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For John Keane, “When seen with the wisdom of hindsight, this constitutional republic called the United States of America was a remarkable innovation with great democratic potential, but to say that just serves to heighten the irony that the whole edifice was built in the name of putting a stop to democracy.” To what extent is this statement true?

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The relationship between democracy, the American Revolution and the creation of the United States has always been a contentious topic for historians. It is hard for many to believe that the so-called ‘leader of the free world’ could have been founded on principles that, in some cases, directly oppose the ideals of democracy that are taken for granted by Americans today. Whilst there is still no clear consensus on what the term ‘democracy’ implies exactly, this project will attempt to analyse the status of democracy in events leading to the creation of the United States with a modern interpretation of the word and its various associated principles, primarily that of regular elections for representative institutions by a certain franchise. With the idea of democracy as the main focus, the scope of this project’s inquiry will be limited specifically to the developments of white male democracy in the US, as unfortunately the concept of democracy was presupposed at the time of study to only apply to that demographic. It will be revealed that because of the conditions of American society at that time, a republic reconcilable with democracy was created from the revolution and despite certain ‘undemocratic’ elements in the new nation’s birth, it would be inaccurate to say that its “whole edifice” was built to stop democracy.

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Historiography of the American Revolution is typically divided into two main schools: that of the Whig interpretation and the Progressive interpretation. Whig historians and their Neo-Whig counterparts view the events as the radical culmination of American desires for freedom and liberty and as a universal advancement for democracy. Meanwhile, the progressive school refers to a group of scholars who take a more critical view of the revolution through the lens of economic relations between classes. Notably, Keane’s statement follows their view of the constitution as a reaction against the development of popular rule in the US by an elite class. This project will attempt to incorporate the works from both main schools to comprehensively unearth the state and development of white male democracy specifically in the revolution. Wood’s works, widely considered to belong under a ‘neo-whig’ interpretation of the revolution, will especially be used to expose the innovative and at times ‘radical’ elements of the revolution, while works that could be considered to belong under a ‘progressive’ interpretation will be used to develop the contention that many forces within the new states were in fact, intent on stifling democracy.

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It is first important to dispel notions, especially prominent among historians of the post-war consensus era of the 1940s and 50s and nowadays among much of the public, that take for granted that the US would fully embrace democratic principles as a nation founded by middle-class colonists, who were “jealous of their liberties and determined to assert their rights in powerful colonial legislatures.”¹ Scholars, especially since the 1970s have rebuked this notion, highlighting the fact that the colonies by the mid-1700s developed societies modelled after the English and that colonists shared similar views with the British on the merits of mixed governance with a monarch and strong aristocracy to balance the popular assembly. Particularly, they were wary of democracy and regarded the mixed government of Britain at the time highly.²

Despite this fact, the so-called ‘democratic potential’ of the colonies cannot be denied. The fact that the colonies were founded on a continent lacking established state structures, where the abundance of land relative to labour meant that the rulers needed to ensure the “consent of the governed” and that “democracy would be expected to flourish.”³ Indeed, despite caution towards to concept of ‘democracy’, two-thirds of white adult men among the colonists were enfranchised to vote for colonial governments. The fact that most of the colonists owned property and thereby had an economic stake in politics and the fact that they took their political rights as a given while owning a significant number of firearms meant that any government wishing to rule over them had to respect their will.⁴ Moreover, the colonies lacked an established aristocracy as the governing class enshrined in law. Although there was a local hierarchy, the wealthy lacked the legal ruling rights such as those of the aristocracy in Britain.⁵ While one would be mistaken to adopt the view that democracy was the inevitable fate of the US, its potential to develop a relatively democratic system of government for its white male population is evident.

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Democracy and the Revolutionary War (1775-83)

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Democracy and the Revolutionary War (1775-83)

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The end of the American Revolutionary War left democracy in a relatively ambiguous state, however, the republican ideals of the revolution can be said to have advanced the position of democracy. The issues of representation and fear of an overbearing government were key drivers of revolt and they were crucial in shaping the emergence of ‘representative democracy in the new nation. The aftermath of the 7 Years War and the debt incurred by Britain saw them implement “unprecedented taxation” of the American colonies.⁶ This shattered the colonists' misled beliefs that they would never be taxed by a house of commons in which they had no representation, and turned them against the British system of government, which Thomas Paine claimed had failed to prevent tyrannical actions from the king.⁷ It must be emphasised that, at this point, ‘democracy’ remained a difficult concept for revolutionaries to accept and the term was even weaponised by loyalists and conservative patriots to condemn the threat of mob rule and egalitarianism they saw develop around them during the war.⁸ Nevertheless, the disillusionment with the British system combined with Paine’s influential calls to distance themselves from all things British led to a consensus on a republican form of governance for the revolutionaries once independence was settled upon.⁹ Under Wood’s neo-whig interpretation of the revolution, the republican government were antithetical to monarchical ideals of hierarchy, and patronage and redefined individual conceptions and relationships with the state, lending the new nation much more open to prospects of democratic principles.¹⁰ By the end of the war and throughout the 1780s, the revolutionaries had established a highly-decentralised form of governance dominated by “intimate” local and state assemblies filled with “officeholders” who were “less educated, less wealthy and closer to the average citizen than they had been in 1765”¹¹. While the new republic did not outright embrace democracy, to Shankman it “was a visible and likely outcome of the revolution”.¹²

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Traditional progressive views of the constitution as a tool for the American elite to stifle the rapid rate of democratisation in the confederation have been increasingly challenged by contemporary scholars. There is a degree of mistruth in saying that “the whole edifice” of the United States was built by the founding fathers to suffocate democracy; staking this claim would ignore the outstanding problems of the Confederation as a disintegrated entity immediately after the revolution that drove the need for a national constitution. Edling contends that:

“According to Madison, the chief architect of the United States Constitution, the impetus to replace the Articles of Confederation arose from the widespread sense that Congress under the Articles was unable to address pressing matters of national and intra-national security.” ¹³

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The Constitution and "Putting A Stop to Democracy" (1787-1788)

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The Constitution and "Putting A Stop to Democracy" (1787-1788)

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Whilst it might not have been the sole objective of the constitution and its drafters, controlling the development of democracy was definitely one of their goals. Neo-Progressive historians such as Bouton in particular emphasise the aristocratic and elitist tendencies of many of the Founding Fathers. He uses the example of Robert Morris as an example of how the gentry, who opposed the fiscal policies of state democratic assemblies, used their wealth to gain increasing influence within both the local government as well as the Constitutional Convention. Bouton goes as far as to say that most members of the constitutional convention, who were themselves some of the wealthiest men in America, were related to Morris in some way, and the constitution would be created around many of his own elitist principles.¹⁴This elitist tendency was also present in Alexander Hamilton himself, who although did not explicitly favoured the rich, believed that they possessed more merits and virtues than the general public.¹⁵

Another factor to note in the creation of the constitution besides the elitism present in the founding fathers was the lingering caution in regards to the concept of ‘democracy’ itself, leading to the introduction of systems of checks and balances on popular rule. In essence, the constitution reflects the attempts of the framers to “balance the imperatives of popular sovereignty against the fear of excessive democracy”.16 The suspicion of the masses alongside deference to the popular will of ‘the people’ was the fundamental dichotomy that defined the provisions of the constitution.¹⁷The provision for a national senate with long, 6-year term limits is a prime example of this; it is claimed by Madison to be a barrier against “the impulse of sudden and violent passions” that was a dangerous aspect of democracy to him.18 Hamilton, a fellow federalist, shared similar sentiments on the merit of the senate, claiming that the public is “frequently lead into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion” and that “they do not possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government.”19 Even the House of Representatives, supposedly the true representative instrument that the constitution mandated, was designed to have large electoral districts to limit the local democratic politics that had allowed commoners to enter office as had happened within state assemblies.²⁰

Crucially, however, the framers of the constitution had to work with the democratic traditions that had existed in the colonies for centuries and therefore could not eliminate democracy completely; rather, the founding fathers would try their best to protect the interests of the wealthy from the interference of the masses.21 In fact, King argues that Americans had, at this point, “taken it for granted that they had a God-given right to play an active part in the government of the new republic.”22  The convention was well aware of this, and this fact is reflected in the US constitution with, for instance, its explicit ban on nobility²³ and eventhe beginning of the constitution, “We the people”²⁴, can be considered radical for its time in that it firmly enshrines the people as the ultimate sovereigns of the nation.25  Hence, although there were many elements of the constitution of the new American nation that can be considered to have been limiting to the development of ‘full’ democracy, the ratifiers were firmly aware of the extent to which democracy was enshrined in the psyche of Americans and therefore did not attempt “put a stop” to democracy per se, rather they limited the impact it could have on their wealth and attempted to stifle aspects of democracy they saw as dangerous to the new union.

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The representative democratic framework that the constitution set up importantly had provisions for amendment and self-correction, allowing for the continuous advancement of democracy within the new federation.26 Thomas Jefferson was particularly concerned about the lack of proclaimed rights for the citizen, and he shared this sentiment with the many described as ‘antifederalist’ around the country.27 To assuage these fears, the ‘Bill of Rights’ was introduced which included terms guaranteeing freedom of speech and state secularism,²⁸ principles widely considered today to be inseparable from a modern liberal democratic government.

Generally, Jefferson and his fellow Democratic-Republican politicians, which formed in opposition to Hamilton’s federalist party, would come to embody the development of popular participation in US politics and political discourse. By 1794 over 30 Democratic-Republican had formed, actively debating and protesting the fiscal and foreign policies of their government.29 Being able to find representation in these politicians, these societies would normalise extraconstitutional political participation among the populace, emboldened by their newly found freedom of speech, and incurring “a democratic widening of American Politics… greater than anything Jefferson, Madison, and their fellow gentry oppositionists could have imagined in 1789”.³⁰

This was all to culminate in the election of 1800, which saw the first peaceful transition of power between the then novel innovation of political parties. Despite the bitter and divisive process³¹, the exaltation of the democratic spirit of peaceful disagreement in the US is perhaps best exemplified in Jefferson’s inaugural address: “Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle.”³²

The study of this period of rapid change in the US seeks to highlight how provisions in the constitution, whether intentionally or not, have allowed for continuous advancement in the state of democracy, which shows that if the intentions of the founding fathers were to lock the development of democracy with the constitution, it has, in the words of Wood, “failed miserably.”³³

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While Keane was correct in outlining the “great democratic potential” of the US, his claim that the new structures of the union were “built in the name of putting a stop to democracy” ignores the many nuances regarding the intentions of the founding fathers. The research undertaken as part of this project has shown that the democratic potential of the US was also the reason why the framers of the constitution, despite aspects of their elitism and distrust of the masses seeping through, drafted one of the most radically democratic documents of their time.

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'Democratic Potential'
1   Robert Brown, (1955) Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1790, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. As cited in Andrew Shankman, “The American Revolution” in The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy : From Pre-History to Future Possibilities / Edited by Benjamin Isakhan ; Stephen Stockwell. 2012. Edinburgh University Press. 199.

2   Andrew Shankman, “The American Revolution” in The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy : From Pre-History to Future Possibilities / Edited by Benjamin Isakhan ; Stephen  Stockwell. 2012. Edinburgh University Press. 199.

3    David Stasavage, The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. 225

4   Michael Zuckerman, ' The Polite and the Plebeian', in Jane Kamensky, and Edward G. Gray (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution, Oxford Handbooks (2012; online edn, Oxford Academic, 28 Dec. 2012).

5  Ibid.

Democracy and the Revolutionary War (1775-83)
6  Shankman, 200

7  Thomas Paine. Common Sense, New York: Penguin ([1776] 1986) as cited in Shankman, 200

8 Seth Cotlar, 'Languages of Democracy in America from the Revolution to the Election of 1800', in Joanna Innes, and Mark Philp (eds), Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland 1750-1850 (Oxford, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Sept. 2013)

9  Shankman, 200

10 Gordon Wood, 1993. The Radicalism of the American Revolution / Gordon S. Wood. Vintage Books. 96

11 Jackson Main, ‘Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratisation of the Legislatures’, William and Mary Quarterly (1966), 23(3), 391-400 as cited in Shankman, 201.

¹² Shankman, 201

The Confederation (1784-86)
¹³ Max Edling, 'A More Perfect Union: The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution', in Jane Kamensky, and Edward G. Gray (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution, Oxford Handbooks (2012; online edn, Oxford Academic, 28 Dec. 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199746705.013.0022

The Constitution and "Putting a Stop to Democracy" (1787-88)
14 Terry Bouton. 2007. Taming Democracy : “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution / Terry Bouton. Oxford University Press. 62

15  Charles Meister. 1987. The Founding Fathers / by Charles W. Meister. McFarland. 125

16 Anthony King. 2012. The Founding Fathers v. the People : Paradoxes of American Democracy / Anthony King. Harvard University Press. 29

17 Sean Wilentz. 2005. The Rise of American Democracy : Jefferson to Lincoln / Sean Wilentz. Norton. 40

18  James Madison, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, JOHN JAY, John Dunn, Donald L. Horowitz, and Eileen Hunt Botting. “The Federalist No. 62: THE SENATE.” In The Federalist Papers, edited by Ian Shapiro, 313–18. Yale University Press, 2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vm398.65

19  Aly Howard, ed., Alexander Hamilton: Selections (Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p. 100, as cited in Meister, 126

20   Bouton, 176.

21  ibid, 177

22  King, 77

²³  U.S. Const. Art. 1, Clause 8

24   U.S. const. Preamble

25 Kloppenberg, James T. 2016. Toward Democracy : The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought / James T. Kloppenberg. Oxford University Press. 410-413

Democratic Progression
26 U.S. const. Art. 5

27  Kloppenberg, 412-415

28  U.S. Const. amend. I

29  Wilentz, 40-42

³⁰ Ibid, 41 & 60

³¹ Dan Sisson and Thom Hartmann. The American Revolution Of 1800 : How Jefferson Rescued Democracy from Tyranny and Faction--And What This Means Today. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Incorporated, 2014.

32  Thomas Jefferson, ‘First Inaugural Address’, 4 March 1801, reprinted in Saul K. Padover (ed.), The Complete Jefferson (Freeport, NY, 1969), pp. 385.

33 Gordon Wood, “Interest and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 70.

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Howard, Aly ed., Alexander Hamilton: Selections (Liberal Arts Press, 1957)

Jefferson, Thomas. ‘First Inaugural Address’, 4 March 1801, reprinted in Saul K. Padover (ed.), The Complete Jefferson (Freeport, NY, 1969).

Madison, James. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, JOHN JAY, John Dunn, Donald L. Horowitz, and Eileen Hunt Botting. “The Federalist No. 62: THE SENATE.” In The Federalist Papers, edited by Ian Shapiro, 313–18. Yale University Press, 2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vm398.65.

Paine, Thomas. Common Sense, New York: Penguin ([1776] 1986).

U.S. Constitution

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Bouton, Terry. 2007. Taming Democracy : “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution / Terry Bouton. Oxford University Press.

Brown, Robert (1955) Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1790, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Cotlar, Seth. 'Languages of Democracy in America from the Revolution to the Election of 1800', in Joanna Innes, and Mark Philp (eds), Re-imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland 1750-1850 (Oxford, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Sept. 2013).

Edling, Max M. 'A More Perfect Union: The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution', in Jane Kamensky, and Edward G. Gray (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution, Oxford Handbooks (2012; online edn, Oxford Academic, 28 Dec. 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199746705.013.0022

King, Anthony S. 2012. The Founding Fathers v. the People : Paradoxes of American Democracy / Anthony King. Harvard University Press.

Kloppenberg, James T. 2016. Toward Democracy : The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought / James T. Kloppenberg. Oxford University Press.

Main, Jackson T. ‘Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratisation of the Legislatures’, William and Mary Quarterly (1966), 23(3), 391-400.

Meister, Charles W. 1987. The Founding Fathers / by Charles W. Meister. McFarland.

Shankman, Andrew. “The American Revolution” in The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy : From Pre-History to Future Possibilities / Edited by Benjamin Isakhan ; Stephen Stockwell. 2012. Edinburgh University Press.

Sisson, Dan and Hartmann,Thom. The American Revolution Of 1800 : How Jefferson Rescued Democracy from Tyranny and Faction--And What This Means Today. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Incorporated, 2014.

Stasavage, David. The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.

Wilentz, Sean. 2005. The Rise of American Democracy : Jefferson to Lincoln / Sean Wilentz. Norton.

Wood, Gordon S. “Interest and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987),

Wood, Gordon S. 1993. The Radicalism of the American Revolution / Gordon S. Wood. Vintage Books.

Zuckerman, Michael. ' The Polite and the Plebeian', in Jane Kamensky, and Edward G. Gray (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution, Oxford Handbooks (2012; online edn, Oxford Academic, 28 Dec. 2012).