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1. Why is the place destroyed?

2. Why is he holding his head?

3. Why is the man without a shirt and tied?

4. Why are they all women?

5. Why do the women look wealthy?

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Human Rights issues in Ukraine either before or during the war.

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Ukraine is a republic with a semi-presidential political system composed of three branches of government: a unicameral legislature; an executive led by a directly elected president who is head of state and commander in chief; and a prime minister, who is chosen through a legislative majority and as head of government leads the Cabinet of Ministers; and a judiciary. In 2019, voters elected Volodymyr Zelenskyy president in an election considered free and fair by international and domestic observers. In 2019, the country also held early parliamentary elections that observers considered free and fair.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for maintaining internal security and order and oversees police and other law enforcement personnel. The Security Service of Ukraine is responsible for state security broadly defined, nonmilitary intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism matters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports to the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Security Service reports directly to the president. The State Border Guard Service, which falls under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, implements state policy regarding border security, while the State Migration Service, also under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, implements state policy regarding migration, citizenship, and registration of refugees and other migrants. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over security forces in the territory controlled by the government. There were reports that members of the security forces committed some abuses in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion.

On February 24, the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, launched an unlawful and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, resulting in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities committed by members of Russia's forces. International organizations and nongovernmental organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, issued periodic reports documenting abuses committed by Russia's forces during the war; however, Russia's forces and their proxies throughout the war methodically obstructed, harassed, and intimidated international monitors denying them sufficient access.

Following the start of its full-scale invasion in February, Russia's forces continued to escalate attacks on civilians. Russia mobilized, armed, trained, and led proxy forces from territories under its occupation (including parts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya oblasts and Crimea). Through the end of the year, Russia's forces continued to conduct hostilities, including launching missile and drone strikes throughout Ukraine, hitting critical infrastructure, including power, water, and heating facilities. They struck at least 261 hospitals and clinics as well as 501 schools by December. Amnesty International and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe characterized these attacks as relentless and indiscriminate; during the year, more than 13 million residents were displaced and thousands of civilians killed, including 429 confirmed deaths among children, with experts assessing the actual number was likely much higher. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that widespread attacks by Russia's forces against critical infrastructure during the coldest months of the year caused the humanitarian situation to further deteriorate, leading to mass displacement of civilians.

Serious human rights abuses committed by Russia's forces in occupied areas involved severe and wide-ranging cases and included credible reports of: mass and unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, including of children; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees, particularly during "filtration" operations involving interrogation, torture, forced separation of families, forced deportation and adoptions of Ukraine's children to Russian families; unjust interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses of a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including atrocities, abductions, torture and physical abuses; serious restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the existence of criminal libel; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive "laws" on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; severe restrictions of religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to vote in free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national/racial/ethnic minority groups, or members of Indigenous groups, including Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, and intersex persons. (See Russia-occupied areas section for abuses committed by Russian military, security, and proxy forces in those territories Russia occupied at year's end.)

The Russian Federation conducted sham referenda in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya oblasts from September 23 to 27. President Putin proclaimed the so-called annexation of these four oblasts into the Russian Federation on September 30. On March 3 and October 12, UN General Assembly resolutions condemned both Russia's invasion and the purported annexation of Ukrainian territories.

There were also significant human rights issues involving Ukrainian government officials, although not comparable to the scope of Russia's abuses, which included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh or life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the media, violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; refoulement of refugees to a country despite risks they would face torture or persecution; serious acts of government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting persons with disabilities, members of ethnic minority groups, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.

The government generally did not take adequate steps to prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity. The government took some steps to identify, prosecute, and punish officials involved in corruption.

The constitution and law provide citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: The country last held parliamentary elections in 2019. A joint international election observation mission by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament assessed that "fundamental rights and freedoms were overall respected, and the campaign was competitive, despite numerous malpractices, particularly in the majoritarian races." The administration of the election was regarded as generally competent and effective, despite the short time available to prepare the elections. In sharp contrast, the campaign was marked by widespread vote buying, misuse of incumbency, and the practice of exploiting all possible legislative loopholes, skewing equality of opportunity for contestants. Intertwined business and political interests dictated media coverage of elections and allowed for the misuse of political finance, including at the local level, according to international observers.

The country last held a presidential election in two rounds in 2019. The joint international election observation mission assessed the election "was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned out in high numbers. In the pre-electoral period, the law was often not implemented in good faith by many stakeholders, which negatively impacted trust in the election administration, enforcement of campaign finance rules, and the effectiveness of election dispute resolution." The election mission reported candidates could campaign freely, although numerous and credible indications of misuse of state resources and vote buying undermined the credibility of the process. While election day was assessed positively, some procedural problems were noted during the count, and conditions for tabulation were at times inadequate.

Martial law states that the president maintains his position if his powers expire during martial law. Scheduled presidential or regular elections may be held only after the termination of martial law. In case of the early termination of the president's term, the speaker of the parliament would assume those authorities. Likewise, parliamentarians would remain in their seats should their powers expire during martial law.

Political Parties and Political Participation: In May, a law allowing the government to ban political parties came into force. As of December, 12 political parties were banned due to persistent collaboration with the Russian Federation. On September 15, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of the pro-Russia Opposition Platform - For Life political party, the only pro-Russia party represented in parliament, banning its activities in Ukraine. Its parliamentary faction wasdissolved in May and former members of the faction formed a new parliamentary deputy group, Platform for Life and Peace.

Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit the participation of women or members of minority groups, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) and Indigenous persons (see section 6), from voting or otherwise participating in the political process, and they did participate. According to ODIHR, citizens found by a court to be incapacitated "on the basis of intellectual or psychosocial disability" were ineligible to vote. The Central Election Commission estimated this restriction affected 36,000 voters.

In the October 2020 local elections, women accounted for 43 percent of candidates on party lists and won approximately 30 percent of seats on local councils. No woman was elected mayor of a major city. Twenty-five Romani candidates stood for election, and 10 were elected to municipal councils, although ODIHR estimated 20,000 to 40,000 Roma were unable to register to vote because they lacked identity documents. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, women accounted for 23 percent of the candidates and won 21 percent of the seats.

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption, but authorities did not always effectively implement the law, and many officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. During the year the nation's priorities shifted to the war and martial law stifled transparency. On March 3, parliament suspended the requirement of asset disclosures for public officials during the period of martial law, to prevent Russia financially targeting Ukrainian leaders. The suspension undermined the system of monitoring and control over incomes, expenditures, and assets of public officials. Anticorruption institutions reported a hampered capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption cases due to budget cuts and a decrease in staff as personnel voluntarily mobilized to the frontlines. The Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office reported six of its 12 lead prosecutors willingly mobilized at the onset of the war but did not have a mechanism to return. Civil society also recognized the public appetite for criticizing corruption diminished as the country rallied together to support the cause of Ukraine's fight against Russia.

While the number of reports of government corruption was low according to the National Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), observers noted corruption remained common at all levels in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. From January 1 to August 3, NABU launched 238 investigations that resulted in 27 indictments against 80 individuals. Accused individuals included public officials, heads of state-owned enterprises, and a judge. The Prosecutor General's Office stated six judges were convicted during the first seven months of the year of soliciting bribes and received various sentences of three to seven years in prison. NABU and the Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office continued to conduct investigations and prosecutions, despite the wartime context and hurdles. Three out of the five specialized anticorruption bodies remained without permanent leadership during the year, posing a major challenge to the effectiveness of the anticorruption system. The selection processes for these positions are usually competitive and based on merit but have been paused due to the war.

Corruption continued to be a significant influence on justice, the work of law enforcement institutions, the management of state property and state companies, and state regulation.

Antireform elites and oligarchs continued to pressure anticorruption bodies by using misinformation campaigns and political maneuvering to undermine public trust. Human rights groups called for increased transparency and discussion regarding proposed changes to these bodies, particularly respecting procedures for appointments to leadership positions.

Human rights groups claimed another threat to the anticorruption infrastructure came from the Constitutional Court, where they alleged antireform interests unduly influenced judges. In January 2021, the State Bureau of Investigations informed the Head of the Constitutional Court Oleksandr Tupytskyy that he was being charged with fraud and witness tampering. In March 2021, Tupytsky left the country for Austria. In July 2021, the Supreme Court overturned President Zelenskyy's decree to remove Tupytskyy from office. The following month, the Podolskyy District Court ruled to arrest Tupytskyy in absentia, allowing Tupytskyy's extradition from Austria. On May 27, the State Bureau of Investigations stated that Tupytskyy was added to the international wanted list.

The Constitutional Court was reviewing the constitutionality of the High Anticorruption Court law at year's end.

On July 13, parliament adopted legislation to relaunch the High Qualification Commission of Judges and the High Council of Justice (HCJ). These bodies respectively control the hiring of judges and oversee judicial self-governance. Judicial reform groups characterize corrupt interests as influencing both bodies. The HCJ Ethics Council nominated qualified candidates to both bodies. On August 15, parliament approved the appointment of the council's nominations of Roman Maselko and Mykola Moroz for two HCJ positions. Civil society supported both nominees whom they deem well qualified. As of December however, 13 HCJ vacancies remained.

On July 12, detectives of the National Anticorruption Bureau charged Anton Yanchuk, a former head of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency, with abuse of power and embezzlement of more than 426 million hryvnias ($10.6 million); four others were also notified of their prosecution in connection with the case.

On February 23, the High Anticorruption Court convicted the former deputy minister of the temporarily occupied territories for extorting 44 million hryvnias ($1.1 million) in bribes, sentenced him to 10 years in prison, and confiscated his assets. On April 20, the court convicted former First Deputy Director General of the State Titanium Research and Design Institute Andrii Rachkov of abuse of office for transferring 52 million hryvnias ($1.3 million) of institute funds to offshore accounts for services that were not provided. The court sentenced him to 10 years of prison, confiscated his assets, and banned him from holding public office for three years.

Law enforcement agencies often failed to appropriately investigate cases of attacks against journalists, human rights defenders, and activists, particularly those who focused on exposing corruption (see section 2.a.).

On February 3, a war veteran and activist in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast started a hunger strike after police reportedly attacked him and authorities failed to investigate his complaint. He ended his hunger strike after a local official was suspended.

The government was generally cooperative and responsive to domestic and international human rights groups. They generally operated without government interference with their investigations and publications of findings on human rights cases. In some instances, the government publicly criticized international organizations engaging on international humanitarian law.

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Ukraine - United States Department of State

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Ukraine is a republic with a semi-presidential political system composed of three branches of government: a unicameral legislature; an executive led by a directly elected president who is head of state and commander in chief; and a prime minister, who is chosen through a legislative majority and as head of government leads the Cabinet of Ministers; and a judiciary.

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There were also significant human rights issues involving Ukrainian government officials, although not comparable to the scope of Russia’s abuses, which included credible reports of:  unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh or life-threatening prison conditions;

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Ukraine is a republic with a semi-presidential political system composed of three branches of government: a unicameral legislature; an executive led by a directly elected president who is head of state and commander in chief; and a prime minister, who is chosen through a legislative majority and as head of government leads the Cabinet of Ministers; and a judiciary. In 2019, voters elected Volodymyr Zelenskyy president in an election considered free and fair by international and domestic observers. In 2019, the country also held early parliamentary elections that observers considered free and fair.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for maintaining internal security and order and oversees police and other law enforcement personnel. The Security Service of Ukraine is responsible for state security broadly defined, nonmilitary intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism matters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports to the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Security Service reports directly to the president. The State Border Guard Service, which falls under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, implements state policy regarding border security, while the State Migration Service, also under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, implements state policy regarding migration, citizenship, and registration of refugees and other migrants. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over security forces in the territory controlled by the government. There were reports that members of the security forces committed some abuses in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion.

On February 24, the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, launched an unlawful and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, resulting in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities committed by members of Russia's forces. International organizations and nongovernmental organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, issued periodic reports documenting abuses committed by Russia's forces during the war; however, Russia's forces and their proxies throughout the war methodically obstructed, harassed, and intimidated international monitors denying them sufficient access.

Following the start of its full-scale invasion in February, Russia's forces continued to escalate attacks on civilians. Russia mobilized, armed, trained, and led proxy forces from territories under its occupation (including parts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya oblasts and Crimea). Through the end of the year, Russia's forces continued to conduct hostilities, including launching missile and drone strikes throughout Ukraine, hitting critical infrastructure, including power, water, and heating facilities. They struck at least 261 hospitals and clinics as well as 501 schools by December. Amnesty International and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe characterized these attacks as relentless and indiscriminate; during the year, more than 13 million residents were displaced and thousands of civilians killed, including 429 confirmed deaths among children, with experts assessing the actual number was likely much higher. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that widespread attacks by Russia's forces against critical infrastructure during the coldest months of the year caused the humanitarian situation to further deteriorate, leading to mass displacement of civilians.

Serious human rights abuses committed by Russia's forces in occupied areas involved severe and wide-ranging cases and included credible reports of: mass and unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, including of children; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees, particularly during "filtration" operations involving interrogation, torture, forced separation of families, forced deportation and adoptions of Ukraine's children to Russian families; unjust interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses of a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including atrocities, abductions, torture and physical abuses; serious restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the existence of criminal libel; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive "laws" on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; severe restrictions of religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to vote in free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national/racial/ethnic minority groups, or members of Indigenous groups, including Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, and intersex persons. (See Russia-occupied areas section for abuses committed by Russian military, security, and proxy forces in those territories Russia occupied at year's end.)

The Russian Federation conducted sham referenda in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya oblasts from September 23 to 27. President Putin proclaimed the so-called annexation of these four oblasts into the Russian Federation on September 30. On March 3 and October 12, UN General Assembly resolutions condemned both Russia's invasion and the purported annexation of Ukrainian territories.

There were also significant human rights issues involving Ukrainian government officials, although not comparable to the scope of Russia's abuses, which included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh or life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the media, violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; refoulement of refugees to a country despite risks they would face torture or persecution; serious acts of government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting persons with disabilities, members of ethnic minority groups, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.

The government generally did not take adequate steps to prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity. The government took some steps to identify, prosecute, and punish officials involved in corruption.

The constitution and law provide citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: The country last held parliamentary elections in 2019. A joint international election observation mission by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament assessed that "fundamental rights and freedoms were overall respected, and the campaign was competitive, despite numerous malpractices, particularly in the majoritarian races." The administration of the election was regarded as generally competent and effective, despite the short time available to prepare the elections. In sharp contrast, the campaign was marked by widespread vote buying, misuse of incumbency, and the practice of exploiting all possible legislative loopholes, skewing equality of opportunity for contestants. Intertwined business and political interests dictated media coverage of elections and allowed for the misuse of political finance, including at the local level, according to international observers.

The country last held a presidential election in two rounds in 2019. The joint international election observation mission assessed the election "was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned out in high numbers. In the pre-electoral period, the law was often not implemented in good faith by many stakeholders, which negatively impacted trust in the election administration, enforcement of campaign finance rules, and the effectiveness of election dispute resolution." The election mission reported candidates could campaign freely, although numerous and credible indications of misuse of state resources and vote buying undermined the credibility of the process. While election day was assessed positively, some procedural problems were noted during the count, and conditions for tabulation were at times inadequate.

Martial law states that the president maintains his position if his powers expire during martial law. Scheduled presidential or regular elections may be held only after the termination of martial law. In case of the early termination of the president's term, the speaker of the parliament would assume those authorities. Likewise, parliamentarians would remain in their seats should their powers expire during martial law.

Political Parties and Political Participation: In May, a law allowing the government to ban political parties came into force. As of December, 12 political parties were banned due to persistent collaboration with the Russian Federation. On September 15, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of the pro-Russia Opposition Platform - For Life political party, the only pro-Russia party represented in parliament, banning its activities in Ukraine. Its parliamentary faction wasdissolved in May and former members of the faction formed a new parliamentary deputy group, Platform for Life and Peace.

Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit the participation of women or members of minority groups, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) and Indigenous persons (see section 6), from voting or otherwise participating in the political process, and they did participate. According to ODIHR, citizens found by a court to be incapacitated "on the basis of intellectual or psychosocial disability" were ineligible to vote. The Central Election Commission estimated this restriction affected 36,000 voters.

In the October 2020 local elections, women accounted for 43 percent of candidates on party lists and won approximately 30 percent of seats on local councils. No woman was elected mayor of a major city. Twenty-five Romani candidates stood for election, and 10 were elected to municipal councils, although ODIHR estimated 20,000 to 40,000 Roma were unable to register to vote because they lacked identity documents. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, women accounted for 23 percent of the candidates and won 21 percent of the seats.

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption, but authorities did not always effectively implement the law, and many officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. During the year the nation's priorities shifted to the war and martial law stifled transparency. On March 3, parliament suspended the requirement of asset disclosures for public officials during the period of martial law, to prevent Russia financially targeting Ukrainian leaders. The suspension undermined the system of monitoring and control over incomes, expenditures, and assets of public officials. Anticorruption institutions reported a hampered capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption cases due to budget cuts and a decrease in staff as personnel voluntarily mobilized to the frontlines. The Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office reported six of its 12 lead prosecutors willingly mobilized at the onset of the war but did not have a mechanism to return. Civil society also recognized the public appetite for criticizing corruption diminished as the country rallied together to support the cause of Ukraine's fight against Russia.

While the number of reports of government corruption was low according to the National Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), observers noted corruption remained common at all levels in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. From January 1 to August 3, NABU launched 238 investigations that resulted in 27 indictments against 80 individuals. Accused individuals included public officials, heads of state-owned enterprises, and a judge. The Prosecutor General's Office stated six judges were convicted during the first seven months of the year of soliciting bribes and received various sentences of three to seven years in prison. NABU and the Specialized Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office continued to conduct investigations and prosecutions, despite the wartime context and hurdles. Three out of the five specialized anticorruption bodies remained without permanent leadership during the year, posing a major challenge to the effectiveness of the anticorruption system. The selection processes for these positions are usually competitive and based on merit but have been paused due to the war.

Corruption continued to be a significant influence on justice, the work of law enforcement institutions, the management of state property and state companies, and state regulation.

Antireform elites and oligarchs continued to pressure anticorruption bodies by using misinformation campaigns and political maneuvering to undermine public trust. Human rights groups called for increased transparency and discussion regarding proposed changes to these bodies, particularly respecting procedures for appointments to leadership positions.

Human rights groups claimed another threat to the anticorruption infrastructure came from the Constitutional Court, where they alleged antireform interests unduly influenced judges. In January 2021, the State Bureau of Investigations informed the Head of the Constitutional Court Oleksandr Tupytskyy that he was being charged with fraud and witness tampering. In March 2021, Tupytsky left the country for Austria. In July 2021, the Supreme Court overturned President Zelenskyy's decree to remove Tupytskyy from office. The following month, the Podolskyy District Court ruled to arrest Tupytskyy in absentia, allowing Tupytskyy's extradition from Austria. On May 27, the State Bureau of Investigations stated that Tupytskyy was added to the international wanted list.

The Constitutional Court was reviewing the constitutionality of the High Anticorruption Court law at year's end.

On July 13, parliament adopted legislation to relaunch the High Qualification Commission of Judges and the High Council of Justice (HCJ). These bodies respectively control the hiring of judges and oversee judicial self-governance. Judicial reform groups characterize corrupt interests as influencing both bodies. The HCJ Ethics Council nominated qualified candidates to both bodies. On August 15, parliament approved the appointment of the council's nominations of Roman Maselko and Mykola Moroz for two HCJ positions. Civil society supported both nominees whom they deem well qualified. As of December however, 13 HCJ vacancies remained.

On July 12, detectives of the National Anticorruption Bureau charged Anton Yanchuk, a former head of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency, with abuse of power and embezzlement of more than 426 million hryvnias ($10.6 million); four others were also notified of their prosecution in connection with the case.

On February 23, the High Anticorruption Court convicted the former deputy minister of the temporarily occupied territories for extorting 44 million hryvnias ($1.1 million) in bribes, sentenced him to 10 years in prison, and confiscated his assets. On April 20, the court convicted former First Deputy Director General of the State Titanium Research and Design Institute Andrii Rachkov of abuse of office for transferring 52 million hryvnias ($1.3 million) of institute funds to offshore accounts for services that were not provided. The court sentenced him to 10 years of prison, confiscated his assets, and banned him from holding public office for three years.

Law enforcement agencies often failed to appropriately investigate cases of attacks against journalists, human rights defenders, and activists, particularly those who focused on exposing corruption (see section 2.a.).

On February 3, a war veteran and activist in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast started a hunger strike after police reportedly attacked him and authorities failed to investigate his complaint. He ended his hunger strike after a local official was suspended.

The government was generally cooperative and responsive to domestic and international human rights groups. They generally operated without government interference with their investigations and publications of findings on human rights cases. In some instances, the government publicly criticized international organizations engaging on international humanitarian law.

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Ukraine - United States Department of State

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Ukraine is a republic with a semi-presidential political system composed of three branches of government: a unicameral legislature; an executive led by a directly elected president who is head of state and commander in chief; and a prime minister, who is chosen through a legislative majority and as head of government leads the Cabinet of Ministers; and a judiciary.

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Examples include high-profile cases not being investigated, bribery, smuggling, non-declaring of assets, and relatives of officials being appointed to top positions in the police.

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Halyna Kokhan - Anti-Corruption Expert, EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine*

* All thoughts and opinions are the author's own and do not reflect the position of the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine

Ukrainians believe that the fight against corruption in government and other key institutions has been unsuccessful. The focus of this blog is the police - a key sector of public anger.

Evidence of failure to address corruption in the police can be seen in lack of progress in investigations of high-profile criminal cases. For example, the murders of anti-corruption civil society activist Kateryna Handziuk and journalist Pavlo Sheremet, the killing by drunk policemen of five-year old Kyrylo Tlyalov, and the rape of a woman at the police unit in Kagarlyk remain unsolved or unpunished. The last of these incidents increased public distrust in the police from 44.3% to 55.6%.

Ukrainians consider all these cases to have taken place due to the failure of police reform and widespread corruption in the police sector. Moreover, Ukraine's National Police does not punish those responsible for attacks on anti-corruption activists and investigative journalists. This again highlights corruption 'at the top' in Ukraine.
Evidence of distrust
A survey conducted on behalf of Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention in March/April 2020 had some significant findings. Key among these was that Ukrainians believe corruption to be one of the country's most significant problems, second only to the war in Eastern Ukraine.

Among the 23 state institutions evaluated in the survey, customs, the courts, Parliament, the Prosecution Office, medical institutions, and the police (excluding patrol officers) were found to be the most corrupt. On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being no corruption, 5 meaning corruption is widespread), the general public scored these institutions well above 4. Of the other target groups interviewed, experts scored the institutions all at around 4. Businesses in the survey perceived the institutions (except customs and Parliament) to be slightly less corrupt (although they still scored them well over 3).

In comparison to the results of the 2017 survey, the population survey showed a deterioration in people's assessment of corruption in the following areas: customs, medicine, tax, the central police, patrol police, local authorities, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, and the armed forces. The only institution that showed a significant improvement was the President of Ukraine, who is now perceived to be more trustworthy.

Ukrainians consider these cases have taken place due to the failure of police reform and widespread corruption in the police sector

I am choosing to take the police as an example in this blog, as this institution was a key focus of public anger over violence and corruption following 2014's Revolution of Dignity. Why, after subsequent reforms, is the National Police still seen to be a corrupt institution?
Inherited corruption
Corruption in the police was inherited from the 1990s, or even from the era of the Soviet Union. Numerous journalist investigations - for example by Bihus.info, Slidstvo.info, ANTAC, and Radiosvoboda - point to practices from these times that are still in evidence today. These include the following:

police officers putting pressure on businessmen and businesswomen and asking them for bribes;

crimes by the police being covered up by the authorities in exchange for bribes/gifts;

non-transparent appointments and promotion of close relatives/friends of politicians and top officials to high-level police positions;

unexplained wealth among the top- and middle-level police leadership (and their families), as well as failure to declare assets, property, expensive cars, and gifts;

close relations between the Ministry of Internal Affairs' leadership and businesses with poor reputations, which may go on to win ministry tenders;

lack of integrity on the part of investigators during pre-trial investigations; and

the police starting criminal proceedings against journalists who investigate and release this information.

History of police reforms ... and failure
The 2014 Revolution of Dignity started after several hundred activists, mostly students, were brutally dispersed from the Maidan Square by the police. In response, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the centre of Kyiv to protest the beatings. The brutal actions of the police were the catalyst for people outraged by corruption, the roll back of European integration, and forced 'russification'.

After the revolution, police corruption was high on the agenda of Ukraine's government and its international partners. As a result, the Law of Ukraine 'On National Police' was adopted. This, along with a series of reforms - all implemented that same year - aimed at rooting out old corrupt practices.

The most successful step in the police reform was the formation of the patrol police, while the highly corrupt car inspection and patrol service was disbanded. Thousands of young motivated people from outside the police system were selected to serve as patrol police officers.

However, the new system clashed with the old. Unreformed local police units and the criminal police also fought back against the change. The new patrols lacked experience, felt ineffective due to forced cooperation with unreformed police stations, and became demotivated. Many left and high staff turnover became a problem. The unreformed criminal units meanwhile continued to ignore high-profile cases.

Another stage of reform to the police was re-attestation. Officers had to pass a new exam (on the law, general skills etc.) if they were to keep their positions. However, this resulted in few being fired (only 7% failed the exam). Even those who were dismissed soon got their jobs back through the courts. These 'old' police officers are still working today, employing old corrupt schemes much as they used to do in the past.

The most successful step in the police reform was the formation of the patrol police

Finally, Ukrainian authorities tried to implement the classic European model of reform by separating the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Police. The National Police was supposed to be in charge of investigating, detecting, and preventing crime, with the ministry responsible for strategic-level decisions and reform processes. The separation of powers and influence happened on paper, but not in practice. The Minister has maintained certain powers of operational management; for example, he/she appoints the heads of regional police departments, and approves all deputy heads of the National Police.

Hence, apart from the creation of patrol police and re-branding of the old militia into the National Police, the other reform efforts have mainly been cosmetic.
Low salaries, high turnover
As well as the failure of reforms, the low salaries of police officers in Ukraine is considered to be another reason for corrupt practices in the sector.

Young and motivated people are leaving the police system...

In 2015, the police were well-paid. However, inflation has negatively affected salaries since then. The average salary of a police officer in Ukraine is about 15,000 UAH (Ukrainian hryvnia) per month. This is about 475 euros. In the regions it is even lower at about 10,000 UAH (317 euros). In comparison, the salaries of bodyguards or even taxi drivers are two to three times higher.

This is also one of the reasons for the high turnover within the sector. Young and motivated people are leaving the police system, while older officers who have illegal 'extra' sources of income are staying. In June 2020, the National Police had a workforce of 151,600 people. This represented a shortage of 23,700 people, almost 16% of staff. The patrol police are understaffed even more (short by about 22%). The biggest shortage is in Kyiv.
Recommendations for the future

There must be the necessary 'political will' and ownership of the reforms by Ukraine's President and Parliament. They must get behind the police and Ministry of Interior reforms in order to reboot them, so that they can be completed successfully.

The appointment of new staff should be via clear legal assessment criteria of professionalism and high integrity. Selection could be carried out by a commission composed of Ukrainian experts and civil society activists, with this backed by some international experts.

There must be open and transparent competition for top- and middle-level police positions. Clear and transparent criteria should serve as the basis for professional promotion.

There should be effective mechanisms for disciplinary proceedings at all levels, with civil society representatives taking part in disciplinary commissions.

Appropriate public oversight must be ensured, in order to prevent and detect abuse and ill-treatment of detainees in police stations.

There is a significant need to adopt a new Code of Administrative Offences, given that the majority of offences are administrative rather than criminal in nature. The current code was adopted in 1984 and has been amended more than 600 times.

Information about the punishments/imprisonments of police officers guilty of crimes or corruption should be made open and available to the public. As things stand, such information is very general and available only on criminal investigations against police officers, but not the eventual results.

The remuneration for police officers should be raised. Salaries should be linked to performance, integrity, and reputation.

Finally, a single independent financial investigation agency should be established, focusing on analytics rather than searches. This applies not only to the competence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also to the tax police and the Security Service of Ukraine. The role of the Minister of the Interior in this reform is significant, as most criminal proceedings for economic crimes are concentrated in the National Police hands, which creates a 'window of opportunity' for corruption.

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The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre at CMI works to identify and communicate informed approaches to partners for reducing the harmful impact of corruption on sustainable and inclusive development.
U4 newsletter
All views expressed in this post are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U4 partner agencies, or CMI/U4.

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Police in Ukraine: corruption versus reform

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Ukrainians have little trust in their key institutions, including the police. Despite reforms following 2014's revolution, corru...

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Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)

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Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukrain

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Latest Developments Fixing of time-limit: Counter-Memorial Available in: Summary of the Judgment of 2 February 2024 Procedure(s):Preliminary objections Available in: Preliminary objections Procedure(s):Preliminary objections Available in: Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v.

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Alleged crimes committed in the context of situation in Ukraine since 21 November 2013

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Following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the continuation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, freedom of expression mandate holders* from the United Nations, the African Commission of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe issue the following joint statement

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GENEVA (4 May 2022) - Following the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the continuation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, freedom of expression mandate holders* from the United Nations, the African Commission of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe issue the following joint statement:

"We collectively condemn the invasion of and continuous aggression against Ukraine, its sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation. The actions of the Russian Federation violate international law and the common UN, OSCE, ItACHR and ACHR commitments and the very principles on which our organisations are based.

We are outraged about the continuous atrocities and the resulting grave human rights and humanitarian crises, which have a massive detrimental impact on civilians' lives, safety and well-being. We stand in solidarity with the people of Ukraine in these difficult times.

We recall that it is precisely during times of war and armed conflict that the right to freedom of expression and free access to information must be vigorously defended, as it is instrumental for the promotion of lasting peace, understanding the nature of the conflict and ensuring accountability.

In this connection, we highlight the following:

First, we are profoundly concerned about the safety of journalists, media workers and associated personnel in Ukraine, who are carrying out their work under unprecedented conditions, and are now at a very high risk. There are numerous reports that journalists are being targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked and killed, or refused safe passage from the cities and regions under siege. Such actions are abhorrent and must be stopped immediately. We recall that under international humanitarian law, during armed conflict journalists are considered to be civilians and must be afforded protection as such. An attack to kill, wound or abduct a journalist constitutes a war crime. Those responsible for direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including journalists, should be held accountable and brought to justice under national and international law. Measures must also be taken to trace missing journalists, ascertain their fate, provide appropriate assistance and facilitate their return to their families. States have the duty and obligation to protect and guarantee human rights, to conduct effective investigations and to guarantee effective remedies and reparations.

Second, we are alarmed by reports that Ukraine's media and internet infrastructure may be intentionally targeted by the Russian forces in an effort to disrupt access to information, including by means of cyberattacks. We appreciate that access to Ukraine's internet infrastructure has remained largely resilient. It is crucial to ensure that people in Ukraine have continued access to the internet, broadcasting and other means of communication. We call for the adoption of all feasible measures to protect the media, media organisations, and internet infrastructure from attacks and hostile take overs. We also call for increased support in various forms by the international community to ensure media sustainability in Ukraine at a time when a number of national and local media outlets have lost their premises and equipment or have been damaged or destroyed. Initiatives that enable Ukrainian journalists and media in exile to continue their professional work should also be supported in a manner that is sustainable and adapted to the exceptional conditions they are facing.

Third, we underline that propaganda for war and national hatred which constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence are profoundly harmful and prohibited under article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We call on the Russian Federation to immediately refrain from these unlawful practices.

Fourth, we are concerned at the spread of disinformation concerning the conflict in Ukraine in Russian state-owned media. However, we believe that disinformation cannot be addressed by blocking or banning media outlets. Any restriction of freedom of expression should respect scrupulously the three-part test of legality, legitimate aim, and necessity and proportionality. We are concerned that the EU's decision to ban two Russian state-owned media outlets may have been a disproportionate response to disinformation. It has been used as a pretext for additional closure of independent media outlets in the Russian Federation. Promoting access to diverse and verifiable information, including ensuring access to free, independent and pluralistic media, is a more effective response to disinformation.

Fifth, we believe that the erosion of the right to freedom of expression and other human rights over a prolonged period of time and the silencing of critical voices in the Russian Federation have contributed to creating an environment that facilitates Russia's war against Ukraine. We are alarmed at the further tightening of censorship and repression of dissent and pluralist sources of information and opinion in the Russian Federation, including the blocking of social media platforms and news websites, disruption of services from foreign content and service providers, massive labelling of independent journalists and media as 'foreign agents', introduction of criminal liability and imprisonment of up to fifteen years for spreading so-called 'fake' information about the war in Ukraine or questioning Russian military action in Ukraine or simply standing for peace or even mentioning the word 'war'. We deplore the systematic crackdown on political opponents, independent journalists and the media, human rights activists, protesters and many others opposing the Russian government's actions. All these measures amount to the creation of a state monopoly on information in blatant violation of Russia's international obligations. They must stop. We call on the Russian government to fully implement its international human rights obligations, including by respecting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive and impart information regardless of frontiers, and by ensuring a safe working environment for independent media, journalists and civil society actors.

Six, we note that the war in Ukraine has further highlighted the risks of the proliferation of disinformation, misinformation and incitement to violence and hatred and restrictions of lawful speech on digital and social media platforms as a result of their business models, policies and practices. While we appreciate that dominant companies recently made some efforts to address these problems, we urge them to strengthen their human rights due diligence and impact assessment, accountability, transparency and equal and consistent application of policies to uphold the rights of all users."

ENDS

*The expert: Ms. Irene Khan was appointed as UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression in June 2020 and is the first woman to hold this mandate. An internationally recognized advocate for human rights, gender equality and social justice, she was Secretary-General of Amnesty International from 2001 to 2009 and Director-General of the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) from 2010 to 2019. Ms. Khan is affiliated with the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, and has been Consulting Editor of the Daily Star, Bangladesh's largest English newspaper.

Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures' experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity.

The freedom of expression mandates issuing the Joint Declaration on freedom of expression and gender justice: Ms. Irene Khan, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; Mrs.Teresa Ribeiro, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Mr. Pedro Pedro Vaca Villarreal, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, and Hon. Ourveena Geereesha Topsy-Sonoo,African Commission Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information.

For more information and media requests please contact OHCHR-freedex@un.org.

For media inquiries related to other UN independent experts, please contact Jeremy Laurence (+ 41 79 444 7578 / jeremy.laurence@un.org).

Follow news related to the UN's independent human rights experts on Twitter: @UN_SPExperts.

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Ukraine: Joint statement on Russia's invasion and importance of freedom of expression and information (04 May 2022) - Ukraine

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News and Press Release in English on Ukraine about Protection and Human Rights; published on 4 May 2022 by ACHPR, IACHR and 3count other organizations

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Russia: UN human rights office ‘appalled’ at death of Navalny in prison

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The UN human rights office (OHCHR) on Friday said it was “appalled” over the death announced by Russian authorities of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in prison, calling for an impartial and transparent independent investigation.

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MOSCOW, Feb 18 (Reuters) - Alexei Navalny, Russian President Vladimir Putin's most prominent domestic foe, died on Friday at the Arctic prison where he was serving a three-decade prison term.

What do we know, and not know, about the death?

DEATH

Navalny was incarcerated at the IK-3 penal colony north of the Arctic Circle located in Kharp in the Yamalо-Nenets region about 1,900 km (1200 miles) northeast of Moscow.

His death was announced by the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District at 2:19 pm Moscow time (1119 GMT) on Feb. 16.

"On Feb. 16, 2024, in penal colony number 3, convict Navalny A.A. felt unwell after a walk, almost immediately losing consciousness.

"The medical staff of the institution arrived immediately, and an ambulance team was called.

"All necessary resuscitation measures were carried out, which did not give positive results. Doctors of the ambulance stated the death of the convict. The causes of death are being established."

No more details about the death have been given by the penitentiary service or by medical officials.

'SUDDEN DEATH SYNDROME'

Navalny's wife Yulia, speaking in Munich just a few hours after the announcement, said that she did not know whether or not to believe the news due to what she said were the lies of Russia.

But on Saturday, Navalny's spokeswoman Kira Yarmysh, confirmed that Navalny was dead.

His 69-year-old mother, Lyudmila, had been given a notice of the death, Yarmysh said. The time of death in that notice was 2:17 p.m. local time (0917 GMT) on Feb. 16, Yarmysh said.

"When Alexei's lawyer and mother arrived at the colony this morning, they were told that the cause of Navalny's death was sudden death syndrome," Ivan Zhdanov, who directs Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation, said on Saturday.

"Sudden death syndrome" is a vague term for different cardiac syndromes that cause sudden cardiac arrest and death.

An unidentified source told state-controlled RT that Navalny died from a blood clot.

THE BODY

It was unclear where Navalny's body was.

His mother had been told that the body had been taken to Salekhard, the town near the prison complex but when she arrived at the morgue it was closed.

When contacted by Navalny's lawyer, the morgue said it did not have Navalny's body, Yarmysh said.

Later, they were told by officials that the body would not be handed over until the investigation was complete, though earlier they had been told that the investigation had discovered no traces of criminality.

"Right now we don't have access to the body and we don't know for sure where it is, and we demand that the Russian authorities immediately give Alexei's body to his family," Yarmysh said in an interview with Reuters on Saturday.

An employee at the morgue in Salekhard told Reuters that Navalny's body had not arrived.

Novaya Gazeta cited unidentified sources as saying that the body had been taken to the morgue at the Salekhard District Clinical Hospital.

The newspaper said that the body showed signs of bruising consistent with some sort of seizure as well as traces of heart massage attempts. The newspaper said it was unclear why his heart stopped.

Some Russian media reported that a special team of investigators had arrived from Moscow. It is unclear when the post-mortem will take place.

HEALTH ISSUES

Just the day before his death, Navalny was shown joking in court via a video link to court. In mirth, he requested a judge use some of his vast salary to top up his own account.

The online news outlet SOTA reported that the court session was convened after an "argument" with a prison officer who tried to confiscate Navalny's pen. Navalny wrote later on Thursday that he had been given 15 days in solitary confinement.

Russian prisons are brutal and his team had repeatedly raised fears that he would be harmed or killed.

He was repeatedly placed in punishment cells for various offences, including for his attitude.

Though he joked about the conditions, the Polar Wolf colony is considered to be one of the toughest prisons in Russia.

"It has not been colder than -32°C yet," Navalny said in January. "Nothing quite invigorates you like a walk in Yamal at 6:30 in the morning."

"Even at this temperature, you can walk for more than half an hour only if you manage to grow a new nose, new ears and new fingers."

He posted a picture of his walking yard - concrete walled, topped with metal bars, 11 steps long and three steps wide.

Navalny mentioned a scene in the 2015 film "The Revenant", in which Leonardo DiCaprio shelters in the carcass of a horse.

"I don't think that would have worked here. A dead horse would freeze in 15 minutes," Navalny said. "We need an elephant here, a hot elephant, a fried one."

Last year, he raised a little publicised problem that haunts Russia's prisons: a lack of teeth due to poor nutrition.

Less than a year ago, his team said he was grappling with severe stomach pain in jail.

Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; Editing by Susan Fenton

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

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Explainer: Alexei Navalny's death: What do we know?

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Alexei Navalny, Russian President Vladimir Putin's most prominent domestic foe, died on Friday at the Arctic prison where he was serving a three-decade prison term.

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Police have been detaining people across Russia as they tried to lay flowers in memory of Alexei Navalny at monuments to Stalinist political repression.

The numbers are small so far, but likely to grow.

Videos from Moscow show one woman being dragged through the snow towards a police van by several officers. There are shouts of "shame" from the crowd.

The police then kettle those remaining on the snowy streets, pushing them away from the shrines that have sprung up to Navalny.

Last night, it seemed officers had orders to allow people to pay their tributes - as long as they then moved on.

Today, the orders seem to have changed.

The Kremlin is moving to stamp out any hint of a mass gathering, any potential explosion of anger at Navalny's death.

In Novosibisrk, in Siberia, the authorities cordoned off the monument where people were heading to pay their respects. They claimed there were bomb threats. Mourners stuck their flowers into snowdrifts instead, nearby.

In Vladimir Putin's Russia, the right to public protest has been gradually, but firmly, squeezed - until it's almost non-existent. It is illegal even to stand with a protest sign in the street without permission. The punishment is a fine or a short spell in police custody.

But if that sign expresses support for Alexei Navalny, there's a real risk of criminal charges - for extremism.

Navalny's entire political organisation - including all its offices across Russia - has been declared "extremist" on a par with terrorist groups like Isis or Al-Qaeda. It means anyone with any links to Navalny - or showing support for him and his team - is taking a major risk.

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Alexei Navalny: Activist's death confirmed as family calls for body to be returned - BBC News

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The death of the outspoken critic of Vladimir Putin was first announced by the Russian prison where he'd been serving a lengthy sentence.

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(Berlin, February 16, 2024) - The Kremlin bears responsibility for Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny's death in prison, Human Rights Watch said today. Russia's state prison service said in a public statement on February 16, 2024 that Navalny had lost consciousness and could not be resuscitated.

"For more than a decade the Kremlin persecuted, imprisoned, and tormented Navalny," said Tirana Hassan, executive director at Human Rights Watch. "He should never have been in prison, in the first place. The Russian authorities bear full responsibility for what has happened to Navalny, starting with his first politically motivated arrest."

Navalny, 47, had been serving a prison sentence on numerous trumped-up charges when he was sentenced in 2023 to 19 years on a new set of charges, including extremism. It was a thinly veiled move to ensure that he remained incarcerated and isolated for the foreseeable future, Human Rights Watch said.

Navalny had been behind bars since he returned to Russia in 2021, following medical treatment after surviving a 2020 poisoning attempt, which many attributed to the Kremlin.

Prison authorities sent him to various punishment cells for most of the time he was in custody, including in recent days.

Navalny had defied the Kremlin's efforts to intimidate him and to crush political opposition, Human Rights Watch said. He refused to live in exile and used court hearings against him as an opportunity to witheringly criticize the Kremlin's repression in Russia and the war against Ukraine. At a court hearing held in prison on February 15, Navalny said that the numerous fines imposed on him were depleting his finances.

Russian authorities have also targeted many of Navalny's allies, supporters, and even his lawyers, who are either in prison or facing criminal charges, in addition to other rights violations,.

The European Court of Human Rights issued numerous judgments that Russian authorities had violated Navalny's right to liberty and security, fair trial, as well as freedoms of expression and association and that his rights had been violated for political purposes. It also found that Russia had failed to carry out an effective investigation into Navalny's poisoning.

Under international law, as reinforced by the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, states have obligations to exercise a "duty of care" to anyone in custody, and all deaths in custody must be effectively investigated in an independent and thorough process, and those responsible held to account.

Russia's state prison service has said that it had sent a medical commission to the penal colony in the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous region, where Navalny was serving his sentence. The local branch of Russia's state criminal investigation service has stated it would conduct a "procedural inquiry" into Navalny's death.

A spokesperson for Navalny has not yet confirmed his death and has said his lawyer is flying to the prison colony. She said she will not comment further until she has more information.

"A long list of people bear responsibility for Navalny's persecution and ultimately his death, and we need to work to hold each and every one of them responsible," Hassan said. "What the authorities should do is drop all baseless cases against his supporters, vacate their convictions, and repeal each repressive law that has facilitated them."

Human Rights Watch wishes to extend its sympathy to his family and loved ones.

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The Kremlin bears responsibility for Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny's death in prison. Russia's state prison service said in a public statement on February 16, 2024 that Navalny had lost consciousness and could not be resuscitated.

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Ukraine has been a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking since the early 1990s. Men, women, and children are trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and begging and sexual and other forms of exploitation.

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U.S. Agency for International Development

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Trafficking in Persons | Ukraine | U.S. Agency for International Development

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Ukraine has been a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking since the early 1990s. Men, women, and children are trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and begging and sexual and other forms of exploitation. The main countries of destination for trafficked Ukrainians have been the Russian Federation, Poland, and Turkey, as well as internal human trafficking within Ukraine.