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Venezuelan migration, crime, and misperceptions: A review of data from Colombia, Peru, and Chile | Brookings

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Dany Bahar, Meagan Dooley, and Andrew Selee examine the relationship between immigration and crime in the three countries with the largest number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees as of 2020—Colombia, Peru, and Chile.

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Economic impact of Venezuelan migrants in Peru

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Economic impact of Venezuelan migrants in Peru

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Venezuelan migrants and refugees could contribute more than 2.2 billion Peruvian soles in tax revenue over the next five years.

Labor productivity could increase by 3.2 percent thanks to the large number of migrants in the country in 2018

As consumers and workers, Venezuelan immigrants contributed 8 percent of GDP growth in 2018 according to the World Bank and Peru's Central Reserve Bank.

This contribution is largely because the Venezuelan population is young and skilled. Fifty-seven percent of female working-age Venezuelans in Peru have some tertiary education.

LIMA, November 26, 2019 - Venezuelan migrants and refugees represent a major economic opportunity for Peru, have the potential to raise the country's productive capacity and significantly drive growth, according to a World Bank study presented today.

Making this opportunity a reality requires adapting public policies and institutions to adequately integrate the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population into the Peruvian economy and society.

This is the conclusion of the report "An Opportunity for All: Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees and Peru's Future Development," which the World Bank released today as part of a research series on Venezuelan migration in Latin America and the Caribbean. The series also includes an analysis of the situation in Colombia, carried out in 2018, and in Ecuador, which will be published in early 2020.

Migration from Venezuela is unprecedented in the recent history of Latin America and the Caribbean. An estimated four million people have fled Venezuela to escape the economic, social and political crisis that has devastated the country's economy, public safety and living standards. Some 870,000 Venezuelans have migrated to Peru since early 2017.

The report acknowledges that assisting such a large group of people poses a challenge for public services in the recipient communities. Nevertheless, services have managed to meet this challenge.

For example, the study finds that of the total estimated demand for 2019, the Peruvian public education system has already incorporated some 35,000 Venezuelan students, allowing many of them to enroll after the school year began to avoid falling behind in their studies.

Demand in the health sector has also been high. In 2018, a single healthcare center in Lima received more than 15,000 visits from Venezuelans, representing nearly a fourth of the total population served by that center.

Despite this, the potential benefits of the social and economic integration of Venezuelan migrants and refugees far exceed the costs of doing so.

Despite working informally and receiving lower wages than local workers, Venezuelan immigrants could generate tax revenues totaling 2.256 billion Peruvian soles annually between 2019 and 2025, on average, thanks to the rise in aggregate demand and tax collection, according to the study.

Additionally, the added value of labor productivity could increase by 3.2 percent due to the large influx of migrants and refugees in the country in 2018.

"Peru has acted with solidarity in response to the significant needs of the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population. Today there is a unique opportunity to channel their immense potential to invigorate the country's economy, transforming this challenge into an opportunity for all," said Marianne Fay, World Bank Director for Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.

This potential will only materialize if the measures necessary for their adequate integration are adopted, however. These measures have become increasingly urgent in an environment of growing discrimination against Venezuelans, which is often associated with perceptions about a lack of safety and appropriation of services. These perceptions are not supported by the data.

To the contrary, evidence from Colombia and Peru demonstrates that crime in recipient countries has not increased due to the arrival of migrants. Rather, estimates show that their arrival could drive growth and enrich the diversity of these countries and communities.
"Despite the major influx of Venezuelans, sufficient support has not been mobilized, unlike in similar situations around the world. We are calling on the international community to join forces to transform this humanitarian crisis into a development opportunity for the migrant and refugee population, as well as for the recipient communities," said Paula Rossiasco, Senior Social Development Specialist at the World Bank and co-leader of the research team.
Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data, the study analyzes the characteristics, challenges and opportunities of Venezuelan immigration in Peru, as well as the institutional framework for the response.

For example, it found that the Venezuelan population arriving in Peru is overwhelmingly young (42 percent are aged 18 to 29), come mainly from urban areas and are highly qualified. Fifty-seven percent of those of working age have some tertiary education, half of which have a college degree.

The analysis seeks to contribute to the development of response plans, strengthen multisector coordination mechanisms and channel sufficient resources to meet the needs of recipient communities.

Adapting the institutional and legal system to facilitate the integration of migrants and refugees;

Expanding the supply of services for everyone in the main recipient areas;

Increasing support for the most vulnerable migrant population; and

Dispelling myths that engender discrimination and xenophobia.

Making this response a reality demands urgent actions. These include:

The World Bank supports the countries that receive Venezuelan migrants through evidence-based research, technical assistance for the implementation of response policies, financial resources and its ability to convene parties to strengthen alliances and mobilize resources and actions to benefit the migrant and refugee population and that of recipient countries.

The report on Venezuelan migration to Colombia contributed to the development of public policies that facilitate migrants' integration into the Colombian economy and society. It also helped to obtain global concessional financing to meet needs associated with Venezuelan migration.
Learn more about the work of the World Bank in Latin America and the Caribbean: www.worldbank.org/lac Visit us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/worldbank Be updated via Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/BancoMundialLAC For our YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/BancoMundi alLA
World Bank assistance is based on its extensive global experience with similar situations, such as the crisis in Syria. It focuses on the most pressing needs, such as the adaptation of the institutional and legal response system and support to recipient communities and the migrant population, generating an enabling environment for public policymaking.

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Venezuelan Migration Can Promote Peru's Productivity and Economic Growth

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Un estudio del Banco Mundial afirma que, con las políticas adecuadas, el país puede tornar este desafío en una oportunidad para todos sus habitantes

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Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército del Perú | Think tank del Ejército del Perú

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This article is part of the book Challenges and Threats to Security in Latin America.

Summary

The deep crisis in Venezuela has generated the largest migratory flow in Latin America. It is estimated that, by the end of 2022, Peru -the second host country after Colombia- will have a population of Venezuelan migrants and refugees close to 1.45 million. In this regard, it is clear that no population is prepared either to forcibly leave their country of origin -due to the critical existing crisis- or to welcome a large number of immigrants in such a short time, generating a context of extreme vulnerability for the migrant population, as well as discomfort and even rejection in the host or receiving population. Achieving the full integration of the Venezuelan population into Peruvian society and economy requires the decisive involvement of the State and civil society with a view to promoting an intensive and progressive change of mentality among Peruvians (moving from rejection to empathy) through education and culture. Otherwise, situations could arise that seriously affect not only security, but also the stability required for the integral development of the country.

Keywords: Crisis in Venezuela, Venezuelan Migration, Migratory Trajectory, Xenophobia.

Introduction

During the last decade, the political and economic situation in Venezuela has generated a deep crisis, causing the forced and massive migration of more than six million Venezuelans in search of better opportunities, of which some five million have been welcomed in different countries of Latin America. In this context, the region faces the largest flow of refugees and migrants in its history, creating a series of challenges and opportunities for both the migrant population and the host or receiving population.

Undoubtedly, no population is prepared either to forcibly leave their country of origin, or to massively receive immigrants in a short period of time. These circumstances generate a context of extreme vulnerability for the migrant population, as well as discomfort and even rejection by the receiving population, especially when the State of the host country is not able to manage this situation. For example, on September 26, 2021, there was a demonstration of almost five thousand people, expressing their rejection of the arrival of Venezuelan immigrants who occupied some public spaces in the Chilean city of Iquique, located in the north of the country, resulting in the burning of personal belongings and tents where the migrants were staying.

Although this aggression was widely rejected by the Chilean population and organizations, including the central government, it shows how the receiving population can externalize its discontent and frustration through xenophobic expressions and violent acts against the migrant population, especially when the authorities are not able to generate empathy in their citizens or face the challenges caused by the massive arrival of foreigners. During this demonstration, approximately three thousand Venezuelan migrants were stranded in Iquique, many of them occupying parks and public places in the city waiting to regularize their migratory status.

What happened in Chile is not an isolated event in the region. Similar cases of xenophobia and violence against Venezuelan citizens have occurred in Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru, which - coincidentally - are the Latin American countries that have welcomed the largest number of Venezuelans. It is estimated that, as of May 2022, Colombia had received around 1.8 million Venezuelans, followed by Peru with 1.3 million, Ecuador with 513,000, Chile with 448,000 and Brazil with 345,000 Venezuelans.

To understand both the painful situation experienced by Venezuelan migrants, as well as the challenges and opportunities faced by the Peruvian State during this migratory process, this article analyzes the existing crisis in Venezuela, the difficult migratory trajectory that Venezuelans must follow, as well as the reaction of the Peruvian population to migrants and refugees, including the influence of the media on the perception of the population. In this sense, the institutions of the Peruvian State must play a more active role to turn this situation into an opportunity for integration and growth, for the benefit of the country and the citizens who inhabit it. Otherwise, situations could be generated that would seriously affect not only the security of the Venezuelan population residing in Peru, but also the stability required for the integral development of the country.

Crisis in Venezuela

The lack of a diversified diet (due to low consumption of meat, fish, eggs, vegetables and fruits) has generated inadequate nutritional intake in most Venezuelan households. According to Caritas, child malnutrition in Venezuela rose to 26 % between December 2019 and March 2020. This has undoubtedly been aggravated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The situation has different repercussions (short and long term) both on the health and performance of the population, mainly affecting the most vulnerable.

The collapse of the health system is another reason why Venezuelans choose to leave their country. It is estimated that during 2016, infant (under one year) and maternal mortality increased by 30.12 % and 65.79 % respectively compared to the previous year. In that sense, insufficient and inadequate food for patients, the deterioration of infrastructure and equipment, the lack of medicines and medical supplies, as well as the shortage of qualified personnel are some of the problems that affect the care of patients in public health facilities in Venezuela. In this context, the shortage of medicines in pharmacies and hospitals endangers the lives of thousands of chronic patients and transplant patients in that country.

In addition, the economic crisis also impacts the Venezuelan education system. Low budgets not only affect the infrastructure of educational institutions, but also educators, many of whom have left the country or have had to engage in other work due to low salaries. As of 2019, more than 50 % of students at the Libertador Experimental Teaching University (Universidad Pedagógica Experimental Libertador) had dropped out of classes because they didn't have money to pay for their tickets or because they had to work to help their families survive. The situation is aggravated because the university does not have water or permanent electricity and the student dining facility has stopped operating.

Widespread corruption is another reason why Venezuelans are leaving their country. Venezuela is among the nations with the highest perceived corruption in the public sector in the world, leading to serious violations of the social rights of its citizens. Unfortunately, the Venezuelan judicial system acts as an instrument of repression against dissent and voices critical of the government. Likewise, the obstacles to the issuance of passports and criminal records, as well as the apostille of documents have not only become a strategy used by the Venezuelan government to hinder the emigration of qualified citizens, but have also allowed corruption and slowness to dominate these administrative processes. In this sense, it is interesting to analyze the role of the "homeland identity card," as an instrument of control and blackmail used by government supporters to avoid attending to those who, according to them, are enemies of the nation.

As can be seen, the Venezuelan State does not safeguard the rights of its citizens, thus putting them in a situation of survival. Consequently, what motivates Venezuelans to begin a difficult migratory journey is the search for a place where they can enjoy these rights.

A difficult migratory journey

The third type is that of "exploratory" migrations. These are carried out by young people (mostly women) who leave Venezuela to work, send remittances to their families and -based on an economic income and stable accommodation- contemplate the possibility of bringing their immediate relatives to Peru. Unlike the previous category thus, these young people do contemplate family reunification with continued residence in Peru. Unfortunately, Venezuelans who engage in these three types of migratory trajectories often suffer both situations of labor exploitation, as well as discrimination.

By contrast to "individual initiative" migration, according to Cavagnoud, "family dynamic" migration is what occurs when young Venezuelans leave their country accompanied by their direct relatives. Cavagnoud identifies within this category three types of migratory trajectories that converge in Peru. The first is "family reunification" migration, which aims at family reunification linked to "exploration" migration. The reconstitution of these families may lead to the birth of new children of Peruvian nationality, reinforcing the decision to stay in the country for the long term, thus ruling out the possibility of returning to live in Venezuela in the future.

The second type is that of "nuclear family" migration, in which family members make the decision to travel together to Peru, involving a significant economic investment by them. Although this is a smaller group, after a period of adaptation, these families achieve some stability (including the schooling of their children) and send remittances to their relatives (particularly their parents) who remained in Venezuela. These families manage to overcome the initial condition of migrants without the intention of returning to Venezuela.

Finally, the third type is that of migration "from a single-parent family." This is carried out by mothers separated from their partner or the father of their children, and who migrate with their young children under very precarious conditions. These families have many needs, but they are allowed to enter the country, benefiting from the exceptions granted to people in vulnerable situations. In addition to being diverse and complex, the typologies presented here are also framed in changing migration policies of the Peruvian State.

The Peruvian State Response

These changes in Peruvian migration policy have generated ambiguous situations and contributed to a lack of protection for Venezuelan migrants. In 2017, the adoption of the Temporary Stay Permit (PTP) was a clear example of the selective hospitality policy, insofar as it was only intended for the Venezuelan immigrant population and, being temporary, did not grant them residence, thus limiting their rights. Subsequently, in 2018, the Peruvian State demanded the presentation of passports by Venezuelans as a condition for entry into the country. However, both the high cost and the collapse of the Venezuelan administrative system for the issuance of this document made it extremely difficult to obtain.

In recent years, Peruvian migration policy has undergone a series of changes as a result of the creation of various entities and new jurisprudence. In this context, in 2011, the Intersectoral Working Group for Migration Management was created, as part of to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to develop the guidelines of the comprehensive migration policy in Peru. Subsequently, in 2012, the National Superintendence of Migrations was created, attached to the Ministry of the Interior, as an agency responsible for the migration control of nationals and foreigners.

This situation was aggravated by the restrictions adopted by the Peruvian State to limit entry into the country during the COVID-19 pandemic. The later generated an increase in irregular entries through new routes to avoid migration controls, putting the lives of Venezuelan migrants at risk by exposing them to criminal organizations dedicated to the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking. Correspondingly, it is necessary to understand the harsh conditions to which Venezuelan migrants arriving in Peru are exposed.

Attitudes Toward Venezuelan Migration in Peru

The massive arrival of Venezuelan migrants has rapidly transformed Peru's migratory posture from a country of origin of migrants, to a destination country. Undoubtedly, the migratory trajectories chosen by Venezuelans to reach Peru are difficult and complex. The rapid insertion of Venezuelans into the informal sector of the Peruvian economy, although it allows them to generate income, exposes them to different forms of exploitation and discrimination, particularly xenophobic discourses.

According to a survey conducted by the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP) in 2019, 73 % of respondents disapproved of Venezuelan migration to Peru. This was due to economic and labor reasons (perceiving they take away jobs, affect the economy, and increase informality), their perceived role in increasing crime and insecurity, and poor relationship with Peruvians, among others. However, 83 % of those who expressed their disapproval with Venezuelan migration had not had contact with them. This clearly shows that the reasons for their rejection are unfounded, and are based on perceptions, as is the case with the increase in crime and insecurity allegedly due to the fault of Venezuelan migrants.

At present, in the XXI century, similar attitudes are manifesting themselves against Venezuelan migrants, who are blamed for all the social problems already existing in the country, such as informality, lack of employment or citizen insecurity. In this context, the term "veneco" has been used to refer disparagingly to a Venezuelan, presenting the same negative connotation of words such as "cholo" or "serrano" with which migrants from the Andes and their descendants are still discriminated against in large cities such as Lima.

The restrictions imposed in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic also negatively impacted Venezuelans in Peru, insofar as they could not go out to earn a daily living, while those who worked without legal contracts (the vast majority) were left unprotected. In additional, the Peruvian government did not provide economic aid bonds to Venezuelan migrants who were living in poverty or extreme poverty, leaving such support in the hands of international cooperation agencies. In this prevailing policy, the Peruvian government was reflected, in part, by the sentiments of former congresswoman Esther Saavedra, who during an intervention in the Congress of the Republic, in September 2019, rebuked former President Martín Vizcarra, saying that "a million immigrants both legal and illegal, workers and criminal bandits, have to eat, have to sleep, and have come to take away jobs from our Peruvians. (...) I want to tell you that he is the president of all Peruvians and not of foreigners, (...), not of Venezuelans. Good or Bad, Venezuelans must now leave the country: let them go."

However, a large part of Peruvians disagree and condemn this attitude of rejection towards the Venezuelan population, showing empathy and commitment to facilitate or promote their insertion into society.

The Peruvian State must be much more proactive and emphatic in valuing, promoting and disseminating the innumerable contributions and opportunities offered by Venezuelan migration to Peru, and thereby avoid generating scenarios of instability that do not favor the inclusive and sustainable development of the country.

Contribution and Opportunities of Venezuelan Migration in Peru

According to the survey conducted by the IEP in 2019, 22 % of respondents agreed with Venezuelan migration to Peru, because: (1) their country is in crisis and they have nowhere to go, (2) historical reciprocity (Peru is a country of migrants and has been supported by other countries), (3) they are friendly, hardworking and well-educated, and (4) because they will help economic growth, contributing more labor to the labor supply. These reasons show a high level of understanding and empathy internalized in a part of the Peruvian population, which the State must help develop in its entire population.

In this context, it is worth highlighting the great work done by Venezuelan health professionals and technicians who joined the Peruvian health system to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the current lack of health professionals in Peru, coordinated work among the corresponding entities must continue in order to incorporate as many of these Venezuelan professionals into the country's health system. As of 2019, of the nearly 500,000 Venezuelans who had obtained PTP in Peru, 3,147 were doctors.

Conclusions

As mentioned, no population is sufficiently prepared either to leave their country forcibly, or to welcome large numbers of outsiders in a short time. On the one hand, the Venezuelan State is not able to safeguard the fundamental rights of its population, forcing a considerable part of it to emigrate. On the other, the Peruvian population usually identifies Venezuelan migrants as the culprits of the structural problems already existing in the country, generating a rejection expressed through discriminatory acts and discourses.

Achieving the full integration of the Venezuelan population into Peruvian society and economy requires the involvement of the State and civil society to achieve a change in the mentality of Peruvian citizens (from rejection to empathy) by means of information, education and culture. In that sense, developing empathy -that is, the ability to identify with someone and share their feelings- requires putting oneself in another's shoes and feeling like them. Peruvians should be aware that many Venezuelans have had to migrate abroad in order to survive, experiencing terrible deprivation and suffering during their migratory journey. Likewise, Peruvians cannot be indifferent to discrimination and misunderstanding since in recent decades many of their relatives and friends also had to emigrate to other cities in Peru or from various countries of the world to seek a better future. Therefore, Peruvian society must be in solidarity with migrants, acknowledging them as opportunities instead of as threats.

The social and cultural composition of many countries reflects the result of large and constant migratory processes. This statement also applies in Peru, where internal migration, as well as that from Europe, Africa and Asia has generated a rich and diverse social and cultural conformation, reflected in different expressions (artistic and culinary, among others) that are a source of local pride and international recognition. It therefore makes no sense for some Peruvians to reject and discriminate against Venezuelan migrants from a perception of "what is Peruvian" or "what is ours", when such purity does not exist in Peru.

To be sure, the Peruvian state has made some appropriate decisions to protect Venezuelan migrants, but these measures are still insufficient. In this regard, political and awareness-raising measures must be adopted by various State institutions to enable the change of mentality of the Peruvian population. Likewise, the media must assume the responsibility to inform without sensationalism and avoid the construction of a negative perception towards Venezuelans. Unfortunately, the fight against xenophobia -as a form of discrimination- takes time. Thus strategies to combat it must not only be thought out in the long term, but must also facilitate the creation of an intercultural project that fosters mutual knowledge, respect, dialogue and encounter between the receiving population and the migrant population. These strategies should allow Peruvian society (including its political class) to face with a positive attitude the challenges of a migration process, as well as recognize the opportunities and potentialities of this process.

Endnotes:

1. R4V - Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, (May 5, 2022), https://www.r4v.info/es/refugiadosymigrantes (Accessed June 11, 2022). ↑

2. R4V, Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela. ↑

3. BBC News World, "Crisis en Venezuela: 5 claves que explican cómo se ha desarrollado hasta ahora", (January 10, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46821723 (Accessed June 11, 2022). ↑

4. EFE Agency, "Nuevo salario mínimo en Venezuela, insuficiente para salir de la pobreza", (March 17, 2022), https://gestion.pe/mundo/nuevo-salario-minimo-en-venezuela-insuficiente-para-salir-de-la-pobreza-noticia/?ref=gesr (Accessed June 11, 2022). ↑

5. Alexander Betts, "Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the crisis of Displacement", (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013), 4, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/30779/642723.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed June 11, 2022). ↑

6. Stéphanie Borios, "Huir para vivir: crisis social y migración de supervivencia", in Migrant trajectories: Venezuelan youth in Peru, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, December 2021), 47. ↑

7. Food and Agriculture Organization, "Una introducción a los conceptos básicos de la seguridad alimentaria", (2011), https://www.fao.org/3/al936s/al936s00.pdf (Accessed June 11, 2022). ↑

8. Borios, "Huir para vivir ...", 55. ↑

9. Borios, "Huir para vivir...", 56. ↑

10. Reliefweb, "WFP Venezuela - Evaluación de seguridad alimentaria: Principales hallazgos. Datos recolectados de julio a septiembre de 2019", (February 23, 2020), https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/wfp-venezuela-evaluaci-n-de-seguridad-alimentaria-principales#:~:text=El%20Programa%20Mundial%20de%20Alimentos,de%20los%20hogares%20en%20Venezuela (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

11. Caritas "Lucha contra la desnutrición infantil en Venezuela", (2020), https://www.caritas.org/ayudenos-a-luchar-contra-la-desnutricion-infantil-en-venezuela/?lang=es#:~:text=La%20desnutrici%C3%B3n%20infantil%20en%20Venezuela%20subi%C3%B3%20al%2026%25%20entre%20diciembre,m%C3%A1s%20desfavorecidas%20con%20numerosos%20programas (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

12. BBC News World, "Crisis en Venezuela: falta de medicamentos, equipos rotos y hasta cucarachas en los hospitales," (February 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-47177510 (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

13. Venezuelan Health Observatory, " El Boletín Epidemiológico Venezolano ¿Por qué ahora y no antes?", (May 23, 2017) https://www.ovsalud.org/noticias/2017/el-boletin-epidemiologico-venezolano-por-que-ahora-y-no-antes/ (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

14. Management, "Venezuela: Sistema educativo golpeado por la crisis", (Lima: December 4, 2019) https://gestion.pe/gestion-tv/venezuela-sistema-educativo-golpeado-por-la-crisis-noticia/?ref=gesr (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

15. Borios, "Huir para vivir...", 78. ↑

16. Transparency Venezuela, "Inseguridad para el pueblo hecha en revolución", (2021), https://transparencia.org.ve/project/inseguridad-pueblo-hecha-revolucion/#:~:text=Venezuela%20se%20ha%20convertido%20en,m%C3%A1s%20de%2090%25%20de%20impunidad (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

17. Borios, "Huir para vivir...", 82. ↑

18. Elizabeth Salmón, et al. Trayectorias migrantes: la juventud venezolana en el Perú, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, December 2021), 29. ↑

19. Cécile Blouin, "Entre la esperanza y el miedo: las trayectorias legales de la población venezolana en la región de Tumbes", in Migrant trajectories: Venezuelan youth in Peru, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, December 2021), 134. ↑

20. Robin Cavagnoud, "Género, cuidados y responsabilidades familiares de los jóvenes venezolanos: una tipología de las trayectorias migratorias en contexto de crisis", en Trayectorias migrantes: la juventud venezolana en el Perú, December 2021), 185. ↑

21. Working Group for refugees and migrants GTRM, "Plan de respuesta para refugiados y migrantes 2022. Capítulo Perú" (2022), 5, https://www.r4v.info/sites/default/files/2021-12/RMRP%202022%20Peru%20no%20oficial%20ESP_PL_Vfinal.pdf (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

22. Blouin, " Entre la esperanza y el miedo...", 144. ↑

23. Unique digital platform of the Peruvian State, "Visa humanitaria para ciudadanos venezolanos" Obtener visa para ingresar al Perú", gob.pe (July 4, 2022), https://www.gob.pe/1063-obtener-visa-para-ingresar-al-peru-visa-humanitaria-para-ciudadanos-venezolanos (Accessed June 18, 2022). ↑

24. Working Group for Refugees and Migrants GTRM, "Plan de respuesta para refugiados y migrantes 2022. Capítulo Perú", 3. ↑

25. Organization of American States, "La CIDH urge a los Estados proteger los derechos humanos de las personas migrantes, refugiadas y desplazadas frente a la pandemia del COVID-19," (Washington: April 17, 2020), https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2020/077.asp#:~:text=Vinculado%20a%20lo%20anterior%2C%20la,la%20pandemia%20de%20COVID%2D19 (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

26. International Organization for Migration, "Glosario sobre Migración. Derecho Internacional sobre Migración", (2006), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_7_sp.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

27. Royal Spanish Academy, "Familia" in Dictionary of the Spanish language, (2001), https://www.rae.es/drae2001/familia (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

28. Marcela Huaita Alegre, "Políticas públicas, familias y reunificación en el contexto de la migración venezolana al Perú", in Migrant trajectories: Venezuelan youth in Peru, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, December 2021), 232. ↑

29. El Peruano, "Decreto Supremo que aprueba la Política Nacional Migratoria 2017 - 2025", (Peru: April 27, 2017), https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/decreto-supremo-que-aprueba-la-politica-nacional-migratoria-decreto-supremo-n-015-2017-re-1513810-1/ ↑

30. Huaita Alegre, "Políticas públicas, familias y reunificación...", 248. ↑

31. UNHCR "Guía sobre Racismo y Xenofobia: Cómo ACNUR puede abordar y responder ante situaciones de racismo y xenofobia que afectan a personas bajo su mandato", (2020), 16, https://www.unhcr.org/6087cc104.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

32. Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid Euskadi, "Diccionario de Asilo", https://diccionario.cear-euskadi.org/xenofobia/ (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

33. Institute of Peruvian Studies, " Conocimiento y actitudes hacia la migración venezolana ", (Lima, June 2019), 9, https://iep.org.pe/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Informe-OP-Junio-2019-Actitudes-hacia-la-migraci%C3%B3n-venezolana.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

34. Pablo Vega Rome, "Experiencias de discriminación hacia jóvenes migrantes venezolanos: construcción del discurso e impactos en la vida cotidiana", en Trayectorias migrantes: la juventud venezolana en el Perú, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, December 2021), 264. ↑

35. Blouin, "Entre la esperanza y el miedo...", 159. ↑

36. Vega Rome, "Experiencias de discriminación hacia jóvenes migrantes venezolanos...", 275. ↑

37. Canal N, "Esther Saavedra: Venezolanos malos o buenos tienen que salir del Perú", (September 30, 2019), https://canaln.pe/actualidad/esther-saavedra-fuerza-popular-venezolanos-malos-buenos-tienen-que-salir-peru-n390200 (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

38. Institute of Peruvian Studies, "Conocimiento y actitudes hacia la migración venezolana". ↑

39. World Bank "Una oportunidad para todos. Los migrantes y refugiados venezolanos y el desarrollo del Perú", (2019), 23, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/107621574372585665/pdf/Una-Oportunidad-para-Todos-Los-Migrantes-y-Refugiados-Venezolanos-y-el-Desarrollo-del-Per%c3%ba.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

40. World Bank, "La migración venezolana puede impulsar la productividad y el crecimiento económico del Perú," (Peru: November 26, 2019), https://www.bancomundial.org/es/news/press-release/2019/11/26/migracion-venezolana-peru (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

41. World Bank, "Una oportunidad para todos..", 30. ↑

42. International Labour Organization, "El aporte de las personas refugiadas y migrantes venezolanas frente a la pandemia de la COVID-19 en los servicios esenciales de salud", (February 2021), 22, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-Americas/-ro-lima/documents/publication/wcms_794074.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2022). ↑

43. Gonzalo Gamio Gebri, "Ética y migración: reflexiones sobre la migración venezolana en tiempos de crisis", in Migrant trajectories: Venezuelan youth in Peru, (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, December 2021), 303. ↑

44. Vega Rome, "Experiencias de discriminación hacia jóvenes migrantes venezolanos...", 281. ↑

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Venezuelan Migration in Peru: Perceptions and Realities | Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército del Perú

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By: Paul Vera Delzo (23/03/2023). The deep crisis in Venezuela has generated the largest migratory flow in Latin America. It is estimated that, by the end of 2022, Peru -the second host country after Colombia- will have a population of Venezuelan migrants and refugees close to 1.45 million.

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LIMA, Peru - Sara Marianys Soto Duque and Yenife Alexandra Carmona Rieracda are young mothers trying to earn money to support their families.

Soto, 26, and Carmona, 23, are two of the more than 700,000 Venezuelans now living in Peru.

Soto arrived in October 2018 after leaving her family, including her 2-year-old son, behind in Venezuela. Carmona arrived in early March with her three children, boyfriend, cousin and uncle.

Although the two women have had different experiences in their journeys to Lima, they both have the same end goal: to return to Venezuela as soon as they can.

"I want to close my eyes and open them and be in my country," Soto said.

Similar sentiments were expressed by many Venezuelans in Lima who were interviewed by Cronkite News reporters. But most also said they have begun to adapt to Peru's cultural and societal norms, which are different from those in Venezuela despite a common language.

Some - hopeful that Venezuela will rebound from its years-long economic and political chaos - predicted their stay in Peru will be short. Others aren't sure Venezuela will be stable anytime soon.

Professor Carlos Eduardo Felix Aramburu, who specializes in migration at Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, said Venezuelans present a case of "push migration," as they have been forced to leave their country due to the crumbling economy and chaotic political climate.

"People are leaving Venezuela because they just can't stand the living conditions there, not only the lack of liberty, but basically a lack of means to survive," he said.

Peru's welcoming approach to the migrants has been a success so far, Aramburu said, without mass xenophobia or backlash. But the strains are showing.

"The open door policy has been an effective one," Aramburu said. "But of course, my concern is that there's a limit to the number of people that our economy can absorb, and that certainly will be a problem in the near future."

Aramburu believes that if Venezuelans remain in Peru for more than a year or two, the majority will stay, despite their dream of returning home.

"History and theory shows that if this is not solved and Venezuelans begin to incorporate themselves into the social network in Peru," he said, "it could be harder and harder for them to return. ... My prediction would be that the longer the crisis, the less likely it is for them to return."

But integration may encounter some speed bumps.

"Our style of living, our personalities, our characters are different. It's something I realized just when I went back to Peru in the last year and I talked to Venezuelan people," said Gabriela Dongo Arevalo, an English professor at Pontifical Catholic University who also is a graduate student and Spanish instructor at Arizona State University. "Our history is alike, but our lifestyle, our way of living, is different."

Although Spanish colonial influences are felt in both Peru and Venezuela, she said, the two countries in recent years have been heavily influenced by other cultures. Peru's main influence comes from the Andean civilizations, and from Italian and Japanese immigration, while Venezuela's most prominent influences come from Caribbean and African cultures.

"I think there are more things that are different than similar," Dongo said.

Igor Olsen, a filmmaker, emigrated from Peru to Venezuela in his early 20s during the crisis of the 1980s and '90s, when the government in Lima sought to wipe out Marxist guerilla groups. Olsen stayed in Venezuela as he raised a family and became accustomed to life there but returned to Peru when Venezuela's economy soured.

From Olsen's perspective, society in Peru is much more stratified by class and race, which was one factor that played into wanting to stay in Venezuela. He, too, plans to return to Venezuela once the situation improves.

Venezuelan blogger Santos Guerra, expressed similar sentiments about the differences he has observed in his travels between the two countries. Although Peru is a beautiful country with many intriguing aspects, he said the societal differences are still a shock to him no matter how many times he leaves and enters the country.

"Since I have come many times to Peru, I know how difficult it is and how shocking the Venezuelan society versus how the Peruvian society is," Guerra said. "The Venezuelans (are) very social, very extroverted, so you stand in a corner next to a stranger, and you will begin to tell them your problems that are your personal problems. ... It is part of us. But the Peruvian here is quite distrustful. He is generally distrustful. They are not open."

Diego Salazar, a Peruvian journalist, worked closely with many Venezuelan migrants while reporting on the influence of news media regarding immigration in Peru.

"Peru is a very conservative country in social norms," Salazar said. "Women are expected (to be) a certain way, sexually speaking, mainly, and Venezuela is not like that at all. ... They are very expressive ... men and women. So that also could be a source of collision."

Dongo also noted the tension between the two countries' societal standards. She said that because of Venezuela's success in international beauty pageants, Venezuelan and Peruvian women often are held to "the image of perfect beauty."

Carmona, the recent arrival from Venezuela, said she had not seen any differences between Venezuela and Peru's societies, but Soto mentioned multiple distinctions she has noticed in her five months of living in Lima.

Soto said people are friendlier and more respectful in Venezuela, which is seen in the way workers treat customers. Soto's close friend, Alexa Sarahi Uzcategui Cardona, 22, said that shows the differing cultures of communication and appreciation.

"If I bought this, whoever sold it to me ... should thank me," Uzcategui said. "Why? He gave me a service, and I should thank him. 'Thank you for your purchase.'"

Oddly, language is one of the main factors that clearly sets the two groups apart. The differing accents and colloquial terms make Venezuelans stand out in a group of Peruvian Spanish speakers.

A common distinction that Venezuelans run into on a regular basis is something as simple as terms for foods. Banana in Peruvian Spanish is "platano;" in Venezuelan Spanish it's "cambur." Small differences like this can lead to bigger conflicts, according to linguistics professor Luis Andrade of the Pontifical Catholic University.

"In the lexicon, there are many other differences that are very much conflicted (more) than the names of fruits," Andrade said. "We have a special adjective that is quite different between Venezuela and Peru, which is arrecho. In Peru, it means sexually hot, excited, and for Venezuelans it means to be pissed off. I have heard - two times at least - stories of Venezuelans speaking here about his state of mind, when they were pissed off. There was an uncomfortable conversation with their Peruvian interlocutors."

Cultural and societal differences between Venezuelans and Peruvians might be more than superficial, Andrade said. They could even be wired into the way they speak and interact with one another.

He said he's observed "different patterns of politeness" between the two groups, where daily interactions could lead to minor conflicts.

Andrade said the two groups could encounter contrasting "face-work," a term coined by sociologist Erving Goffman to describe socially acceptable gestures and intonations while conversing. If the two groups have different ideas of proper face-work, Andrade said, then conflict and resentment can arise. This is especially significant, he said, because Peru has a more complex hierarchy and way of speaking respectfully, while Venezuelans are more casual and less hierarchical.

Despite these differences, Andrade said the two versions of Spanish could be integrated, but there's no way to predict when or how that might occur.

"We Peruvians have learned that language change is unpredictable," Andrade said. "It would be very arrogant to establish a likely pattern of change for language."

Although there have been no tested or proven studies quite yet, Andrade said he has observed Venezuelans hiding their identity by behaving or speaking as Peruvians do.

In cases like these, it can be debated whether true cultural integration has occurred, but it's certain that the dynamic has shifted between Venezuelans and Peruvians. What was once a quite friendly environment has turned somewhat xenophobic.

Because many Venezuelans who migrated to Peru expect to return, many do not intend to integrate into the culture and society, Dongo said, which leave some Peruvians feeling like their generosity hasn't been appreciated.

But for Venezuelans who left loved ones behind, the desire to return is strong.

Soto's main motivation for returning to Venezuela is to reunite with her 2-year-old son, Mathias. She said she didn't like to talk about him or her family much because it makes her cry.

"My mom called me, tells me my son is sick, cannot breathe," Soto said. "I do not know what to do. ... You know that your son is six days away (traveling by bus) and that he is sick, that he cannot breathe and that medicines are not available and that there is no money. ... For me it is a very hard period."

Soto and her friend, Uzcategui, agreed that, although they wanted to keep in contact with their families, it is hard to see them on video calls but not be able to hug them or talk to them in person. Uzcategui reminisced about homemade arepas and the feeling of being around family but said that the journey to help her family by working in Peru has made her strong.

"In migration, you win and you lose," Uzcategui said. "You gain life experiences because I believe that someone who can emigrate can do anything in the world."

Carmona and her family traveled for two months, with little to eat, to arrive in Lima. They are staying in a hostel that opened its doors to migrants for free for up to 30 days before they need to move on.

She said she plans to find work, so she and her boyfriend can make enough for her family to live. After just a short time in Peru, it was too early to tell whether she would be open to becoming acculturated to her new country of residence.

Dongo said whether new immigrants decide to try to assimilate could affect how they're perceived and accepted long-term in Peruvian society.

"Two situations can happen. They can go back (to Venezuela) when the situation is better, of course," Dongo said. "I think that would be perfect. So the family reunites and they can go back to their lives. It could be one choice. Another one it could be is they accept they are not in Peru temporarily, so they are more willing to accept the culture and feel like they are part of Peru. 'I've decided to stay here, and I'm going to do my best to embrace the culture and share their culture and values,' but in a harmonic way."

Soto already has made a choice. Weeks after arriving in Lima, she moved to Ecuador, where her boyfriend has family, and reunited with Mathias. But even in this new country her goals haven't changed. She plans to find work and eventually hopes to return to Venezuela.

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Venezuelans adapt to Peru but dream of returning home

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Many of the 700,000 Venezuelans who moved to Peru in recent years dream of returning home, which could slow their integration into Peruvian society.