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American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)

The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) was formed. It is the largest and oldest organization of it's kind.  Part of the mission of the AAIDD is to promote universal human rights for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.

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Brown v. Board of Education

This landmark civil rights decision no longer allowed schools to discrimate against students based on race.  This paved the way for other important legislation for those with disabilities.

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U.S. Supreme Court

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Argued December 9, 1952 Reargued December 8, 1953 Decided May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. [ Footnote 1]

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance,

they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Fergson, . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. [ Footnote 2] Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. [ Footnote 3]

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history with respect to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. [ Footnote 4] In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported

by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. [ Footnote 5] The doctrine of

"separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. [ Footnote 6] American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. [ Footnote 7] In Cumming v. County Board of Education, , and Gong Lum v. Rice, , the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. [ Footnote 8] In more recent cases, all on the graduate school

level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, ; Sweatt v. Painter, ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, . In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. [ Footnote 9] Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout

the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."

Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system. [ Footnote 10]"

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. [ Footnote 11] Any language

in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 12]

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. [ Footnote 13] The Attorney General

of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. [ Footnote 14]
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan.Gen.Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S.C.Const., Art. XI, § 7; S.C.Code § 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools, and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program. . On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va.Const., § 140; Va.Code § 22-221 (1950). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del.Const., Art. X, § 2; Del.Rev.Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved in travel. 87 A.2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children ( see note 10 infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id. at 865. The Chancellor's decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A.2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.

345 U.S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.

For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex.Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially the same pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South ( e.g., the rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id. at 427-428. The low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.

16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, , 307-308 (1880):

"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race -- the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored -- exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race."

See also Virginia v. Rives, , 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, , 344-345 (1880).

The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.198, 206 (1850), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass.Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North, segregation in public education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.

See also Berea College v. Kentucky, (1908).

In the Cummin case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for white children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend a Negro school.

In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's decree." 103 F. Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization program was already "afoot and progressing" ( 103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equalization program was well under way. 91 A.2d 137, 149.

[ Footnote 10]

A similar finding was made in the Delaware case:

"I conclude from the testimony that, in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated."

87 A.2d 862, 865.

[ Footnote 11]

K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int.J.Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).

[ Footnote 12]

See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

[ Footnote 13]

"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment"

"( a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or"

"( b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?"

"5. On the assumption on which questions 4( a) and ( b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4( b),"

"( a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;"

"( b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;"

"( c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;"

"( d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases and, if so, what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?"

[ Footnote 14]

See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).

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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from segregating public school students on the basis of race. This marked a reversal of the "separate but equal" doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson that had permitted separate schools for white and colored children provided that the facilities were equal.

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Hobson v. Hansen

This case ruled that tracking systems for students were unconstitutional.  Students were separated using standard aptitude tests, which were culturally biased. Once students were on a track they were not able to advance.  This was declared to be in violation of equal education opportunity, under the 14th amendment.

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PARC v. Commonwealth of Penn.
This legislation entitled all children to a free and appropriate education.

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PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania | Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse

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Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Section 504 of this act guaranteed civil rights to people with disabilities.   This act extended civil rights students in schools, making sure reasonable accommodations were provided.

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[Image description: People in wheelchairs inside a building looking out of a glass door, where a man with a wheelchair looks in.] There were protests in and outside federal offices in San Francisco. At one, Mike Williams, far left, could see Nancy D'Angelo, center, and Judy Heumann, far right, through windows on April 12, 1977. Credit... HolLynn D'Lil

In 1977, people with disabilities held sit-ins to demand action on a law that granted accessibility, paving the way for the Americans With Disabilities Act.

[Image description: People in wheelchairs inside a building looking out of a glass door, where a man with a wheelchair looks in.] There were protests in and outside federal offices in San Francisco. At one, Mike Williams, far left, could see Nancy D'Angelo, center, and Judy Heumann, far right, through windows on April 12, 1977. Credit... HolLynn D'Lil

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When the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed to prohibit employment discrimination based on disability, it was supposed to protect disabled people and ensure their rights in the United States.

"No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States," Section 504 of that law reads, "shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."

Libraries, schools, courtrooms, subsidized transportation and countless other resources were "available" to the public - but still not accessible to the millions of disabled people who lived in the United States. Richard Scotch, a professor of sociology, public policy and political economy at the University of Texas at Dallas, said that when Section 504 was drafted, it was a beacon of hope.

The section operated on the social model of disability, which focuses not on a person's "impairment," but on ways in which their surroundings could better accommodate their needs.

"So instead of trying to fix the person," Mr. Scotch said, "we're trying to fix the environment to make it more inclusive."

After twice being vetoed, the Rehabilitation Act was signed by President Richard M. Nixon. But four years later, the law had yet to be implemented. The cost to meet the new standards, which required retrofitting and fixing the many federally funded buildings around the country, would have been enormous, and as administrations changed, action was delayed for years.

By 1977 - after years of letter writing, lobbying and pleading with lawmakers - disability activists were tired of waiting. The American Coalition of Citizens With Disabilities said that if Joseph A. Califano Jr., the secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under President Jimmy Carter, did not take action by April 4, there would be national protests.

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[Image description: Demonstrators with a sign reading "Sign 504 now."] Protesters at United Nations Plaza in San Francisco on April 5, 1977. Credit... Anthony Tusler

On April 5, demonstrators across the country began occupying federal offices; protesters in New York City showed up to protest outside of the H.E.W. offices in Manhattan, while disabled people in Washington occupied areas outside of Mr. Califano's office. Sit-ins began across the country; federal buildings in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Seattle, among others, were occupied for hours or days.

In San Francisco, Judy Heumann, then 29, and Kitty Cone, who turned 33 during the protests, showed up at the regional H.E.W. office. With them were more than 100 other disabled protesters, interpreters and personal care aides.

But when the demonstrators arrived to meet with Joseph Maldonado, the regional director who reported to Mr. Califano, they expected him to be aware of the issues.

"No one had briefed him; he didn't know what 504 was," Ms. Heumann said in an interview with The New York Times. "We were incredulous about the fact that nobody was taking what we were doing seriously."

"We stayed in the building," she continued, "because Maldonado did not know what we were talking about."

[Image description: A contact sheet with dozens of black and white photos of demonstrators.] A contact sheet, starting with the second row, shows images of April 5, 1977, the first day of the San Francisco sit-in. Credit... Anthony Tusler

As the occupation continued, the demonstrators in San Francisco had no idea that they would end up living there for almost a month, making it among the longest occupations of a federal building in U.S. history. Many of them showed up with little more than the clothes they were wearing.

"It was hard," Ms. Cone said in a 2002 interview with Joseph Shapiro of NPR. "But it was also the most exhilarating, victorious, wonderful experience of many of our lives, too."

While other demonstrations around the country fizzled out, the federal government was working to deter the protesters in San Francisco, cutting the building's phone lines and water supply.

"If we left, we were going to be the last group to leave," Ms. Heumann said, "and while we had no idea how long this was going to last, we really did have a belief that we could do it."

[Image description: Two people under a blanket sleeping at the foot of a staircase near an empty wheelchair.] Some of the demonstrators remained inside for almost a month, making it among the longest occupations of a federal building in U.S. history. Credit... HolLynn D'Lil

But they found unexpected allies. The city's mayor, George Moscone, sent over mattresses and tried to arrange portable showers for the protesters. Members of other organizations, including the Black Panther Party and the Gray Panthers, brought supplies and cooked meals.

Brad Lomax, a member of the Black Panthers who had multiple sclerosis, took part in the 504 Sit-in, as did his aide, a fellow Black Panther named Chuck Jackson.

As the sit-in wore on, about two dozen of the demonstrators - including Ms. Heumann, Ms. Cone, Mr. Lomax and Mr. Jackson - decided to fly to Washington to put more pressure on Mr. Califano.

"We will no longer allow the government to oppress disabled individuals," Ms. Heumann said that spring at a special hearing with members of Congress after a government official suggested creating "separate but equal" programs. "We want the law enforced. We will accept no more discussion of segregation."

"And I would appreciate it if you would stop shaking your head in agreement," she said to Eugene Eidenberg, who was sent by H.E.W. to hear the group's testimony, "when I don't think you understand what we are talking about."

[Image description: Several protesters, including one in a wheelchair holding a sign reading "Sign 504 Now."] Judy Heumann, holding the sign, and Kitty Cone, right, protested in front of the White House on April 26, 1977. Credit... HolLynn D'Lil

On April 28, 1977, the regulation was implemented. The San Francisco occupation lasted two more days - just enough time for the remaining demonstrators to clean up the building and await the return of those who had gone to Washington.

Though Section 504 applied only to federally funded buildings, the regulations laid the groundwork for the Americans With Disabilities Act, which extended the protections to all private institutions and workplaces when it was enacted 13 years later.

"We were creating a community that hadn't existed earlier," Ms. Heumann said, reflecting on the lasting effects of the sit-in. "We stayed together because people were recognizing and really were believing that we could make a difference."

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Before the A.D.A., There Was Section 504

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In 1977, people with disabilities held sit-ins to demand action on a law that granted accessibility, paving the way for the Americans With Disabilities Act. [Image description: People in wheelchairs inside a building looking out of a glass door, where a man with a wheelchair looks in.]

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Education for All Handicapped Children Act

This legislation guaranteed all students regardless of disability the right to an education in public schools.  In 1990, it was revised, and became the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). There were later more revisions and amendments in 1997 and 2004.

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Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of IDEA

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Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
This civil rights legislation made it illegal to discriminate against people with disabilities.  The ADA made sure public spaces are accessable.   This legislation also  protects children with disabilities in settings such as summer camps and sports teams.

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No Child Left Behind Act

This law expands on the  Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.   This act was designed to further hold schools accountable for student achievement.   This law was replaced in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).

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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)

This four part law was signed by George W. Bush.  This law made sure students with disabilities were to receive a free and appropriate education.  It also guarantees the least restrictive environment (LRE), procedural safe guards, and appropriate evaluations. It was an expansion and reauthorization of the 1990 legislation.

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With Republican and Democratic 'Individuals with Disabilities Education Act' sponsors and others standing behind him, President Bush... read more

With Republican and Democratic 'Individuals with Disabilities Education Act' sponsors and others standing behind him, President Bush thanked Rep. Castle, Senator Kennedy and other dignitaries who were present. The president spoke briefly and topics included special education teachers, individual tutoring, the role of parents, the reduction of paperwork, and local control. After his remarks he signed the reauthorization of the IDEA legislation with disabled children standing beside him. close

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Disabilities Education Improvement Bill Signing

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With Republican and Democratic 'Individuals with Disabilities Education Act' sponsors and others standing behind him, President Bush thanked Rep. Castle, Senator Kennedy and other dignitaries who were present. The president spoke briefly and topics included special education teachers, individual tutoring, the role of parents, the reduction of paperwork, and local control.

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Rosa's Law
Signed by President Obama in 2010, this legislation removed the terms "mental retardation" and "mentally retarded" in federal language.  The terms "intellectual disability" is used instead.

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Known as "Rosa's Law," the law removes the terms "mental retardation" and "mentally retarded" from federal health, education and labor policy and replaces them with people first language "individual with an intellectual disability" and "intellectual disability."

The bill, championed by Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.) and Sen. Mike Enzi (R-Wy.), garnered unanimous support in passing both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Rosa's Law was commemorated in a White House ceremony on October 8 with an 11 member delegation of Special Olympics athletes, leaders and self-advocates present to celebrate the milestone. See the list of delegates.

"Respect, value, and dignity-everyone deserves to be treated this way, including people with intellectual disabilities," said Dr. Timothy P. Shriver, Chairman and CEO of Special Olympics. "The President's signature and the unanimous support of both the House and Senate show that our elected officials understand and embrace this ideal. I congratulate Sen. Mikulski and Sen. Enzi for their vision and sensitivity to people with intellectual disabilities everywhere."

"For far too long we have used hurtful words like 'mental retardation' or 'mentally retarded' in our federal statutes to refer to those living with intellectual disabilities," said Sen. Mikulski. "Rosa's Law will make a greatly-needed change that should have been made well before today-and it will encourage us to treat people the way they would like to be treated."

Special Olympics, as the world's largest movement dedicated to promoting respect and human dignity for those with intellectual disabilities, has long championed the use of people first language. In 2004, in response to its athletes' call for change, the Special Olympics International Board of Directors adopted a resolution to update the movement's terminology from "mental retardation" to "people with intellectual disabilities." In 2008, Special Olympics launched the website to combat the inappropriate use of the R-word in common usage and helped lead protests against media use of the word in response to the film 'Tropic Thunder.' In 2009, the youth-led "Spread the Word to End the Word" campaign launched with rallies in K-12 schools and universities around the country, enlisting young people to combat use of the word and collecting more than 100,000 signatures to pledge inclusion and respect towards all people.

In order to learn more about youth experiences with the R-word, the Special Olympics Global Collaborating Center at the University of Massachusetts Boston, and Harris Interactive®ii worked together to design an online survey. In this online survey, youth across the U.S. were asked questions about the R-word, including whether they have ever heard the word, and if so, how they reacted to hearing it. Over a thousand youth between the ages of 8 and 18 responded to the online survey.

92% of young Americans (ages 8-18) report having heard the R-word used, while 36% have heard the word used specifically toward someone with an intellectual disability.

Only 50% of those who heard it used to refer to someone with an intellectual disability told the person who used the word that it was wrong to do so.

The study also confirmed that as young people progress from elementary school, to middle school and then on to high school, they are less likely to feel bad or sorry for the person being picked on, and more likely to laugh, do nothing, and/or not care.

Youth leaders like Spread the Word to End the Word campaign co-founders Soeren Palumbo and Tim Shriver have used viral and grassroots methods to garner support amongst their peers and in schools across the United States and around the world. By highlighting the pervasive use of the R-word in and reaching out to people like Bill O'Reilly when the R-word is used , the campaign has begun to have a noticeable impact. FOX adopted the campaign's ideals when they edited out multiple uses of the R-word in the movie "Miss March" and replaced it with alternatives in the DVD release. The F/X network now includes the R-word as one of three words that are not allowed to be broadcast. MTV has also embraced the campaign by bleeping out the R-word just like any other curse word or slur in shows like "The Real World" and "Teen Mom."

"What people, I hope, are starting to see is that making their pledge to stop using the R-word is just the beginning of a whole new and amazing world that opens up to them," said Shriver. "Once you open your heart to people with intellectual disabilities you're going to want to do more and that's where Special Olympics comes in-it's the next level of activation. Young people today are desperate to make change, to channel their passions in meaningful ways and whether it's starting a unified team at your school, or just cheering at a competition, that's what Special Olympics is offering - a way for young people to make meaningful change in the world."

Although originally a clinical term and introduced with good intentions, the term "mental retardation" and its pejorative form, "retard" have been used widely in today's society to degrade and insult people with intellectual disabilities. By instead using "intellectual disability" and "an individual with an intellectual disability" in federal laws, the United States sends a strong message that language is important and that no form of the 'R-word' should be used to refer to any of its citizens.

Champions of Rosa's law made sure that by updating language in federal law that the bill would not expand nor diminish services, rights, responsibilities or educational opportunities duly owed to individuals with intellectual disabilities. It simply makes the federal law language consistent with that used by the Centers for Disease Control, the World Health Organization, and the White House through the President's Committee for People with Intellectual Disabilities. The changes will occur during routine revisions to laws and documents over the next several years. Since the alterations will be implemented gradually, the legislation is not expected to incur any cost.

A family in Edgewater, Maryland provided the inspiration for the law. Nina Marcellino is the mother of four children, including Rosa, a child with Down syndrome. In 2009, Marcellino learned that Rosa had been labeled retarded at school. Marcellino didn't allow the R-word in her house, and none of her children described their sister that way. Nina teamed up with other parents and her state delegate to introduce a bill to change the terminology in Maryland state law. Before the bill was brought up for consideration in the Maryland General Assembly, they held a hearing on the implications of changing the term.

There were several witnesses at that hearing, but the testimony that had the greatest impact was given by an 11-year-old boy: Rosa's brother, Nick. "What you call people is how you treat them," Nick said. "What you call my sister is how you will treat her. If you believe she's 'retarded,' it invites taunting, stigma. It invites bullying and it also invites the slammed doors of being treated with respect and dignity."

Nick's comments speak to the core values of Special Olympics-respect, dignity, acceptance and inclusion. Special Olympics congratulates and thanks all involved in passing 'Rosa's Law.'

Dr. Timothy Shriver, Special Olympics Chairman and CEO

Loretta Claiborne, Self-Advocate and Special Olympics International Board Director

Eddie Barbanell, Self-Advocate, Actor and Special Olympics International Board Director

Soeren Palumbo, Co-founder "Spread the Word to End the Word" Campaign, Co-founder SO College

Tim Shriver, Co-founder "Spread the Word to End the Word" Campaign, Co-founder SO College

Erica Wheeler, Self-Advocate and Special Olympics Maryland Board Director and Athlete

Danielle Liebl, Self-Advocate and Special Olympics Minnesota Athlete, Youth Activation Committee Member

Roberta Blomster, Self-Advocate and Special Olympics Minnesota Athlete and Global Messenger

Frank Stephens, Self-Advocate and Special Olympics Virginia Athlete

David Egan, Self-Advocate, Special Olympics Virginia Board Director and Athlete

Julie Petty, Self-Advocate from Fayetteville, Arkansas.

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Rosa's Law Signed Into Law by President Obama

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A journey that began as one Maryland family's battle for respect and acceptance for their daughter and sister, Rosa, became a significant milestone in the ongoing battle for dignity, inclusion and respect of all people with intellectual disabilities when United States President Barack Obama signed...