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Winston Churchill - We Shall Fight them on the beaches

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June 4, 1940

June 4, 1940

House of Commons
The position of the B. E.F had now become critical As a result of a most skillfully conducted retreat and German errors, the bulk of the British Forces reached the Dunkirk bridgehead. The peril facing the British nation was now suddenly and universally perceived. On May 26, "Operation Dynamo "-the evacuation from Dunkirk began. The seas remained absolutely calm. The Royal Air Force-bitterly maligned at the time by the Army-fought vehemently to deny the enemy the total air supremacy which would have wrecked the operation. At the outset, it was hoped that 45,000 men might be evacuated; in the event, over 338,000 Allied troops reached England, including 26,000 French soldiers. On June 4, Churchill reported to the House of Commons, seeking to check the mood of national euphoria and relief at the unexpected deliverance, and to make a clear appeal to the United States.
From the moment that the French defences at Sedan and on the Meuse were broken at the end of the second week of May, only a rapid retreat to Amiens and the south could have saved the British and French Armies who had entered Belgium at the appeal of the Belgian King; but this strategic fact was not immediately realised. The French High Command hoped they would be able to close the gap, and the Armies of the north were under their orders. Moreover, a retirement of this kind would have involved almost certainly the destruction of the fine Belgian Army of over 20 divisions and the abandonment of the whole of Belgium. Therefore, when the force and scope of the German penetration were realised and when a new French Generalissimo, General Weygand, assumed command in place of General Gamelin, an effort was made by the French and British Armies in Belgium to keep on holding the right hand of the Belgians and to give their own right hand to a newly created French Army which was to have advanced across the Somme in great strength to grasp it.

However, the German eruption swept like a sharp scythe around the right and rear of the Armies of the north. Eight or nine armoured divisions, each of about four hundred armoured vehicles of different kinds, but carefully assorted to be complementary and divisible into small self-contained units, cut off all communications between us and the main French Armies. It severed our own communications for food and ammunition, which ran first to Amiens and afterwards through Abbeville, and it shore its way up the coast to Boulogne and Calais, and almost to Dunkirk. Behind this armoured and mechanised onslaught came a number of German divisions in lorries, and behind them again there plodded comparatively slowly the dull brute mass of the ordinary German Army and German people, always so ready to be led to the trampling down in other lands of liberties and comforts which they have never known in their own.

I have said this armoured scythe-stroke almost reached Dunkirk-almost but not quite. Boulogne and Calais were the scenes of desperate fighting. The Guards defended Boulogne for a while and were then withdrawn by orders from this country. The Rifle Brigade, the 60th Rifles, and the Queen Victoria's Rifles, with a battalion of British tanks and 1,000 Frenchmen, in all about four thousand strong, defended Calais to the last. The British Brigadier was given an hour to surrender. He spurned the offer, and four days of intense street fighting passed before silence reigned over Calais, which marked the end of a memorable resistance. Only 30 unwounded survivors were brought off by the Navy, and we do not know the fate of their comrades. Their sacrifice, however, was not in vain. At least two armoured divisions, which otherwise would have been turned against the British Expeditionary Force, had to be sent to overcome them. They have added another page to the glories of the light divisions, and the time gained enabled the Graveline water lines to be flooded and to be held by the French troops.

Thus it was that the port of Dunkirk was kept open. When it was found impossible for the Armies of the north to reopen their communications to Amiens with the main French Armies, only one choice remained. It seemed, indeed, forlorn. The Belgian, British and French Armies were almost surrounded. Their sole line of retreat was to a single port and to its neighbouring beaches. They were pressed on every side by heavy attacks and far outnumbered in the air.

When, a week ago today, I asked the House to fix this afternoon as the occasion for a statement, I feared it would be my hard lot to announce the greatest military disaster in our long history. I thought-and some good judges agreed with me-that perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 men might be re-embarked. But it certainly seemed that the whole of the French First Army and the whole of the British Expeditionary Force north of the Amiens-Abbeville gap would be broken up in the open field or else would have to capitulate for lack of food and ammunition. These were the hard and heavy tidings for which I called upon the House and the nation to prepare themselves a week ago. The whole root and core and brain of the British Army, on which and around which we were to build, and are to build, the great British Armies in the later years of the war, seemed about to perish upon the field or to be led into an ignominious and starving captivity.

That was the prospect a week ago. But another blow which might well have proved final was yet to fall upon us. The King of the Belgians had called upon us to come to his aid. Had not this Ruler and his Government severed themselves from the Allies, who rescued their country from extinction in the late war, and had they not sought refuge in what was proved to be a fatal neutrality, the French and British Armies might well at the outset have saved not only Belgium but perhaps even Poland. Yet at the last moment, when Belgium was already invaded, King Leopold called upon us to come to his aid, and even at the last moment we came. He and his brave, efficient Army, nearly half a million strong, guarded our left flank and thus kept open our only line of retreat to the sea. Suddenly, without prior consultation, with the least possible notice, without the advice of his Ministers and upon his own personal act, he sent a plenipotentiary to the German Command, surrendered his Army, and exposed our whole flank and means of retreat.

I asked the House a week ago to suspend its judgment because the facts were not clear, but I do not feel that any reason now exists why we should not form our own opinions upon this pitiful episode. The surrender of the Belgian Army compelled the British at the shortest notice to cover a flank to the sea more than 30 miles in length. Otherwise all would have been cut off, and all would have shared the fate to which King Leopold had condemned the finest Army his country had ever formed. So in doing this and in exposing this flank, as anyone who followed the operations on the map will see, contact was lost between the British and two out of the three corps forming the First French Army, who were still farther from the coast than we were, and it seemed impossible that any large number of Allied troops could reach the coast.

The enemy attacked on all sides with great strength and fierceness, and their main power, the power of their far more numerous Air Force, was thrown into the battle or else concentrated upon Dunkirk and the beaches. Pressing in upon the narrow exit, both from the east and from the west, the enemy began to fire with cannon upon the beaches by which alone the shipping could approach or depart. They sowed magnetic mines in the channels and seas; they sent repeated waves of hostile aircraft, sometimes more than a hundred strong in one formation, to cast their bombs upon the single pier that remained, and upon the sand dunes upon which the troops had their eyes for shelter. Their U-boats, one of which was sunk, and their motor launches took their toll of the vast traffic which now began. For four or five days an intense struggle reigned. All their armoured divisions-or what Was left of them-together with great masses of infantry and artillery, hurled themselves in vain upon the ever-narrowing, ever-contracting appendix within which the British and French Armies fought.

Meanwhile, the Royal Navy, with the willing help of countless merchant seamen, strained every nerve to embark the British and Allied troops; 220 light warships and 650 other vessels were engaged. They had to operate upon the difficult coast, often in adverse weather, under an almost ceaseless hail of bombs and an increasing concentration of artillery fire. Nor were the seas, as I have said, themselves free from mines and torpedoes. It was in conditions such as these that our men carried on, with little or no rest, for days and nights on end, making trip after trip across the dangerous waters, bringing with them always men whom they had rescued. The numbers they have brought back are the measure of their devotion and their courage. The hospital ships, which brought off many thousands of British and French wounded, being so plainly marked were a special target for Nazi bombs; but the men and women on board them never faltered in their duty.

Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force, which had already been intervening in the battle, so far as its range would allow, from home bases, now used part of its main metropolitan fighter strength, and struck at the German bombers and at the fighters which in large numbers protected them. This struggle was protracted and fierce. Suddenly the scene has cleared, the crash and thunder has for the moment-but only for the moment-died away. A miracle of deliverance, achieved by valor, by perseverance, by perfect discipline, by faultless service, by resource, by skill, by unconquerable fidelity, is manifest to us all. The enemy was hurled back by the retreating British and French troops. He was so roughly handled that he did not hurry their departure seriously. The Royal Air Force engaged the main strength of the German Air Force, and inflicted upon them losses of at least four to one; and the Navy, using nearly 1,000 ships of all kinds, carried over 335,000 men, French and British, out of the jaws of death and shame, to their native land and to the tasks which lie immediately ahead. We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations. But there was a victory inside this deliverance, which should be noted. It was gained by the Air Force. Many of our soldiers coming back have not seen the Air Force at work; they saw only the bombers which escaped its protective attack. They underrate its achievements. I have heard much talk of this; that is why I go out of my way to say this. I will tell you about it.

This was a great trial of strength between the British and German Air Forces. Can you conceive a greater objective for the Germans in the air than to make evacuation from these beaches impossible, and to sink all these ships which were displayed, almost to the extent of thousands? Could there have been an objective of greater military importance and significance for the whole purpose of the war than this? They tried hard, and they were beaten back; they were frustrated in their task. We got the Army away; and they have paid fourfold for any losses which they have inflicted. Very large formations of German aeroplanes-and we know that they are a very brave race-have turned on several occasions from the attack of one-quarter of their number of the Royal Air Force, and have dispersed in different directions. Twelve aeroplanes have been hunted by two. One aeroplane was driven into the water and cast away by the mere charge of a British aeroplane, which had no more ammunition. All of our types-the Hurricane, the Spitfire and the new Defiant-and all our pilots have been vindicated as superior to what they have at present to face.

When we consider how much greater would be our advantage in defending the air above this Island against an overseas attack, I must say that I find in these facts a sure basis upon which practical and reassuring thoughts may rest. I will pay my tribute to these young airmen. The great French Army was very largely, for the time being, cast back and disturbed by the onrush of a few thousands of armoured vehicles. May it not also be that the cause of civilisation itself will be defended by the skill and devotion of a few thousand airmen? There never has been, I suppose, in all the world, in all the history of war, such an opportunity for youth. The Knights of the Round Table, the Crusaders, all fall back into the past-not only distant but prosaic; these young men, going forth every morn to guard their native land and all that we stand for, holding in their hands these instruments of colossal and shattering power, of whom it may be said that:

Every morn brought forth a noble chance
And every chance brought forth a noble knight,
deserve our gratitude, as do all the brave men who, in so many ways and on so many occasions, are ready, and continue ready to give life and all for their native land.

I return to the Army. In the long series of very fierce battles, now on this front, now on that, fighting on three fronts at once, battles fought by two or three divisions against an equal or somewhat larger number of the enemy, and fought fiercely on some of the old grounds that so many of us knew so well-in these battles our losses in men have exceeded 30,000 killed, wounded and missing. I take occasion to express the sympathy of the House to all who have suffered bereavement or who are still anxious. The President of the Board of Trade [Sir Andrew Duncan] is not here today. His son has been killed, and many in the House have felt the pangs of affliction in the sharpest form. But I will say this about the missing: We have had a large number of wounded come home safely to this country, but I would say about the missing that there may be very many reported missing who will come back home, some day, in one way or another. In the confusion of this fight it is inevitable that many have been left in positions where honor required no further resistance from them.

Against this loss of over 30,000 men, we can set a far heavier loss certainly inflicted upon the enemy. But our losses in material are enormous. We have perhaps lost one-third of the men we lost in the opening days of the battle of 21st March, 1918, but we have lost nearly as many guns - nearly one thousand-and all our transport, all the armoured vehicles that were with the Army in the north. This loss will impose a further delay on the expansion of our military strength. That expansion had not been proceeding as far as we had hoped. The best of all we had to give had gone to the British Expeditionary Force, and although they had not the numbers of tanks and some articles of equipment which were desirable, they were a very well and finely equipped Army. They had the first-fruits of all that our industry had to give, and that is gone. And now here is this further delay. How long it will be, how long it will last, depends upon the exertions which we make in this Island. An effort the like of which has never been seen in our records is now being made. Work is proceeding everywhere, night and day, Sundays and week days. Capital and Labor have cast aside their interests, rights, and customs and put them into the common stock. Already the flow of munitions has leaped forward. There is no reason why we should not in a few months overtake the sudden and serious loss that has come upon us, without retarding the development of our general program.

Nevertheless, our thankfulness at the escape of our Army and so many men, whose loved ones have passed through an agonising week, must not blind us to the fact that what has happened in France and Belgium is a colossal military disaster. The French Army has been weakened, the Belgian Army has been lost, a large part of those fortified lines upon which so much faith had been reposed is gone, many valuable mining districts and factories have passed into the enemy's possession, the whole of the Channel ports are in his hands, with all the tragic consequences that follow from that, and we must expect another blow to be struck almost immediately at us or at France. We are told that Herr Hitler has a plan for invading the British Isles. This has often been thought of before. When Napoleon lay at Boulogne for a year with his flat-bottomed boats and his Grand Army, he was told by someone. "There are bitter weeds in England." There are certainly a great many more of them since the British Expeditionary Force returned.

The whole question of home defense against invasion is, of course, powerfully affected by the fact that we have for the time being in this Island incomparably more powerful military forces than we have ever had at any moment in this war or the last. But this will not continue. We shall not be content with a defensive war. We have our duty to our Ally. We have to reconstitute and build up the British Expeditionary Force once again, under its gallant Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gort. All this is in train; but in the interval we must put our defences in this Island into such a high state of organisation that the fewest possible numbers will be required to give effective security and that the largest possible potential of offensive effort may be realised. On this we are now engaged. It will be very convenient, if it be the desire of the House, to enter upon this subject in a secret Session. Not that the government would necessarily be able to reveal in very great detail military secrets, but we like to have our discussions free, without the restraint imposed by the fact that they will be read the next day by the enemy; and the Government would benefit by views freely expressed in all parts of the House by Members with their knowledge of so many different parts of the country. I understand that some request is to be made upon this subject, which will be readily acceded to by His Majesty's Government.

We have found it necessary to take measures of increasing stringency, not only against enemy aliens and suspicious characters of other nationalities, but also against British subjects who may become a danger or a nuisance should the war be transported to the United Kingdom. I know there are a great many people affected by the orders which we have made who are the passionate enemies of Nazi Germany. I am very sorry for them, but we cannot, at the present time and under the present stress, draw all the distinctions which we should like to do. If parachute landings were attempted and fierce fighting attendant upon them followed, these unfortunate people would be far better out of the way, for their own sakes as well as for ours. There is, however, another class, for which I feel not the slightest sympathy. Parliament has given us the powers to put down Fifth Column activities with a strong hand, and we shall use those powers subject to the supervision and correction of the House, without the slightest hesitation until we are satisfied, and more than satisfied, that this malignancy in our midst has been effectively stamped out.

Turning once again, and this time more generally, to the question of invasion, I would observe that there has never been a period in all these long centuries of which we boast when an absolute guarantee against invasion, still less against serious raids, could have been given to our people. In the days of Napoleon the same wind which would have carried his transports across the Channel might have driven away the blockading fleet. There was always the chance, and it is that chance which has excited and befooled the imaginations of many Continental tyrants. Many are the tales that are told. We are assured that novel methods will be adopted, and when we see the originality of malice, the ingenuity of aggression, which our enemy displays, we may certainly prepare ourselves for every kind of novel stratagem and every kind of brutal and treacherous maneuver. I think that no idea is so outlandish that it should not be considered and viewed with a searching, but at the same time, I hope, with a steady eye. We must never forget the solid assurances of sea power and those which belong to air power if it can be locally exercised.

I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty's Government-every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation. The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength. Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.

© Chartwell Trust. Reprinted by permission Curtis Brown, London

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June 4, 1940 House of Commons The position of the B. E.F had now become critical As a result of a most skillfully conducted retreat and German errors, the bulk [...]

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The instruction to 'Keep Calm and Carry On' has become one of the most recognisable slogans in British history. The phrase has reinforced a popular view of life in the Second World War and has been reproduced on everything from champagne flutes to smartphone cases. Yet its popularity also obscures a more complicated history.

This blog post marks the 75th anniversary of this significant cultural artefact by exploring its place in the British government's preparations for the Second World War and drawing attention to the Treasury compromise which led to the poster's creation.

Preparing 'Home Publicity'

'Keep Calm and Carry On' was coined by the shadow Ministry of Information (MOI) at some point between 27 June and 6 July 1939. It was produced as part of a series of three posters that would be issued in the event of war (the others read 'Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution; Will Bring Us Victory' and 'Freedom is in Peril; Defend it with all Your Might'). The 'Keep Calm' design was never officially issued and only a very small number of originals have survived to the present day.

The MOI's planners had first considered 'Home Publicity' in August 1937 and returned to the subject in July 1938. However their efforts were constrained by an earlier agreement that these activities would not begin until later into any future war (with the MOI to initially focus wholly on the issue of official news and censorship). It was only after the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) was asked to produce a secret report on foreign propaganda policy in March 1939 that this assumption was challenged and thoughts turned to the necessary content of such material.

A new Home Publicity committee duly began work on 6 April 1939 with lunchtime meetings between civil servants and volunteer academics, publicists and publishers taking place on a weekly basis. The members quickly agreed that the MOI should undertake a general campaign to present 'the national cause' immediately upon the outbreak of war. They paid particular attention to proposals for a series of posters that would reassure the public by stressing the certainty of ultimate victory and emphasising that the whole community was committed to the war effort.

It was decided that the posters must 'stand out strikingly' from commercial efforts and stressed that they should be regarded as part of a coherent campaign. It was for this reason that the planners began to experiment with the use of a 'special and handsome type'. Of course this left questions about the message. The team were instructed that this would need to attract attention, complement preconceived ideas about the conflict, be universal in appeal and balance a 'steadying influence' with an incitement to 'spontaneous' action. It was clear from the outset that this would be a difficult task, with initial proposals for a slogan reading 'England is prepared' abandoned in favour of the less politicised claim that 'We're going to see it through'.

Stalled Plans for Production and Distribution

The design process accelerated in May 1939 as funding was transferred from the secret service to the Treasury and a small 'Publicity Planning' subcommittee comprising of William Surrey Dane (the managing director of Odhams press), Gervas Huxley (the former head of publicity for the Empire Marketing Board) and later W.G.V. Vaughan (an advertising agent who was appointed provisional Head of Production) was formed. They eventually decided that the slogan should invoke a 'state of mind' and commissioned a graphic artist to draw up a series of roughs.

The Publicity Planning subcommittee were also responsible for the later stages of production and distribution. It was quickly agreed that HM Stationery Office should be placed in charge of printing and a programme for distribution was prepared alongside a budget for preliminary printing. Surrey Dane and Huxley also proposed a contract with the advertising agency S.H. Benson Ltd so that display would extend to cover commercial as well as voluntary sites (they argued this was the only way to ensure nationwide coverage). It was anticipated that the whole campaign would cost £112,000 to deliver.

Although these figures were tentatively agreed by the MOI's planners, the Treasury were unimpressed by plans to produce seven separate designs of poster, and unwilling to risk sanctioning expenditure on any design that was too specific. The existing designs were scrapped when Surrey Dane and Huxley's programme was blocked during a specially convened meeting on 26 June 1939. This led A.P. Waterfield, the civil servant responsible for planning the MOI, to hastily convene a meeting between members of the Home Publicity section and the controller of HMSO in a bid to find a compromise. It was reluctantly agreed that a revised application should be made for £45,000 to cover 2.5 million copies of a single design that could be 'revised as to allow for variant forms'.

A Textual Compromise

'Keep Calm and Carry On' would emerge from these and subsequent discussions. The exact point at which the slogan was coined is not recorded in the archives. However it is clear that a revised brief was sent to Wall-Cousins, the graphic artist chosen for his versatility, on 27 June 1939, and that a selection of new designs were ready on 6 July with 'Keep Calm' amongst twenty put forward for further consideration.

It is similarly clear that the design owed much to the inter-departmental wrangling around the budget. Indeed the experiment with a wholly textual poster was a direct response to the Treasury veto and Waterfield's proposal for a flexible design whilst the slogan was influenced by Huxley's belief in 'sober restraint' and an earlier suggestion - 'Keep Calm. Don't Panic' - made by Surrey Dane. The stylised crown was borrowed from ill-fated plans for a 'Royal Message' that was to be sent by direct mail. And the colours were chosen in the belief that the combination of red and white produced a psychological reaction (which was in turn borrowed from Hitler's Mein Kampf).

It would take a further four meetings for the twenty designs to be whittled down to a shortlist of five. These were presented to the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, on 4 August 1939 and it was he who finally decided on 'Keep Calm', 'Your Courage' and 'Freedom is in Peril'. On 23 August 1939, exactly two weeks after the final designs had been submitted to HMSO, Nazi Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR, and the decision was taken to print. Treasury approval for 3.75 million posters was granted the following day, although final contracts were only signed on Thursday 31 August, and production was still underway when war was declared on Monday 3 September.

An Uneasy Tone

It is often claimed that a decision to keep the poster 'in reserve' had been taken before the war. In fact, whilst it was agreed to wait until severe bombing began, this idea had only emerged after the aerial apocalypse failed to materialise, by which point 2.45million copies of the poster had already been passed to local distribution centres. Indeed it had been decided that 'Keep Calm' should account for 65 per cent of the first print run on 23 August. It was only when initial reports on civilian morale pointed to boredom rather than dislocation, that a newly appointed director of Home Publicity decided to 'go slow' and asked for funds to be transferred to produce an additional 750,000 copies of 'Your Courage' and 'Freedom is in Peril'.

This decision can be partly attributed to changes in staff and responsibility as the MOI moved out of the shadows and into the glare of public attention. However it was also likely to have been influenced by an unease that had surrounded the slogan since its inception. The individual responsible for sanctioning expenditure at the Treasury had, for instance, expressed real fear that 'the population might well resent having this poster crammed down their throats at every turn' whilst Waterfield maintained that the slogan was 'too commonplace to be inspiring' and feared that 'it may even annoy people that we should seem to doubt the steadiness of their nerves'.

It is worth noting that the 'Your Courage' design was subject to just such criticism (while 'Freedom is in Peril' was decried for being too abstract). Accused of failing to understand publicity during a hostile parliamentary debate, and attacked in the press for an inept 'Waste and Paste', the MOI scrapped the entire commercial campaign after just four weeks. Stocks of 'Keep Calm' were retained until April 1940 but began to be pulped after this point as part of a cross-government effort to overcome a serious paper shortage.

Re-Discovery

The fact that a design which is now seen to symbolise an era caused so much unease amongst contemporaries remains something of an irony. Yet it was this very unease that ensured the poster would remain hidden from public view until one dusty copy was re-discovered by two booksellers in Alnwick at the turn of the twenty-first century. The rest, as they say, is history.

Further Reading

You can find out more about the history of the Ministry of Information at http://www.moidigital.ac.uk

See also:

John D. Cantwell, Images of War: British Posters 1939-45 (London: HMSO, 1989)

Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979)

Richard Slocombe, British Posters of the Second World War (London: IWM, 2012)

Marion Yass, This is Your War: Home Front Propaganda in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1983)

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Keep Calm and Carry On - The Compromise Behind the Slogan

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The instruction to 'Keep Calm and Carry On' has become one of the most recognisable slogans in British history. The phrase has reinforced a popular view of life in the Second World War and has been reproduced on everything from champagne flutes to smartphone cases. Yet its popularity also obscures a more complicated history.

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Air raids were anticipated in the run up to the Second World War, particularly on London. Air Raid Precautions (ARP) plans were put in place and 1.25 million people were evacuated from London in August and September 1939, with London Transport heavily involved. Yet this time the authorities were reluctant to use the Underground network as a source of shelter, partly due to a misconception that doing so could have a detrimental impact on civilian morale and behaviour.

The ferocity of the Blitz changed everything. On 7 September 1940 the first raid of this near continuous period of bombing left 430 dead and 1,600 injured. This was nearly the same number of casualties as sustained in all the raids on London in the First World War.

Thousands flocked to the natural shelter of the Underground network, forcing a rapid change of policy. Deep-level Tube stations again became dual-purpose spaces, with shelterers bedding down for the night on walkways, platforms and even de-electrified tracks.

Sheltering in stations became better organised, with improved facilities and ticketing to ensure fairness and avoid overcrowding. There was even the 'Tube Refreshments Special', a train service that delivered sustenance to shelterers. Conditions remained basic. For many, this became part of wartime daily life.

Over the next eight months until the Blitz ended in May 1941, around 30,000 civilians in London were killed.

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Shelter in wartime | London Transport Museum

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In both world wars, the London Underground network provided much needed shelter from the horrors of air raids. Read about sheltering during wartime and how thousands of Londoners found shelter in Tube stations.

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He's one of the most famous Britons of the 20th Century and led the country during the Second World War.
He's a hero to many and his speeches are some of the most famous in history - there's even a statue of him outside Parliament.

He's credited as being one of the driving forces that inspired the UK to keep fighting against Nazi Germany.

But he also suffered with mental health problems and was a complicated person who said and did things that many people today don't like.

Winston Churchill was born in 1874. He became a Member of Parliament (MP) in 1900.

He was British prime minister from 1940-1945 and again between 1951 and 1955.

Churchill is best remembered for successfully leading Britain through World War Two.

He was famous for his inspiring speeches, and for his refusal to give in, even when things were going badly.

Many people consider him the greatest Briton of all time and he's almost certainly the most famous British prime minister.

Before World War Two started in 1939, he had warned about the rise of Hitler and the Nazis in Germany.

He became British prime minister in 1940 after then-leader Neville Chamberlain resigned.

Churchill lost power after World War Two ended in 1945.

But he became prime minister again in 1951, before resigning four years later.

For many people Winston Churchill was the greatest prime minister of all time, yet he was often deeply troubled. He lived with bouts of depression throughout his life.

Churchill called his depression 'the black dog'.

His good friend Lord Beaverbrook said Churchill was always either 'at the top of the wheel of confidence or at the bottom of an intense depression.'

Some of things that Churchill said seem controversial today and there are many debates about some of the things he did.

Some experts say he believed that some countries and races were naturally superior to others. In 1937 he said "I do not admit for instance, that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place."

Others say that it's unfair to judge him by attitudes and beliefs we hold today and that many of his views were held by many other people at the time.

He had very strong views about the British relationship with India and was opposed to self-rule. He also considered Ghandi a threat to the British Empire.

He is accused of not doing enough to prevent during a famine in the region of Bengal, in south east Asia in which millions of people are thought to have died.

This happened in 1943, during World War Two, and some experts say his focus was on fighting the war in Europe and that when he became aware of the true seriousness what was happening, he ordered grain to be sent there.

He also has a negative reputation for the way he dealt with Unions and workers rights, mainly after sending the army in to stop riots following strikes in Tonypandy in South Wales.

Churchill died on 24 January 1965 and was given a state funeral, an honour saved only for kings and queens, and sometimes other people of the highest national importance.

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Who was Winston Churchill and why was he important?

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He's one of the most famous Britons of the 20th Century, read our guide to the former British prime minister.

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Two of the four Group Commanders, 11 Group's Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park and 10 Group's Air Vice-Marshal Sir Quintin Brand, came from New Zealand and South Africa respectively. The War Cabinet created two Polish fighter squadrons, Nos. 302 and 303, in the summer of 1940. These were followed by other national units, including two Czech fighter squadrons.

Many of the RAF's aces were men from the Commonwealth and the highest scoring pilot of the Battle was Josef Frantisek, a Czech pilot flying with No. 303 (Polish) Fighter Squadron. No. 303 entered battle on 31 August, at the peak of the Battle of Britain, but quickly became Fighter Command's highest claiming squadron with 126 kills.

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8 Things You Need To Know About The Battle Of Britain

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The Battle of Britain was a major air campaign fought over southern England in the summer and autumn of 1940. Here are 8 things you need to know about one of Britain's most important victories of the Second World War.

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the Blitz, (September 7, 1940-May 11, 1941), intense bombing campaign undertaken by Nazi Germany against the United Kingdom during World War II. For eight months the Luftwaffe dropped bombs on London and other strategic cities across Britain. The attacks were authorized by Germany's chancellor, Adolf Hitler, after the British carried out a nighttime air raid on Berlin. The offensive came to be called the Blitz after the German word blitzkrieg ("lightning war").

The Battle of Britain

With the surrender of France in June 1940, Germany's sole remaining enemy lay across the English Channel. On July 16, 1940, Hitler issued a directive ordering the preparation and, if necessary, execution of Operation Sea Lion, the amphibious invasion of Great Britain. With Britain's powerful Royal Navy controlling the surface approaches in the Channel and the North Sea, it fell to the Luftwaffe to establish dominance of the skies above the battle zone. On August 2, Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring issued his "Eagle Day" directive, laying down a plan of attack in which a few massive blows from the air were to destroy British air power and so open the way for the invasion.

A victory for the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain would indeed have exposed Great Britain to invasion and occupation. Victory for the Royal Air Force's (RAF's) Fighter Command blocked this possibility and, in fact, created the conditions for Britain's survival and the eventual destruction of the Third Reich. Fighter Command's efforts were greatly aided by the lack of any consistent plan of action on the part of the Germans. Sometimes they were trying establish a blockade by destroying shipping and port facilities, sometimes they were directly attacking Fighter Command ground installations, sometimes they were targeting aircraft factories, and sometimes they were attempting to engage Fighter Command in the skies.

The British, on the other hand, were supremely well prepared for the kind of battle in which they now found themselves. Their Chain Home early warning radar, the most advanced system in the world, gave Fighter Command adequate notice of where and when to direct their forces, and the Luftwaffe never made a concerted effort to neutralize it. The RAF's Spitfire was a superlative fighter, and it was not always easy for the Germans to distinguish it from the slightly less maneuverable but much more numerous Hurricanes. Both planes quickly proved their mettle against German bombers, and Germany's best fighter, the Bf 109, was of limited use as an escort due to its relatively short operating range. The British thus fought with the advantage of superior equipment and undivided aim against an enemy with inconsistent objectives.

Nevertheless, through sheer weight of numbers, the Germans were on the brink of victory in late August 1940. The Luftwaffe had lost more than 600 aircraft, and, although the RAF had lost fewer than half that many, the battle was claiming British fighters and experienced pilots at too great a rate. Instead of pressing his advantage, however, Hitler abruptly changed his strategy. In late August the Germans dropped some bombs, apparently by accident, on civilian areas in London. On August 25 the British retaliated by launching a bombing raid on Berlin. Göring had insisted that such an attack was an impossibility, because of the city's formidable air defense network. The raid so infuriated Hitler that he ordered the Luftwaffe to shift its attacks from RAF sites to London and other cities.

Preparation

The British government had anticipated air attacks on its population centres, and it had predicted catastrophic casualties. A Luftwaffe terror bombing attack on the Spanish city of Guernica (April 26, 1937) during the Spanish Civil War had killed hundreds of civilians and destroyed much of the town. On September 1, 1939, the day World War II began with Germany's invasion of Poland, the British government implemented a massive evacuation plan. Over the course of three days, some 1.5 million civilians-the overwhelming majority of them children-were transported from urban centres to rural areas that were believed to be safe. The mass relocation, called Operation Pied Piper, was the largest internal migration in British history.

Authorities quickly implemented plans to protect Londoners from bombs and to house those left homeless by the attacks. The national government also provided funds to local municipalities to construct public air-raid shelters. The Air Raid Precautions (A.R.P.) department distributed more than two million Anderson shelters (named after Sir John Anderson, head of the A.R.P.) to households. These shelters, made of corrugated steel, were designed to be dug into a garden and then covered with dirt. While Anderson shelters offered good protection from bomb fragments and debris, they were cold and damp and generally ill-suited for prolonged occupancy. Because basements, a logical destination in the event of an air raid, were a relative rarity in Britain, the A.R.P. devised the Morrison shelter (named for Home Secretary Herbert Stanley Morrison) as an alternative to the Anderson shelter. This type of shelter-essentially a low steel cage large enough to contain two adults and two small children-was designed to be set up indoors and could serve as a refuge if the building began to collapse.

During the first year of the war, "behind-the-lines" conditions prevailed in London. In spite of blackouts, ubiquitous shelters and sandbags, the visible effects of mass evacuation, the presence of A.R.P. wardens, and members of the Home Guard drilling in the parks, life went on much as usual. The winter of 1939-40 was severe, but the summer was pleasant, and in their leisure hours Londoners thronged the parks or worked in their gardens. Several theatres and many cinemas were open, and there were even a few sporting events. Apart from one or two false alarms in the early days of the war, no sirens wailed in London until June 25. The sense of relative calm was abruptly shattered in the first week of September 1940, when the war came to London in earnest.

The raids

The Blitz began at about 4:00 in the afternoon on September 7, 1940, when German planes appeared over London. For two hours, 348 German bombers and 617 fighters targeted the city, dropping high-explosive bombs as well as incendiary devices. Later, guided by the raging fires caused by the first attack, a second group of planes began another assault that lasted until 4:30 the following morning. In just these few hours, 430 people were killed and 1,600 were badly injured. The first day of the Blitz is remembered as Black Saturday.

Beginning on Black Saturday, London was attacked on 57 straight nights. Between Black Saturday and December 2, there was no 24-hour period without at least one "alert"-as the alarms came to be called-and generally far more. Nine were registered on three separate occasions, and from the start of the Blitz until November 30 there were more than 350 alerts. The nights of November 3 and 28 were the only occasions during this period in which London's peace was unbroken by siren or bomb. After the first week of September, although night bombing on a large scale continued, the large mass attacks by day, which had proved so costly to the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, were replaced by smaller parties coming over in successive waves. On occasion, forces consisting of as many as 300 to 400 aircraft would cross the coast by day and split into small groups, and a few planes would succeed in penetrating London's outer defenses.

The A.R.P. sprang into action, and Londoners, while maintaining the work, business, and efficiency of their city, displayed remarkable fortitude. During the whole period, although the city's operation was disrupted in ways that were sometimes serious, no essential service was more than temporarily impaired. No significant cut was made in necessary social services, and public and private premises, except when irreparably damaged, were repaired as speedily as possible. In many cases the daily life of the city was able to resume with delays of only hours.

The raids on London primarily targeted the Docklands area of the East End. This hub of industry and trade represented a legitimate military target for the Germans, and some 25,000 bombs were dropped on the Port of London alone. However, the Docklands was also a densely populated and impoverished area where thousands of working-class Londoners lived in run-down housing. The raids hurt Britain's war production, but they also killed many civilians and left many others homeless. A charitable relief fund for the people of London was opened September 10. Contributions poured in from every part of the world in such profusion that on October 28 its scope was extended to cover the whole of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. By the middle of December it had reached nearly £1,700,000 (adjusted for inflation, this was the equivalent of roughly £100 million in 2020).

A modern bomb census has attempted to pinpoint the location of every bomb dropped on London during the Blitz, and the visualization of that data makes clear how thoroughly the Luftwaffe saturated the city. Air-raid damage was widespread; hospitals, clubs, churches, museums, residential and shopping streets, hotels, public houses, theatres, schools, monuments, newspaper offices, embassies, and the London Zoo were bombed. While some of the poorer and more crowded suburban areas suffered severely, the mansions of Mayfair, the luxury flats of Kensington, and Buckingham Palace itself-which was bombed four separate times-fared little better. Although casualties were heavy, at no time did they approach the estimates that had been made before the war, and only a fraction of the available hospital and ambulance capacity was ever utilized.

Author Lawrence H. Dawson detailed the damage to London's historic buildings for the 1941 Britannica Book of the Year:

The following curtailed list identifies some of the better known places in inner London that have been damaged by enemy action. Some are a total loss; others are already under repair with little outward sign of the damage sustained: Besides Buckingham palace, the chapel of which was wrecked, and Guildhall (the six-centuries old centre of London civic ceremonies and of great architectural beauty), which was destroyed by fire, Kensington palace (the London home of the earl of Athlone, governor general of Canada, and the birthplace of Queen Mary and Queen Victoria), the banqueting hall of Eltham palace (dating from King John's time and long a royal residence), Lambeth palace (the archbishop of Canterbury), and Holland house (famous for its 17th century domestic architecture, its political associations, and its art treasures), suffered, the latter severely. Of the churches, besides St. Paul's cathedral, where at one time were five unexploded bombs in the immediate vicinity and the roof of which was pierced by another that exploded and shattered the high altar to fragments, those damaged were Westminster abbey, St. Margaret's Westminster, Southwark cathedral; fifteen Wren churches (including St. Brides, Fleet St.; St. Lawrence Jewry; St. Magnus the Martyr; St. Mary-at-hill; St. Dunstan in the East; St. Clement [Eastcheap] and St. James's, Piccadilly). St. Giles, Cripplegate, and St. Mary Wolnooth, also in the city, were damaged, while the Dutch church in Austin Friars, dating from the 14th century and covering a larger area than any church in the city of London, St. Paul's alone excepted, was totally destroyed. Islington parish church, the rebuilt Our Lady of Victories (Kensington), the French church by Leicester square, St. Anne's, Soho (famous for its music), All Souls', Langham place, and Christ Church in Westminster Bridge road (whose tower-fortunately saved-commemorates President Lincoln's abolition of slavery), were among a large number of others. Over 20 hospitals were hit, among them the London (many times), St. Thomas's, St. Bartholomew's, and the children's hospital in Great Ormond st., as well as Chelsea hospital, the home for the aged and invalid soldiers, built by Wren. The famous places damaged include the palace of Westminster and Westminster hall, the County hall, the Public Record office, the Law Courts, the Temple and the Inner Temple library; Somerset house, Burlington house, the tower of London, Greenwich observatory, Hogarth's house; the Carlton, Reform, American, Savage, Arts and Orleans clubs; the Royal College of Surgeons, University college and its library, Stationers' hall, the Y.M.C.A. headquarters, Toynbee hall and St. Dunstan's; the American, Spanish, Japanese and Peruvian embassies and the buildings of the Times newspaper, the Associated Press of America, and the National City bank of New York; the centre court at Wimbledon, Wembley stadium, the Ring (Blackfriars); Drury Lane, the Queen's and the Saville theatres; Rotten row, Lambeth walk, the Burlington arcade and Madame Tussaud's.

The Germans expanded the Blitz to other cities in November 1940. The most heavily bombed cities outside London were Liverpool and Birmingham. Other targets included Sheffield, Manchester, Coventry, and Southampton. The attack on Coventry was particularly destructive. On November 14, 1940, a German force of more than 500 bombers destroyed much of the old city centre and killed more than 550 people. The devastation was so great that the Germans coined a new verb, "to coventrate," to describe it. In early 1941 the Germans launched another wave of attacks, this time focusing on ports. Raids between February and May pounded Plymouth, Portsmouth, Bristol, Newcastle upon Tyne, and Hull in England; Swansea in Wales; Belfast in Northern Ireland; and Clydeside in Scotland.

The night raids on London continued into 1941, and January 10-11 saw exceptionally heavy attacks; the Mansion House (residence of the lord mayor of London) and the Bank of England narrowly avoided destruction when a bomb fell directly between them, creating a gigantic crater. After a brief lull, the Luftwaffe returned in force on February 17. Hundreds of incendiary and many high-explosive bombs were dropped, doing little material damage but causing many casualties. Another large-scale attack followed on March 19, when hundreds of houses and shops, many churches, six hospitals, and other public buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged. A short respite followed, until a widespread series of night raids on April 7 included some targets in the London area. On April 16 an attack even fiercer and more indiscriminate than those of the previous autumn started at 9:00 pm and continued until 5:00 the following morning; 500 aircraft were believed to have flown over in continuous waves, raining an estimated 450 tons of bombs across the city. More than 1,000 people were killed, and the damage was more widespread than on any previous occasion. Three nights later (April 19-20) London was again subjected to a seven-hour raid, and the loss of life was considerable, especially among firefighters and the A.R.P. workers.

Londoners enjoyed three weeks of uneasy peace until May 10-11, the night of a full moon, when the Luftwaffe launched the most intense raid of the Blitz. London seemed ablaze from the docks to Westminster, much damage was done, and casualties were high. More than 500 German planes dropped more than 700 tons of bombs across the city, killing nearly 1,500 people and destroying 11,000 homes. The House of Commons, Westminster Abbey, and the British Museum were severely damaged, and The Temple was almost completely destroyed. Elsewhere in the skies over Britain, Nazi official Rudolph Hess chose that same evening to parachute into Scotland on a quixotic and wholly unauthorized peace mission. Although there were some comparatively slight raids later in 1941, the most notable one on July 27, the May 10-11 attack marked the conclusion of the Blitz.

Response

When the Blitz began, the government enforced a blackout in an attempt to make targeting more difficult for German night bombers. Streetlights, car headlights, and illuminated signs were kept off. People hung black curtains in their windows so that no lights showed outside their houses. When a bombing raid was imminent, air-raid sirens were set off to sound a warning. At the beginning of the Blitz, British "ack ack" gunners struggled to inflict meaningful damage on German bombers, but later developments in radar guidance greatly improved the effectiveness of both antiaircraft artillery and searchlights.

Another defensive measure employed by the British was barrage balloons-large oval-shaped unmanned balloons with stabilizing tail fins-installed in and around major target areas. These balloons, the largest of which were some 60 feet (18 metres) long, were essentially an airspace denial tool. They prevented low-flying aircraft from approaching their targets at optimal altitudes and angles of attack. The higher the German planes had to fly to avoid the balloons, the less accurate they were when dropping their bombs. While the balloons themselves were an obvious deterrent, they were anchored to the ground by steel tethers that were strong enough to damage or destroy any aircraft that flew into them. Over 100 German planes made contact with barrage balloon cables during the Blitz, and two-thirds of them crashed or made forced landings on British soil.

Seeking shelter

The initial human cost of the Blitz was lower than the government had expected, but the level of destruction exceeded the government's dire predictions. Very early in the German bombing campaign, it became clear that the preparations-however extensive they seemed to have been-were inadequate. Many of the surface shelters built by local authorities were flimsy and provided little protection from bombs, falling debris, and fire. In addition, there simply was not enough space for everyone who needed shelter in one of the largest and most densely populated cities in the world. In a survey of shelter use, it was found that, although the public shelters were fully occupied every night, just 9 percent of Londoners made use of them. Some 27 percent of Londoners utilized private shelters, such as Anderson shelters, while the remaining 64 percent spent their evenings on duty with some branch of the civil defense or remained in their own homes.

In the first days of the Blitz, a tragic incident in the East End stoked public anger over the government's shelter policy. After the bombing began on September 7, local authorities urged displaced people to take shelter at South Hallsville School. Those who sought refuge at the school were told that they would quickly be relocated to a safer area, but the evacuation was delayed. On September 10, 1940, the school was flattened by a German bomb, and people huddled in the basement were killed or trapped in the rubble. The government announced that 77 people had died, but for years local residents insisted the toll was much higher. Revised estimates made decades later indicated that close to 600 men, women, and children had been killed in the bombing. It is believed that the wartime government covered up the death toll because of concern over the effect it would have had on public morale.

The South Hallsville School disaster prompted Londoners, especially residents of the East End, to find safer shelters, on their own if necessary. Days later a group of East Enders occupied the shelter at the upscale Savoy Hotel, and many others began to take refuge in the city's underground railway, or Tube, stations. This option had been forbidden by city officials, who feared that once people began sleeping in Underground stations, they would be reluctant to return to the surface and resume daily life. As more and more people began sleeping on the platforms, however, the government relented and provided bunk beds and bathrooms for the underground communities. The use of the Tube system as a shelter saved thousands of lives, and images of Londoners huddled in Underground stations would become an indelible image of British life during World War II.

Dissatisfaction with public shelters also led to another notable development in the East End-Mickey's Shelter. After his optician business was destroyed by a bomb, Mickey Davies led an effort to organize the Spitalfield Shelter. As many as 5,000 people had packed into this network of underground tunnels, which was dangerously overcrowded, dirty, and dark. Guided by Davies, the people of the shelter created an ad hoc government and established a set of rules. Davies also set up medical stations and persuaded off-duty medical personnel to treat the sick and wounded. The success of Mickey's Shelter was another factor that urged the government to improve existing "deep shelters" and to create new ones.

Impact and legacy

The Blitz was devastating for the people of London and other cities. In the eight months of attacks, some 43,000 civilians were killed. This amounted to nearly half of Britain's total civilian deaths for the whole war. One of every six Londoners was made homeless at some point during the Blitz, and at least 1.1 million houses and flats were damaged or destroyed. Nevertheless, for all the hardship it caused, the campaign proved to be a strategic mistake by the Germans. Hitler's intention had been to break the morale of the British people so they would pressure their government to surrender. Morale did suffer amid the death and devastation, but there were few calls for surrender. The phrase "Business as usual," written in chalk on boarded-up shop windows, exemplified the British determination to "keep calm and carry on" as best they could.

From a purely military perspective, the Blitz was entirely counterproductive to the main purpose of Germany's air offensive-to dominate the skies in advance of an invasion of England. By mid-September 1940 the RAF had won the Battle of Britain, and the invasion was postponed indefinitely. Air power alone had failed to knock the United Kingdom out of the war. On May 11, 1941, Hitler called off the Blitz as he shifted his forces eastward against the Soviet Union.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica Michael Ray.

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The Blitz | World War II, History, & Facts

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The Blitz (September 7, 1940-May 11, 1941), bombing campaign undertaken by Nazi Germany against Britain during World War II. For eight months planes of the Luftwaffe dropped bombs on London and other strategic cities. The offensive came to be called the Blitz after the German word 'blitzkrieg,' meaning 'lightning war.'

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What Spitfire Was Used in The Battle of Britain?

The Battle of Britain was a pivotal moment in WWII and undeniably one of the most significant turning points in British history. The failure of the German air force to claim dominance of our skies was their first major reversal and led to the ultimate failure of Hitler's attempted invasion of Britain.

But what gave the RAF an advantage over the German Luftwaffe? The answer is easy. The Supermarine Spitfire Mk I and Mk II

The high-performance aircraft, designed by R.J Mitchell, is without a doubt the most famous plane of World War Two. Its high speed coupled with its light weight and ground-breaking design meant it was vastly adaptable and played a critical role in the defeat of the German air force.

The Supermarine Spitfire was an agile fighting machine. The aircraft's unique elliptical wings made it the supplest fighter in the sky. The Mk I was built with a Merlin II or Merlin III engine giving it up to 1,030 horsepower. This gave the Spitfire Mk I a top speed of 362mph at 18,5000ft, making this model faster than existing British fighter planes such as the Hurricane.

From June 1940, thirty of the aircraft were equipped with twin 20mm cannons. To distinguish between the two variants, the Spitfire Mk I's equipped with lethal .303 machine guns were designated IA's. These machine guns were able to deliver a concentration of 160 rounds per second. Those with fitted cannons were designated IB's. These were the models which were used against the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain. At the peak of the battle, 372 Spitfires were used against them, predominantly Mk Is.

Mk II Spitfires were designed to be more powerful and faster than the original model. The main difference between these is the fact that the Supermarine Spitfire Mk II came with a Merlin Mk XII powerplant. Most of these models were introduced after the Battle of Britain meaning it was mainly the Mk I that carved out the Spitfire legend in the Summer of 1940.

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What Spitfire Was Used in The Battle of Britain? | Fly a Spitfire

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The Battle of Britain was a pivotal moment in WWII and undeniably one of the most significant turning points in British history. The failure of the German air force to claim dominance of our skies was their first major reversal and led to the ultimate failure of Hitler's attempted invasion of Britain.