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UK News Footage What you would have seen on the daily news channel !

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UK News Footage What you would have seen on the daily news channel !

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1982 Falklands War Day by Day (PART 1/2) | Archive Footage Documentary

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The Falklands War: Remembered | The Untold Story | Timeline

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Due in 31st March

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Terrorism in the EU: trends, terror attacks and arrests in 2023

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Terrorism in the EU: trends, terror attacks and arrests in 2023

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The number of terrorist attacks in the EU increased in 2023 compared to previous years. Read about key facts and trends presented in the European Parliament.

The EU's law enforcement agency, Europol, publishes a yearly report that looks at the latest trends, threats and activities related to different types of terrorism. The information comes from EU countries, Europol's partners, and publicly available sources.

The 2024 report was presented to the European Parliament's home affairs committee in January 2025 by Jean-Philippe Lecouffe, deputy executive director for operations at Europol.

Terrorist attacks and deaths in the EU in 2023

According to the 2024 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 120 terrorist attacks were recorded in the EU in 2023, including 98 completed attacks, 9 failed attempts and 13 foiled plots. This marked a sharp increase from 28 attacks in 2022 and 18 in 2021.

Attacks occurred in seven EU countries:

France: 80 attacks

Italy: 30 attacks

Germany: 3 attacks

Spain: 3 attacks

Belgium: 2 attacks

Greece: 1 attack

Luxembourg: 1 attack

Most completed attacks (70) were carried out by separatist groups. Jihadist groups completed five attacks, which caused the highest number of casualties with twelve people injured and six killed.

Terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU in 2023

Terrorist arrests in the EU in 2023

There were 426 individuals arrested for terrorist offences across 22 EU countries in 2023 - an increase from 380 in 2022. More than half of these arrests took place in four countries: Spain (84), France (78), Belgium (75), and Germany (51). Those arrested were mainly young, male EU nationals.

The total number of concluded court proceedings in 2023 was 358 - a decrease from 427 in the previous year. The proceedings, which took place across 14 EU countries, resulted in 290 convictions and 68 acquittals.

Terrorism in the EU: key figures

Jihadist terrorism was the deadliest form, causing 6 deaths and injuring 12 people

Arrests: 426 people were arrested in 22 EU countries for terrorism-related offenses, with most arrests (334) linked to jihadist terrorism

Court proceedings: 358 cases concluded in 2023, leading to 290 convictions and 68 acquittals

Recent trends in terrorism in the EU

Young people targeted in recruitment

Vulnerable youngsters are actively targeted for recruitment into terrorism, Lecouffe said at the presentation of the report in Parliament. He suggested that the issue should be tackled not only through law enforcement but also through the general policy towards youth.

In 2023, young people were involved in planning attacks, creating propaganda and inciting violence. Radicalisation often occurs online through virtual communities that reinforce extremist views and target younger audiences with visually appealing content.

Using technology in recruitment

Terrorists are leveraging technology to communicate, recruit and spread propaganda. The Europol report mentions the use of:

Artificial intelligence (AI): Some groups use AI to create deepfakes and spread misinformation.

Privacy tools: Encrypted messaging apps, VPNs (apps that allow users to hide their device's location), and the dark web (a hidden part of the internet not indexed by regular search engines) help terrorists evade detection.

Immersive technologies: Virtual environments are being used for training, including attack simulations.

Cryptocurrencies: Cryptocurrency is used to finance terrorism.

In an answer to MEPs' questions, Europol's deputy executive director said that the EU regulation, adopted in 2021 to prevent the spread of terrorist content online, is yielding results.

He explained that Europol has developed a tool that facilitates referring terrorist content to online service providers that can then take a decision to remove the flagged content in line with their policies and terms of services. The tool also transmits removal orders from authorities in the member states to the online service providers.

"Since June 2023, we have made 46,400 referrals [of content] and the member states have sent through us 1,406 removal orders that were followed by the online service providers," Lecouffe said.

The Israel-Gaza conflict

Extremist groups exploited the terrorist attack by Hamas on 7 October 2023 against Israel and the subsequent military response by Israel in Gaza to attract followers and raise funds. The Europol report noted that the conflict has fuelled online hate speech, polarisation and a surge in anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim rhetoric in the EU.

Rise of conspiracy theories and anti-system narratives

Economic, social and political challenges have created fertile ground for the spread of extremist narratives and conspiracy theories, the Europol report said. Social media platforms amplify these narratives, which makes it more likely for their targets to construct their own hybrid ideologies, which are then used to justify and promote violence.

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Terrorism in the EU: trends, terror attacks and arrests in 2023 | Topics | European Parliament

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The number of terrorist attacks in the EU increased in 2023 compared to previous years. Read about key facts and trends presented in the European Parliament.

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Ten worst terrorist attacks in terms of fatalities in Europe from 1980 to 2023

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Ten worst terrorist attacks in terms of fatalities in Europe from 1980 to 2023

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Worst terrorist attacks in Europe | Statista

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The Lockerbie plane bombing of 1988 was the worst terrorist attack up until 2024, resulting in 270 fatalities.

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Carnage at German Christmas market as car smashes into crowd in suspected attack | BBC News

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Resource on understanding data -motivation of attacks with Europe to date

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Resource on understanding data -motivation of attacks with Europe to date

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Examples of Separatist Movements:

Kurds: A large, stateless ethnic group with a long history of seeking autonomy or independence in regions spanning several countries.

Basque Separatists: A movement in the Basque Country, a region in northern Spain and southwestern France, seeking independence or greater autonomy.

Tamil Tigers (LTTE): A militant separatist group that fought for an independent Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka.

Causes of Ethno-nationalist Separatism:

Historical Grievances: Perceived injustices, discrimination, or marginalization by a dominant group can fuel separatist movements.

Cultural and Linguistic Differences: Distinct cultures, languages, or religions can create a sense of separation and a desire for self-governance.

Economic Disparities: Perceived economic exploitation or inequality can lead to calls for separation.

Political Marginalization: Lack of representation or influence in the larger political system can drive separatist sentiments.

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Europol - the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation - publishes an EU terrorism situation and trend report every year. The report provides figures on terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the European Union and is based on information provided by EU member states.

Terrorist attacks in the EU and the UK by affiliation (2010-2020)

This chart shows terrorist attacks in the EU and UK between 2010 and 2020. The figures include completed, failed and foiled attacks and are broken down by year and by affiliation: jihadist / religiously inspired, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, ethno-nationalist and separatist, single-issue and non-specified.

The 'single-issue' category refers to extremist and terrorist groups using criminal means to try to change a specific policy or practice.

In 2020 there were 57 terrorist incidents in the EU member states. The total number of attacks in 2020 was comparable to the number in 2019 but lower than in earlier years. Between 2018 and 2020, 44 jihadist or extreme right-wing plots were foiled across the EU and UK.

Terrorism-related arrests in the EU and the UK (2010-2020)

This chart shows terrorism-related arrests in the EU and UK between 2010 and 2020, by year and by affiliation: jihadist / religiously inspired, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, ethno-nationalist and separatist, single-issue and non-specified.

Between 2018 and 2020, nearly 2,000 people were arrested in EU member states on suspicion of terrorism-related offences, along with a further 739 in the UK. In 2020, the most frequent offence leading to arrest - among those reported - was membership of a terrorist group, followed by propaganda dissemination, planning terrorist acts and facilitating and financing terrorism.

Terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU (2020)

This chart shows terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU in 2020. The figures include completed, failed and foiled attacks and all types of affiliation: jihadist / religiously inspired, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, ethno-nationalist and separatist, single-issue and non-specified.

21 people lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the EU in 2020. Jihadist terrorists completed 10 attacks in Austria, France and Germany, killing 12 people. One right-wing terrorist attack in Germany killed nine people.

More information:

See all infographics

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Europol - the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation - publishes an EU terrorism situation and trend report every year. The report provides figures on terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the European Union and is based on information provided by EU member states.

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Channel 4 Documentary 3 Parts to this one 

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Channel 4 Documentary 3 Parts to this one 

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Getting Away with Murder(s)

Fortress Britain with Alice Roberts

Empire State of Mind

Stephen Fry: Willem & Frieda - Defying Nazis

His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh

Britain's Human Zoos

Hitler: The Lost Tapes

The Real Windsors

Getting Away with Murder(s)

Fortress Britain with Alice Roberts

Empire State of Mind

Stephen Fry: Willem & Frieda - Defying Nazis

His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh

Britain's Human Zoos

Hitler: The Lost Tapes

The Real Windsors

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Miners' Strike 1984: The Battle for Britain - Episode 1

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The strike was bitterly divisive, nowhere more so than Derbyshire pit village Shirebrook

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Annual budget of Europol in the European Union from 2010 to 2024

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Annual budget of Europol in the European Union from 2010 to 2024

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In 2024, Europol’s budget reached 222.44 million euros, reflecting an approximate 4.5% increase compared to the previous year.

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BBC news Miners strike picketts fight police 1984

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BBC news Miners strike picketts fight police 1984. the police had a fine collection of marbles at the end of the day!!

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The Battle of Orgreave, The Miners Strike.

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Maggie and the miners - were the army at the ready?

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Miners' strike - 30 years since the pit crisis of 1984

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On this day, the UK Miners' Strike of 1984-85 ended in defeat for Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers when miners reluctantly and bitterly voted to return to work. The strike, lasting just two days short of a year, was Britain's longest and largest industrial dispute. It was also a pivotal turning point in post-war British history - the seminal moment when Britain's Left was brutally, comprehensively and thus far subjugated. Before 1984, Britain had been an industrial nation - resuscitated from the ashes of the Second World War by Clement Attlee's socialist-democratic vision of a welfare state with its National Health Service and nationalised industries. But when Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative government came to power in 1979, they determined to unleash privatisation and free market policies on the whole of society - and the only way to do that was by destroying the trade unions.

The miners' strike began on 5th March 1984 after the Tories announced a programme of pit closures; by 12th March, half of Britain's 187,000 miners had downed tools. But Thatcher - riding high from her victory in the Falklands - had secretly and cynically prepared for battle by stockpiling two years' worth of coal before announcing the closures. And she was hellbent on defeating "the enemy within" by any means necessary, even if it meant turning the full force of the state against its own people. For the first time in a postwar national strike, British police were openly used as a political weapon. Civil liberties were forgotten as miners were beaten and arrested even when standing still. Agent provocateurs and spies were deployed. State benefits were withheld in order to starve the miners back to work. And the media was used to portray the miners as thugs. What had begun as an industrial dispute degenerated into a clash of ideologies and civil class war.

For an entire year, some 130,000 miners and their families suffered unimaginable hardships in order to save jobs and preserve communities. But despite the strikers being pitted against the full force of the ruling class, and additionally betrayed by the Trades Union Congress and Labour Party's refusal to mobilise support, some extraordinary stories of grassroots British solidarity emerged: the refusal of print workers at The Sun to allow the publication of a doctored photo of Arthur Scargill appearing to make a Nazi salute; rail workers blocking the delivery of coal to the Orgreave coking plant; attempts by the alternative media to counter the shameful distortions of the mainstream coverage; the generosity of the Sikh community which regularly provided free meals; and the indefatigable work of the local miners' support groups, especially the remarkable Women Against Pit Closures.

Fundraising allowed the strikers to hold out for as long as they did, but in the early months of 1985, increasing numbers began to drift back to work as the hardship became too much. And, on 3 rd March 1984, an NUM delegate conference narrowly voted to end the strike. The miners marched back to work together, brokenhearted but their heads held high in defiance. Thatcher was graceless in victory. "There is no such thing as society," she infamously declared. Her neo-liberal blueprint would result not only in the selling off and selling out of the coal industry, but also the decimation of Britain's manufacturing industry, the subjugation of all trade unions, and the doubling of unemployment and inflation. Indeed, the roots of the UK's current financial chaos can be directly traced to the defeat of the miners' strike and her subsequent privatisation policies.

The coal industry was never going to survive as it had been, but that's not the point. A government has a moral responsibility for its population, but Thatcher heartlessly snuffed out thriving communities. The Tories spent £6 billion during the strike to defeat the NUM and would eventually spend £26 billion to dismantle the mining industry, leaving a nationwide residue of ghost towns rife with unemployment, drug addiction and anti-social behaviour.

Arthur Scargill recently gave his verdict on the strike's legacy:

"Britain in 1984 was already a divided and degraded society - it has become much more so in the 25 years since ... The NUM's struggle remains not only an inspiration for workers but a warning to today's union leaders of their responsibility to their members, and the need to challenge both government and employers over all forms of injustice, inequality and exploitation. That is the legacy of the NUM's strike of 1984/85, a truly historic fight that gave birth to the magnificent Women Against Pit Closures and the miners' support groups. I have always said that the greatest victory in the strike was the struggle itself, a struggle that inspired millions of people around the world."

This entry was posted in World Events. Bookmark the permalink.

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3rd March 1985 - The End of the 1984-85 Miners' Strike

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On this day, the UK Miners' Strike of 1984-85 ended in defeat for Arthur Scargill and the National Union of Mineworkers when miners reluctantly and bitterly voted to return to work. The strike, lasting just two days short of a ...

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report by Police Scotland north of the border and impact 

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report by Police Scotland north of the border and impact 

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3. Policing and beyond

From an early stage in our work, one thing became apparent. In terms of much of the permanent impact and damage caused by the Strike, it is impossible to separate out the role played by the policing of the Strike and identify an impact or impacts which could be attributed solely to policing. In any event, this relationship appears to have changed during the progression of the strike.

It is true, however, that decisions made by the police led to decisions made by others, whether within the justice system or within the NCB. Some of those who have suffered the most are men who were arrested but also convicted and sacked. This Chapter will explore the full range of processes and procedures experienced by many miners, beginning with arrest but extending to various other aspects of the justice system and dismissal by the NCB.

The detailed submission from Dr Jim Phillips, received in response to the Call for Evidence, reflected on evidence we heard at the Fallin meeting which outlined the sequence of events experienced by some:
"It is clear that policing targeted individual strikers. Key local activists at Fallin were persistently harassed. They experienced both direct and indirect wrongs as a result. Direct wrongs included false arrest, threatened and actual lengthy spells of detainment on remand, physical abuse in custody by police officers, verbal threats and intimidation in the community by police officers, and highly punitive sentencing, including fines of £350 to £400 for public order offences. Indirect wrongs included dismissal from coal industry employment arising from arrest (not conviction) and loss of income, including pension contributions, subsequent financial hardship, loss of esteem, pressure on family and marital relationships, and negative effects on physical and mental health. The effects of these indirect wrongs were compounded in many cases by the evident black-listing of ex-mining activists by non-coal employers. Policing decisions had major impacts on the employment status and subsequent careers of the strikers who were targeted. The injustices encountered by striking miners in Scotland were the result of decisions made in Scotland as well as in Whitehall and Westminster."
Operation of the criminal justice system affected a surprisingly high number and percentage of striking miners. In Scotland, the number of striking miners was approximately 14,000 and, by the end of the Strike, approximately 1,400 had been arrested, with over 500 convicted, whether by plea of guilty or after trial. According to the Brown/Rees Report (page 7), in Scotland, 603 were found guilty and 140 acquitted up to 22 March 1985, with 569 convictions and 109 acquittals being for breach of the peace, 220 convictions and 29 acquittals under the Police (Scotland) Act, 1967, section 41 and smaller numbers for miscellaneous matters.

In England and Wales, between 13 March 1984 and 5 March 1985, the number of striking miners was approximately 187,000; of these, the number of miners arrested was 8,788 from a total of arrests related to the Strike of 9,808. The total number of charges was 10,372. This included charges of murder (3), arson (15), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (429), assault occasioning grievous bodily harm (39), riot (137) and unlawful imprisonment (2). 5,653 cases were dealt with by the courts of which 4,318 resulted in convictions and 1,335 in acquittals.

In Scotland, there were far fewer of the more serious charges which featured south of the border. Notwithstanding this, it will be seen that approximately 10% of striking miners in Scotland were arrested, by comparison to approximately 5% in England and Wales.

In Scotland, approximately 206 (1.5% of the total number of striking miners) were dismissed. This was a higher percentage than in England and Wales where approximately 800 to 900 miners were dismissed out of a total of 131,000 strikers, giving a percentage of 0.61/0.68%. In Bilston Glen, 36 of 1,800 striking miners were dismissed (2.0%) and at Monktonhall, 46 out of 1,700 striking miners were dismissed (2.7%).

The arbitrary and inconsistent approach by the NCB was addressed in the Brown/Rees Report from page 65 onwards, for example:
(i) "In all, more than 900 miners have been dismissed by the National Coal Board. After representations in England and Wales, 280 have been reinstated. In Scotland, some 200 miners have been dismissed - and none reinstated. With less than 10% of British miners, and around 10% of convictions for offences related to the strike, Scotland has had more than 30% of the dismissals." (iii) "From information available on 150 of the dismissed miners in Scotland, it appears that more than 90% of the Scottish dismissals have arisen as a result of breach of the peace offences, police obstruction and breaches of the Bail Act. In addition, the vast majority of fines imposed by the Courts have been £100 or less, and the majority of miners dismissed have no previous criminal convictions. Some miners have been dismissed even when they were admonished in court, found not proven or not guilty, or even not brought to court."
This additional disproportionality is another aspect of the lasting damage caused by the Strike, with an unanswered question being why proportionately more of those on strike in Scotland suffered arrest and dismissal than elsewhere, especially when the relative gravity of the offending in Scotland appears to have been less serious than in England and Wales - something acknowledged, for example, in the Fife Constabulary Debrief Report -
"While it is still suggested that the existing legislation is basically sufficient to deal with the problem, especially in Scotland where the same level of violence was never reached as what was evident in England, there may be some merit in setting up a"
These miners experienced not one process, nor the impact of a single agency or actor. The police were involved at an early stage of the series of events which befell them, but conviction and dismissal involved other processes, decisions and agencies, including other parts of the State.

In the evidence we have seen and heard, it is clear that some of the main continuing impact is felt to be a consequence of policing but, when explored as we were able to do at the public meetings, individuals recognised the greater complexity of factors which contributed to what they still feel. Some people attributed the impacts to the policing of the strike, and this may be a result of the police being the arm of the State closest to daily aspects of the Strike, and often the first in a series of steps which led to the greater impacts of conviction, dismissal and loss of career. In meetings, it became apparent that the Crown (Procurator Fiscal), judiciary, legal profession and NCB were also implicated by miners as authors of the various impacts of the Strike.

Of course, looking at this takes us beyond the strict limits of our Terms of Reference but we considered it necessary to include this chapter because of the impossibility in some cases of isolating impacts of policing alone and because these aspects came up at every meeting and in many of the responses to the Call for Evidence. As policing was an early part of the processes touching individuals, serving as a stepping stone to those processes which followed, we recognise these other parts of the justice system even if they involved subsequent and distinct decisions which moved the individuals on to further stages of increasingly adverse impact. In any event, it should also be borne in mind that the police were involved in subsequent parts of the justice system, for example in the preparation of reports to the Procurator Fiscal and statements, and giving evidence as witnesses in court or at tribunals regarding dismissal. It is therefore impossible to separate entirely the role of the police from that of the justice system itself. And the justice system, including the courts, Procurator Fiscal service and legal profession are all within devolved competence. All of this served to draw our attention to matters raised in this chapter as an aspect of the impacts of the Strike as well as part of its context.

Justice System

The justice system is perhaps best understood as a series of different systems which, in theory, work together to achieve fair, just and proportionate processes and outcomes. For our purposes, the justice system means the police, Procurator Fiscal, defence lawyers and the judiciary. Once more, we start with quotes from miners which outline some of the lingering issues.
"Judiciary in cahoots with police" "If no one was directing the courts, why were there so many arrests/sackings?" "A judiciary set up against miners" "all miners are criminals and should be jailed." (quote attributed by a miner to a Sheriff in Ayrshire, perhaps a version of the episode mentioned later in this chapter).
(quotes from miners at our public meetings).

An outline of the system of criminal procedure applying at the time of the strike is helpful, as current law differs in certain respects.

For those individuals who were arrested, there would usually, although not always, be a court appearance the next day (or the first day after the weekend or any public holiday). Some were released for summons (the report would be sent by the police to the Procurator Fiscal who could decide to issue a summons/citation to appear in court on a subsequent date), and some were released by the police on bail undertakings (they signed at the police station to accept that they would attend court on a specific date in the next few weeks). In all of these situations, the role of the Procurator Fiscal was important for the next stage following arrest. The Procurator Fiscal had to assess each case reported by the police and decide if there was sufficient evidence in law to justify proceedings, i.e. was there corroboration of a crime and the identity of the perpetrator. Thereafter, the Procurator Fiscal still had to decide if proceedings were in the public interest. The latter test may well have been applied differently in those days than now, especially as diversion from prosecution was not so common as it has become.

The Fife Constabulary Debrief Report dated 11 April 1985 commented on some of these police reports to the Procurator Fiscal.
"The subsequent Police reports compiled were on occasions of fairly poor quality."
If the decision was to take criminal proceedings against a miner, a summary complaint (document containing the charge or charges) would be prepared by the Procurator Fiscal and, if he had been kept in police custody, served on him at court, usually in the cells. Unlike petition proceedings (for more serious cases), the miner would be expected to enter a plea - guilty or not guilty - at the first appearance. A continuation without plea was possible but rather more unusual. If the plea was not guilty, a trial would be fixed and the only remaining question would be the crucial matter of whether the miner was to be bailed or remanded in custody for trial. This was a question for the Sheriff. A number of factors were relevant to this decision, not least the attitude of the Procurator Fiscal. If bail was opposed by the Procurator Fiscal, it would usually be refused. If bail was unopposed, it could be granted subject to special conditions identified by the Procurator Fiscal. Commonly, during the Strike, conditions would include not to return to the picket line from which a miner had been arrested.

Remand in custody was a possibility if the individual had previous convictions or was on bail. In particular, if a miner was on bail to stay away from a picket and was arrested back there in apparent breach of bail, a remand was perhaps even likely.

If the plea was guilty, the Sheriff could proceed to dispose of the matter, often, perhaps even usually, by way of a fine. In some cases, the Sheriff might order a Social Enquiry Report for more information before imposing a penalty. This final decision would involve taking into account all the personal circumstances of the miner, including what, if any, income he had.

Even away from the Strike, many who experience the justice system find it confusing and unfair, at least partly because of a lack of knowledge about how it works or is supposed to work. It is also generally recognised that any individual is at their most vulnerable immediately at the outset of detention. This adds to a sense of disorientation.

For a variety of reasons, including personal experience and stories of what happened to others, that perception was a common view of those who gave evidence to us. The perception of arbitrariness extended to miners whose involvement in the Strike brought them into contact with the courts, often for the first and only time in their lives. In terms of evidence, a vague, even apocryphal, sense of unfairness in the justice system may have been the only impact, had it not been for one well-known example which offered support for the idea of a system set against the miners. The example, which was mentioned frequently in evidence to the review, but is also vouched by a reported decision of the Appeal Court in Scotland, is the case known to lawyers as Bradford v McLeod. The case is probably better known by reference to the identity of the Sheriff (Sheriff David Smith, now deceased). It involved an appeal by 14 miners, one of whom attended our Cumnock consultation event, who had each been convicted of a breach of the peace in relation to attendance at a picket at Hunterston in the early stages of the Strike in 1984. Each man had been convicted by a Sheriff following trial. All 14 convictions were quashed on the basis that the Appeal Court accepted that justice had not been seen to have been done. This was because the Sheriff had been overheard by a solicitor at a social event in June 1984 stating that he would not grant legal aid to any miner whose application he dealt with in respect of a criminal prosecution. That solicitor raised the matter in court in a case involving a miner. The Opinion of the court confirms that the Sheriff refused legal aid to 7 of the 14 men involved in the appeal (he did not deal with any of the other legal aid applications relevant to the case). This pronouncement by the Sheriff was particularly significant because the Sheriffs in Kilmarnock had a policy of granting legal aid only if an applicant could establish in advance that he had a "serious defence" to the charge against him. The Sheriff's private declaration regarding miners might suggest that he had decided, even before seeing an application for legal aid, that their defences were without sufficient merit - at the very least, a clear appearance of bias -

"In my opinion, a reasonable person on hearing that the sheriff had made that observation would be likely to conclude that the sheriff was biased so far as cases involving miners were concerned. Indeed the generality of the observation is such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man a definite suspicion that the sheriff may have such a bias. As explained... in the passage quoted above, that is sufficient to disqualify a judge from performing his duty even though as matter of fact the judge is not biased. I appreciate that at the time when the sheriff made the observation about legal aid, he had no reason to suppose that he personally would be involved in the determination of legal aid applications by any miners as he was not the nominated legal aid sheriff at Kilmarnock for the year in question. In my opinion, that does not matter since the important question is the effect that hearing the observation would have on a reasonable person...
"It follows that the convictions cannot stand. It is a tribute to the law in Scotland that there are so few recorded cases where it has been alleged that justice has not been seen to be done. This case may serve as a reminder that the law in Scotland is jealous of its reputation for doing justice and for ensuring that justice is seen to be done; it may also serve to remind judges that if justice is not merely to be done but is to be visibly done, they like Caesar's wife must be above suspicion." (Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Ross)."
The decision of the Appeal Court reads as being of a different age, with niceties around private conversations at social gatherings seeming to cause almost as much concern to the Judges as what the Sheriff actually said, with its disturbing implications. Nonetheless, the case, involving 14 men involved in the Strike, has left an understandable and indelible mark on the collective memory of the mining community throughout Scotland. While many people leave court feeling aggrieved, very few are able to point to hard evidence of unfairness in how their cases have been handled or in justice being seen to be done. These 14 men were able to point at least to a strong perception of unfairness and, in turn, their experience has informed that of many who also feel that they were treated unfairly, even if they are unable to point to a specific unfairness in their own cases such as those dealt with by the Sheriff following his unguarded remarks suggestive of prejudice against all miners charged with a crime connected to the Strike.

In our consideration of the justice system, we have been careful to note that there is an additional factor which may not be quite so obvious as the Procurator Fiscal and the Sheriff - the defence lawyer. The defence lawyer played a part in most of these cases from an early stage. When the miners appeared in court, many of them were represented by a lawyer, whether the duty solicitor, a union solicitor or some other solicitor. That lawyer would offer advice on the key questions of how to plead, whether bail would be granted and what the penalty would be following a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt after trial.

These days, that lawyer and the accused person would be informed by a summary of evidence attached to the complaint served on the accused. This allows for a more meaningful discussion than would have been possible in the days of the Strike when the only information would be the bare terms of the charge and whatever could be gleaned from the miner, in far from ideal circumstances with an often confused and vulnerable man in custody for the first time in busy, noisy and disorientating cells in the court.

On the question of bail, the Strike pre-dates the impact on our courts of the Human Rights Act 1998 (given effect in Scotland from May 1999 through the Scotland Act 1998). This means that the attitude of the Crown was frequently given greater weight and less scrutiny than would be the case now.

From what we have heard, there were situations where the impact of the justice system on an individual developed as follows - if the first accused miner to appear from custody was refused bail on a plea of not guilty, and we heard of this happening, word would spread in the cells among other accused persons and in the court among the lawyers. This often resulted in reconsideration of a previously instructed plea of not guilty, as it was sometimes easier to obtain release by pleading guilty (which opened up the possibility of, for example, a fine to deal with the matter). Those already on bail, in particular if that was for a matter also related to the Strike, may well have been advised that they would be better off pleading guilty if their priority was to obtain their release. Following pleas of guilty, many men were indeed fined. We have heard complaints about the level of fines imposed which many are convinced were higher for some than fines for equivalent behaviour which was unrelated to the Strike but, for obvious reasons, a fine would almost always be considered preferable to a remand in custody.

Pleading not guilty would also involve at least the possibility of stringent bail conditions which would prevent further picketing.

Those who decided to plead not guilty faced trial, usually a few months after the initial court appearance but not uncommonly even later than that when cases were adjourned. Some of those who went to trial were also convicted with many convinced that they received unfair hearings, forming an impression that a guilty verdict was inevitable. We spoke to men who were acquitted following trial, with reasons varying from a lack of conjunction of testimony of police officers to impressions of a reluctance on the part of some officers to see men convicted, especially after the Strike had ended. The Fife Constabulary Debrief Report commented on acquittals as follows:
"The main reason for the Not Guilty verdicts has been the evidence of some Sergeants who have not prepared their presentation in Court. This is a fundamental mistake, but not restricted to our Sheriffdom. Others have been found Not Guilty by virtue of mistakes made by the Fiscal Service in that they preferred inaccurate charges against a few accused. What happened was that where an accused was charged with attempting to rescue a prisoner the Fiscal preferred a charge of Police Obstruction and the cases fell because of this."
We encountered men who regretted pleading guilty to charges despite protesting their innocence, given the immediate and long-term impact of the conviction on their employment and employability, matters which were not anticipated, certainly in the early days of the Strike.

We move on now to address the issue of dismissals by the NCB. It is worth bearing in mind that dismissal was not an inevitable or expected consequence, even of conviction. It appears to have become so by operation of a specific policy by the NCB in Scotland. There may have come a point in the Strike when it was understood that dismissal may well follow but, given what happened in England and Wales, there may also have been an anticipation of the possibility of reinstatement. Arbitrary and unjustified dismissal in Scotland, frequently without reinstatement, is the single-most adverse lasting impact of the Strike on those from whom we received evidence.

National Coal Board And Dismissal
"Police had full and certain knowledge that we would lose our job" "Police said they didn't know - but everyone knew"
(quotes from miners at our public meetings).
(iv) "We find it unsatisfactory and anomalous that the Scottish Coal Board director has stated that his policy includes dismissals even where there are court acquittals; and sackings even before summonses to court. He has also stated that he will not feel bound by decisions of Industrial Tribunals favouring reinstatement."
(Brown/Rees Report, page 66)

We did not locate any official documentation from the NCB to confirm such a policy but we heard evidence to that effect from miners and it was a policy identified as far back as this report in 1985.

When miners had been processed in the justice system, for many that was not the end of the matter. A policy of dismissal was instituted by the NCB for those convicted, seemingly regardless of the penalty imposed. The same happened to some men who were merely arrested, with charges subsequently dropped and even some who were acquitted. The numbers and percentages appear at the start of this Chapter.

Despite this stage being distinct from the justice system, we have included it here because of its particular significance and because what preceded it in the justice system was used as justification for what followed.

Questions were asked at our meetings about the lines of communication between the justice system, either the Procurator Fiscal or the courts, and the NCB, given the remarkable efficiency in a largely pre-digital age in tracking arrests and convictions and arranging dismissal. One miner told us of a hand-delivered letter of dismissal from the NCB waiting for him behind the door when he got back from court. The suggestion was made at meetings that the Procurator Fiscal updated the NCB with information about court appearances. The speed of some dismissals supports the suggestion and appears to us to be credible.

Even leaving aside data protection and GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) issues these days, such a line of communication would be troubling. Many arrests were reported in newspapers and it may be that this was another source of information.

Men were often, but not always, dismissed when the court had decided that a financial penalty would suffice by way of punishment. There are serious questions about the proportionality of this action, with many of the convictions being for crimes where the underlying behaviour could not readily be described as "gross misconduct" or the equivalent, such as might have been used to justify dismissal. Many miners believe that the NCB used the excuse of arrest, among other things, to carry out a cull of "troublemakers", with known union activists and officials featuring heavily in the arrests and dismissals.

It should be noted that the NCB was another arm of the State, albeit a statutory corporation established to run the nationalised coal industry in the UK, run, in theory at least, at arm's length from Government. The Chair during the Strike was Sir Ian MacGregor. In his autobiography, he speaks of regular contact with the Government, including the Prime Minister, during the Strike. He mentions discussions with her about the policing of the Strike and his concern that the police were standing back too much and failing to offer sufficient protection to the miners who continued, or returned, to work.

With the NCB, a part of the State, the dismissal of convicted miners was another impact of State action. Indeed, for many, this was the impact which distinguishes the 1984/85 Strike from those strikes which had gone before. Many miners thought that, after the Strike, they would simply be allowed to return to work. If so, they were to be quickly disappointed. Some found other work, but we heard from men who never worked again. "Blacklisting" was part of what men described when they attempted to obtain other work after the Strike, although it seems that the mere fact of conviction operated as effectively as a blacklist for some. Those who held positions in trade unions or had been particularly active during the Strike seem to have been disproportionately affected in this way too.

One name mentioned repeatedly in our meetings was Albert Wheeler, NCB Scottish Area Director during the Strike. We were interested in seeing if we might be able to talk to him, especially to better understand the processes within the NCB which led to the usually strict policy of dismissal for convictions and arrests, as well as lines of communication with the justice system. Unfortunately, when we made inquiries, Mr Wheeler was unfit to be interviewed. He died earlier this year.

Notwithstanding evidence from several miners in line with the quotes at the start of this section about police officers knowing that dismissal might follow arrest, we should record at this point that police officers who provided evidence stated that they were unaware, at least during the early stages of the Strike, that arrested miners would often be dismissed. When this became common knowledge, it was suggested to us by some officers that miners were sometimes "arrested" but simply released after a short while without formal processing. Officers told us that they considered dismissal from employment an excessive response to most of the behaviour they had to deal with.

The Impact Of Convictions

As will be seen from our Terms of Reference, the conviction of specific individuals was beyond our remit. We have noted the patterns of convictions, however, because they represent a real and continuing impact of policing, a visible "scar", albeit also of some of the other processes described above which followed on from policing.

Several hundred men were convicted, whether by plea of guilty or verdict of guilt following trial, mostly on summary complaint for breach of the peace.

The impact of convictions went beyond the men affected, touching their families and communities, both in terms of the financial consequences of dismissal and unemployment, as well as confidence in the police, judiciary and the State. As outlined, dismissals followed in many cases, with pensions reduced or lost and re-employment thereafter difficult or impossible to secure for many. This compounded a sense of arbitrariness, even injustice in some cases.

For those who seek to challenge individual convictions, avenues already exist, whether by late
appeal to the High Court or application to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (" SCCRC") to seek a referral back to the High Court - section 194C, Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995: The grounds upon which the Commission may refer a case to the High Court are that they believe
(a) that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred; and (b) that it is in the interests of justice that a reference should be made.

During the period of the review, we sought to signpost individuals appropriately, without raising expectations due to the uncertainty of these processes, as well as the high attrition rate for applications, with only a small number of cases being referred back to the High Court by the SCCRC and not all of them resulting in the quashing of convictions. The small numbers are unsurprising for a number of reasons although it should be noted that the current system of independent assessment and investigation by the SCCRC is significantly better than what it replaced, namely review by Government. That system was seen as flawed for many reasons, not least the absence of proper independence and, in the SCCRC's 2019 Annual Report, it is highlighted that the referral rate by the SCCRC is 2,500% higher than that of its predecessor.

In fact, having checked the matter with the Chief Executive of the SCCRC in July 2019, over the period of the review there have been no applications to the SCCRC associated with the Strike. There may be a number of reasons for this, not least recognition of the practical and legal challenges, especially in relation to summary convictions from over 30 years ago.

The SCCRC performs a crucial role in our system, providing independent oversight of possible miscarriages of justice but its strengths - independence of investigation and assessment - are only effective in certain circumstances. It is significant for our purposes that the SCCRC is more effective when it comes to referring solemn cases back to the Appeal Court. That is because solemn cases necessarily produce more material which can be the subject of investigation, for example, transcripts of the Sheriff or Judge's Charge to the Jury or audio-recordings of the whole evidence in a trial. The SCCRC has also been most effective when considering cases which are relatively more recent than those from the Strike, where retention of records is more extensive than it was over 30 years ago or where retention periods have expired.

We have given this area further consideration and, as a result, it is now the subject of a specific recommendation. Taking into account the evidence we have heard and further exploration of the practicalities and legal technicalities of the process involved, we can no longer suggest that application to the SCCRC represents a practical and effective remedy for those with convictions arising out of incidents during the strike.

It was only towards the end of the review process that we reached this conclusion. It is informed in part by detailed consideration of the evidence we have heard as we prepared this report, including the absence of paperwork or documented evidence in the case of most individuals and the impact of the passage of time on the type of official records which would be a basic requirement for any investigation by the SCCRC. It will be noted that, unlike in solemn cases, there is no audio-recording of summary cases. Discussions with senior staff at the National Records Scotland, Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the Scottish Courts and Tribunal Service confirm that most relevant records (summary complaints, court minutes) will no longer exist owing to the passage of time and the fact that they involved summary procedure. The only other records which might exist would be the notes taken by the Sheriff. It is unlikely that many of these survive. In cases involving a plea of guilty, these notes would simply record the Crown narrative and any plea in mitigation. In trials which ended in conviction, it is unlikely that the Sheriff's notes would disclose anything which would be supportive of there having been a miscarriage of justice.

Thinking about the possibilities for some sort of basis for an application to the SCCRC, the only conceivable case would be if there was some fresh evidence. 34 years on it seems to us to be most unlikely that any such evidence would appear. It appears to us that most, if not all, applications by miners to the SCCRC would fail at the early hurdle of having to set out a stateable ground of review. It may seem strange to some but "actual innocence" is not in itself such a ground. While, in order to demonstrate that there may have been a miscarriage of justice and that it is in the interests of justice to refer a case to the Appeal Court, actual innocence may be an important starting-point, a "stateable ground of review" would have to involve something more - significant disclosure withheld by the police or Crown, defective representation by the defence lawyer or additional evidence being the likeliest possibilities.

The removal of the SCCRC for all practical purposes in addressing convictions relating to the Strike has caused us to reflect further, recognising that this has been a fundamental aspect of the understanding we shared with the Scottish Government about the relevant landscape to an important part of the impact of the Strike. This change in our understanding is the main reason we sought a further extension of time to complete our work as we wanted to make sure that any misconceptions were fully addressed and that we gave careful consideration to any prospects for reconciliation.

Our evidence-gathering has included aspects of impact arising from and around convictions connected to the Strike.

The numbers involved are not insignificant, albeit many men affected have died in the 34 years since the Strike.

In evidence we heard from some who accepted that they were punished for what they did, that they behaved in a manner for which a criminal penalty was acknowledged as appropriate. This included acceptance of disorderly behaviour with even some hints of violence, albeit without explicit admissions of violence by those who gave evidence to us.

In addition, we heard from, and about, those who were punished but insisted that they had done nothing. Sometimes caught up in general disorder caused by others and, in some cases, complaints of being targeted for arrest without having done anything at all and not even being near the relevant scenes of crime or disorder.

In addition to penalties imposed by the Courts, however, there were more severe penalties imposed by the NCB. Even those who acknowledged that their behaviour was criminal complained of the disproportionality of impact upon them of often relatively low-level disturbance or violence, with dismissal by the NCB adjudged an excessive punishment for any behaviour admitted or accepted.

One retired senior officer who attended one of our public meetings said that he was struck by the disproportionality of consequences as against behaviour, in particular those consequences related to employment. This is part of the lingering damage on affected communities. At a meeting with retired officers from four of the main areas affected - Strathclyde, Fife, central and Lothian and Borders - all of the officers said that there were men they would not have arrested if they had known then what the consequences would have been for them. We were left with the distinct impression that in a high number of cases (but not in each and every case) - whether a miner was arrested, was in reality a matter of chance. We were also satisfied that arbitrariness in the application of the criminal justice system extended further, for the reasons discussed above.

As stated above, the Kilmarnock case has entered into the institutional memory of mining communities, even in parts of the country other than Ayrshire. While aspects of that story have become exaggerated in the telling, the simple reality outlined in cold legal text is bad enough. It is easy to understand how one such example might become symbolic for arrested and convicted miners more generally. If the Sheriff's views, aired in private, were disclosed only because of the courage of one solicitor, in effect coming to public attention only by happenstance, or so the thinking goes, what other similar examples stayed beneath the surface, allowing unconscious or even conscious bias to warp outcomes for other miners?

In agreeing to this review, the Scottish Government has acknowledged a sense of moral responsibility for the lingering sense of unfairness which has become intertwined for some with institutions for which legal responsibility has been devolved. Looking in detail at the wider justice system as it impacted on, and was itself impacted by, arrested miners might require a separate review. The merits of such a review now would be limited, especially given the significant changes in personnel, legislation, policies and procedures in every part of the justice system. In any event, all it might tell us is that systems under undue and prolonged pressure cannot work at their best.

However, as it stands, we consider that we should offer some comment in this area, as well as a recommendation in our concluding chapter. The Strike placed demands on the police, Procurator Fiscal, defence lawyers and courts for which it appears they may have been ill-prepared. The number of prosecutions involved was significant and may well have skewed the system, in terms of delays if nothing else. The criminal justice system must be flexible enough to be able to cope with such unprecedented pressures in a manner which meets minimum expectations fairly. Of course, such pressures become less unforeseeable after they have persisted for a while. As the Strike continued, they became the norm, but we picked up no suggestion that the system had expanded to allow it to cope. Police cells were often filled beyond capacity (we heard of 15 to a cell on one occasion and the Fife Constabulary Debrief Report referred to the system becoming "overwhelmed with the volume of prisoners"), and miners were moved to other police stations to try to cope with the numbers. Arguably, such excessive overcrowding would now violate European Convention on Human Rights standards. Almost certainly, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture would be interested in such conditions.

It is inevitable, in a national event like the Strike, that discussions would take place in and between different branches of the State, for example, within the justice system, especially when it extended for a much longer period than might have been anticipated. It would not be unexpected to find that "policies" developed around matters such as bail and levels of fine. We understand that this happened. Apart from anything else, consistency and predictability in such matters are generally to be welcomed. For those affected by such policies, the benefits of consistency and predictability may be outweighed by implementation of the particular policy or level of penalty selected.

What we heard was of a system at times struggling to cope with the knock-on implications of the Strike. As with the policing of the Strike, it is difficult to isolate impacts for which the justice system alone is responsible. Nonetheless, as the police, justice system and NCB were all arms of the State, even if to varying degrees, it seems inappropriate for the State to avoid responsibility for any impact which can be attributed to the State by operation of various State actors but not attributed or attributable solely to any individual part of the State.

For many of those affected, the greatest disproportionality was inflicted by decision of the NCB as opposed to any part of the justice system but, as we have highlighted, the different State actors and processes were interlinked. The obvious remaining scars are the convictions. Consequently, we will return to the possibility of reconciliation by seeking to address at least some of the convictions.

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Policing of the miners' strike 1984-1985 - impact on communities: independent review

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From an early stage in our work, one thing became apparent. In terms of much of the permanent impact and damage caused by the Strike, it is impossible to separate out the role played by the policing of the Strike and identify an impact or impacts which could be attributed solely to policing.

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The Miners' Strike of 1984-1985 was an attempt by miners to stop the National Coal Board (NCB) and the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher shutting down collieries (mines).

By the early 1980s the collieries were losing money. The government announced on 6 March 1984 that 20 collieries would close, meaning that many mining communities would lose their main source of employment. Many of the richest coal fields had been worked out and the number of miners had been decreasing over the previous few decades. After successful strikes in 1972 and 1974 which prevented pit closures, calls were made for strikes in the early 1980s, eventually leading to the strike of 1984-1985. Miners across Yorkshire began strike action and on 12 March, a national strike was declared by the NUM, but no official vote was held.

The government had already stockpiled six months worth of coal before the strike, anticipating that a strike might be coming. The National Recording Centre (NRC), founded by the Association of Chief Police Officers for England and Wales (ACPO) in 1972 helped the government prepare for the organisation of police units travelling to areas of protests and in figuring out how to deal with flying pickets (strikers who travelled to different areas to protest).

A greater number of miners came out on strike in Scotland, Yorkshire (where the strike had started following the closure of Cortonwood Colliery), North East England and South Wales. There was less support across the Midlands, and Nottinghamshire, in particular, was targeted by flying picketing in the hopes of preventing local miners from going in to work. During the strike, there were violent clashes between flying pickets and the police. Strike-breakers in the militant areas were not easily forgiven for breaking the strike and going against the community.

Other miners' strikes in the 1970s had caused the public a lot of trouble, as there had been power cuts, but this time the government had prepared well. Some miners began returning to work from September, with many more returning by January as union pay ran out and some found it hard to pay for basic necessities. The strike officially ended on 3 March 1985. Despite the miners' efforts, the government succeeded and in the end most of Britain's coal mines were closed.

Violence

Most pickets throughout the strike were non-violent. However, violence against working miners was reported from the beginning. Police action during the strike has also been criticised, for instance, in South Yorkshire complaints were made against police for unnecessary property damage caused whilst engaging with pickets. There was also criticism of police action at the 'Battle of Orgreave' in June 1984 where policemen were caught on camera seemingly using 'excessive force' against strikers.

A number of lawsuits were brought against South Yorkshire police and eventually they were forced to pay out compensation.

Long-term Impact

After the strike, statistics showed over 11,000 people had been arrested, just over 8,000 of which had been charged, but only 150-200 were given prison sentences. You can download a list showing the occupations of people arrested in Nottinghamshire between March 1984 and March 1985.

Calls for a further strike in 1986 were ignored and from 174 collieries in 1983, only six remained in 2009. In December 2015, the last deep colliery in Britain closed.

Suggested Films to Watch

Glossary

Colliery - coal mine and buildings associated with it

NUM - National Union of Mineworkers

Strike breaker - someone who works during a strike

Strike - organised (often by a union, but not allowed by the employers) stopping of work by employees

Flying pickets - strikers who moved around the country to protest at different striking mines

Picket line - boundary at a place of work made by strikers, to stop strike breakers from entering

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The Miners' Strike of 1984-1985 was an attempt by miners to stop the National Coal Board (NCB) and the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher shutting down collieries (mines). By the early 1980s the collieries were losing money. The government announced on 6 March 1984 that 20 collieries would close, meaning that many mining communities would lose their main source of employment.

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The miners' strike of 1984-85 was the longest and most acrimonious industrial dispute in Britain's modern history. But it was more than that: to the communities involved, from Scotland and South Wales to Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire, it often felt like an undeclared civil war, pitting village against village, family against family - even brother against brother.

The origins of the strike lay in the gradual rundown of the British coal industry, with the workforce falling from a peak of more than 1 million between the world wars to barely 200,000 at the start of the 1980s. For decades, Conservative and Labour governments alike had been closing pits and shedding jobs. But as national unemployment mounted, it was obvious more closures would provoke an intense reaction.

At the end of 1981, the miners elected a new leader in the hard-left Yorkshireman Arthur Scargill, who made no secret of his eagerness for a confrontation with the government. Scargill predicted - rightly, as it turned out - that in an attempt to stem its heavy financial losses, the National Coal Board was bound to push for further closures. But Scargill denied that there was such a thing as an 'uneconomic pit', and argued that every colliery should be kept open, no matter how much it cost.

Three times Scargill pushed his members to vote for a national strike; three times they voted no. Then, in March 1984, the Coal Board announced plans for a new wave of pit closures. Desperate to preserve their jobs and communities, which often depended entirely on the local pit, the Yorkshire miners walked out, as did their Scottish counterparts. But instead of calling a national strike, Scargill encouraged the regions to follow suit individually. That way, he would still get a strike without having to run the risk of a national ballot.

From the start, Scargill was confident of victory. Twice in recent years, in 1972 and 1974, the miners had struck for higher pay, and both times they had won. But this time was different.
Listen: Dominic Sandbrook explores the pivotal early years of Margaret Thatcher's premiership in Britain, 1979-82
The Thatcher factor

First, the miners were divided. In traditionally non-militant Nottinghamshire, many miners resented being strong-armed, as they saw it, into a strike without a ballot. Most Nottinghamshire miners refused to strike, as did smaller groups of miners elsewhere. So right from the start, the dispute was marked by intense bitterness and violent confrontations between striking and working miners.

The second difference was that the government was far better prepared in 1984 than it had been 10 years earlier. Since Scargill had been so public about his enthusiasm for confrontation, ministers had been building up coal stocks for years. As a result, the strikers never really came close to causing the kind of coal shortages and power cuts that might have brought victory.

National Union of Mineworkers' (NUM) General Secretary Arthur Scargill during a demonstration against pit closures in Stoke, Staffordshire, March 1984. A supporter can be seen wearing a Margaret Thatcher mask. (Photo by SSPL/Getty Images)

The third difference was the Thatcher factor. Like Scargill, Mrs Thatcher struck a remarkably aggressive, uncompromising tone right from the start. She encouraged the police to crack down on picketing miners and badgered local Chief Constables to block the mobile 'flying pickets' which had been so successful in the 1970s. Some commentators worried that she was using the police as a paramilitary wing of the state. But as the dispute went on, she became ever more outspoken, even describing the miners' leaders as Britain's "enemy within".

Very quickly, therefore, the strike became a trial of strength between two exceptionally abrasive public figures. In the media, the striking miners, working miners and the police were cast as little armies sweeping backwards and forwards across the countryside. Meanwhile the newspapers played up every skirmish for all it was worth. Although there was clearly violence on both sides, miners' leaders often complained that the press exaggerated strikers' violence while ignoring the abuses of the police. In particular, the miners' supporters were outraged by the so-called 'Battle of Orgreave' in June 1984, when mounted policemen charged pickets outside a South Yorkshire coking plant - an event that has gone down in political folklore.

Even at this early stage, Scargill's cause was probably doomed. With coal stocks high, the miners divided and public opinion firmly against the strike, he was always facing an uphill struggle. According to a poll by the Opinion Research Corporation for the Evening Standard, published on 31 August 1984, some 94 per cent of the public disapproved of pickets' tactics and, when asked to pick between working and striking miners, 74 per cent sympathised with working miners compared to just 19 per cent with strikers.

But with both sides refusing to compromise, the strike dragged on for almost exactly a year, causing immense hardship to thousands of families, before Scargill reluctantly conceded defeat in March 1985.

Although the strike was over, the scars never went away. To this day both sides have their impassioned partisans. Afterwards the pace of closures was accelerated, and many pit villages never recovered. Whatever people thought of the issues at stake, millions were appalled by the scenes of open fighting between pickets and police, which became emblematic of the conflicted, confrontational 1980s.
Dominic Sandbrook is a historian and television presenter best-known for his books about Britain since the 1950s. The most recent, Who Dares Wins (Allen Lane, 2019), covers the early 1980s, including the first Thatcher administration, the Falklands War, and the New Romantics. You can listen to a podcast interview with Dominic about the early 1980s here

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Your guide to the miners' strike of 1984-85

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The biggest rail strike in 30 years is causing severe disruption to passengers this week, with the walkout of at least 40,000 members of the Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) union.

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Heidelberg shooting: One dead in gun attack on German students

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A gunman in the university town of Heidelberg shoots four people, one fatally, before killing himself.

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Describe the impact of conflict on UK public services 

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Describe the impact of conflict on UK public services 

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How the rest of the world reported our reactions to an invasion of sovereign territory

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How the rest of the world reported our reactions to an invasion of sovereign territory

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British Armada Set Sail for War in the Falklands - CBS Evening News - April 5, 1982

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The Iron Lady: "the Falkland Islands belong to Britain"

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What were the news headlines to the world ?

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What were the news headlines to the world ?

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HMS Queen Elizabeth: Carrier's Russian jet run-ins

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How it started, key names and facts Ref 'Empire of the Deep'

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How it started, key names and facts Ref 'Empire of the Deep'

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https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/how-the-troubles-began-a-timeline-1.3987076

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Contemporary theories of the causes of war divide roughly into two major schools. One attributes war to certain innate biological and psychological factors or drives, the other attributes it to certain social relations and institutions. Both schools include optimists and pessimists concerning the preventability of war.

Biological theories

Theories centring upon man's innate drives are developed by ethologists, who draw analogies from animal behaviour, and also by psychologists and psychoanalysts.

Ethologists start with the persuasive argument that study of animal warfare may contribute toward an understanding of war as employed by man. The behaviour of monkeys and apes in captivity and the behaviour of young children, for example, show basic similarities. In both cases it is possible to observe that aggressive behaviour usually arises from several drives: rivalry for possession, the intrusion of a stranger, or frustration of an activity. The major conflict situations leading to aggression among animals, especially those concerning access of males to females and control of a territory for feeding and breeding, are usually associated with patterns of dominance.

The analogies of animal to human behaviour drawn by many ethologists, however, are severely questioned by their more restrained colleagues as well as by many social scientists. The term "aggression," for example, is imprecisely and inconsistently used, often referring merely to the largely symbolic behaviour of animals involving such signals as grimaces.

Observed animal behaviour can be regarded as a possible important source of inspiration for hypotheses, but these must then be checked through the study of actual human behaviour. As this has not yet been adequately done, the hypotheses advanced have little foundation and are merely interesting ideas to be investigated. Further, human behaviour is not fixed to the extent that animal behaviour is, partly because man rapidly evolves different patterns of behaviour in response to environmental factors, such as geography, climate, and contact with other social groups. The variety of these behaviour patterns is such that they can be used on both sides of an argument concerning, for example, whether or not men have an innate tendency to be aggressive.

Two particularly interesting subjects studied by ethologists are the effects of overcrowding on animals and animal behaviour regarding territory. The study of overcrowding is incomplete, and the findings that normal behaviour patterns tend to break down in such conditions and that aggressive behaviour often becomes prominent are subject to the qualification that animal and human reactions to overcrowding may be different. Ethologists have also advanced plausible hypotheses concerning biological means of population control through reduced fertility that occurs when animal populations increase beyond the capacity of their environment. Whether such biological control mechanisms operate in human society, however, requires further investigation.

Findings concerning the " territorial imperative" in animals-that is, the demarcation and defense against intrusion of a fixed area for feeding and breeding-are even more subject to qualification when an analogy is drawn from them to human behaviour. The analogy between an animal territory and a territorial state is obviously extremely tenuous. In nature the territories of members of a species differ in extent but usually seem to be provided with adequate resources, and use of force in their defense is rarely necessary, as the customary menacing signals generally lead to the withdrawal of potential rivals. This scarcely compares with the sometimes catastrophic defense of the territory of a national state.

One school of theorists has postulated that the major causes of war can be found in man's psychological nature. Such psychological approaches range from very general, often merely intuitive assertions regarding human nature to complex analyses utilizing the concepts and techniques of modern psychology. The former category includes a wide range of ethical and philosophical teaching and insights, including the works of such figures as St. Augustine and the 17th-century Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza.

Modern writers utilizing psychological approaches emphasize the significance of psychological maladjustments or complexes and of false, stereotyped images held by decision makers of other countries and their leaders. Some psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness in man. Others concentrate upon public opinion and its influence, particularly in times of tension. Others stress the importance of decision makers and the need for their careful selection and training. Most believe that an improved social adjustment of individuals would decrease frustration, insecurity, and fear and would reduce the likelihood of war. All of them believe in the importance of research and education. Still, the limitations of such approaches derive from their very generality. Also, whether the psychological premises are optimistic or pessimistic about the nature of man, one cannot ignore the impact upon human behaviour of social and political institutions that give man the opportunities to exercise his good or evil propensities and to impose restraints upon him.

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Contemporary theories of the causes of war divide roughly into two major schools. One attributes war to certain innate biological and psychological factors or drives, the other attributes it to certain social relations and institutions. Both schools include optimists and pessimists concerning the preventability of war.

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Lord mountbatten - 23:00

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A daring plan , this is boys own and true bravery and skill by the RAF 

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A daring plan , this is boys own and true bravery and skill by the RAF 

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Black Buck One, the Vulcan Raid on the Falklands - Time-Lapse

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The Sea Harrier Odds stacked against them !

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The Sea Harrier Odds stacked against them !

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Footage of a Tense Aerial Battle During the Falklands War

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Handout 7 The Circumstances leading up to the Conflict

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Northern Ireland Troubles The circumstances leading up to the conflict worksheet

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Handout 6 Bloody Sunday RUC / British Army combat Rioting (1972)

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Handout 5 Hunger Strikes in prison

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Hunger strikes 1981 decision game activity (1)

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Some background and a Case Study on NI

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Handout 4 RUC Targeted

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All you need to know from key terms , timelines , plus extra research to conclusion.

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Northern Ireland is a region of scenic beauty, rich culture and Celtic charm - but its recent history has been marred by political tension, sectarianism and terrorism. Between 1969 and 1999 the world watched in despair as Northern Ireland was wracked by unrest and violence that bordered on civil war. This three-decade period is euphemistically referred to as 'the Troubles'.

Trouble had in fact been brewing in Northern Ireland for generations. Conquered by the English and divided in 1920, Ireland's historical wounds had never fully healed. Northern Ireland evolved into a self-governing member of the United Kingdom - but its population remained divided along political, economic and religious fault lines. On one side stood Unionists and Loyalists - Protestants who identified as British and were determined to maintain British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. On the other side were the Nationalists, a Catholic minority who had endured decades of political and economic discrimination.

These sectarian divisions were a potent recipe for conflict and disaster. The origins of the Troubles can be traced back to the civil rights movement of the mid to late 1960s, a push to obtain fair and equal treatment for Catholics. The first significant violence erupted in the city of Londonderry, known to locals as Derry, in 1969. Sectarian rioting in Derry quickly exploded into a fully fledged street war, dubbed the ' Battle of the Bogside '.

As the situation worsened, British troops were landed in Belfast to help keep order. The Troubles took a turn for the worse in January 1972 after British paratroopers opened fire on protestors in Derry, killing 14 civilians. By mid-1972, Britain had suspended the Northern Ireland government and deployed 20,000 troops in the troubled region.

These developments triggered rapid growth in the newly-formed Provisional IRA, a Republican paramilitary group that aimed to drive out the British and make Northern Ireland ungovernable. More than 3,500 people, most of them civilians, would die before peace was restored in 1998.

The Troubles in Northern Ireland are an intriguing example of modern sectarianism and post-colonial conflict. Studying this period provides a solid foundation in historical and political concepts.

Alpha History's Northern Ireland website contains detailed overviews of significant topics, primary sources such as images and documents, as well as useful reference material like timelines, glossaries, biographies and a range of online activities. We welcome constructive feedback, suggestions and contributions about this site - please contact us for more information.

With the exception of primary sources, all content on this website is © Alpha History 2014-19. This content may not be copied, republished or redistributed without the express permission of Alpha History. For more information about the use of Alpha History's website and content, please refer to our Terms of Use.

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Northern Ireland is a region of scenic beauty, rich culture and Celtic charm - but its recent history has been marred by political tension, sectarianism and terrorism. Between 1969 and 1999 the world watched in despair as Northern Ireland was wracked by unrest and violence that bordered on civil war.

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Create a new document and edit with others at the same time -- from your computer, phone or tablet. Get stuff done with or without an internet connection. Use Docs to edit Word files. Free from Google.

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Create a new document and edit with others at the same time -- from your computer, phone or tablet. Get stuff done with or without an internet connection. Use Docs to edit Word files. Free from Google.

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20th Century Battlefields   1982 Falklands

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Falklands war 30 years on: how a British taskforce achieved the impossible

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Falklands war 30 years on: how a British taskforce achieved the impossible Subscribe HERE: http://bitly.com/UvkFpD To mark the 30th anniversary of the end of the Falklands War, Michael White re-examines how a small British task force was able to liberate a remote group of islands from an invading Argentine army, despite being heavily outnumbered and 8,000 miles from home.

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What are our UK Armed Forces doing now in the Falkland Islands 

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What are our UK Armed Forces doing now in the Falkland Islands 

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Guardians Of The South Atlantic: UK Forces In The Falklands | Forces TV

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An inside look at an typical deployment "down South "

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An inside look at an typical deployment "down South "

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It is one of the Royal Navy's most advanced and powerful warships, now on its way to the other side of the world; destination - the Falkland Islands.

HMS Dauntless is the largest destroyer ever built for the Royal Navy, made from nearly 3,000 tonnes of steel. Its wide hull helps to support its two massive radar.

This Type 45 destroyer is radically different in design from earlier warships. The sleek, angled lines means it appears no larger than a fishing boat on another ship's radar. It is the navy's first stealth warship.

This is also the first time that a Type 45 destroyer has been deployed to the Falklands and the first time the navy has invited a TV crew on board a Type 45 during a deployment.

Many of the 200-strong crew were not even born when a much larger task force left to liberate the islands exactly 30 years ago.

But there are still a few veterans of that conflict on board. Weapons engineer Steve Collins was just 18 when he was on HMS Antelope, sunk by the Argentine air force in San Carlos Sound, better known as Bomb Alley. That was his very first deployment. And this will be his last.

He says he is looking forward to seeing the islands once again and visiting the memorials. But he also insists the deployment is nothing out of the ordinary.

Gary Morris, another Falklands veteran serving on board, also dismisses talk that this deployment to the South Atlantic is an act of "provocation" towards Argentina.

It is, he says, routine to have a Royal Navy warship protecting a piece of sovereign British territory.

The ship's captain, Will Warrender, says he can "understand why there's been a spike in interest" with Dauntless heading south.

But he adds that the Royal Navy has had a presence there for "many, many years". No-one on board seems to want to stoke any political fires.

'Awesome capability'

Nevertheless, the design of Dauntless was born out of the bitter lessons from 1982, when Britain lost half a dozen ships to low-flying Argentine jets and sea-skimming missiles.

The Type 45 destroyer is the most advanced air defence destroyer of its kind. In theory, at least, it could deal with any threat posed by the ageing Argentine air force.

Down in the ship's nerve centre, the operations room, dozens of computer screens stream data from the two large radar, which can see for up to 250 miles.

From 60 miles they can identify and engage multiple targets at the same time. They can even track an object the size of a cricket ball, travelling at more than Mach 2 - twice the speed of sound.

Lt Tom Rowley, one of Dauntless's air warfare officers, describes it as an "awesome capability".

Its main weapon is the Sea Viper missile. It can reach speeds of Mach 4 to Mach 5 in only two seconds and carry out flight manoeuvres three times more severe than a fighter pilot can withstand. Dauntless can carry 48 Sea Viper missiles.

If there were ever to be an "Armaggedon" scenario, it could fire them all in just two seconds. But at £1m each, Dauntless has only ever test-fired one.

Its other defences are machine-guns mounted around the vessel, a 4.5-inch gun on the bow, and a Lynx helicopter that can protect the ship from attack by submarine or other surface ships.

Crew conditions

But Capt Warrender says it is much more than just an air defence destroyer, providing "versatility and flexibility".

There is plenty of space on board to add other weapons systems, such as a compartment that could be fitted with Cruise missiles. There is also an extra cabin to carry a detachment of Royal Marines or special forces.

There is more room for the crew than other Royal Navy ships, with most accommodated in two-bunk cabins.

There are separate messes for officers, senior and junior ratings. But for a seven-month deployment like this it is hardly luxury living. Each crew member is fed for just £2.38 a day.

The Royal Navy too is having to eke out the most from this £1bn warship. Originally, Britain was planning to buy 12 Type 45 destroyers. But the navy is getting only six.

For Dauntless that means this voyage is about much more than just patrolling the Falklands. En route, off the west coast of Africa, the crew has been helping to train other nations in the region in how to combat maritime crime.

Teams from The Gambia, Senegal and Morocco have been put through their paces on Dauntless, carrying out boarding missions and learning how to tackle anything from piracy to illegal fishing and the illicit trade in drugs, weapons and people smuggling.

Capt Warrender says it shows that the Royal Navy is getting the best value for money for the taxpayer. Today's navy has a surface fleet of just 19 frigates and destroyers.

Long journey

But back home this mission is still likely to be seen as primarily about defending the Falklands - particularly at a time of rising tensions with Argentina.

Those tensions have already raised doubts as to where Dauntless may be able to stop on its return journey.

It is no secret that the government would like to show off its latest warship to the rising economic powers in the region, particularly Brazil.

Dauntless is not just flying the flag for the navy, but for British business too, and the main contractor BAE systems.

However, South American nations have already turned away other British warships - an act of solidarity in Argentina's dispute over the ownership of the islands.

Capt Warrender says he is not prepared to be drawn on where the ship may or may not go.

But he admits that the climate in South America "does make it a little more difficult" to stop off in the region. For the crew of Dauntless it might be a very long journey home.

The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites.

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Life on Royal Navy's Falklands-bound HMS Dauntless

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It is one of the Royal Navy's most advanced and powerful warships, now on its way to the other side of the world; destination - the Falkland Islands. HMS Dauntless is the largest destroyer ever built for the Royal Navy, made from nearly 3,000 tonnes of steel.

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Glossary of terms match up

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Northern Ireland Troubles Key terms and events (1)

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Handout no 2

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Handout no 1

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BBC The Day Lord Mountbatten Died |UK Documentary

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Lord Mountbatten Assassination S04xE01 - The Crown (2020)

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Netflix Series The Crown

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Create a new document and edit with others at the same time -- from your computer, phone or tablet. Get stuff done with or without an internet connection. Use Docs to edit Word files. Free from Google.

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13 Protestors shot dead!

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Bloody Sunday 1972: The day's events explained

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How Saddam Hussein gained total power as an Dictator 

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How Saddam Hussein gained total power as an Dictator 

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Londonderry and the thoughts of its people up to 2019

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50 Years on from the Troubles – many fear a return to violence

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Royal Marines in UK beach 'assault' 04.10.12

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RAF Quick Reaction Alert Force in Action

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Story of contrast of Policing Northern Ireland 

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Story of contrast of Policing Northern Ireland 

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NORTHERN IRELAND: LONDONDERRY: RIOTERS CLASH WITH RUC OFFICERS

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Interesting reflection post war from one of the senior Naval Officers 

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Interesting reflection post war from one of the senior Naval Officers 

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Warfighting at Sea: What Has Changed Since the Falklands War of 1982

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Short Lesson in Naval Warfare on both sides !

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Short Lesson in Naval Warfare on both sides !

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Sink Argentina's Carrier 1982 - The Secret British Falklands War Mission

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Case study Commander Chris Craig DSC ," my ship down south"

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Case study Commander Chris Craig DSC ," my ship down south"

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needs additional citations for verification .improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

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HMS Coventry

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This was one of the most used pictures of the conflict 

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This was one of the most used pictures of the conflict 

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HMS Antelope

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HMS London RN Flagship for preps for and during Gulf War 1991

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HMS London RN Flagship for preps for and during Gulf War 1991

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Gulf War (040 of 374) - Desert Shield, 1990

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On January 16, 1991 President George H. W. Bush announced the start of the first Gulf War as cruise missiles and waves of bombers pummeled Iraq's military targets in the Persian Gulf.

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Army Test Rapid Reaction Force On Ex Joint Warrior | Forces TV