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Eire, Carlos. Learning to Die in Miami: Confessions of a Refugee Boy. Free Press, 2010

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Carlos was shipped away from Cuba to America, hoping for a better life. However, he was left alone with no parents and nothing on him.

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"What are you doing here?" The social worker peered at Carlos Eire, shocked to find the Cuban 12-year-old in a home for delinquent boys in Miami, Florida. "You're supposed to be with your uncle."

By 1963, the preteen had been living in the foster home for months, accompanied by his brother and a revolving cast of characters-boys from troubled backgrounds who constantly tried to convince the Eire boys to join their gangs and commit petty crimes. Carlos knew he was no delinquent, but he figured he had no choice. It had been a temporary solution, a place to live after he had been put on a plane in Havana by his mother, who told him she would rejoin him soon in the United States. But she hadn't come yet. In fact, nobody had claimed him.

Unbeknownst to Eire, someone had dropped the ball. For months, a Cuban uncle living in the United States had been prepared to claim him and put an end to his time as an exiled child with no guardian. He had simply been lost in the system.

Image courtesy of Carlos Eire

"They fixed the problem really fast after that," recalls Eire today. "But we spent many months [in the home for delinquent boys] needlessly. You can multiply these things by the hundreds or thousands."

Eire is referring to the 14,000 unaccompanied children brought to the United States from Cuba during Operation Peter Pan, a covert program that helped school-age kids escape repression in Cuba. The program was designed to protect Cuban children whose parents were being targeted by Fidel Castro's new regime-and to shield them from the Communist ideologies feared by the U.S. at the height of the Cold War.

From 1960 to 1962, Cuban parents who had heard of the program took advantage of visa waivers to put their kids on flights to the United States. Some never saw their children again.

Unlike this century's unaccompanied minors, thousands of whom have entered the foster care system or been detained in camps after seeking asylum in the United States, Eire and the other children of Operación Pedro Pan, as it was known in Cuba, were welcomed by the United States government. The program was a U.S.-sanctioned one-and the Eisenhower administration and private citizens who helped make it happen were motivated not just by the human rights of children who faced repression and political retaliation in Cuba, but by ideology.

Though begun for the children of Cuban dissidents being targeted by the Castro regime, the program was eventually opened up to cover all Cuban children whose parents wanted them to leave the island. During the Cold War, many thought it was worth any price to rescue children from indoctrination into Communism-even if it meant sending them to the U.S. without any chaperones.

Eire's family thought so, too. The son of a judge, Eire grew up in wealth and privilege in Havana. But things changed in 1959, when Castro became Cuba's dictator and Eire's family found themselves in the crosshairs of the new regime. "We were under watch all the time," says Eire.

Suddenly, the idyllic Cuba of Eire's childhood became a "hell" in which he was forced to praise Castro's regime in school, limit his movements, adjust to life under surveillance and watch his family succumb to the effects of paranoia and stress. Under suspicion and worried their children might be sent to work camps in Soviet satellite states in retribution for their parents' views, Eire's parents decided to participate in a new visa waiver program, news of which circulated in whispers.

It was the brainchild of Father Bryan O. Walsh, director of a Catholic charity in Miami. In 1960, he arranged foster care for a Cuban child named Pedro Martinez, an unaccompanied boy who had come to the United States as a refugee. Fearing both harassment of the children of Castro's political enemies and Communist indoctrination of those kids by Castro's regime, Walsh decided to help other Cuban minors sent to the United States by parents who felt threatened.
READ MORE: The Largest Mass Deportation in American History
Soon, private donations-many from Cuban businesses and individuals in exile-flooded in to finance the program, and the Eisenhower administration provided both visa waivers and funded a Catholic charity-run organization that arranged foster care for refugee children. With the help of James Baker, an educator at an American school in Cuba, Walsh spread word of a program that would waive visa requirements for Cuban children entering the United States and care for them until they could be reunited with their parents.

Image courtesy of Carlos Eire

The U.S. press cooperated with Walsh's request to keep the program out of the news. Operation Peter Pan's funding was a secret, and from the eyes of Cuban officials, it simply looked like Cuban parents arranging legal migration for their children in compliance with Cuban laws.

Since Cubans and Americans alike expected Castro to be toppled from power soon, nobody anticipated that parents and children might be separated for years-or never see one another again. Though many children and parents were reunited within a few months, about 60 percent became the responsibility of the United States government. Some never reunited with their families at all.

Once in the United States, the children who didn't have relatives or friends to claim them-about 8,000 in all-were housed in temporary camps near Miami. Then they were put in foster homes and institutions all over the country under the auspices of the Cuban Children's Program (CCP), which was run by Walsh and the Catholic Welfare Bureau.

At first, Eire ping-ponged between homes. He liked his first foster family in a home where he learned English mixed with Yiddish ("I didn't find out until I moved to the Midwest later," he laughs). But then disaster struck: The Cuban Missile Crisis erupted, bringing Cuba and the United States close to nuclear war. Suddenly his mother, who had a permit to follow her children to the U.S. in early November, 1962, was stuck in Cuba.

Image courtesy of Carlos Eire

"My mother was trapped," he says. "No one knew if she would ever get out." His first foster family had planned on taking him in only temporarily, so he was sent to another foster home run by a married Cuban couple and populated by unaccompanied Cuban children who were considered juvenile delinquents. "They were horrible people," he says of the people who ran the home. Bullied by children who tried to get him to join gangs and commit crimes, he was fed just one meal a day.

Finally, a Cuban uncle living in Illinois claimed Eire and his brother. The boys were actually supposed to be claimed much sooner, and had been forgotten by their social worker. Their experience was similar to that of other exiled children, many of whom were mistakenly categorized as juvenile delinquents and caught up in a bureaucracy that did not live up to modern standards of child welfare.

After they were claimed, the Eire boys moved to Bloomington, where they were the only Cuban children in town. "I kind of blended in," says Eire, who went by Charles or Charlie at the time instead of Carlos. Though he recalls some bigotry from his classmates, he also remembers being defended by other children.

Operation Peter Pan ended with the Cuban Missile Crisis. All air traffic stopped between the two countries beginning in October 1962. The influx of Cuban children had been reported on locally in the United States, but details of the program were murky and few outside Florida realized it was happening. "The Communists are certain to call it child-smuggling," wrote Gene Miller in a March 1962 article in the Miami Herald. "No one is telling exactly how it is done."

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The Secret Cold War Program That Airlifted Cuban Kids to the U.S.-Without Their Parents

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"What are you doing here?" The social worker peered at Carlos Eire, shocked to find the Cuban 12-year-old in a home for delinquent boys in Miami, Florida. "You're supposed to be with your uncle."

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Carlos was adopted by a Cuban couple who happened to be Carlos' dad's friend. The couple also have a son who is also Carlos' friend. Later on they adopted 2 more kids.

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Carlos was in the Chicago Hospital where he calls it Hell to get his injury fixed. He experienced shaking, cold, sweating, as if he was going to die. He described the experience as painful and terror

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"When I get to my house, I can't believe my good fortune: My house parents are people I know, friends of my mom and dad" (7).

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"I'm out of Hell, and back to the operation table" (14).

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Carlos visits the hospital with his mom, who is on the edge of dying. He spent the lost few hours holding his mom's hands on the hospital bed as she lies there. At last, his mother passed away.

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"She's unconscious, and her breathing doesn't sound anything like breathing" (29).

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Carlos struggled with English as he only knows basic sentences, he cannot communicate with anyone who doesn't speak Spanish. His first attempt with Norma and Lou were not great but they somehow almost understood what each other are saying.

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"Both of us set ourselves back a whole year, knowing we had a lot of catching up to do... We'd missed too much schooling and didn't know enough English" (53).

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Carlos and Tony were sent to school, however, they've missed a whole year of school in Cuba so they have to stay behind one grade. Both of them know it and are fine with it since they didn't know much English anyway.

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On Thanksgiving, which Carlos called it "Festive Day", his family invited the Rubins over for dinner. At dinner, a turkey was brought out which scares Carlos off, he protested that he doesn't want to eat a bird. Later on, as Carlos is eating, he ate a calf's brain, tongue, and more which makes him ill.

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"And my ignorance of English was a serious problem. I knew how to form basic sentences, but I couldn't really communicate with anyone who didn't speak Spanish" (34).

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"How well I remember that sudden rush of nausea, and the vomit that spewed out" (48).

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"I begin to feel my split personality surface, intensely. I'm no longer just 'me,' but Charles and Carlos. Charles had forgotten how good Cuban food could be and had steadfastly refused to admit to himself that American food was far inferior" (71).

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Carlos made friends with a neighbor kid named Mark. Sometimes Carlos would call and ask the family if he can come over and swim. Lou and Norma would invite him and Tony to hang out with them too. This shows a drastic improvement to his life, making friends and breaking the language barrier.

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Juan Becquer picks up Tony and Carlos over to his house to spend time with him and his family. Even though they are not related, Carlos feels a connection between them because they are just like him- Cuban.

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Ever since Carlos moved to America, he left the Cuban in him behind. He refused to acknowledge anything that is Cuban related; food, cultures, traditions. However, whenever he spends time with the Becquers, he finds the Cuban him in that brings him inner peace.

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Carlos likes bowling because it makes him feel like a true American. Every summer in Miami Carlos' adopted parents would take him to bowling and would put him in bowling lessons. During the summer during 1962, Carlos invited all of his friends to have a party at a bowling alley.

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When attending 6th grade, Carlos had a blunt accent that is hard to not laugh at whenever he speaks. Kids at school would often laugh at him when he speaks English, or would ask annoying questions because he's from another country.

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Norma showed Carlos an article about a missile crisis that happened in Castrolandia. During that time, Carlos' mother was ready to visit him from Cuba in November. Both of Norma and Carlos was upset since they haven't since his mom since they both came to the US.

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The social worker took Carlos and Tony to see their new place to live. Carlos was stunt when he first saw the house. Old, dirty, moldy, small- everything was just out of nowhere. Carlos couldn't handle the fact that it was his new home.

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Since celebrating Christmas was illegal in Cuba, Carlos is not used to getting in the spirit of celebrating his first Christmas ever. Ever since the first Christmas, Christmas to him is now like a 'cannonballs fired from defective artillery', meaning he can't never get used to the spirit.

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When Carlos moved into the new house, which filled with troublesome kids, it was exhausting for him. He started to wonder why his foster parents decided to put him up instead of taking care of him because he is severely ill.

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Carlos moved out of elementary and is now attending middle school. His new classmates are not what he's expected- American; blond, and blue eyes, they were just not American looking.

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Carlos and Tony decided to go to a New Years parade. Even though he doesn't care about how the parade will be- fun, loud, boring- he just doesn't care. He only wants to be out of the house that he's currently living in.

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Carlos' mother is visiting Carlos after many years not seeing him. Now he is a grown man who has a family. His mother groups up with her friends and travel throughout Europe and meets his family in Chicago

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After went to college, Carlos started writing his book "Waiting for Snow in Havana", which was a major success. After that, he continues on with his golden career path.

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"The entire classroom erupts into laughter. Belly laughs, not mere snickering. Prolonged outright laughter" (98).

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"'I can't live there. I can't live in that house'" (114).

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"I don't care how good or how lousy the parade is; I just want to be somewhere other than that stinkhole of a house" (144).

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Our recipe for butterflied (spatchcocked) turkey uses a dry brine that's as simple as rubbing some kosher salt all over the turkey and letting it rest in the fridge overnight, and by removing the turkey's backbone with a pair of poultry shears (I promise, it's easier than it sounds!), you'll wind up with a bird that cooks faster and more evenly. And don't throw out that backbone! Its extra cartilage and meat are the keys to forming the base of our thick, rich gravy.

Sure, we've got plenty of cranberry sauce recipes to choose from, but if you're craving simple, traditional, and easy (but not quite can-shaped-easy), this is it. The recipe calls for little more than cranberries, sugar, water, and salt, with a splash of fresh orange juice to round out the sharp tartness of the berries.

I don't know about you, but in my book, Thanksgiving is all about the stuffing. Moist, fluffy stuffing, to be precise, fragrant with sage and laden with juicy nubbins of sausage. I could eat the leftovers for days-if they were ever to make it that long.

Mildly garlicky and studded with tender chunks of celery and onion, this version gets its richness from a whole stick of butter ( so worth it). If you're feeling adventurous, whip up a little extra to throw into the waffle iron. Haven't you heard? Stuffing waffles are all the rage.

The canned-soup version is all well and good, but if you want to satisfy your nostalgia without sacrificing flavor and texture, you're far better off taking the from-scratch route. We're talking fresh-blanched green beans, mushroom sauce made out of real mushrooms, and your very own fried shallots.

Sweet potatoes should always be delicious, so how come they sometimes come out bland and starchy? The trick to this recipe is par-cooking the potatoes in water between 135 and 170°F (57 and 77°C) before you roast them. This temperature range activates an enzyme that converts their starches into maltose, producing extra-sweet, flavorful spuds. After that, only a stint in the oven will lie between you and those crisp, caramelized edges.

The best part? You need only sweet potatoes, salt, pepper, olive oil, and a little honey and parsley to make it all happen.

If you haven't swapped out steamed or boiled Brussels sprouts for the crispy roasted variety, we need to have a talk. Actually, all we need to do is this: Trim and halve sprouts; toss in olive oil, salt, and pepper; roast; and serve. It's that simple, that easy, and so good-rest assured, you won't have to worry about any stinky leftovers gassing up your fridge.

Getting truly fluffy mashed potatoes all boils (ha!) down to removing as much starch as possible. We start by peeling and dicing russet potatoes and rinsing them thoroughly in cold water before boiling them until tender. Then they get another starch-cleansing rinse before we pass them through a ricer or food mill. Using the proper tool is crucial-unlike a food processor or blender, ricers and food mills won't damage the starch granules excessively, which means your mash will stay nice and light.

PSA to anyone who's been buying canned pumpkin purée with the goal of making pie from real pumpkin: those cans actually contain pumpkin, and you've been making butternut squash pie all along. And with good reason! Butternut squash delivers more concentrated flavor than pumpkin, with way less hassle.

For a shining example of this, look no further than Stella's butternut pie. Enhanced with sweet and creamy homemade condensed milk, her purée starts with roasted squash and gets its warm fall flavor from cinnamon, freshly grated nutmeg, vanilla extract, and brown sugar.

If an entirely from-scratch affair sounds like too much work, try our rich and creamy extra-smooth pumpkin pie, which starts with canned pumpkin butternut squash instead. It's plenty delicious, though it may come with fewer bragging rights.

Every Thanksgiving spread needs a nutty, sweet, custardy pecan pie. Our recipe uses honey, corn syrup, and brown sugar to sweeten the filling, and a touch of vanilla and salt to complement the warm toasted pecans. So long as you blind-bake the crust, you'll wind up with the perfect balance of crisp, crunchy, and incredibly smooth.

What's that? You want even more traditional Thanksgiving dishes? It's cool, we've got you covered. Check out our complete listing of Thanksgiving recipes for an overflowing cornucopia of turkeys, pies, stuffings, mashed potatoes, and more.

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A Classic Thanksgiving Menu to Feed a Crowd

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Our guide to how to make a classic Thanksgiving menu for a crowd includes a crisp-skinned roast turkey, the best caramelized sweet potatoes you've ever tasted, a classic fluffy and moist sausage stuffing, and a "pumpkin" pie made with deeply roasted butternut squash (which doesn't sound traditional, but is!)

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Streamers: Yellow with green borders and three red stripes centered.

Advisory, 15 March 1962 - 7 March 1965. During this period, direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict increased steadily as U.S. trained Vietnamese pilots moved Vietnamese helicopter units into and out of combat. Ultimately the United States hoped that a strong Vietnamese government would result in improved internal security and national defense. The number of U.S. advisors in the field rose from 746 in January 1962 to over 3,400 by June; the entire U.S. commitment by the end of the year was 11,000, which included 29 U.S. Army Special Forces detachments. These advisory and support elements operated under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, a position established 8 February 1962. The object of American military assistance was to counter the threat to the government of the Republic of Vietnam posed by the insurgency of an estimated 30,000 regular communist Viet Cong and civilian sympathizers among the population. Despite what appeared to be considerable successes in consolidating the population in a series of defended strategic hamlets, and in establishing local defense forces, the U.S. equipped Army of the Republic of Vietnam repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to close with the enemy. A corrupt government and bitterly contending Vietnamese political factions further hampered a coherent prosecution of the war with American advisors, who nevertheless continued their efforts well into the period of large scale commitments of U.S. Army forces to the conflict.

Defense, 8 March 1965 - 24 December 1965. During this campaign the U.S. objective was to hold off the enemy while gaining time needed to build base camps and logistical facilities. The U.S. also attempted to consolidate its ground operations more efficiently. For this purpose, it organized the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). U.S. support in the I Corps tactical zone, composed of five northernmost provinces, was to be primarily a Marine Corps responsibility; the U.S. Army was to operate mainly in the II and III Corps tactical zones which comprised the Central highlands, adjacent coastal regions, and the area around Saigon; and ARVN troops were to retain primary responsibility for the Delta region of the IV Corps.

On 19 October 1965. three VC regiments totaling 6,000 men attacked a Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) - U.S. Special Forces at Plei Me, near the entrance to the Ia Drang Valley, in what purported to be the start of a thrust to cut the country in half.

With the assistance of massive air strikes, elements of the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division thwarted the enemy in a battle that lasted nearly a month and included several engagements. The Ia Drang Valley action was the costliest in terms of casualties to date. The successful defense of the region improved security in and around the Central Highlands and raised the morale of the soldiers involved.

Counteroffensive, 25 December 1965 - 30 June 1966. Following the U.S. victory in the Ia Drang Valley, American forces for the remainder of 1965 and well into 1966 sought to keep the enemy off balance while building base camps and logistical installations. This involved search and destroy operations to protect the logistical bases under construction along the coast and the base camps for incoming U.S. units in the provinces near Saigon.

Also of particular concern to the American military mission was the protection of the government and the people of South Vietnam. To accomplish the tasks outlined U.S. efforts were concentrated in the most vital and heavily populated regions. The III Marine Amphibious Force supported the South Vietnamese I Corps in the northern provinces; the I Field Force supported the Vietnamese II Corps in the central region; and the II Field Force supported the South Vietnamese III Corps around Saigon. Consequently, the major battles of the year occurred in these critical areas. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the Korean 2d Marine Brigade, and the ARVN 47th Regiment began Operation VAN BUREN on 19 January to locate and destroy the North Vietnamese 95th Regiment, which was believed to be in the Tuy Hoa Valley. Their mission included protecting the rice harvest produced in the coastal region. The successful execution of these assignments resulted in serious enemy losses. During 20-23 January, a temporary cease fire was proclaimed in honor of the lunar new year (Tet), although minor clashes continued throughout this period.

During February and March, U.S. intelligence reported heavy North Vietnamese Army infiltration from Laos and across the demilitarized zone into Quang Tri Province. Only the South Vietnamese 1st Division and a single U.S. marine battalion were deployed to the province. However, to defend against this threatened invasion the bulk of the U.S. 3d Marine Division and the first U.S. Army combat units, the 173d Airborne Brigade, were moved into the northern provinces. On April 12, U.S. B-52s based on Guam bombed infiltration routes near the Laos border in the first use of these weapons against NVA. Throughout this phase of the campaign, the enemy continued to take refuge in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Driving the enemy back removed the threat of harassment of the populace by North Vietnamese regular forces and curbed local guerrilla activity.

Counteroffensive, Phase II, 1 July 1966 - 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.

North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.

During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.

The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLEBORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.

By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.

On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam-in the so-called "Iron Triangle" about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.

In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the "Iron Triangle", were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.

Counteroffensive, Phase III, 1 June 1967-29 January 1968. The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took peace in the Long Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared "Iron Triangle."

South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.

With an increased delegation of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of contacts.

Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh.

Tet Counteroffensive, 30 January 1968-1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-lunar new year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of the I CTZ, south of the Demilitarized Zone.

Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.

The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.

At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.

Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.

Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.

The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.

Counteroffensive. Phase IV, 2 Apri1 1968-30 June 1968. During this period friendly forces conducted a number of battalion-size attritional operations against the enemy.

Operations PEGASUS-Lam Son 207 relieved the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 5 April and thereby opened Route 9 for the first time since August 1967. This operation not only severely restricted the North Vietnamese Army's use of western Quang Tri Province but also inflicted casualties on the remnants of two North Vietnamese divisions withdrawing from the area. This success was followed by a singular allied spoiling operation in the A Shau Valley, Operation DELAWARE-Lam Son. These two operations prevented the enemy from further attacking I Corps Tactical Zone population centers and forced him to shift his pressure to the III Corps Tactical Zone.

During the period 5-12 May 1968 the Viet Cong launched an offensive with Saigon as the primary objective. Friendly forces defended the city with great determination. Consequently Saigon was never in danger of being overrun. Small Viet Cong units that did manage to get into the outskirts were fragmented and driven out with great loss of enemy life. By the end of June 1968 friendly forces had decisively blunted the enemy's attacks, inflicted very heavy casualties, and hindered his ability to attack urban areas throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy was forced to withdraw to his sanctuaries.

The strength of the U.S. Army in Vietnam reach a peak of nearly 360,000 men during this period.

Counteroffensive, Phase V, 1 July 1968 - 1 November 1968. During this period a country-wide effort was begun to restore government control of territory lost to the enemy since the Tet offensive. The enemy attempted another such offensive on 17-18 August but his efforts were comparatively feeble and were quickly overwhelmed by Allied forces.

In the fall of 1968 the South Vietnamese government, with major U.S. support, launched an accelerated pacification campaign. All friendly forces were coordinated and brought to bear on the enemy in every tactical area of operation. In these intensified operations, friendly units first secured a target area, then Vietnamese government units, regional forces/popular forces, police and civil authorities screened the inhabitants, seeking members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. This technique was so successful against the political apparatus that it became the basis for subsequent friendly operations. Government influence expanded into areas of the countryside previously dominated by the Viet Cong to such an extent that two years later at least some measure of government control was evident in all but a few remote regions.

Counteroffensive, Phase VI, 2 November 1968 - 22 February 1969. In November 1968 the South Vietnam government with American support began a concentrated effort to expand security in the countryside. This project was known as the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign."

This period covers the election of President Richard M. Nixon and a change of policy brought about by his administration after January 1969 when he announced a coming end to US combat in Southeast Asia and a simultaneous strengthening of South Vietnam's ability to defend itself. Formal truce negotiations began in Paris on January 25, 1969. The period can be characterized as marking time in preparation for an about face. Forty-seven ground combat operations were recorded during this period, the following being the most important:

1. Operation NAPOLEON in the Dong Ha area initiated previously (1967) by Marine units, terminated on 9 December 1968.

2. Operation WHEELER WALLOWA by 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) in north-central Quan Tin Province. This ended on 11 November.

3. Operation MACARTHUR initiated by 4th U.S. Infantry Division in II Corps tactical zone terminated on 31 January 1969.

4. Operation COCHISE GREEN conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province.

5. Operation TOAN THANG II consisted of ground operations throughout III CTZ. This was a multi-division operation involving allied forces.

6. Operation SEA LORDS was a coast and riverine operation. On 6 December Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT was started to disrupt enemy infiltration of materials from the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia. Air operations continued to be important with over 60,000 sorties flown.

Tet 69/Counteroffensive, 23 February 1969 - 8 June 1969. From Tet 1969 through the month of June, the enemy again tried to sustain an offensive. His inability to do so can be largely attributed to aggressive allied ground operations. Between 23 February and 8 June 1969, a total of 70 significant named ground operations were terminated resulting in heavy enemy loss of life and materiel. The main operations concluded during this period were:

1. The 3d Marine Division's Operation KENTUCKY aimed at preventing enemy infiltration through the Demilitarized Zone in central Quang Tri Province. Throughout the early part of January 1969, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces continued to avoid major contacts with Free World Forces. Their continual movement to avoid friendly forces or to search for food and supplies contributed to a decrease in the enemy-initiated ground attacks and attacks-by-fire in Quang Tri Province.

2. Operation NEVADA EAG:E, initiated on 17 May 1968 in Thua Thien Province, continued in 1969 as the U.S. 101st Airborne Division continued to defeat enemy personnel, and capture rice caches, material, and installations within its large area of operations, where it undertook offensive sweeps along Route 547 and around Song Bo.

3. Two battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment were engaged in Operation SCOTLAND II. Initiated on 15 April 1968, this multi-battalion search and clear operation was centered in and around Khe Sanh.

4. The IV Corps Tactical Zone Dry Weather Campaign began on 1 December 1968 in support of the overall mission to prevent Viet Cong units from interfering with pacification efforts. This operation, "Speedy Express," interdicted lines of enemy communication and denied him the use of base areas. In 1969 the 1st Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division continued the operation in Dinh Tuong Province, using its highly successful night ambush tactics while the 2d Brigade continued its mission with the Mobile Riverine Force. Although engagements in Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS were typically small, the 9th Infantry Division fought several sizeable engagements with impressive results.

On 23 February U.S. Navy units and installations at Da Nang, Tan An, Ben Luc, Go Dan Ha, and Tra Cu came under numerous and widespread attacks associated with a new enemy offensive, but since many units in these areas were poised to meet these attacks they caused only minimal damage. April saw the heaviest cumulative enemy activity in the barrier interdiction camapign to date.

Summer-Fall 1969, 9 June 1969-31 October 1969. During the summer and fall of 1969, conduct of operations was increasingly turned over to Vietnamese, US troops withdrew in greater numbers amid reaffirmations of support for the Republic of South Vietnam government. President Nixon announced the reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam which would be demonstrated initially by the withdrawal of 25,000 troops by 31 August 1969.

American troop strength had peaked at 543,400 in April 1969 but dropped to 505,500 by mid October. More scattered than before, enemy attacks were concentrated on South Vietnamese positions. U.S. combat deaths were down in the early fall as American units switched to small unit actions. The trend was not constant, however, because U.S. troops deaths which had fallen well below l00 a week in the fall, rose above 100 later in the year.

Winter-Spring 1970, 1 November 1969-30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter campaign. This was highlighted by intensified harassment incidents, and attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In November-December these were heaviest in Corps Tactical Zones III and IV (around Saigon), primarily directed against Vietnamese military installations in order to disrupt the pacification program. The most significant enemy activity occurred in November with heavy attacks upon By Prang and Duc Lap in CTZ II (Central Vietnam).

By February 1970 the focus of enemy activity began to shift to CTZ I and II. Attacks increased steadily, reaching a peak in April 1970. Hostile forces staged their heaviest attacks in the Central Highlands near Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Dak Seang, Dak Pek, and Ben Het in I CTZ. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks by fire and several sapper attacks against U.S. fire support bases. This high level of enemy activity began in I CTZ in April and continued through May.

During the period 1 November 1969 through 30 April 1970 U.S. and allied forces concentrated on aggressive operations to find and destroy enemy main and local forces, the penetration of base camps and installations and the seizure of enemy supplies and materiel. These operations sought to deny the enemy the initiative and to inflict heavy losses in men and materiel. Further progress was made in Vietnamization through improving the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. As a result of these advances three brigades of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and several major U.S.M.C. units were withdrawn from Vietnam during this period.

The enemy made several efforts to take the offensive at Dak Seang, which was attacked on 1 April 1970 and remained under siege throughout the month, and at Quang Duc in the By Prong-Duc Lap area which ended on 28 December. Only Vietnamese forces were engaged in both of these operations, the Quang Duc campaign involving some 12,000 ARVN troops. South Vietnamese forces again took the offensive on 14 April in a bold 3-day operation in the Angel's Wing area along the Cambodian border. The Vietnamese Army completed this mission in an aggressive professional manner without U.S. support-further evidence of their growing proficiency.

Sanctuary Counteroffensive, 1 May 1970 - 30 June 1970. This campaign was mainly concerned with the Allied incursion into Cambodia, codenamed Operation ROCK CRUSHER. As American withdrawal from South Vietnam proceeded, increasing concern arose over the enemy's strength in the sanctuaries inside Cambodia. With the emergence in Cambodia of an antiCommunist government under Lon Nol, President Nixon relaxed the restrictions on moving against the bases inside Cambodia. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong began to move on the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. At this juncture Lon Nol appealed to the United States for help. American and allied Vietnamese forces began large-scale offensives in Cambodia on 1 May. Eight major US Army and South Vietnamese operations took place in Cambodia in May and June with the object of cutting enemy communication lines, seizing the sanctuary areas and capturing the shadowy Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) described as the control center for enemy military operations against III CTZ.

Counteroffensive, Phase VII, 1 July 1970 - 30 June 1971. Fighting continued in Cambodia during early February before and after South Vietnam began its U.S.-aided drive in Laos, Lam Son 719, the most significant operation during this campaign.

Lam Son 719 was conducted out of I Corps by Vietnamese troops with US fire and air support. Their object was to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to destroy enemy bases at Techepone, Laos. The operation consisted of four phases. In Phases I, called Operation DEWEY CANYON II, the 1st Brigade, US 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) occupied the Khe Sanh area and cleared Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. In the meantime, the US 101st Airborne Division conducted diversionary operations in the A Shau Valley. The US 45th Engineer Group had the mission of repairing Route No. 9 up to the Laotian border. This lasted from 30 January to 7 February 1971. During Phase II US forces continued to provide fire support, helilift, and tactical and strategic air support for ARVN units. This phase was 8 February to March 1971. Phase III ran from March to 16 March 1971; Phase IV was the withdrawal phase.

Faced with mounting losses, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, the commander of the invasion forces, decided to cut short the operation and ordered a withdrawal.

Lam Son 719, though it was less than a signal success, forestalled a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971. Enemy units and replacements enroute south were diverted to the scene of the action.

Consolidation I, 1 July 1971 - 30 November 1971. This period witnessed additional progress in the Vietnamization program which included turning over the ground war to South Vietnam, sustaining the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but also continuing, U.S. air strikes on enemy targets.

South Vietnam assumed full control of defense for the area immediately below the demilitarized zone on 11 July, a process begun in 1969. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced completion of Phase I of Vietnamization on 11 August which meant that the U.S. relinquished all ground combat responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam. The participation of U.S. forces in ground combat operations had not ceased, however, U.S. maneuver battalions were still conducting missions, and the 101st Airborne Division joined the 1st Army of Vietnam 1st Infantry Division in Operation JEFFERSON GLEN that took place in Thua Thien Province in October. This was the last major combat operation in Vietnam which involved U.S. ground forces. Following the close of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN on 8 October, the 101st began stand-down procedures and was the last U.S. division to leave Vietnam.

U.S. troop strengths decreased during Consolidation I. American battle deaths for July 1971 were 66, the lowest monthly figure since May 1967. By early November, U.S. troop totals dropped to 191,000, the lowest level since December 1965. In early November, President Nixon announced that American troops had reverted to a defensive role in Vietnam.

Consolidation II, 1 December 1971 - 29 March 1972. The U.S. continued to reduce its ground presence in South Vietnam during late 1971 and early 1972, but American air attacks increased while both sides exchanged peace proposals.

In early January 1972 President Nixon confirmed that U.S. troop withdrawals would continue but promised that a force of 25,000-30,000 would remain in Vietnam until all American prisoners of war were released. Secretary of Defense Laird reported that Vietnamization was progressing well and that U.S. troops would not be reintroduced into Vietnam even in a military emergency. U.S. troop strength in Vietnam dropped to 136,500 by 31 January 1972, to 119,600 by 29 February, and then to 95,500 by the end of March.

During the last week of December 1971 U.S. Air Force and Navy planes carried out 1,000 strikes on North Vietnam, the heaviest U.S. air attacks since November 1968. Allied commanders insisted that it was necessary because of a huge buildup of military supplies in North Vietnam for possible offensive operations against South Vietnam and Cambodia. Stepped up North Vietnamese anti-aircraft and missile attacks on U.S. aircraft that bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos also contributed to the decision. During January 1972 American planes maintained their intermittent bombardment of missile sites in North Vietnam and on he Laotian border and also struck North Vietnamese troop concentrations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.

On 25 January President Nixon announced an eight part program to end the war which included agreement to remove all U.S. and foreign allied troops from Vietnam no later than six months after a peace agreement was reached. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong delegates rejected the proposal and insisted upon complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina and cessation of all forms of U.S. aid to South Vietnam.

Cease-Fire, 30 March 1972 - 28 January 1973. On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese Army launched its greatest offensive of the entire war. The enemy deployed the greatest array of troops and modern weapons to date in a major effort to end the war with conventional forces and seized considerable territory in an effort to exercise control of key provinces throughout Vietnam.

During this critical period the Vietnamization program continued in the face of the North Vietnamese invasion and the successful counterattack by the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Army aviation units played an impressive role throughout the period, flying reconnaissance, close support missions, and transporting troops. As U.S. combat troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, the role of helicopter units increased in importance and they responded to the challenge of continuing to support while preparing the RVNAF to assume their function. Similarly, advisors of all services contributed immeasurably to the defeat of the enemy invasion and the continued Vietnamization process. Army and Marine advisors fought side-by-side with their RVNAF counterparts to stop and defeat the enemy invasion, as the Vietnamese counteroffensive gained momentum and the reduction of field advisers continued. The advisory effort shifted to emphasize training and to assure that the VNAF attained self-sufficiency prior to the complete withdrawal of the U.S forces.

Recapture of Quang Tri City on 16 September 1972 marked the complete failure of the enemy to hold any of the targeted provincial capitols. Massive aid replaced materiel lost during the spring counteroffensive. Retraining and reconstruction of selected RVNAF units increased their capabilities. The completion of the massive logistical buildup of RVNAF was accomplished, which enabled the RVNAF to become more self-sufficient as direct U.S. participation diminished. The US ground role in Vietnam was totally replaced by the RVNAF. During December 1972 and January 1973 the RVIVAF flew more than 45% of air sorties within Vietnam. In November 1972, the RVNAF began a C-130 training program and by January 1973 realized a significant increase in their capability. RVNAF forward air controllers began directing USAF and RVNAF strike aircraft in January 1973. The US policy of Vietnamization continued.

US combat and combat support operations were conducted in support of RVNAF ground operations during the North Vietnamese invasion and the counteroffensive including intensive interdiction of enemy supply routes into Vietnam. Since US ground forces had been reduced to seven battalions, the US ground combat role was limited to defense of key installations. Further reduction in troop ceilings led to the redeployment of all US ground combat battalions, leaving an Army contingent of combat support and service support units.

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Streamers: Yellow with green borders and three red stripes centered. Advisory, 15 March 1962 - 7 March 1965. During this period, direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict increased steadily as U.S. trained Vietnamese pilots moved Vietnamese helicopter units into and out of combat.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was unique in a number of ways, featuring calculations and miscalculations as well as direct and secret communications and miscommunications between the two sides. The dramatic crisis was also characterized by the fact that it was primarily played out at the White House and the Kremlin level with relatively little input from the respective bureaucracies typically involved in the foreign policy process.

After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL-28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14 a U.S. U-2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers-including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff-argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a naval "quarantine" of Cuba. The use of "quarantine" legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of "quarantine" instead of "blockade" also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States.

That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis.

The President also went on national television that evening to inform the public of the developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a "quarantine," and the potential global consequences if the crisis continued to escalate. The tone of the President's remarks was stern, and the message unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: "It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy's message with a statement that the U.S. "blockade" was an "act of aggression" and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no offensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2-meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent. On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate.

That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this "back channel" offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the middle of the night Moscow time. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day. "If there is no intention," he said, "to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this."

Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a resolution was short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution. It was determined that Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night, Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba.

It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message. Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and indicated that the United States was planning to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey anyway, and that it would do so soon, but this could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis. The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba.

The crisis was over but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL-28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963.

The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy's image domestically and internationally. It also may have helped mitigate negative world opinion regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique forms. First, despite the flurry of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin-perhaps because of it-Kennedy and Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled throughout the crisis to clearly understand each others' true intentions, while the world hung on the brink of possible nuclear war. In an effort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the "Hotline." Second, having approached the brink of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

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Milestones: 1961-1968 - Office of the Historian

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