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Cambodia is 1 of the more prone to effects of climate change countries in Southeast Asia due to them being being affected by floods & droughts from the monsoon winds on a seasonal basis

Cambodia's vulnerability is also linked to them being a leas developed, post civil war, & predominately agrarian country (80% of population are in rural areas)

poor infrastructure & limited institutions

Since 2015, there has been

3 major floods(2015, 2018, 2019)

2 major storms (2015, 2020)

1 major drought (2016)

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Cambodia is one of the more disaster‐prone countries in Southeast Asia, affected by floods and droughts on a seasonal basis. Cambodia's vulnerability to climate change is linked to its characteristics as a post‐civil war, least developed, predominantly agrarian country, with nearly 80% of the population living in rural areas. Weak adaptive capacity, poor infrastructure, and limited institutions exacerbate the country's vulnerability to climate variability and change. Indeed, floods and droughts are recognized by the government as one of the main drivers of poverty. During the 20-year period from 1987 to 2007, a succession of droughts and floods resulted in significant loss of life and considerable economic loss.
This section provides a summary of key natural hazards and their associated socioeconomic impacts in a given country. And it allows quick evaluation of most vulnerable areas through the spatial comparison of natural hazard data with development data, thereby identifying exposed livelihoods and natural systems.

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World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal

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The Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) provides global data on historical and future climate, vulnerabilities, and impacts.

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Cambodia's Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

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Cambodia's Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

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Cambodia's GHG Emissions of 5 years

2020: 42,363.18 -- 0.99% increase

2019: 41,947.80 -- 11.80% increase

2018: 37,519.11 -- 2.68% increase

2017: 36,540.99 -- 7.72% increase

2016: 33,920.89 -- 8.92% increase

Source: https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/cambodia

Largest industry contributor to Cambodia's GHG emissions = land use change & forestry sector (32.48 million t)

2nd largest = agriculture (21 million t)

3rd largest = transport (6.93 million t)

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Cambodia's Climate & Ecological Communities

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Cambodia's Climate & Ecological Communities

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Climate (Source: Britannica https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia/Climate)

Cambodia has a tropical wet & dry climate, temperatures don't vary greatly

climate is effected by the monsoon winds = 2 major seasons (mid May - October is heavy rain & high humidity while early November - mid March is lighter winds which brings lower humidity, cloudiness, & infrequent rain)

4 Main Ecological Communities

1. Annamite Range Moist Forests - 134 species of mammals & 525 bird species

50% of these forests have been cleared due to the timber industry sector

2. Cardamom Mountains Moist Forests - 1 of the most species rich ecoregions in Cambodia, 100+ mammal species, 450 bird species, elephants reside here

illegal logging effects region negatively

3. Central Indochina Moist Forests - deciduous trees dominated sparse woodlands, 167 mammal species, & 500+ bird species

ecoregion is threatened by forest clearing for settlements

4. Mekong Freshwater Ecoregion - high diversity of habits including grasslands, wetlands, deciduous forests, & riparian environments. 212 mammal species, 240 reptile species, 536 bird species, 850 freshwater fish species, 435 marine fish species, & 2,000+ plant species (a lot of these having yet to be taxonimized)

the construction of hydroelectric dams, sand mining, & overfishing have negative consequences in this region

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Biodiversity protection is highlighted in the Rectangular Strategy Phase III, and the National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018. Both documents address biodiversity in the context of balancing development and conservation

The national policy framework for conservation of biodiversity is expressed through laws and regulations to protect the environment and converse biodiversity, including the Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management (1996), The Land Law (2001), The Law on Fisheries, Forest Law (2002), Law on Mineral Exploitation and Mining Resources (2001), Law on Water Resource Management, Law on Biosafety (2008) and Law on Protected Areas (2008) , [3]. Cambodia is also finalizing " the Environment and Natural Resources Code of Cambodia", which is the legal framework for the management of the environment and natural resources

In 2016, Cambodia updated its 2002 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP). Cambodia's vision for biodiversity is that, through this updated NBSAP and in support of the National Strategic Development Plan, by 2050, "Cambodia's biodiversity and its ecosystem services are valued, conserved, restored where necessary, wisely used and managed so as to ensure equitable economic prosperity and improved quality of life for all in the country". Cambodia adopted the following four overall strategic objectives: (A) Identify, inventory, monitor and enhance awareness about genetic resources, species, habitats or ecosystems and related ecosystem services that are important for sustainable development and poverty eradication in Cambodia, as a priority for conservation and sustainable use; (B) Identify and describe the direct and indirect factors and processes that are negatively impacting Cambodia's priority biodiversity components; and apply, as appropriate, preventive and corrective measures; (C) Maintain or strengthen measures that have a positive impact on biodiversity and thus enhance the benefits to all in Cambodia from biodiversity and associated ecosystem services, for an equitable economic prosperity and improved quality of life; and (D) Strengthen the enabling environment for the implementation of the strategy [4].

Related strategies and plans in Cambodia include, the National Forest Programme ( NFP) (2010-2029), the National Action Plan for Zero Hunger Challenge (2016-2025) and the National Protected Area Strategic Management Plan ( NPASMP) (2017-2031). The NPASMP indicates that there are 49 protected areas and several biodiversity corridors in Cambodia that collectively cover 7.4 million hectares or 41% of the country [5].

SUCCESSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES

For protected areas, remaining challenges identified in the NPASMP include: (i) lack of boundary demarcation (land registration), management and zoning plans to clearly identify and protect core and conservation zones inside protected areas; (ii) difficulties of ensuring the sustained reduction or eradication of illegal activities; (iii) limited contributions of existing protected areas to local rural livelihoods; (iv) complexities of resolving land use conflicts in and around protected areas; (v) limited collaboration between Ministries; (vi) insufficient technical training of rangers and protected area staff; and (vii) inadequate government funding to maintain effective management of protected areas

Initiatives and Development Plans

National Council for Sustainable Development (NCSD) launched the Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN) Project in Cambodia in June 2019 with technical support from UNDP. The global financial gap for biodiversity conservation ranges from USD $100 to 400 billion annually. BIOFIN was initiated in response to the urgent global need to attract additional funding from possible sources, as a means of achieving global and national biodiversity objectives. If the forested ecosystems in Cambodia continue to diminish, Cambodia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could experience a 6.6% reduction by 2050 due to climate change, according to the NCSD. Cambodia is now exploring biodiversity financial solutions for sustainable development and to support the country in effectively achieving its national biodiversity and development objectives by 2050. Innovative financing mechanisms that are being tested in Cambodia include REDD+, Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES), and Conservation Trust Fund [6].

Goals and Ambitions

Leaders of the G7 nations have backed a coalition of about 60 countries that have already promised to conserve at least 30% of their land and oceans by 2030. Cambodia was the first Southeast Asian nation to have signed up to the goal

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Biodiversity / Cambodia | Interactive Country Fiches

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Biodiversity protection is highlighted in the Rectangular Strategy Phase III, and the National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018.

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land is filled with low mountains, plains, & rivers with some notable ones being the Kravanh (Cardamom) Mountains, Damrei (Elephant) Mountains, the Mekong River & the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) which are connected by the Sab River

The Tonle Sap is 1 of the world's richest sources of freshwater fish

a lot of the rivers are trade routes in which connect China with India and a lot of parts of Southeast Asia

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Head Of Government:

Prime Minister: Hun Manet

...(Show more)

Population:

(2023 est.) 16,493,000

...(Show more)

Form Of Government:

constitutional monarchy with two legislative houses (Senate [621]; National Assembly [125])

...(Show more)

Relief

Cambodia's landscape is characterized by a low-lying central alluvial plain that is surrounded by uplands and low mountains and includes the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and the upper reaches of the Mekong River delta. Extending outward from this central region are transitional plains, thinly forested and rising to elevations of about 650 feet (200 metres) above sea level. To the north the Cambodian plain abuts a sandstone escarpment, which forms a southward-facing cliff stretching more than 200 miles (320 km) from west to east and rising abruptly above the plain to heights of 600 to 1,800 feet (180 to 550 metres). This escarpment marks the southern limit of the Dangrek (Khmer: Dângrêk) Mountains. Flowing south through the country's eastern regions is the Mekong River. East of the Mekong the transitional plains gradually merge with the eastern highlands, a region of forested mountains and high plateaus that extend into Laos and Vietnam. In southwestern Cambodia two distinct upland blocks, the Krâvanh (Cardamom) Mountains and the Dâmrei (Elephant) Mountains, form another highland region that covers much of the land area between the Tonle Sap and the Gulf of Thailand. In this remote and largely uninhabited area, Mount Aôral, Cambodia's highest peak, rises to an elevation of 5,949 feet (1,813 metres). The southern coastal region adjoining the Gulf of Thailand is a narrow lowland strip, heavily wooded and sparsely populated, which is isolated from the central plain by the southwestern highlands.

Drainage

The two dominant hydrological features of Cambodia are the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. Rising in the Plateau of Tibet and emptying into the South China Sea, the Mekong enters Cambodia from Laos at the Khone Falls and flows generally southward to the border with Vietnam, a distance within Cambodia of approximately 315 miles (510 km). The Mekong is connected to the Tonle Sap by the Sab River. During the rainy season (mid-May to early October), the Mekong's enormous volume of water backs up into the Sab and flows up into the Tonle Sap 65 miles (105 km) to the northwest, expanding the lake's surface area from a dry-season minimum of 1,200 square miles (3,100 square km) to a rainy-season maximum of more than 3,000 square miles (7,800 square km). As the water level of the Mekong falls during the dry season, the process is reversed: water drains from the Tonle Sap back down into the Mekong, switching the direction of its flow. As a result of this annual phenomenon, the Tonle Sap is one of the world's richest sources of freshwater fish.

Soils

Most of Cambodia's soils are sandy and poor in nutrients. The so-called red-soil areas in the eastern part of the country, however, are suitable for commercial crops such as rubber and cotton. The annual flooding of the Mekong during the rainy season deposits a rich alluvial sediment that accounts for the fertility of the central plain and provides natural irrigation for rice cultivation.

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Cambodia | History, Map, Flag, Capital, Population, Language, & Facts

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Cambodia, country of the Indochinese mainland of Southeast Asia, bordered to the west and northwest by Thailand, to the northeast by Laos, to the east and southeast by Vietnam, and to the southwest by the Gulf of Thailand. The capital city is Phnom Penh.

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Demographics:

Capital of Cambodia is Phnom Penh, population of ~1.5 million

the current population of Cambodia is 17 million (2023)

Cambodia is ranked 73rd as the most populous countries

26.2% of the population lives in an urban setting

life expectancy = 71.46 years old

infant mortality rate = 19.3/1,000 births

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The current population of Cambodia is 17,023,953 as of Tuesday, December 12, 2023, based on Worldometer elaboration of the latest United Nations data ¹.

Cambodia 2023 population is estimated at 16,944,826 people at mid year.

Cambodia population is equivalent to 0.21% of the total world population.

Cambodia ranks number 73 in the list of countries (and dependencies) by population.

The population density in Cambodia is 96 per Km² (249 people per mi²).

The total land area is 176,520 Km2 (68,155 sq. miles)

26.2 % of the population is urban (4,445,360 people in 2023)

The median age in Cambodia is 27.1 years.

1. Updated on July 16, 2023 with the latest July 2023-July 2024 estimates from the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

-29,998

Notes

The Cambodia Population (Live) counter shows a continuously updated estimate of the current population of Cambodia delivered by Worldometer's RTS algorithm, which processes data collected from the United Nations Population Division.

The Population of Cambodia (1950 - 2023) chart plots the total population count as of July 1 of each year, from 1950 to 2023.

The Yearly Population Growth Rate chart plots the annual percentage changes in population registered on July 1 of each year, from 1951 to 2023. This value can differ from the Yearly % Change shown in the historical table, which shows the last year equivalent percentage change assuming homogeneous change in the preceding five year period.

Definitions

Year: as of July 1 of the year indicated.

Population: Overall total population (both sexes and all ages) in the country as of July 1 of the year indicated, as estimated by the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision . For forecasted years, the U.N. medium-fertility variant is used.

Read More Definitions...

Yearly % Change: For 2023: percentage change in total population over the last year (from July 1, 2022 to June 30 2023). For all other years: latest year annual percentage change equivalent assuming homogeneous change in the preceding five year period, calculated through reverse compounding.

Yearly Change: For 2023: absolute change in total population (increase or decrease in number of people) over the last year (from July 1, 2022 to June 30 2023). For all other years: average annual numerical change over the preceding five year period.

Migrants (net): The average annual number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants over the preceding five year period (running from July 1 to June 30 of the initial and final years), or subsequent five year period (for 2016 data). A negative number means that there are more emigrants than immigrants.

Median Age: age that divides the population into two numerically equal groups: half of the people are older than the median age indicated and half are younger. This parameter provides an indication of age distribution.

Fertility Rate: (Total Fertility Rate, or TFR), it is expressed as children per woman. It is calculated as the average number of children an average woman will have during her reproductive period (15 to 49 years old) based on the current fertility rates of every age group in the country, and assuming she is not subject to mortality.

Density (P/Km²): (Population Density) Population per square Kilometer (Km²).

Urban Pop % : Urban population as a percentage of total population.

Urban Population: Population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria used by each country.

Country's Share of World Pop: Total population in the country as a percentage of total World Population as of July 1 of the year indicated.

World Population: Total World Population as of July 1 of the year indicated.

Global Rank: Position held by Cambodia in the list of all countries worldwide ranked by population (from the highest population to the lowest population) as of July 1 of the year indicated.

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Cambodia Population (2023) - Worldometer

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Population of Cambodia: current, historical, and projected population, growth rate, immigration, median age, total fertility rate (TFR), population density, urbanization, urban population, country's share of world population, and global rank. Data tables, maps, charts, and live population clock

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Komodo Island, Komodo, West Manggarai Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia

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Komodo Island, Komodo, West Manggarai Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia

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Komodo Island, Komodo, West Manggarai Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia

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Komodo Island, as well as the island of Rinca (also in Indonesia) are the only two places in the world that provide a home to the Komodo Dragon. The Komodo Dragon is endemic to Indonesia.

Because of its high biodiversity and archipelago makeup, Indonesia is home to many endemic island-based species, many of which are endangered by climate change.

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Because of its equatorial location, Indonesia seasons are divided into two: monsoon and dry. While the country generally receives a lot of rain, Bogor in particular gets in immense amount with an annual rainfall of approx. 170 inches.

These monsoon and dry cycles are likely to become more unstable as the climate changes, making Indonesia's fresh water access more vulnerable.

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Siak, Siak Regency, Riau, Republic of Indonesia

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Palm Oil Plantation in Siak Regency, Indonesia

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Siak, Siak Regency, Riau, Republic of Indonesia

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Siak, Siak Regency, Riau, Republic of Indonesia

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200,000 hectares of palm plantations are planned to be reforested in Indonesia as the government have found them to illegally farmed lands.

https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/land-use-biodiversity/indonesia-says-200000-hectares-palm-plantations-be-made-forests-2023-11-01/

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Andrew Pounds Philippines Talanoa

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Home of the Suludnon tribe, a village of indigenous people, maintain and live in Iloilo. Iloilo is characterized by it's biodiversity. The Suludnon people have lived for centuries living in harmony with nature. Sustainable agriculture, a diverse range of crops, natural fertilizer, hand weeding, soil retention, and centuries of knowledge have enabled the Suludnon tribe to survive. They are so good at surviving that they can observe environmental changes to predict extreme weather events. Hit hard by Typhoon Haiyan, the Suludnon people have faced decreased crop yield ushered by plant diseases, pests, and extreme weather events. Without proper governmental support, the Suludnon people are struggling to maintain harvest and have begun to find other sources of income outside of their holistic agricultural practices. A gem of agricultural knowledge and a hot spot of biodiversity, Iloilo is among the most affected parts of the country.

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Mindanao is a heavily affected area of the Philippines as a result of climate change. Rising temperatures increase food insecurity among citizens who largely profit from cash-for-crops business. The increase of 1 degree celsius is known to decrease rice yields by 10%, a blow for the country's annual GDP. This struggle has brought about war and famine, as well as an increase in the urban workforce as women have been forced to find jobs in urban districts after the death of their husbands, enlistment, or other reasons. This poses women (and often their children) with many obstacles such as exploitation, trafficking, and isang gabi, isang salop, as the locals say; or, in other words, exchanging sexual favors for food. Mindanao is a suffering representation on how climate change affects human systems as scarcity drives conflict.

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Philippines - Sierra Madre Mountain Range

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Philippines - Sierra Madre Mountain Range

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Manila's water shortage has led the Filipino government to construct a dam in order to provide water for the capital's population. In their aspirations to curb water shortages, the Filipino government overlooks the indigenous Dumagat people living along the path of water flow the dam would take. Centuries of land use, sacred white marble rock formations, and a village of 5,000 people are in fear of being wiped out by the dam, compelling the Dumagat people to protest the dam. Again, while this may benefit the people of Manila, the dam is in violation of the Philippines own INDC's priority to protect biodiversity and indigenous communities. A cash compensation has been offered to the village in order to relocate, but the village has rejected the proposal.

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To combat the catastrophic drought in Manila, the Filipino government hopes to build a dam in these mountains, the Kaliwa dam. While this dam would benefit the people of Manila, there is an indigenous village down river from the dam that could be obliterated with the increased water flow the dam brings, as well as harming the agriculture in the area, and potentially flattening the landscape. The Philippines are a powerhouse of biodiversity, so while this will help mitigate drought, there's concern for the health of the biodiversity in the area.

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In the Capital Manila, Filipinos face water shortages. 13 million people face water insecurity. As an archipelagic country, the Philippines most valuable asset, water, is also it's most at risk resource in the country. To combat this water shortage, the Filipino government hopes to install a dam up river in the Sierra Madre Mountains.

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Jurong East Street 31, GoCycling @ Jurong Lake Gardens, Singapore

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(photo credit: Land Transport Authority)

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The Strait Times article “New cycling paths in 7 towns will be progressively completed from 2024: LTA” (published on Jan 12, 2023) details Singapore's expansion of cycling paths and supporting infrastructure. Above is an image from this article.

Seven towns in Singapore will have new cycling paths in their neighborhoods by 2024 as a part of a phased plan to expand cycling networks. The Land Transport Authority (LTA) has initiated plans for constructing around 55 km of new cycling paths in Geylang, Hougang, Kaki Bukit, Marine Parade, Potong Pasir, Sengkang, and Serangoon. These new paths are part of the LTA's plan to double the current cycling network from 530 km to 1,300 km by 2030. Moreover, this project will build additional supporting infrastructure, including bicycle parking facilities, bicycle crossings, wheeling ramps, and map boards.

Here is some history of Singapore’s LTA - In 2009, the LTA initiated efforts to enhance cycling infrastructure within housing estates through a S$43 million intra-town cycling program, starting with 5 HDB towns - Yishun, Tampines, Taman Jurong, Pasir Ris and Sembawang. Then in 2010, the LTA in collaboration with other agencies introduced the National Cycling Plan, a plan which incorporates the earlier program. This initiative aims to construct 700 km of cycling paths that include park connectors by 2030. This plan is developing intra-town cycling routes designed for reasons such as recreation, to shorten commutes, improve safety, and to reduce car emissions.

Here is more information about Singapore’s cycling paths:

How Singapore Is Building A Cycling Utopia | YouTube video by World Know More | Published on May 16, 2023

14.5km of new cycling paths completed in Ang Mo Kio, Bishan and Toa Payoh | The Strait Times article by Wallace Woon | Published on Oct 21, 2022

References

1. Woon, W. (2023). New cycling paths in 7 towns will be progressively completed from 2024: LTA. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/new-cycling-paths-in-7-towns-will-be-progressively-completed-from-2024-lta

2. Choo, C. (n.d.). The big read: Why Singapore has yet to become a cycling paradise - and it’s not just about the heat. TODAY. https://www.todayonline.com/big-read/big-read-why-singapore-has-yet-become-cycling-paradise-and-its-not-just-about-heat

* I chose this location of GoCycling, a bike rental shop, because it is right next to a cycling path.

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676 Woodlands Drive 71, Kampung Admiralty, Singapore

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This is a photo of Kampung Admiralty (sourced from: https://shorturl.at/gszS6). This multipurpose building is among Singapore's well-known green buildings.

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As stated in an article titled, “Heat Waves Become Singapore’s Scorching Reality” (published on July 26, 2023 by Climate Impacts Tracker Asia) during April and May 2023, Singapore was part of Southeast Asia’s “once-in-200 year” heat occurrences. Experts state that this “would have been ‘virtually impossible’ without human-caused climate change.”

A YouTube video titled “How Singapore Uses Science to Stay Cool” goes over Singapore’s innovation and engineering to combat the urban heat island effect.

As highlighted in “How Singapore Uses Science to Stay Cool”, integrating plant life helps cool cities. Vegetation lowers buildings’ carbon footprint, leading to cost savings for property owners on air conditioning and other energy costs. Furthermore, Singapore’s well-designed green buildings provide mental health benefits and continue to attract tourists. The endeavor to cover Singapore’s urban area with plants is part of their commitment to create a "Garden City." Outlined in its Green Plan 2030. This plan has set forth many ambitious environmental objectives. These include doubling the tree planting rate from 2020 to 2030, aiming for a minimum of 80% of buildings to be green, and establishing 200 hectares of green roofs by 2030. Additionally, Singapore is investing in a network of dense tree cover along streets, these trees will offer shade and moisture which will naturally cool the city's environment.

References:

1. Koons, E. (2023, July 20). Heat waves become Singapore’s scorching reality. Climate Impacts Tracker Asia. https://www.climateimpactstracker.com/heat-wave-singapore/

2. Dotto, C., Shveda, K., & Robinson, L. (2023, June 7). A “once-in-200 years” heat wave caught Southeast Asia off guard. climate change will make them more common. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/06/asia/southeast-asia-heat-wave-humidity-climate-intl-hnk-dst-scn-dg/index.html

3. YouTube. (2021a, March 17). How Singapore uses science to stay cool. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PM101DvvG4Q&t=344s

4. Our Targets. Singapore Green Plan 2030. (n.d.). https://www.greenplan.gov.sg/targets/

5. Relman, E. (2023, September 19). Why so many buildings in Singapore are covered in plants. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/why-buildings-in-singapore-covered-in-plants-government-incentives-2023-9

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“How Singapore is driving the city towards electric vehicles: vowing to phase out sales of internal combustion engine cars by 2030, its Green Plan aims to overhaul both private and public transport” is a South China Morning Post article (published on August 9, 2023). The image is from this article which goes over Singapore’s commitment to reduce emissions and promote sustainable transportation options while outlining some requirements to achieve these objectives.

Singapore promotes lower emitting vehicles through emissions standards. All new vehicles are mandated to adhere to minimum emission standards, which have undergone tighter restrictions over the years. Furthermore, existing vehicles on the roads are subject to regular inspections to ensure they do not emit excessive smoke, contributing to the efforts aimed at maintaining emissions within acceptable limits. One way the country promotes lower emitting vehicles is by encouraging the replacement of older, more polluting vehicles through their Early Turnover Scheme which has resulted in over 40,000 commercial diesel vehicles being replaced for “cleaner” vehicles.

Outlined in their Land Transport Master Plan 2040, Singapore’s goal is for 9 out of 10 peak-period journeys to be made using Walk-Cycle-Ride modes, which includes public and shared transport options such as taxis and private hire cars. Additionally, by 2040, the plan aims for 100% greener and “cleaner” energy-based public bus and taxi fleets.

Outlined in the Green Plan 2030, Singapore aims for all vehicles to run on “cleaner” energy sources by 2040. To achieve this, the country is working to facilitate the adoption of Electric Vehicles (EVs) through these approaches:

1. Vehicle Taxes and Incentives: Singapore has introduced several measures to incentivize the adoption of EVs. These measures include the EV Early Adoption Incentive, Vehicular Emissions Scheme, Additional Registration Fee (ARF) floor reduction, and revisions to the road tax framework for electric cars.

2. Regulations and Standards: The LTA oversees and regulates the safe use of EVs and EV charging in the country. Their EV charging standard, Technical Reference 25 (TR25), is regularly reviewed by representatives from industry, academia, and government agencies to meet best practices.

3. EV Charger Deployment: Singapore aims to install 60,000 EV charging points nationwide by 2030, with a distribution of 40,000 in public car parks and 20,000 in private premises.

In addition, Singapore is capping an increase on luxury vehicles through tax increases.

References:

1. Mengying, Z. (2023, August 9). How Singapore is transforming its transport infrastructure to support evs. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/country-reports/country-reports/topics/singapore-national-day-2023/article/3230343/how-singapore-driving-city-towards-electric-vehicles-vowing-phase-out-sales-internal-combustion?campaign=3230343&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

2. Clean air. MSE. (n.d.-a). https://www.mse.gov.sg/policies/clean-air

3. Early turnover scheme. LTA. (n.d.). https://onemotoring.lta.gov.sg/content/onemotoring/home/buying/vehicle-types-and-registrations/commercial-vehicle/early-turnover.html

4. Climate game changer. MSE. (n.d.-c). https://www.mse.gov.sg/policies/climate-change/climategamechanger

5. YouTube. (2019a, May 25). Land Transport master plan 2040 #LTMP2040. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3aKaM2Sui4k

6. Our Targets. Singapore Green Plan 2030. (n.d.). https://www.greenplan.gov.sg/targets/

7. Transport. National Climate Change Secretariat. (n.d.). https://www.nccs.gov.sg/singapores-climate-action/mitigation-efforts/transport/

8. Tan, Christopher. (2023, February 14). Budget 2023: Tax for higher-end cars to rise again; arf to go up from 220% to 320%. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/budget-2023-tax-for-higher-end-cars-to-rise-again

* I chose this location because it is where an EV charging station is.

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The Strait Times article “Budget 2023: Lessons from Covid-19 will help Singapore strengthen resilience against climate change” (published on Feb 14, 2023) mentions Singapore’s current pilot polder project.

Above is an image of the project underway at Pulau Tekong. I sourced this image from this article: Shoring Up Sustainability - Reshaping the Coastline of Pulau Tekong

Singapore’s first polder is currently being built on Pulau Tekong, Singapore's second largest island. A polder is a low-lying tract of land protected from the sea by structures known as dikes. Through a network of drainage canals and pumps, a polder regulates and controls water levels within its boundaries. This project is scheduled for completion by the end of 2024. It serves many purposes including to: protect the coastline as sea levels rise, lessen Singapore’s reliance on sand imports, and create more space for Singapore’s expected growing population.

As of June 2023, Singapore’s population reached 5.92 million, a 5% increase from the previous June. The country's population is projected to continue to rise to 6.9 million by 2030. This pilot polder project is part of Singapore’s solution for the increasing demand to accommodate more residential, working, and recreational spaces.

References:

1. Tan, C. (2023, February 17). Budget 2023: Lessons from covid-19 will help Singapore Strengthen Resilience Against Climate Change. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/budget-2023-lessons-from-covid-19-will-help-singapore-strengthen-resilience-against-climate-change

2. Shoring up sustainability - reshaping the coastline of Pulau tekong. CTRL Your Future, SHIFT Your Perspective. (n.d.). https://www.ctrlshift.gov.sg/stories/sustainability-reshaping-coastline-of-pulau-tekong/

3. Youjin, L. (n.d.). Explainer: Why sand is so highly valued and the controversy surrounding cross-border trade. TODAY. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/explainer-why-sand-so-highly-valued-and-consequences-overmining

4. Population in brief 2023: Key trends. National Population and Talent Division. (n.d.). https://www.population.gov.sg/media-centre/articles/population-in-brief-2023-key-trends/

5. Shoring up sustainability - reshaping the coastline of Pulau tekong. CTRL Your Future, SHIFT Your Perspective. (n.d.). https://www.ctrlshift.gov.sg/stories/sustainability-reshaping-coastline-of-pulau-tekong/

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The graphic is from an article in The Strait Times titled: “Singapore’s first urban fish farm in a container launched in Tampines” (published on Nov 20, 2023).

Singapore launched their first urban fish farm in a shipping container very recently on November 19, aiming to bolster local urban agriculture. This is part of the country’s “30 by 30” food target of generating 30% of its food supply domestically by 2030. It is located on Tampines Street 11 and is an effort in partnership with aquaculture company Aqualita Ecotechnology and Tampines Town Council. Within the container fish farm are Jade Perch, a fish delicacy. Jade Perch reaches market readiness at a weight between 500g to 600g which should take 4 to 6 months in the container fish farm. Notably, this container fish farm is 25% more productive compared to conventional fish farming methods. The Tampines Round Market and Food Centre Merchants’ Association will collaborate with local fish vendors to offer these fish, which can reach prices of up to $38 per kilogram.

Here is more information about Singapore’s food security:

30 by 30 Vision: Singapore's agritech sector nurtures food security | from GuideMeSingapore | Published on June 3, 2023

References:

1. Hong, L. (2023, November 20). Singapore’s first urban fish farm in a container launched in tampines. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/first-hdb-container-fish-farm-launched-in-tampines

2. 30 by 30. Our Food Future. (n.d.). https://www.ourfoodfuture.gov.sg/30by30/

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Jalan Tanpa Nama, Kariangau, Kec. Balikpapan Bar., Kota Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia

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Jalan Tanpa Nama, Kariangau, Kec. Balikpapan Bar., Kota Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia

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Jalan Tanpa Nama, Kariangau, Kec. Balikpapan Bar., Kota Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia

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The approximate location of the planned replacement capital, called Nunsantara.

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Indonesia's capital city of Jakarta, home to 30 million people, is sinking into the ocean.

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Climate Refugees from droughts and flooding are projected to increase dramatically.

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Climate change: The IPCC environmental warning India cannot ignore

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It is the world’s third largest carbon emitter, but hasn’t set a date for becoming carbon neutral.

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India is warming. It has had less rain overall each year, but more extreme rain events.

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As India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, said last year during remarks at the UN's COP 26 climate conference in Glasgow, Scotland: "For many developing countries, climate change is looming large over their existence. We have to take big steps today to save the world. This is the need of the hour."

From heat waves devastating crop yields to torrential rains causing flooding that submerges entire communities, India is experiencing some of the most extreme impacts of the climate crisis. While India comprises a little over 17% of the world's population, it produces just about 7% of global emissions.

Here are a few major ways climate change is affecting India.

There's no denying it: India is heating up. Between 1901 and 2018, temperatures rose by 1.3 degrees Fahrenheit (0.7 degrees Celsius).

Like many countries around the world, India is facing water security issues, and at the same time, widespread flooding.

India's agricultural sector relies on monsoon season. However, over the last century, there have been more days with extremely heavy rains with longer dry spells in between. This has heavily impacted India's central belt running from western Maharashtra State to the Bay of Bengal, which has seen extreme rainfall events increase threefold over the last 70 years, but has also had a decrease in total annual rainfall

The Himalayas, a long-time protector against drought in India, are at risk, too. A 2019 report predicted that at least one-third of the glaciers in the region will be gone Glacial melting as a result of rising temperatures has also exacerbated both flooding and drought, especially in agricultural mountain communities that rely on seasonal snowmelt

Flooding impacts India's urban areas, too. This fall, torrential rain flooded Bengaluru, known as India's Silicon Valley, where it disrupted water supplies and left many stranded in their homes. In some areas of the city, rapid urbanization and a lack of sustainable infrastructure is thought to have contributed to the flooding.

In 2005, 37 inches of rain hit Maharasthra state in under 24 hours, flooding the city of Mumbai and killing almost 900 people. The heavy rain was traced back to warming in the Arabian Sea, which is thought to have contributed to the moisture surge. In the past decade, flooding attributed to extreme rain events resulted in losses of approximately $3 billion each year.

As global temperatures rise, we will continue to see the country's poorest suffer the most as climate change destroys livelihoods and washes away communities. Last year, Cyclone Yaas left an estimated 150,000 homeless in eastern India after destroying at least 25,000 homes.

In India, approximately 70% of households rely on agriculture for their livelihoods but are "struggling with lower yields" attributed to "frequent droughts and lower rainfall." Farmers are severely impacted by these unpredictable weather patterns, which has caused many to move on to urban areas, where extreme heat can make outdoor work dangerous. These are just a few ways the climate crisis hits India's most vulnerable communities the hardest.

The good news is that there's still time to turn things around. But only if we act now. Here at Climate Reality, we are fighting to bring real solutions to communities all over the world, and with support from activists like you, we're catalyzing the bold climate action that our planet desperately needs.

You can get even more involved in our work to forge a just, sustainable future by joining one of our upcoming trainings and becoming a Climate Reality Leader. You'll join a global community with the skills and knowledge to take on the climate crisis - and win.
To stay connected with the fight for climate solutions around the world, sign up for our email activist list today.

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How the Climate Crisis is Impacting India

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As India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, said last year during remarks at the UN's COP 26 climate conference in Glasgow, Scotland: "For many developing countries, climate change is looming large over their existence. We have to take big steps today to save the world. This is the need of the hour."

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India is 4th globally for solar power capacity. India has a goal of 500 GW of energy by 2030 and has increased from 21.6 to 70 GW in the past 5 years. This is because of the Production Linked Incentive policy funding solar projects to reach India's goals.

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India's Solar Power Revolution: Leading the Way in Renewable E...

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In the domain of solar innovations, progress is both subtle and ground-breaking. From solar panels adorned with nanowires to windows that magically transform ligh...

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Modhera is the first village in India that is fully powered by renewable energy. It is the result of a project funded by the government of India and Gujarat.

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Gadvi Kailashben, a 42-year-old widow, lives in Modhera, home to the centuries-old Sun Temple and now the first village in India that runs on solar energy.

She earns a meagre income from agriculture which she uses to take care of her family. The Government has installed solar panels on her house which has given her much-needed relief from household expenses.

"Earlier, when solar was not there, I had to pay huge amount for the electricity bill - close to 2,000 rupees. However, with the installation of the solar, my electricity bill is now zero. Everything from the refrigerator to washing machine now runs on solar in my house. I am not paying even 1 rupee electricity bill now," said Ms. Kailashben.

"The extra money is now saved in my account. I use that money for daily house expenses, and for the education of my children," she added.

Renewable energy as an income source

Conversion to a clean, renewable energy source is not only enabling the villagers to run more electrical household gadgets to make life comfortable, without worrying about the electricity bill. It is also becoming a source of income for them.

Ashaben Mahendrabhai, 38, lives with her husband and two children. "We work in our farm and used to pay huge electricity bill for agriculture. Since solar installation in our village, we are now saving a lot of electricity. Earlier our electricity bill used to come around 2,000 rupees. Now it is in minus," she said.

With the electricity bill in minus, Ashaben is not only saving the money that she used to spend on electricity, but the excess electricity generated is sold back to the grid and she gets money in return.

"When the first time the project team came to us with the idea of solar, we didn't understand the concept, so we refused to get it installed. We were not literate to understand what solar energy was and had little knowledge about it. But slowly, the team made us understand the concept and the advantages of solar, how we will save electricity and money, then we got interested in it," she said.

Local farmers Pingalsinh Karsanbhai Gadhvi and Surajben Gadhvi, who are married, got solar rooftops installed on their house six months ago.

Pingalsinh Karsanbhai feels that this project has not only given them freedom from electricity bills, but the savings will hold them in good stead in old age.

"Earlier we used to get electricity bill of 3,000 rupees and after solar it is zero now. Now we are saving those 3,000 rupees every month," he said.

"These solar panels have benefited the entire village. All the institutions like schools, public institutions, all have benefited from the solar in the village. In my individual capacity I am saving 3,000 rupees. Now we don't require extra energy. The entire house runs on solar."

He exclaimed that " this saving is like a pension for our old age. We are really happy about it."

His wife Surajben was all smiles and eager to recommend it for other villages.

"If this solar is installed across the country it would be really advantageous. It feels like the Sun God is providing us energy through its light. This benefit that our Modhera village has got, should reach the entire country," she said.

Interacting with the villagers of Modhera during his visit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres hailed the efforts of the Government and the residents.

"Here where the Temple of Sun was built 1,000 years ago, there is a new Temple of Sun. It's based on solar energy. And the fact that solar energy is transforming the lives of the people of this village, making it more healthy, giving them more prosperity, but at the same time, contributing to rescue our planet from climate change that is still riding without control."

Inspiration from the Sun God

Home to the iconic Sun Temple of Gujarat, Modhera village is approximately 97 km from the city of Ahmedabad in the Mehsana district of Gujarat.

With the vision of powering the Sun Temple and the entire village through Sun God (solar energy), this project is the first of its kind, where rural residents are envisaged to be self-reliant through green energy.

"The idea behind this project is that since the Modhera temple is the Temple of the Sun God, so the entire energy of this town and community should come from solar energy," said Mamta Verma, Principal Secretary, Energy and Petrochemicals in the Government of Gujarat.

The Sun Temple now runs a 3D light show entirely on solar power, its premises run on solar energy and the parking area also boasts electric vehicle charging stations.

Renewable energy storage

Armed with a large array of solar panels on the rooftops of houses, on Government schools, bus stops, utility buildings, car parks and even the premises of the Sun Temple, Modhera benefits from the six-megawatt installed capacity power plant in nearby Sujjanpura village.

With the village consumption merely one to two megawatts, the excess is added to the transmission grid.

"There are three major components to this entire project. One is our ground mounted 6-megawatt project. The second is the 15-megawatt battery storage system and the third is the one-kilowatt rooftops installed on 1,300 houses," the Chief Project Officer of Gujarat Power Corporation Limited (GPCL), Rajendra Mistry, explained.

"Out of the 1,000 rooftops we have provided in the village, the electricity that comes out is first consumed by the people of the village, and the excess electricity is then given to the grid."

Funded by the Government of India and the Government of Gujarat, the estimated cost of the entire project is $9.7 million. What sets it apart is the fact that Modhera is also the first village to become a net renewable energy generator.

"This is the first village in India where even during the night, the energy consumed by the villagers comes from the solar component. That's the speciality of this project," said Vikalp Bhardwaj, Managing Director of Gujarat Power Corporation Limited.

Vision for the future

This demonstration project is expected to provide learning to resolve bottlenecks related to renewable energy. If the project proves to be economically viable, the plan is to replicate it in other rural areas in Gujarat.

Said Mr. Bhardwaj: "This kind of project acts as a demonstration project for other villages and towns in India. And similarly, the other villages and towns can adopt this model to become self-dependent, self-sufficient in the energy needs."

Modhera resident Ashaben Mahendrabhai summed up the benefits.

"I would encourage the other villages also to put solar as it is beneficial in all aspects, from saving money to saving electricity," she said.
POWERED BY THE SUN

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India's first solar-powered village promotes green energy, sustainability and self-reliance

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During his two-day visit to India this week, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited a model project site in Gujarat state, designated the country's first solar-powered village. He commended villagers there on the shift towards renewable energy, which he said is not only changing lives in the community, but also combating climate change.

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India is supporting the loss and damage fund and wants to see it open up at COP 28. Modi attended the World Climate Action Summit and pushed for Mission LiFE or a “lifestyle for the environment” and focusing on individual impact rather than large scale regulation which it doesn’t seem to include.

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Talanoa Dialogue of Brazil

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Talanoa Dialogue - United States by Ben Hatton

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Spain Talanoa Dialogue

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Valmeyer, Illinois was a farming community outside of St. Louis, Missouri with about 900 residents among 300 homes. It had just under 30 businesses, three churches, and a school. In 1993, the Mississippi River flooded and damaged about 90% of the buildings, both residential and commercial, beyond repair. It looked like the town was done for - the residents were going to have to find other places to live, destroying this very close community.

While the population dipped by several hundred following the floods, Valmeyer has become one of the most successful cases of managed retreat in the United States. Managed retreat in this context is when a community purposely and deliberately moves itself out of harm's way of climate caused calamities.

In Valmeyer’s case, they moved the whole town two miles east and 400 ft up.  Today the population of "New Valmeyer" is up to 1,300 and, while it took longer to rebuild the commercial success of the town, it is thriving. There are a lot of reasons that Valmeyer was successful where other communities were not.  However, a recent Grist article points to its success as an example that these sorts of programs can work with the right community and buy-in.

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brazil's initiatives includes fire prevention, promoting forest economies, combating conservation crimes, protecting urban environment, and more. Brazil aims to reach net zero emissions by 2050.

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February 10, 2023 "Addressing the climate crisis requires impactful global partnerships and Brazil will be a key partner in identifying and implementing

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According to Reuters, Brazil emitted 2.42 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in 2021. The major contributions to the greenhouse gas emissions is deforestation, energy production, and more.

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Brazil’s 2021 climate emissions highest since 2005, report says

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Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions rose more than 12% in 2021 largely due to surging deforestation in the Amazon rainforest under far-right President Jair Bolsonaro, a non-profit report said on Tuesday.

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Extreme weather events can occur in Brazil. Specifically in the state of Minas Gerais, heavy rains has caused many floods. Many deaths has occurred because of this. And it can also impact communities and agriculture. Many end up leaving the area which can impact the societal systems. Many indigenous communities are impacted as well.

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The Mediterranean region of Spain has already experience temperature rises around 1.5 degrees celsius, it is above the global average of 1.1 degrees celsius. Spain has plans to become carbon neutral by 2050. This ambitious goal will cost $53 billion and be a 10 year investment plan in which the country will work toward sourcing 74% of its energy from renewable sources such as wind and solar by 2030 and taking that percentage up to 100% by 2050. In hopes of achieving this goal, Spain plans to install at least 3,000 wind turbines and solar panel plants every year for the next decade. On top of that they plan to ban new licenses for fossil fuel drilling and fracking.

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Every year, the UN's climate action branch, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (most people go with "UNFCCC"), brings nearly 200 countries together for a Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting to talk about global efforts on climate and the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

But the path to this year's conference has been a particularly rocky one.

Brazil was awarded the event last fall but backed out just two months later, following the election of climate denier Jair Bolsonaro as president. Soon after, Chile, a rising global leader on climate action and renewables, stepped up to the plate.

Unrest has rocked the South American nation in recent months, however. Protests spurred at first by rising public transit prices have evolved into larger demonstrations about inequality and health care costs, leading Chile to make the difficult decision to pull out of hosting the international climate summit "to prioritize re-establishing public order," according to President Sebastián Piñera.

Chile's decision came a little more than a month before COP 25 was set to begin, creating an uncertain future for one of the globe's most important climate events. Luckily, a nation half a world away - and looking to raise its own climate ambitions - was willing to take the reins.

Just a day after Chile's decision, the UN announced that Spain would host COP 25 in Madrid - and it would stick to the original dates planned for the conference too, Dec. 2-13.

(While Madrid will host the talks, which are expected to draw around 20,000 delegates from around the world, Chile will retain control of them.)

Stepping up to host COP 25 is just the latest incident to show us that after a mixed start, Spain is growing into a true leader on climate. The country is feeling the effects of the climate crisis, and rather than bury its head in the sand like a certain major world power, it is rising to the occasion by promising some major changes in the years ahead.

Spain's Changing Climate

Like so many places around the world, Spain is getting warmer and drier because of the climate crisis.

The Mediterranean region of Spain has already warmed about 1.5 degrees Celsius - more than the global average of 1.1 degrees Celsius - since the Industrial Revolution. And according to a recent report from Mediterranean Experts on Climate and Environmental Change (MedECC), without urgent climate action, Spain and other Mediterranean countries are likely to see dramatic temperature increases in the decades to come.

"Without additional mitigation, regional temperature increase will be of 2.2°C in 2040, possibly exceeding 3.8°C in some regions in 2100," researchers found.

For crystal-clear context, if temperatures in the Mediterranean basin rise by 2 degrees Celsius, much of Spain and Southern Europe would have a climate similar to that of current North Africa.

For an already hot and dry area, this added heat could prove disastrous. Indeed, in what seemed like a preview amid this summer's intense European heat wave, Spain battled its worst wildfires in more than 20 years.

>> Learn more about how increases in average annual temperatures create conditions that dramatically elevate the risk and severity of forest fires. <<

Spanish summers are expected to warm more than winters, creating space for periods of excessively hot weather to become more frequent and more severe. Extreme heat waves leave people susceptible to all kinds of dangerous health impacts, including respiratory problems and even heat stroke.

This temperature rise is likely to happen at the same time as " a trend towards reduced rainfall in coming decades " - as much as 10-15 percent less precipitation if we see 2 degrees Celsius of global temperature rise - and an increased possibility of extreme drought.

This combination of rising temperatures and less and less rain may result in desertification of vast swaths of Spain, devastating agriculture. That includes two of the country's most celebrated (and profitable) exports: olives and wine.

Wine grapes are famously fickle. Higher temperatures are already forcing growers to pick earlier in the growing season to prevent sugar levels from skyrocketing. Looking forward, diminishing and unpredictable rainfall could make growing grapes at all in southern Spain difficult in the not-distant future.

This very real possibility has Spanish winemakers thinking differently about the road ahead. Case in point, one of the nation's most-renowned winemakers, Familia Torres, is already buying up land high in the Pyrenees Mountain foothills along the French border, "a zone whose consistently cool temperatures once made the area inhospitable to growing grapes" but where it's getting warmer because of climate change.

At the same time that parts of southern Spain are dramatically drying out, climate disruption could lead to severe flooding in other parts of the country, particularly its northern-most regions along the Bay of Biscay, because of increased severe storm activity.

The tourist-friendly nation also must contend with rising seas and destruction to its celebrated coastline. Already, in the north of Spain, " there's mounting soil erosion along the 5,978 kilometers (3,715 miles) of coast where 90 percent of all tourists spend their vacations."

How Spain is Taking Action

Luckily, Spain isn't sitting on the sidelines.

Seeing the havoc fossil fuel emissions are wreaking right now - and accepting the science of what they'll do in the future - Spain announced an ambitious plan earlier this year that would see it become carbon neutral by 2050.

The $53 billion, 10-year public investment plan would see Spain work toward sourcing 74 percent of its electricity from renewables like solar and wind by 2030 - and 100 percent by 2050. This would allow the nation to cut its dependence on imported energy by at least 15 percent over the next decade, saving $83.1 billion in fossil fuel costs over that same timeframe.

To achieve this goal, Spain will install at least 3,000 MW of wind and solar power capacity every year for the next 10 years, implement major energy efficiency measures, and ban new licenses for fossil fuel drilling and fracking wells.

And speaking of fossil fuels, Spain closed all of its unprofitable coal mines at the end of last year, as part of a directive from the European Union "in which deposits that no longer make money and receive public funds must stop production by Jan. 1, 2019." (The country still imports coal.)

Spain's government, in October 2018, also repealed a "sunshine tax" on the nation's solar consumers, removing what had been a major roadblock to home solar for many. And just last month, Spain was one of eight EU member states to call on the bloc to raise its carbon dioxide reduction target for 2030 from 40 percent to 55 percent.

>> Read more about the taxes, fees, and other dirty tricks some utilities and governments impose on renewable energy customers in an effort to prop up Big Polluter profits in our free e-book written with HGTV's Property Brothers host Jonathan Scott, Knowledge is Power. <<

What You Can Do

"Spain believes that multilateral climate action is a priority for both the UN and the EU, and one which demands the highest commitment from all of us," Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said on Twitter following the announcement that Spain would host COP 25.

He's exactly right - and that's why COP 25 is such a big deal. This year's event will show just how committed countries are to the emissions reduction goals they agreed to in the Paris Agreement. And what happens at COP 25 will prove pivotal to the future not just of the agreement, but international action on climate.

Stay up-to-date with the latest from COP 25 by following Climate Reality on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, and by joining the nearly 1 million digital activists around the world on our email list working for a clean energy future for all.

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Spain is Feeling the Impacts of the Climate Crisis - and it is Fighting Back

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Stepping up to host COP 25 is just the latest incident to show us that after a mixed start, Spain is growing into a true leader on climate.

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The Spanish government believes that the EU needs to accelerate the green transition to have a chance to face the next wave of global crises and to be able to effectively contribute to the fight against climate change. Spain believes the EU needs to take an initiative in creating more progressive climate action plans to ensure that global temperatures don't go above 1.5 degrees C. In order for true progress to be made, Spain believes that the power lies in legislation, and the adoption of regulations restricting emissions.

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As Spain experiences an increase in temperatures it can mean different things for the ecosystems that lie within the country. According to the IPCC, the tolerance of many ecosystems will be exceeded here in the 21st century. Ecosystems will experience changes in seasonal plant and animal behavior and some ecosystems will stop functioning properly because of shifts in weather patterns. In Catalonia, researchers have seen tree leaves unfolding 20 days earlier compared with their sprouting period of the past 50 years. Changes in ecosystems it is predicted can come through increases in plagues and disease as well as growing numbers of invasive species driving native species biodiversity down.

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Climate change is unequivocal and Spain is one of the most vulnerable countries within the EU. The consequences of global warming will bring about higher temperatures, average sea level rises and a reduction in water availability, among others. The consequences for the Spanish economy will vary depending on the sector analysed. Tourism, the construction sector and the insurance sector stand to lose if mitigation and adaptation are further delayed.

Spain's international commitments in the fight against climate change after the UNFCCC, and more so after ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, have spurred a host of institutional responses. These responses are depicted along with the key opportunities and challenges for the post Kyoto period.

Available cost estimates of climate change are presented. Mitigation and adaptation costs are also analysed, highlighting the preliminary nature of current studies and the need to broaden the knowledge of the economic costs of our actions.

Climate change can be loosely defined as the alteration in climate patterns. According to the UNFCCC[1] this phenomenon 'means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods' (UN, 1992, p. 3). The complexity of the climate system and the limitations in modelling imply that predictions are necessarily uncertain to an extent. There exists, however, a broad scientific consensus regarding the unequivocal warming of the earth. Global warming and its associated damages bring about the need to limit the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere in order to minimise the possibility of a dangerous interference with global climate stability. The EU's recommendation is to limit GHG concentrations in the atmosphere to 550ppm[2] and limit temperature increases to 2ºC, as global average temperature increases above this will most likely imply irreversible effects (Abanades García et al., 2007). The Stern Review states that this stabilisation target will imply allowing GHG emissions to peak in the next decade or two and then ensuring a decline in GHG emissions of between 1% and 3% per year.[3]

Climate change has both positive and negative consequences.[4] The developed countries located in the North might benefit from higher agricultural yields (harvesting plant varieties that had hitherto been unable to grow in colder areas), reduced heating demands and a reduction in the number of cold-related deaths, among others. These countries are nevertheless exposed to temperature increases and sea level rises that can alter ecosystems, human health and economic activities. Damages from climate change will not be evenly distributed among countries. Developing countries and some developed countries located in the South of Europe such as Spain will suffer the consequences of more severe and more frequent extreme weather events, reductions in rainfall, increases in heat-related illnesses and deaths plus the displacement or decline of certain economic activities. Eastern and Mediterranean Europe is expected to suffer more floods and more frequent and severe droughts (EEA, 2007). Overall, the greater the rise in temperatures the more severe the consequences of global warming will be.

The problem we face is a global one in need of broad and deep international agreements that take into account each country's responsibilities and damages. Countries will therefore have to make individual efforts to mitigate GHG emissions according to the principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities. Additionally, all countries will adapt to global warming to a greater or lesser extent depending on the damages caused to their territory and on their adaptation capabilities. This paper focuses on the causes and consequences of climate change in Spain as well as the actions taken and planned to mitigate and adapt to one of the greatest threats of the 21st century. The analysis will conclude with a presentation of the latest guidelines for the post-Kyoto negotiations.

Causes of Climate Change and the Main Consequences for Spain

In a nutshell, the process of anthropogenic climate change originates from human activities in the form of production, consumption and distribution processes and population growth. Human activity entails emitting greenhouse gases which trap heat, thus warming the Earth. In Spain, the main activities that contribute to GHG generation and accumulation in the atmosphere are mainly related to the production and use of energy, agriculture, stockbreeding and industrial activity. Graph 1 shows the breakdown of the main sectors' contributions to GHG emissions.

The main sectors that contribute to energy derived emissions are: electricity (24.04%), road transport (21.66%), industrial energy consumption (16.33%), residential uses (6%), oil refining (3%) and services (2.8%).

The consequences of climate change in Spain are being analysed by a growing number of institutions. To date, the most comprehensive study[5] is is the one developed by Moreno et al., (2005) and the following analysis draws on this assessment as well as on the IPCC's 4AR,[6] Martín Vide (2007), the EEA (2007), Abanades García et al., (2007), and others. The overall impact of climate change throughout the 21st century will be increasing temperatures and average sea level rises. Temperature increases will be more severe during the summer and inland. Rainfall trends are harder to predict, but both past trends and projections show a reduction in expected rain and lower water availability that will be discussed below. Temperature anomalies will become more common with more days reaching maximum temperatures. These tendencies will be exacerbated the higher the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere. Different ecosystems and activities will be affected in Spain. The main consequences can be summarised as follows:

Terrestrial Ecosystems
According to the IPCC (4AR), the resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded during the 21st century. Ecosystems will experience alterations in periodic and seasonal plant and animal behaviour (eg, birds will alter their migration habits). For example, in Spain, Catalonia has recorded tree leaves unfolding 20 days earlier compared with their sprouting period 50 years ago. The extent to which affected species will be able to adapt is uncertain. Changes in the interaction of species will take place and we can expect increases in plagues and invasive species which cause biodiversity losses (as invasive species can appropriate the niche of native species and thereby displace them). These effects will be more severe in previously vulnerable isolated areas and islands, among others. Given that preserving these ecosystems can run against the development of other economic activities (eg, preserving forests can run against land use planning decisions, for instance), the recommendations are to implement holistic management schemes in which competing interests are taken into account. The long-term follow-up of terrestrial ecosystems from a multidisciplinary stance is recommended, along with determining tolerance levels with regards to climate change.

The productivity of certain commercial varieties is expected to decline, especially boreal species. Additionally, species such as the jelly fish are expected to become more frequent, especially in Catalonia, Mar Menor and the Canary Islands. Both warmer sea temperatures and increases in organic nutrients in the water are suspected to favour this. Theeffects of having more jelly fish in our beaches are as yet impossible to know with any degree of certainty but the phenomenon is expected to reduce tourism in the affected areas. On a brighter note, subtropical species such as the marlin will increase, partly offsetting the decline in other species.

Data from the National Meteorology Institute depict a statistically significant decrease in winter rainfall in Spain (which is the main component of our rainfall according to Ayala Carcedo, 2004) in the last half of the XX century (see Graph 2).

The expected trend throughout the 21st century will entail a reduction in annual rainfall, particularly during the latter part of the century and during the spring. The area to be most affected will be the South-Eastern part of the Iberian Peninsula. This tendency is however reversed in the North-West, where rainfall is expected to increase. Reduced rainfall and droughts have already caused damage to the Spanish economy, costing over €3 billion in losses in 1999 (EEA, 2007).

The agricultural sector presents a mixed picture with higher agricultural yields, due to greater photosynthesis in the North of Spain, and reductions in agricultural yields in the South. For higher emission scenarios, however, Spain's agricultural yields are projected to exhibit significant reductions in most parts of our territory. According to EEA (2007), crop yields are expected to record reductions of between 15% and 30% for most parts of the country (see Map 2).

Renewable energies, such as onshore wind power, are cleaner (compared with oil or gas, for example) in terms of GHG emissions. No energy source, however, is free from problems. For instance, onshore wind power has faced opposition due to the impact on certain bird species such as the Griffon Vulture. According to experts from CSIC[7] the overall impact on birds from onshore wind power is of low to medium intensity compared with the number of deaths caused by road collisions, for example. This, however, seems unsurprising given the lower number of wind generators compared with the number of roads and their length in kilometres. The design of models to predict which areas are used by the most vulnerable species, plus the search for scientific consensus and action protocols to help decide which areas should be avoided when planning wind power installations, is paramount to minimise the opposition to this renewable energy source.

In Madrid, for instance, the data available from one of the weather stations in Navacerrada show a significant reduction in the number of days it snowed between the 1970s and the end of the last century. This will affect the quantity and the quality of snow and is therefore expected to lead to a reduction in this type of activity.

The peak tourist season might be altered and more tourists might arrive during shoulder seasons (spring and autumn) and during the low season. Potential droughts and water supply problems, especially on the Mediterranean coast, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands, plus flooding of coastal areas, might hinder growth in this sector and, unfortunately, risk and sensitivity maps are still part of our collective wishful thinking in planning tourist and urban infrastructures. Overall, however, the picture is mixed -as it has been for other areas of analysis- since the damages to more vulnerable areas might be partially offset by the development of other tourist destinations. Protected natural areas, the Northern part of Spain and different activities such as inland sports and river sports may become increasingly attractive for tourists.

In any case, under high-emission scenarios, compared to other European tourist destinations, greenhouse emission increases and their related consequences are expected to reduce Spain's attractive tourist profile in favour of Northern destinations. The PESETA project[9] estimates that high-emission scenarios will imply a worsening of tourist conditions for the last third of the present century. These would deteriorate from excellent (in red in Map 3 below), very good (in yellow) and good (in green) to mainly acceptable (in blue).
Table 2. Expected climate-related insurance losses

A changing climate for insurance (2004)Financial risks of Climate Change (2005)

Association of British Insurers (ABI) by Climate Risk Management in Cooperation with Metroeconomica

Assessed major property insurance markets and the major weather perils affecting these markets: US hurricane, Japanese typhoon andEuropean windstorm. Found that 2004 was the costliest year for typhoon damage in the last 100 years. By 2080 the following are estimated:* 65% increase in world-wide costs of major storms* 75% increase in costs of insured damage in a severe hurricane season in the US* 65% increase in costs of insured damage in a severe hurricane seasonin Japan* 5% increase in wind-related insured losses from extreme European storms

Sigma study on natural catastrophes and man-made disasters.Opportunities and risks of Climate Change

Swiss Re Group

Found that in 2004:* US$123bn total economic losses due to natural catastrophes and man-made disasters* US$120bn economic losses due to natural hazards* US$49bn insured losses

Annual Review: Natural Catastrophes 2004

Munich Re Group

Found that 2004:* Was most expensive natural-catastrophe year in insurance history to date.* US$145bn economic losses due to natural hazards* US$95bn economic losses due to wind storms* US$44bn insured losses

Climate Change and Insurance: An Agenda for Action in the United States

Allianz Group and WWF

Predicts climate change has the potential to significantly alter and intensify destructive weather patterns (US) with increased flooding, forest fires and storm damage. These changes could make insurance unaffordable for customers in high-risk areas

Source: EEA (2007), p. 43.

According to the EEA (2007), the development of information on the costs of climate change is still at an early stage and the figures presented below are likely to provide the lower bound estimates of the damages of global warming as many unquantifiable damages are left out of the analyses. This is due to the fact that accurately estimating the impacts of climate change is a complex endeavour. This is coupled with the difficulty in valuing these consequences in monetary terms, especially when non-use values, that can only be captured by stated preference techniques, are large. Simplified climate models and simplified 'impact relationships' lead to partial and uncertain outcomes. There are damages that are not adequately captured by the models, there is uncertainty about the exact damages and there may be losses that we are currently unable to predict. This wealth of limitations and uncertainties plus the different assumptions made by researchers might explain the disparity in the costs of climate change that are published in different academic and policy papers.

Tol (2005) reviewed the literature on estimates of the marginal damage costs of CO2 emissions and concluded that they are unlikely to exceed US$50/tC.[10] This figure contrasts with the Stern review that estimates the marginal damage of a ton of carbon at US$312/tC. The IPCC (2007) presents the figures for the social cost of carbon[11] to vary between US$-3 to US$95 per tonne of CO2 with an average value, among the peer-reviewed estimates analysed, of US$12. Differences in parameters and assumptions yield wide-ranging estimates and we are still far from a scientific consensus regarding the cost of emitting GHG. Regional differences in exposure to climate change and adaptation capabilities will imply damages are unevenly distributed and regional estimates are therefore vital in order to understand the full extent of the consequences of climate change for a given region.

At a global scale, the costs of inaction if temperatures rise above 2º-3ºC are expected to damage almost all countries. For rises in temperatures above 4ºC, global GDP losses are estimated at between 1% and 5% according to the IPCC. The costs of inaction on a global scale for the Stern review are significantly larger, causing an indefinite drop in global consumption ranging from 5% to 20% depending on the assumptions made. According to the Spanish Office for Climate Change, there are no overall cost estimates of climate change for Spain at present.[12]

Actions and the Cost of Actions for Spain

This subsection will present Spain's most noteworthy actions to limit GHG emissions, the main adaptation actions and the expected cost of these actions whenever the data is available. The potential impact of climate change as well as the preliminary costs presented above are a powerful call for action. Spain agreed to be part of the international efforts to curb global warming. This commitment was put forth through its membership of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was the first multilateral milestone in the fight against global warming, and though its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The KP was approved by the third Conference of Parties (COP) in 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005 after Russia's ratification in November 2004. At a global scale, the KP's goal is to reduce GHG emissions by 5.2% by the first commitment period (2008-12). As part of the EU bubble that agreed to reduce its GHG emissions by 8% of its 1990 emissions, Spain was allowed to increase its emissions by 15% for the first KP commitment period.

The evolution of GHG emissions in Spain from 1990 to 2006 shows a significant increase, well above its KP goal. The rise in GHG emissions has been coupled with an increase in economic growth. The trend in Spain's GHG emissions started to change in 2006 and a 4.1% decrease in GHG emissions was reported along with a drop in primary energy consumption of 1.3% despite a 3.9% increase in economic growth (MMA, 2007, and Nieto & Santamarta, 2007). Graph 2 illustrates historical emissions in Spain as percentage increases compared to 1990 as well as the goal to be achieved by Spain according to its KP commitments. Except for a decline in 1993, 1996 and 2006, GHG emissions have soared, reaching 48.1% above 1990 levels. Population and economic growth, an increasing energy demand and changing lifestyles have all contributed to this trend.

Spain's response to climate change has been articulated by multiple institutions. The former Ministry of the Environment was the institution in charge of developing and implementing climate change policies at the state level. Since March, the Ministry has been restructured. It now includes rural and marine environments within its competences at the central government level. The change has not altered the fact that nation-wide climate change policies will be dealt with by the Ministry. More specifically, the Spanish Office for Climate Change[13] is in charge of developing climate change policies and providing administrative and technical support for the National Climate Council.[14] The latter was established in 1992 to provide information about the potential effects of climate change in Spain, promote research in this area, provide policy guidance for the government on climate policies and develop the National Climate Plan. A further institution is the Coordination Commission for Climate Change Policies,[15] whose main task is to coordinate climate change initiatives between the central government and the autonomous communities (regions). Finally, the Inter-cabinet Group for Climate Change[16] was designed as a coordinating institution within the central government sphere. Its main task is to develop preparatory work for the government's delegate commission for economic affairs.[17]

According to the Spanish Office for Climate Change (OECC, Pers. Comm., 2008) there are currently no final estimates of the cost of mitigating or of adapting to global warming in Spain. The costs of the latter are only expected to be available once adaptation measures are well under way. On a global scale, the IPCC acknowledges 'much less information is available about the costs and effectiveness of adaptation measures than about mitigation measures' (IPCC, 2007, p. 56). In what follows the main initiatives to mitigate and adapt to climate change will be explored and cost estimates will be offered when available according to official data published by the institutions in charge of climate change policies or by academic research when appropriate. These estimates will depend on the assumptions made (eg, expected economic growth, emissions growth, the evolution of the energy sector, the discount rate used, the policy instruments used, etc.) and therefore figures should be taken with caution.

Mitigation will be more costly the higher the emission scenarios from which we decide to reduce emissions and the more stringent targets we set. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report estimates that the cost of reducing a tonne of CO2 equivalent ranges from slightly negative to US$100. A more wide-ranging summary of the costs of action under different stabilisation targets is provided in Table 3 below.
Table 3. IPCC's (2007) estimates on the costs of stabilising GHG concentrations
Source: Abanades García et al. (2007), p. 5.

Available cost estimates of mitigation for Spain (see Labandeira and Rodríguez, 2004) point to the efficiency of early and continued action versus delayed and sudden cuts in GHG emissions. In their simulation for Spain, using a static applied general equilibrium model, the above mentioned authors find that annual reductions in GHG emissions of less than 6% would imply drops in GDP of less than 0.5% yearly. Although the figure is significant, especially with the current economic outlook, it is judged to be manageable compared to more drastic cuts (eg, a 16% cut in annual GHG emissions leading to drops in GDP of over 1.6% yearly).

On a global scale, the cost of meeting the KP's goals in the first commitment period (2008-12) with emission-trading between Annex-B countries[18] will be lower than the range given by the previous IPCC report (the TAR), which expected GDP losses of between 0.1% and 1.1% in 2010. Other estimates endorsed by the Ministry of the Environment in the past estimated the cost of meeting Kyoto for Spain at between €500 million and €1,000 million annually. The cost of meeting our Kyoto Protocol target is significant, but less than 0.1% of Spain's then expected GDP for 2010 (Philp, 2004). There have, however, been higher estimates of up to €3,800 million annually (Carvajal et al., 2004).

Mitigation can be achieved both by internal measures (national GHG reduction measures plus the use of carbon sinks) and by the use of the KP's flexibility mechanisms (Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and Emissions Trading System). As described by Abanades García et al., (2007), along with the National Allocation Plan 2008-12, in which emission rights were assigned to those sectors allowed to participate in the ETS (ie, those that were contemplated in Directive 2003/87/CE), other measures are ongoing to ensure Spain meets its KP goal. The measures and emissions reduction targets include:

1. Using flexibility mechanisms by the government and the private sector. The government is expected to buy carbon credits in the global market to cover 31.8 MTCO2-eq per year. The private sector receives a limited amount of credits equal to 26.1 MTCO2-eq per annum.

2. Carbon sinks are an additional tool to meet our GHG reduction goals and are expected to be able to capture 5.8 MTCO2 -eq annually.

3. Using additional measures to limit GHG emissions from diffuse sectors which will mean reducing 37,6 MtCO2-eq annually.

4. Plan of Urgent Measures with over 80 actions aimed at further reducing Spain's emissions. These measures are expected to reduce our GHG emissions by up to 12.2MTCO2-eq per year

5. Autonomous communities are expected to further cooperate in implementing regional and local measures in order to meet our KP goal. The expected reduction of these measures is 15.03MTCO2-eq annually.

The Spanish Climate Change and Clean Energy Strategy[19](part of Spain's recently approved Sustainable Development Strategy) describes actions that are being implemented and planned plus indicators that will help monitor future progress. The strategy divides these actions into the climate change response and actions directed specifically towards promoting cleaner energy and improving energy efficiency. The main goals of this strategy include a further reduction of GHG emissions in order to help us achieve our KP targets, increasing carbon sinks and promoting R&D. Within the climate change actions being developed, the Spanish Climate Change and Clean Energy Strategy describes the main initiatives in energy consumption. These are summarised in Table 4.
Table 4. Examples of energy efficiency initiatives: goals, emission reductions and government investment
Source: MMA (2007).

In Spain the National Allocation Plan[22] (NAP) for the KP's first commitment period maintains the burden sharing effort between the sectors[23] that are allowed to participate in the ETS and the other sectors. The annual amount of emission permits assigned to the sectors allowed to participate in the ETS is equal to 152,673 million tonnes, which are allocated for free.[24] This implies a 16% reduction with regards to the previous NAP (2005-07). The main goal of the current NAP is to help achieve the KP objective, to preserve Spain's competitiveness and employment and to ensure economic and budgetary stability.

Within the remaining flexibility mechanisms, the CDM is considered a priority for Spain and particularly so in Latin America, where Spain is promoting projects to boost renewable energy development. Although the basic goal is to reduce GHG emissions within our national boundaries, the CDM is seen as an efficient facilitator to lead to a low carbon future and as a way of promoting growth in developing countries that host these projects. Table 5 below illustrates the main CDM programmes in which Spain is participating.
Table 5. CDM projects and carbon funds
Source: MMA (2007).

A further strategic area for Spain in the climate change challenge is its involvement in international cooperation projects. One of the most significant landmarks in this area was the development of the Latin American Network of Climate Change Offices[29] as well as the Latin American programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change.[30] The main goals of these initiatives have been to provide assistance in understanding the potential threats of climate change for Latin American countries as well as the development of strategies for dealing with it. Additional initiatives including bilateral climate change agreements included the Araucaria XXI programme to promote sustainable development in Latin America, reforestation projects in Latin America and Spanish cooperation programmes in the Mediterranean basin, among others.

With regards to multilateral aid, Spain has also contributed to projects designed to help developing countries adapt to climate change, foster technology transfer initiatives, help with the integration of developing countries in the global carbon markets and participate in CDM projects. Spain's efforts in this area have included the contribution of more than €9 million in various projects, including the Carbon Finance Assist initiative, the UNDP-UNEP initiative (mainly directed to African and Latin American countries), the Fund for Less Developed Countries and the Special Fund for Climate Change. According to the former Ministry of the Environment, an estimate of the overall cost of using the flexibility mechanisms will range from €445 million to €613 million per year.

Efficient actions towards limiting GHG emissions will also bring about ancillary benefits, that again are hard to quantify. These benefits might well partially offset some of the GHG mitigation costs (IPCC, 2007). Co-benefits include improvements in air quality, that will reduce respiratory diseases, the reduction in Spain's energy dependence, increases in competitiveness for those firms that innovate in the renewable energy sector and the creation of new employment niches. The agricultural sector and the tertiary sector are both expected to reap the economic opportunities brought about by an economy which is less carbon intensive.

Some climate change, as we have seen, is already under way. No matter how much we reduce GHG emissions in the future, we will suffer the damages resulting from past emissions, ie, from past inaction. Vulnerability to climate change depends on the level of exposure, sensitivity and adaptability (IPCC, 2007). Adaptation is a damage minimising strategy that has been used throughout human history, and more realistic projections include this behaviour in their analyses. Adaptation has come to the forefront of international climate talks and will remain among the higher priorities on the climate policy agenda as the consequences and damages of climate change become increasingly visible.

Global warming will hit poorer people the hardest, affecting those that are already under stress due to floods, droughts, food shortage and diseases, among others. Helping vulnerable people to adapt is an issue of inter- and intra-generational equity that is on the table.[31] As necessary and inevitable as adaptation strategies might be, they will not be able to cope with the consequences of unlimited GHG emissions. Designing a balanced and efficient mix of mitigation and adaptation efforts is therefore the best strategy to deal with global warming. Equity considerations in adaptation strategies are therefore of paramount importance. Asymmetric responsibilities in past emissions provide strong arguments to advocate for transferring funds from developed to developing countries.

Stern (2008) suggests that funds to ensure aid could be raised by auctioning emission permits rather than allocating them for free among polluters allowed to participate in ETS. Even though this might be attractive in theory (in that an approach that ensures that a polluter pays can serve to improve the industry's public image), the stakeholders' resistance and pressures might have to be overcome in order to implement this idea. Although cost estimates for adaptation remain very uncertain, the UNFCCC estimates the cost of adaptation for developing countries will be between US$28 billion and US$67 billion annually by 2030. The UNDP's estimates are higher, at around US$86 billion a year by 2015 ( ibid.). On a global scale the main recommendations in terms of adaptation according to the IPCC are summarised in Table 6 below along with the policy framework in which adaptation will have to be integrated and the main opportunities and barriers to implementation.

Spain is among the most vulnerable countries within the EU and therefore the following part of this subsection will briefly introduce the main areas and issues within Spain's adaptation strategy.

Spain's planned response to adaptation has been to develop the National Adaptation Plan. The main goals of our adaptation strategy include: to provide information and guidance; to design mechanisms to cope with change that is already under way; to gather information on regional and sector-wide impacts; to determine the most pressing needs in R&D; and to include all stakeholders in the information and decision-making framework plus to evaluate the measures implemented.

The main areas in which the adaptation plan is to thrive are biodiversity, the agricultural sector, water availability, coastal areas and marine ecosystems, forests and mountain areas, the fishing sector, transport, health, tourism, energy, the insurance sector and the building industry. These sectors are the same as those analysed earlier, on the impact of climate change for Spain and, once again, the main source in the development of our adaptation strategies is Moreno et al., (2005). A concise and insightful summary of the main adaptation strategies to be followed in Spain is presented by Abanades García et al., (2007). Accurate information on the assets at risk is lacking in many areas. Research and development efforts need to be decisively advanced. Valuation studies are still at an early stage and there is an increasing need for information if we want to allocate scarce funds optimally.
Table 6. IPCC's selected examples of adaptation strategies by sector

Sector Adaptation option/strategy Underlying policy framework Key constraints and opportunities to implementation

Infrastructure& settlement Including coastal zones
Relocation; seawalls and storm surge barriers; dune reinforcement; land acquisition and creation of marshlands/wetlands as buffer against sea level rise and flooding; protection of existing naturalbarriers

Standardsand regulations that integrate climate change considerations into design; land-use policies; building codes; insurance

Financial and technological barriers; availability of relocation space; integrated policies and management; synergies with sustainable development goals

Source: IPCC (2007), p. 57.

Ecosystems and biodiversity at risk are said to have limited adaptation capabilities and therefore the advice is to try to reduce the pressure exerted by activities such as construction, infrastructure development, livestock, water pollution, overfishing, etc. Designation of new protected areas plus ensuring there are enough resources to manage these areas is also recommended in order to increase ecosystem resilience.

Analysing adaptation options for water resources is considered essential for Spain. The main recommendation in order to adapt our water resources is to ensure we have adequate management systems that take into account climate change in their planning and implementation. Efficiency in the use of water and clear priority setting in the use of water resources are believed to be profitable long-term goals. For coastal areas such as the Cantabrian Sea and the Canary islands the main recommendation is to increase the weight of docks between 10% and 25% to ensure their stability. Additional measures would also entail considering vacating areas that will be flooded and building coastal defences as part of broader adaptation strategies.

With regards to agriculture, the main adaptive strategy is to tailor sowing, cultivation and harvesting to the new climate patterns. Stockbreeding is also seen as a threat to pastures and reducing its pressure to ensure higher quality grazing land is the main adaptation measure recommended in order to minimise damages. Fisheries are also expected to see declining catch numbers. Fishing businesses on the continental shelf are thus expected to take this into account in the future, diversifying their activity or relocating to other areas. Forests are also at risk of more frequent wildfires and the adaptation advice in this area is to avoid risky monocultures and to ensure adequate maintenance.

Health adaptation strategies should include early warning messages and prevention programmes for the Spanish population, especially those who are considered more vulnerable to climate-related diseases. Finally, other adaptation strategies for the energy sector, the tourism sector and the insurance industry are explored. The energy sector is encouraged to further increase its efficiency, reduce demand and promote renewable energy, provided the government encourages a stable and efficient regulatory framework. The Spanish tourism sector will inevitably see higher infrastructure deterioration in certain areas, a shift in seasonal visitors and a decrease in traditional tourist destinations and activities. To counteract this, civil engineering might alleviate infrastructure damages. Complementary services such as SPA's or funfairs can be encouraged as an artificial and less vulnerable alternative. The environmental impacts and stakeholder opposition to these artificial options might hinder their widespread implementation. The insurance sector is expected to adapt to more adverse weather conditions through increased preventive strategies, increases in risk premiums and possible reductions in the coverage of damages.

The main criticisms to our adaptation plan as well as to Spain's climate change strategy come from various stakeholders and NGOs. These agents believe that Spain's response is a somewhat vague and shallow attempt to face climate change. According to these groups, Spain's response is in need of more information, further specific measures and benchmarks against which achievements can be gauged. The specific measures suggested by these agents include: a long term and stable policy framework to ensure renewable energies are continuously incentivised; further promotion of public transport; a greater use of fiscal measures to 'green' production and consumption processes; the increasing the use of production standards; and ensuring climate policies permeate across all government departments. We still have a long way to go and future negotiations for the post-Kyoto era are not going to be easier.

Post-Kyoto: The New Global Deal
Sir Nicholas Stern has released a policy guidance paper in which the main challenges of the Post-Kyoto era are unravelled and advice for the Copenhagen Conference of Parties (COP15) is put forth (Stern, 2008). Future efforts in the quest for a stable climate are going to be greater than those required by the Kyoto Protocol. This endeavour is expected to be significant but the positive outlook provided is that it is achievable if action is taken now. The message that a greater effort is needed first from the developed countries but soon after from the developing countries is similar to that voiced by the IPCC in 2007 and by the Stern Review in 2006. Being prepared to face forthcoming commitments is paramount if we are to ensure a bearable climate system. The present subsection will present the main ideas discussed by Stern (2008) as well as the recommendations for Spain in the post-Kyoto era.

The relevance of a stable and strong policy framework that builds on the existing institutional setting is seen to lie at the heart of effective action in the climate-change arena. Achieving environmental goals in a cost-effective manner plus taking into account how actions and policies affect different groups of people is considered fundamental if we are to ensure we all walk towards a tolerable climate scenario. Stern estimates this will require greater cuts in emissions to limit GHG concentrations to a 'critical threshold' of 500ppm.

At a global scale, this more stringent target will require GHG emissions to be cut by 50% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. Developed countries are expected to reduce by 80% their GHG emissions by 2050, proving that decoupling growth and emissions is possible minimising harm to the former. This should be accompanied by wide-ranging technology transfers and the provision of adaptation funds for developing countries in order to provide them with adequate incentives to engage in GHG emission limits. Developing countries are expected to agree to binding emission cuts by 2020 if benefits of binding constraints outweigh the expected costs. These countries are to reap the benefits of CDM in terms of technology transfer and lower emission paths in the meantime. Additionally, sectors that are particularly exposed to international competition should face equivalent regulatory requirements in order to minimise carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns. On an individual basis, per capita emissions should be reduced drastically to 2 tonnes per capita. Note that Spain's per capita emissions were 9.59 tonnes per capita in 2006 (versus 11 tonnes per capita in the EU in 2006 and countries such as the US reaching 20-25 tonnes per capita) and that current KP commitments entail a reduction in per capita terms to 7 tonnes per capita (Nieto & Santamarta, 2007).

The policy mix that has been developed world-wide to face climate change is also examined by Stern (2008).[32] Little new advice is given and further expansion of the emission trading system to cover more sectors and countries is seen as the way ahead to ensure environmental goals are met, costs of meeting our commitments are minimised and developing countries can benefit from lower emission paths. Expanding the emission trading system could reduce costs by 70%. One of the major players in the climate challenge, the US, is showing an increasing interest in the use of cap and trade emission trading schemes. The presidential candidates support the future implementation of this market-based instrument and thus it is highly likely that we will see a US scheme in the near future.

Additional market mechanisms that put a price on carbon emissions and more traditional command and control policies are also considered in the mix. The weight and implementation of these tools will depend on the specific conditions of the country/sector analysed. International experience and success stories can help develop these tools in different settings. In order to send the correct signals to investors these tools are again expected to be implemented over the long run so that investors face stable policy frameworks and incentives. Spain is, according to MMA (2007), considering the further use of green fiscal policy measures but stakeholder resistance, coupled with the current economic outlook, might well delay or reduce the widespread development of this initiative.

On a more specific level, the report provides advice on halting deforestation. Biodiversity losses and deforestation are at present inextricably linked. Tropical rainforests hold a high percentage of the world's remaining biodiversity and act as a global carbon sink. Deforestation is furthermore acknowledged to potentially cause over 17% of GHG emissions world-wide. Halting deforestation seems to be an attractive strategy in the struggle against global warming. All efforts in this area are welcome, but the geographical location of forests brings equity issues again to the forefront of the analysis. Less developed countries hold a wealth of species and a high percentage of remaining forests. They also have access to these resources and incentives to reduce forest cover according to immiserisation and frontier model explanations (Hanley et al., 2001). In order to provide incentives to halt deforestation, Stern (2008) advocates an annual payment of US$15 billion and extending carbon trading to fully account for forest services. It seems that time to compensate developing countries for the opportunity cost of forest preservation is here to stay and this will mean a push for international initiatives such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).[33]

A further step towards a low carbon future is the development, adoption and diffusion of new technology. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is presented as one of the main future alternatives due to the increasing energy demand and the abundance of highly polluting coal. Safety concerns in terms of large-scale leakage and the current cost of capturing and storing carbon are the main concerns with this technology.

Renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and second generation bio fuels are considered to hold a great potential in the future global energy mix. Adequate incentives can ensure that countries like Spain retain a significant share of the renewable pie. Spain's climate makes it one of the best locations for investing in renewables. This value is demonstrated and captured by our energy companies who have thrived in this competitive field. We are the second-largest wind energy producer, with our energy companies leading the wind power market world-wide. Solar power is also a blooming business in Spain. In 2007 we were second in Europe in the use of solar power. These energy sources are believed to be able to reduce GHG emissions by 10GT by 2030. This is a significant amount given that in 2005 world-wide emissions were estimated at 45GT and the goal proposed by Stern (2008) is to emit 20GT by 2050 and to halve that figure in the following decades in order to stabilise GHG emissions.

The final milestone is the institutional setting in which the post-Kyoto agreement will develop. In the absence of a World Environmental Organisation, agreements will happen under the auspices and using the research potential of various institutions such as the UNFCCC, UNEP, the IPCC, the EEA, NGO's, universities, etc. The scope and depth of climate change could, however, lead to the development of an 'International Climate Change Organisation' (Stern, 2008). In any case, no matter the exact setting in which future climate plans thrive, the fundamental goal seems to be to ensure the provision of a stable, proactive, flexible and efficient setting for action.

IPCC experts agree that citizen involvement in all the above mentioned initiatives can contribute to meeting climate change goals (IPCC, 2007). For Spain, the good news in this area comes from the survey conducted by the Centre for Sociological Research ( CIS in its Spanish acronym) in November 2007. According to the results obtained in this survey the majority of the people in Spain would be willing to change their lifestyle and habits if this can help fight climate change. These changes may come from choosing energy providers with greater investments in renewables, walking and using bicycles for short distances, using public transport whenever this option is feasible, keeping car tyres properly inflated, buying energy efficient appliances, separating waste so it can be adequately recycled, buying local products, etc. Warm glow effects and other biases aside, whether these intentions are good predictors of behaviour remains to be seen especially if we have to pay extra for it. Further efforts to inform, involve people and remind us all of how we can contribute to climate change mitigation in our daily activities are, according to the available data, beneficial strategies in the medium and long term.

Climate change is unequivocal and existing scientific consensus points towards the need to curb global warming if we want to minimise the possibility of dangerous interference with the climate system. The currently available data point to broadly comparable estimates of costs and benefits of mitigation, but according to the IPCC we do not as of yet have unambiguous emission pathways for which benefits will outweigh costs. It is, however, important to note that the longer mitigation decisions are postponed, the higher the damages of climate change. Thus, minimising maximum losses will in all likelihood imply acting sooner rather than later.

Spain's geographical location and some of our most important economic activities, such as tourism and the building sector, are particularly sensitive to temperature increases, sea level rises and more frequent extreme weather events. Our international commitments in the fight against global warming plus our vulnerability are strong incentives to act. Mitigation strategies for Spain are seen not only as a liability but as an opportunity. These opportunities include reducing our energy dependence through our thriving renewable energy sector, reaping co-benefits through cleaner air and reduced health hazards, improving land use planning, etc.

Emission trends until 2006 have been coupled with economic growth and thus the gap between our KP commitment and our GHG emission reductions has grown. In order to close this gap Spain has developed and is implementing various measures within its national boundaries. Within Spain's Sustainable Development Strategy, Spain's Climate Change and Clean Energy Strategy was presented along with some of its salient measures and plans. These measures include, among others, the Action Plan for Energy Saving and Energy efficiency (E4), the Technical Building Code, the Plan for Renewable Energies and the promotion of carbon sinks through reforestation initiatives. Additionally, the use of KP's flexibility mechanisms, especially through the ETS and the CDM, are seen as vital in the quest for a low carbon future. The costs and benefits of the policies implemented are to date uncertain although the available figures have been provided by official estimates and academic publications.

Mitigation and adaptation strategies are complementary and choosing only one of them would come at a great cost for the environment and for socio-economic structures. Some climate change is, however, unavoidable and adaptation strategies are increasingly important in order to minimise the most damaging consequences of global warming. Spain should be particularly mindful of the developments in this area as it is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change within the EU. The advancement of the National Adaptation Plan is the first planned move in this area. Further analysis of the potential economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of these actions will help us engage in efficient strategies avoiding piecemeal and expensive maladaptation.

The remaining challenges are to effectively reduce GHG emissions, making sure there is a long term decoupling of Spain's economic growth and its emissions. Citizens seem, theoretically at least, willing to act. Incentives for firms, further R&D, stable policies securing our leadership in renewable energies and horizontal wholehearted involvement of institutions could be the way forward in the winding road to Spain's Kyoto goals.

Abanades García, J.C., et al., (2007), 'El cambio climático en España. Estado de situación. Documento resumen. Noviembre de 2007',
http://www.programaagua.org/secciones/cambio_climatico/pdf/ad_hoc_resumen.pdf.

Ayala-Carcedo, F. (2004), 'La realidad del cambio climático en España y sus principales impactos ecológicos y socioeconómicos',
http://ram.meteored.com/numero21/cambioclimatico.asp

Carvajal, A., J. Toribio & F. Arlandis (Dir.) (2004), 'Efectos de la aplicación del Protocolo de Kioto en la economía española', PriceWaterhouseCoopers España.

Convery, F.J., & L. Redmond (2004), 'Allocating Allowances in Transfrontier Emissions Trading - A Note on the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EETS)', Asociación Hispano Portuguesa de Economía de los Recursos Naturales y Ambientales (AERNA),Vigo.

EEA (2007), 'Climate Change: The Cost of Inaction and the Cost of Adaptation. Technical Report 13/2007', http://reports.eea.europa.eu/technical_report_2007_13/en/Tech_report_13_2007.pdf.

Hanley, N., et al., (2001), Introduction to Environmental Economics, Oxford University Press.

IPCC (2007), 'Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report', http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/ia_sec_8.pdf http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml http://www.cne.es/cne/doc/legislacion/RD1370_2006-PNA(1).pdf http://www.energias-renovables.com http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do http://www.ine.es/prensa/np486.pdf http://www.meteored.com/ram/1477/la-realidad-del-cambio-climtico-en-espaa-
y-sus-principales-impactos-ecolgicos-y-socioeconmicos/
Labandeira, X., & M. Rodríguez (2004), 'The Effects of a Sudden CO2 Reduction in Spain', Documento de Traballo, nr 0408.

Lázaro Touza, L. (2007), 'Climate Change: Cherry-picking Alarmists or Time to Eat at the Table?', ARI, nr 72/2007, Elcano Royal Institute,
https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_
CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/International+Economy/ARI+72-2007

Lázaro Touza, L. (2008), 'Climate Change: Policy Mix for a Brave New Kyoto?', ARI, 12/2008, Elcano Royal Institute, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_
CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/International+Economy/ARI12-2008

MMA (2006) Medio Ambiente en España 2006. Available on-line at: http://www.mma.es/secciones/info_estadistica_ambiental/estadisticas_info/
memorias/2006/pdf/mem06_3_1_1_cambioclimatico.pdf

MMA (2007), 'Estrategia española de cambio climático y energía limpia', http://www.mma.es/portal/secciones/cambio_climatico/documentacion_cc/
estrategia_cc/pdf/est_cc_energ_limp.pdf

MMA (2008), 'Primer barómetro CIS sobre medio ambiente. Los españoles están dispuestos a modificar sus hábitos para luchar contra el cambio climático', Ambienta, January, p. 42-47.

Martín Vide, J. (Coord.) (2007), Aspectos económicos del cambio climático en España, Estudios Caixa Catalunya, http://www.caixacatalunya.es/caixacat/es/ccpublic/particulars/publica/pdf/estudi04.pdf

Moreno, J.M. (Dir.) (2005), Evaluación Preliminar de los Impactos en España por Efecto del Cambio Climático. Proyecto ECCE - Informe Final, MMA and UCLM,
http://www.mma.es/portal/en/secciones/cambio_climatico/areas_tematicas/
impactos_cc/pdf/evaluacion_preliminar_impactos_completo_2.pdf

Nieto, J., & J. Santamarta, (2007), 'Evolución de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero en España 1990-2006', http://www.cincodias.com/5diasmedia/cincodias/media/200704/17/economia/
20070417cdscdseco_1.Pes.PDF.pdf

Pearce, D. (2004), 'Environmental Market Creation: Saviour or Oversell?', Portuguese Economic Journal, p. 115-144.

Philp, L. (2004), 'Pero, de verdad, ¿cuánto cuesta Kioto?', Ambienta, July, p. 26-33.

Rodríguez Ruiz, J., & A. Martínez Palacio (2008), 'Energía eólica marina: una solución a considerar para un abastecimiento energético sostenible', Ambienta, March, p. 52-55.

Stern, N., et al., (2006), 'Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change', http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate
_change/stern_review_report.cfm

Stern, N. (2008), 'Key Elements of a Global Deal on Climate Change', http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/climateNetwork/publications/KeyElements
OfAGlobalDeal_30Apr08.pdf

UN (1992), 'United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change', http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf

World Bank (2007), 'Carbon Finance for Sustainable Development'.

[1] UNFCCC is the acronym for United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

[2] Ppm means parts per million.

[3] For additional information see Lara Lázaro (2007), 'Climate Change: Cherry-picking Alarmists or Time to Eat at the Table?', ARI nr 72/2007, Elcano Royal Institute.

[4] For a limited temperature increase (2-3ºC).

[5] To the author's knowledge.

[6] IPCC (4AR) is the acronym for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report.

[7] CSIC is the Spanish acronym for Higher Scientific Research Centre.

[8] Data updated by Spain's National Statistics Institute (INE inits Spanish acronym) on 20 December 2007.

[9] The PESETA project is devoted to developing projections of the economic impact of climate change in sectors of Europe based on a bottom-up analysis.

[10] According to EEA (2007, p. 18), 1tC = 3.664tCO2, so a value of 100GBP/tC would be equivalent to GBP27/tCO2.

[11] Defined as the global discounted net economic damages of emitting GHG.

[12] Current references on the latest estimates, although partial and uncertain, are in http://www.ingurumena.ejgv.euskadi.net/r49-435/es/contenidos/nota_prensa/markandya/es_prensa/indice.html(for estimates of the cost of climate change in Bilbao) and the PESETA project (http://peseta.jrc.es/index.htm).

[13] The Spanish acronym is OECC ( Oficina Española de Cambio Climático).

[14] The Spanish acronym is CNC ( Consejo Nacional del Clima).

[15] The Spanish acronym is CCPCC ( Comisión de Coordinación de Políticas de Cambio Climático).

[16] The Spanish acronym is GICC ( Grupo Interministerial de Cambio Climático).

[17] For further information on the specific goals and tasks of the above institutions see www.mma.es.

[18] Which according to the KP include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the UK and the US (see http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf).

[19] Estrategia Española de Cambio Climático y Energía Limpia ( EECCEL).

[20] Not Available.

[21] According to Abanades García et al. (2007) thebreakdown of the contribution of the different energy sources to Spain's energy demand in 2006 was: 48.5% oil, 20.8% gas, 14.4% coal, 10.3% nuclear energy and 5.9% renewable energy.

[22] http://www.cne.es/cne/doc/legislacion/RD1370_2006-PNA(1).pdf.

[23] These currently include the refinery sector, iron and steel, cement and lime, ceramic industry, glass, paper and cardboard.

[24] This free allocation will apply in principle to all permits distributed. Auctioning may only be considered for those permits that are reserved to new entrants to the market.

[25] ADC is the acronym for Andean Development Corporation( CAF Corporación Andina de Fomento).

[26] LCI is the acronym for Latin American Carbon Initiative(ICC Iniciativa Iberoamericana de carbono).

[27] EIB is the acronym for European Investment Bank.

[28] EBRD is the acronym for European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

[29] Red Iberoamericanas de Cambio Climático.

[30] Programa Iberoamericano de Impactos, Vulnerabilidad y Adaptación al Cambio Climático.

[31] See IPCC (2007), Stern (2006) and the main conclusions and recommendations agreed at the Bali conference in December 2007 which resulted in the Bali Roadmap: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf.

[32] See, for example, Lara Lázaro (2008), 'Climate Change: Policy Mix for a Brave New Kyoto?', ARI nr 12/2008, Elcano Royal Institute.

[33] For an insightful analysis of market creation initiatives to preserve environmental assets see Pearce (2004).

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Climate Change in Spain: Friend and Foe-Causes, Consequences and Response- - Elcano Royal Institute

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Climate change is unequivocal and Spain is one of the most vulnerable countries within the EU. The consequences for the Spanish economy will vary depending on the sector analysed. Tourism, the construction sector and the insurance sector stand to lose if mitigation and adaptation are further delayed.

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Sustainable fishing is a major focus for Iceland since they have a large fishing industry. They follow the UN Code of Conduct that provides them with best practices and the Marine Research Institute does sampling throughout the year to monitor the marine life populations and determine safe fishing practices.

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Well Managed Fishers in Icelandic Waters

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Iceland is a unique example of a country moving towards almost 100% renewable energy. Due to the volcanic activity in the area, they have lots of geothermal activity to use for geothermal plants and they have lots of glaciers that help with renewable energy from water. They are also quite small and have a relatively agreeable government and people who have a common goal. They also had the pressure of increased energy costs that helped push them towards renewable energy.

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Spain is one of the EUs most affected countries by climate change. Spain is facing problems caused by climate change such as decreases in rain fall as well as extreme heat waves. In the region of Extremadura, annual rainfall has decreased by 35% in the last 50 years. The country also faces extreme desertification, 20% of the county's mainland has already be desertified and 74% of the remaining mainland faces desertification from things like the overexploitation of groundwater. The country is also responsible for 9% of the EU emissions and wants to incorporate plans to reduce that number.

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Spain, one of the EU countries most affected by the climate crisis, has a climate change law since 2021 and is quite advanced on renewable energy, but needs to do more.

Spaniards love jamón ibérico de bellota, a revered ham, but it could be scarce in the future or in an extreme case disappear because of climate change. Rising temperatures -last year was the hottest on record in Spain and the third driest- threaten a key part of the pigs' diet: acorns.

Spain is one of the EU countries expected to be affected the most by the climate crisis. Rainfall in the poor region of Extremadura, one of the main producers of ham, has fallen by around 35% in the past 50 years. Some 20% of mainland Spain is already desertified, due to climate change and human responsibility, such as overexploitation of water, particularly groundwater extraction, and 74% is at risk of desertification. The Doñana National Park in Andalucia, home to one of Europe's largest wetlands, is under threat from intensive farming.

Spain has many reservoirs to ensure the availability of water, a lot of which were built during the Franco regime (1939-75), but they rely on rainfall. The country experienced its longest-running drought in 2022 since records began in 1961, according to AEMET, the meteorological agency, although rain last December and part of January this year has improved the situation. The total water in reservoirs was at 51.3% of capacity at the end of January, up from 44.8% a year earlier but below the 10-year average of 57.8%. The reservoir at Buendía, one of the biggest, a village where I have a house, is at 24% capacity.

The country emits around 0.8% of the world's greenhouse gases and accounts for 9% of the EU's gases (the sixth-largest emitter). Spain's per capita carbon dioxide emissions peaked at 8.47 tonnes in 2005 and dropped to 4.92 tonnes in 2021, as measures to combat climate change began to bite and the country became more environmentally conscious (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions, 2005 and 2021, selected countries (1)
Spain, after Portugal, is the most worried among EU countries about the impact of climate change, a concern that has topped Spaniards' foreign policy priorities since 2017, ahead for example, of aid for developing countries, according to Elcano's barometers, although worry over energy security is rising following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

It took Spain 10 years to adopt its first Climate Change and Energy Transition Law, which Parliament finally approved in May 2021.

This commits the country to cut emissions by at least 23% by 2030 compared with 1990 levels (see Figure 2). The law requires companies, banks and other firms to present an annual report on exposure to climate risks as well as on measures to arrest them, and the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge (MITECO) is charged with producing a report every five years on risks, policies and measures.
Figure 2. Highlights of Spain's climate law
The Popular Party (PP) and the hard-right populist VOX are contesting the prohibition of fossil-fuel production, and the creation of low emission zones in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants was not achieved on time. The Housing Law is currently under negotiations in parliament.

Spain has significantly moved from fossil fuels and is already quite advanced in the use of renewable energy. Just over 40% of electricity was generated in 2022 by renewable energy sources, the largest part being wind power. Spain has Europe's second-largest installed wind power (1,265 wind farms in 2021) after Germany and the fifth in the world. Spain's share of total renewables in electricity production was the ninth largest in the world in 2021 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Share of renewables in generation of electricity in 2021 (%)
Iberia's abundance of sunshine and wind also looks set to be a blessing for the wider EU. Spain, Portugal and France agreed last December to move ahead with a sub-sea hydrogen pipeline connecting Barcelona with Marseilles, which is expected to be operational by 2030. Germany joined the project in January. Green hydrogen is created using electrolysers that are powered by renewable energy. France wants to use the pipeline to transport red hydrogen made from nuclear energy in the opposite direction. But it needs to overcome resistance to including red hydrogen in the EU's renewable energy targets, which focus on green hydrogen.

Not everyone in Spain is happy at the pace of the ecological transition, particularly in what is known as the 'empty Spain', rural areas with very low population densities, such as Soria, where giant wind turbines and vast solar panels dominate the skyline. The film Alcarràs about how a solar park uproots and divides a family that has farmed for generations growing peaches in Catalonia was a box office hit in 2022 and won the Berlin International Film Festival's Golden Bear award, while As Bestas, about a conflict over wind power, won the Goya award in Spain.

All political parties, to varying degrees, believe Spain needs to do more to combat climate change except VOX, 10.2% of whose voters, according to a survey published last month by OIKOS, say the government is doing too much. The results of the survey showed two very different approaches to the problem among the right- and left-wing parties, but there is some room for consensus stemming from the alternative policies.

Broadly speaking, the PP, Ciudadanos (Cs) and VOX want a gradual, flexible and ordered approach, respecting the free market, while the hard-left Unidas Podemos (UP), the junior partner in the minority Socialist-led government, prefers more drastic measures and greater state control of the economy (see Figures 4 and 5).
Figure 4. Environmental policies should be used to promote the market economy and business competition (%) Figure 5. Environmental policies should be used to promote social justice, spur equality policies and increase public spending (%)
As with so many other issues, the very polarised and aggressive political climate does not make for the kind of consensus needed for a successful ecological transition. One can only hope this changes; otherwise, the worst fears of pig farmers might come true, which would be a dark day and not just for Iberian ham lovers.

Image: Drought in the Doñana marshes, natural park in southern Spain. Photo: Mikirabba (Wikimedia Commons-CC BY-SA 4.0).

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Spain to be hard hit by climate change - Elcano Royal Institute

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Spain, one of the EU countries most affected by the climate crisis, is quite advanced on renewable energy, but needs to do more.

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Starting in 2002, Iceland started looking at geothermal energy as a possible renewable and sustainable energy source for the country. They have one of the worlds largest geothermal power plants in Hengill, Iceland.

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Hellisheidi geothermal power plant is located at Hengil, Iceland. Credit: ThinkGeoEnergy/Wikipedia.

The Hellisheidi power plant produces approximately 303MW of electricity and 400MW of thermal energy. Credit: Ron Przysucha/Wikipedia.

Steam at Hellisheidi plant is currently gathered from more than 300 boreholes. Credit: Ron Przysucha/Wikipedia

Iceland's Hellisheidi geothermal power plant is one of the world's ten biggest geothermal power plants. It is a flash steam combined heat and power (CHP) plant that generates 303MW of electricity and 400MW of thermal energy.

The plant is located at Hengill, approximately 11km away from the existing Nesjavellir geothermal power station in southwest Iceland.

The plant was commissioned in five phases, from 2006 to 2011 and is owned and operated by Orkuveita Reykjavíkur. The Hellisheidi geothermal power plant is scheduled to achieve 133MWth by 2030.

The plant's power output is primarily supplied to the aluminium refineries in the capital city of Reykjavik, which is located 20km west of Hellisheidi.

A major carbon capture and storage (CCS) project, Orca, began operating at the Hellisheidi geothermal power plant site in September 2021. Claimed to be the world's biggest direct air CCS plant, Orca utilises geothermal energy generated by the Hellisheidi facility to perform CCS operations.

Hellisheidi power plant development

Orkuveita Reykjavikur decided to build the geothermal power plant in 2002, based on the conclusions of research drilling that was completed in 2001. The first phase of the project included the installation of two high-pressure 45MW turbines and commenced production in 2006. A low-pressure steam turbine of 33MW capacity was added to the plant in 2007 as part of the second phase of development.

The third phase, commissioned in 2008, involved the installation of two more high-pressure turbines of 45MW capacity each. Steam from Skarðsmýrarfjall Mountain is used for the power generation of the third phase.

The geothermal plant started producing hot water in its fourth phase of development, which was completed in 2010. A hot water main pipeline for district heating purposes was also installed in this phase.

The fifth stage comprised the installation of two 45MW turbines in 2011. As part of the sixth stage expansion, four production wells were connected in 2015.

The plant was further expanded to 200MWth in 2018 as part of phase seven. Another 133MWth expansion (phase eight) is scheduled for 2030.

Hellisheidi power plant makeup

The Hellisheidi geothermal power plant was developed in an area of 13,000m² (139,930.8ft²) near Mount Hengill in the Hengill geothermal area, one of the largest high-temperature geothermal fields in Iceland, which covers an area of 110km². Power is generated using a combination of six high-pressure turbines and one low-pressure steam turbine.

Hot fluid is extracted from 44 production wells, ranging from 1,000m to 2,200m. A total of 17 reinjection wells were also drilled. The extracted fluid passes through steam and mist separators. The separated hot steam propels the turbines for electricity generation. The plant uses about 500kg/s of geothermal steam at 180°C to produce electricity.

The electrical system of each generating unit of the power station comprises a 50MVA generator, 50MVA/220kV step-up transformer and 11/11 kV transformer for connection to the 11kV station service system.

The generated power is transmitted to a national grid substation located 1km away from the power plant.

Hellisheidi hot water production and supply

Fresh groundwater is heated to 50°C using the steam from the turbines. The water is heated again by heat exchange up to 83°C.

The reheated water is pumped to a 950m³ capacity hot water storage tank at the plant site through a 1m-wide and 360m-long pipe. The hot water is further supplied to the city of Reykjavík through a 19.5km-long pre-insulated underground pipeline with a diameter of 0.9m to 1m.

Construction of the Hellisheidi hot water main pipeline started in 2008. The pipeline was brought into service towards the end of 2010 and has a maximum flow rate of 2,250l/s.

Hellisheidi cold water production and supply

Three 500kW submersible pumps are installed, along with power transformers and 11kV switchgear. Each pump has a capacity of 160l/s with a depth of 120m.

Cold water is extracted from a depth of 120m and directed into heat exchangers, where it is warmed to temperatures between 83°C and 93°C as required. The system currently has a combined capacity of 303MWe and 200MWth.

The drainage pipes underwent a few modifications to comply with water protection regulations. As the expansion was originally planned during the construction of the first phase, the plant's structure was not required to be expanded.

Contractors and suppliers involved in the Hellisheidi power project

The Hellisheidi power plant design and construction contract was awarded to Mannvit Engineering.

Verkís Engineering was awarded the design and construction contract for the Hellisheidi hot water main pipeline.

Mitsubishi supplied six 45MW high-pressure steam turbines while Toshiba provided one 33MW low-pressure steam turbine for the power plant.

The counter-flow wet used at the power plant was supplied by SPX Cooling Technologies. Siemens supplied a control and protection system for the power plant.

Orca CCS plant details

The Orca CCS facility, located adjacent to the Hellisheidi geothermal power plant, captures carbon dioxide (CO₂) directly from the air and stores it permanently as rocks in the earth's crust.

The Orca carbon capture plant was developed and is operated by Climeworks, a direct air CO₂ capture technology company based in Switzerland.

Icelandic company Carbfix is responsible for mixing the air-captured CO₂ with water and pumping it deep underground for natural mineralisation and permanent storage in the form of rocks.

Construction works on the Orca project started in May 2020 and the CCS facility commenced operations in September 2021.

The carbon capture plant uses a modular system and is made up of eight stackable CO₂ collector units, each of which can capture 500t of CO₂ a year.

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Hellisheidi Geothermal Power Plant, Hengill, Iceland

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The Hellisheidi geothermal power plant in Iceland is a flash steam CHP plant that generates 303MW of electricity and 400MW of thermal energy.

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Iceland has invested in the construction of carbon capture and storage plants. These plants use a carbon storage method called carbfix. This method takes carbon emissions from the air and stores them in the earth. It is not possible in all areas of the works because it utilizes and lot of water and porous basaltic rock. These are very abundant in Iceland, but not is most of the world. This process helps reduce emissions, but is not the only solution that the country is focused on.

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Named for the Icelandic word 'orka' meaning 'energy', the plant combines the capture of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere, facilitated by the Swiss start-up Climeworks AG, and its storage deep underground by the Icelandic start-up CarbFix, led by CEO Dr Edda Sif Aradóttir (pictured).

As the UNESCO Science Report (2021) explains, this process relies on research published in 2016, when scientists from Australia, Denmark, France, Iceland, the UK and USA reported a successful attempt to dispose of CO2 permanently as environmentally benign carbonate minerals in subsurface basaltic rocks (Matter et al., 2016). Within two years, 95% of the anthropogenic CO2 injected in a storage formation was mineralized, contradicting the prevailing view that such a process would take up to 1 000 years (Hertig et al., 2021; Box 11.2).

The report relates how the successful pilot project was run at the CarbFix injection site near Reykjavik. Massive volumes of 'sour gas' emissions containing high levels of contaminants such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulphide were captured after being released together with geothermal fluids from the Hellisheidi power plant. These emissions were then mixed with water and pumped back from whence they came.

This technique has since become commonplace. The CarbFix method is used to clean and store underground one-third of the annual 40 000 tonnes of CO2 flowing through gas turbines. Through the same process, two-thirds of the released hydrogen sulphide are also safely deposited in the subsurface.

CarbFix will not solve the world's problem of greenhouse gas emissions, of course. One severe limitation of the method described above is the need for substantial quantities of water and the presence of porous basaltic rock. Both are widely available on the continental margins, such as in Iceland and the Pacific Northwest of the USA, but are rare or absent in other parts of the world.

The cost of carbon capture and storage is another barrier. The Orca plant cost US$ 10-15 million to build and could draw down 4 000 tonnes of CO2 each year when operating at full capacity. To put that number into context, this is equivalent to the emissions from about 870 cars, according to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

Climeworks aims to reach a carbon offset purchase price of $200-300 per tonne of CO2 by 2030 and $100 to $200 by the mid-2030s, once fully operational (Sigurdardottir and Rathi, 2021). With European carbon prices at about US$ 50 per ton of CO2 equivalent under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme , the penalty for emitting could soon exceed the cost of carbon capture.

Progress in this field will call for a close partnership between science, technology and industry. CarbFix itself is the brainchild of four institutions: Reykjavik Energy, the University of Iceland, the National Centre for Scientific Research in Toulouse (France) and Columbia University (USA).

Despite these advances, the high-tech industry of carbon capture and storage is still in its infancy. All of the pathways defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for limiting global warming to 1.5°C rely on technological advances in CO2 removal from the atmosphere to augment the natural process of carbon sequestration (IPCC, 2018). However, research output on carbon capture and storage has one of the lowest growth rates (6% between 2011 and 2019) among 56 sustainability topics studied by UNESCO, with a mere 2 501 publications on this topic produced around the world in 2019 (Straza and Schneegans, 2021).

Output by Icelandic researchers on carbon capture and storage has even declined slightly, from 21 publications over 2012-2015 to 16 publications over 2016-2019, according to original research by UNESCO.

As the UNESCO Science Report (2021) observes, Iceland plans to become carbon-neutral by 2040. It has a high carbon tax and provides its population with virtually carbon-free electricity and heating from its vast geothermal and hydro-electric resources. The government plans to take this logic a step farther by raising the existing carbon tax by 10% annually and banning (new) diesel and gasoline cars after 2030 (Hertig, 2021).

Norway's carbon tax is also among the highest in the world. Norway plans to meet its goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2030 by expanding electrification of road transportation - no other country has more electric cars on the road - and making 'climate, environment and clean energy' one of four long-term research priorities, among other measures. With its current plans to intensify oil exploitation in the North Sea, the strategy of offsetting 40% of its greenhouse gas emissions through the procurement of carbon credits, as permitted under the Paris Agreement, will not suffice. The country will also need to invest massively in compensatory mechanisms like carbon capture and storage (Hertig, 2021).

The Norwegian state enterprise Gassnova is working closely with industry to demonstrate that carbon capture and storage can be done safely on a large scale (Hertig, 2021; Box 11.1). Norwegian output on this topic is consequential, even if it has dropped slightly from 533 (2012-2015) to 470 (2016-2019) publications. It ranked seventh worldwide in terms of volume over 2016-2019.

The USA produces the most publications on carbon capture and storage but its own publications have declined from 2 507 (2012-2015) to 2 098 (2016-2019). Output has also been declining in five of the other top ten countries for this topic, namely Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. High-income countries' dominance of research on carbon capture and storage is waning, as upper middle-income countries like China develop this technology (see figure). China is even poised to take the lead, its publications in this field having surged from 1 300 (2012 2015) to 2 049 (2016-2019) [Straza and Schneegans, 2021].

Switzerland has boosted its own output on this topic by 45% from 128 (2012-2015) to 185 (2016-2019) publications. Over 2016-2019, Switzerland accounted for 2% of global output on carbon capture and storage, compared to 0.2% for Iceland and 5.1% for Norway (Straza and Schneegans, 2021).

In August 2019, the Swiss government revised its target for carbon neutrality to 2050. Hertig (2021) observed that, 'should the Swiss adopt the 2050 target for carbon neutrality in a popular initiative... parliament will be required to adopt the requisite measures to reach this target, such as by expanding the existing incentive tax on thermal fuels to include motor fuels'. In June 2021, the Swiss population voted by a slim majority (51.6%) to reject the CO2 law.

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Carbon capture and storage plant becomes operational in Iceland

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Lauded as the world's largest operational system for carbon capture and storage, the Orca plant in Iceland has been up and running since 8 September 2021.

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Iceland has increased funding for their climate initiatives significantly in the last couple years. They plant to reduce their emissions by 30-40% by 2030. They plan to do this with a verity of incentive programs and changes to transportation, habitat restoration projects, energy production changes and sustainable agriculture initiatives.

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Here is the Talonoa Dialouge I wrote for Brazil referencing its NDC.

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Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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This article explains how climate finance works in Brazil focusing particularly on agriculture.

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Climate finance is crucial for the transition to a low-carbon economy, as it allows financial flows to be geared towards mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapting to the impacts of climate change. However, climate finance faces significant challenges, such as mobilizing sufficient resources to meet agreed-upon climate targets, prioritizing resource allocation, and effectively and transparently distributing funds.

In Brazil, activities related to land use play a central role in decarbonizing the economy, as agriculture and deforestation together account for almost three quarters of the country's GHG emissions (SEEG 2021). As such, finance strategies must be developed to promote a transition to low-carbon agriculture and forest protection, increase climate resilience, reduce socio-economic vulnerabilities, and support activities compatible with the preservation of forests and their inhabitants.

To understand climate finance for land use in Brazil, researchers from the Climate Policy Initiative/Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (CPI/PUC-Rio) conducted an unprecedented tracking exercise to quantify the financial flows directed towards agriculture and forest in alignment with climate goals. This work identifies the amounts allocated from public and private sources of finance, both domestic and international. It also specifies the disbursement channels and financial instruments used, the sectors financed, and climate objectives. As such, this report provides a baseline for characterizing financial flows that contribute to land-use-related climate mitigation and adaptation for the period 2015 to 2020.

In addition to a quantitative overview of climate flows, another relevant contribution of this work is the development of a methodology to characterize climate finance in Brazil and identify land use practices, technologies, sectors, and activities aligned with mitigation and adaptation objectives. This approach is based on CPI's international experience in tracking climate finance flows globally since 2011, by means of the Global Landscape of Climate Finance (Buchner et al. 2021). This methodology has been adapted to the specificities of the Brazilian context and can be replicated by other researchers, extended to other sectors, and used in the classification and disclosure of investments.

Information constraints posed a challenge when tracking financial flows. Finding relevant characteristics for the classification of financial flows proved impossible in some of the available databases. The private financial flows included in the map are also likely to be underestimated due to a lack of consistent and standardized data.

In this context, the careful characterization of climate finance flows for land use presented in this report aims to increase transparency and enable the monitoring of the evolution of finance, making it possible to assess whether they are growing in a way that is compatible with climate challenges. This work also helps with identifying finance gaps, designing investment and disinvestment strategies, and holding stakeholders accountable.

WHAT IS CLIMATE FINANCE?

Climate finance refers to capital flows that have direct or indirect effects on the mitigation of GHG emissions or which contribute to climate change adaptation. Flows can also be geared towards dual benefit activities, should they contribute to both mitigation and adaptation. According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), funds for climate finance may originate locally, nationally, or transnationally, from public, private, or alternative sources.

WHAT IS LAND USE?

This report tracks climate finance for land use, which includes:

Agriculture: crop and cattle production, all the way from the primary sector to activities in the secondary sector of the value chain, such as agroindustry. It includes infrastructure on rural properties, the purchase and production of inputs, rural extension activities, and financial services. It also spans measures for energy efficiency in agroindustry and renewable energy generation from sugarcane or crop residue, such as biofuel production. Finally, it covers policy management and planning, as well as research and development (R&D) for agriculture.

Forest: conservation, restoration, and reforestation activities, as well as use for economic purposes, as in the case of planted forests. This includes policies to combat deforestation, and on environmental and land tenure regularization and territorial planning.

Multi-sector: policies and projects aimed at reducing vulnerability to climate change, including meteorological monitoring and surveillance systems, natural disaster alerts, and risk management for hydrological and geological events, among others. For more detail, see the list of climate-aligned activities in Appendix I and the definition of sectors in Appendix III.

Main results

* Climate finance for land use in Brazil amounted to an average of US$ 6.6 billion/year[1] between 2015 and 2020. During this time, financial flows increased from US$ 6.6 billion in 2015 to US$ 7.1 billion in 2020, this represents a growth of 65% in Brazilian reais.

* Most of the finance aligned with climate objectives came from domestic sources, which channeled US$ 6.3 billion/year (95%).

* Two-thirds of domestic finance (US$ 4.1 billion/year) came in the way of private finance, which is largely explained by the fact that financial institutions are obligated to allocate finance to rural credit. As such, a relevant portion of climate finance for land use in Brazil comes from private finance directed by public policies.

* International finance accounted for 5% (US$ 327 million/year) of climate finance flows. International finance originated mostly from public sources: foreign governments (US$ 136 million/year), climate funds (US$ 125 million/year) and multilateral development banks (US$ 58 million/year), channeled mainly via grants (US$ 216 million/year).

* The Amazon Fund is the main climate fund channeling international finance for land use in Brazil. Despite this, the Amazon Fund approved an average of US$ 53 million/year in finance, which is equivalent to 0.7% of the total tracked for climate finance for land use in the country between 2015 and 2020.

* Rural credit is the main instrument to finance activities aligned with climate objectives for land use, as it channeled almost half of the flows tracked between 2015 and 2020 (US$ 3.2 billion/year). However, climate-aligned flows account for only 8% of the total volume of rural credit in Brazil, whose annual average was US$ 42.2 billion/year in the period under analysis.

* Agricultural risk management instruments, which constitute the main tool for climate adaptation, accounted for US$ 1.1 billion/year in finance aligned with climate objectives. Rural insurance was the most relevant of these instruments, with a channeled total of US$ 625 million/year. Of this amount, US$ 500 million/year came from private funds used to take out insurance policies.

* Thematic bonds, which obtain resources to finance projects with social and environmental impact, raised, on average, US$ 1 billion/year (16%) in climate finance for land use, obtained mostly via issuances by Brazilian companies abroad. Although the volume of funds raised via thematic bonds has almost quadrupled in the period under analysis- from US$ 685 million in 2015 to US$ 1.6 billion in 2020- it still represents only a small portion of fixed-income capital market finance.

* The public budget channeled US$ 767 million/year (11%) of finance aligned with climate objectives and was the main instrument for the implementation of policies for the forest sector (US$ 572 million/year). In that same period, finance from international public sources amounted to US$ 320 million/year geared towards projects in this sector. There was a drop, however, in the amount of finance from the public budget, from US$ 993 million in 2015 to US$ 394 million in 2020.

* The crop sector was the main recipient of climate finance, receiving an average of US$ 3.9 billion/year, which corresponds to 60% of flows in the tracked period. The forest sector received US$ 1.7 billion/year (25%), cattle received US$ 532 million/year (8%), bioenergy and fuels received US$ 311 million/year (5%) and multi-sector received US$ 86 million/year (1%).

* Finance geared towards mitigating climate change amounted to US$ 4.5 billion/year, or 68% of the finance tracked. Finance for climate adaptation totaled US$ 1.2 billion/year (19%), while flows with both mitigation and adaptation objectives stood at US$ 859 million/year (13%).

Landscape of Climate Finance for Land Use

Climate finance for land use in Brazil amounted to an annual average of US$ 6.6 billion for the period between 2015 and 2020. Figure 2 shows that the total finance amount increased from US$ 6.6 billion in 2015 to US$ 7.1 billion in 2020.[2] Given the evolution of the exchange rates, during the analyzed timeframe, this represents a growth of 65% in Brazilian reais. This trend is mainly related to the increase in issuances of thematic bonds - which almost quadrupled in the period, reaching US$ 1.6 billion in 2020 - and rural credit, which channeled US$ 3.2 billion aligned with climate goals in that same year.[3] Furthermore, the establishment of new financial instruments, such as Decarbonization Credit ( Crédito de Descarbonização - CBIO), has contributed to Brazil's efforts to promote climate finance.

Figure 1. Evolution of Climate Finance for Land Use, 2015-2020

Note: The values refer to the average amount of financial flows in Brazilian Real (R$) during the analyzed period, deflated by the IPCA using December 2020 as reference. The values were converted into United States Dollar (US$), according to the average exchange rate for the corresponding year, as provided by the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil - BCB).

Source: CPI/PUC-RIO with data from SICOR/BCB, SIOP/MPO, MAPA, SES/SUSEP, MMA, BNDES, MME, B3, NINT, OECD-DAC, and IDB, 2023

Figure 2 shows the Landscape of climate finance for land use in Brazil by means of a sankey diagram, which tracks public/private and domestic/international finance flows, sources of finance, disbursement channels, financial instruments, beneficiary sectors, and climate objectives.

Figure 2. Landscape of Climate Finance for Land Use in Brazil, 2015-2020
Interactive Sankey
Note: The values refer to the average amount of financial flows in Brazilian Real (R$) during the analyzed period, deflated by the IPCA using December 2020 as reference. The values were converted into United States Dollar (US$), according to the average exchange rate for the corresponding year, as provided by the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil - BCB).

Source: CPI/PUC-RIO with data from SICOR/BCB, SIOP/MPO, MAPA, SES/SUSEP, MMA, BNDES, MME, B3, NINT, OECD-DAC, and IDB, 2023

Funding for Climate Finance

Most of the finance aligned with climate objectives came from domestic sources, which channeled US$ 6.3 billion/year (95%) between 2015 and 2020. Two-thirds of domestic finance US$ 4.1 billion/year came from private finance, which is largely explained by the fact that financial institutions in Brazil are obligated to allocate funds to rural credit.[4] Domestic private funding originated primarily from financial institutions (31%), corporations (16%), and rural producers (10%). The main sources of domestic public finance were the federal and state governments (26%) and the Brazilian Development Bank ( Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - BNDES) (6%).

International funds accounted for 5% (US$ 327 million/year) of climate finance flows. This international funding originated mostly from public sources: international governments (US$ 136 million/year), climate funds (US$ 125 million/year), and multilateral development banks (US$ 58 million/year). The main sources were the government of Germany (US$ 79 million/year), the Amazon Fund (US$ 53 million/year), the World Bank (US$ 39 million/year), the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (US$ 33 million/year), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (US$ 32 million/year), and the government of Norway (US$ 20 million/year) - which, together, accounted for approximately 80% of climate-aligned international public funding. To avoid the double counting of financial flows, the source of finance called "international governments" does not include grants from the governments of Germany and Norway to the Amazon Fund.

The Amazon Fund is the main climate fund that channels international funding for land use in Brazil and, as such, is quite relevant in the promotion of conservation and sustainable land use in the country. Despite this, the Amazon Fund approved an average of US$ 53 million/year in project finance, which is equivalent to 0.7% of the total climate finance for land use in the country between 2015 and 2020.

Disbursement Channels

Disbursement channels intermediate climate finance for land use in Brazil and allocate finance to various sectors. Financial institutions were responsible for channeling almost two-thirds (US$ 4.1 billion/year) of finance tracked from 2015 to 2020, most of which came from private sources (US$ 3.1 billion/year), mainly originating from the institutions themselves (US$ 2.0 billion/year). Financial institutions also intermediate finance from public sources, such as federal and state governments (US$ 608 million/year) and BNDES (US$ 386 million/year). Climate finance channeled from corporations accounted for 16% (US$ 1.0 billion/year) and originated mostly from the corporations' own funds, obtained by means of thematic bonds (US$ 1.0 billion/year).

Disbursements channeled via government agencies amounted to (US$ 1.0 billion/year) (15%) of climate finance, with (US$ 872 million/year) (84%) coming from federal and state government funds. Government agencies also channeled international finance (US$ 162 million/year) from international governments US$ 85 million/year, multilateral development banks (US$ 45 million/year), and climate funds (US$ 31 million/year).

Financial Instruments

Rural credit is the main financial instrument with climate-aligned finance for land use in Brazil, having channeled US$ 3.2 billion/year between 2015 and 2020, equivalent to 48% of all flows tracked in the same period. Approximately two-thirds (US$ 2 billion/year) of finance were sourced from the financial institutions that operate them. However, the total volume of rural credit in the country in the period under analysis was US$ 42.2 billion/year, meaning that the portion of rural credit aligned with climate objectives corresponded to only 8% of the total volume, in accordance with the criteria established in this work.[5]

Agricultural risk management instruments, which constitute the main tool for climate adaptation, accounted for US$ 1.0 billion/year in finance aligned with climate objectives between 2015 and 2020. The most relevant of these instruments was rural insurance, which directed US$ 625 million/year in climate finance for agricultural risk management. Rural insurance relied on private finance expressed in the amount paid by producers to take out the insurance policies (US$ 500 million/year and), in the case of subsidized premiums, it also relied on public finance from the Rural Insurance Premium Subsidy Program (Programa de Subvenção ao Prêmio de Seguro Rural - PSR), in the amount of US$ 124 million/year.

Thematic bonds, which obtain resources to finance projects that have social and environmental impact, captured US$ 1.0 billion/year (16%) in climate finance for land use, corresponding to only a small portion of traditional capital market finance. These securities were issued following voluntary guidelines and standards, such as the Green Bond Principles (GBP), and include global notes (US$ 686 million/year), bonds (US$ 100 million/year), Eurobonds (US$ 114 million/year), Agribusiness Receivables Certificates ( Certificado de Recebíveis do Agronegócio - CRA) (US$ 85 million/year), debentures (US$ 22 million/year), and promissory notes (US$ 0.4 million/year).

The public budget channeled US$ 767 million/year (11%) in climate-aligned finance and constituted the main financial instrument for the implementation of policies aimed at the forest sector (US$ 572 million/year). Among the activities financed for this sector, the public budget disbursed US$ 22 million/year for actions to prevent and control deforestation and fires, and US$ 16 million/year for environmental and land regularization policies and territorial planning.

Public international finance (US$ 320 million/year) were mainly channeled via grants (US$ 216 million/year) and were mostly earmarked for the forest sector (US$ 221 million/year).

Sectors

The crop sector received, on average, US$ 3.9 billion/year in climate finance, which corresponds to 60% of the flows tracked from 2015 to 2020. This is explained by the prevalence of rural credit as the main financial instrument for climate-aligned finance. The forest sector received US$ 1.7 billion/year (25%); the cattle sector received US$ 532 million/year (8%); bioenergy and fuels received US$ 311 million/year (5%); and multi-sector received US$ 86 million/year (1%).

Climate Objectives

Finance aimed towards mitigation activities amounted to US$ 4.5 billion/year, i.e., 68% of climate finance for land use in the period from 2015 to 2020. Adaptation activities amounted to US$ 1.2 billion/year (19%). Furthermore, flows targeting both mitigation and adaptation accounted for US$ 859 million/year (13%). The high share of finance directed towards mitigation is in line with the GHG reduction commitments set in Brazil's NDC, given that most of the country's emissions come from changes in land use and agriculture.

In some rural credit lines and development and international cooperation projects, it is possible to identify the beneficiaries of the finance and ascertain whether they are small, medium or large rural producers, producer cooperatives, corporations, indigenous peoples, quilombolas, or other traditional communities. But this is not possible for most climate finance tracked in this report. Furthermore, a portion of the flows accounts for the provision of a public good, having been allocated to activities such as forest conservation. However, for climate finance to support the transition more effectively to low-carbon land use in Brazil, the design and information about finance will need to be improved in order to increase transparency about who the beneficiaries are and their locations.

Methodology

This report develops a methodology to quantify and compare financial flows for land use and their use for climate mitigation and adaptation objectives. The approach is based on CPI's international experience for over a decade in tracking climate finance globally, as well as in specific countries and sectors, within the Global Landscape of Climate Finance (Buchner et al. 2021).

This work adapts the Global Landscape's methodological criteria to reflect Brazil's climate context- including, for example, finance for the protection of the rights of indigenous and traditional peoples, land use policies such as combating deforestation and land tenure regularization, production management, and infrastructure on rural properties and agroindustry activities. This work draws on four main sources of information to incorporate criteria relevant to land use in Brazil:

1. CPI Global - Activities pertaining to agriculture and forest aligned with climate goals (Rosenberg et al. 2018; Chiriac, Naran and Falconer 2020; Buchner et al. 2021).

2. Public Consultation No. 82 of 2021 by the Central Bank of Brazil ( Banco Central do Brasil - BCB) - Sustainability criteria applicable to the granting of rural credit (BCB 2021).[6]

3. CPI/PUC-Rio - Institutional analysis of government policies and actions for the conservation and restoration of forest and for the development of sustainable agriculture that contribute to achieving the climate targets in Brazil's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (Antonaccio et al. 2018).

4. Rio Markers for Climate Change of the Development Assistance Committee - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC/OECD) - Finance flows aligned with UNFCCC objectives (OECD 2018).

Appendix I shows a detailed list of the criteria used to define which financial flows are aligned with climate objectives. The criteria are divided by:

Climate objective: (i) mitigation; (ii) adaptation; (iii) mitigation and adaptation.

Area: (i) Agricultural credit policy; (ii) Agricultural risk management; (iii) Government expenditures; (iv) Financial market; (v) International cooperation and development.

Sectors: (i) crop; (ii) forest; (iii) cattle; (iv) bioenergy and fuels; (v) multi-sector.

Appendix II describes the five areas relevant for climate finance in Brazil; it also specifies the databases used for each of them. An important methodological measures were to avoid double counting financial flows.

Public and private finance sources, both domestic and international, were tracked for the period of 2015 to 2020. Financial flows were updated via indexation to the Extended National Consumer Price Index ( Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo - IPCA) using December 2020 as a reference. For finance originally granted in foreign currencies -such as US dollar or Euro - the amounts were converted into Brazilian Real (R$) according to the average exchange rate for the year corresponding to the flow in question, as provided by the Central Bank of Brazil, and then subsequently updated via indexation to the IPCA.

This report provides a broad view of climate-aligned finance for land use activities. However, the list of climate finance flows is not exhaustive. Indeed, the methodology for measuring climate finance and its composition are constantly evolving (Meattle et al. 2022).

Transparency about the use of climate-aligned public and private finance needs to be improved. This issue is particularly critical for private finance that is not guided by public policy. In the context of strengthening the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) agenda, improving disclosure requirements is necessary to better understand project implementation and operation. Clearer disclosure regulations and standards will allow for more accurate estimates of private finance aligned with climate objectives.

Figure 3 presents the Climate Finance Ecosystem for the land use sector in Brazil, which organizes financial flows into five areas: agricultural credit policy; agricultural risk management; government expenditures; financial markets; and international cooperation and development (described in Appendix II). The Ecosystem structures the relationship between the various types of actors involved and characterizes climate-aligned financial flows. Analysis of the databases related to the five areas of climate finance made it possible to extract information to characterize the flows in terms of: origin of finance, sources of finance, disbursement channels, instruments, sectors, and climate objectives. The definitions of each of the categories and subcategories in this figure can be found in Appendix III.

Figure 3. Climate Finance Ecosystem for Land Use in Brazil

Source: CPI/PUC-Rio, 2023

The authors would like to thank Juliano Assunção, Luiza Antonaccio and Mariana Stussi for their comments and suggestions, Natalie Hoover El Rashidi, Giovanna de Miranda, Camila Calado, Rogério Reis de Mello Filho and Letícia Miranda for the editing and revision of the text and Meyrele Nascimento for formatting and graphic design.
[1] The values refer to the average amount of financial flows in Brazilian Real (R$) during the analyzed period, deflated by the IPCA using December 2020 as reference. The values were converted into United States Dollar (US$), according to the average exchange rate for the corresponding year, as provided by the Central Bank of Brazil ( Banco Central do Brasil - BCB).

[2] The total amount tracked in Brazilian reais corresponded to 22.1 billion in 2015 and 36.5 billion in 2020.

[3] Detailed definitions of thematic bonds, rural credit, and other financial instruments can be found in Appendix III.

[4] Public policy in Brazil directs finance from financial institutions to rural credit. Financial institutions are required to allocate the equivalent of 30% of all bank deposits in checking accounts to rural credit operations through Compulsory Resources. Additionally, 65% of rural savings accounts ( Poupança Rural, a form of savings account in certain public banks and cooperatives) funds must be directed to rural credit.

[5] The trade purpose was excluded from the calculation of the total value of total rural credit granted in the period. This purpose was not considered because it can be used to finance the purchase of products by means of the Minimum Price Guarantee Policy ( Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos - PGPM) or for refinance, as in the cases of Rural Duplicate ( Duplicata Rural - DR) and Rural Promissory Note ( Nota Promissória Rural - NPR) discounts. The annual average of rural credit granted for all purposes - funding, investment, industrialization and trade - was US$ 49.4 billion in 2020 prices.

[6] Although not listed in BCB Public Consultation No. 82, all lines in the following initiatives were deemed to be climate-aligned: the National Program for Low-carbon emissions in Agriculture ( Programa para Redução da Emissão de Gases de Efeito Estufa na Agricultura - ABC+ Program), the National Plan for Family Farming under the ABC ( Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar no âmbito do ABC - Pronaf ABC+) and the Constitutional Financing Fund of the North under the ABC ( Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte - FNO-ABC).

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Landscape of Climate Finance for Land Use in Brazil - CPI

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CPI/PUC-Rio conducted an unprecedented tracking exercise to quantify the climate-aligned financial flows directed to land use in Brazil.

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This research program at Yale showed how Brazilians view climate change and compares those views to the United States.

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Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

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In March 2022 we reported results from our latest nationally representative survey on Climate Change and Public Perception in Brazil , in partnership with the Institute for Technology & Society of Rio (ITS) and the Brazilian survey research firm IPEC.

We found a strong consensus on climate change in Brazil: 96% of Brazilians said climate change is happening and 77% identified human activity as its primary cause. Likewise, most Brazilians (76%) said that most scientists think global warming is happening. By contrast, in our fall 2021 in the U.S., fewer Americans said global warming is happening (76%), is human-caused (60%), or that most scientists agree (59%).
Brazilian and American views: Is global warming happening, human caused, and is there a scientific consensus?
Nearly nine in ten Brazilians were either "very worried" (61%) or "somewhat worried" (26%) about global warming, rates much higher than in the US (35% and 35% respectively).

About eight in ten Brazilians (81%) said the issue of climate change is "very important". Although the degree of importance varied somewhat by education, age, and political orientation, it was high among all groups. Politically, nearly nine out of ten (88%) left and center-leaning Brazilians said climate change is a very important issue. Among Brazilians leaning to the right of the political spectrum, 75% said the issue is very important.
Economy versus environment
Climate change has been more acutely felt every year and is now a part of the everyday life of the Brazilian population. The impacts can be perceived in the increased cost of power, excess or lack of rainfall, air quality, and water rationing. The survey shows that the general public is concerned about climate change and forest fires. However, the environmental agenda has not been taken up by political actors yet, ahead of the 2022 elections, despite the salience of the issue for the Brazilian public. Brazilians are very engaged in the issue of climate change, often more so than people in the United States. Issues such as climate change, the environment, and deforestation are not as politically polarized in Brazil as they are in the US.
Forest fires and the Amazon
When asked if protecting the environment is more important than economic growth, a majority of Brazilians (77%) said that protecting the environment is more important, even if this means lower economic growth and job creation. However, this percentage was slightly lower among specific segments of the population. For example, among Brazilians aged 55 or older, Brazilians whose formal education ended with the completion of elementary school, or politically right-leaning Brazilians, the figure was 69%.

The main source of greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil is forest degradation through deforestation and fires. The Brazilian population's awareness is high: 87% of respondents said they have heard a lot about forest fires. In the Brazilian states with a higher incidence of fires, such as those in the Central West region, this rate reached 92%. When it comes specifically to fires in the Amazon, the public's awareness was even higher: 98% of Brazilians said they had heard about the issue.

Politically left-leaning respondents were more likely to say human activity is the primary cause of fires in the Amazon (84%), compared to centrist (76%) and politically right-leaning (69%) respondents. A minority of right-leaning respondents, though relatively more than left-leaning or centrist respondents, attributed the Amazon fires to natural causes or both factors (human and natural).
Who is most responsible for the fires in the Amazon?
Those respondents who said the fires in the Amazon are primarily caused by human activity were then asked to rank order who they thought is most responsible for starting them. Loggers were the most cited (37%), followed by farmers (18%), cattle and livestock ranchers (17%), politicians (12%), and prospectors (8%). Very few Brazilians blamed NGOs (1%) or indigenous people (1%) for the fires.

When asked who could best solve the problem of fires in the Amazon, Brazilians most cited governments (50%), citizens (21%), and companies and industries (13%).

Details on the survey: The survey was conducted from September 28 to November 1, 2021, with 2,600 participants 18 years or older from all regions of the country. The margin of error for the total sample is two percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval.

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Climate Change in the Brazilian Mind - Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

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In March 2022 we reported results from our latest nationally representative survey on Climate Change and Public Perception in Brazil, in partnership with the Institute for Technology & Society of Rio (ITS) and the Brazilian survey research firm IPEC. We [...]

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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This news article from Nature checks in on how the new Brazilian president Lula is doing on climate considerations.

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Amazon Rainforest - Codajás, State of Amazonas, Brazil

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Amazon Rainforest - Codajás, State of Amazonas, Brazil

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Amazon Rainforest - Codajás, State of Amazonas, Brazil

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This video explains challenges and successes with saving the Amazon Rainforest.

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Petrópolis - State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Petrópolis - State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Petrópolis - State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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This article shows the disconnect between knowing the problems and implementing solutions.

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Dozens of hillside houses were destroyed by the landslides in the region in the heaviest rainfall registered since 1932 [Silvia Izquierdo/AP Photo]

The landslides that devastated the Brazilian mountain city of Petropolis this week demolished houses and ripped families apart, scarred hillsides and hearts, and left at least 120 dead and nearly as many missing.

And it was all largely predictable - and to some degree, preventable.

Keep reading

Rapid urbanisation, poor planning, lack of financing for subsidised housing - all of these things have afflicted the city in Rio de Janeiro state - and little has been done in response to repeated warnings about the risks of mountainside construction, researchers, as well as current and former public servants, have said.

Now, with evidence indicating that climate change is causing more intense rainfall, peril has only increased - not just for Petropolis, but elsewhere, too.

Antonio Guerra, a geography professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, has studied weather-related catastrophes in Petropolis for almost 30 years. He has visited dozens of sites where houses and lives were swallowed by torrents of mud, and investigated the root causes.

"Rain is the great villain, but the main cause is poor land use. There's a total lack of planning," Guerra told The Associated Press.

More than 1,500 people have died in similar landslides in recent decades in that portion of the Serra do Mar range. There have been more than 400 deaths from heavy storms in Petropolis alone since 1981.

The city's haphazard sprawl is recent. Nestled in the mountains some 64km (40 miles) from Rio de Janeiro and named for a former Brazilian emperor, Petropolis was among the nation's first planned cities.

Earlier settlers built stately homes along its waterways. But in recent decades the city's prosperity has drawn newcomers from poorer regions and the population grew to about 300,000.

Mountainsides are now covered with small homes packed tightly together, constructed by people who are not fully aware of the dangers. Many have built without proper permissions because they cannot afford to do so elsewhere.

Many high-risk areas are even more vulnerable due to deforestation or inadequate drainage, Guerra said. As time goes by, people forget disasters and return to devastated areas, building houses on unsafe ground.

For nearly two decades, Yara Valverde led the local office of the federal environmental regulator. In 2001, she started the city's first hydrogeological risk alert system, installing plastic bottles in communities to collect rainfall. When they reached a certain level, sirens blasted.

There was no public money allotted for the programme, so she enlisted volunteers.

Between 2007 and 2010, Guerra and a team of civil engineers and geologists mapped risky areas in Petropolis and sent their findings to the city. The next January, heavy rain set off landslides that claimed nearly 1,000 lives, 71 of them in Petropolis. It was considered Brazil's worst-ever natural disaster.

The city has recognised the problem. In 2017, authorities noted that 18 percent of the city - including about 20,000 households - was at high or very high risk. Yet another 7,000 would also need to be relocated, according to a plan devised by the municipality, which called for the construction of affordable housing units and a halt to new construction in at-risk areas.

Guerra, Valverde, non-governmental organisations and residents say little has been done to execute that vision. There is little available space in Petropolis for new, safe construction, and removing residents from existing homes is unpopular politically - there is often nowhere to relocate residents near their original homes.

The Brazilian daily Folha de S Paulo, citing official data, reported that Rio's state government spent less than half of the money earmarked for its disaster prevention and response programme.

Rio state's construction and infrastructure secretariat said in an email to AP that inspections of at-risk areas, housing policy and relocations are the city's responsibility. The city did not reply to repeated requests for information on how many families had been relocated since 2017 and what other measures had been undertaken to carry out the plan.

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has tried to deflect the blame, saying the budget for preventive measures is limited. "A lot of times, we have no way to guard against everything that might happen," he said on Friday from Petropolis after flying over the disaster.

Dozens of hillside houses were destroyed by the landslides on Tuesday in the heaviest rainfall registered since 1932. Cars and buses were swept away in the floods that left a trail of destruction down city streets.

Downpours continued increasing the climate of fear and anguish in the city as residents searched for missing relatives and friends.

Heavy rains are typical in the region, especially during the Southern Hemisphere's summer, between December and March. But with climate change, the rains appear to be getting heavier, experts say.

"They are all weather extremes, happening very close to one another. Climate change also acts to increase the frequency of events, and we are clearly observing this," said Marcelo Seluchi, a coordinator at the government's National Centre for Monitoring and Early Warning of Natural Disasters. "It's not about looking at a particular event, but the total."

Southeastern Brazil has been punished with heavy rains since the start of the year. More than 40 deaths were recorded between mudslides in Minas Gerais state in early January and Sao Paulo state later the same month.

That followed months of drought - Brazil's worst in nine decades - that saw hydroelectric reservoirs in the southeast fall to levels that raised concern about possible power rationing.

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Brazil: Climate change, neglect contribute to deadly mudslides

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Little done in response to repeated warnings of risks of mountainside construction, researchers and public servants say.

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Spain Talanoa Dialogue

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Pantanal - Poconé, State of Mato Grosso, Brazil

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Pantanal - Poconé, State of Mato Grosso, Brazil

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Pantanal - Poconé, State of Mato Grosso, Brazil

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As I was finishing writing my Talanoa Dialogue on 11.18 I heard the devastating news of the ongoing and spreading wildfires in the Pantanal biome, the world's largest tropical wetland. Home to various wildlife, including the largest concentrations of jaguars, has been burning for the first two weeks of November due to the early intense heatwaves affecting this region in the interior. On the same day temperatures rose to 40ºC in the coastal city of Rio de Janeiro.

Nicole MJ

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Brazil Wildfire | Wildfires in Brazil's Pantanal threaten the world's largest jaguar populations

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil

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Japan relies on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar for the bulk of its crude oil imports. The Prime Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida, visited the United Arab Emirates earlier this year ahead of COP28, which will be held in the United Arab Emirates. This visit was due to talks of Japan hoping to offer its renewable energy technologies to help aid the UAE in its decarbonization efforts. It is said that both Japan and the UAE are on board for climate action, clean energy, and decarbonization. Interestingly enough, the technologies spoken about are hydrogen, carbon capture, and carbon recycling technologies. From a recent visit from Sierra Clubs, Peter Wagenius, I learned that big oil companies are pouring money into carbon capture because it is a false promise that it will work in the end. Peter Wagenius claims that putting money into carbon capture is taking resources and energy away from actually moving into clean energy.

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Rising temperatures in Japan are not only changing cherry blossom blooms but are putting their aging population at significant risk. Japan is experiencing a demographic tipping point where over 20% of its population is over the age of 65. An aging population is more vulnerable to experiencing difficulties with heat. In Japan, rising temperature is not the only thing at work but also a cultural resistance to air conditioning from the senior population since they were raised without it. The cultural resistance to air conditioning is coupled with the economic burden of powering air conditioning. Thirteen hundred people die of heatstroke annually in the country, the majority of them elderly.

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Japan this October announced it would be putting 165 billion yen, equivalent to 1.11 billion US dollars, into the United Nation's Green Climate Fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate change. This contribution and the contribution Japan had in the last round makes Japan one of the biggest backers after Germany, Britain, and France. It is huge to see countries that have contributed the most to climate change give money to countries that have had little contribution to the climate crisis yet face some of the worst ramifications of the climate crisis.

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Climate change affects cherry blossoms in Kyoto, Japan, in many ways. The average temperature in Kyoto has been steadily increasing since the Industrial Revolution, and this warming is causing the cherry blossoms to bloom earlier in the year. This is a problem for both locals and tourists, as the cherry blossom season is a popular time to visit Kyoto. The earlier blooms also mean that other plants and animals in that ecosystem are struggling to adapt to the rising temperatures. The cherry blossoms are also “a culturally significant event in Japan” (Yasuyuki Aono). The effects of climate change on cherry blossoms in Kyoto are a reminder of climate change's impact on flora, fauna, and cultural values.

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Create a new document and edit with others at the same time -- from your computer, phone or tablet. Get stuff done with or without an internet connection. Use Docs to edit Word files. Free from Google.

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James H. Miller Jr. Electric Generating Plant

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James H. Miller Jr. Electric Generating Plant

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It was revealed in the most recent National Climate Assessment that the United States has reduced its greenhouse gas emissions 12% between 2005 and 2019. This is a pretty big deal and the US is on track to be up to reduce another 16% by 2025. Obviously, the best result would be zero emissions but the trend is actually very heartening.

There are still facilities that release millions of tons of greenhouse gasses - with the worst polluter being Alabama Power’s James H. Miller Jr. Electric Generating Plant. This coal-burning power plant releases 21.8 million MT CO2e every year - a full six million metric tons more than the next largest polluter. That’s a million more tons than Guatemala. It has been the top CO2e emitter in America for almost a decade. It also releases 68,000 tons of methane and 108,000 tons of nitrous oxide. One could almost think it would be illegal to NOT shut down the plant.

Unfortunately, that is just one side of the story for the residents of nearby West Jefferson. The plant provides electricity for over a million homes and provides 330 jobs for a town of 500. It is seen as the economic lifeblood for the region. Southern Electric - the parent company of Alabama Power - has committed to net-zero by 2050 but has no intention of shutting down the plant.

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What are the country’s climate change vulnerabilities, both in terms of current challenges and those anticipated in the future?

Recently, the  Climate Vulnerability Index (CVI) released its findings with a published journal article and interactive website.  Created by a partnership between the Environmental Defense Fund, Texas A&M University, and Dark Horse Analytics, the CVI’s stated purpose is to help policy makers understand the risks and threats currently occurring in America so that better decisions can be made. It compares two large categories: Baseline vulnerabilities and Climate change risks.  Baseline vulnerabilities are things currently happening that reduce a community’s resilience: access to health care or groceries, diabetes rates, and impact of air pollution.  Climate change risks are how climate change is forecasted to impact these same areas in the future.  It looks at factors like heat related deaths and droughts.

St. John the Baptist parish in Louisiana- a county about 30 miles up river  of New Orleans, was found to be the most climate vulnerable area in the US. St. John is almost 70% households of color and has a median income $14,000 below the national average, pointing to the trend that climate change impacts marginalized groups harder than others.. It has historically been part of the string of parishes known as “Cancer Alley,” because of the adverse impact of industrial plants.

It is important to note the St. John the Baptist parish is not the only Louisiana county in the top ten most climate vulnerable places in America.  In fact, half of the counties are located in the state, with the others being in Kentucky (3), Texas (1), and South Caroline (1).

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"What are the country’s climate change vulnerabilities, both in terms of current challenges and those anticipated in the future?"

Many places in the US are experiencing huge impacts from climate change.  The American Southwest is one of the hardest hit places.  In the summer of 2023, Phoenix passed a number of benchmarks:

1. It had 31 consecutive days where the highs reached or went higher than 110 degrees.

2. It had 145 consecutive days without any measurable rain.

3. It had more than 100 heat related deaths.

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This is the location of Russia's military headquarters. A location I chose to represent the climate crisis that the Russia-Ukraine war has caused. Along with a devastating civilian toll, this war is damaging more than lives, it is wrecking havoc on our environment as well. According to CNN, researchers found that 120 million metric tons of planet-heating pollution can be attributed to the first 12 months of war. This includes fuel for tanks, planes, and other equipment as well as other impacts of war such as fire, destruction, and rebuilding. Scientists worry that this will only continue to get worse as the conflict rages on and during the reconstruction stages. Rebuilding materials such as cement and concrete produce very high levels of carbon pollution making this an ongoing issue.

Source:

Paddison, L. (2023, June 7). Russia’s war in Ukraine is undermining global efforts to tackle the Climate Crisis, new report finds. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/europe/ukraine-war-climate-change-impact-intl/index.html

By: Tess Ingebrigtsen

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This October, Russia's lower house of parliament approved an amendment a bill that would allow, if made into a bill, sanitary logging at Lake Baikal, a UNESCO World Heritage site since 1996 and recognized as the planet's best example of a freshwater ecosystem. This type of logging is considered to be a forestry management strategy for minimizing insect infestation, forest fires, and other disasters. However, this type of logging will be incredibly economically favorable for the Sable Mountain Ski Resort. Many worry that with more area cleared the ski resort will try to expand and build on the newly cleared land. Those against the bill are also arguing that this type of logging is "unneeded" and "unnecessary" for the lake.

Source:

Latypova, L. (2023, November 18). New bill puts Russia’s Lake Baikal at risk of deforestation, harmful urbanization. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/08/03/new-bill-puts-russias-lake-baikal-at-risk-of-deforestation-harmful-urbanization-a82048

By: Tess Ingebrigtsen

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Norilsk, Russia has long been identified as "the most polluted place in Russia" due to the 30 industrial sites that are classified the most hazardous; oil, gas, non-ferrous and ferrous metal production, paper, and coal mining. As of October 2023, a campaign has been the clean up of this area. Already 3,300 tons of garbage have been removed. This campaign has been helped moved along with catchy slogans such as "Let's clean up the Arctic together!" along with education efforts to help emphasize the environmental affect this area has. Although this seems like a large feat, this is nothing compared to the 1.9 million tons of hazardous emissions Norilsk Nickel produces yearly. This idea emphasizes that it will take a lot more than a slogan and some clean up to clear Norilsk from its "most polluted place in Russia" title.

Source:

Digges, C. (2023, October 16). Norilsk Nickel and Gazprom are the biggest polluters in the Arctic. Bellona.org. https://bellona.org/news/industrial-pollution/2023-10-norilsk-nickel-and-gazprom-are-the-biggest-polluters-in-the-arctic

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In August 2023, parts of the Primorye area of Russia experienced major flooding. More than 4,600 homes and 28 towns were flooded and over 2,500 people had to be evacuated. According to Climate Change Post over the 21st century the annual runoff in Russia has increased by 15-40%, depending on the region, and there has been an increase in major flooding events by 15%. This causes concern for Russia's government and citizens because as climate change continues to effect the globe, these events will become more and more frequent and disastrous.

Sources:

River floods in Russia. Climatechangepost.com. (n.d.). https://www.climatechangepost.com/russia/river-floods/#:~:text=At%20the%20beginning%20of%20the,become%20more%20frequent%20(21).

The Moscow Times. (2023, November 18). Flooding in Russia’s Far East triggers evacuations. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/08/14/flooding-in-russias-far-east-triggers-evacuations-a82139

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Portovaya Ulitsa, Vysotsk, Leningrad Oblast, Russia

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Portovaya Ulitsa, Vysotsk, Leningrad Oblast, Russia

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Portovaya Ulitsa, Vysotsk, Leningrad Oblast, Russia

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A new liquified natural gas plant located in Portovaya, Russia is burning an estimated $10 million dollars worth of gas everyday. According to the BBC article by Matt McGrath, an environment correspondent, this is causing alarm in scientists because this creates a large amount of carbon dioxide and soot. This combined could increase the melting rate of the Arctic ice. Researchers have also noted a dramatic heat increase from the natural gas plant since June. Germany's ambassador when asked why Russia was doing this, responded saying that, "they couldn't sell it elsewhere". This along with Europe cutting ties with buying Russia's natural gas has caused a huge price increase in gas in European countries.

Source:

McGrath, M. (2022, August 26). Climate change: Russia Burns off gas as Europe’s Energy Bills Rocket. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-62652133

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Heat waves impact on health and tourism

The extreme heat felt across Spain and all of Europe has great impacts on human health and the economy. Over 60,000 people died due to heat related illness this past year. These impacts are affecting the political landscape in Spain and is also affecting the tourism industry which is around 10% of the Spanish economy. Seville saw temperatures soaring over 110° F this summer. The heat is causing shifts in the tourism season with less people coming in the summer and shifting to the spring and fall. People are unable to work in the heat of the day causing financial losses.

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Heat wave in Spain causing record-breaking temperatures | CNN

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Christina Macfarlane speaks with Spain's Minister for Ecological Transition and Demographic Change as the country faces more frequent severe temperatures.

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Wildfires caused or impacted are on the rise across the world. This is especially true for the Mediterrean region of Europe. Fires and climate experts have determined that the fires will continue to be more intense and will be “beyond the capability (of firefighters) to extinguish”. This will require Spain to fight fires before they start with forest management. Less than 0.3% of forests are managed. There is a call to increase this to over 1% and spend 1 billion euros more in management. Spain accounted for 35% of all burned land in the EU in the last year. The wildfire season is starting early in the year making the fire season last longer and is more dry due to drought conditions.

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BARCELONA, Spain (AP) - Spain must do more to prepare for increasingly virulent wildfires stoked by climate change, a large group of the country's leading wildfire prevention experts said on Thursday.

A declaration backed by 60 experts and institutions said the "increasingly intense fires ... are producing unprecedented ecological and social consequences."

The experts concluded that Spanish society must come to terms with the emergencies that it will likely face, given that wildfires in increasingly hot and dry conditions in the Iberian Peninsula are often "beyond the capability (of firefighters) to extinguish" with their own means.

The declaration was the outcome of a two-day meeting in Madrid in March organized by the Pau Costa Foundation, a nonprofit group based in Barcelona that works for fire prevention awareness. That meeting included wildlife and forestry experts drawn from government, academia, NGOs such as Greenpeace and the WWF, and firefighting services.

They urge Spain to increase its management of wooded areas to compensate for the abandonment of traditional forest industries and to quadruple its budget for prevention.
READ MORE: UN chief says fossil fuels are 'incompatible with human survival,' calls for credible exit strategy
Only about 78,000 hectares (192,000 acres), or 0.3 percent of Spain's woods, are currently managed, the foundation estimates. The declaration calls for that to be increased to 1 percent, some 260,000 hectares (642,000 acres) and for Spanish authorities to dedicate the necessary resources.

The report sets a recommended figure of 1 billion euros ($1.09 billion) that Spain should be spending on forest management, to help compensate for the abandonment of traditional uses of wooded areas by local communities, such as taking timber or firewood.

The declaration was presented Thursday simultaneously in Barcelona and Madrid.

"This declaration is born from the need to create a consensus and bring together voices from different regions to send a powerful message and increase awareness so we can act and prepare for the wildfires of the future," Míriam Piqué, head of Sustainable Forest Management Unit in the Forest Science Center of Catalonia, said in a wooded area near Barcelona.

In Spain, each region is charged with managing its forests and fighting wildfires. That has led to considerable differences in the firefighting muscle of poorer and less populated regions like Castilla y León, where one fire fighter died last year in massive blazes, compared to wealthier ones like Madrid's central region or northeast Catalonia.

The emergency firefighting brigades of Spain's army are often deployed to help put out the worst fires.

Some 267,000 hectares (666,000 acres) burned last year in Spain, making 2022 its worst year of fire destruction since 1994, government statistics said. That was three times the national average for the past decade of 94,000 hectares (232,000 acres). According to the European Union's Copernicus satellite observation service, Spain accounted for 35 percent of all burned land in European wildfires last year.

After a record hot 2022, Spain saw the arrival of forest fires earlier than usual this year. Recent rains have provided some relief despite a record-hot spring, but summer is typically dry and authorities are on guard for another difficult season.

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Wildfires driven by climate change are on the rise - Spain must do more to prepare, experts say

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A group of 60 fire experts and institutions in Spain say the country must do more to prepare for increasingly virulent wildfires stoked by climate change.

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Telde, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain

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Spain has conditions that are optimal for wind energy. There are issues associated with the increase of wind power. For the offshore increase in wind farms can possible impact the fishing industry. Spain has the largest offshore available area for wind power. This is an expansion of available areas but there will also be limits. The fishing industry is concerned this will impact the fishing stock.

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In May 2021, Spain passed the Law on Climate Change and Energy Transition. This law was the product of 10 years of work. The law has binding targets for the year 2030 which will ensure that the country is in compliance with the Paris Agreement. The targets will help decarbonize Spain's economy. There are also targets to help Spain have sustainable development that will increase employment opportunities and reduces inequalities in the country. The targets for 2030 include a reduction in emissions to 55% relative to 1990 emissions, 74% electricity from renewable resources, an increase in area used for organic agriculture to 25% for 2030 and 60% for 2050, and to increase the average reforestation rate to 20,000 hectacres/yr. There will be no new oil or gas licensing in the country. The overall target is to be carbon neutral by 2050.

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La Baells Reservoir - north of Barcelona

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Drought and declining rainfall are a current problem in Spain. Spain is already more arid than many other European countries. With increasing global temperatures this will only get worse. Even with a 2° increase southern Spain will face water scarcity. As with other places in the world when rain does fall it will be more spread out and be more extreme.

Kristin Gabel

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Restored enviornmentally degraded former cattle ranch

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The “Instituto da Terra” or Earth Institute project started a bit more than a decade ago when the couple Leila, an environmentalist and Sebastião Salgado, a renowned photographer and photojournalist, decided to restore and give back to nature their highly environmentally degraded family cattle ranch, in Vale do Rio Doce located near the “Mata Atlántico” or Atlantic rainforest on the eastern coast of Brazil.

After a decade 7,000 degraded hectares have been successfully recuperated with several native species of trees bringing back endangered species of flora and fauna. The Rio Doce, once almost dry, is now flowing again. This successful sustainable development pilot project serves as model not only for Brazil, but the whole world. Current plans include the recreation of 5,000 forests outside of the perimeter of this newly replanted forest.

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Station Tilburg, Spoorlaan, Tilburg, Netherlands

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Station Tilburg, Spoorlaan, Tilburg, Netherlands

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Station Tilburg, Spoorlaan, Tilburg, Netherlands

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Rhenus Warehousing Solutions Tilburg Kraaiven B.V., Ledeboerstraat, Tilburg, Netherlands

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Rhenus Warehousing Solutions Tilburg Kraaiven B.V., Ledeboerstraat, Tilburg, Netherlands

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Rhenus Warehousing Solutions Tilburg Kraaiven B.V., Ledeboerstraat, Tilburg, Netherlands

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Port of Rotterdam, Wilhelminakade, Rotterdam, Netherlands

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Port of Rotterdam, Wilhelminakade, Rotterdam, Netherlands

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Port of Rotterdam, Wilhelminakade, Rotterdam, Netherlands

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Chile is now discussing an additional strengthening of its already-accelerated coal phase-out plan to advance the closure of all coal-fired plants by 2030 and has recently announced a plan to ban the sales of combustion engine vehicles by 2035.

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Chilecito, La Rioja Province, Argentina-Caden Erickson

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Chilecito, La Rioja Province, Argentina-Caden Erickson

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For Chile, the impacts of climate change have now become an issue of profound concern on numerous fronts, from melting glaciers to conflicts over water rights between big agricultural businesses and small farmers. These issues are also very prevalent in Argentina.

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The Netherlands has committed to achieving net zero emissions by 2050, which is necessary given how threatened the country and its 17.5 million population is by rising sea levels and its wet climate. The Dutch government has outlined how the Netherlands plans to strengthen its response to climate challenges both domestically and also aid developing countries to accelerate the climate transition worldwide.

40% of the Dutch Greenhouse Gas footprint extends beyond the Netherlands. This is because a large proportion of the goods and services used in the country are imported from abroad. About 60% of the global biodiversity loss that can be attributed to Dutch consumption is linked to greenhouse gas emissions.

Probably the Netherlands' most famous climate project is the massive offshore wind turbine off the coast of Rotterdam.

In Utrecht, 316 bus stops have been given green roofs planted with wildflowers and grass, creating habitats for bees.

Delft has a completely solar-powered train station which was completed as part of Delft Zuid's expansion project.

The Rhenus warehouse building in Tilburg has 13,000 solar panels, triple-glazed windows, and uses rainwater for non-drinking water requirements such as flushing toilets.

Also in Tilburg is a completely solar-powered large bus station which services many places nearby in Europe.

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Fernando de Noronha, located in Pernambuco State is an archipealgo. Here, in 1985, the Projeto Tamar started its research and conservation on 5 different marine turtle species.

Projeto Tamar works along the coast of Brazil (7,400 km/ 4,600 miles) in 23 locations protecting and recuperating nine species of turtles, found in the Atlantic Ocean, through research, conservation, and social inclusion .

Environmental and marine education include raising awareness among coastal communties, fishers, and society to protect marine turtles and their marine habitat.

Climate change is a result of the mismanagment of our ocean. Yet if we preserve and sustainably manage ocean ecosystems they inturn become our most important ally in climate mitigation, adaptations, and resiliance effort. Blue carbon ecosystems or carbon stored in mangroves , salt marshes and seagrasses or Blue Nature based Solutions (NbS) are urgently needed and play a vital role for the achievment of adaptation outcomes.

https://www.tamar.org.br/

Nicole MJ

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With the climate issue in mind, Puerto Rico passed the Puerto Rico Energy Public Policy Act in 2019. This act set a goal of 100% renewable energy by 2050. To make sure consistent progress is being made, the act sets a goal of 40% renewable energy by 2025 and 60% by 2040.

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The Vilcanota mountain range in the Andes of Peru is host to numerous alpine lakes, and surprisingly, 469 glaciers. The Quelccaya Ice Cap in this region is the world’s largest tropical ice cap. However, emissions cuts will be needed to protect these areas and prevent them from melting away. Peru’s glaciers have already shrunk by 30% since 2000.

More Info:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kthbk8wql8yK9KeYIxIFGHZJ_FrzY86Zk72Mn2epXss/edit?usp=sharing

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Extreme weather events have been devastating many cities in Peru. Extra strong El Nino weather patterns have caused torrential rains in the mountain regions and the water then floods lower altitude cities that are not infrastructurally prepared. In 2017 over 100,000 people were left homeless due to floods and conditions were made significantly worse because of food and water shortages.

More Info:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kthbk8wql8yK9KeYIxIFGHZJ_FrzY86Zk72Mn2epXss/edit?usp=sharing

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Peru is in the top 10 most biodiverse countries in the world and over half of the country (around 260,000 square miles) is covered by the Amazon Rainforest. The region of Loreto, Peru has been the target of the most extreme deforestation in the country. Roughly 1,100 square miles of Peru's forests are cut down every year—around 80% of them are illegally logged.

More Info:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kthbk8wql8yK9KeYIxIFGHZJ_FrzY86Zk72Mn2epXss/edit?usp=sharing

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This small village is home to about 600 people of the Harakmbut ethnic group that live in partnership with the forest. The president of the small town said in an interview that, “Now [the sun] burns our skin, we get headaches at night, get sick.” They have noticed that the forest is changing. Fruits are ripening and rotting much more quickly, likely due to rising temperatures. The animals the villagers hunt are often small, sickly, and burdened with parasites.

Many indigenous groups are participating in the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation program (REDD+). The program facilitates the monitoring of carbon emissions from changes within the forest, and some versions of the program also track biodiversity and include sustainable forest management plans.

More Info:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kthbk8wql8yK9KeYIxIFGHZJ_FrzY86Zk72Mn2epXss/edit?usp=sharing

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Lima is the world’s second largest city with a population of 10 million people. Meeting water demands in Lima has always been a challenge and high levels of inequality and poverty prevent many citizens from getting access to safe drinking water. Climate uncertainties, including drought and increasingly extreme temperatures are exacerbating this problem. New infrastructure is in the works, but it may not be enough to meet the increasing demands.

More Info:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kthbk8wql8yK9KeYIxIFGHZJ_FrzY86Zk72Mn2epXss/edit?usp=sharing

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Nature based Solutions (NbS) are one of the five key types of measures for adaptation in Member States’ voluntary reporting on adaptation measures. NbS are defined as "actions to protect, manage, and restore sustainably use and manage natural terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems in an efficient but also  sustainably considering the complexities and wellbeing of both humans ( climate mitigation, risk reduction, economic social development & human health) and the biodiversity benefits (food security, water security, and environmental stability).

November , 2nd, 2023

Brazil contains 15-20% of the world’s biodiversity and six very important biomes. NbS could represent 37% of all the measures needed to keep the average global temperatures below the required 2ºC. Brazil  could  therefore play an important role in promoting NbS. (Grossi, 2023)

Nicole MJ

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Brazil is the main producer of food, fiber, and energy in the Southern Hemisphere and therefore plays an important role at the IPCC discussions. Their position will highlight  the country’s  ongoing practices in agriculture, reforestation, low carbon products and renewable energies.

On November 12, 2023, the rencetly elected President Lula Da Silva stated he will officially present a plan to recover degraded pasturelands on the eve of COP 28. The program of recuperating degraded pasturelands is not only considered  sustainable but also a vital carbon sequester. (Reuters) This is very welcoming news after the previous pro-deforestatin leader.

Whilst the Brazilian potential focuses on the forest conservation and reforestation issues there is a great potential for it to also address soil management and recuperation of degraded pastureland in the agriculture and cattle raising (ironically were former areas of tropical rainforests!) . There are 42 million hectares of degraded pastureland which, via Nature based Solutions (NbS), could be utilized to fulfill its NDC’s Nationally Determined contribution.” whose objective is to restore 12 million hectares of degraded land by the end of the century. (Grossi, 2023)

Nicole MJ

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September 6th,  2023. An extratropical cyclone with heavy rains which hit the Southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul  caused major flooding as many riverbanks burst. CNN later reported over 30 people died plus 1,600 left homeless and 60 municipalities were affected by these floods. Meteorologists also confirmed that the average amount of rain expected in the whole month of September fell within one week. The week’s rains were the worst natural disaster to hit the state in 40 years. (The Guardian, Sept. 6, 2023)

El Niño is a climate pattern when unusaul warming of surface waters takes place in Eastern Pacific.

The effects of El Niño on Brazil will produce above average rainfall in the South and below average rainfall in the Northern parts of Brazil until January 2024, stated the Brazillian Minsitry of Science, Technology and Innovation (27.10.2023)

Nicole MJ

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Floods submerge homes and leave at least 21 people dead in Brazil

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The Cerrado or savanna covers more than 20% of Brazil and is the second largest biome in Brazil. Its rich biodiverstiy and native habitats in this wooded grasslands are being destroyed faster than the rainforest nearby. It is also one of the least protected areas in Brazil.

Deforestation, unsustainable agricultural practices such as soybeans, cattle ranching and burning vegetation for coal are all thretenting local biodiversity. Wolves, jaguars and the endangered macaw all live in one of the richest and oldest biomes of our planet.

This savanna also acts as a vital buffer to climate change since it supplys clean water and its soils sequester large amounts of carbon

Nicole MJ

Source: Save the Cerrado: Our climate depends on it | Pages | WWF (worldwildlife.org)

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Puerto Rico severely suffers from the increase in climate. As many people know, Puerto Rico tends to get very bad storms and the increase in climate change causes these to be much more frequent. The island’s roads and infrastructure are constantly at risk of these storms. The island also experiences the depletion of many of its resources that come from the water due to rising acidification levels.

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Southern Nigeria has been hit especially hard by high-intensity rainfall, while Northern Nigeria suffers from desertification and overgrazing.

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Nigeria is at very high risk for flooding. The already-vulnerable country will face increasing challenges as flooding likely worsens if climate change is not addressed.