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Definition: High supreme court within the United States that has final appellate jurisdiction and has jurisdiction over all courts in the US.

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A 14-year-old girl is facing first-degree murder charges after police say she admitted to choking her newborn baby to death after giving birth to the child in her bathroom, according to the probable cause affidavit.

On September 22, the Polk County Sheriff's Office said they received a 911 call in regards to a full-term baby that had been located inside a shoebox with soiled clothing at the 14-year-old girl's home, according to a Polk County Sheriff's news release.

During an interview with authorities, the girl's mother told them she was collecting dirty laundry from her daughter's bedroom and "smelled a foul odor coming from a storage stool," according to the affidavit. Inside the storage stool, the mother said she found a plastic bag containing wet clothing which she then placed in the kitchen sink so she could sort through the wet items, police said.

While sorting through the clothing, the girl's mother told police she located a deceased baby among the items, according to the affidavit. In a panic, the mother told investigators she called her sister, who called 911.

"My niece had a miscarriage and was at the hospital Wednesday. They took all the information down," the girl's aunt told the 911 dispatcher. "My sister called me...She said they found the baby."

Four days earlier, the girl's mother told police she took her daughter to the emergency room after she "observed a lot of blood in and around the toilet area" immediately after her daughter used the bathroom, according to the affidavit. During the visit at the hospital, the girl admitted to her mother she had a miscarriage and flushed the fetus down the toilet without looking, police said the girl's mother told them. Medical staff advised the mother that her 14-year-old daughter showed signs of a miscarriage, the affidavit states.

According to the affidavit, the teen girl's mother told authorities that over the past five months family members expressed to her that her daughter may be pregnant. After noticing her daughter had gained weight, the mother said she confronted her daughter who assured her that she was not pregnant, police said. Two pregnancy tests given to her daughter gave no response which she interpreted as a negative result, the mother allegedly told investigators.

During an interview with authorities, the 14-year-old girl told them she began to feeling ill on September 17, according to the affidavit. Two days later, the girl told police she woke up feeling sick and went to the bathroom. Once sitting on the toilet, the girl stated to police she "felt an extreme amount of pressure and a sensation to 'push.'"

Realizing she was delivering, the girl told investigators she "placed a towel in her mouth and turned on the bathroom water to conceal any noise she might make during the delivery," according to a sheriff's news release. As the labor pains increased, the girl said she reached for a pair of scissors to "'pry' the child out,'" police said in the affidavit.

After feeling for the child's pulse-which was present-the girl "placed her hands around the neck of the child and choked it for approximately one minute, to stop the child from breathing," police said the girl told them, according to the affidavit.

After choking the child, the girl told police she checked for a pulse again and found none, according to the affidavit. She then attempted to clean herself and the child and hid the dead child in her room, police said the girl told them.

Aware of possible alternatives-such as caring for the child and adoption-the girl told police she decided to "terminate the life of the child because she was afraid her relationship with her parents would change," according to the affidavit. She said she wore "baggy, loose clothing in an attempt to hide her pregnancy from everyone," police said the girl told them.

A medical examiner determined the 9.5 lb baby boy was alive and breathing prior to death, and suffered 32 contusions, hemorrhages and severe head trauma consistent with blunt force trauma, "which is consistent with the head being struck repeatedly by scissors," according to the affidavit.

The 14-year-old girl was charged with premeditated first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse. She is currently being held at the Polk County Juvenile Detention Facility.

The name of an attorney representing the 14-year-old girl would not be released due to the fact that she is considered a juvenile.

Brian Hass, a Florida assistant state attorney, told HLN they are reviewing the case and will be making a decision soon whether or not she will be tried as an adult.

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Cops: Teen girl kills baby, hides remains in shoebox

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A 14-year-old girl is facing first-degree murder charges after police say she admitted to choking her newborn baby to death after giving birth to the child in her bathroom, according to the probable cause affidavit.On September 22, the Polk County Sheriff's Office said they received a 911 call in regards to a full-term baby that had been located inside a shoebox with soiled clothing at the 14-year-old girl's home, according to a Polk County Sheriff's news release.

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family disagrees with ernie banks's will and takes it to court after he gave everything to his caregiver

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Three months before his death, Chicago Cubs legend Ernie Banks signed a new will giving control of his assets to his caregiver, Regina Rice. Banks' adult sons and estranged wife are accusing Rice of manipulating Banks to gain access to his estate. Other recent high-profile estate quarrels include those of actor Robin Williams and disc jockey Casey Kasem. David Lieberman, a partner at law firm Levin Schreder & Carey who specializes in estate law, joins us to discuss the dynamics of wills and the disputes that can arise from them.

Read an interview with Lieberman.
What do you make of the dispute unfolding around Ernie Banks' estate? Do you believe Banks' caretaker took advantage of him?
It's difficult to say from what I've read in the newspapers because you get two very different accounts from two different sides. It certainly does raise questions when there's a caretaker who becomes very involved in an elderly person's life as their health is declining, especially when that person takes steps to separate the elderly person's family from them.
How common is it for an elderly or ailing person to leave a majority or all of their estate to a caretaker?
There's actually a new addition to the Illinois Probate Act that's relevant to this case. If a will benefits a caregiver, then there is a presumption that there's some undue influence involved and the onus is on the caretaker to prove that it's valid. So this is something that the state and General Assembly have recognized as a point of scrutiny. The law applies to wills signed after Jan. 1, 2015, so it doesn't apply directly to Banks' case. However, the common law recognition is that if someone has a fiduciary relationship with an elderly person, then you may also see these presumptions of undue influences, even without that statute. So that may still apply to this case.
How might a caretaker manipulate or coerce someone into signing their will over to them? Are there any safeguards regarding wills to prevent an older or incapacitated relative from being taken advantage of?
I have a somewhat skewed perspective because my work focuses on disputed cases. It is uncommon, though, and it's certainly unusual in someone's estate plan. But it happens enough that there are a number of lawyers like me who work on these cases. These disputes with a caretaker are more infrequent. You usually see different immediate members of a family, like siblings or spouses. It's very often the case that you have different spouses in these disputes.
Wills are different from state to state; what happens when someone dies without a will in Illinois?
You can imagine the circumstances that someone is in when they're elderly and not capable of caring for themselves. The reliance that a person in that position places on a caretaker may be very genuine. It may not be the manipulation of the caretaker. The elderly person may have a very dependent mindset. They may be very appreciative of their caretaker. If a caretaker is at fault, they may make manipulative statements about his or her own needs and may try to alienate the elderly person's family from them.
Is it normal for burial or cremation requests to be in wills?
The biggest safeguard is communication. You need to be in communication with the people you know and trust. If you can, it's important to find yourself a lawyer who you trust and who will be there. Find an attorney that is familiar with your documents and your needs. When you're still relatively young and of strong mind, you need to make sure that you are surrounded by people who you trust and who you know will put your interests first. These are people that can pay attention to any changes made to your estate documents. Some people may not be able to afford a lawyer, but most people have family or friends who they trust who can keep an eye on what's happening.
There is some suspicion over Banks' former caretaker's request to have Banks' body cremated. Why would that raise suspicion? What would be a nefarious motivation to have that done?
Generally, if you have a spouse and children, half goes to your spouse and the other half is given to your children. I'm not aware of too much variation from state to state in that regard. This particular issue about caregivers is one that's receiving attention from a number of states. California has been paying attention in that area. There is also a lot of attention on the federal level. And I think it's an issue that should receive increasing attention.
There have also been recent disputes over the estates of disc jockey Casey Kasem and actor Robin Williams. How do these cases compare to Banks'?
Often, yes, you would put those requests in a will. I think, in most cases, people don't expect a controversy. They expect their children or spouse to take care of it without controversy. Remarriage can create disputes over burial or cremation, so it would make a lot of sense to put that in your will. It's something that a person and their lawyer should talk about when they're preparing their will.
In these cases, we're seeing difficulty caused by estranged or numerous spouses. Do divorces, separations and remarriages complicate the will process?
If you have reason to believe that someone had a hand in bringing about the death or demise of a person, then that's the only reason that I could imagine. There's certainly a destruction of evidence if something untoward happens and the person is cremated.
Do you need an attorney to create a will?
What I know is only from what I've read in the newspapers. What's common among all of these is the existence of multiple marriages and children from prior marriages who are at odds with the later spouses. In those situations, you have people who are less aligned than they'd be if it were a tight-knit, immediate family. From what I read about the Williams' dispute, a lot of it surrounds his personal affects. The more you lay out your wishes and intentions, the less conflict there will be. My own personal feeling is why do these objects matter? Certainly you'd want to keep a few things, but I don't know what Williams' kids want with his collection of bicycles and film awards. From my experience, if it's worth hiring lawyers and paying all that money, there's a lot of money at stake - not personal objects.
I've heard that pretty much anything that you sign and write a request of bequeathal can serve as a will. Is that true?
In reference to Casey Kasem, there are allegations from the children that his last wife had a hand in his death, which is not a usual occurrence. We pay attention to these cases because there are celebrities involved, but these problems happen to everyone and arise every day.
Do these disagreements have certain hallmarks?
Absolutely, but there are a lot of good estate planners who are familiar with that scenario and can help a person deal with it. These cases are not unique to those circumstances. People get old and they depend on their children, and all of a sudden there's a will or trust that benefits one heir at the expense of the others. There's a number of ways that these cases can play out.
What kind of effect do these disputes have on the decedent's legacy?
You do not. Not in Illinois and not in most states.

There's a lot of new law about that and it's interesting. The popularity of digital documents and tablets adds a new angle to that. If you write something and sign it, there's a good chance that you can have a court consider that a will. I wouldn't recommend that, but if you're suddenly in a situation where you think you only have an hour left to live, it may work.
How do you think the Banks situation will turn out?
The number one that we touched on is that there is not adequate communication when the person is alive. The person did not discuss their intentions up front and with everyone. The next one is an effort by someone to exclude others. The other hallmark is that somebody is surprised after someone dies regarding the distribution of property or how someone chooses to have their remains disposed of. These can be difficult discussions to have. There isn't anybody who wants their legacy to be a dispute over their assets. The primary hallmarks are surprise and lack of communication. The other inevitable hallmark is that these cases are always sad.
Interview has been condensed and edited.
The public figure Ernie Banks was a big part of my childhood. Does this sully his legacy? I hope not. But obviously if something like this gathers a lot of attention then it becomes a salient part of what you think about this person. Even finding out that he had all this family discord. It makes you view this public figure differently.

As for everyone, most people are not famous and there's not this much attention paid to their disputes. In these cases, it might not reflect on the deceased person's legacy, but it does rip apart families in a way that they can't be healed.

I certainly hope they'll resolve this because it's worth the effort, but often you can't. It is too early to tell and I have no idea how much money is at stake. Unfortunately, that factor can affect how long these cases are litigated. I've seen cases like this go on for 10 years.

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Three months before his death, Chicago Cubs legend Ernie Banks signed a new will giving control of his assets to his caregiver, Regina Rice. Banks' adult sons and estranged wife are accusing Rice of manipulating Banks to gain access to his estate. We discuss the dynamics of wills and the disputes that can arise from them.

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Dartmouth woman who said golf balls bounce into her yard and, on one occasion, hit her cat.

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Dartmouth woman who said golf balls bounce into her yard and, on one occasion, hit her cat.

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http://thechronicleherald.ca/metro/1264808-small-claims-court-turfs-golf-ball-nuisance-claim

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http://www.idahostatesman.com/2015/02/17/3649749/instant-horse-racing-repeal-bill.html

Idaho senators who say they were duped into approving cleverly disguised slot machines two years ago pushed back Tuesday by voting 25-9 to repeal all instant horse racing in the state.

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Idaho does not have a probate court

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my roofing company goes to small claims court when people don't pay us for completing their roof so they get a lean on their house(Isaac's roofing company )

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my roofing company goes to small claims court when people don't pay us for completing their roof so they get a lean on their house(Isaac's roofing company )

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Defendant pled guilty to enticing or attempting to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity.

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Download PDF

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMOTHY ANDREW FUGIT, Defendant-Appellant. ï£¼ ï£½ No. 11-6741 ï£¾ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Jerome B. Friedman, Senior District Judge. (4:07-cr-00065-JBF-JEB-1; 4:09-cv-00135-JBF-DEM) Argued: October 25, 2012 Decided: December 31, 2012 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Agee joined. COUNSEL ARGUED: Mary Beth Usher, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for 2 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT Appellee. ON BRIEF: John J. Korzen, Director, Melissa Evett, Third Year Law Student, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Advocacy Clinic, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Lisa R. McKeel, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee. OPINION WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: Timothy Andrew Fugit moves for post-conviction relief in connection with his guilty plea for enticing or attempting to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The district court denied Fugit s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment. I. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a two-count indictment against Fugit on May 24, 2007. Count One charged him with distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1). Count Two charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which provides, in pertinent part: Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 3 attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. Count Two alone is at issue here. On the advice of counsel, Fugit pleaded guilty to both counts on July 20, 2007. Although Fugit and the government did not enter a formal plea agreement, the parties agreed to a stipulated "Statement of Facts." This document described the following foundations for the charges. On November 28, 2005, while claiming to be a young girl named "Kimberly," Fugit held a conversation in an internet chat room with an eleven-year-old girl, "Jane Doe #2." He asked her questions regarding her breasts and genitals, her underwear, slumber parties, and whether she had ever appeared naked in front of men. He also obtained her telephone number. Pretending to be Kimberly s father, Fugit telephoned Jane Doe #2 shortly thereafter and engaged her "in an inappropriate sexual conversation." He asked whether she had "seen a grown man naked," whether "she minded if he came in to check on her while she was naked," whether "she would mind seeing him naked," and whether she would "get naked for him." Tracking the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), the Statement of Facts concluded its discussion of this incident by noting that Fugit "admits that he knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed or coerced Jane Doe #2 to engage in a sexual activity, to wit; Taking Indecent Liberties with Children, in violation of § 18.2-370 of the Code of Virginia 1950, as amended, for which he could be charged." Likewise, on December 12, 2005, once more posing as "Kimberly," Fugit chatted online with a ten-year-old girl, "Jane Doe #1," and obtained her telephone number. Approximately five minutes later, he telephoned her, pretended to be Kimberly s father, and engaged her "in an inappropriate sexual conversation." The Statement of Facts further described how this latter incident precipitated an extensive police inves- 4 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT tigation. During the execution of a search warrant at his residence, Fugit told police that he had "attempted to contact children on the computer and telephone" and that an internet account of his had been "bumped" several times because of inappropriate contact with minors. Law enforcement discovered, "among other things" on Fugit s computer, that he had once distributed a child pornography image over e-mail. Additionally, at his sentencing hearing, Fugit effectively admitted the facts contained in the pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared by the probation office. Specifically, he contested only one allegation, which is not at issue here, and affirmed that the remainder of the factual background was error-free. The PSR revealed a great deal of information beyond that contained in the Statement of Facts. Apparently referencing the incidents discussed above, the PSR described how Fugit, in claiming to be Kimberly s father, asked Jane Doe #2 "to masturbate and take her shirt off" and repeatedly demanded that she remove her pants. And with regard to Jane Doe #1, among other statements, Fugit "informed her of the rules he would impose" if she spent the night at his house, "instructed her to call him Daddy, " and stated that he "would perform a finger test on [her] by rubbing her all over with his finger." Additionally, he said "that he would allow her to touch his penis" and asked her "to take her clothes off." Moreover, the PSR made clear that the incidents involving Jane Does #1 and #2 were anything but isolated occurrences. Investigation revealed that Fugit had participated in internet chats with 129 individuals who appeared to be children, twelve of whom police confirmed were indeed minors between nine and twelve years old. During these dozen conversations, which occurred between March 2005 and January 2006, Fugit "always represented himself to be a child and often asked inappropriate questions," including UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 5 the child s breast size, whether or not the child had pubic hair, whether or not the child slept in the nude, whether or not the child engaged in masturbation, what type of underwear the child wore, and whether or not the child had been naked in front of a member of the opposite sex. As with Jane Does #1 and #2, Fugit often proceeded to engage these children in telephone conversations involving "inappropriate sexual comments." Finally, the PSR disclosed that 289 still images and twentyfour videos of child pornography at least some of which were extremely graphic were found on Fugit s computers. In addition to the single occasion described in the Statement of Facts, the PSR revealed that law enforcement identified forty-three instances of child pornography distribution between September 2004 and January 2006, some involving multiple images. Following a hearing on December 19, 2007, the district court sentenced Fugit to 240 months of imprisonment on Count One (the statutory maximum) and seventy months of imprisonment on Count Two, to be served consecutively, yielding a sentence of 310 months from a guideline range of 292 to 365 months. Represented by the same counsel as during the initial plea proceedings, Fugit appealed only his sentence, and this court affirmed the judgment of the district court. United States v. Fugit, 296 F. App x 311 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). On October 1, 2009, Fugit filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He contested his convictions on ten grounds. The district court denied the motion in its entirety, rejecting each of Fugit s claims on the merits and also seeming to find that several were procedurally defaulted. This court granted a certificate of appealability on the following issues, which relate to Count Two only: (1) 6 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT "whether Fugit s stipulated conduct constituted attempted inducement of sexual activity of a minor within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)" and (2) "whether Fugit s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to stipulate to the inducement of sexual activity and guilt under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)." II. We underscore at the outset of our review the interest of the criminal justice system in the finality of convictions, an interest repeatedly confirmed the Supreme Court. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492-93 (1991); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 n.13 (1977). "The historical evidence demonstrates that the purposes of the writ [of habeas corpus], at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, were tempered by a due regard for the finality of the judgment of the committing court." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Relitigation of a conviction is a rear-view mirror, while a respect for finality encourages those in custody to contemplate the future prospect of "becoming a constructive citizen." Id. at 262. The Supreme Court has declared, moreover, that "the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas." United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979). In explaining this corollary to the finality principle, the Court remarked: Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice. The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas. UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 7 Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). In addition to emphasizing the sheer volume of guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has located independent value in the fact that such a plea "usually rest[s] . . . on a defendant s profession of guilt in open court," United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82-83 (2004), and allows him to demonstrate "that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary," Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). On the strength of these rationales, this circuit has long refused to permit the casual withdrawal of guilty pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Though high, the bar of finality is not insurmountable, even in the guilty plea context. It bears emphasis, however, that allowing a person to abrogate his guilty plea on collateral attack represents a rare exception to the rule of finality, and we proceed to review Fugit s claims with this foundational principle in mind. III. Fugit s primary contention is that the district court erred in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), the statute underlying his conviction on Count Two. The government argues, however, that the doctrine of procedural default bars this claim because Fugit failed to raise it during his initial plea proceedings or on direct appeal. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 16768 (1982)). This doctrine, too, rests on the law s basic interest in finality. Id. ("The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law s important interest in the finality of judgments."). 8 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT Fugit did not make the statutory argument he now presses during his initial plea proceedings before the district court, and although he "contested his sentence on appeal, [he] did not challenge the validity of his plea." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). It would appear, therefore, that Fugit has procedurally defaulted this claim. See id. A procedural default, however, may be excused in two circumstances: where a person attacking his conviction can establish (1) that he is "actually innocent" or (2) "cause" for the default and "prejudice" resulting therefrom. Id. at 622. While a successful showing on either actual innocence or cause and prejudice would suffice to excuse the default, Fugit contends that he can accomplish both. We consider Fugit s actual innocence claim first an analysis that, incidentally, requires us to resolve the underlying statutory dispute. As outlined above, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) comprises four elements: "(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) a person who is younger than eighteen; (4) to engage in an illegal sexual activity." United States v. Kaye, 451 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (E.D. Va. 2006). Fugit s claim of actual innocence focuses exclusively on the "sexual activity" component of the fourth element. He contests neither the other three elements nor the illegality component of the fourth, effectively conceding that his behavior violated § 18.2-370 of the Code of Virginia, which prohibits taking indecent liberties with children. Fugit acknowledges that his behavior was to put it mildly "reprehensible." Nevertheless, he argues that the phrase "sexual activity" in § 2422(b) incorporates an irreducible minimum of interpersonal physical contact and that, because the relevant interactions with his victims neither included nor referenced such contact, he cannot have been guilty of violating the statute. We first interpret the phrase "sexual activity" as used in § 2422(b) and then proceed to apply that interpretation to Fugit s actual innocence claim. UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 9 A. For the reasons that follow, we hold that interpersonal physical contact is not a requirement of § 2422(b) s "sexual activity" element. "Statutory interpretation necessarily begins with an analysis of the language of the statute." Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 2000). As far as the text of § 2422(b) is concerned, Fugit appears to have pulled his proposed interpersonal physical contact requirement out of a hat. The statute is simply not framed in the terms for which he contends: it mentions nothing about physical contact. In fact, it does not expressly demarcate the meaning of "sexual activity" in any way, instead leaving the term undefined. By contrast, where similar statutory terms were meant to encompass only a specific subset of conduct, Congress took care to define them explicitly for purposes of the sections or chapters in which they are found. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (defining "sexual act"); id. § 2246(3) (defining "sexual contact"); id. § 2256(2) (defining "sexually explicit conduct"); id. § 2423(f) (defining "illicit sexual conduct"). When analyzing the meaning of an undefined statutory term, "we must first determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning. " Chris, 221 F.3d at 651 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). We think the meaning of "sexual activity" in § 2422(b) is indeed plain and that this meaning extends beyond interpersonal physical contact. This court has long consulted dictionaries of common usage in order to establish the plain meaning of disputed statutory language. See Nat l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1998). In determining the meaning of "sexual," we find instructive a definition from Webster s: "of or relating to the sphere of behavior associated with libidinal gratification." 10 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT Webster s New International Dictionary 2082 (3d ed. 1993). This court has previously relied on this very definition in a related context. See United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343, 349 (4th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the phrase "sexual abuse of a minor" for purposes of sentencing enhancement in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2). Likewise, we find the most pertinent definition of "activity" to be "an occupation, pursuit, or recreation in which a person is active." Webster s, supra, at 22. Thus, as a matter of plain meaning, the phrase "sexual activity" as used in § 2422(b) comprises conduct connected with the "active pursuit of libidinal gratification" on the part of any individual. The fact that such conduct need not involve interpersonal physical contact is self-evident. See DiazIbarra, 522 F.3d at 351-52 (concluding that " sexual abuse of a minor means the perpetrator s physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for a purpose associated with sexual gratification " (emphasis added)). This meaning of the "sexual activity" element is not only plain; it also renders the statutory scheme coherent as a whole. This court has made clear that § 2422(b) "was designed to protect children from the act of solicitation itself." United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 632 F.3d 956, 961 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2975 (2011)). Consequently, by forbidding the knowing persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a minor, the statute "criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve a mental state a minor s assent regardless of the accused s intentions concerning the actual consummation of sexual activities with the minor." Id. (quoting United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 140 (1st Cir. 2011)). The primary evil that Congress meant to avert by enacting § 2422(b) was the psychological sexualization of children, and this evil can surely obtain in situations where the contemplated conduct does not involve interpersonal physical contact. UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 11 We cannot accept Fugit s contention that absent an interpersonal physical contact requirement, § 2422(b) becomes a trap capable of snaring all sorts of innocent behavior. For several reasons, our interpretation of the term "sexual activity" is hardly open-ended. First, wide swaths of behavior simply cannot be described as "sexual activity": indeed, the overwhelming preponderance of human interaction does not involve the "active pursuit of libidinal gratification" in any minimally tenable way. Second, § 2422(b) concerns only conduct that is already criminally prohibited. That is, § 2422(b) does not criminalize enticement of "sexual activity," full stop; instead, it forbids enticement of "sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." The latter category is considerably narrower than the former. As a general matter, conduct that is innocuous, ambiguous, or merely flirtatious is not criminal and thus not subject to prosecution under § 2422(b). Third, § 2422(b) addresses only behavior involving children. And there exists, of course, a vast range of everyday adult-child interactions that are neither remotely erotic nor independently illegal from the salutary mentoring of teachers, coaches, and counselors to the unintentional jostling between strangers traversing a crowded city sidewalk. Finally, we believe that the Seventh Circuit s decision in United States v. Taylor, 640 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2011), upon which Fugit places great weight, was mistaken. The Taylor court held that the phrase "sexual activity" in § 2422(b) is synonymous with the phrase "sexual act," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). Id. at 259-60. That complex provision defines "sexual act" to require not only interpersonal physical contact but interpersonal physical contact involving the genitalia or anus and, for persons who are sixteen or older, requires either oral sex or actual penetration of the genital or anal opening. 12 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT We decline Taylor s invitation to cut and paste this restrictive definition into § 2422(b) because doing so would contravene express statutory text. Section 2246 explicitly limits the definitions provided therein to the chapter in which it resides. Specifically, the very first words of the section are "[a]s used in this chapter" (with the various definitions following), and the section s title is "[d]efinitions for chapter." Whereas § 2246 appears in Chapter 109A of Title 18, § 2422(b) is situated in an entirely different location, Chapter 117. Simply put, we find "no indication that Congress intended to import the definitions of chapter 109A to [another] chapter." United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2009). For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the phrase "sexual activity" in § 2422(b) denotes conduct connected with the "active pursuit of libidinal gratification" on the part of any individual nothing more, nothing less and, therefore, does not incorporate an invariable requirement of interpersonal physical contact. B. Having thus determined the interpretation of § 2422(b) s "sexual activity" element, we must analyze whether the conduct at issue in this case supports Fugit s claim of actual innocence. In order to succeed, Fugit "must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. " Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995)). 1. At the threshold of the actual innocence inquiry, the parties spar over what universe of facts this court may take into account. Fugit asserts that this universe is small and strictly bounded. Invoking the precise text of the certificate of appealability, Fugit contends that our review is limited to UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 13 whether his "stipulated conduct constituted attempted inducement of sexual activity of a minor within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)." He further argues that "stipulated conduct" refers only to the Statement of Facts to which he conceded as part of his guilty plea. For several reasons, we think that the range of relevant conduct is significantly broader even assuming that Fugit is correct that the phrase "stipulated conduct" in the certificate of appealability denotes only the conduct discussed in the Statement of Facts. We are guided, first, by the Supreme Court s clear instruction that, because acceptance of a claim of actual innocence from someone previously adjudicated guilty represents an extraordinary form of relief, the scope of pertinent evidence is expansive. Schlup s requirement that a person prove actual innocence "in light of all the evidence" points to this principle, 513 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added), and in Bousley, the Court made it explicit: It is important to note . . . that "actual innocence" means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. In other words, the Government is not limited to the existing record to rebut any showing that petitioner might make . . . [and may rely on] any admissible evidence of petitioner s guilt even if that evidence was not presented during petitioner s plea colloquy . . . . 523 U.S. at 623-24. Moreover, the Supreme Court has specifically linked the notion that actual innocence claims must surmount a high hurdle to the systemic interest in finality. See, e.g., Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (describing actual innocence jurisprudence as "seek[ing] to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case"); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) ("[P]etitioner s 14 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT standard [for actual innocence claims] would so broaden the inquiry as to make it anything but a narrow exception to the principle of finality that we have previously described it to be."). Given the Court s pronouncements, we can only greet skeptically Fugit s effort to constrict the universe of evidence relevant to his belated actual innocence claim. Second, Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012), confirms the propriety of considering a broad base of evidence despite the arguably narrow span of the certificate of appealability. At issue in Gonzalez was 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which requires that a person seeking to challenge an adverse district court judgment on collateral attack obtain a certificate of appealability. Specifically, § 2253(c) provides: (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2). The Gonzalez Court determined that, whereas the baseline requirement of a certificate s existence in § 2253(c)(1) is UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 15 jurisdictional in nature, the directive stated in subsection (c)(3) constitutes a mere "claim-processing rule" and is consequently non-jurisdictional. Id. at 648-49. "Accordingly," the Court decided, "a judge s failure to indicate the requisite constitutional issue . . . does not deprive a court of appeals of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate [an] appeal." Id. at 646. By holding that the specific wording of the certificate of appealability does not limit a court s ability to adjudicate a collateral attack as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, Gonzalez directs the conclusion that the reference to "stipulated conduct" in the certificate does not constrain our consideration of Fugit s actual innocence claim in view of all of the evidence in the record. In light of Bousley s unequivocal message that resolving such claims on an artificially restricted record would eviscerate the critical systemic interest in finality, we believe that we would be mistaken to confine our analysis to the stipulated Statement of Facts. Gonzalez confirms that we need not do so. And third, to treat the certificate of appealability as circumscribing the permissible ambit of arguments offered by the government as Fugit would have it entirely upends congressional intent as to the nature of appellate review over collateral challenges to convictions. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure make manifest that while the convicted individual "cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)," a certificate "is not required when a state or its representative or the United States or its representative appeals." Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1), (3); see also Fed. R. App. P. 22 advisory committee s note. The fact that the government need not obtain a certificate of appealability at all strongly indicates that the function of the certificate is to restrain the appeal of insubstantial claims on collateral attack, not to restrict artificially the government s capacity to respond to them. 16 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT Although we thus decline to confine our review of Fugit s actual innocence claim to the Statement of Facts, we find it unnecessary to explore the outer parameters of permissible evidence. In particular, the facts set forth in the PSR stand on a different and firmer footing than does other potentially inculpatory evidence uncovered during the police investigation. As discussed above, Bousley speaks of "admissible evidence of petitioner s guilt." 523 U.S. at 624 (emphasis added). Here, Fugit conceded the conduct discussed in the PSR in open court (besides one allegation upon which we do not rely), and the trial judge accordingly used those allegations as the basis for his sentencing calculations, which this court has affirmed. There is no need for us to address other evidence. 2. With the boundaries of inquiry thus established, Fugit s actual innocence claim fails by a wide margin. Given the interpretation of § 2422(b) s "sexual activity" element established above, Fugit falls far short of proving that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" on Count Two, the § 2422(b) enticement charge. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In fact, Fugit s conceded conduct so surely satisfies the "sexual activity" element that it is difficult to conceive of any reasonable juror not convicting him. Count Two appears to have been based on Fugit s behavior toward Jane Doe #2. The conduct described in the PSR with respect to this victim is condemnatory. Fugit tricked this eleven-year-old child into providing her telephone number during an online chat in which he pretended to befriend her as a girl named "Kimberly." During that chat, Fugit "inquired as to the child s breast size, her underwear, and whether or not she had been nude in front of boys." When he telephoned her, "[t]he victim asked to speak to Kimberly, however, the defendant refused and stated that he was Kimberly s father UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 17 and needed to ask the victim some questions first." Later in the conversation, he "inquired as to where the victim s parents were and told her he wanted her to go to another room." Fugit thus attempted to lure this young girl away from her protectors in hopes of exploiting her undisturbed. The PSR further describes Fugit s telephone inquiries to Jane Doe #2 "about her underwear and bras" and whether she "had seen other girls naked," had been "in a hot tub with other girls and boys," had "seen a grown man naked," and "would mind seeing him naked." Following these questions, Fugit requested that she remove her shirt and, on more than one occasion, demanded that she take off her pants as well. He also asked her to masturbate. That such conduct qualifies as involving the "active pursuit of libidinal gratification" on Fugit s part is beyond question. Nor is the conduct disclosed in the Statement of Facts at all exonerative. To the contrary, that document described how Fugit baited two children into participating in "inappropriate sexual conversation[s]" and asked at least one a barrage of questions regarding her anatomy, underwear, and experiences, as well as whether the two of them could be naked in front of each other. Engaging young girls in the kind of discussions described above plainly involves them in "sexual activity" that is, the "active pursuit of libidinal gratification." The idea of an adult man behaving in such a manner is utterly unpersuasive of "actual innocence," and Fugit s procedural default of his statutory claim cannot be excused on this ground. C. Fugit maintains, however, that he can satisfy the second ground for excusing procedural default, cause and prejudice, by establishing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ("Ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause for a procedural default."). As an initial matter, this court has agreed to consider a limited subset of Fugit s ineffective 18 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT assistance claims, and there is some question as to whether those theories are sufficiently connected to the procedural default in order to excuse it. We conclude, though, that we need not consider Fugit s ineffective assistance arguments for this purpose at all, given the above disposition of the dispute over the meaning of § 2422(b) s "sexual activity" element. That is, because we have decided that Fugit s statutory claim fails on the merits, whether that claim is defaulted has become irrelevant. IV. Moreover, Fugit s ineffective assistance arguments provide no substantive grounds for relief. The Supreme Court has made clear that ineffective assistance challenges brought under the aegis of § 2255 are not themselves susceptible to procedural default. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503-04 (2003). We do not think, however, that Fugit s ineffective assistance claims provide any independent basis for overturning his conviction on Count Two. The framework governing this analysis is familiar. In order to establish ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment, a person must show (1) that his attorney s performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that he experienced prejudice as a result, meaning that there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). A different inquiry is necessary with respect to the prejudice prong, however, where a conviction is based upon a guilty plea. In that situation, a person must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In discussing "the importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas," the Supreme Court recently declared that "[s]urmounting Strickland s high bar is UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 19 never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1484-85 (2010). A. As for Strickland s first prong, Fugit argues that his counsel s advice to plead guilty to Count Two constituted deficient performance for two reasons. First, Fugit contends that his attorney failed to inform him of a critical defense specifically, the argument that § 2422(b) s "sexual activity" element includes an interpersonal physical contact requirement. Given our rejection of this defense above, we find that the performance of Fugit s attorney did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness on this ground. Just as "[i]t is certainly reasonable for counsel not to raise unmeritorious claims," Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 756 (4th Cir. 1998), it is equally reasonable for counsel not to advise clients of unmeritorious defenses. Next, Fugit argues that his attorney performed deficiently by imparting erroneous advice regarding the plea process and its consequences. Specifically, Fugit contends that his attorney incorrectly informed him that he could not enter a "split plea" of guilty to Count One and not guilty to Count Two because both counts were presented in the same indictment. Fugit also contends that his attorney told him that if he pleaded guilty to both counts, his sentences would run concurrently (again because both counts were contained in a single indictment), whereas, in actuality, the sentencing court retained discretion to select either concurrent or consecutive sentences and, in fact, ordered the latter. While any such advice would have been erroneous, Fugit nonetheless fails to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Lockhart inquiry. B. As outlined above, in order to prove prejudice in the guilty plea context, a person challenging his conviction must estab- 20 UNITED STATES v. FUGIT lish "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court has specified, furthermore, that such an individual "must convince the court" that such a decision "would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. The challenger s subjective preferences, therefore, are not dispositive; what matters is whether proceeding to trial would have been objectively reasonable in light of all of the facts. See Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The test is objective, not subjective . . . ."). Fugit falls far short of satisfying this standard. He insists that "the record is . . . clear" that he "would not have pleaded guilty to Count Two but for trial counsel s erroneous advice." Even if this statement is subjectively true, however, the decision to go to trial would not have been objectively reasonable for the reasons discussed above. The evidence on Count Two was overwhelming. Fugit conceded to contacting a young girl over both the internet and telephone, lulling her into a false sense of security by lying about his identity, asking her a sustained series of totally inappropriate questions, and making numerous patently lewd comments including soliciting her to undress and to masturbate. What is more, had Fugit proceeded to trial, he would have undoubtedly opened himself up to multiple additional charges relating to multiple other victims and to child pornography as well. Fugit, in other words, was lucky to receive the deal that he did. Pleading guilty generally involves a conscious decision to accept both the benefits and burdens of a bargain. That decision may not be lightly undone by buyer s remorse on the part of one who has reaped advantage from the purchase. Fugit, consequently, cannot show that declining to plead guilty "would have been rational under the circumstances," Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485, and his remaining ineffective assistance arguments thus fail for lack of prejudice. See Pilla, 668 F.3d at 373 (finding that proceeding to trial would have been irra- UNITED STATES v. FUGIT 21 tional where defendant "faced overwhelming evidence of her guilt" and "had no rational defense, would have been convicted and would have faced a longer term of incarceration"). V. There are cases where the most learned doctrines of law match the most untutored lessons of common experience. This is one of those. There is no innocence here, save that of the child victims. Collateral review has nothing to correct. The judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED

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Defendant pled guilty to enticing or attempting to entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court held that defendant's primary contention that the district court erred in interpreting 18 U.S.C.

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http://www.hlntv.com/article/2012/10/02/girl-14-accused-choking-newborn-death

Teen girl kills her newborn and hides remains in shoe box.

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http://www.idahostatesman.com/2015/02/18/3650501/idaho-broadband-messstate-promises.html

CenturyLink is threatening to pull the plug on the Boise, Nampa, and Ada districts

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12 year old faces life in prison after shooting dad's fiance

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summary: Resisting and obstructing officers.(DUI)

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Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Sex Abuse Conviction. Renteria, Lee, West, Henley

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Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Sex Abuse Conviction. Renteria, Lee, West, Henley

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The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 2010 conviction of a Twin Falls man who sexually abused a vulnerable adult while both he and the victim were patients at St. Luke’s Canyon View Behavioral Health Services.

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TWIN FALLS * The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 2010 conviction of a Twin Falls man who sexually abused a vulnerable adult while both he and the victim were patients at St. Luke's Canyon View Behavioral Health Services.

David Aaron Knutsen, 34, of Filer, was sentenced Jan. 29, 2013, to 18 to 25 years in prison for sexually abusing a 22-year-old mentally disabled woman. He is serving additional time for the remainder of a sentence for a 1999 charge of lewd conduct with a minor.

May 7, 2010, the day after Knutsen was found guilty, he fled Idaho and was arrested in Ely, Nev., following a multistate manhunt. He spent time in prison there after nearly running over an officer while trying to escape.

At Knutsen's sentencing, attorney Doug Nelson said Knutsen was not operating at his full capacity while he was a patient at Canyon View, but he is also a low-functioning adult in general. Nelson questioned how Knutsen could be expected to know the victim could not legally consent to sexual activity.

In his appeal, Knutsen contended that the term of the grand jury that indicted him had already expired, the statute defining the crimes is unconstitutional, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and that his conviction should be for only one count because his conduct was one continuous act.

The Idaho Supreme Court unanimously rejected Knutsen's arguments in its opinion, which was filed Jan. 26.

The incident involving Knutsen was one of two that prompted sweeping changes to Canyon View's safety procedures, including 31 new security cameras and tighter patient-contact rules, after state inspectors determined the facility was unable to supervise patients and protect them from sexual harassment.

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Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Sex Abuse Conviction for Twin Falls Man

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TWIN FALLS * The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 2010 conviction of a Twin Falls man who sexually abused a vulnerable adult while both he and the victim were patients at St. Luke's Canyon View Behavioral Health Services. David Aaron Knutsen, 34, of Filer, was sentenced Jan.

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Shield more than 4 million immigrants.

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Abdul: a court of law responsible for the trial or legal supervision of children under the age of 18.

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Abdul: a court of law responsible for the trial or legal supervision of children under the age of 18.

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fraud or inequitable conduct.

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Dred Scott

By Jacob Hart

In March of 1857, the United States Supreme Court declared that all blacks -- slaves as well as free -- were not and could never become citizens of the US. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4h2933.html

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Idaho Supreme Court Rules Against City of Boise. Renteria, Lee, West, Henely

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Idaho Supreme Court Rules Against City of Boise. Renteria, Lee, West, Henely

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The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled in favor of a Boise building owner and against the city of Boise in a legal battle.

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click to enlarge

The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled in favor of a Boise building owner and against the city of Boise in a legal battle surrounding the currently under-construction River Edge Apartment complex on West Royal Boulevard near Boise State University.

It was March 2012 when 917 Lusk LLC, which owns a building next to the proposed five-story apartment complex, argued that the city had improperly granted a conditional use permit to the apartment building's developers.

Lusk said the area had been zoned for residential/office developments but required a special permit for a building taller than 35 feet. Lusk owners also argued that the proposed apartment building would have an adverse impact on needed parking spaces.

Lusk took the city of Boise and Royal Boulevard Associates-the developer of the apartment building-to district court, which agreed with the City Council decision to give developers the conditional use permit.

But in a ruling handed down today, the Idaho Supreme court reversed the lower court's decision, thus upending the permit for the project. The high court ruled that the Boise City Council "erred by affirming the Planning and Zoning decision" and that the commission "abused its discretion."

"We conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Lusk is in jeopardy of economic hardship from the project," wrote the justices.

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Idaho Supreme Court Rules Against City of Boise, Developer of River Edge Apartments

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click to enlarge The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled in favor of a Boise building owner and against the city of Boise in a legal battle surrounding the currently under-construction River Edge Apartment complex on West Royal Boulevard near Boise State University.

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an area of a country or city, especially one regarded as a distinct unit because of a particular characteristic.

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The Idaho Supreme Court is the state supreme court of Idaho and is composed of the chief justice and four associate justices.

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Trial courts of the federal court system

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1. Probate is a legal document. Receipt of probate is the first step in the legal process of administering the estate of a deceased person, resolving all claims and distributing the deceased person's property under a will.

2. A probate court (also called a surrogate court) is a specialized court that deals with matters of probate and the administration of estates.

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Definition: A court who's jurisdiction is to review decisions of lower courts or agencies

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Special court where disputes are resolved quickly and inexpensively attorneys usualy are not allowed.