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En clase practicamos la diferenciación entre reglas descriptivas y prescriptivas. El siguiente vídeo lleva este tema un paso más allá al presentar cada tipo de regla como diferentes perspectivas sobre gramática. Hay dos personajes principales, Spencer y Abby, que representan uno de los dos enfoques. Spencer sigue y mantiene el enfoque "prescrito" que nos enseñaron en los libros que crecían. Abby quiere "describir" cómo la gente usa el lenguaje, sin tener en cuenta su corrección.

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En clase, aprendimos acerca de ocho características distintas del lenguaje humano, que incluyen la arbitrariedad y el desplazamiento, por nombrar algunos. El siguiente vídeo enseña a los espectadores acerca de estos conceptos, pero dentro de contextos relacionables y actuales. Por ejemplo, el narrador compara la presencia del desplazamiento en el lenguaje humano con la falta de desplazamiento en todas las lenguas animales. Esto tiene sentido porque todos somos conscientes del hecho de que los animales no pueden comunicarse sobre su pasado o futuro. Además, el video hace referencia a cómo los humanos están constantemente empleando la productividad creando constantemente nuevas palabras, como cuando hacemos verbos a partir de aplicaciones de redes sociales como "snapchatting" o "Instagram it".

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Repasamos un método para clasificar artículos bajo varias ramas de la linguística en clase. La primera página del artículo siguiente agrupa estas ramas bajo las dos áreas principales de la estructura del lenguaje y el uso del lenguaje. Puede mirar a través de las diversas páginas de cada rama y ver varias explicaciones, ejemplos, imágenes y anécdotas de investigadores de cada rama. Por ejemplo, el autor explica que la fonética analiza el concepto de voz, que ocurre en el par de músculos que se encuentran en su caja de voz conocida como la manzana de Adán. La presencia o falta de vibraciones de los pliegues vocales es lo que nos permite hacer sonidos "z" y "s", respectivamente.

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Linguistics is the science of language. It is the subject whose practitioners devote their energy to understanding why human language is the way it is. They study the history, acquisition, structure, and use of as many languages as possible.

Professor David Crystal

Key questions

The work of linguists falls into two main areas: language structure and language use.

Linguists interested in language structure consider the formal properties of language, including word structure (morphology), sentence structure (syntax), speech sounds and the rules and patterns between them (phonetics and phonology), and meaning in language (semantics and pragmatics).

Linguists also study the way that language is used, and this can cover a very broad range of subjects, since language enters almost every area of human activity. Examples include: psycholinguistics (the psychology of language acquisition and use); historical linguistics and the history of languages; applied linguistics (using linguistic knowledge to help in real-world situations like language teaching); sociolinguistics, varieties of English, discourse analysis and conversation analysis (language use in social contexts) and stylistics (the use of diﬀerent styles in language).

Research in Linguistics

You will find examples of research that has been undertaken in each area of linguistics. Research is an important part of what linguists do in universities. All linguists engage in research alongside teaching, which means that they are pushing the boundaries of knowledge in the area. At Sheffield, we have specialists teaching and researching all areas of linguistics covered on this website, and students have the opportunity to learn about and be involved in the very latest research as part of studying for their degree programme.

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Linguistics is the science of language. It is the subject whose practitioners devote their energy to understanding why human language is the way it is. They study the history, acquisition, structure, and use of as many languages as possible. Professor David Crystal The work of linguists falls into two main areas: language structure and language use.

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La siguiente charla TED detalla dos tipos de afasia, que son afasia fluida y no fluida. Estos tipos se relacionan con los que estudiamos en clase ya que la afasia fluida es la afasia de Wernicke, mientras que la afasia no fluida es la afasia de Broca. El video continúa explicando más sobre la ubicación y función de las áreas de Wernicke y Broca en el hemisferio izquierdo del cerebro, que aprendimos en clase como que contiene el centro de idiomas principal.

¿Cuál no es otro nombre para la afasia caracterizado por la falta de comprensión del lenguaje?
A. Afasia fluida
B. Afasia no fluida
C. Afasia receptiva
D. Afasia de Wernicke

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Aphasia: The disorder that makes you lose your words - Susan Wortman-Jutt

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El siguiente artículo resume la definición y la función de un par mínimo. Un par mínimo es un par de palabras que tienen un sonido diferente al igual que "pero" /pe ɾ o/ y "perro" /pe r o/ o "pala" /p ala/ y "mala" /m ala/. Además, se utilizan pares mínimos para determinar si un sonido es un fonema o un alófono en un idioma determinado, es decir, si un sonido puede cambiar el significado de las palabras o es simplemente una forma diferente de pronunciar.

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Cualquier hispanohablante sabe sin titubeos que son cinco las vocales, como todo el mundo sabe: a, e, i, o, u. En español la correspondencia de letras y de fonemas vocálicos es simétrica.

Sin embargo, tenemos que preguntarnos cómo hemos llegado a esta situación desde las diez vocales que tenía el latín y por qué la mayoría de las lenguas romances tienen, al menos, siete.

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¿Qué es un par mínimo en fonética? ‹ Glosario de términos lingüísticos

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Cualquier hispanohablante sabe sin titubeos que son cinco las vocales, como todo el mundo sabe: a, e, i, o, u. En español la correspondencia de letras y de fonemas vocálicos es simétrica. Sin embargo, tenemos que preguntarnos cómo hemos llegado a esta situación desde las diez vocales que tenía el latín y por qué la mayoría de las lenguas romances tienen, al menos, siete.

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En este video, el narrador explica cómo reconocer y diferenciar entre los diptongos y los hiatos. Un diptongo se forma cuando dos vocales están en la misma sílaba y se pronuncian en un solo golpe de voz. Un hiato se forma cuando dos vocales consecutivas se pronuncian en dos golpes de voz, es decir, están en dos sílabas diferentes.

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Problemas de pronunciación de hispanohablantes

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Problemas de pronunciación de hispanohablantes

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El siguiente artículo aclara algunos puntos de dificultad que los hablantes nativos de español pueden encontrar al tratar de aprender inglés. El principal problema de pronunciación surge del hecho de que el español no tiene una distinción entre vocales cortas y largas, mientras que el inglés sí. Los hablantes nativos de español pueden estirar demasiado todos los sonidos vocálicos y confundir pares de sonidos vocales cortos y largos en inglés como "bit" y "beat", tanto en comprensión como en habla.

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Although a strong Spanish accent is usually easier to understand than a similarly strong French or Portuguese one, the pronunciation can cause considerable strain for the listener and seem somewhat harsh and flat. More importantly, Spanish speakers often have listening comprehension far below their other skills.

School English lessons in most Spanish-speaking countries also tend to focus much more on reading and grammar than speaking and listening, and so pronunciation work will both help redress the balance and be considered worthwhile by students.

This article will focus mainly on pronunciation problems that cause miscomprehension, including some attempt to prioritise the entries in each section. The sections themselves are arranged more traditionally, starting with individual sounds.

Points That Spanish-Speaking Learners Of English Find Difficult

Vowels

Short and long vowel pairs

Perhaps the single biggest pronunciation problem for Spanish speakers is that their language does not have a distinction between short and long vowels. They often stretch all vowel sounds out too much and confuse pairs of short and long English vowel sounds like "ship" and "sheep" both in comprehension and speaking. Relevant pairs include:

As the pairs above are all pronounced with different mouth positions as well as different lengths, focusing on that can help students distinguish between the minimal pairs above even if they don't fully get the hang of vowel length.

Other vowels

In common with most learners, Spanish speakers find the distinction between the very similar sounds in "cat" and "cut" difficult to notice and produce. Perhaps more importantly, they can also have problems with the two closest sounds to an "o" sound in "not" mentioned above, making "boat" and "bought" difficult to distinguish. The unstressed schwa "er" sound in "computer" does not exist in Spanish, and neither do the closest long sounds in "fur" and "her". Spanish speakers tend to find it much more difficult to recognise not rhotic versions of vowel sounds.

Consonants

Words written with "b" and "v" are mostly pronounced identically, making this perhaps the most common spelling mistake in Spanish. There is also no distinction between the first sounds in "yacht" and "jot" in Spanish and which of those two sounds is perceived by English speakers tends to depend on the variety of Spanish spoken (this being one of the easiest ways of spotting an Argentinean accent, for example). There may also be some confusion between the first sound in "jeep" and its unvoiced equivalent in "cheap" (a common sound in Spanish).

The "ch" in "cheese" may also be confused with the "sh" in "she's", as the latter sound does not exist in Spanish. The difference is similar to that between "yacht" and "jot" mentioned above, being between a smooth sound (sh) and a more explosive one (ch), so the distinction can usefully be taught as a more general point. Alternatively, the "sh" in "sheep" may come out sounding more like "s" in "seep", in which case it is mouth shape that needs to be worked on.

Spanish words never start with an "s" sound, and words which are similar to English tend to have an initial "es" sound instead, as in escuela/school. This is very common in Spanish speakers' pronunciation of English as well, leading to pronunciations like "I am from Espain". Spanish speakers have no problem producing a hissing sound, so the secret is to have them make the word directly after that "ssss" and then practise reducing the length of that down to a short initial "s".

Unlike most languages, the "th" sounds in "thing" and "bathe" do exist in Spanish. The problem with "bathe" is that the sound is just a variation on mid or final "d" for Spanish speakers and so some work on understanding the distinction between initial "d" and initial "th" is usually needed before it can be understood and produced in an initial position - in fact making the amount of work needed not much less than for speakers of languages entirely without this sound. The problem with "thing" and "sing" is different as it is a distinction that exists in some varieties of Spanish and not others, meaning that again for some speakers practice will need to start basically from zero.

Some speakers also pronounce a final "d" similar to an unvoiced "th". "d" and "t" can also be a problem at the end of words, as can "thing"/"think" and sometimes "thing"/"thin" or even "ring" and "rim". In general, Spanish consonant sounds vary more by position than English consonants do.

Although a "w" sound exists in Spanish, it is spelt "gu" and can be pronounced "gw", sometimes making it difficult to work out if a "g" or "w" is what is meant.

As a "z" is pronounced as "s" or "th" (depending on the speaker, as in the two pronunciations of "Barcelona"), a "z" sound does not exist in Spanish. However, perhaps because not so much air is produced in a Spanish "s" I find that this version rarely produces comprehension problems.

Although a Spanish "r" is different from most English ones, it rarely causes comprehension problems. However, the English "r" can seem so soft to Spanish speakers that it is sometimes perceived as "w".

The Spanish "j" in José (similar to the Scottish "ch" in "loch") and the English "h" in "hope" rarely if ever cause communication problems, but is perhaps the main thing to work on if students are interested in accent reduction. An English "h" is like breathing air onto your glasses so you can polish them, and students can actually practise doing that to help.

Spanish doesn't have the soft, French-sounding sound from the middle of "television" and "pleasure", but this rarely if ever causes comprehension problems.

Number of syllables

Particularly when it comes to final consonant clusters in English, Spanish-speakers can suffer both from adding extra syllables (e.g. three syllables for "advanced" with the final "e" pronounced) and swallowing sounds to make it match the desired number of syllables (e.g. "fifths" sounding like "fiss"). With words that are similar in Spanish and English, they can also often try to make the English word match the Spanish number of syllables.

Word stress

Trying to make Latinate words in English match Spanish pronunciation is also true for word stress. There is also a more general problem that Spanish, unlike English, has a pretty regular system of word stress.

Sentence stress

Spanish is sometimes described as a "syllable-timed" language, basically meaning that each syllable takes up about the same amount of time. This means that the English idea of unstressed syllables and weak forms being squashed in between stressed syllables doesn't really exist in Spanish. This can make it difficult for Spanish speakers to pick out and point out the important words in a sentence.

Intonation

Spanish speakers, especially males, can sound quite flat in English, and this can cause problems in formal situations and other times when polite language is needed (especially as Spanish speakers also have other problems with polite language such as over-use of the verb "give").

Alphabet

The names and pronunciations of the letters of the alphabet in Spanish can cause confusions between these pairs in both listening and speaking, e.g.

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Pronunciation Problems For Spanish-Speaking Learners Of English

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Although a strong Spanish accent is usually easier to understand than a similarly strong French or Portuguese one, the pronunciation can cause considerable strain for the listener and seem somewhat harsh and flat. More importantly, Spanish speakers often have listening comprehension far below their other skills.

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Los fonemas se pueden clasificar según el punto de articulación (también llamada zona de articulación). El punto de articulación se refiere al área de los órganos de la garganta que están involucrados en la producción de sonido. El siguiente artículo resume cada punto de articulación con ejemplos de fonemas específicos e imágenes de las áreas de la boca. El artículo menciona fonemas bilabiales, labiodentales, interdentales, dentales, alveolares, palatales y velares.

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Son los fonemas // y /■ Dentales: los órganos que intervienen en la producción del sonido son la lengua detrás de los dientes superiores. t d/:

o, uudado, ded día, deuda, dodo, d da, d do ...

■ Alveolares: los órganos que intervienen en la producción del sonido son la lengua sobre l a raíz de los dientes superiores. Son los fonemas:

/s/

/ar/ ra, ira, hora, mora, claro, mira

/ n/ no, nona, ana, ando, lana, cono

■ Palatales: los órganos que intervienen en la producción del sonido son la lengua y el paladar. Son los fonemas:

/ch/

/ oll/ lla, pollo, calla, llama, elle, llano

■ Velares: los órganos que intervienen en la producción del sonido son la lengua y el velo del paladar. Son los fonemas:

/k/ →

/ iso, hag/ → ga ga, higo, ahogo, gu ga

/ o, paí, j/ → gema, jaque, jeta, aj jota girja,

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Son los fonemas // y /■ Dentales: los órganos que intervienen en la producción del sonido son la lengua detrás de los dientes superiores. t d/: o, uudado, ded día, deuda, dodo, d da, d do ... ■ Alveolares: los órganos que intervienen en la producción del sonido son la lengua sobre l a raíz de los dientes superiores.

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La presentación de SlideShare repasa los conceptos básicos de la morfología. Los morfemas derivativos se agregan para producir nuevas palabras que se derivan de la palabra principal o raíz. En todos los casos, la palabra derivada significa algo diferente a la raíz, y la clase de palabra puede cambiar con cada derivación. Algunos ejemplos incluyen felicidad y felicidad, examen y examen, y belleza, belleza y belleza. Los morfemas inflexivos permiten a los hablantes codificar morfológicamente información gramatical. Un ejemplo es la palabra niñas porque contiene dos morfemas: niña y s.

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El siguiente video es muy descriptivo y detalla todos los modos verbales con ejemplos y explicaciones. El video establece que los verbos pueden ser uno de tres modos: indicativo, subjuntivo e imperativo. Los tiempos del modo indicativo son el presente del modo indicativo, el pretérito perfecto, el pretérito imperfecto del modo indicativo y el futuro del modo indicativo.

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El sitio web explica cómo hay nueve categorías gramaticales diferentes en español. Incluyen sustantivos, verbos, artículos, adverbios, adjetivos, pronombres, preposiciones, conjunciones e interjecciones. Los adverbios describen o dan información adicional sobre un verbo, un adjetivo u otro adverbio. Las preposiciones se usan para mostrar la relación entre los elementos de la oración.

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Nouns are names of things, places, ideas/concepts, or people.

SUSTANTIVOS (nouns)

Examples of nouns:

Pedro - name of a person

Casa (house) - name of a thing

Centro comercial (shopping mall) - name of a place

Democracia (democracy) - name of a concept (abstract noun)

Remember that in Spanish nouns need to carry the gender and number. To do this correctly, you need to remember the rules and exceptions for feminine and masculine nouns. The basic rule is that nouns that end in 'o' are masculine, and nouns that end in 'a' are feminine. But there are other rules and exceptions you need to know.

Articles - definite and indefinite define the status of the noun.

ARTICULOS (articles)

Examples of articles:

The - is the definite article. In singular in Spanish it is "El" or "La" - el niño, la niña

The definite article in plural in Spanish is "Los" or "Las" - los niños, las niñas

A - is the indefinite article. In singular in Spanish it is "Un" or "Una" - un niño, una niña.

The indefinite plural in Spanish is "Unos" or "Unas" - unos niños, unas niñas.

PRONOMBRES (pronouns)

Pronouns are words we use to replace nouns. Pronouns carry the same number and gender as the noun they replace.

There are many different pronouns, for example:

Personal pronouns: yo, tú, él, nosotros, vosotros, ellos. (I, you, he/she, we, they)

Demonstrative pronouns: éste, aquél, ésa. (this, that, those)

Possessive pronouns: los míos, la mía. (my, your, his, hers, theirs

Relative pronouns: que, quien, el que, la cual.( which, who, whose)

Indefinite pronouns: algo, alguien. (something, someone)

VERBOS (verbs)

Verbs express an action or state that the subject of the sentence performs. In Spanish, there are regular and irregular verbs, and many different verb tenses which you can learn in our Grammar section.

The three infinitive forms that exist are: verbs ending in -ar (hablar), verbs ending in -er (comer) and verbs ending in -ir (vivir).

There are verbs that are transitive (those that need a direct object), and there are verbs that are intransitive (which do not need an object). An example of a transitive verb is preparar. Lucía está preparando la cena (Lucía is preparing dinner). On the other hand, you have intransitive verbs like correr. El corre cada mañana. (He runs every day).

ADJETIVOS (adjectives)

Adjectives describe and give extra information about nouns. There are descriptive adjectives such as "tonto", "grande", and limiting adjectives such as "este", "aquel", "cinco", "mi", "la", "los", etc. Adjectives must agree in number and gender with the noun, so adjectives have different forms. For example: "bueno", "buena", "buenos", "buenas", "mejor", "el mejor".

ADVERBIOS (adverbs)

Adverbs describe or give extra information about a verb, an adjective or another adverb. There are many different type of adverbs:

Adverbios de tiempo (adverbs of time): primero, luego, después.

Adverbios de lugar (adverbs of place): acá, allá.

Adverbios de modo (adverbs of manner): lentamente, mal, bruscamente.

Adverbios de afirmación y negación (adverbs of affirmation and negation): sí, no, nunca.

It is important to know that adverbs can have comparative and superlative forms, as well as diminutive forms.

PREPOSICIONES (preposition)

Prepositions are used to show the relationship between items in the sentence. For instance, these are some of the prepositions you can learn in Spanish:

There are prepositions of time, place, direction, sequence, etc.

CONJUNCIONES (conjunctions)

Conjunctions are linkers we use to make sentences and paragraphs more cohesive and natural. The most common ones are y (and) and pero (but). Other common ones are: de manera que, así que, etc.

INTERJECCIONES (interjections)

Interjections are exclamations and sounds one make when speaking to express a certain reaction or emotion:

Multiple-choice questions - Preguntas de múltiple opción

Read the following sentences. Choose the option that best describes the word that is in bold.

1. Pedro jugó al fútbol con María anoche.

2. Pedro jugó al fútbol con María anoche.

3. Pedro jugó al fútbol con María anoche.

4. ¡Ay! Esos niños son muy ruidosos!

5. ¡Ay! Esos niños son muy ruidosos!

6. ¡Ay! Esos niños son muy ruidosos!

7. ¡Ay! Esos niños son muy ruidosos!

Covered in this lesson: Parts of Speech in Spanish - to form sentences in Spanish learn how to use each of them in the correct order.

TRY A FREE TRIAL CLASS!

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Nouns are names of things, places, ideas/concepts, or people. Examples of nouns: Pedro - name of a person Casa (house) - name of a thing Centro comercial (shopping mall) - name of a place Democracia (democracy) - name of a concept (abstract noun) Remember that in Spanish nouns need to carry the gender and number.

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El siguiente video ilustra formas de transformar verbos en español en varios sustantivos. Por ejemplo, el narrador enumera algunos sufijos comunes que hacen que las palabras sean sustantivos. El video menciona -aje (aterrizaje), -anza (desconfianza), -dad (lealdad) y -eza (pobreza). El video es una buena ayuda didáctica porque los gráficos son simples y lindos. También se usan muy pocas palabras en la pantalla, lo que ayuda a que el público no se distraiga con información innecesaria.

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Created using PowToon -- Free sign up at http://www.powtoon.com/youtube/ -- Create animated videos and animated presentations for free. PowToon is a free tool that allows you to develop cool animated clips and animated presentations for your website, office meeting, sales pitch, nonprofit fundraiser, product launch, video resume, or anything else you could use an animated explainer video.

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En este video la profesora explica los usos de se. Ella sugiere que  primero debemos diferenciar si el uso de se es un uso pronominal o no pronominal. Para que el uso de se sea pronominal, el uso de se tiene que ser una variante de le o les, ser reflexiva se, ser recíproca se, ser dativa de interés, ética o enfática, o ser se como un verbo pronominal.

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Usos del se: el se pronominal. Si quieres practicar lo que has aprendido en este vídeo puedes descargarte ejercicios con sus soluciones en http://www.unprofesor.com/lengua-espanola/usos-del-se-el-se-pronominal-912.html - Además podrás hacer preguntas al profesor que ha hecho el vídeo.

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En este artículo se explican los conceptos básicos de ordenar palabras en un idioma. El artículo también explica cómo el orden de las palabras difiere entre los idiomas de varias partes del mundo. Si consideramos que los elementos principales de las frases del lenguaje humano son el sujeto (el que realiza la acción), el verbo (la acción en sí) y el objeto (el receptor de la acción), nos damos cuenta de que podemos ordenar estos elementos de diferentes maneras. De hecho, hay seis maneras de hacerlo: SVO (Juan golpea el balón), SOV (Juan el balón golpea), VSO (golpea Juan el balón), VOS (golpea el balón Juan), OSV (el balón Juan golpea), y OVS (El balón Juan golpea). En español todos los pedidos se pueden llevar a cabo, pero el orden preferido es SVO.

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Si consideramos que los elementos principales de las oraciones del lenguaje humano son el sujeto (en grueso, quién realiza la acción), el verbo (la acción propiamente tal) y el objeto (o complemento directo, el receptor de la acción) uno de los efectos más importantes de este simple hecho es que las diferentes lenguas ordenarán los elementos de distintas maneras. De hecho, existen seis formas de hacerlo:

SVO (Juan golpea la pelota)

SOV (Juan la pelota golpea)

VSO (Golpea Juan la pelota)

VOS (Golpea la pelota Juan)

OSV (La pelota Juan golpea)

OVS (La pelota golpea Juan)

En castellano se puede realizar todos los órdenes, como muestran "Juan", "la pelota" y "golpear" de los ejemplos anteriores; sin embargo, hay un orden predilecto (que en lingüística se llama "orden no marcado"), SVO. Se dice entonces, en tipología lingüística, que el castellano es una lengua SVO, mientras que, por ejemplo, el japonés y el latín son lenguas SOV. Joseph Greenberg (1963) fue probablemente quién más atención le prestó a este tipo de asuntos y descubrió que, en las lenguas humanas, los tres órdenes favoritos eran SVO, SOV y VSO (este último en lenguas como el galés o el árabe); mientras que los restantes tres eran extremadamente infrecuentes. En efecto, OVS y OSV practicamente no existirían (a menos que hablemos Klingon como en Star Trek, la más conocida lengua OSV).

Es hoy una idea bastante consolidada (teoría monogenética) que existió una lengua originaria africana de la que se derivan las lenguas habladas hoy en el mundo (los lenguajes de señas, que son lenguas propiamente tales, en cambio, pueden aparecer espontáneamente, a menudo en comunidades de personas sordas, en cualquier momento y lugar); de modo que una pregunta interesante es: ¿cuál era el orden de los elementos en dicha lengua?

Un estudio reciente de Gell-Mann (sí, adivinó, Murray, el inventor de los quarks y Premio Nobel de Física 1969) & Ruhlen ( 2011), en que los investigadores revisaron el orden en 2.135 idiomas propone que dicho orden es SOV.

Las conclusiones a la que llegan los autores son las siguientes:

1. si hay una lengua de la que todos o la mayoría de los lenguajes derivan, tenía un orden de palabras SOV;

2. excepto en los casos de difusión, la dirección del cambio, cuando se produce, ha sido en su mayoría SOV > SVO > VSO / VOS con reversión ocasional a SVO, pero no a SOV,

3. la difusión, aunque importante, no es el proceso dominante en la evolución del orden de las palabras, y

4. los órdenes OVS y OSV, inusuales, parecen derivar directamente de SOV.

Los dejamos con las tablas por familias lingüísticas.

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Si consideramos que los elementos principales de las oraciones del lenguaje humano son el sujeto (en grueso, quién realiza la acción), el verbo (la acción propiamente tal) y el objeto (o complemento directo, el receptor de la acción) uno de los ...

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Este artículo explica cómo las clíticas trabajan en español. Una clítica es un elemento que carece de independencia prosódica en el habla conectada, que requiere un "huésped" fonológico a su izquierda o a su derecha. En el primer caso, se dice que el elemento es enclitico y en el segundo proclitico. En español, las llamadas formas "débiles" de los pronombres personales son en realidad camarillas que requieren un huésped verbal. Estas formas son las siguientes: se, me, te, lo(s), la(s), le(s), nos y os. Los elementos me, te, nos y os son deictic en que su referencia depende del contexto de la expresión. Me refiere al orador, te al destinatario, nos no a un grupo de personas que incluye al orador y os a los destinatarios.

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clitics weak pronouns spanish clitic doubling clitic left dislocation clitic climbing clitic array

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En este video, Señor Jordan repasa muchos ejemplos de frases correctamente e incorrectamente usando la a personal. Al hacerlo, aclara cómo y por qué la a personal puede ser utilizada en español. Primero explica cuáles son los usos. Dice que podemos usar la a personal cuando 1) la persona es actuada por el verbo en la oración o 2) cuando las mascotas, animales, o cualquier otra cosa tratada como una persona son el objeto del verbo.

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El video explica a fondo la historia y la influencia de los moros y árabes en español y portugués. La única área donde el árabe se convirtió en el idioma principal de todas las clases sociales fue en el pequeño reino de Granada. En Granada, los musulmanes se vieron obligados a asimilarse, por lo que los árabes no tenían un punto de apoyo permanente en España. Sin embargo, el idioma influyó en muchos sustantivos en español y portugués.

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ARABIC Influence on Spanish & Portuguese!

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El siguiente Prezi detalla las diferencias entre el latín vulgar y el latín clásico en el Imperio Romano. El romano clásico era el lenguaje escrito de los romanos y hoy se estudia. El latín vulgar era hablado por las masas y se derivaba del latín clásico. El latín vulgar se extendió a través de conquistas militares. El latín vulgar es lo que influyó en el desarrollo de muchos idiomas romances como el español, portugués, italiano y francés.

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Classical Latin vs. Vulgar Latin in the Roman Empire

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Occitan Picard Piedmontese Portuguese Romansh Romanian Sardinian Sassarese Sicilian Spanish Umbrian Venetian Walloon French Friulan Galician Italian Judaeo-Spanish Ladin Leonese Ligurian Milanese Mirandese Mozarabic Neapolitan Norman Roman Soldiers fueled the spread of Latin

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La influencia de los idiomas nativos americanos en español

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La influencia de los idiomas nativos americanos en español

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Esta presentación repasa la influencia de las tribus nativas americanas en muchas variedades de español latinoamericano. Por ejemplo, cuando los idiomas entran en contacto, los préstamos léxicos son inevitable. Cuando los colonizadores entraron en contacto con las tribus nativas, los artículos nuevos, como la comida, requerían nuevas palabras. Estas palabras a menudo fueron tomadas del idioma local. Los ejemplos incluyen maíz y maní.

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Este sitio web tiene muchas páginas sobre la historia de España y su cultura. La historia de España es rica y diversa a pesar de que el país es relativamente pequeño. En diferentes momentos, la tierra de la España actual ha sido buscada por grandes imperios como los cartagineses, romanos, árabes y los Reyes Católicos. Bajo el gobierno del rey Felipe II, el territorio de España se extendía desde Filipinas hasta América. Sin embargo, los territorios estadounidenses se independizaron en el transcurso del siglo XIX, culminando con España perdiendo el control de Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas.

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The history of Spain encompasses some of the most captivating, complex, and entertaining stories you can find in all the world. Spain is a small territory in southwest Europe whose history has run parallel to that of other countries throughout the centuries.

At different moments in time, the land of present-day Spain has been sought after by the greatest empires: the Carthaginians and the Romans fought over it, the Arabs conquered it, and the Catholic Monarchs recovered it and made it into the most powerful empire in the world with the Spanish conquest of America. In fact, under King Philip II of Spain there was no time in which the sun was not shining on one part of Spain's territory, which stretched from the Philippines (guess which king they were named after!) to the Americas with Spain, Portugal, Flanders, Italy, and parts of what is now Germany in between.

However, the reign of Phillip II also marked the beginning of an era of economic and political decline, with wars both domestic and foreign. The American territories won independence over the course of the 1800s, culminating with Spain losing control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines just before the turn of the 20th century. These events have shaped a large part of the modern world into what it is today.

Follow the links below to learn more about the role Spain has played in world history as you read about the origin of the country's flag, the wars it has fought, its times of great splendor, and much more.

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The history of Spain encompasses some of the most captivating, complex, and entertaining stories you can find in all the world. Spain is a small territory in southwest Europe whose history has run parallel to that of other countries throughout the centuries.

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¿Cuál no es otro nombre para la afasia caracterizado por la falta de comprensión del lenguaje?

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¿Cuál no es otro nombre para la afasia caracterizado por la falta de comprensión del lenguaje?

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A. Afasia fluida
B. Afasia no fluida
C. Afasia receptiva
D. Afasia de Wernicke

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¿Cuántas palabras españolas tienen un origen árabe?

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¿Cuántas palabras españolas tienen un origen árabe?

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A. 300
B. 400
C. 3000
D. 4000

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El siguiente video proporciona una descripción general completa de la implicatura conversacional. La implicatura conversacional se define como mensajes que transmiten los hablantes que a menudo están más allá de los significados literales de las palabras que hablan. Las tres dimensiones del significado incluyen el significado condicional de la verdad conversacional, el significado implícito no conversacional, y el significado condicional conversacional no de la verdad.

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PHILOSOPHY - Language: Conventional Implicature [HD]

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Este sitio web contiene mucha información de fuentes acreditadas sobre muchos subtemas en semántica e implicatura. Paul Grice postuló un Principio Cooperativo general y cuatro máximas que especifican cómo ser cooperativo. Afirmó que es de conocimiento común que las personas generalmente siguen estas reglas para una comunicación eficiente. Para la Máxima de Calidad, haga su contribución verdadera. No transmita lo que cree que es falso o injustificado. Para la Máxima de Cantidad, sea tan informativo como sea necesario. Para la Máxima de Relación, sea relevante. Para la Máxima de Manera, evite la oscuridad y la ambigüedad y luche por la brevedad y el orden.

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1. Speaker Implicature

H. P. Grice (1913-1988) was the first to systematically study cases in which what a speaker means differs from what the sentence used by the speaker means. Consider (1).

If this was a typical exchange, Barb meant that she is not going to Paul's party by saying that she has to work. She did not say that she is not going to Paul's party, and the sentence she uttered does not mean that. Grice introduced the technical terms implicate and implicature for the case in which what the speaker said is distinct from what the speaker thereby meant or implied. Thus Barb implicated that she is not going; that she is not going was her implicature.

In (2), Carla is a dispatcher in Denver, where it is sunny and dry. Don is a truck driver trying to get over the continental divide during a blizzard.

(2) Carla: How's the weather over there?
Don: The weather's lovely.

Don is using irony. He said that the weather is lovely, but he thereby meant that the weather is terrible. So he implicated that the weather is terrible. Implicating is an illocutionary speech act, something done in or by uttering words (Austin 1962: 98-103). Since it involves meaning one thing by saying something else, it is an indirect speech act, albeit not one that Searle (1975: 265-6) analyzed.

By "saying", Grice meant not the mere utterance of words, but saying that something is the case, another illocutionary speech act. Barb could have said the same thing by uttering different words. As Grice realized, "say" is used more or less strictly. Thus if Ed says "The largest planet is a gas giant", we will sometimes count him as saying that Jupiter is a gas giant. We will follow Grice in using "say" more narrowly, requiring that what a speaker says be something that the sentence uttered conventionally means (except when an indexical or ellipsis is used). So we will take Ed to have implicated that Jupiter is a gas giant by saying that the largest planet is. Stating or asserting that p entails both saying and meaning that p. When Yogi Berra, famous for his malapropisms, said "Texas has a lot of electrical votes", he said that Texas has a lot of electrical votes; but since that was not something he meant, it was not something he asserted. Don did not mean what he said for a different reason. So he too said but did not assert that the weather is lovely.

It is not possible to fully understand speakers without knowing what they have implicated as well as what they have said. Unless we know what Barb meant by saying that she has to work, we will not know that she has answered Alan's question. Unless Carla knows what Don meant by saying that the weather is lovely, she might mistakenly infer that he will arrive on time. The difference between saying and implicating also affects how we evaluate speakers. If Barb knew she did not have to work, then she was lying in dialogue (1). If she knew she was going to Paul's party, she might be guilty of misleading Alan, but not of lying or making a false statement. In court, witnesses are typically required to answer questions directly. They cannot avoid perjury by implicating a falsehood rather than saying it.

What someone implicates is not given to us directly. We have to infer it from evidence. We would typically infer in(1) that Barb meant she is not going from what she said, what Alan asked, and our assumption that Barb was responding to Alan's question. An implicature can be characterized as an inference ("something inferred"), but implicating is not itself inferring. To implicate something is to express a belief in a particular way. To infer something is to acquire or possess a belief in a particular way. Hearers have to infer what speakers implicate. This is not what makes implicating an indirect speech act. Implicature is indirect because to implicate something is to mean it by saying something else. Even though it requires an inference, our recognition of what is meant is commonly automatic and effortless, whether it is said or implicated. In(1), for example, competent speakers will grasp immediately that Barb meant both that she has to work and that she is not going to Paul's party. All speech acts have to be inferred from contextual evidence, including what was said and what words were uttered. Whether there is any significant difference in the kind of inference required to recognize an implicature is a matter of some debate, and may depend on the type of implicature.

2. Conversational and Conventional Implicature

The implicatures in (1) and(2) are conversational. They depend on features of the conversational context, and are not determined by the conventional meaning of the sentences uttered. A key feature in (1) was Alan's question. Had he asked "What are you going to do today?", Barb could have implicated something completely different (that she is going to work) by saying the same thing (that she has to work). Grice (1975: 25) contrasted a conversational implicature with a conventional implicature, by which he meant one that is determined by the meaning of the sentence used. Here's a variant of Grice's example.

We will use parentheses to refer to the sentences in an example like (3), and brackets to refer to what the sentences express. So (3c) is the sentence "Being brave follows from being English" and [3c] is the proposition that being brave follows from being English. By using (3a) to say and mean [3a], speakers implicate [3c]. That is, by using (3a) to say and mean that the queen is English and therefore brave, speakers implicate that being brave follows from being English. They imply rather than say that being brave follows from being English. In contrast, (3b) would rarely if ever be used to implicate [3c]. The meaning of "therefore" generates the implicature of (3a). Other words "triggering" conventional implicatures are but, even, too, still, yet, already, again, stop, start, know, and regret.

While Grice's examples were triggered lexically, other conventional implicatures are triggered syntactically. Speakers who assert Ravel, a Spaniard, wrote Spanish-style music implicate that Ravel was a Spaniard-they imply but do not say that Ravel was a Spaniard. Hence their utterance is misleading but not a lie if they know Ravel was French. The implicature is conventional in that it is determined by the meaning of the sentence via the appositive construction. Other constructions that generate conventional implicatures are as-parentheticals ( as a Spaniard) and parenthetical relative clauses ( who was Spanish).

As (1) illustrates, when a conversational implicature is false, the speaker's statement is misleading. Barb's utterance would nonetheless be linguistically flawless. Because [3c] is false, on the other hand, the use of(3a) to make a statement is infelicitous and improper as well as misleading. The truth of [3c] is a precondition of properly using(3a) to assert what it says. Conventional implicatures like [3c] are presuppositions in the non-technical sense in which the question "Have you cheated again?" presupposes that you cheated before. The question is inappropriate, and cannot be given a straight "Yes" or "No" answer, unless you did cheat before. For the same reason, the question Is the queen English and therefore brave? is improper; answering either "Yes" or "No" implies a connection between being English and brave.

Not all conventional implicatures are presuppositions in the same way. For example, Jack knows that 51 is prime entails and implicates that 51 is prime. It is false and possibly misleading, but not at all linguistically improper. Other words that trigger conventional implicatures but not presuppositions are start and stop applied to gerunds like cheating (Simons 2001: 432-3).

Grice (1975: 25) said that conventional implicatures are determined by the meaning of a sentence. Potts's (2005: 35-6; 2007: 669) stronger claim that a sentence cannot be used with its conventional meaning without implicating its conventional implicatures is implausible given examples like (4).

(3a) is used with its conventional meaning in (4a) as the consequent of a conditional. But because(3c) is a conjunct of the antecedent of that conditional, (4a) itself does not imply in any way that being brave follows from being English. A speaker asserting [4a] does not say [3a] and does not mean [3c]. So the speaker does not implicate that being brave follows from being English. The antecedent of [4a] prevents the conversational implicature of its consequent from "projecting". The implicature triggered by the appositive is not implicated for a completely different reason in (4b). When this sentence is used ironically, the speaker uses it with its conventional meaning and says that Trump, the stable genius, started a trade war. But because it is used to mock Trump's claim that he is a stable genius, the speaker does not implicate that Trump is a stable genius. Indeed, he implicates the very opposite. The meaning of a sentence determines its conventional implicatures, but whether a speaker implicates them depends on how the sentence is used. The speaker does implicate them when the sentence is used to assert what the sentence means. The same is not always true for conversational implicatures.

While Grice used "conventional" to denote an implicature determined by linguistic meaning, W. Davis (1998: Chs. 5-6) and Lepore & Stone (2015: Pt. II) argue that even conversational implicatures can be conventional in the non-technical sense in which it is conventional for women to wear a sari in India but not Mongolia, and for German speakers to use rot to mean "red" but not English speakers. Conventions in this sense are common practices that serve a social interest, perpetuate themselves in certain ways, and are arbitrary in that other practices could have served the same purposes and perpetuated themselves. New speakers pick up conventions from prior speakers, often with no instruction. Consider (5):

It would be unconventional (unusual, idiosyncratic, even unprecedented) for people who say "Some athletes smoke" to conversationally implicate that some physically fit people will develop bladder cancer, but conventional (customary, normal, standard practice) for them to implicate that not all athletes smoke. The customary implicature is not conventional in Grice's sense, though. For "Not all athletes smoke" is not determined by the meaning of "Some athletes smoke". Speakers can and often do use ( 5a) while implicating something other than [ 5b], as(6) will illustrate. The practice of using sentences of the form "Some NP VP" to mean "Not all NP VP" is not a semantic or syntactic convention. It is a pragmatic convention. To avoid confusion, I will describe implicatures that are conventional in Grice's sense as semantic. When not modified by "in Grice's sense", "conventional" will have the broader sense of customary.

Grice (1975: 37ff) called implicatures like [ 5b] generalized conversational implicatures ("GCIs"). The term is appropriate because ( 5a) can be used to implicate [ 5b] in a wide variety of contexts. Grice characterized generalized implicatures as those that "would normally (in the absence of special circumstances)" be carried by "the use of a certain form of words". Levinson's (2000: 11-12, 16-22, 42-46) characterized GCIs similarly as "default inferences"-implicatures we normally and automatically infer in the absence of evidence to the contrary. These characterizations are too strong in one respect. There is nothing abnormal about the use of ( 5a) in (6), where Gina would normally implicate [6a] rather than [ 5b].

(6) Fred: Do you know whether all athletes smoke?
Gina: Some athletes smoke.

The fact that "Some athletes smoke" implicates [ 5b] in some contexts and [ 6a] in others shows that neither is a conventional implicature in Grice's sense. Having more than one GCI is compatible with them all being conventional in the broad sense. The word bank has several meanings in English, including "row", as in bank of switches. So it is conventional to use bank to mean "row", even though this cannot be described as its normal or default use.

Following Grice (1975: 39), it is widely accepted that generalized conversational implicatures differ from semantic implicatures in being cancelable. Whereas [3a] cannot be asserted without implicating [3c], [ 5a] can be asserted without implicating [ 5b]. The speaker may do this explicitly by adding "Indeed, all do" after uttering "Some athletes smoke". Alternatively, an implicature may be cancelled implicitly by the utterance context, as when it is obvious to all that the speaker is engaging in understatement. Whereas Some athletes smoke, indeed all do could well be true, The queen is English and therefore brave, but being brave does not follow from being English is contradictory. We saw above, though, that even semantic implicatures can be cancelled by figures of speech or conditionals.

Whereas semantic implicatures are generally entailed by what is said, many believe that conversational implicatures cannot be. As (1),(2),(5), and(6) illustrate, conversational implicatures are typically not entailments. But exceptions have been observed. When a speaker gives an affirmative answer to "Did you drive somewhere yesterday?" by saying "I drove to Aspen", what is implicated ("I did drive somewhere") is entailed by what is said ("I drove to Aspen"). The same is true in hyperbole and loose use ( §4). Neale (1992: 529) believes the cancelability of conversational implicatures prevents them from being entailments. But while an entailed implicature cannot be explicitly canceled without contradiction ("I drove to Aspen but did not drive anywhere"), it can be implicitly canceled. If a blizzard makes it obvious that no one could have driven to Aspen yesterday, "I drove to Aspen" may implicate that I did not drive anywhere.

Grice observed that conversational implicatures are typically connected to what is said rather than the way it is said, so that "it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question" (1975: 39). The implicature of (1) is thus said to be nondetachable. Grice allowed exceptions, though, "where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant to the determination of an implicature" (see Grice's "maxim of Manner" in §6). Metalinguistic implicatures-those that refer to the particular words the speaker used-are also clearly detachable.

(7) Harry: What is this species of bird called in English?
Irene: This is a widgeon.

In example (7), Irene used "This is a widgeon" to implicate that the English word for the species is "widgeon". Had Irene used a German sentence with the same meaning ( Dies ist eine Pfeife) she would have said the same thing while implicating something different (that it is called "Pfeife"). Semantic implicatures, in contrast, are nondetachable because they are determined by what the sentence means.

3. Sentence Implicature

As we observed in §1, Grice defined implicating as a form of speaker meaning. But Grice and others nevertheless began applying "implicate" to sentences, analogous to the way "imply", "presuppose", and "mean" apply to sentences as well as people. If an implicature is conventional in either sense (that is, either semantic or generalized), we may say that the sentence implicates it, or has the implicature. Even though Barb implicates that she is not going to Paul's party, "I have to work" does not itself implicate this. But "Some athletes smoke" implicates that not all do even though speakers can use the sentence without implicating this. (Analogy: plane means "airplane" even though speakers can use plane without meaning "airplane".) Similarly,(4b) implies that Trump is a stable genius even though speakers can use it without implying that.

Whereas knowledge of what speakers implicate is essential to fully understand speakers, knowledge of what sentences implicate is a critical component of our knowledge of a language. This is obvious for sentences with semantic implicatures like (3a). But speakers are not fully competent with "some" unless they know that it is related to "all" in a way it is not related to "several" or "two". A man using ( 5a) may mislead others if he does not realize that it implicates [ 5b], and fail to communicate if he thinks it implicates "It is not the case that several athletes smoke".

4. Common Forms of Conversational Implicature

Many forms of conversational implicature occur frequently in everyday speech and literature, with a wide variety of sentences and in all known languages. They are common ways of both using and understanding language. The forms are differentiated in part by the relationship between what is said and what is implicated. Knowledge of them is an important component of our linguistic competence, and is acquired at an early age.

The most widely recognized forms of implicature use figures of speech ( tropes). Irony, overstatement (hyperbole), understatement (meiosis and litotes), and metaphor have been known at least since Aristotle. They are taught in school as elements of style. When Don said in(2)The weather is lovely, he used irony and implicated that the weather is awful. Don did so in part to make light of the awful weather. Don could have implicated the same thing by saying The weather is not good (litotes) or The weather is the worst in history (hyperbole).

Figurative speech is non-literal: users generally do not mean what they say, and expect their audience to recognize that. (Litotes is an exception.) Don did not mean that the weather is lovely. A typical clue that speech is figurative is the obvious falsity of what is said. Some figures also tend to be marked intonationally, including irony and hyperbole. Others are not, including metaphor and understatement. They are all used to make speech lively, interesting, and stylish ( §1 0).

Many forms of implicature are not figures of speech, and have become widely recognized only since Grice (1975). (1) illustrates relevance implicature: the speaker implicates an answer to an expressed or implied question by stating something related to it by implication or explanation. [ 5b] is a quantity (or scalar) implicature: the speaker implicates the denial of a proposition stronger than the one said.(6) illustrates ignorance implicature: the speaker implicates that something stronger than what was said is unknown.(7) illustrates metalinguistic implicature: the speaker implicates that something has a certain name by using that name to describe it. These "modes of speech" (non-figurative forms of implicature) are not taught in school, and names for them are not in general use. Nevertheless, they are as frequent and natural as figurative speech, and are learned at the same time. Modes of speech are not marked intonationally, and the speech is literal. They are not used to make speech or writing lively. Speakers do not intend what they say to be obviously false, and generally do mean what they say.

Two modes of speech do have common names. One is damning with faint praise. Grice's example has become classic:

A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc". (Grice 1975: 33)

By saying so little, A implicated that Mr. X is a poor candidate for the job. The other named mode is loose use, or speaking loosely, illustrated by (8):

If Mike's response is typical, what he meant is only that dinner will be served close enough to six o'clock for current purposes. That would be typically be true if dinner will be served at 6:01. What Mike said, though, is that dinner will be served at 6:00, which would be false if dinner is served at 6:01. If Mike gave the same response to a question about when a swimmer touched the wall in the final lap of an Olympic event, 6:01 may not be close enough.

The figures and modes of speech are common, socially useful practices. They perpetuate themselves through precedent following, social acceptance, individual habit and association, and traditional transmission from one generation of speakers to another. Precedent operates when hearers call on their knowledge of the forms speakers commonly use to either interpret speakers in new contexts, or to predict what hearers will understand. The forms are less arbitrary than lexical or syntactic conventions, but no one has to implicate rather than say things, or use one form of implicature rather than others.

Since these conventions do not attach implicatures to particular sentence forms, they do not give rise to sentence implicatures.

5. Pragmatics and Semantics

As our examples make clear, semantics, conceived as the study of the meaning of words and sentences, does not exhaust the study of meaning. The study of speaker meaning and implicature is included in pragmatics, which covers the broad range of speech acts performed by using words and sentences. Applied pragmatics arose from the recognition that second language learners cannot become fully proficient without mastering more than grammar and literal meaning (Kasper 2003). Clinical pragmatics studies communication disorders that arise from failure to master pragmatic rules (Cummings 2009, 2014). Formal pragmatics uses formal models of utterances, contexts, and discourse to state precise rules specifying the interpretation of an utterance in a context, including what is both said and implicated (Roberts 2006).

The phenomenon of Gricean conventional implicature ( §2) shows further that standard truth conditional semantics does not exhaust semantics. For example, Ravel, a Spaniard, wrote Spanish-style music and Ravel was a Spaniard and wrote Spanish-style music have the same entailments. Yet they differ in meaning in such a way that the former but not the latter is infelicitous and improper because Ravel was French. "False" clearly applies to the latter but not to the former.

Implicature is important even in truth conditional semantics. For example, logicians customarily take sentences of the form " p or q" to be true provided " p" or " q" or both are true. Thus "It is not the case that cats meow or purr" would be counted as false. But there are also cases in which speakers use " p or q" to mean that " p" or " q" is true but not both. This would be the natural way to interpret someone who said "John is going to invite Mary or Jane to the prom". Some maintain that "or" is ambiguous in English, with an inclusive and an exclusive sense. But another possibility is that the exclusive interpretation is a generalized conversational implicature. One piece of evidence supporting the implicature hypothesis is that the exclusive interpretation seems cancelable. Thus "Jane will visit France or Germany this summer; indeed, she will drive through both on her way to Poland" has no contradictory interpretation. A methodological issue is to describe the evidence necessary to decide whether a particular interpretation is a sense or a generalized conversational implicature. A foundational issue to is describe exactly what the difference consists in.

Implicature continues to be invoked in this way to defend controversial semantic claims:

Knowledge. The standard of justification necessary to claim knowledge varies from context to context depending on what is at stake and salient. On contextualist theories, sentences of the form "S knows p" are indexical, with different truth conditions in different contexts (S. Cohen 1986, Lewis 1996, DeRose 2009). An alternative theory is that "S knowsp" has a strict invariant semantics, but is used loosely to implicate thatS is close enough to knowing for the purposes of the context (W. Davis 2007b). Another is that "S knows p" has a weak invariant semantics but its negation is used to implicate that contextually relevant alternatives cannot be ruled out (Rysiew 2001, 2005; Brown 2006; Hazlett 2007).

Names. The Millian theory that the meaning of a name is its referent entails that coreferential names are synonymous, and that names without a referent are meaningless. This seems untenable in light of names like "Superman" and "Clark Kent". Millians have proposed that the source of these linguistic intuitions is a difference in implicature (Salmon 1986; Soames 1989; Berg 2012). One hypothesis invokes metalinguistic implicature, noting that "Clark Kent can fly" implicates that a man called "Clark Kent" can fly (McKay 1981; Berg 1988, 1998). One problem is its implication that the Chinese translation of "Lois Lane believes Superman can fly" should seem as false as "Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly".

Negation. On the regular interpretation of (9), "some" is equivalent to "any", and the whole sentence is contradictory.
(9) The boy did not eat some of the cookies, he ate all the cookies.

But there is another interpretation, marked by intonation and other features, on which the negation in (9) denies the "not all" implicature of "The boy ate some of the cookies", and is thus consistent. The question is how to account for the two different interpretations of negations given that the word "not" seems unambiguous (Geurts 1998). Horn (1989: 362-4; 370-5) and Burton-Roberts (1989) propose that the marked interpretation of (9) is an implicature. W. Davis (2016a: Ch. 6) argues that it is an idiom that plausibly evolved from a generalized conversational implicature.

Implicature plays a well-attested diachronic role in grammaticalization and the origin of new meanings and idioms. For example, metaphors have a typical life cycle: beginning as something a speaker means on a particular occasion; being picked up by others; catching on, which means becoming self-perpetuating and spreading through the population; and finally, dying and becoming a new lexical meaning or idiom. When dead, what used to be indirectly expressed is directly expressed. The term virus as applied to computers went through this evolution in the last few decades, originally denoting a biological organism that spreads from host to host, now having another meaning on which it denotes computer programs that spread from computer to computer in a similar fashion. When a dead metaphor has syntactic structure like go viral, it is an idiom. When metaphors become widespread and self-perpetuating, but are not yet idioms, they generate generalized conversational implicatures.

6. Gricean Theory

In addition to identifying the phenomenon of implicature, and classifying its types, Grice developed a theory designed to explain and predict conversational implicatures and to describe how they are understood. Grice (1975: 26-30) postulated a general Cooperative Principle and four maxims specifying how to be cooperative. It is common knowledge, he asserted, that people generally follow these rules for efficient communication.

Cooperative Principle. Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation.

Maxim of Quality. Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or unjustified.

Maxim of Quantity. Be as informative as required.

Maxim of Relation. Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner. Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order.

Grice viewed these not as arbitrary conventions, but as instances of general rules governing rational, cooperative behavior. For example, if Jane is helping Kelly build a house, she will hand Kelly a hammer rather than a tennis racket (relevance), more than one nail when several are needed (quantity), and straight nails rather than bent ones (quality); she will do all this quickly and efficiently (manner).

Relevance implicatures like (1) are thought to arise from the maxim of Relation. Barb would have infringed this maxim unless her contribution were relevant to the purpose of the conversation. If Barb was being cooperative, then she was trying to answer Alan's question. Given that working is incompatible with partying, it is inferred that Barb must have intended to communicate that she is not going to the party. Grice (1975: 34) thought other implicatures arise by flouting maxims. This happens when what a cooperative speaker says so patently violates a maxim that the hearer must infer that the speaker means something different. Irony is thought to arise from flouting the maxim of Quality ( §9).

Generalizing from such examples, Grice provided a theoretical account of conversational implicature that has been widely adopted. A representative formulation goes as follows, with S the speaker and H the hearer.

Theoretical Definition: S conversationally implicates p iff S implicates p when:

1. S is presumed to be observing the Cooperative Principle (Cooperative Presumption);

2. The supposition that S believes p is required to makeS's utterance consistent with the Cooperative Principle (Determinacy); and

3. S believes (or knows), and expects H to believe thatS believes, that H is able to determine that (ii) is true (Mutual Knowledge).

This says that an implicature is conversational provided conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied, where (ii) is the condition that S's believing p is required for S to be in conformity with the Cooperative Principle. The Theoretical Definition does not entail that S implicated p is inferable from (i)-(iii). Calculability does that.

Calculability: Conversational implicatures must be capable of being worked out.

Grice's calculability principle says more than that hearers are generally able to infer what speakers implicate on the basis of the linguistic meaning of what they utter. The same is true of what people say. To work out an implicature is to infer it in a specific way from the Cooperative Principle using particular facts about the meaning of the sentence uttered and the context of utterance.

To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. A general pattern for the working-out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows: He has said that q; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle [Cooperative Presumption]; he could not be doing this unless he thought that p [Determinacy]; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks thatp is required [Mutual Knowledge]; he has done nothing to stop me thinking thatp; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, thatp; and so he has implicated thatp". (Grice 1975: 31; my emphasis and insertions)

Key steps of the working out schema have been named in brackets, corresponding to (i)-(iii) in the Theoretical Definition.

In addition to postulating that the conversationality of an implicature depends on the Cooperative Presumption, Determinacy, and Mutual Knowledge conditions, and that the implicature can be inferred in part from their satisfaction, Grice claimed that the conditions give rise to or generate the implicatures. The implicatures exist because conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied. From his assumption that conversational implicatures can be explained and predicted on the basis of the Cooperative Principle, Grice drew a methodological conclusion:

Grice's Razor: Other things equal, it is preferable to postulate conversational implicatures rather than senses, semantic implicatures, or semantic presuppositions because conversational implicatures can be derived from independently motivated psycho-social principles.

The pithy formulation is "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity", alluding to Ockham. If a phenomenon can be explained and predicted in terms of psycho-social principles, then it is theoretically more economical to do so than to posit senses and the like, which cannot be so explained. Grice's Razor is often invoked to support classifying the exclusive interpretation of " p or q" as an implicature rather than as a second sense ( §5).

Following Grice, "conversational implicature" was defined in §2 to mean an implicature that depends on features of the conversational context and is not determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered. On this definition, Grice's Theoretical Definition and Calculability are empirical hypotheses that may turn out to be false. Indeed, we will review evidence against these hypotheses below. Many linguists and philosophers, however, take Calculability to be true by definition. They take "conversational implicature" to mean an implicature that can be worked out from what is said and the Cooperative Principle or its maxims. If this definition is adopted, then what the evidence would show is that the implicatures illustrated in § §1 -4 are not conversational, even those that are not conventional in Grice's sense (cf. Lepore & Stone 2015: 6, 83, 148).

7. Theoretical Difficulties

While Grice viewed his ideas as tentative and exploratory, followers have taken the theory to be well established. Indeed, it has served as a paradigm for research in pragmatics. Serious difficulties have emerged.

According to Grice's Theoretical Definition ( §6), conversational implicatures depend on a presumption that the speaker is observing the Cooperative Principle. W. Davis (1998: §2.5) notes, however, that speakers can engage in implicature when there is no conversation. All the figures and modes of speech can appear in private journals or in manuscripts that have little hope of being read.

The Cooperative Principle further assumes that the participants in every conversation strive only to achieve common goals. From the perspective of social psychology, evolutionary biology, and game theory, Pinker (2007) observes that pure cooperation is generally an unrealistic idealization or naive assumption. Conversations are often among adversaries, whose goals beyond communication are opposed. It would be foolhardy and possibly dangerous for an interrogator to presume that a prisoner of war or terrorism suspect is being cooperative. Even when participants are friends or relatives, they often have some divergent goals, and may give priority to other principles ( §10). To the extent that they diverge, the speaker's goals may be promoted and the hearer's goals thwarted by withholding information, providing misinformation, going off on a tangent, or being obscure. Even when it is correctly presumed that a speaker is not being cooperative, the speaker may use all the figures and modes of speech. If the prosecuting attorney asks the defendant whether he was in the bank on the day of the robbery, the defendant might answer "I took my mother to the hospital that day", thereby implicating that he was not at the bank. He may do this in the hope of misleading the jury as well as the prosecutor. The official purpose of the conversation is to get at the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But the defendant's purpose is to hide it.

Many conversations have goals other than the exchange of information. One is amusement, which speakers often pursue by making jokes (Lepore & Stone 2015: §11.3). Because the goal is not to provide information, the maxims of Quality, Quantity, and Relation do not apply. If for any of these reasons the Cooperative Principle does not apply, reasoning based on it will be unsound.

8. Overgeneration

Many have observed that for every implicature that appears to be correctly predicted by Gricean theory, others appear to be falsely predicted. The schema used to "work out" observed implicatures can usually be used just as well to work out nonexistent implicatures. So the schema as formulated is invalid-an unreliable method of inferring implicatures. By a simple application of Mill's Methods, it follows that the observed implicatures do not exist because of the Gricean factors.

We will illustrate using the case that has been most extensively studied, and is generally considered a paradigm application of Gricean theory: the derivation of quantity implicatures from the maxim of Quantity. Adapted to (5), here is Huang's (2014: 34) formulation.

Since the speaker has used a semantically weaker expression (i.e., some) where a semantically stronger one (e.g., all) is available, he would contradict Grice's Quantity Maxim if the semantically stronger sentence held. Consequently, he believes that the semantically stronger statement does not hold. Furthermore, he has not done anything to stop the addressee thinking that he so thinks, therefore he conversationally implicates that not all athletes smoke.

In the typical case represented by (5), S says "Some athletes smoke" and implicates "Not all athletes smoke". The stronger statement S does not make is "All athletes smoke". There are countless statements more informative than what S said, however, whose negations were not implicated, including Several athletes smoke, Some athletes smoke regularly, I know some athletes smoke, and 13% of all athletes smoke. The Gricean reasoning could be repeated using any of these stronger statements, with fallacious results. For example:

S said "Some athletes smoke". If S were in a position to assert the stronger statement "Several athletes smoke" but did not, S would be in a breach of the maxim of Quantity unless S wished to convey that it does not hold. So S implicated that it is not the case that several athletes smoke.

But speakers who utter sentences of the form "Some S are P" rarely if ever implicate the denial of "Several S are P ". Among the infinity of statements stronger than "Some athletes smoke", "All athletes smoke" is highly unusual in that people commonly implicate its denial. Since the derivations have the same form whether or not their conclusions are observed to be true, Lepore & Stone (2015: 143ff) call this the "symmetry" problem. The Gricean derivation seems plausible only because we knew antecedently that the conclusion is true.

An irony underscoring the ex post facto character of the Gricean calculation is that Grice himself derived an ignorance implicature from the maxim of Quantity.

A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in France. Both know that A wants to see his friend C, if to do so would not involve too great a prolongation of his journey:

A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.

(Gloss: There is no reason to suppose that B is opting out; his answer is, as he well knows, less informative than is required to meet A's needs. This infringement of the first maxim of Quantity can be explained only by the supposition that B is aware that to be more informative would be to say something that infringed the second maxim of Quality. "Don't say what you lack adequate evidence for", so B implicates that he does not know in which town C lives.) (Grice 1975: 32-33; example number deleted)

It is plausible that B would have implicated this. But if Grice's reasoning is valid, why shouldn't Huang assume that someone uttering "Some athletes smoke" must be ignorant of whether all athletes smoke? If Huang's reasoning is valid, why shouldn't Grice assume that B knows a stronger statement does not hold, such as that A lives in the southernmost city in France?

Accounting for the differences in implicature described in this section is an outstanding problem for pragmatic theory.

9. Failures of Determinacy

Grice's Determinacy condition states that S conversationally implicates p only if S has to believe (and implicate) p if S's utterance is to be consistent with the Cooperative Principle. Determinacy is a key premise in the working-out schema, so Calculability depends on it. As §8 illustrated, however, there are normally many alternative ways to be cooperative, and contribute what is required by the conversation, even when the meanings and referents of the words used are taken as given.

Grice believed irony involves flouting Quality. Here is Grice's oft-repeated "gloss" applied to (2), in which Don said "The weather's lovely" during a blizzard.

It is perfectly obvious to Don and his audience (Carla) that what Don has said is something he does not believe, and the audience knows that Don knows that is obvious to the audience. So ... Don must be trying to get across some other proposition than the one he purports to be putting forward. This must be some obviously related proposition; the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward. (After Grice 1975: 34).

While irony often involves saying something obviously false, it need not have been obvious to Carla in (2) that Don believed the weather was unlovely. She may have had no independent source of information about his weather. Don would also have made a suitable contribution to the conversation if he had meant and believed that the weather is lovely. So Determinacy is unsatisfied in irony when the speaker could have been speaking literally, believing what was said (W. Davis 1998: §3.3; see even Grice 1978: 53).

Many have observed that the obvious falsity of what speakers say may signal that they mean something else, but it does not tell us what else they mean (e.g., Levinson 1983: 157-8; Lepore & Stone 2015: 38-9). Indeed, metaphor is another case in which Grice (1975: 34) takes the speaker to be flouting Quality. So the flouting of Quality does not tell us which figure of speech Don is using. He would have made a suitable contribution to the conversation if he had been engaging in metaphor instead of irony, meaning and believing that relations between he and his partner (the "weather" in the cabin) are fine.

Metaphors are often difficult to interpret. Suppose a commentator says "Iraq was Bush's Vietnam", referring to George W. Bush and the second Gulf War. Did she mean that the U.S. lost in Iraq the way it lost in Vietnam? That the reasons for going to war in Iraq were as misguided as those that got the U.S. into Vietnam? Or did she perhaps mean that even though the U.S. did not secure all its objectives, the Iraq war was still worth fighting? She could mean and believe any of these things and still be making a useful contribution. Lepore & Stone (2015: Ch. 10) describe such metaphors as inviting hearers to imagine all the things the speaker might have meant. Grice (1975: 39-40) himself acknowledged such cases when he said that

there may be many possible specific explanations ... ; and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have just the kind of indeterminacy that many implicata do in fact have.

But to say this is to deny Determinacy and Calculability.

Rysiew (2000: 577-8) suggested weakening the determinacy condition by replacing " has to believe (and implicate) p" with " is likely to believe (and implicate) p ". As he notes, hearers commonly use abduction to figure out what speakers have implicated (cf. Hobbs et al. 1993). Abduction is a specific form of inductive or non-demonstrative reasoning in which a hypothesis is inferred to be true from the fact that it provides the best explanation of the data. By their nature, non-demonstrative methods are not guaranteed to succeed. This fact of life is no reason to shun induction when seeking to discover implicatures. W. Davis (1998: 66-8) had observed, though, that an implicature can exist and be conversational even though the available evidence does not make that implicature (or belief) more likely than others. Examples like those above with more than two equally likely alternatives show this.

Saul (2001, 2002, 2010) and M. S. Green (2002) suggested that "implicature" be defined normatively, as properly implicating something. W. Davis (2007a) replied that while determinacy is more plausible as a norm, similar considerations show that it is not required even for properly meaning one thing by saying something else. For example, a speaker who says "I ate some of the cookies" could properly be meaning either "I ate them all" (engaging in understatement), or "I did not eat them all" (quantity implicature), or "I do not know whether I ate them all" (ignorance implicature). None of these contributions is required given that all would be appropriate.

10. Conflicting Principles

Grice (1975: 30) recognized that his maxims may "clash". When they do, there is no way to determine what is required for conformity to the Cooperative Principle. In the case of irony, for example, Manner clashes with Quality. When Don said "The weather's lovely", we cannot interpret him as meaning what he said because on that interpretation he would be violating Quality. But we cannot interpret him as meaning the opposite because then he would be violating Manner (Wilson & Sperber 2012: 18-9). It is more perspicuous to explicitly state something than to implicate it.

We use irony and other figures in part because we have conversational goals other than the efficient communication of information (Lakoff 1977; Sainsbury 1984: 427-9). We observe not only the Cooperative Principle, but also the Principle of Style.

Principle of Style: Be stylish, so be beautiful, distinctive, entertaining, and interesting.

Clear and simple prose-"just the facts, please"-can be boring, tedious and dull. We liven up our writing with figures of speech. Metaphor in particular makes speech more interesting and insightful by engaging our imagination (Lepore & Stone 2015: Ch. 10). In the process, we sacrifice perspicuity (violating Manner). We sometimes "embellish" a narration to make it more interesting (violating Quality) and delete boring or ugly details even when they are important (violating Quantity).

The Gricean maxims often clash with the Principle of Politeness, emphasized by Leech (1983).

Principle of Politeness: Be polite, so be tactful, respectful, generous, praising, modest, deferential, and sympathetic.

Speakers frequently withhold information that would be offensive or disappointing to the hearer, violating Quantity. Speakers often exaggerate in order to please or flatter, and utter "white lies" in order to spare the hearer's feelings, violating Quality. People pick "safe topics" (e.g., the weather) to stress agreement and communicate an interest in maintaining good relations, violating Relation. Euphemisms avoid mentioning the unmentionable, but in the process violate Manner.

One common motive for implicating something is that it is often perceived to be more polite than asserting it (Pinker 2007; Huang 2014: 142). In case (1), Barb may have answered Alan's question indirectly because she thinks it is less likely to hurt his feelings, even if she realizes he will assume that is what she is doing.

11. Neo-Gricean Pragmatics

Prominent linguists have sought to improve on Grice's formulation of the conversational principles, and provide a solution to the problem of clashes. Horn (2004: §4) replaces Quantity, Relevance, and Manner with two interrelated principles.

Q Principle: Say as much as you can [given Quality and R].

R Principle: Say no more than you must [given Q].

Levinson (2000: 76, 114, 137) adopts similar principles, which he calls "Q" and "I" (for "Informativeness"). Since Horn believes that interpretations like [10a] are derivable from the R-principle, he calls them "R-based implicatures". The assumption is that there is no reason to make a stronger statement (say more) if the extra information can be contributed by implicature. Implicature [11b] is similarly described as "Q-based". The assumption is that if the speaker did not make a stronger statement (say more), its denial was implicated.

Horn has clearly identified two distinct and very general patterns of meaning and interpretation. Critics maintain, however, that Horn's two principles provide no reason to expect the two indicated interpretations rather than those we do not observe (Lepore & Stone 2015: §3.1; W. Davis 2016a: §4.7). They ask how Q can predict [11b] without predicting [10b], and how [10a] can be derivable from R if [11a] is not. What in R predicts [10a] rather than other strengthenings, such as "He broke someone else's finger"?

Horn goes on to formulate what he calls the Division of Pragmatic Labor:

Given two expressions covering the same semantic ground, a relatively unmarked form-briefer and/or more lexicalized-tends to be R-associated with a particular unmarked, stereotypical meaning, use, or situation, while the use of the periphrastic or less lexicalized expression, typically more complex or prolix, tends to be Q-restricted to those situations outside the stereotype, for which the unmarked expression could not have been used appropriately. (Horn 2004: 16)

Horn illustrates this division with the contrast between (12) and (13).

Horn appears to be assuming, plausibly, that "stopped" and "got to stop" have the same meaning. If so, then it is difficult to see how either implicature could be derived from Q or R, which refer to what is said, not how it is said. (Recall Grice's nondetachability criterion.) Levinson (2000: 136-7) therefore reinstated a version of Manner.

M Principle: Indicate abnormal, nonstereotypical situations by using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situations.

Levinson describes "got to stop" as "marked" because it is more complex and less lexicalized than "stopped". W. Davis (2016a: 160) notes, though, that when we look at clear cases in which a single word is synonymous with a less lexicalized phrase, we often find no difference in implicature (e.g., mare versus adult female horse). And the word often connotes an unusually good example of the kind (e.g., stallion in common parlance connotes an especially fast or dominant uncastrated adult male horse).

Horn sometimes describes Q and R as "antinomic forces" (e.g., Horn 2004: 14), which would be appropriate if the bracketed conditions were omitted. Without the conditions, Horn's principles would clash as often as Grice's. Without independent means of determining antecedently which force will "prevail" in a given case, Horn's principles would lack predictive or explanatory value. Lepore & Stone (2015: §3.1) suggest treating Horn's principles as "simultaneous equations", constraining but not determining the conversational implicatures. But this assumes the equations have a solution. Not all simultaneous equations do.

Levinson (2000: 157-64) sought to avoid clashes by stating an order of precedence: Q > M > R. Huang (2014: 49) reverses the ordering, saying that

the R-principle generally takes precedence until the use of a contrastive linguistic form induces a Q-implicature to the non-applicability of the pertinent R-implicature....

Such orderings make sense only if the bracketed clauses in Q and R are omitted. W. Davis (2016a: 159) responds that Levinson's ordering makes it is hard to see why (10) or(12) should have an R implicature rather than a Q implicature, while Huang's ordering makes it hard to explain why(11) and(13) have Q implicatures.

12. Relevance Theory

The most influential alternative to Gricean and neo-Gricean theory, called "Relevance theory", was developed by Sperber and Wilson.

We have proposed a definition of relevance and suggested what factors might be involved in assessments of degrees of relevance. We have also argued that all Grice's maxims can be replaced by a single principle of relevance-that the speaker tries to be as relevant as possible in the circumstances-which, when suitably elaborated, can handle the full range of data that Grice's maxims were designed to explain. (Wilson & Sperber 1986: 381)

"Relevance" is given a highly technical sense, in which the relevance of a proposition in a context is directly related to how many positive cognitive effects it has and inversely related to how much effort is required to process it (Wilson & Sperber 2012: 6, 62-3, 219). "Positive cognitive effects" are "improvements in knowledge", including "true contextual implications, or warranted strengthenings or weakenings of existing assumptions". Contextual implications are propositions logically implied by the proposition and the cognitive context together but from neither alone. Propositions or assumptions are objects of belief or knowledge-cognitive representations. Wilson and Sperber illustrate their concept by imagining a doctor whose choice of true statements is confined to the alternatives in (14).

They conclude that [14b] would be maximally relevant on the grounds that it entails everything [14a] does and more, while being as easy to process; [14c] has the same cognitive effects as [14b], but is harder to process.

Example (14) is a special case in that either the effects or the effort are equal between alternative contributions. To know what is maximally relevant in other cases, a particular function of effects and effort must be specified (Hinkelman 1987). Sperber and Wilson specify one when describing the theory of cognition on which they ground their theory of communication. "Our claim is that all human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible" (Sperber & Wilson 1986a: 49). "Efficiency in cognition ... involves processing inputs that offer the best possible cost/benefit ratio at the time"(Wilson & Sperber 2012: 62). Selecting this function and formulating a principle in the style of Grice's yields:

Principle of Maximal Relevance (Cognitive Efficiency): Contribute that which has the maximum ratio of positive cognitive effects to processing cost.

We will see that Relevance theorists qualify this idea, but many important points can be made with the simpler principle.

While Grice's maxims enjoin the speaker to contribute the required information and do so perspicuously and briefly, they do not require the speaker to maximize information, perspicuity, or brevity when other things are equal. For example, Grice's maxims do not predict that Barb implicated I am not going anywhere in(1) even though it is more informative than I am not going to Peter's party, and may have a greater effects/cost ratio. Or suppose that in a discussion of a new prescription drug benefit, someone comments "It will take some money to fund that program". The speaker would normally be engaging in understatement, implicating "The program will be very expensive". Relevance theorists account for this by saying that because the proposition explicitly conveyed is trivial, and thus has few positive cognitive effects, the hearer will "recover" the more informative proposition. Critics respond that countless propositions are more informative than the one implicated, such as "The program will cost trillions", and seem as easy to process.

Conversely, Maximal Relevance does not imply or subsume Grice's principles. For instance, nothing guarantees that the contribution with the most positive cognitive effects per unit processing cost is germane to the topic of the conversation or as informative as required (less informative contributions might have more positive cognitive effects per unit processing cost). As a result, Maximal Relevance does not predict what Barb implicated in example (1). The proposition I am not going to Peter's party will have different effects than I am not going to Paul's party, but seems as easy to process and could well have as many positive cognitive effects. Only the proposition about Paul is relevant in the ordinary sense to what Alan asked, but this does not entail that it is maximally relevant in the technical sense of Relevance theory.

Sperber and Wilson observe that Gricean theory provides no explanation for why Don would say in (2) that the weather is lovely if he wanted to express the opposite belief. Maximal Relevance has the same problem: Don's simply saying what he means would seem easier to process and thus more efficient. Wilson & Sperber (2004: 621) think saying something in order to mean the opposite would be "patently irrational". Adler (1987: 710) observed, however, that it need not be irrational given how readily hearers recognize when speakers do so. Moreover, speakers engaging in irony are doing more than meaning the opposite of what they said. As Grice (1978: 53-4) later recognized, they are also pretending to mean and assert what they said, and are expressing more than disbelief of what is said. Sperber and Wilson call it a "dissociative attitude-wry, skeptical, bitter, or mocking". Hearers readily recognize and commonly enjoy the performance of this complex speech act. The observation that irony involves expressing a dissociative attitude does not lessen the theoretical problem, however. There is no reason to think, for example, that "The weather is terrible and anyone who thinks it lovely is foolish" has the maximum effects/cost ratio. Processing just what Don actually said (that the weather is lovely) would seem to require even less effort; so that proposition could conceivably have a greater effect/cost ratio. And there is no reason to think an ironic interpretation has a greater effect/cost ratio than a hyperbolic or meiotic interpretation. If expressing a dissociative attitude involves something other than expressing a proposition, as seems plausible (cf. M. S. Green 2018: §5), it would not be a positive cognitive effect as defined, and thus would not affect the relevance ratio. For reasons such as these, Levinson (1989: 463-4) charged that the accounts offered by Relevance theorists are as ex post facto as Gricean accounts.

The explanations of loose use offered by Relevance theorists are problematic in another way. In (8), where Mike said "Dinner will be at six", they explain why Mike did not say something true like "Dinner will be at six or shortly after" by saying that the strictly false statement has the same positive cognitive effects but is easier to process and so more relevant. But that would erroneously imply that Mike did not mean and implicate that dinner will be at six or shortly after. Another reason the explanation is unsatisfactory is that there are other things Mike did not say with the same positive contextual effects that seem as easy to process as "Dinner will be at six". including "Dinner will be around six". This proposition has some true cognitive effects that "Dinner will be at six" lacks, including "Dinner may not be exactly at six".

The recital example in §10 illustrates on reason why Relevance theories adopt Optimal rather than Maximal Relevance (Wilson & Sperber 2012: 64-5):

the communicator is manifestly limited by her own abilities (to provide appropriate information, and to present it in the most efficient way). Nor can she be expected to go against her own preferences (e.g., against the goal she wants to achieve in communicating, or the rules of etiquette she wishes to follow).

However:

Since it is also manifest that the audience will tend to pay appropriate attention only to an utterance that seems relevant enough, it is manifest that the communicator wants her audience to assume that the utterance is indeed relevant enough. There is thus a minimal level of relevance that the audience is encouraged to expect: the utterance should be relevant enough to be worth the effort needed for comprehension.

Relevance theorists thus propose that every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance, defined by (a) and (b):

Presumption of Optimal Relevance:

1. The utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing.

2. It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

Because of its preference provision, Optimal Relevance does not clash with Politeness and Style the way Maximal Relevance does. The parents may say "Your performance wasn't perfect" rather than "It was horrendous" because they strongly prefer not to hurt their daughter's feelings. This means, however, that Optimal Relevance would not predict that Barb meant I am not going to Paul's party in(1) even if it is relevant enough to process and more relevant than the other alternatives. For Barb might have preferred to dodge Alan's question. In(2), Don may have preferred an ironic utterance to ones with higher E/C ratios (Millikan 1987: 725).

The ratio of positive cognitive effects to processing cost is zero when there are no positive cognitive effects at all. Given the definition of contextual implication, any proposition that is part of the cognitive context has no contextual implications. So both Maximal and Optimal Relevance seem to imply that speakers cannot mean or implicate anything already known, and must mean something else. Gerrig (1987: 718) and McCawley (1987: 724) find this implausible. If A and B are walking in torrential rain, A might well say "It is raining really hard", stating the obvious, and B might respond "There is indeed some rain coming down", engaging in understatement and implicating exactly what A said.

Many critics have observed, and Sperber and Wilson have acknowledged, that relevance as defined is not measurable. Positive cognitive effects are non-denumerable. Anything a speaker might say or implicate will have infinitely many true contextual implications if it has any. We do not know whether processing cost is measured by time, mental effort, electro-chemical energy, inferential steps, or some function of them all. We have no unit of measurement for mental effort, and do not yet know how to measure the energy consumed in processing an utterance. If relevance is not well defined and knowable, it cannot be used to account for specific implicatures.

We have looked at Relevance theory as an alternative attempt to predict and explain what speakers implicate. The main focus of Relevance theorists, however, is the process by which hearers interpret utterances. The hearer's aim, on their view, is "to find an interpretation of the speaker's meaning that satisfies the presumption of optimal relevance". They infer that the hearer "should follow a path of least effort, and stop at the first overall interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance" (Wilson & Sperber 2012: 7). Discussion of this part of Relevance theory is beyond the scope of this entry.

13. Explicature and Impliciture

As observed in §1, Grice (1975: 24) introduced the technical term "implicature" to denote either (i) the act of meaning or implying one thing by saying something else, or (ii) what the speaker meant or implied. Grice (1975: 87ff) used "say" quite strictly, requiring what a speaker says to be closely related to what the sentence uttered means on that occasion. Indexicals provide cases in which what a speaker says is not what the sentence used means. When Barb uttered "I have to work" in(1), she said that she, Barb, has to work; but the sentence she used does not mean "She, Barb, has to work" even on that occasion. Ellipsis allows people to say things without even uttering sentences. If John asks "Where did Mary go?" and Sue answers "To the gym", then Sue said that Mary went to the gym. The infinitive phrase she uttered was elliptical for a sentence meaning "Mary went to the gym" but does not itself mean that.

Sperber and Wilson (1986a: 182-3) introduced the parallel term explicature to mean what is "explicitly communicated". Carston (1988: 33) initially identified this with "what is said, in Grice's terms". On this definition, Barb's explicature in(1) was that she has to work, and her implicature was that she is not going to Paul's party". Carston's (1988: 40) paradigm case is less clear.

After saying or observing that Alice ran to the edge of the cliff, a speaker would typically use (15a) "Alice jumped" to mean that Alice jumped off the cliff [15b]. Carston counts this an explicature. It does resemble ellipsis, but a speaker who used (15a) to mean that Alice jumped up to the rescue helicopter said the same thing while meaning something different. And if the speaker knew that Alice jumped up to safety, the speaker might be accused of misleading the hearer but not of lying.

Carston's (1988: 45; 2004a: 646-8) most influential argument is based on what are commonly called "embedded implicatures". She would claim that if "Alice jumped off the cliff" were an implicature of "Alice jumped", then we should not understand (16a) and (16b) as having the same truth conditions. Yet we do, Carston believes. The alleged implicature seems to fall within the scope of the logical operator, something she believes an implicature would not do.

W. Davis (2016a: §5.3) replies as follows. A speaker who used (15a) to mean[15b] would just as naturally use (16a) to mean [16b], and hearers would understand the speaker accordingly. But what the speaker said is not entailed by [16b]. What the speaker of (16a) said would be false in circumstances in which Alice was unlikely to jump off the cliff if she jumped. Hearers would focus on what the speaker meant, though, which would be true even in those circumstances. Since the speaker meant one thing [16b] by saying something else [16a], the speaker implicates [16b]. The speaker does not implicate anything by uttering the antecedent of (16a). The speaker says something only by uttering the whole conditional. So there is really no embedding of implicatures when (16a) is uttered. The relationship between(15) and (16) is special. In many other cases in which a sentence " p" conversationally implicates " q", the conditional "If p then r" does not implicate "If p and q then r". For example, If Bill got some problems wrong, he might have gotten them all wrong does not implicate "If Bill got some but not all problems wrong, he might have gotten them all wrong".

A lively debate between Relevance theorists and neo-Griceans concerns numerical claims.

All parties agree that a speaker can use (17) to mean either [17a] or [17b]. Horn (1972) and Levinson (2000: 87-90) further agree with Carston that (17) itself is unambiguous. But whereas the neo-Griceans hold that (17) means [17a] rather than [17b], Carston (1988: 46-7) maintains that (17) means neither but can be used to say both. So the neo-Griceans hold that (17) always says [17a] while sometimes implicating [17b]. Carston holds that (17) is sometimes used to explicate [17a] and sometimes [17b]; neither is an implicature. The thesis that sentence meaning leaves open what is said to this extent is called semantic underdetermination.

While still doubting that Carston's view can fully account for cardinals, Horn (1989: 250-1; 2010: 314-5) now concludes that they do not behave like quantifiers. For example, if you know that everyone passed, you must answer "Did some students pass?" with "Yes". But if you know that Peter has two children, you cannot answer "Does Peter have one child?" without knowing whether the speaker meant "at least" or "exactly". Indeed, a strong case can be made that (17) is ambiguous, so that Neo-Gricean and Relevance accounts are both wrong.

Following Sperber & Wilson (1986a: 182), Carston (2004b: 635) later defines an explicature as a development of a logical form encoded by the sentence uttered, and an implicature as any proposition communicated by an utterance that is not an explicature. The technical terms "development" and "logical form" are understood in such a way that [15b] is a development of [15a]. Thus understood, "explicature" covers much more than what is said, and "implicature" covers much less than what is implicated as defined in §1.

Bach (1994: 160) uses "say" even more strictly than Grice, meaning "strictly, literally, and explicitly say". Since the speaker of(15a) did not explicitly say[15b], Bach counts "The speaker said that Alice jumped off the cliff" as false. Bach (1994: 125-6, 140-1; 2006: 28-9) agrees with Carston, though, in withholding the term "implicature" when what the speaker means is an "expansion" or "completion" of what is said. Bach introduces the term impliciture (with "i" rather than "a" after soft "c") to cover such cases. Bach restricts "implicature" to cases in which what is meant is "completely separate" from what is said.

A thesis attributed to Grice is that what S says is determined by "decoding", while what S conversationally implicates is determined by what S says together with an inferential, pragmatic mechanism (see, e.g., Sperber & Wilson 1986a: 182). An alleged problem, called "Grice's Circle" (Levinson 2000: 173-4, 186-7), is that many of the processes involved in figuring out what is said, such as reference identification and ambiguity resolution, "involve exactly those inferential mechanisms that characterize Gricean pragmatics". Grice never talked about decoding however, and observed himself that conversational principles are involved in determining what is said (Grice 1957: 222). For example, if an ambiguous term is used, we naturally assume-in the absence of specific counterevidence-that the intended meaning is the one relevant to the conversation. In a discussion of snow, "There is a large bank on Main Street" is naturally interpreted as referring to a snow bank.

There is no circle on Grice's view because what is said is the conclusion of one pragmatic inference, and is one of the premises in a further pragmatic inference to what is implicated. The process is serial rather than parallel, although later conclusions may always lead to adjustment of earlier conclusions.

14. Speaker Implicature and Intention

W. Davis (2016a: Ch. 2) describes ways of explaining and inferring conversational implicatures that do not rely on conversational principles. The methods he proposes for speaker implicature are described in this section and for sentence implicature in the next.

For a speaker to implicate something is for the speaker to mean something by saying something else ( §1). It is generally agreed that what a speaker means is determined by the speaker's intentions. When Steve utters "Kathryn is a Russian teacher", whether Steve means that Kathryn is a teacher of Russian nationality or a teacher of the Russian language, and whether he is speaking literally or ironically, depends entirely on what Steve intends to convey. What "convey" means precisely is controversial, but is an independent issue.

We most commonly explain why people do A with the intention of doing B by explaining why they believe they will do B by doing A, or why they want to do B. We can explain why speakers intend to convey a thought by uttering a sentence that says something else in the same ways. Why do speakers believe they can convey thoughts by means of the various figures and modes of speech identified in §4? One reason is that they have seen others doing so. Knowledge of the common forms of implicature is acquired along with knowledge of the semantics and syntax of our native language. Speakers pick up figures and modes of speech from other speakers, as they learn vocabulary and grammar. After speakers have become proficient, their own past success in using figures and modes of speech is a reason for them to believe they will succeed again. Knowledge of both figures and modes is as tacit as our knowledge of syntax and semantics. It is not knowledge of facts that define a language, but of how a language is used and understood. Since the figures and modes do not depend on a particular language, they can be used with any language.

Why do speakers want to engage in implicature? The main reasons are the reasons speakers make statements: to communicate, express themselves, and record their thoughts. These goals may serve to cooperate with others, or to oppose them. What goals are served by implicating rather than saying something? One is verbal efficiency (Levinson 2000: 28-31; Camp 2006: 3; Wilson & Sperber 2012: 62): through implicature we express two or more thoughts by uttering just one sentence. Another is to mislead without lying (Horn 2010: §4; 2017). People often wish others to believe things that are false, and not only in situations of conflict and competition. And they nearly always prefer misleading to lying. The greater deniability of implicature, and the fact that it enables us to veil our intentions, are often motivating factors (Brown & Levinson 1978: 137; Pinker 2007). We observed in §10 how implicature promotes the goals of style and politeness.

It should also be recognized that people perform many even highly skilled actions automatically, spontaneously, or habitually. Such actions are done without deliberation or conscious planning. What speakers implicate as well as what they say commonly falls in this category.

Given that speaker meaning is a matter of speaker intention, it follows that speaker implicatures can be recognized or predicted by the methods we use to infer intentions from behavior, including abduction, analogy, and testimony. In example (2), Carla may suspect that Don means the weather is bad because irony is a common linguistic device ( §4), and Don has been ironic in similar situations before. Don's intonation may be a clue. On the other hand, if Don rarely speaks figuratively when reporting in, Carla may infer that he meant what he said.

Conversational principles can play the same indirect role in implicature recognition that known tendencies or goals play in inductive inference generally. Since speakers commonly observe the Cooperative Principle, and hearers know this in a vague and tacit sort of way, hearers tend to assume that particular speakers are cooperating, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. If the hypothesis that Barb means she is not going to Paul's party in example (1) fits better with the assumption that she is being cooperative than the hypothesis that she is not answering the question, Alan may by abduction infer she is implicating that. Further support for the hypothesis may be provided by the recollection that other speakers have implicated similar things in similar circumstances before. The fact that relevance implicature is a common practice thus provides analogical evidence ( §4). Recognition of an unconventional form of implicature is more difficult, but no harder than recognizing when a speaker is using a sentence with an unconventional meaning. As Sterelny (1982: 192-3) observed, knowledge of the particular speaker is ultimately more important than knowledge of non-universal generalizations.

When S is being uncooperative, we have to use other generalizations or analogies. We are familiar with the ways defendants manipulate language in an effort to avoid self-incrimination.

15. Sentence Implicature and Convention

Whereas what a speaker implicates depends on the particular speaker's intentions, what a sentence implicates on Davis's theory depends on the conventions of the community of speakers who use the language. To know or explain sentence implicatures is to know or explain the relevant conventions. This is as true of generalized conversational implicatures as it is of implicatures that are conventional in Grice's sense (§2).

When Grice talked about conventional implicatures he was referring to semantic implicatures, like [3c]. These exist because of conventions that give individual words or syntactic structures their meanings. The queen is English and therefore brave implicates "Being brave follows from being English" because it is conventional for English speakers to use "therefore" with a certain meaning, which determines the implicature. A conversational sentence implicature is not determined by the meaning of the sentence used, even when sentences with the same form are conventionally used with that implicature. It is a second-order convention: a convention to use a sentence of a given form with an implicature that is not part of its meaning. The common modes and figures of speech are also second-order conventions, but not restricted to sentences with a particular form. A language is defined by first-order lexical and syntactic conventions, not by second-order implicature conventions. In this respect conversational implicature conventions are like naming conventions, word formation rules, intonation rules, speech act rituals (e.g., saying "This is N" when answering a telephone), and indirect speech act conventions (e.g., asking "Can I get an N?" to request an N). Second-order conventions are not as arbitrary, though, because there is always some antecedent relation between what the sentence means and the implicature that makes it natural to use one to convey the other. Implicature conventions promote style, politeness, and efficiency as well as communication.

Like other second-order linguistic conventions, conversational implicature conventions differ in their cross-linguistic spread. Whereas the quantity implicature of "some" has been found in all observed languages (Horn 1989), common metaphors differ as much from language to language as the idioms that evolve from them do. The fact that regularities in implicature obtain cross-linguistically is compatible with their being arbitrary and conventional. Witness the practice of using "?" and rising intonation to mark questions. Why some implicatures are common to more languages than others is an open question on any view. To the extent that implicatures are conventional, it is a question for historical linguistics.

Knowledge of sentence implicatures is a crucial component of linguistic competence. Speakers unaware of them are likely to mislead their audience. Imagine the possibilities if an oblivious speaker said Your husband saw a woman to the subject's wife. Hearers without such knowledge are likely to either misinterpret or fail to fully understand the speaker. Sentence implicatures, both semantic and conversational, resemble idioms and figures of speech in being picked up by native speakers from other speakers in the course of learning the language. Sentence implicatures thus perpetuate themselves from one generation to the next as sentence meanings do. Recent metaphors are special in being picked up by adults, and are liable to become idioms if they pass on to new generations.

An impressive body of research has attempted to discern general regularities in the multitude of conversational implicature conventions associated with a language. Wierzbicka (1985, 2003) has studied how implicature conventions reflect broader "cultural scripts". Others study how the implicatures of a sentence are related to the implicatures of compound sentences in which the sentence is embedded (Gazdar 1979; Levinson 2000: §2.5.1; Sauerland & Stateva 2007)-the question raised by example (16).

The most influential work on conversational implicature conventions describes "Horn scales". Horn (1972, 1989) observed that the quantifiers all, most, many, some form a scale with the following properties. Instances of "___ S are P" with one term entail instances with any term to the right, but not to the left; the terms are thus ordered by logical strength. Moreover, the result of substituting one term implicates the denial of the result of substituting any term to the left, but not to the right. In the negative context "It is not the case that ___ S are P", the logical and pragmatic relations are reversed. Other Horn scales are 〈 necessarily, actually, possibly〉, 〈 certainly, probably, possibly〉, and 〈 must, should, may〉. Horn (1989: §4.5) correlates the existence of scales with the absence of certain lexical items, such as a quantifier meaning "not all". Levinson (2000: 156) looked for a generalization that would cover these cases but not scales like 〈Over 90%, over 10%, some〉 which have the same logical relations as Horn scales but not the pragmatic relations. One generalization is that the items on a Horn scale are widely and frequently used monolexemes. A companion problem is to explain why some common monolexemes with similar logical relations lack the pragmatic relations, as several illustrates. Given the conventional nature of generalized conversational implicatures, there may be no systematic ("synchronic") explanation. All languages are "irregular" to some extent. For example, the regular pattern for adjectives in English is that of tall, taller, tallest. But there are exceptions, such as good, better, best. No one expects that anything other than a historical ("diachronic") explanation exists for these facts.

The literature on implicature is enormous and still growing. This entry, regrettably, had to ignore many valuable contributions.

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H. P. Grice (1913-1988) was the first to systematically study cases in which what a speaker means differs from what the sentence used by the speaker means. Consider (1). If this was a typical exchange, Barb meant that she is not going to Paul's party by saying that she has to work.

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La siguiente presentación repasa los conceptos básicos de la semántica. Una diapositiva repasa los roles semánticos. Las palabras se describen de acuerdo con los roles que cumplen con la situación descrita en una oración. En la oración "El niño pateó la pelota", el niño realiza la acción, por lo que él es el agente. La pelota sufre la acción, por lo que es el paciente. El experimentador es el que percibe algo. El instrumento es una entidad utilizada para realizar una acción. La ubicación es el lugar donde ocurre la acción.

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Semantics: The Analysis of Meaning - ppt download

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Linguists create descriptive grammars in order to understand language more deeply. They understand that a single language can have multiple dialects, and that each dialect will have its own grammatical rules--internally consistent, but perhaps different from other dialects of the same language. The rules they deduce are sometimes more nuanced than the ones taught by prescriptivists.

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El siguiente sitio web proporciona un resumen conciso de lo que es la deixis y los diversos tipos. Deixis es una referencia por medio de una expresión cuya interpretación es relativa al contexto extralingüístico de la emisión, como quién habla, el momento o el lugar de hablar, los gestos del hablante o la ubicación actual en el discurso. Los tipos de deixis incluyen personal, temporal, espacial y discurso.

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Deixis

Partial source: www.sil.org

1. Deixis is reference by means of an expression whose interpretation is relative to the (usually) extralinguistic context of the utterance, such as

who is speaking

the time or place of speaking

the gestures of the speaker, or

the current location in the discourse.

Examples

2. Person deixis is deictic reference to the participant role of a referent, such as

the speaker, the addressee, and referents which are neither speaker nor addressee.

Person deixis is commonly expressed by the following kinds of constituents:

Pronouns--first person, second person, and third person

Possessive affixes of nouns

Agreement affixes of verbs

3. Time deixis is reference to time relative to a temporal reference point. Typically, this point is the moment of utterance.

Examples

Temporal adverbs

4. Spatial deixis localises both the Speech participants and narrated participants in space.

Examples

5. Discourse deixis is deictic reference to a portion of a discourse relative to the speaker's current location in the discourse.

Examples (English)

Use of this to refer to a story one is about to tell in:

· Use of this in a creaky-voiced utterance of:

This is what phoneticians call a creaky voice.

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Deixis Partial source: www.sil.org 1. Deixis is reference by means of an expression whose interpretation is relative to the (usually) extralinguistic context of the utterance, such as who is speaking the time or place of speaking the gestures of the speaker, or the current location in the discourse. Examples 2.

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En este video, el orador repasa muchos acentos diferentes de varios países de habla español. Algunos incluyen castellano, español mexicano y español argentino. El castellano es el idioma de Madrid y el norte de España y se identifica fácilmente. Su característica más obvia es la pronunciación de "ci" y "ce" como "th". El español mexicano es otro acento distinto que tiene características únicas. Además de la jerga muy particular que se usa en todo México, debe escuchar la entonación de la última palabra de cada oración. El tono aumenta y se estira ligeramente hacia el final de las oraciones y es ligeramente nasal. Debido a su fuerte influencia italiana, el acento argentino es bastante singular. Tiene la calidad de una canción para cantar, y los argentinos pronuncian "ll" como "sh" en lugar del sonido "y" que sueles escuchar.

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Las diferencias entre los dialectos y lenguages

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Las diferencias entre los dialectos y lenguages

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Esta presentación cubre muchos temas sobre las variedades de las lenguas. Sin embargo, me concentré en las diapositivas que hablan sobre las diferencias entre los dialectos y lenguas. Las lenguas tienen un alto grado de diferenciación, nivelación o normalización, y una tradición literaria. Los dialectos están subordinados a otra lengua y no tienen tradición literaria. Los dialectos se fragmentan en varias subvariedades con una limitación geográfica que corresponde a una región, un valle o una localidad.

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Publicado el

1. 1. Situación lingüística de España en la actualidad

2. 2. LENGUAJE"Capacidad que poseen los humanos para poder comunicarse mediante un sistema de signos lingüísticos"Lengua:  La realización concreta del lenguaje en una determinada comunidad.  Un código común que utilizan los hablantes de una comunidad.

3. 3. LENGUA Y HABLA LENGUA HABLA Social: código compartido  Individual: depende de los por los miembros de una hablantes singulares en cada comunidad lingüística. uno de sus actos de habla. Histórica: acompaña a  Puntual: se materializa en diferentes comunidades a lo momentos concretos en largo de la historia. diferentes actos de habla. Abstracta: es un sistema que,  Concreta: es posible registrar como código, no se hace real cada emisión y describir sus hasta que es utilizado. rasgos concretos

4. 4. ¿Qué pensáis?¿Todos hablamos igual ¿Es correcto hablar de una lengua? "unidad de la lengua"? Sí, es correcto hablar de UNIDAD de la lengua, pero no de UNIFORMIDAD de la lengua

5. 5. No todos los hablantes utilizan la la lengua dela misma forma. El uso de la misma depende...a. Del lugar donde aprenden la lengua y del lugar en que residen (variedades diatópicas).b. Del nivel de instrucción, que acostumbra a estar vinculado al nivel socioeconómico (variedades diastráticas).c. De la situación comunicativa (variedades diafásicas).Además, la lengua ha ido evolucionando a lo largo de la historia. El estudio de los textos permite trazar su evolución (variedades diacrónicas).

6. 6. Las variedades diatópicasRelacionan al hablante con su origen territorial.Son variedades geográficas: los dialectos: modalidad que adopta una lengua en una determinada zona geográfica las hablas regionales: variedad que presenta la lengua en una región determinada, de extensión más limitada que el dialecto. las hablas locales: variedad que se produce en una zona geográfica muy reducida: comarca, ciudad...

7. 7. DialectoProcede del griego y significa "modo de hablar".De su estudio se ocupa la Dialectología.Alvar: "sistema lingüístico derivado de otro con una concreta limitación geográfica pero sin una fuerte diferenciación respecto a otros de origen común"

8. 8. DIFERENCIAS ENTRE LENGUA Y DIALECTO LENGUA DIALECTOAlto grado de diferenciación Subordinación a otra lengua respecto a las demás lenguas Escasa nivelación oNivelación o normalización normalizaciónTradición literaria Sin tradición literaria Además... Esta escasa normalización hace que los dialectos se encuentren fragmentados en diversas subvariedades con una limitación geográfica que corresponden a una comarca, un valle o una localidad.

9. 9. Importante...El hecho de que el dialecto se entienda como un sistema lingüístico derivado de otro ha conllevado que este concepto se haya cargado de connotaciones negativas.Un dialecto no es una versión reducida o menor de una lengua. Como este término se ha utilizado con sentido peyorativo, ciertos lingüistas prefieren hablar de variedad."

10. 10. La realidad plurilingüe en España Lenguas oficiales: castellano catalán gallego vasco o euskera Dialectos del castellano: andaluz murciano extremeño canario

11. 11. Dialectos del catalán:occidentaloriental Dialectos del valenciano: septentrional "apitxat" meridional

12. 12. Dialectos del gallego: Dialectos del vasco:occidental vizcaínocentral guipuzcoanooriental altonavarro oriental altonavarro meridional

13. 13. Hablas regionales y hablas localesLa complejidad interna y diferenciación respecto a la variedad estándar son mucho menos acusadasLas peculiaridades lingüísticas se perciben sobre todo en el léxico

14. 14. Relaciones entre lengua y sociedadHay determinados factores sociales que influyen en la lengua:  grado de instrucción o de cultura  hábitat (lengua urbana y lengua rural)  grupo generacional (jóvenes frente a mayores)  oficios o actividades  sexoLa Sociolingüística se ocupa del estudio de la lengua en su contexto socialLengua y sociedad mantienen una íntima conexión.

15. 15. Las variedades diastráticas Las variedades diastráticas, dialecto social, sociolecto o nivel de lengua son las modalidades que adopta una lengua entre los hablantes de los distintos estratos sociales. No obstante, el uso de un nivel de lengua no depende tanto del nivel socioeconómico como del grado de instrucción o de cultura del hablante, que es el que determina su competencia lingüística.

16. 16. Una primera clasificación que nosaclara algunas cosas...Bernstein: teoría del déficit: diferencia 2 formas de uso de la lengua:o código restringido.o codigo elaborado.Todos los hablantes de cualquier nivel sociocultural tienen acceso a un código restringido, pero sólo algunos estratos tienen acceso al código elaborado y pueden utilizar características del código restringido para situaciones informales, como la comunicación familiar.

17. 17. Distintos niveles de lenguaNivel culto: personas instruidas y de gran nivel cultural.  Corrección  Riqueza léxica  Capacidad de abstracción  Tradición literaria. La más apropiada para actividades intelectuales.Nivel estándar: nivel socio-cultural medio.  Menos rígido  Respeta la norma léxica y gramatical según la R.A.E.  Sirve de modelo a la comunicación oral y escrita  Se difunde a través de medios de comunicación y la enseñanzaNivel vulgar: nivel socio-cultural bajo. Vulgarismos fonéticos, léxicos, morfológicos y sintácticos.

18. 18. VULGARISMOSSe producen en todos los niveles de la lengua:Vulgarismos fonéticos  Desplazamientos acentuales (máestro)  Indecisión vocálica (sigún)  Relajación consonántica (dotor)Vulgarismos léxicos (explosionar, ves-por ve o vete)Vulgarismos morfológicos (haiga, la dije, contra más,...)Vulgarismos sintácticos (me se escapó, la Carmen,...)

19. 19. Ejemplos de vulgarismos Disimilación: guardia ceviles  Formaciones analógicas: haiga Asimilación: dibilidad (caiga), andé (canté) Reducción de diptongos: pos,  Tendencia a restringir las mu, pacencia irregularidades vocálicas: preta, Hiatos en diptongos: pior frega.  Cambio de orden en los Desplazamientos acentuales: máistro pronombres átonos: me se salen  ¿sus vais? Prótesis de -a: ajuntar, arrascar, amoto, afoto  La colocación del pronombre Metátesis r/l: redetir, dentífrico personal átono delante del imperativo: se sienten. Simplificación consonántica:  Habían tres niños en el parque. tasi, tamién  La primer semana Deformaciones: fúrbol  Muchísmo Ultracorrecciones: acsurdo  Mucho bueno

20. 20. Lenguajes específicos  Son las variedades de la lengua común o estándar que identifican a un grupo sociocultural.  Las características de estos subsistemas afectan fundamentalmente al léxico.  Vienen condicionados por su área de aplicación  Se distinguen tres tipos: 1. Las jergas o argots 2. Los lenguajes sectoriales 3. Los lenguajes científico-técnicos

21. 21. 1. Jergas o argotsSon el conjunto de rasgos lingüísticos, utilizados por diversos grupos sociales, con una finalidad críptica o secreta.Sirven como forma de identificación entre sus miembros y aíslan y defienden frente al resto de la sociedad.Destaca el lenguaje del hampa, el carcelario, el de las tribus urbanas,...

22. 22. Otros términos similares: jerigonza, germanía, jácara, jacarandinaCaracterísticas: 1. Afectan principalmente al léxico 2. Poseen gran capacidad de cambio (conforme las palabras se hacen transparentes, hay que cambiarlas). 3. Abundancia de sinónimos: Ej: robar (afanar, aliviar, apalancar, birlar, chorizar, limpiar, mangar, pulir...)

23. 23. 2. Lenguajes sectorialesCaracterizan a un grupo social o profesional determinado: jerga estudiantil, lenguaje de los deportes, de la política, de la economía, el lenguaje jurídico, el informático, el taurino, etc.No hay intención crípticaPalabras o expresiones propias de algún lenguaje sectorial han pasado a la lengua común: ej.: cambiar de tercio.

24. 24. 3. Lenguajes científico-técnicosSon los lenguajes de las diversas ciencias: medicina, biología, física,...Utilizan nomenclaturas específicas: conjunto de vocablos técnicos.No tienen finalidad críptica, si bien resultan incomprensibles para los no iniciados.Se caracterizan porque el significante y el significado de los signos lingüístico-técnicos guardan una relación biunívoca: no hay homonimia, ni polisemia, ni sinonimia, ni connotación.

25. 25. Lenguaje juvenilBusca la cohesión del grupo generacional.Es una manifestación de rebeldía frente a los mayores.No existe en el mundo hispánico un solo lenguaje juvenil.No es fácil distinguir entre lenguaje juvenil y jerga o argot marginal porque buena parte de los jóvenes toman como propios los argots marginales.Por todo esto, el sociolecto de los jóvenes puede ser considerado una jerga o argot en sentido muy amplio.Se trata de una variedad oral con las características propias del estilo coloquial

26. 26. Las variedades diafásicasEl estilo o registro es el conjunto de características lingüísticas determinadas por el grado de formalidad-informalidad de la situación comunicativa.Son variedades según el uso, frente a dialectos y sociolectos que son variedades según el usuario.Con excepción de los niños y extranjeros con un escaso dominio de la lengua, todos los hablantes tenemos acceso a más de un estilo de lengua.

27. 27. * Es necesario adaptar el modo de hablar a las circunstancias concretas desde los estilos más informales, pasando por los intermedios hasta los más formales.* Cuanto más alto es el nivel (sociolecto) del hablante, mayor dominio de estilos posee. 1. Relación de igualdad entre interlocutores: igualdad social e igualdad funcional. 2. Relación vivencial de proximidad entre interlocutores: si se conocen más o menos y han compartido o no vivencias. 3. Marco de interacción: cuanto más familiar el lugar donde se produce la comunicación, más fácilmente surge un estilo coloquial. 4. Temática: formal o informal. 5. Intención comunicativa: didáctica, persuasiva, lúdica, etc.

28. 28. * Algunos factores implicados en la variedad diafásica (adaptado de F. Moreno Fernández)I. FACTORES PERSONALESa) Hablante: características sociolingüísticas y psicolingüísticas (grado de atención que el hablante presta a su propio discurso, intención del hablante).b) Las relaciones de poder/solidaridad entre interlocutoresII. FACTORES NO PERSONALESa) Discurso: tema (formal/informal), tipo de comunicación (monólogo/conversación).b) Contexto: momento (adecuado/no adecuado) y ámbito de interacción social(familiar, artístico, académico, etc).

29. 29. Registro formalUtilizado en ámbitos especializados (científico, literario, jurídico, técnico o periodístico).Preocupación por utilizar un lenguaje cuidado en todos los planos: fónico, morfosintáctico y léxico.Busca la precisión, la originalidad y la variedad.

30. 30. Registro coloquial: consideraciones previasNo hay que confundir coloquial con vulgar o popular.No hay que confundir coloquial con conversacional. Éste es un tipo concreto de discurso. Aunque donde se manifiesta comúnmente el registro coloquial es en la conversación.No hay que confundir coloquial con oral (por ejemplo no es registro coloquial una conferencia o un discurso).No pertenece a una clase social.No es uniforme: varía según las características dialectales y sociolectales de los hablantes.

31. 31. Registro coloquial:Espontaneidad: ausencia de planificación que la favorece.Finalidad interpersonal: la comunicación por la comunicación. Socializador.Relación de igualdad entre interlocutoresRelación vivencial de proximidadMarco de interacción familiarTemática no especializadaCarácter dialogadoConfluencia del código verbal y el no verbal

32. 32. Rasgos lingüísticos Aspectos fónicos:  Relajamiento en la articulación de sonidos ( diptongaciones forzadas, yeísmo, pérdida de fonemas o grupos de fonemas). El tratamiento:  Distintas formas con que una persona se dirige a otra en función de la relación social de solidaridad o jerarquía.  Incluye fórmulas de cortesía. La expresividad:  Abundancia de interjecciones, exclamaciones, interrogaciones retóricas.  Ampliación de la modalidad de la frase según la actitud del hablante.  Organización subjetiva del mensaje: dislocación sintáctica y condensación sintáctica.  Énfasis lingüístico (elementos intensificadores y redundancias).  Creaciones léxicas espontáneas.

33. 33.  Economía y comodidad: descuido formal e imprecisión expresiva  Apócope (cole, bici, sufi, Tina)  Concordancias improvisadas ( Se arreglan toda clase de muebles)  Muletillas ( o sea, bueno, vamos, ...)  Frases hechas, refranes  Palabras comodín (cosa, chisme, ...)

34. 34. Pero ¡cuidado!No todas las comunidades, a pesar de hablar la misma lengua, comparten las mismas actitudes lingüísticas, ni reglas de uso: Humberto López Morales hablando de Madrid y Caracas explica que: Para un caraqueño, la elisión de -d- es una fenómeno de carácter vulgar Para un madrileño, es un fenómeno de carácter familiar, cuestión de estilo.

35. 35. FORMACIÓN DE LOS ROMANCES PENINSULARESEl español o castellano es uno de los idiomas más utilizados en el mundo con más de cuatrocientos millones de hablantes que lo tienen como lengua materna.En sus orígenes era sólo un dialecto del latín, que surgió en un pequeño condado en el norte de la península ibérica.

36. 36. ETAPAS La etapa prerromana Gran diversidad de pueblos que hablaban lenguas distintas en el territorio peninsular:  iberos  vascos  celtas  tartesios  fenicios y cartagineses Cuando llegaron los romanos todas las lengua desaparecieron menos el vascuence o euskera

37. 37. La romanización (s.III a.C.)Fue un proceso lento (comenzó el 218 a.C. y se completó el 19 a.C.)Situación de bilingüismo:empleaban el latín en la vida pública y su lengua propia en la vida privada.Se propagó el latín vulgar, hablada por el pueblo y lejana al latín clásico.La diversificación del latín se debe a que los pueblos sometidos aprendieron y desarrollaron el latín según los hábitos lingüísticos de su propia lengua.

38. 38. Las invasiones germánicas Durante el siglo V, los pueblos germánicos invaden la península y provocan la caída del imperio romano y una gran disgregación lingüística que dio lugar a las lenguas romances. a) En una primera oleada invasora llegaron a España los suevos, los alanos y los vándalos. Esta invasión trajo consigo la ruptura lingüística y el latín comenzó a evolucionar de forma distinta, influido por la lengua de los nuevos invasores. b) La segunda oleada invasora fue la de los visigodos. Su entrada significó de nuevo la unificación territorial, cultural y jurídica, pero no la lingüística, porque las lenguas peninsulares habían comenzado ya su proceso de diferenciación.

39. 39. La invasión musulmana (año 711)Los musulmanes llegaron a ocupar en pocos años la mayor parte del territorio peninsular (Al-Andalus).La invasión árabe supuso la separación definitiva de los recién nacidos romances peninsulares.Los romances que se formaron fueron, de oeste a este: el gallego, el portugués, el astur-leonés, el castellano, el navarro-aragonés y el catalán.Las lenguas hispánicas se vieron bastante influidas por la lengua árabe durante los ocho siglos que duró la presencia musulmana en la península ibérica.

40. 40. La Reconquista (s. XI)Algunas zonas de las montañas del norte resistieron el fuerte empuje musulmán, y allí nacerán los reinos cristianos, que irán recuperando lentamente los territorios invadidos.Con la Reconquista los reinos cristianos amplían sus fronteras lingüísticas e imponen su lengua a las regiones dominadas.

41. 41. Resumen de la evolución histórica de laslenguas peninsulares Situación en el siglo XI Situación a mediados del siglo XIII

42. 42. LENGUAS DIALECTOS HISTÓRICOS DIALECTOS DEL CASTELLANO vasco gallego navarro- aragonés astur- leonés catalánextremeño castellano murciano canario andaluz

43. 43. El castellanoLengua oficial del Estado y lengua oficial de casi 400 millones de personas.Lengua románica derivada del latín vulgar hablado en la antigua Cantabria.El conde Fernán González unificó el reino de Castilla y fomentó la expansión del reino y de su lengua.Fue un dialecto innovador. Introdujo novedades más radicales y resolvió las etapas de vacilación lingüística con más firmeza y rapidez, por lo que fue ganando terreno a los romances con los que entraba en contacto.Entre los siglos XII y XIII se convirtió en el instrumento principal de comunicación entre los españoles.

44. 44. Consolidación del castellanoSiglo X: Primeras palabras escritas en romance medieval (glosas silenses y emilianenses).Siglo XIII: Con Alfonso X el castellano sustituye al latín como lengua oficial y se convierte en una lengua de cultura.Siglo XV: Con los Reyes Católicos es la lengua del nuevo estado y se expande por América. Se empieza a denominar español. Primera Gramática (Nebrija, 1492).Siglos XVI y XVII: Florece con el auge de la literatura en los Siglos de Oro.Siglos XVIII: Se funda la RAE y se publica el Diccionario de Autoridades, la Ortografía y la Gramática.

45. 45. Dialectos del castellano El andaluz (Es el dialecto con mayor número de hablantes)  Se constituyó a consecuencia de la expansión del castellano a partir del siglo XIII en contacto con el árabe.  Presenta variedades locales  Rasgos: Ceceo, seseo, pérdida de d final de palabras o entre vocales, aspiración o pérdida de la s, aspiración de la g o la j. El murciano Tiene influencias del mozárabe y del valenciano  Rasgos: Conservación de la fl (flamarada), sufijo -ico, seseo y aspiración de s final y j. El extremeño, con rasgos similares al andaluz. El canario, con características similares al andaluz y al español de América. Restos del vocabulario guanche anterior al dominio del castellano (s.XV). Otra modalidad del castellano es el español de América, con peculiaridades en cada país en que se habla, aunque con rasgos comunes:  Seseo, yeísmo, voseo, uso generalizado del pretérito perfecto simple, diminutivos, riqueza del léxico,...

46. 46. El catalán Se habla en Cataluña, Baleares, Comunidad Valenciana, una franja de Aragón limítrofe con Cataluña, el principado de Andorra, el antiguo Rosellón francés y la ciudad de Alguer (Cerdeña). Dos áreas dialectales (catalán occidental y catalán oriental) Rasgos fonéticos:  Conservación de f-inicial latina  Conservación de los grupos cl, pl, fl.  Sonorización de p, t, c (b, d, g)  Pérdida de vocales finales

47. 47. El gallego Se habla en Galicia y comarcas limítrofes. Está ligada en su origen al galaico-portugués (trovadores). Se distinguen tres variantes:  Bloque occidental  Bloque central  Bloque oriental

48. 48. El euskera o vasco  Se habla en el País Vasco, parte del Norte de Navarra y algunas comarcas del Sur de Francia.  Es la única lengua peninsular que no procede del latín. Tiene más de tres mil años de vida.  Gran fragmentación dialectal. Para unificarlos se ha creado el euskera batua o vascuence unificado,usado en los medios de comunicación.

49. 49. Resultado comparativo de los romanceshispánicos LATÍN GALLEGO- ASTUR-LEONÉS CASTELLANO ARAGONÉS CATALÁN PORTUGUÉS FILIUM filho fíu hijo fillo fill FACERE fazer facer hacer facer fer PLANUM chao chano/llano llano plan(o) plaLUMINEM lume llumbre lumbre lumbre llum LUNAM lua lluna luna luna lluna ANNUM ano año año año anyCASTELLUM castelo castiellu castillo castiello castellLUMBUM lombo llombu lomo lomo llom NOCTEM noite nueche noche nueite nit OCULUM olho güeyu ojo güello ullMULIEREM muller muyer mujer muller muyer/muller CAELUM ceu cielo cielo cielo cel CLAVEM chave llave llave llave cla Fuente: Salvador Gutiérrez, Joaquín Serrano y Jesús Hernández, Lengua y Literatura Bachillerato 1, Madrid, Anaya Editorial, 2002.

50. 50. España, país plurilingüe¿Qué es el bilingüismo? ¿Qué es la diglosia? Te toca investigar: Busca en internet y nos lo cuentas el próximo día

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Publicado el 1. Situación lingüística de España en la actualidad 2. LENGUAJE"Capacidad que poseen los humanos para poder comunicarse mediante un sistema de signos lingüísticos"Lengua:  La realización concreta del lenguaje en una determinada comunidad.  Un código común que utilizan los hablantes de una comunidad. 3.

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Este sitio de la RAE describe las reglas estándar sobre leísmo, laísmo y loísmo. Para utilizar correctamente los pronombres no estresados ​​de la tercera persona lo(s), la(s) y le(s) de acuerdo con la norma culta del español general, se debe tener en cuenta la función sintáctica del pronombre. También se debe considerar el género y el número gramatical de la palabra a la que se refiere el pronombre. Cuando el pronombre realiza la función de un complemento directo, deben usarse las formas lo(s) (masculinas) y la(s) (femeninas).

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Para usar adecuadamente los pronombres átonos de 3.ª persona lo(s), la(s), le(s) según la norma culta del español general, debe tenerse en cuenta, en primer lugar, la función sintáctica que desempeña el pronombre y, en segundo lugar, el género y el número gramatical de la palabra a la que se refiere. En el siguiente cuadro se muestra la distribución de formas y funciones de estos pronombres:

1En el Esbozo de una nueva gramática de la lengua española (RAE, 1973) se condena el leísmo referido a cosa, pero se permite el referido a persona masculina singular; el leísmo plural siempre ha sido censurado por la Academia, ya que su baja incidencia desde los textos castellanos más antiguos atestigua que tampoco lo ha sancionado nunca mayoritariamente el uso de los hablantes cultos.

A continuación se expone de forma sucinta la norma que rige el empleo de estos pronombres:

Cuando el pronombre desempeña la función de complemento directo, deben usarse las formas lo, los para el masculino (singular y plural, respectivamente) y la, las para el femenino (singular y plural, respectivamente):
¿Has visto a Juan? Sí, lo vi ayer. ¿Has visto a Juan y a los niños? Sí, los he visto en el parque. Compré la medicina y se la di sin que nadie me viera. ¿Has recogido a las niñas? Sí, las recogí antes de ir al taller.
[Dada la gran extensión en el uso de los hablantes cultos de ciertas zonas de España de la forma le cuando el referente es un hombre, se admite, únicamente para el masculino singular, el uso de le en función de complemento directo de persona: ¿Has visto a Jorge? Sí, le vi ayer en el parque].

Cuando el pronombre desempeña la función de complemento indirecto, deben usarse las formas le, les (singular y plural, respectivamente), con independencia del género de la palabra a la que se refiera el pronombre:

A pesar de la aparente simplicidad del sistema, existen casos excepcionales o aparentemente excepcionales dentro de la norma, así como una enorme variedad en cuanto a los usos efectivos en las distintas zonas hispanohablantes. Si se desea información pormenorizada, pueden consultarse los artículos leísmo, laísmo y loísmo del Diccionario panhispánico de dudas, así como las entradas dedicadas a verbos que plantean problemas a los hablantes en cuanto a la selección de los pronombres átonos de tercera persona ( avisar, ayudar, curar, disparar, escribir, llamar, molestar, obedecer, pegar, saludar, etc.).

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Uso de los pronombres lo(s), la(s), le(s). Leísmo, laísmo, loísmo

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Para usar adecuadamente los pronombres átonos de 3.ª persona lo(s), la(s), le(s) según la norma culta del español general, debe tenerse en cuenta, en primer lugar, la función sintáctica que desempeña el pronombre y, en segundo lugar, el género y el número gramatical de la palabra a la que se refiere.

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Este sitio incluye los mapas isoglosos de la Península Ibérica según el español, según el ALPI (Atlas Lingüístico de la Península Ibérica). Utilizando los datos de las encuestas ALPI, se han realizado varios mapas de forma semiautomática, que representan algunas de las diferencias fonéticas más conocidas en español. Algunas de las diferencias fonéticas que se mapearon incluyen post-vocales -s- aspiración, final -z elisión o aspiración, pronunciación de /j/ fonema, diferenciación de fonemas /y/ y /ll/, final -r elisión, final -l elisión y distinción o no de /s/ y /z/ fonemas.

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Este artículo detalla estadísticas sobre el número de hispanohablantes en los EEUU. Según un informe de 2015 del Instituto Cervantes, los EEUU tiene la segunda concentración más alta de hispanohablantes en el mundo, después de México. Aproximadamente 53 millones de personas, 41 millones de hablantes nativos de español y aproximadamente 11.6 millones de hispanohablantes bilingües viven en los EEUU. Hay más personas que hablan español en los EEUU que en España (47 millones de hablantes) y Colombia (48 millones de hablantes). Para 2050, se espera que los EEUU tenga 138 millones de hispanohablantes, lo que lo convierte en el país de habla hispana más grande del mundo.

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Spanish Speakers in the United States ...According to a 2015 report by Instituto Cervantes, the United States has the second highest concentration of Spanish speakers in the world, after Mexico. Roughly 53 million people, 41 million native Spanish speakers, and approximately 11.6 million bilingual Spanish Speakers live in the United States. There are more people speaking Spanish in the U.S. than Spain (47 million speakers) and Colombia (48 million speakers). By 2050, the United States is expected to have 138 million Spanish speakers, making it the largest Spanish-speaking country in the world.

Spanish is spoken by more than 559 million people globally, and here in the U.S., it is the most common non-English language spoken in U.S. homes. While many people who speak a foreign language also speak English very well, 8% of the United States population (25.1 million) is considered limited-English proficient (LEP), meaning they speak English less than "very well." Spanish speakers in the United States account for 64% (16.2 million) of the country's total LEP population. With a large population of Spanish speakers in the United States, and globally, effective communication with limited-English proficient Spanish speakers is critically important in all major industries, such as business, healthcare, legal, government, and education.

We wrote about the top non-English languages spoken by U.S. state here. Today, we're focusing on Spanish speakers in the United States. Watch the video below to learn the top 10 Spanish-speaking states in the country, and then check out the interactive infographic below to deepen your understanding of Spanish language use in your state.

Spanish Spoken at Home: Top 10 States

*(ranked by percentage of total population)

Spanish Speakers in the United States (Interactive Infographic)

*Hover over the interactive map to display.

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Spanish Speakers in the United States (Infographic) - Telelanguage

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Spanish Speakers in the United States ...According to a 2015 report by Instituto Cervantes, the United States has the second highest concentration of Spanish speakers in the world, after Mexico. Roughly 53 million people, 41 million native Spanish speakers, and approximately 11.6 million bilingual Spanish Speakers live in the United States.

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En este video, la maestra habla sobre leísmo, loísmo y laísmo. El leísmo es el fenómeno de usar los pronombres no subrayados le y les cuando lo correcto sería lo y los o la y las. Cuando se refiere a un nombre masculino, en singular, son correctos, pero no si se refiere a un nombre femenino. El laísmo es el uso de y el en lugar de él y ellos como un complemento indirecto. El orador, de esta manera, siente la obligación de marcar el género del referente. El loísmo es el uso de lo y los en lugar de los pronombres no subrayados de complemento indirecto le y les. Este fenómeno que se considera más vulgar.

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Este artículo revisa a fondo los mensajes de texto en español, incluyendo jerga y abreviaturas. El acrónimo GPI se usa como una forma rápida de escribir gracias por invitar. Xq?, Xk?, o simplemente X? son las siglas de ¿por qué?. Otro ejemplo es Q, Khé o Ké. Este es el mismo que ¿qué?, que, y todos los usos de la palabra y su sonido.

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Hla! Cmo stas? Spro bn. Vasir a lo de Carla? GPI btw,... cmo 100pre!
What's that? Ever encountered something similar while texting with a Spanish native speaker, hanging around on Spanish forums, following social media accounts in Spanish, or watching YouTube videos in what's arguably the most popular romance language?

Well, that's Spanish internet slang, language, or whatever you want to call it... Spanish text abbreviations is another name! You might have noticed that most of it is just using the consonants of the words, or abbreviating the phrase. Were you able to catch the meaning of the above phrase? Here's a translation to good ol' English:

"Hi! How are you? Hope you're doing ok. Are you going to Carla's later? Thanks for inviting me, by the way, ...as always!"

Phew! So, if you're learning Spanish and would like to engage in conversation with native speakers either on the internet or through instant text messaging, it might come in handy to know some of the slang we'll share below.

Mainly, however, the idea of this article is to share with you how internet and text slang in Spanish-and more specifically, Mexican Spanish-slang is created and thought of by its users.

As with any language one hopes to master, this is a useful thing to consider on your journey to learning it.
Table of Contents

1. What Do We Mean by "Internet Talk"?

2. Writing with Only Consonants, Abbreviations, and Sounds

3. Texting Slang with Numbers

4. Texting Slang to Agree on a Meeting

5. Conveying Emotions with Spanish Texting Slang

6. Final Word About Spanish Text Lingo

7. How Can SpanishPod101 Help You Learn Your Spanish Texting and Internet Slang?

1. What Do We Mean by "Internet Talk"?

First of all, it serves to do a quick recap on what "Internet Talk" is in the first place. This consists of all the terms and expressions that started to appear as the internet exploded in popularity.

The internet, being, in broad terms, an American invention, has English as an official language. Thus it's very normal for young people in Spain, Mexico, Columbia, or most places in Latin America (and most of the world for that matter), to look at internet pages in English.

As a consequence of that, certain expressions have seeped into our usage of Spanish in the web and social media, so don't be surprised if you see Spanish speakers writing lol, wtf, brb, txt, omg, tfti, and even lmao.

Those mean the same to us Spanish speakers as they do to anyone speaking English, so we'll assume you got them covered.

Let's now take a look at what we'll assume you're here for: those Spanish abbreviations that aren't very easy to understand at first.

2. Writing with Only Consonants, Abbreviations, and Sounds

Actual Meaning & Translation:

As you may have caught from the example at the beginning of this article, this is merely a quick way of typing Gracias por invitar. In English, that's something like "thanks for the invite."

Use:

This one can be used in two different ways. One is if you were actually invited to an event that has yet to occur, and you'd like to express gratitude. No problem there, right?

The other one is more sarcastic. You would use it when there's an event that already happened, or an event that's happening very soon and you definitely can't attend. Then you would say GPI or "thanks for the invite," just to be funny or to rub it in someone's face that you regret not being invited, or even that you're sore about not being told in advance.

Be careful with this one, as it can be taken as you being friendly and playful-blasé, let's say, about not being invited. But depending on the context and the particular situation, it could come off as you actually being offended.

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Short for ¿Porqué?, which is the same as "Why?" or "How come?"

Use:

This one should be pretty self-explanatory. The thing worth noting is that the "q" and "k" are both used interchangeably for the sound of the word que, as in...uhm, quesadilla? Forgive the obvious example, but most people know how to say that one, don't they?

Also, what's up with just using the "x" for ¿por qué? Well, in math in Spanish, when you say something like "two times two," you might say dos veces dos, or, especially if you're in Mexico and some parts of Latin America, . Since the symbol for multiplying is a little "x" for us Spanish speakers as well, then it makes a good quick way of asking x?

Actual Meaning & Translation:

This one is the same as ¿qué?, que, and all the uses of both the word and its sound. Translates to "what," or "which," depending on the use.

Use:

That "Q" can actually be seen as q? to ask "what?" as in stating confusion or apprehension. Khé is the same, but much more exaggerated, like you really can't believe what's being said and you would go to such lengths as writing it in that manner.

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Short for bien, which is "good!"

Use:

This is what you're most likely to answer when someone asks the following in Spanish slang to you over a text or internet convo:

5- Slang: Cmo stas?

Actual meaning & Translation:

Short for ¿Cómo estás? this literally means "How are you?" So of course, you answer "Good!" or plainly bn.

Use:

6- Slang: Bno

Actual Meaning & Translation:

A fast way of typing bueno, which is also "good."

Use:

Bno can also express agreement or resignation. Like:
- ¿Vamos x unos tacos? - Bno, pro pasas por mí? Translation:
- "Are u down for some tacos?"

- "Ok, but can u give me a ride?"

Actual Meaning & Translation:

No te preocupes, which translates to "Don't worry."

Use:

Whenever your Spanish-speaking interlocutor is fretting about something, apologizing, or overthinking things, just say ntp. It's almost used as "chill out."

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Gracias, which, as almost everybody knows, is "Thank you" or "Thanks."

Use:

Use this when you want to say thanks, but want to appear light-hearted or cool about the whole thing.

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Remember how por got turned into x? just a while ago with xq? Well, this is the same thing, but applied to porfa, which is short for Por favor -which is regular old "Please."

Use:

Want to ask for something the nice way without appearing too formal all the time? Vamos x tacos, xfa.

10- Slang: Spero

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Use:
Spero que entiendas esta oración.
Translation? "Hope you catch the meaning of this sentence."

11- Slang: Vrd or Vdd

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Abbreviation for verdad, which is the word for "truth."

Use:

This one can be used like you would use the word "truth" in English, as in la vrd no quiero ir ("To tell you the truth, I don't want to go.").

It can also be used like when you ask "right" after saying something in English. To stick with the example above: No quieres ir, vdd? ("You don't really want to go, right?")

3. Texting Slang with Numbers

Perhaps you've come across crazy things like this:

12- Slang: 100pre

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Use:

You can drop this one whenever you need to use the word "forever" in a Spanish sentence.

13- Slang: Salu2

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Same idea. What's the Spanish word for the number two? Dos is the right answer, as in Saludos, which is something like "greetings," in English.

Use:

If you use saludos or salu2 at the end of a sentence online, it's almost like saying "cheers" to say goodbye.

4. Texting Slang to Agree on a Meeting

14- Slang: Vns?

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Short for Vienes, which means "Are you coming?"

Use:

If you're already at a place or event where you agreed to meet someone, you can text him or her that.

15- Slang: Vasir?

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Short for the phrase ¿Vas a ir? which means "Are you going?"

Use:

Use this when you're talking about an event or place, but you're not there yourself.

16- Slang: Aki

Actual Meaning & Translation:

This is Aquí which is the Spanish word for "here," but spelled with a "k."

Use:

This is used mostly by very young people, talking informally.

17- Slang: ¡Ámonos!

Actual Meaning & Translation:

Not really sure if this is slang or an expression, but it's just a funny, tongue-in-cheek way of saying Vamonos, which is the first-person plural imperative of ir, which is the verb "to go"... so! In short, it's how you say "Let's go!" in Spanish.

Use:

You say this to rush people in a group you're in, but it could also be used almost as a way of saying "Holy sh*t!" or something like that. It expresses amazement, surprise, and wonder.

Let's say a friend of yours sends this photo of a massive taco he or she's about to eat. You could text back saying ámonos! and the scream emoji.

5. Conveying Emotions with Spanish Texting Slang

18- Slang: TQM

Actual Meaning & Translation:

This one's cute. It's just the first letter of every word in the phrase Te quiero mucho. The literal translation is "I want you so much," but that's not the meaning Spanish-speakers have for it at all. I'll explain...

Use:

In Spanish texting or internet lingo, tqm is even less serious than typing it in full. You could say it's like when you say "luv u" to a close friend, or in a lighthearted manner to a significant other.

Actual Meaning & Translation:

What does the sound of two "b"s pronounced in Spanish sound like? Of course, it's exactly like the word bebé, which is Spanish for "baby."

Use:

You would call someone bb while texting in Spanish, only if they're your significant other, like when you call your boyfriend/girlfriend "baby," or when you're talking sweetly with a close friend of either sex.

It could also be used to talk to someone in a bit of a superior manner, but with a good and kind spirit. Like if they're confused about something and you call them bb right before explaining.

How Do You Communicate Laughter While Texting in Spanish?

Both when texting in any kind of Spanish, or writing on the internet, you write jajaja, which is simply the same as the English version "hahaha."

"J," in Spanish, is the same sound as the "h" in "horse," so it's actually closer to the way we all laugh than if you'd write "hahaha" texting in Spanish.

Nevertheless, if you do that most people will get that you're laughing, pretty much for the same reasons that Spanish speakers can use "lol" or "rofl."

6. Final Word About Spanish Text Lingo

It's very much worth mentioning that all of the internet and texting slang in Spanish that we've shared here is rather informal. Very much like in English, it should only be used in informal settings and situations.

It's a matter of personal taste of course. I would say that you shouldn't write this way even on a forum or a comment section, but you may see things differently.

I'd save your new slang skills in Spanish for when you're speaking with close interlocutors. If you're addressing strangers and want to come off as serious, like if you're writing an email to a stranger, a company, or something like that, don't use these! They can say a lot about the speaker.

7. How Can SpanishPod101 Help You Learn Your Spanish Texting and Internet Slang?

If you liked this guide to the essential Spanish slang for texting and internet lingo, then feel free to find more resources, idiomatic expressions, and fun lessons on our SpanishPod101 website. We have over 1800 audio and video lessons, lively community forums, and a good combination of energetic hosts to help you with your Spanish learning needs in a fun and easy manner!

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Our Guide to Spanish Internet & Text Slang

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Hla! Cmo stas? Spro bn. Vasir a lo de Carla? GPI btw,... cmo 100pre! What's that? Ever encountered something similar while texting with a Spanish native speaker, hanging around on Spanish forums, following social media accounts in Spanish, or watching YouTube videos in what's arguably the most popular romance language?

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Los acentos españoles de diferentes países

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Los acentos españoles de diferentes países

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Este divertido video incluye hispanohablantes de diferentes países y le pide al espectador que adivine de qué país es cada hablante. Los acentos y dialectos españoles varían de país a país. Con más de veinte países de habla hispana en todo el mundo, puede escuchar una amplia variedad de palabras y frases comunes, así como las tendencias en la pronunciación que caracterizan a cada región. En este video, hay oradores de España, México, Colombia, Venezuela, Chile y Uruguay.

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Spanish Accents from Different Countries [Guess the Dialect]