, promote human rights, and strengthen public financial management and rule of law to tackle corruption. USAID Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance staff also work across the USAID portfolio to ensure that investments in other development sectors integrate democratic governance principles.

For the latest updates on USAID's programs in DRC, visit: https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo

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The United States Provides Additional Assistance For The 2023 Election In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo

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Tuesday, September 6, 2022, Washington, USA - The United States government announced an additional $13 million, in addition to its current election support of $10.65 million, to support transparent, credible, and inclusive political processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

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the goal of world peace is to have countries go to a democracy and for there to be no wars.

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World Peace and International Relations - California Democratic Party

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The Biden administration has reestablished America's global standing. The Administration has empowered the State Department and its mission of promoting democracy globally. It has renewed the American commitment to humanitarian efforts worldwide. It withdrew from America's longest war in Afghanistan, rejoined the Paris Climate Accord, and provided assurances to the United Nations and other NATO ...