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And here someone who links weaving to Federici

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Heidegger’s Ways of Being | Issue 125 | Philosophy Now

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Andrew Royle introduces Heidegger’s key ideas from his classic Being and Time, showing how they lead towards his concept of Being-towards-death.

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Dear Sofia,

I can remember that we had a conversation about depth. I wonder if the deepest depth is the surface.  Warhol once said If you want to know all about Andy Warhol, just look at the surface: of my paintings and films and me, and there I am. There's nothing behind it.

It’s about the nothingness as potentiality of meaning: the Zen-Buddhist mind. Zen master Dogen talks about non-thinking without a goal. That is why the works of herman de vries  (inspired by Zen) are so simple and at the same deep because they have no meaning but speak for themselves. I think this is the essence of beauty. Kant described beauty as purposiveness without purpose. We see something visual that shows a purposiveness but lacks a functional purpose. Contemplation becomes a goal in itself without leading to an answer. There is depth and at the same not. See post text Beauty. But there is also the sublime as described by Heidegger. This happens according to him when we are present in the becoming. When we bump into nothingness we use history to understand the future, in the nothingness we find possibilities. It’s an in-between state of change, in-between there is the nothingness of becoming because things are not clear yet. The moment of creating.

But Plato also had his view on beauty by relating it to a memory of completeness where we were once part of, which we still feel a bit and vaguely remember. Leading maybe to nostalgia. By following our love for beauty (eros) we can come a bit closer. This fleeting memory of the world we were once part of. maybe also has something ephemeral. I think your work touches a lot upon these issues (nostalgia, nothingness, ephemerality, beauty, the futuristic past, and beauty as something in-between, as described by Heiddeger.) https://philosophynow.org/issues/125/Heideggers_Ways_of_Being

One of the words you also mentioning was decoration. See posts.

Decoration is a word that is strongly related to the idea of beauty as something empty in the sense that it doesn’t fulfill a functional purpose. We can enjoy something without needing to know what it is. It is as it is. The arts and crafts movement wanted to introduce a lot of decoration in houses as beauty for the souls, as a reaction to the alienation of the industrial revolution. These were functional objects without a human touch. Maybe it might be interesting to delve into the word decoration and how it is related to the aforementioned concepts that revolve around your work, like alienation, beauty, nostalgia, ephemerality, nothingness, the futuristic past, the in-between,  the unbearable self. For the last topic, it might also be interesting to look into the work of Byung Chul Han, who wrote about beauty and the importance the ritual. See posts. He is also dealing like Camus with the nothingness of life. At last, we have meta-modernism which talks about the in-between. In-between naive enthusiasm and critical irony. See post.

Best regards,

Hille

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Epicurus is one of the major philosophers in the Hellenistic period, the three centuries following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C.E. (and of Aristotle in 322 B.C.E.). Epicurus developed an unsparingly materialistic metaphysics, empiricist epistemology, and hedonistic ethics. Epicurus taught that the basic constituents of the world are atoms, uncuttable bits of matter, flying through empty space, and he tried to explain all natural phenomena in atomic terms. Epicurus rejected the existence of Platonic forms and an immaterial soul, and he said that the gods have no influence on our lives. Epicurus also thought skepticism was untenable, and that we could gain knowledge of the world relying upon the senses. He taught that the point of all one's actions was to attain pleasure (conceived of as tranquility) for oneself, and that this could be done by limiting one's desires and by banishing the fear of the gods and of death. Epicurus' gospel of freedom from fear proved to be quite popular, and communities of Epicureans flourished for centuries after his death.

Table of Contents

1. Life

Epicurus was born around 341 B.C.E., seven years after Plato's death, and grew up in the Athenian colony of Samos, an island in the Mediterranean Sea. He was about 19 when Aristotle died, and he studied philosophy under followers of Democritus and Plato. Epicurus founded his first philosophical schools in Mytilene and Lampsacus, before moving to Athens around 306 B.C.E. There Epicurus founded the Garden, a combination of philosophical community and school. The residents of the Garden put Epicurus' teachings into practice. Epicurus died from kidney stones around 271 or 270 B.C.E.

After Epicurus' death, Epicureanism continued to flourish as a philosophical movement. Communities of Epicureans sprang up throughout the Hellenistic world; along with Stoicism, it was one of the major philosophical schools competing for people's allegiances. Epicureanism went into decline with the rise of Christianity. Certain aspects of Epicurus' thought were revived during the Renaissance and early modern periods, when reaction against scholastic neo-Aristotelianism led thinkers to turn to mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena.

2. Sources

Epicurus was a voluminous writer, but almost none of his own work survives. A likely reason for this is that Christian authorities found his ideas ungodly. Diogenes Laertius, who probably lived in the third century CE , wrote a 10-book Lives of the Philosophers, which includes three of Epicurus' letters in its recounting of the life and teachings of Epicurus. These three letters are brief summaries of major areas of Epicurus' philosophy: the Letter to Herodotus, which summarizes his metaphysics, the Letter to Pythocles, which gives atomic explanations for meteorological phenomena, and the Letter to Menoeceus, which summarizes his ethics. It also includes the Principal Doctrines, 40 sayings which deal mainly with ethical matters.

Because of the absence of Epicurus' own writings, we have to rely on later writers to reconstruct Epicurus' thought. Two of our most important sources are the Roman poet Lucretius (c. 94-55 B.C.E.) and the Roman politician Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.). Lucretius was an Epicurean who wrote De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), a six-book poem expounding Epicurus' metaphysics. Cicero was an adherent of the skeptical academy, who wrote a series of works setting forth the major philosophical systems of his day, including Epicureanism. Another major source is the essayist Plutarch (c. 50-120 CE), a Platonist. However, both Cicero and Plutarch were very hostile toward Epicureanism, so they must be used with care, since they often are less than charitable toward Epicurus, and may skew his views to serve their own purposes.

Although the major outlines of Epicurus' thought are clear enough, the lack of sources means many of the details of his philosophy are still open to dispute.

3. Metaphysics

Epicurus believes that the basic constituents of the world are atoms (which are uncuttable, microscopic bits of matter) moving in the void (which is simply empty space). Ordinary objects are conglomerations of atoms. Furthermore, the properties of macroscopic bodies and all of the events we see occurring can be explained in terms of the collisions, reboundings, and entanglements of atoms.

a. Arguments for the Existence of Atoms and Void

Epicurus' metaphysics starts from two simple points: (1) we see that there are bodies in motion, and (2) nothing comes into existence from what does not exist. Epicurus takes the first point to be simply a datum of experience. The second point is a commonplace of ancient Greek philosophy, derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the principle that for everything which occurs there is a reason or explanation for why it occurs, and why this way rather than that).

First, because bodies move, there must be empty space for them to move in, and Epicurus calls this empty space 'void.' Second, the ordinary bodies that we see are compound bodies-that is, bodies which are made up of further bodies, which is shown by the fact that they can be broken down into smaller pieces. However, Epicurus thinks that this process of division cannot go on indefinitely, because otherwise bodies would dissolve away into nothing. Also, there must be basic and unchangeable building blocks of matter in order to explain the regularities in nature. These non-compound bodies are atoms-literally, 'uncuttables.' Only bodies and void exist per se, that is, exist without depending for their existence on something else. Other things-such as colors, time, and justice-are ultimately explicable as attributes of bodies.

b. Properties of Atoms, Limitlessness of the Universe

Because Epicurus believes that nothing comes into existence from nothing, he thinks that the universe has no beginning, but has always existed, and will always exist. Atoms, too, as the basic building blocks of all else, cannot come into existence, but have always existed. Our particular cosmos, however, is only a temporary agglomeration of atoms, and it is only one of an infinite number of such cosmoi, which come into existence and then dissolve away. Against Aristotle, Epicurus argues that the universe is unlimited in size. If the universe were limited in size, says Epicurus, you could go to the end of it, stick your fist out, and where your fist was located would be the new 'limit' of the universe. Of course, this process could be reiterated an endless number of times. Since the universe is unlimited in size, there must also be an unlimited number of atoms and an infinite amount of void. If the number of atoms were limited, then the 'density' of atoms in any region would effectively be zero, and there would be no macroscopic bodies, as there evidently are. And there must be an unlimited amount of void, since without a limitless amount of void, the infinite number of atoms would be unable to move.

c. Differences from Democritus

Up to this point, Epicurus is largely following the thought of Democritus, a pre-Socratic philosopher and one of the inventors of atomism. However, he modifies Democritus' atomism in at least three important ways.

i. Weight

The first is that Epicurus thinks that atoms have weight. Like Democritus, Epicurus believes that atoms have the properties of size, shape, and resistance. Democritus explains all atomic motion as the result of previous atomic collisions, plus the inertia of atoms. Aristotle, however, criticizes Democritus on this point, saying that Democritus has not explained why it is that atoms move at all, rather than simply standing still. Epicurus seems to be answering this criticism when he says that atoms do have a natural motion of direction-'downward'-even though there is no bottom to the universe. This natural motion is supposed to give an explanation for why atoms move in the first place. Also, Epicurus thinks that it is evident that bodies do tend to travel down, all else being equal, and he thinks that positing weight as an atomic property accounts for this better than thinking all atomic motion is the result of past collisions and inertia.

ii. The Swerve

The second modification of Democritus' views is the addition of the 'swerve.' In addition to the regular tendency of atoms to move downward, Epicurus thinks that occasionally, and at random times, the atoms swerve to the side. One reason for this swerve is that it is needed to explain why there are atomic collisions. The natural tendency of atoms is to fall straight downward, at uniform velocity. If this were the only natural atomic motion, the atoms never would have collided with one another, forming macroscopic bodies. As Lucretius puts it, they would 'fall downward, like drops of rain, through the deep void.' The second reason for thinking that atoms swerve is that a random atomic motion is needed to preserve human freedom and 'break the bonds of fate,' as Lucretius says. If the laws of atomic motion are deterministic, then the past positions of the atoms in the universe, plus these laws, determine everything that will occur, including human action. Cicero reports that Epicurus worries that, if it has been true from eternity that, e.g., "Milo will wrestle tomorrow," then presently deliberating about whether to make it true or false would be idle.

iii. Sensible Qualities

The third difference between Epicurus and Democritus has to do with their attitudes toward the reality of sensible properties. Democritus thinks that, in reality, only atoms and the void exist, and that sensible qualities such as sweetness, whiteness, and the like exist only 'by convention.' It is controversial exactly how to understand Democritus' position, but most likely he is asserting that atoms themselves have no sensible qualities-they are simply extended bits of stuff. The sensible qualities that we think bodies have, like sweetness, are not really in the object at all, but are simply subjective states of the percipient's awareness produced by the interaction of bodies with our sense-organs. This is shown, thinks Democritus, by the fact that the same body appears differently to different percipients depending on their bodily constitution, e.g., that a 'white' body appears yellow to somebody with jaundice, or that honey tastes bitter to an ill person. From this, Democritus derives skeptical conclusions. He is pessimistic about our ability to gain any knowledge about the world on the basis of our senses, since they systematically deceive us about the way the world is.

Epicurus wants to resist these pessimistic conclusions. He argues that properties like sweetness, whiteness, and such do not exist at the atomic level-individual atoms are not sweet or white-but that these properties are nonetheless real. These are properties of macroscopic bodies, but the possession of these properties by macroscopic bodies are explicable in terms of the properties of and relations amongst the individual atoms that make up bodies. Epicurus thinks that bodies have the capability to cause us to have certain types of experiences because of their atomic structure, and that such capabilities are real properties of the bodies. Similar considerations apply for properties like "being healthy," "being deadly," and "being enslaved." They are real, but can only apply to groups of atoms (like people), not individual atoms. And these sorts of properties are also relational properties, not intrinsic ones. For example, cyanide is deadly-not deadly per se, but deadly for human beings (and perhaps for other types of organisms). Nonetheless, its deadliness for us is still a real property of the cyanide, albeit a relational one.

d. Mechanistic Explanations of Natural Phenomena

One important aspect of Epicurus' philosophy is his desire to replace teleological (goal-based) explanations of natural phenomena with mechanistic ones. His main target is mythological explanations of meteorological occurrences and the like in terms of the will of the gods. Because Epicurus wishes to banish the fear of the gods, he insists that occurrences like earthquakes and lightning can be explained entirely in atomic terms and are not due to the will of the gods. Epicurus is also against the intrinsic teleology of philosophers like Aristotle. Teeth appear to be well-designed for the purpose of chewing. Aristotle thinks that this apparent purposiveness in nature cannot be eliminated, and that the functioning of the parts of organisms must be explained by appealing to how they contribute to the functioning of the organism as a whole. Other philosophers, such as the Stoics, took this apparent design as evidence for the intelligence and benevolence of God. Epicurus, however, following Empedocles, tries to explain away this apparent purposiveness in nature in a proto-Darwinian way, as the result of a process of natural selection.

e. The Gods

Because of its denial of divine providence, Epicureanism was often charged in antiquity with being a godless philosophy, although Epicurus and his followers denied the charge. The main upshot of Epicurean theology is certainly negative, however. Epicurus' mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena are supposed to displace explanations that appeal to the will of the gods. In addition, Epicurus is one of the earliest philosophers we know of to have raised the Problem of Evil, arguing against the notion that the world is under the providential care of a loving deity by pointing out the manifold suffering in the world.

Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these gods are quite different from the popular conception of gods. We have a conception of the gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy beings. Troubling oneself about the miseries of the world, or trying to administer the world, would be inconsistent with a life of tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no concern for us. In fact, they are unaware of our existence, and live eternally in the intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to emulate, but whose wrath we need not fear.

Ancient critics thought the Epicurean gods were a thin smoke-screen to hide Epicurus' atheism, and difficulties with a literal interpretation of Epicurus' sayings on the nature of the gods (for instance, it appears inconsistent with Epicurus' atomic theory to hold that any compound body, even a god, could be immortal) have led some scholars to conjecture that Epicurus' 'gods' are thought-constructs, and exist only in human minds as idealizations, i.e., the gods exist, but only as projections of what the most blessed life would be.

f. Philosophy of Mind

Epicurus is one of the first philosophers to put forward an Identity Theory of Mind. In modern versions of the identity theory, the mind is identified with the brain, and mental processes are identified with neural processes. Epicurus' physiology is quite different; the mind is identified as an organ that resides in the chest, since the common Greek view was that the chest, not the head, is the seat of the emotions. However, the underlying idea is quite similar. (Note: not all commentators accept that Epicurus' theory is actually an Identity Theory.)

The main point that Epicurus wants to establish is that the mind is something bodily. The mind must be a body, thinks Epicurus, because of its ability to interact with the body. The mind is affected by the body, as vision, drunkenness, and disease show. Likewise, the mind affects the body, as our ability to move our limbs when we want to and the physiological effects of emotional states show. Only bodies can interact with other bodies, so the mind must be a body. Epicurus says that the mind cannot be something incorporeal, as Plato thinks, since the only thing that is not a body is void, which is simply empty space and cannot act or be acted upon.

The mind, then, is an organ in the body, and mental processes are identified with atomic processes. The mind is composed of four different types of particles-fire, air, wind, and the "nameless element," which surpasses the other particles in its fineness. Although Epicurus is reticent about the details, some features of the mind are accounted for in terms of the features of these atoms-for instance, the mind is able to be moved a great deal by the impact of an image (which is something quite flimsy), because of the smallness of the particles that make up the mind. The mind proper, which is primarily responsible for sensation and thought, is located in the chest, but Epicurus thinks that there is also a 'spirit,' spread throughout the rest of the body, which allows the mind to communicate with it. The mind and spirit play roles very similar to those of the central and peripheral nervous systems in modern theory.

One important result of Epicurus' philosophy of mind is that death is annihilation. The mind is able to engage in the motions of sensation and thought only when it is housed in the body and the atoms that make it up are properly arranged. Upon death, says Epicurus, the container of the body shatters, and the atoms disperse in the air. The atoms are eternal, but the mind made up of these atoms is not, just as other compound bodies cease to exist when the atoms that make them up disperse.

g. Perception

Epicurus explains perception in terms of the interaction of atoms with the sense-organs. Objects continually throw off one-atom-thick layers, like the skin peeling off of an onion. These images, or "eidola," fly through the air and bang into one's eyes, from which one learns about the properties of the objects that threw off these eidola. This explains vision. Other senses are analyzed in similar terms; e.g., the soothing action of smooth atoms on the tongue causes the sensation of sweetness. As noted above, Epicurus maintains that such sensible qualities are real qualities of bodies.

4. Epistemology

a. The Canon: Sensations, Preconceptions, and Feelings

Epicurus' epistemology is resolutely empiricist and anti-skeptical. All of our knowledge ultimately comes from the senses, thinks Epicurus, and we can trust the senses, when properly used. Epicurus' epistemology was contained in his work the 'Canon,' or 'measuring stick,' which is lost, so many of the details of his views are unavailable to us.

Epicurus says that there are three criteria of truth: sensations, 'preconceptions,' and feelings. Sensations give us information about the external world, and we can test the judgments based upon sensations against further sensations; e.g., a provisional judgment that a tower is round, based upon sensation, can be tested against later sensations to be corroborated or disproved. Epicurus says that all sensations give us information about the world, but that sensation itself is never in error, since sensation is a purely passive, mechanical reception of images and the like by sense-organs, and the senses themselves do not make judgments 'that' the world is this way or that. Instead, error enters in when we make judgments about the world based upon the information received through the senses.

Epicurus thinks that, in order to make judgments about the world, or even to start any inquiry whatsoever, we must already be in possession of certain basic concepts, which stand in need of no further proof or definition, on pain of entering into an infinite regress. This concern is similar to the Paradox of Inquiry explored by Plato in the Meno, that one must already know about something in order to be able to inquire about it. However, instead of postulating that our immaterial souls had acquaintance with transcendent Forms in a pre-natal existence, as Plato does, Epicurus thinks that we have certain 'preconceptions'-concepts such as 'body,' 'person,' 'usefulness,' and 'truth'-which are formed in our (material) minds as the result of repeated sense-experiences of similar objects. Further ideas are formed by processes of analogy or similarity or by compounding these basic concepts. Thus, all ideas are ultimately formed on the basis of sense-experience.

Feelings of pleasure and pain form the basic criteria for what is to be sought and avoided.

b. Anti-skeptical Arguments

Epicurus is concerned to refute the skeptical tendencies of Democritus, whose metaphysics and theory of perception were similar to Epicurus'. At least three separate anti-skeptical arguments are given by Epicureans:

i. The "Lazy Argument"

Epicurus says that it is impossible to live as a skeptic. If a person really were to believe that he knows nothing, then he would have no reason to engage in one course of action instead of another. Thus, the consistent skeptic would engage in no action whatsoever, and would die.

ii. The Self-refutation Argument

If a skeptic claims that nothing can be known, then one should ask whether he knows that nothing can be known. If he says 'yes,' then he is contradicting himself. If he doesn't say yes, then he isn't making a claim, and we don't need to listen to him.

iii. The Argument from Concept-formation

If the skeptic says that nothing can be known, or that we cannot know the truth, we can ask him where he gets his knowledge of concepts such as 'knowledge' and 'truth.' If the senses cannot be relied on, as the skeptic claims, then he is not entitled to use concepts such as 'knowledge' and 'truth' in formulating his thesis, since such concepts derive from the senses.

5. Ethics

Epicurus' ethics is a form of egoistic hedonism; i.e., he says that the only thing that is intrinsically valuable is one's own pleasure; anything else that has value is valuable merely as a means to securing pleasure for oneself. However, Epicurus has a sophisticated and idiosyncratic view of the nature of pleasure, which leads him to recommend a virtuous, moderately ascetic life as the best means to securing pleasure. This contrasts Epicurus strongly with the Cyrenaics, a group of ancient hedonists who better fit the stereotype of hedonists as recommending a policy of "eat, drink, and be merry."

a. Hedonism, Psychological and Ethical

Epicurus' ethics starts from the Aristotelian commonplace that the highest good is what is valued for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else, and Epicurus agrees with Aristotle that happiness is the highest good. However, he disagrees with Aristotle by identifying happiness with pleasure. Epicurus gives two reasons for this. The main reason is that pleasure is the only thing that people do, as a matter of fact, value for its own sake; that is, Epicurus' ethical hedonism is based upon his psychological hedonism. Everything we do, claims Epicurus, we do for the sake ultimately of gaining pleasure for ourselves. This is supposedly confirmed by observing the behavior of infants, who, it is claimed, instinctively pursue pleasure and shun pain. This is also true of adults, thinks Epicurus, but in adults it is more difficult to see that this is true, since adults have much more complicated beliefs about what will bring them pleasure. But the Epicureans did spend a great deal of energy trying to make plausible the contention that all activity, even apparently self-sacrificing activity or activity done solely for the sake of virtue or what is noble, is in fact directed toward obtaining pleasure for oneself.

The second proof, which fits in well with Epicurus' empiricism, supposedly lies in one's introspective experience. One immediately perceives that pleasure is good and that pain is bad, in the same way that one immediately perceives that fire is hot; no further argument is needed to show the goodness of pleasure or the badness of pain. (Of course, this does not establish Epicurus' further contention that only pleasure is intrinsically valuable and only pain is intrinsically bad.)

Although all pleasures are good and all pains evil, Epicurus says that not all pleasures are choiceworthy or all pains to be avoided. Instead, one should calculate what is in one's long-term self-interest, and forgo what will bring pleasure in the short-term if doing so will ultimately lead to greater pleasure in the long-term.

b. Types of Pleasure

For Epicurus, pleasure is tied closely to satisfying one's desires. He distinguishes between two different types of pleasure: 'moving' pleasures and 'static' pleasures. 'Moving' pleasures occur when one is in the process of satisfying a desire, e.g., eating a hamburger when one is hungry. These pleasures involve an active titillation of the senses, and these feelings are what most people call 'pleasure.' However, Epicurus says that after one's desires have been satisfied, (e.g., when one is full after eating), the state of satiety, of no longer being in need or want, is itself pleasurable. Epicurus calls this a 'static' pleasure, and says that these static pleasures are the best pleasures.

Because of this, Epicurus denies that there is any intermediate state between pleasure and pain. When one has unfulfilled desires, this is painful, and when one no longer has unfulfilled desires, this steady state is the most pleasurable of all, not merely some intermediate state between pleasure and pain.

Epicurus also distinguishes between physical and mental pleasures and pains. Physical pleasures and pains concern only the present, whereas mental pleasures and pains also encompass the past (fond memories of past pleasure or regret over past pain or mistakes) and the future (confidence or fear about what will occur). The greatest destroyer of happiness, thinks Epicurus, is anxiety about the future, especially fear of the gods and fear of death. If one can banish fear about the future, and face the future with confidence that one's desires will be satisfied, then one will attain tranquility (ataraxia), the most exalted state. In fact, given Epicurus' conception of pleasure, it might be less misleading to call him a 'tranquillist' instead of a 'hedonist.'

c. Types of Desire

Because of the close connection of pleasure with desire-satisfaction, Epicurus devotes a considerable part of his ethics to analyzing different kinds of desires. If pleasure results from getting what you want (desire-satisfaction) and pain from not getting what you want (desire-frustration), then there are two strategies you can pursue with respect to any given desire: you can either strive to fulfill the desire, or you can try to eliminate the desire. For the most part Epicurus advocates the second strategy, that of paring your desires down to a minimum core, which are then easily satisfied.

Epicurus distinguishes between three types of desires: natural and necessary desires, natural but non-necessary desires, and "vain and empty" desires. Examples of natural and necessary desires include the desires for food, shelter, and the like. Epicurus thinks that these desires are easy to satisfy, difficult to eliminate (they are 'hard-wired' into human beings naturally), and bring great pleasure when satisfied. Furthermore, they are necessary for life, and they are naturally limited: that is, if one is hungry, it only takes a limited amount of food to fill the stomach, after which the desire is satisfied. Epicurus says that one should try to fulfill these desires.

Vain desires include desires for power, wealth, fame, and the like. They are difficult to satisfy, in part because they have no natural limit. If one desires wealth or power, no matter how much one gets, it is always possible to get more, and the more one gets, the more one wants. These desires are not natural to human beings, but inculcated by society and by false beliefs about what we need; e.g., believing that having power will bring us security from others. Epicurus thinks that these desires should be eliminated.

An example of a natural but non-necessary desire is the desire for luxury food. Although food is needed for survival, one does not need a particular type of food to survive. Thus, despite his hedonism, Epicurus advocates a surprisingly ascetic way of life. Although one shouldn't spurn extravagant foods if they happen to be available, becoming dependent on such goods ultimately leads to unhappiness. As Epicurus puts it, "If you wish to make Pythocles wealthy, don't give him more money; rather, reduce his desires." By eliminating the pain caused by unfulfilled desires, and the anxiety that occurs because of the fear that one's desires will not be fulfilled in the future, the wise Epicurean attains tranquility, and thus happiness.

d. The Virtues

Epicurus' hedonism was widely denounced in the ancient world as undermining traditional morality. Epicurus, however, insists that courage, moderation, and the other virtues are needed in order to attain happiness. However, the virtues for Epicurus are all purely instrumental goods-that is, they are valuable solely for the sake of the happiness that they can bring oneself, not for their own sake. Epicurus says that all of the virtues are ultimately forms of prudence, of calculating what is in one's own best interest. In this, Epicurus goes against the majority of Greek ethical theorists, such as the Stoics, who identify happiness with virtue, and Aristotle, who identifies happiness with a life of virtuous activity. Epicurus thinks that natural science and philosophy itself also are instrumental goods. Natural science is needed in order to give mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena and thus dispel the fear of the gods, while philosophy helps to show us the natural limits of our desires and to dispel the fear of death.

e. Justice

Epicurus is one of the first philosophers to give a well-developed contractarian theory of justice. Epicurus says that justice is an agreement "neither to harm nor be harmed," and that we have a preconception of justice as "what is useful in mutual associations." People enter into communities in order to gain protection from the dangers of the wild, and agreements concerning the behavior of the members of the community are needed in order for these communities to function, e.g., prohibitions of murder, regulations concerning the killing and eating of animals, and so on. Justice exists only where there are such agreements.

Like the virtues, justice is valued entirely on instrumental grounds, because of its utility for each of the members of society. Epicurus says that the main reason not to be unjust is that one will be punished if one gets caught, and that even if one does not get caught, the fear of being caught will still cause pain. However, he adds that the fear of punishment is needed mainly to keep fools in line, who otherwise would kill, steal, etc. The Epicurean wise man recognizes the usefulness of the laws, and since he does not desire great wealth, luxury goods, political power, or the like, he sees that he has no reason to engage in the conduct prohibited by the laws in any case.

Although justice only exists where there is an agreement about how to behave, that does not make justice entirely 'conventional,' if by 'conventional' we mean that any behavior dictated by the laws of a particular society is thereby just, and that the laws of a particular society are just for that society. Since the 'justice contract' is entered into for the purpose of securing what is useful for the members of the society, only laws that are actually useful are just. Thus, a prohibition of murder would be just, but antimiscegenation laws would not. Since what is useful can vary from place to place and time to time, what laws are just can likewise vary.

f. Friendship

Epicurus values friendship highly and praises it in quite extravagant terms. He says that friendship "dances around the world" telling us that we must "wake to blessedness." He also says that the wise man is sometimes willing to die for a friend. Because of this, some scholars have thought that in this area, at least, Epicurus abandons his egoistic hedonism and advocates altruism toward friends. This is not clear, however. Epicurus consistently maintains that friendship is valuable because it is one of the greatest means of attaining pleasure. Friends, he says, are able to provide one another the greatest security, whereas a life without friends is solitary and beset with perils. In order for there to be friendship, Epicurus says, there must be trust between friends, and friends have to treat each other as well as they treat themselves. The communities of Epicureans can be seen as embodying these ideals, and these are ideals that ultimately promote ataraxia.

g. Death

One of the greatest fears that Epicurus tries to combat is the fear of death. Epicurus thinks that this fear is often based upon anxiety about having an unpleasant afterlife; this anxiety, he thinks, should be dispelled once one realizes that death is annihilation, because the mind is a group of atoms that disperses upon death.

i. The No Subject of Harm Argument

If death is annihilation, says Epicurus, then it is 'nothing to us.' Epicurus' main argument for why death is not bad is contained in the Letter to Menoeceus and can be dubbed the 'no subject of harm' argument. If death is bad, for whom is it bad? Not for the living, since they're not dead, and not for the dead, since they don't exist. His argument can be set out as follows:

1. Death is annihilation.

2. The living have not yet been annihilated (otherwise they wouldn't be alive).

3. Death does not affect the living. (from 1 and 2)

4. So, death is not bad for the living. (from 3)

5. For something to be bad for somebody, that person has to exist, at least.

6. The dead do not exist. (from 1)

7. Therefore, death is not bad for the dead. (from 5 and 6)

8. Therefore death is bad for neither the living nor the dead. (from 4 and 7)

Epicurus adds that if death causes you no pain when you're dead, it's foolish to allow the fear of it to cause you pain now.

ii. The Symmetry Argument

A second Epicurean argument against the fear of death, the so-called 'symmetry argument,' is recorded by the Epicurean poet Lucretius. He says that anyone who fears death should consider the time before he was born. The past infinity of pre-natal non-existence is like the future infinity of post-mortem non-existence; it is as though nature has put up a mirror to let us see what our future non-existence will be like. But we do not consider not having existed for an eternity before our births to be a terrible thing; therefore, neither should we think not existing for an eternity after our deaths to be evil.

6. References and Further Reading

This is not meant as comprehensive bibliography; rather, it's a selection of further texts to read for those who want to learn more about Epicurus and Epicureanism. Most of the books listed below have extensive bibliographies for those looking for more specialized and scholarly publications.

a. Collections of Primary Source

The Epicurus Reader, translated and edited by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hackett Publishing.
This inexpensive collection has most of the major extant writings of Epicurus, in addition to other ancient sources such as Cicero and Plutarch who wrote about Epicureanism. (Lucretius is not included much.) However, there is little commentary or explication of the material, and some of the primary sources are fairly opaque.

The Hellenistic philosophers, Volume 1: translations of the principal sources, with philosophical commentary, by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, Cambridge University Press.
This excellent book organizes the texts into sections topically, (e.g., "Atoms," "Soul," "Language," "Death,") and follows each selection of texts with commentary and explication. Vol. 2, which contains the original Greek and Latin texts, has a fine, if somewhat dated (1987) bibliography at the end.Lucretius, De Rerum Natura

There are many different editions of Lucretius' masterpiece, an extended exposition of Epicurus' metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and natural science. I personally like the translation by Rolfe Humphries: Lucretius: The Way Things Are. The De Rerum Natura of Titus Lucretius Carus, Indiana University Press. Humphries translates Lucretius' poem as a poem, not as prose, yet the translation is still very clear and readable.

b. Recent Books on Particular Areas of Epicurus' Philosophy

The books below are all well-written and influential. They deal in-depth with problems of interpreting particular areas of Epicurus' philosophy, while still remaining, for the most part, accessible to well-educated general readers. They also have extensive bibliographies. However, do not assume that the interpretations of Epicurus in these books are always widely accepted.

Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, by Julia Annas, University of California Press.
This book deals with Epicurean and Stoic theories of what the mind is.

Epicurus' Ethical Theory : The Pleasures of Invulnerability, by Phillip Mitsis, Cornell University Press.
This book is concerned with all of the major areas of Epicurean ethics, from pleasure, to friendship, justice, and human freedom. Mitsis is especially good at showing how Epicurus' conception of pleasure differs from that of the utilitarians.

The Morality of Happiness, by Julia Annas, Oxford University Press.
This book focuses deals with all major ancient theorists from Aristotle on, but is still a good source of information on Epicurean ethics, especially if one wants to put Epicurean ethics in the context of other ancient ethical theories.

Epicurus' Scientific Method, by Elizabeth Asmis, Cornell University Press.
The best book-length treatment of Epicurus' epistemology available. A little more technical than the books above, but still fairly accessible.

Author Information

Tim O'Keefe
Email: see web page
Georgia State University
U. S. A.

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Epicurus is one of the major philosophers in the Hellenistic period, the three centuries following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C.E. (and of Aristotle in 322 B.C.E.). Epicurus developed an unsparingly materialistic metaphysics, empiricist epistemology, and hedonistic ethics.

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Zen Master Dōgen Zenji: Four Lessons About Genuine Enlightenment | Zen Quotes

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The theologian, philosopher, and mathematician Nicholas of Cusa, also known as Nicholas Kryfts or Krebs, was born at Kues on the Moselle River between Trier and Koblenz. After attending the school of the Brothers of the Common Life in Deventer, Holland, he studied philosophy at Heidelberg (1416), canon law at Padua (14171423), and theology at Cologne (1425). Nicholas received a doctorate in canon law in 1423. About 1426 he gave legal assistance to Cardinal Orsini, papal legate to Germany. At about the same time began his lifelong interest in collecting classical and medieval manuscripts. Among his notable discoveries were twelve lost comedies of Plautus. He took an active part in the Council of Basel, first as a lawyer of Count von Manderscheid and later as a member of the deputation De Fide. Nicholas's De Concordantia Catholica, a vast program for reform of the church and the empire, supported the conciliar theory of the supremacy of the council over the pope. Later, disillusioned by the council's failure to reform the church, he abandoned the conciliar theory and supported the papal cause.

Nicholas carried out several missions for the pope in an effort to unify and reform the church. He was a member of the commission sent to Constantinople to negotiate with the Eastern church for reunion with Rome, which was temporarily effected at the Council of Florence (1439). In 1450 Nicholas was sent to Germany as a legate to carry out church reforms. He was created a cardinal in 1448 and appointed bishop of Brixen (Bressanone) in 1450. He died in Todi, Umbria.

Knowledge

According to Nicholas, a man is wise only if he is aware of the limits of the mind in knowing the truth. Knowledge is learned ignorance ( docta ignorantia ). Endowed with a natural desire for truth, humans seek it through rational inquiry, which is a movement of the reason from something presupposed as certain to a conclusion that is still in doubt. Reasoning involves a relating or comparing of conclusion with premises. The greater the distance between them, the more difficult and uncertain is the conclusion. If the distance is infinite, the mind never reaches its goal, for there is no relation or proportion between the finite and infinite. Hence, the mind cannot know the infinite. The infinite is an absolute, and the absolute cannot be known by means of relations or comparisons.

Accordingly, the mind cannot comprehend the infinite God. By rational investigation we can draw ever nearer to him but cannot reach him. The case is the same with any truth, for every truth is an absolute, not admitting of degrees. Since reason proceeds by steps, relating conclusion to premises, it is relational and hence never arrives at absolute truth. According to Nicholas, "our intellect, which is not the truth, never grasps the truth with such precision that it could not be comprehended with infinitely greater precision" ( De Docta Ignorantia I, 3). As a polygon inscribed in a circle increases in number of sides but never becomes a circle, so the mind approximates to truth but never coincides with it.

Thus, knowledge at best is conjecture ( coniectura ). This is no mere guess or supposition that may or may not be true; it is an assertion that is true as far as it goes, although it does not completely measure up to its object. Reason is like an eye that looks at a face from different and even from opposite positions. Each view of the face is true, but it is partial and relative. No one view, nor all taken together, coincides with the face. Similarly, human reason knows a simple and indivisible truth piecemeal and through opposing views, with the result that it never adequately measures up to it.

The weakness of human reason was evident to Nicholas because its primary rule is the principle of noncontradiction, which states that contradictories cannot be simultaneously true of the same object. He insisted that there is a "coincidence of opposites" ( coincidentia oppositorum ) in reality, especially in the infinite God. He criticized the Aristotelians for insisting on the principle of noncontradiction and stubbornly refusing to admit the compatibility of contradictories in reality. It takes almost a miracle, he complained, to get them to admit this; and yet without this admission the ascent of mystical theology is impossible.

Nicholas preferred the Neoplatonists to the Aristotelian philosophers because they recognized in humans a power of knowing superior to reason which they called intellect ( intellectus ). This was a faculty of intuition or intelligence by which we rise above the principle of noncontradiction and see the unity and coincidence of opposites in reality. He found this faculty best described and most fruitfully cultivated by the Christian Neoplatonists, especially St. Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, St. Anselm, the School of Chartres, St. Bonaventure, and Meister Eckhart. Following their tradition, he constantly strove to see unity and simplicity where the Aristotelians could see only plurality and contradiction. He frequently expressed his views in symbols and analogies, often mathematical in character, because the rational language of demonstration is appropriate to the processes of reason but not to the simple views of the intellect.

God

Nicholas was most concerned with showing the coincidence of opposites in God. God is the absolute maximum or infinite being, in the sense that he has the fullness of perfection. There is nothing outside him to oppose him or to limit him. He is the all. He is also the maximum, but not in the sense of the supreme degree in a series. As infinite being he does not enter into relation or proportion with finite beings. As the absolute, he excludes all degrees. If we say he is the maximum, we can also say he is the minimum. He is at once all extremes, the absolute maximum as well as the absolute minimum. In short, in God, the infinite being, all opposition is reconciled in perfect unity.

The coincidence of the maximum and minimum in infinity is illustrated by mathematical figures. For example, imagine a circle with a finite diameter. As the size of the circle is increased, the curvature of the circumference decreases. When the diameter is infinite, the circumference is an absolutely straight line. Thus, in infinity the maximum of straightness is identical with the minimum of curvature. Or, to put it another way, an infinite circle is identical with a straight line.

Nicholas offered several a priori proofs for the existence of the absolute maximum, or God. The first argued that the finite is inconceivable without the infinite. What is finite and limited has a beginning and an end, so that there must be a being to which it owes its existence and in which it will have its end. This being is either finite or infinite. If it is finite, then it has its beginning and end in another being. This leads either to an infinite series of actually existing finite beings, which is impossible, or to an infinite being which is the beginning and end of all finite beings. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary that there be an infinite being, or absolute maximum.

The second proof argued that the absolute truth about the absolute maximum can be stated in three propositions: It either is or is not. It is and it is not. It neither is nor is not. These exhaust all the possibilities, so that one of them must be the absolute truth. Hence there is an absolute truth, and this is what is meant by the absolute maximum.

As the absolute maximum, God contains all things; he is their "enfolding" ( complicatio ). He is also their "unfolding" ( explicatio ) because they come forth from him. Creatures add nothing to the divine reality; they are simply limited and partial appearances of it. As a face reproduces itself more or less perfectly in a number of mirrors, so God reflects himself in various ways in his creatures. In this case, however, there are no mirrors.

God transcends the universe but is also immanent in it, as a face is present in its mirrored images. Each creature is also present in every other, as each image exists in every other. Thus, as Anaxagoras said, everything is in everything else. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz recalled this doctrine of Nicholas's in his Monadology when showing that each monad mirrors every other.

Like all medieval Platonists, Nicholas upheld the reality of universal forms. According to him, the most universal of all created forms is the form of the universe, called the Soul of the World. This form embraces in its unity all lower forms, such as those of genera and species. These lower forms are "contractions" of the form of the universe; they are the universe existing in a limited way. They exist in the universe, and it in turn exists in a limited way in them. Individuals are further contractions of universal formsfor example, Socrates is a contraction of the form of humanity. The universe as a whole is a contraction of the infinite God. Thus, all things exist in a unified manner in the universe, and the universe in turn exists in the unity of God. Oppositions and contradictions that appear on the level of individuals and lower universal forms are reconciled in the unity of the universe and ultimately in the unity of God.

Cosmology

Since the universe mirrors God, it too must be a maximumnot the absolute maximum, to be sure, but the relative maximum, for it contains everything that exists except God. Nicholas denied that the universe is positively infinite; only God, in his view, could be described in these terms. But he asserted that the universe has no circumference and consequently that it is boundless or undetermineda revolutionary notion in cosmology. (See Alexandre Koyr, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, Baltimore, 1957.) Just as the universe has no circumference, said Nicholas, so it has no fixed center. The earth is not at the center of the universe, nor is it absolutely at rest. Like everything else it moves in space with a motion that is not absolute but is relative to the observer.

Nicholas of Cusa's cosmology in some respects broke with the Ptolemaic and Aristotelian cosmological views of the Middle Ages and anticipated those of modern times. He was above all concerned with denying the absolute oppositions in the world of Ptolemy and Aristotle. In Nicholas's world there was no center opposed to its circumference, no maximum movement of the spheres opposed to the fixity of Earth, no movement of bodies in absolutely opposed directions, such as up and down. Nicholas also denied that the heavenly bodies are composed of a substance different from that of sublunar bodies.

Nicholas extended his principle of the coincidence of opposites to religion. In his irenical work On the Peace of Faith, while maintaining the superiority of Christianity over other religions, he tried to reconcile their differences. Beneath their oppositions and contradictions he believed there is a fundamental unity and harmony, which, when it is recognized by all, will be the basis of universal peace.

In a century of social, political, and religious unrest, Nicholas revitalized Neoplatonism as the most effective answer to the needs of his time. His thought was firmly rooted in the philosophy of Proclus and Christian medieval Neoplatonism and was opposed to the Aristotelianism that had prevailed in western Europe since the thirteenth century. It was also highly original and expressed in a language abounding in symbolism and paradox. Nicholas of Cusa had many of the traits of the Renaissance person: love of classical antiquity, all-encompassing curiosity, optimism, cultivation of literary style, critical spirit, preoccupation with the individual, and love of mathematics and science. His works were widely read for several centuries, and they influenced the philosophy of the Renaissance and of early modern times.

See also Anaxagoras of Clazomenae; Anselm, St.; Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Augustine, St.; Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus; Bonaventure, St.; Chartres, School of; Eckhart, Meister; Infinity in Theology and Metaphysics; Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm; Medieval Philosophy; Neoplatonism; Platonism and the Platonic Tradition; Proclus; Pseudo-Dionysius; Renaissance; Socrates; Universals, A Historical Survey.

Bibliography

Nicholas's religious-political works are De Concordantia Catholica (14331434); De Pace Fidei (1453); and Cribratio Alchorani (1461).

His theological-philosophical works are De Docta Ignorantia and De Coniecturis (1440); De Deo Abscondito (1444); De Quaerendo Deum (1445); De Genesi (1447); Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae (1449); Idiotae Libri (containing De Sapientia, De Mente, and De Staticis Experimentis ; 1450); De Visione Dei (1453); De Beryllo (1458); De Possest (1460); Tetralogus de Non Aliud (1462); De Venatione Sapientiae (1463); De Ludo Globi (1463); and De Apice Theoriae (1463).

His mathematical-scientific works are De Staticis Experimentis (1450); De Transmutationibus Geometricis (1450); De Mathematicis Complementis (1453); and De Mathematica Perfectione (1458).

Editions of Nicholas's works are Opera (Basel, 1565); Opera, 3 vols. (Paris, 1514; reprinted Frankfurt am Main, 1962); Nicolaus von Cues, Texte seiner philosophischen Schriften, edited by A. Petzelt, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1949); Opera Omnia, 14 vols. (Leipzig and Hamburg, 19321959); and De Pace Fidei, edited by R. Klibansky and H. Bascour (London: Warburg Institute, 1956).

Translations include The Vision of God, translated by E. G. Salter ( New York: Dutton, 1928); The Idiot, translated by W. R. Dennes ( San Francisco, 1940); Of Learned Ignorance, translated by G. Heron (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1954); and Unity and Reform; Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa, edited by J. P. Dolan (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962).

Literature on Nicholas includes P. Duhem, "Nicholas de Cues et Lonard de Vinci." in tudes sur Lonard de Vinci, Vol. II (Paris: Hermann, 1909); E. Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues (Paris: Champion, 1920); P. Rotta, Il cardinale Nicol di Cusa, la vita ed il pensiero (Milan: Societ editrice, "Vita e pensiero," 1928); and Nicol Cusano (Milan: Bocca, 1942); A. Posch, Die "Concordantia Catholica" des Nikolaus von Cusa (Paderborn, 1930); H. Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Methuen, 1932); M. de Gandillac, La philosophie de Nicolas de Cues (Paris: Aubier, ditions Montaigne, 1941); J. Koch, Nikolaus von Cues und seine Umwelt (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1948); P. Mennicken, Nikolaus von Kues (Trier: Cusanus-Verl, 1950); tienne Gilson, Les mtamorphoses de la cit de Dieu (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952); K. H. Volkmann-Schluck, Nicolaus Cusanus (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1957); E. Meuthen, Die letzten Jahre des Nikolaus von Kues (Cologne: Westdeutscher, 1958); G. Santinello, Il pensiero di Nicol Cusano nella sua prospettiva estetica (Padua: Liviana, 1958); G. Heinz-Mohr, Unitas Christiana (Trier, 1958); E. Zellinger, Cusanus-Konkordanz (Munich: Hueber, 1960); P. E. Sigmund, Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963); and Ernst Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Leipzig: Teubner, 1927), translated by Mario Domandi as The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963).

See also Louis Dupre and Nancy Hudson, "Nicholas of Cusa," in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003); Jasper Hopkins, "Nicholas of Cusa (14011464): First Modern Philosopher?" Midwest Studies in Philosophy (26[2002]: 1329; John Longeway, "Nicolas of Cusa and Man's Knowledge of God," Philosophy Research Archives (13[19871988]: 289313.
Armand A. Maurer (1967) Bibliography updated by Tamra Frei (2005)

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Nicholas of Cusa >The German prelate and humanist Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) was active in >conciliating various schisms in the 15th-century Church and was a strong >advocate of Church unity.

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Zizek: The paradox that Marx didn't see, but Lacan got it - the Object of Desire

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Dear Sofia,

I can remember we were talking about half-learning. In-between. This also brought me to the liminal space (see post 1). We also talked about Zizek (post 2). How he constantly talks about the ungraspable of the Real. How we live in a symbolic structure and how there’s always something that doesn’t fit in. That thing is the non-representable. Where we would lose ourselves because we also need a structure to live form. This is the paradox. You could see that Camus is seeing also the Absurd as the paradox (see post 3). We want to know the sense of life but we will never know if there is a sense at all. I also recommended you Cusanus (post 4). Here you also see the paradox. The moment we stumble on the limits of our knowledge to know more, things turn over in less knowledge,  because we see the unlimited in the limited. Maybe it might be interesting for you to see how you interest of retrofuturism relates to Zizek (see post 5). The Zen Philosopher Dogen believed we are already there but not knowing it because we known (thinking) too much (post 6). We also discussed Lacan and Girard in relation to desire (see post 7 and 8). It might also be interesting to include Epicurus in relation to the problem of desire (post 9). In the paradox is confusion.

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places people will bes and has beens

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openness of the desert
tremor of a push that reverberates into nothing

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Moonrise, Hernandez, New Mexico - Wikipedia

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Retrofuturism

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Agnes Pelton, Winter, 1933

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Summer Wagner

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Pollypocket

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Female Pentimento - over the grass hung smog

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Vogue Singapore March issue: Roots

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Max Slobodda, Stranger things

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Duane Michals, mother after father died, 1969

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δεν θέλω να ξέρουν 

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Googie: architecture of the space age

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Iris Van Herpen, Hypnosis AW 19/20

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Duane Michals: The Illuminated Man, 1968

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#AnnaTsing#TheMushroomAtTheEndOfTheWorld#2019

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#02 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing: The mushroom at the end of the world by Spoken Earth: The environment podcast

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In the second episode of Spoken Earth, Adam Weymouth speaks with Professor Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing about her book The Mushroom at the End of the World, and how the matsutake mushroom can help us to see ourselves in another light. A professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Tsing's latest book takes the matsutake mushroom as its subject, a luxury product traded for vast sums in Japan, but one that refuses to be cultivated. It thrives best where old growth forest has been logged, and Tsing explores these landscapes, in particular in the Pacific Northwest. Here, she discovers various migrants and others characters making a living from the crop in these ruined landscapes, and the sprawling networks of global supply chains that refuse to be standardised. By examining the webs that hold all these different elements in place, she suggests a new way to conceive of nature. Not as something external, on a one way trajectory towards decay, but as a messy network of both ruin and flourishing, with people very much entangled within it.

Podcast by Lacuna Magazine www.lacuna.org.uk

Interviewer: Adam Weymouth www.adamweymouth.com
Producer and musician: Ulli Mattsson www.ullimattsson.com

Further reading:
Prof Anna Tsing https://anthro.ucsc.edu/faculty/academic-personnel/index.php
The Mushroom at the end of the World https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691178325/the-mushroom-at-the-end-of-the-world 
The New Wild, an essay by Anna Tsing https://www.littletoller.co.uk/the-clearing/the-new-wild-by-anna-tsing/
Feral atlas http://anthropocene.au.dk/feral-atlas/
Satoyama https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/greetings-from-satoyama
John the Poacher https://www.esquire.com/uk/food-drink/a15768/john-the-poacher-east-london-foraging/

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#DonnaHaraway#Cyborg

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For writer, professor, and self-proclaimed cyborg Donna Haraway, we are already assimilated.

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#SylviaPlath#Poem#Poetry#Death

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#MaxSlobodda#Otherworldly#Futuristic

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"Man expects a logical explanation for everything he sees in this world. If there's not an immediate explanation, he is forced to grapple with perception, question his beliefs, and form his own conclusion about what he has perceived. It is extremely difficult for man to accept the idea that there are still unanswered questions in this world.

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#Dream#Luminal#InBetween

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Αθήνα κάποτε τον Ιανουάριο 2023 

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#Rooftops

δεν ξέρω τι είναι τόσο θελκτικο σε αυτές τις εικόνες από άναρχες ταράτσες με ηλεκτρικές απολήξεις και γιατί τις αγαπώ τόσο πηγαία τόσο αινιγματικά τόσο τόσο τόσο σπίτι σπίτι σπίτι τίποτα πιο ελπιδοφόρο

I don't know what's so appealing about these images of anarchic rooftops with electrical outlets and why I love them so goofy so enigmatic so so so home home home nothing more hopeful

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#Planet#LightPlanet

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απόγευμα στο αστικό Αθήνα 

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Argos, December 2022, home, mine (mom? dad?_)

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#Athens#Greece

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Jos de Mul: West versus East vision on Robotics. Japanese Shinto

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Jos de Mul: West versus East vision on Robotics. Japanese Shinto

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#JosDeMul#Robotics#Shinto#Android

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Now that robots no longer can only be found in factories, but have started to enter the social world (e.g. as care robots) and are being used as military weapons (e.g flying robots known as drones), the latent fear for robots in the Western world increasingly invades the headlines of the newspapers and magazines. In 2016, University of Oxford associate professor Michael Osborne predicted that robots will pick up 50 percent of current jobs within the next twenty years.[2] Scientists warn about the development of fully 'autonomous drones', which select and destroy targets without interference by humans.[3] And in January 2015 dozens of leading experts - including the famous physicist Stephen Hawking, entrepreneur Elon Musk, co-founder of DeepMind Demis Hassabis,, Director of Future of Humanity Institute Nick Bostrom, Google's director of research Peter Norvig, and Harvard professor of computer science David Parkes - have signed an open letter calling for researchers to take care to avoid potential "pitfalls" of Artificial Intelligence.[4] In a BBC interview Stephan Hawking even warned that superior artificial intelligences could end mankind.[5]

Whoever believed that these developments will take their time, was startled by the news that in 2014, for the first time in history, an artificial intelligence passed the Turing test.[6] This test should determine whether an artificial intelligence can be distinguished from natural (human) intelligence. The test was designed in 1950 by Alan Turing (1912-1954), the brilliant mathematician who invented the programmable computer.[7] He was also one of the pioneers in the domain of Artificial Intelligence (AI)[8], and the one who cracked the secret Enigma code of the Nazis.[9]

In 2014, the last mentioned achievement was the subject of the movie The Imitation Game (2014). However, this movie was not the only recent movie in which Turing's "imitation game", also known as the Turing Test, appears. The test plays a major role in three science fiction films that were released around the same time: Her (2013), Ex Machina (2015) and Uncanny (2015). Each of these films deals with a love affair between a human being and a more or less human-looking (that is: android) robot. In each movie, the main philosophical theme is Turing's question whether it is possible to distinguish the intelligence of an android robot from a human being, and each time it runs poorly if not tragically for the human protagonist.
The Turing Test
Before analyzing the three movies, let me first say a few words about the Turing Test. In his 1950 paper 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', Turing starts by remarking that the question 'Can machines think?' is very difficult to answer, because there is not much agreement among philosophers about what the word 'thinking' exactly means.[10] Moreover, we have no access to the 'inner ' of the computer. That applies, according to Turing, to human beings as well. After all, we can neither 'look in the head' of our fellow humans to determine whether there is some intelligent spirit or consciousness active. According Turing, for that reason it is better to look at the behavior of the machine in order to determinate if it is intelligent.

Turing describes an ' imitation Game ' for three players, where a man and a woman are in one room, and an interrogator in another room. They communicate via notes. The interrogator has formulate questions that will help him (or her) to find out who of the two persons is the woman. The woman must answer all questions correctly, the man must try to deceive the questioner. In the 1950 version of the imitation game Turing replaces the man by an intelligent machine, pretending that it is the woman. In a later version, often referred to as the standard version, the man and woman are replaced by a human and a computer. The task now is to determine who is the human being and 'who' the machine. The human has to assist the interrogator, the 'intelligent machine' (actually a chatbot, a software program) has to try to deceive the interrogator. In this case the communication takes place through a teleprinter. In order to pass the test, the intelligent machine - that is the computer program it runs - has to be able to convince at least 30% of the interrogators for at least 5 minutes that it is the human being. Turing predicted that it would take 50 years before a machine would be able to pass the test, that is: in the year 2000. As we saw, the prediction was not that bad: in 2014 the first computer program passed the test.

The Turing test is not uncontroversial. Is being able to conduct a conversation not a far too narrow conception of human intelligence? Turing also observes that the best way to make an intelligent machine would be to build a complete human being, with senses and limbs, who could explore the world, and learn from his experiences. But even is such an artificial human being would be realized - which, according to Turing in his 1948 paper 'Intelligent Machinery' was not very realistic, because of the sheer size of the 'artificial brains' - "the creature would still have no contact with food, sex, sport and many other things of interest to the human being".[11]

The most fundamental criticism one can bring forth against the Turing test is that in the test it's not so much about testing intelligence, but rather about generating the illusion of it, that is, arousing in the interrogator the feeling that he or she is dealing with a human being. Is it therefore that Turing calls the idea of intelligence "emotional rather than mathematical"?[12] After all, deception is already ingrained in The Imitation Game, as it is the task of the computer to deceive the human interrogator.

Seen in this light, the title of the movie about Turing's life - The Imitation Game - is, in spite of the fact that the Turing test plays no role in the movie, well chosen. After the 'intelligent machine' designed by Turing had cracked the Nazis' Enigma code, the British had to deceive the Germans, preventing that they would realize that the enemy knows the code, because in that case they would immediately change it. Turing therefore refused to warn the ship on which the brother of one of his employees was located, for an imminent attack. And this was not the only deadly game in which Turing became trapped. Because was prohibited by law in those years, he was forced to play that he was heterosexual. After being caught, Turing was forced to go to jail or to be chemically castrated. He choose chemical castration, causing the development of female breasts. It was his last 'imitation play'. Only 42 years old, he committed suicide by taking a bite of a poisoned apple in the footsteps of his favorite film - Disney's Snow White (1937). Unfortunately for Turing, there was no prince to awake him from death with a life-giving kiss.

Perhaps the Turing test still fascinates us so much because it is based on ruse and deception. Since 1990 Hugh Loebner organizes an annual competition in which chatbots try to convince a jury that they are human beings. Despite the limited nature of this intelligence test, up to 2014 no chatbot succeeded to deceive the jury. But in that year the Russian chatbot 'Eugene Goosman' succeeded in convincing the jury in more than 30 percent of the tests at least for five minutes - Turing's criterion - that it was a human being. According to critics, that was mainly due to a trick: the chatbot presented itself as a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy, who had learned English only as a second language.[13] The interrogators were in fact deceived by a 'digital dummy'. Some critics were of the opinion that this was unfair and argued that Eugene Goosman did not pass the Turing test.
The Turing test in recent science fiction movies
But maybe the Russians did exactly what the Turing test is all about. Turing might be right in presupposing that the ability to deceive is an important quality of intelligence. At least, it is difficult to escape this impression when one watches the three recent science fiction movies I've already mentioned. In Her, the main theme seems to be self-deception. The film deals with the lonely Theodore, who falls in love with the new talking operating system of his computer (with the voice of Scarlett Johansson), named Samantha. She appears to be a future version of virtual assistants like Siri (Apple) and Cortana (Windows 10). That Theodore falls in love with his operating system seems naive, as he knows that Samantha is just a computer program. However, by now it is a well-established fact that we emotionally attach ourselves to interactive devices, especially when they ask our attention (the Tamagotchi) or give attention to us, think about care robots like Zora, to which the elderly pour out their hearts). That tendency only becomes stronger if we do not know to have an artificial of doing. That happened for example the American psychology professor and Turing test specialist Robert Epstein. In an amusing article in the Scientific American (2007) he describes his amorous correspondence with a Russian lady through a dating site. Only after four months he got suspicious, and he emailed the handsome Ivana: "asdf; kj as; kj I; jkj; j; kasdkljk; klkj KLASDFK; Asjdfkj. With Love, Robert." When Ivana cheerfully sent him another mail about her mother in reply, Epstein finally realized that 'she' actually was a chatbot, and that he was the victim of self-deception and "darned clever programming."[14]

In Ex Machina, the central theme seems to be self-deception, too. In this film, the software programmer Caleb, who works with the search engine Bluebook, is invited by the eccentric founder of the company for a variant on the Turing test with Ava, a beautiful female robot. Ava may possess particularly attractive body shapes (the film is a long masculine fantasy), a transparent part of it clearly shows its mechanical inner. Can Ava convince Caleb that she has real emotions, although he sees that she is a robot? The loving Caleb fails his Turing test: he is seeing blind, and just like Theodore in Her, it runs badly with him. However, the fact that Ava turns out to be an android femme fatale and also kills her creator Nathan, who reigns as a modern Bluebeard over his collection of robotic sex slaves, raises the uncanny question of whether Ava's emotions might be real, and the even uncannier question whether it will be still possible in the future to find out.

The idea that in the future we might no longer be able to distinguish people and robots is the central theme of Uncanny. Just like in Ex Machina in Uncanny one of the characters - in this case the female science journalist Joy (a former artificial intelligence student who dropped out) - is subjected to an emotional Turing test by an evil genius, called David, for a week. Joy is confronted with the male android robot Adam, who in appearance and behavior - he even has a digestive organ - is not distinguishable from a human being. Like in Ex machina, sexual attraction plays a role. Yet Uncanny is also the counterpoint of Ex Machina, because we are dealing here with a male android robot, and the love initiative this time emanates from the robot. When Joy engages in a love affair with David, Adam begins to exhibit obsessive jealous behavior and the Turing test takes a bizarre twist. I don't want to spoil the surprising plot for those who did not see the movie yet, but I can assure you that in this case not only Joy is being fooled during this 90 minutes Turing test, but the spectator as well.
Origins of the Turing test
Although the Turing test is closely connected to the computer age, several centuries earlier mechanical dolls already raised similar questions. In the seventeenth century, for example, Descartes, confronted with mechanical ducks and other automatons, wondered how we can distinguish a perfectly moving mechanical doll from a human being.[15] Descartes could still reassure himself with the idea that such dolls are unable to carry out a meaningful conversation with us. However, such an reassurance no longer seems possible in the epoch of computers, artificial intelligence and speaking robots.

Maybe the most fundamental reason artificial intelligences evoke our deepest fears, is that they affront the narcissism of the human species. Darwin had already convincingly argued that we are not exceptional, God-created beings, but an ape-related primate species. And now robots are even blurring the distinction between human and lifeless matter. Luckily, so far all this is mainly happening in science fiction movies In the real world, digital dummies like Eugene Goosman still dominate the overtone. And if we think of the perplexing complexity of human intelligence, that will remain the same for the time being.

However, the Goosmans of the digital world already have begun to 'test ' us. For example, think of Captcha's (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), the programs on websites that ask you to enter a set of letters or numbers to check if you are a human or a robot.

It is all the more apparent that our lives are increasingly in the grasp of such algorithms. I am, unlike Hawking, not so much afraid that in the near future we will be outstripped by superior intelligences. My fear is rather that we will be dominated by inferior artificial intelligences. And that, after the human race have long been extinct, they will continue to reproduce themselves thoughtlessly until the end of time.

Or is this a Western, too Western anxiety and preoccupation?

During my guest professorship at Ritsumeikan in 2016, I spent part of my time studying the Japanese approach to robotics. Asin Europe, in Japan there was an early interest in automatons, such as mechanic tea-serving dolls. But whereas in Europe such android - humanlike - robots did not become very popular, in Japan, especially in the Kansai region, there is a strong interest in android robotics. During the writing of my book Artificial by Nature. On the way to Homo sapiens 3.0, I became fascinated by this Japanese preference for androids. And during my stay in Kyoto I've visited the Ishiguro Laboraties, which are part of the Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International (ATR) in Kansai Science City.

Hiroshi Ishiguro, professor of Robotics at the Graduate School of Engineering Science at Osaka University, is one of the most famous researchers in this field. He acquired international fame in 2006 with his robot Doppelgänger, Geminoid HI-1 (from Latin Gemini, twins, see www.geminoid.jp/). My first visit to his laboratory was to attend a demonstration session of this geminoid robot and of his latest model, the communication robot Erica.

Geminoid HI-01 actually is a so-called telerobot. He does not act independently, but is controlled in real time by a human operator, in this case Ishiguro himself. The robot has been made in collaboration with artists. The robots have a metal skeleton and a plastic skull, and especially their silicone skin and human hair (from Ishiguro itself) makes HI-01 eerily realistic. The movements - Ishiguro's Doppelgänger has fifty different movements and facial expressions - are produced by means of an air compressor and pneumatic actuators. They run synchronously with the movements Ishiguro, located in another room, is making. His movements are translated into robot movements via tracking devices and teleoperation software. With the help of a microphone and speakers in the geminoid, Ishiguro can also speak through the robot. Ishigoru himself undergoes impressions of his environment thanks to sensors and cameras in the robot.

Ishiguro uses his mechanical Doppelgänger, among other things, to hold lectures from his home at his university or elsewhere in the world. However, such practical applications - which also successfully serve his public relations - are only one side of Ishiguro's android science. He also uses the geminoids for (neuro)psychological experiments in the field of human-robot interaction and telepresence. One of the notable findings is that even without tactile feedback the user will undergo a physical sensation when his twin robot is touched. Probably, mirror neurons appear to play a crucial role in this phenomenon. When watching an action by another person, the same neural patterns are triggered as those which are active during the performance of the action. This not only plays a role in evoking empathic feelings for other people, but also in identifying with a robotic body and literally including them in their own body schedule.

Ishiguro's telerobots realize materially what the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner calls the excentric positionality of man.[16] According to Plessner, we have a threefold relationship to our body. Like plants, we are our body, and like other animals, we have our body in the sense that we can control it thanks to our nervous system and brain which constitute the center of our experience. However, we distinguish ourselves as human beings form other animals because we are also positioned outside our bodies in the sense that we can reflect on ourselves from an ex-centric position. Whereas in ordinary life, sitting on the sofa in our house, we can only imagine that we walk through Manhattan in New York, rescue a victim from a burning house, or walk on Mars, thanks to telerobot - which we can equip with cameras and microphones and artificial senses like infrared eyes and echo location and artificial limbs, we can actually do these things now.

Interacting with the robot Doppelgänger is a remarkable experience. Because of the strong resemblance to the real Ishiguro and the fact that we speak with 'the man behind the robot', we are inclined to approach the robot as a human being. However, as the mechanical and stereotypes movements and facial expressions break through that familiar pattern, cognitive dissonance occurs.

The Japanese robot designer Masahiro Mori argues in an article from 1970 that things make a more familiar impression as they appear more like a human being, but that in cases where the similarity becomes very close, but not complete - as we experience with bodies of deceased people or zombies in a horror movie, and android robots, the familiarity turns into disgust. [17] In a chart in an article Mori discusses this this phenomenon he calls it bukimi no tani genshō. In English it became Uncanny valley, with which a link was made to Sigmund Freuds essay on the uncanny (in German: 'Das Unheimliche'). Freud connects the uncanny among other things with mechanical Doppelgängers, and associates it with the fear of death, suppressed sexual feelings and narcissistic feelings of omnipotence

However, during my visit to Ishiguro's laboratory, my curiosity was especially focused on Erica. Erica is also an android robot, but she's not a geminoid in the sense that she's not a copy of a specific human individual. Instead, she has been designed by Ishiguro on the computer by combining thirty pictures of women he found particularly beautiful. (Having Freud in my mind, involuntary I had to think of the aforementioned movie Ex Machina). Erica is an autonomous robot, which interacts with its surroundings without immediate control. However, 'her' freedom of movement is limited. Like Ishigiro's Doppelgänger she can't walk, but is attached to her seat. This has a reason. Erica, an acronym for ERato Intelligent Conversational Android, is an Android version of a chatbot that provides additional problems. To be able to communicate, Erica must be able to hear the voice of her interlocutor. However, auditory speech recognition in noisy rooms with a group of people - visitors who attend the demonstration of Erica - is a particularly difficult task. For this reason, Erica is invisibly connected to a number of microphones and sensors, so that she can pinpoint her interlocutor even when he or she is moving.

Erica, whose voice is synthesized in real time, is not only able to respond to questions and remarks, but she also continues to follow her interlocutors with her eyes and her face shows the emotions appropriate to the conversation. At least, that was what Dr. Takashi Minato, who accompanied Erica's demonstration, told me. As the day I attended the demonstration the audience was mainly consisted of Japanese visitors, the question and answer session was entirely in Japanese and I do not master Japanese. However, the fact that Dr. Minato explained the demonstration to me in English, confused Erica a couple of times. As she can handle only one language at a time, she turned several times to our English conversation without being able to change to English and to reply to us.[18]

Afterwards I discussed with Dr. Minato the many obstacles on the way to the perfect conversational robot. The focus of Erica on her interlocutor is still child's play compared to the task of letting her make an everyday conversation about every possible subject. Although her skills, thanks to the use of an open domain conversational system (which searches the web for usable, similar dialogues, roughly like Google translate does in translating) and deep learning (a contemporary version of neural networks) are quite impressive, the number of subjects that can be discussed with Erica is currently still very limited. So you can talk to her about her hobbies, but in many other subjects she keeps the boat off (as she also does - apparently not just a human habit - if you ask her for her age).
It is Ishiguro's ambition to develop Erica to the level that will enable her to pass the famous Turing test. That means, as you will remember, that Erica should be able to fool at least 30% of her interlocutors for 5 minutes that she is a human being, regardless of the subject being addressed. As in 2014 the chatbot Eugene Goosman has passed the Turing test, this seems to be a realistic goal.

However, Ishiguro's ambitions reaches much further, his aim is a robot capable of passing the Total Turing Test. Unlike the traditional Turing test, where the call takes place via keyboard and screen, this requires that the future version of Erica - like the robot Ava in the Ex Machina - a questioner in the same room must be able to convince that she is a real human being. The experiments conducted by Ishiguro so far show that 20% of subjects record within one second that they deal with a robot. And in my estimation the remaining 80% will follow in the next four seconds.

The hype is no less so. The day after I attended the demonstration, I came across a page big picture of Erica on the back page of the New York Times with the text "Meet Erica. She didn't go to school. She doesn't have DNA. Soon She will be smarter than you. " However much I was impressed by Erica, the demonstration suggests that this ' soon ' strikes an evolutionary time scale. When I hold a lecture on the Turing test a few weeks later for Ishiguro and his team, I notice how optimistic Ishiguro and his team are about the possibility of traversing the uncanny valley and passing the Total Turing test. Ishiguro's optimism is not shared by everyone. The critics not only doubt the feasibility of the project, but also its usefulness. Planes can fly excellently without doing it like a bird. And a conveyor belt is a lot more efficient than android robots carrying boxes.

In the discussion that followed my lecture, Ishiguro frankly admits that android robots are not in all cases the best solution. However, in the case robots enter the social world, they might be the best option. Human beings have been evolutionary adapted and from childhood on trained in dealing with other humans. According to Ishiguro, robots that resemble people will not only facilitate a smooth interaction between robots and human beings, but also enhance the acceptance of robots in the human society. Something that looks like a human being is more likely to be also treated as a human being. In Human- Robot Interaction in Social Robotics (2013)[19], Ishiguro discusses a series of field experiments with android guide robots in a museum, a shopping mall and a train station. These experiments not only confirm the effectiveness of the services, but also show that most adults and children have a lot of fun in interacting with the robots.

Because the robots remember the questions and preferences of their customers with the help of ID chips, there is even something like a ' personal bond ' with the robots, and even emotional attachment takes place. At least, as long as the uncanny valley has not been crossed. That's why cartoonized robots often work better than 'photorealistic' androids do, as they don't cause the kind of disgust the imperfection of the latter do. This explains the success of the catoonized care and communication robots designed by Ishiguro and other robot engineers, which are applied in the care of the elderly and the education and the guidance of autists. In the Netherlands and Belgium cartoonized care robots like Alice and the aforementioned Zora made their appearance, too. The difference with Japan, however, is rmarkable. Japan is the most strongly robotized society in the world. Not only do more than 250,000 industrial robots do their daily work, the government and the business world have invested billions in the development of social and affective robotics over the past decades. Robots are immensely popular. They dance and sing at electronics fairs, Flasher bridal clothing on the catwalk and perform in television programs. The annual ROBO ONE robot competitions are attended by whole families. And from the introduction of the Robot Dog Aibo in 1999, consumer robots eagerly find deductions. The cartoonized android Pepper, marketed as the first emotional robot, was sold out in 2015 within one minute of its introduction.

Since 2015 in the theme park Huis ten Bosch in Nagasaki, enthusiasts can also stay in the (practically) completely robots-run Hennna Hotel, and in the film Sayonara (2015) Ishigoru's female Geminoid-F plays one of the leading roles. At the Tokyo International Film Festival she even was nominated for the best female leading role. The film, based on the Oriza Hiratan's Theatre production S ayonara II, deals with the friendship between a human and an android, which develops in the aftermath of a Fukushima-modeled nuclear disaster. The central theme is their vulnerability. The android even was nominated for the best female actress at the Tokyo Film Festival. With the stay of the companion robot Kirobo in the International Space Station, this human-robotic friendship model has now passed the cinematic imagination.

It is often claimed that the Japanese love for the robot is a practical necessity. Not only economically, to be able to compete with the rapidly developing economies of other Asian countries like China, but also socially. Japan has the strongest ageing population in the world and has a relatively low number of immigrants that could lower the average age. As a result, the country suffers from an ascending shortage of personnel in care, education, and other service professions.

However, the practical necessity seems insufficient to explain the emotional bond that Japanese maintain with their robots and which encourages them to bless their robotic dog or android by letting Shinto priests and with a Buddhist ritual to their last resting place to accompany. Such uses suggest that the unique other relationship that Japanese maintain with their Android robots cannot be detached from their worldview, which in some respects differs greatly from the western.

In the Western, Christianity-shaped culture, a taboo rests on 'playing God'. Man has been appointed by God as a steward of nature and may even experiment with it, but the creation of life, especially human life, is the privilege of God. Geneticists and robotics who violate this taboo, even in the most secular western societies, are quickly dealing with the reproach to act from hubris, in the Christian tradition the mother of all mortal sins. And as also the Greek tragedies learn, hubris leads to disaster and catastrophes.

It is for that reason that the vast majority of Western science fiction that deals with robots is apocalyptic in nature. Earlier in my talk I already referred to the bad ending of the movies Her, Ex Machina and Uncanny, but these are no exceptions, they stand in a long tradition that goes back at least to Frankenstein (1817) of Mary Shelley and also characterizes iconic science fiction movies like Cyberspace Odyssey (1968), Blade Runner (1982) and Terminator (1984) and , androids are invariably focused on the destruction of humans. Even in the famous robot stories of Asimov, which revolve around the three robotic laws that must prevent robots from ever doing harm to humans, the plot almost always revolves around its circumvention. And that apocalyptic view is not confined to fiction. And as we have seen, Western scientists also warn against robots taking away people's jobs, drones causing death and destruction, or even starting to dominate the human race and eventually will replace them. Even in the most optimistic versions - like the paradisiacal end-time fantasies of Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil about robots and singularities which transcend humans - there is no longer a place for human being.

In comparison with this, the robotic image in Japanese science fiction is usually much more positive. Robots like Astroboy, the main character in a manga comic that appeared between 1952 and 1968 and has been repeatedly edited into animated film, are not enemies, but helpers of humanity. They do not form the evil negative of man, such as Freud's uncanny Doppelgänger. Human beings and robots are rather - as in the movie Sayonara - of the same nature and relying on each other.

This cannot be dissociated from the worldview of Shintoism and Buddhism, which does not know the separative cosmology, which dominates the modern western worldview. Whereas in Western thinking the separation between life and death, body and mind, man and animal, man and woman is often absolutized, in Asian thinking the boundaries between the opposing parts are much smoother and blurred, as the paradigmatic yin-yang symbol shows. This is reflected in many aspects of everyday life, but especially in the religious traditions.

This seems to color the Japanese attitude towards robots in a fundamental way. In Shintoism, for example, everything is attributed a spiritual dimension, a kami. 'Kami' is a concept which is difficult to translate in Western languages. It refers to 'holy powers', so sometimes it is translated as 'gods' or 'spirits' (for example those of venerated dead persons), but it can also refer to living human beings, to other animals, trees, plants, and even to stones, mountains, oceans - all may be kami. According to Edo scholar Motoori Norinaga "...any being whatsoever which possesses some eminent quality out of the ordinary, and is awe-inspiring, is called kami." [20] Within this worldview it is not strange that kami is also attributed to robots. And from a Buddhist background, the robotic engineer Mori suggests that robots also strive to realize their Buddha nature.[21

Like in the West, Japanese people compare with animals, but that is not only to appoint the differences, but also, precisely, the similarities. Traditionally mostly were apes that fulfilled this mirror function, in modern Japan that role is played ever more frequently by robots. Within the reflexive anthropomorphism that characterizes the Japanese worldview, robots are not opposed to humans, but they share a common nature.
The Turing-Wittgenstein debate
Although relativizing the difference between human beings and other animals is gradually entering the Western worldview (think about the work of the popular primatologist Frans de Waal[23]), attributing a spiritual dimension to robots seems to be still a bridge too far.

Certainly within a mechanistic worldview, as we find it paradigmatically expressed in the title of Julien De la Mettrie's book Machine Man ( 'l Homme machine[24]) In this view, to quote the contemporary successor of De La Mettries's materialism, the famous American philosopher Daniel Dennett, who claims that human beings actually are nothing more than 'moist robots'.[25]

However, in my view in Western thinking we also see a gradual turn to overcome the unfruitful opposition between materialism and spiritualism. Let me try to explain this by returning for a moment to the movie Ex machina. Not only Turing's famous test plays an important role in this movie, but also the spirit of Turing's intellectual rival Wittgenstein is remarkably present. The name of Nathan's company, Bluebook, refers to one of Wittgenstein's writings[26], and that is just one of the many references to Wittgenstein in the film. For example, in one of the scenes, we see Gustav Klimt's famous portrait of Wittgenstein's sister hanging on the wall of Nathan's house.

In the years that Turing worked on his 'thinking machines ' he attended the lectures of Wittgenstein on the foundations of mathematics.[27] Like Turing, Wittgenstein was a philosophical behaviorist, who believed that you cannot separate the mental life from the bodily behavior. Both agree that intelligence is not a mysterious inner power, but shows itself in the behavior of human beings. On one point, however, they were passionately disagreeing. In his Bluebook, Wittgenstein argues that the question of whether a machine can think is just as nonsensical as asking for the color of the number three.[28] The meaning of words lies in their use, and in the ' language game ' around machines words like ' thinking ' and ' emotions ' do not belong. According to Wittgenstein, attributing an autumn depression to a vacuum cleaner is a blunt category mistake or a poetic metaphor at best.

However, in this particular debate Turing seems to be more consistent in his behaviorism than Wittgenstein. He follows the motto that something that looks, swims and croaks like a duck, is also a duck. A perfect robot that in all its behaviors is not distinguishable from a human, the predicate thinking cannot be denied. Turing, more than Wittgenstein, seemed to realize that language use changes with our practices. Where it is indeed rather absurd to attribute intentions or emotions to a traditional vacuum cleaner, we are inclined to do so in the case of artificial intelligences. So my grandchildren believe that the vacuum cleaner robot turns around before the stairs because he is afraid to fall down. However, they perfectly know the robot is programmed that way. But aren't we programmed as well, in this case not by a human programmer, but by natural selection in the course of human evolution?

The grammar and vocabulary of Western philosophy still needs finetuning if it tries to develop a common future for humans and robots that is mutually advantageous. Here, the Japanese worldview, imbued by Shintoism and Buddhism, seems to be conceptually far better equipped to think and shape the common future of humans and robots and can be a source of fruitful inspiration. Of course, we have to prevent digital orientalism, an uncritical idealization of oriental robotic wisdom. Not only because the opposites between East and West are not absolute (who is of this opinion, is still victim of a problematic separative cosmology), but also because also in the East there is often a clash between the high ideals and expectations on the one hand, and the often crude reality on the other. Think for example of the Buddhist violence against the Rohingya minority.

And even in robophile Japan the introduction of robots is not without problems. This is, for example, already being read out to the user agreement that SoftBank allows the buyers of Emorobot Pepper to sign, and which includes the provision that the user promises to refrain from sexual and otherwise indecent acts with the robot. Contrary to the Campaign against Sex Robots initiated in England in 2015[29], that provision seems not so much to be motivated by the fear that such robots dehumanize sexuality by transforming sex into a commodity, but mainly by concern for the fragile robot soul.[30] The Buddha nature has not yet been realized in Japan. Maybe we should be grateful for the fact that that there is not yet a consumer version of Erica for sale.

Endnotes
[1] See http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/ss/education/professional/mul.html/

[2] https://www.techtimes.com/articles/41932/20150324/robots-replace-half-jobs-20-years.htm

[3] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3099703/Humans-left-defenceless-killer-drones-Flying-AI-robots-pose-threat-lives-expert-warns.html

[4] https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter

[5] https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540

[6] http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-archive/press-releases/pr583836.html

[7] Turing, A. (1937). On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungs problem. Proceedings London Mathemetical Society, 42 (July), 230-265. In this article, Turing presents three proofs of the thesis that that some decision problems are "undecidable". In these proofs Turing uses an imaginary like "computing machine". This type-writer like device is able to process a simple set of rules in a mechanistic way. This leads Turing to the idea of a "universal computing machine", "a single machine which can be used to compute any computable sequence" (p.241).

[8] Turing, A. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind, LIX(2236), 433-460.

[9] https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-alan-turing-cracked-the-enigma-code

[10] Turing A. Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 1950; LIX: 433-60.

[11] Idem, 420.

[13] http://www.reading.ac.uk/news-archive/press-releases/pr583836.html

[14] Epstein, R. (2007). From Russia, with Love. How I got fooled (and somewhat humiliated) by a computer. Scientific American Mind (October/November ), 16-17.

[15] Kang, M. (2017). The mechanical daughter of René Descartes: the origin and history of an intellectual fable. the mechanical daughter of rene descartes: the origin and history of an intellectual fable, 14(3), 633-660.

[16] Plessner, H. (2019). Levels of Organic Life and the Human (M. Hyatt, Trans.). New York: Fordham University Press.

[17] Mori M. The uncanny valley. IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine 1970; 19: 98-100.

[18] See for an English speaking conversation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NTj88EdPtM.

[19] Ishiguro, H., & Kanda, T. (2013). Human-Robot Interaction in Social Robotics. Boca Raton: CRC Press. Taylor & Francis Group.

[20] Gall, Robert S. (1999). "Kami and Daimon: A Cross-Cultural Reflection on What Is Divine". Philosophy East and West. 49 (1): 63-74.

[21] Mori, M. (1982). The Buddha in the robot: a robot engineer's thoughts on science and religion. Tokyo: Tuttle.

[22] Is it therefore that the Japanese behavior in Western eyes often appear to be somewhat robotic? In the local train that took me from Ryoan-ji station towards center, I look at every ride fascinated to the machinist-conductor, who runs a script at lightning speed. Before every single act - looking in the mirror, on the clock, on the time schedule; turning the handle that starts the train - ,he points with his stretched finger to the object.

[23] "We start out postulating sharp boundaries, such as between humans and apes, or between apes and monkeys, but are in fact dealing with sand castles that lose much of their structure when the sea of knowledge washes over them. They turn into hills, leveled ever more, until we are back to where evolutionary theory always leads us: a gently sloping beach.", ??.

[24] La Mettrie, J. O. de (1981 [1748]). L'homme-machine. Paris: Denoèel/Gonthier.

[25] Statement in an interview with Jennifer Schuessler: Schuessler, J. (2013, April 29). Philosophy That Stirs the Waters. The New York Times.

[26] Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Preliminary studies for the "Philosophical investigations," generally known as the Blue and Brown books. Oxford,: B. Blackwell.

[27] Wittgenstein, L., Bosanquet, R. G., & Diamond, C. (1976). Wittgenstein's Lectures on the foundations of mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 : from the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

[28] Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Preliminary studies for the "Philosophical investigations," generally known as the Blue and Brown books. Oxford,: B. Blackwell, 47.

[29] See https://campaignagainstsexrobots.org/

[30] See https://www.wired.co.uk/article/pepper-robot-sex-banned

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The Total Turing Test. Eastern versus Western robotics - Jos de Mul

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Jos de Mul. The Total Turing Test. Robotics from Japanese and European perspectives [Translation of the Japanese original: ジョス・デ・ムル . 総合的チューリング・テスト ─日本的観点およびヨーロッパ的観点からロボティクスを考える─ Ritsumeikan Studies in Language and Culture. Vol.31 (2020), Vol.32, no.2, 95-107.] It's a great honor and pleasure to be...

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Peter Paul Verbeek: Morality and Technology 

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Peter Paul Verbeek: Morality and Technology 

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#PeterPaulVerbeek#Morality#Technology

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#JohnZerzan#Technology

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#TetsumiKudo#Hybridity#EcologicalSystem#Cyborg#SymbioticSystems#Symbiosis#Pollution

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#NickErvinck#Biomorphic

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Official website of Nick Ervinck, contemporary artist

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Nick Ervinck is a Belgian sculptor. He is particularly interested in the tension between nature and culture, between tradition and innovation. He tries to push the limits of digital possibilities, while maintaining respect for the (art) historical legacy.

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#HenkVisch#Sculpture

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#MarkManders#Sculpture

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#KarenBarad#MeetingTheUniverseHalfway#QuantumPhysics#Posthumanism

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Meeting the Universe Halfway is an ambitious book with far-reaching implications for numerous fields in the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. In this volume, Karen Barad, theoretical physicist and feminist theorist, elaborates her theory of agential realism.

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#NickVerstand#Aura#Sensory#Senses

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Nick Verstand is a contemporary artist researching human perception through spatial audiovisual compositions. His autonomous installations and live performances investigate the frontier between the material and the immaterial, and are created through collaborative design processes aimed at breaking down social boundaries. The resulting intuitive experiences, co-creations of artist and audience, generate a hypnotizing environment for the subconscious mind.

Nick has exhibited and performed at Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam, The Shed (NYC), Museum of Contemporary Art (Shanghai, CHN), National Opera & Ballet (NL), STRP Festival, Design Society (CHN), Paris Couture Week (FR), SXSW (USA), Dekmantel Festival, Art Central Hong Kong, MTV VMAs (NYC), Design Museum Gent (BE), Le Guess Who (NL), Iceland Airwaves (IS), Dutch Design Week and collaborated with artists such as Iris van Herpen, Björk, Lykke Li, Eefje de Visser, Charlotte Adigéry, Doja Cat, Fatima Yamaha and Suzanne Ciani. Dezeen selected his project AURA as one of the top 10 art installations of 2017, alongside Olafur Eliasson, Ai Weiwei and Anish Kapoor.
selected exhibitions & live performances
Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam (NL)

The Shed (NYC)

Paris Couture Week (Paris, FR)

Dekmantel (NL)

SXSW (Austin, USA)

Barbican (London, UK)

Art Central Hong Kong (CHN)

MTV VMAs (NYC)

Design Museum Gent (BE)

Lowlands Festival (NL)

Dutch Design Week (NL)

Design Society (Shenzhen, CHN)

Le Guess Who (NL)

Iceland Airwaves (Reykjavik, ISL)

MIRA Festival (Barcelona, ES)

STRP (NL)

Nuit Blanche (Paris, FR)

EYE Film Museum (NL)

De School (NL)

Nieuw Dakota Gallery (NL)

Concertgebouw (NL)

FRAME Lab (NL)

Sandberg Institute (NL)

Lehrter Siebzehn Gallery (Berlin, DE)

FORMS (Toronto, CAN)

De Nieuwe Kerk (NL)

TEDx (NL)

Van Gogh Museum (NL)

Gabriel Rolt Gallery (NL)

Amsterdam Dance Event (NL)

REC Festival (NL)

Trouw (NL)

Bimhuis (NL)
selected awards
Dutch Design Award - finalist

Elisabeth van Thüringenprijs - winner

Lumen Prize - category 3D/Sculpture - finalist

HKU Award Entrepreneurship - winner
strategy and website design Agency Agency selected collaborations
Iris van Herpen

Björk

Lykke Li

Charlotte Adigéry

Eefje de Visser

Suzanne Ciani

Doja Cat

Fatima Yamaha

Tale of Us
selected publications
Dezeen

Victoria & Albert Museum

FRAME Magazine

Resident Advisor

Elephant

Design Society

Mister Motley

BBC Radio

NRC

Volkskrant

3voor12

The Chicago Tribune

Creators Project

Engadget

Trendtablet

National Post
selected presentations
SXSW - Linking Art & Science Through Technology

Netherlands Film Festival - Visualising Beyond The Mind

TENT Rotterdam - Collaborative Art Practices

Fiber Festival - EEG Interfaces In Contemporary Art

MTA Beijing - Discovering Interfaces Between Art, Technology and Sound

MU Artspace - Materialising The Internet

FORMS Toronto - AI In Art Is Metaphor

RTL Late Night - Muziek Maken Met Je Emoties

HKU - Realising Multidisciplinary Art Projects

Blink YoungBlood Award - head of jury

Amsterdam Dance Event - Sound Lab

Pakhuis de Zwijger

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Nick Verstand is a contemporary artist researching human perception through spatial audiovisual compositions. His autonomous installations and live performances investigate the frontier between the material and the immaterial, and are created through collaborative design processes aimed at breaking down social boundaries. The resulting intuitive experiences, co-creations of artist and audience, generate a hypnotizing environment for the subconscious mind.

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#FritzLang#Metropolis#1927#Dance#Dystopia#Maria'sDance

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Metropolis - Maria's Dance (Fritz Lang, 1927) // Modern Score

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#JohnGalliano#Fashion

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real human being?

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#Anamnesis#Melancholy#Subconsiousness#Nostalgia#Homesick

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Nikolaos Gyzis "Behold the bridegroom cometh"

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#NikolaosGyzis#BeholdTheCelestialBridegroomCometh#1895#Symbolism#Cosmos

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#Humanoid#Robot#Hybrity#Real#Unreal#Transhumanism

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I rarely remember quotes from the books I read but I remember feelings
and I hold on to them
tight in my eyes

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#Grimes#Music

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#JohnGalliano#2009#FW

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#Baudrillard#Simulacra#SimulacraAndSimulation#1981

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Ethan Russell hit the nail on the head. The Matrix trilogy is to Baudrillard as The Big Lebowski is to Taoism. It's just an entertaining story to descEthan Russell hit the nail on the head. The Matrix trilogy is to Baudrillard as The Big Lebowski is to Taoism. It's just an entertaining story to describe something very complex in laymen's terms. Baudrillard doesn't even assume a place where reality exists, since the hyperreal has supplanted it. But the hyperreal itself is just "nexus of symbols" that pretend to reference the reality they falsely claim to represent. In other words, the true "reality" in the Matrix doesn't even exist to Baudrillard. Where the Matrix makes the claim that the real world and the virtual world both "exist", Baudrillard claims that the "real world" has been completely lost and the virtual (i.e. the "map") is all that remains. Luke Connors...more (less)

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Trevor (I sometimes get notified of comments)

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Ethan Russell hit the nail on the head. The Matrix trilogy is to Baudrillard as The Big Lebowski is to Taoism. It's just an entertaining story to descEthan Russell hit the nail on the head. The Matrix trilogy is to Baudrillard as The Big Lebowski is to Taoism.

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#JohfraBosschart#Surrealism#Psychology#Magic#Occultism."

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Concerning Copyrights...

Monster Brains is copyright Aeron Alfrey 2006 - 2019. All artworks posted at Monster Brains are the property of their respective copyright owners. Any works posted against the wishes of the copyright owner will be removed from Monster Brains by request. I can be contacted at evilenergy@yahoo.com

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Monster Brains is copyright Aeron Alfrey 2006 - 2019. All artworks posted at Monster Brains are the property of their respective copyright owners. Any works posted against the wishes of the copyright owner will be removed from Monster Brains by request. I can be contacted at evilenergy@yahoo.com

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#Humanoid#Human#Hybridity

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#VirginiaWoolf#StreamOfConsciousness#Unconsciousness

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PhillipDick#DoAndroidsDreamOfElectricSheep#BladeRunner#ScienceFiction#1968