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This cartoon shows the other side of the argument where people think that Kim Jong Un is unpredictable and almost seems child-like. But I believe Kim has a lot more logic behind what he is doing than what we see from him.

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In this quote from Kim Jong Un, you can see why he is building up his army and is building nuclear weapons. Kim believes having a big army will somehow make the country more wealthy. They already have the most massive army in the world, so I wonder when North Korea is supposed to start thriving.

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In this article they discuss why going to war with North Korea would be a bad idea. Even if we somehow attacked North Korea and take out Kim Jung Un without him using any weapons it would be harmful to start a war with them. Going to war with North Korea would risk another situation like in Iraq. Most likely a civil war would break out in North Korea, and the country would become very unstable and threaten the neighboring countries as well.

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If war erupts with North Korea, then the U.S. military will have problems, according to a series of war games conducted by the RAND Corporation.

Invading North Korea to capture or destroy Kim Jong-un's nuclear arsenal, or to knock out artillery batteries threatening Seoul, would overstretch and deplete American and South Korean forces. More ominously, this could also trigger Chinese military intervention.

RAND focused on the ability of the U.S. military-and especially the U.S. Army, which sponsored the research-to respond to three potential issues: the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons, the ability of North Korean conventional artillery to devastate Seoul, and the military and diplomatic challenges of securing Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal should the Communist regime collapse and North Korea degenerate into civil war.

"We simply don't have enough troops to search North Korea for loose nukes and perform all the other missions of a post-conflict or collapse scenario, and we can't get them into North Korea nearly quickly enough to avoid leakage," RAND researcher Michael Mazarr told the National Interest.
Related: This Is One Of US Military Planners' Greatest Fears In A War With North Korea "
Regarding nuclear weapons, the report pointed out an obvious but uncomfortable fact: a sufficiently large North Korea atomic arsenal will render an invasion and conquest of North Korea impossible. "Within five to eight years, North Korea is likely to have enough survivable nuclear capability to make any move into North Korea prohibitively costly in the absence of transformative new capabilities to neutralize the North Korean nuclear force." And regardless of U.S. policy, South Korea and Japan may be constrained by the prospect of North Korean nuclear retaliation.

As for the threat of North Korea's formidable artillery arsenal (reportedly more than ten thousand artillery pieces) turning Seoul into a sea of fire, RAND examined either knocking out the guns with air and artillery strikes, or a limited cross-border invasion to seize the Kaesong Heights where the weapons are emplaced. But air and artillery fire could take weeks to knock out the heavily fortified guns, while a ground invasion runs the risk of triggering use of North Korea's nuclear weapons.

A major problem is that even a limited invasion would require massive forces, including two full South Korean corps. And there is reason to question whether South Korea could sustain the effort. "In our wargames, it was not unusual for the equivalent of a corps to be destroyed in one week's fighting to achieve a single penetration, translating to tens of thousands of casualties," RAND noted. "Casualties at this scale would likely exhaust the South Korean military's capacity for follow-on missions, such as unifying the peninsula or securing WMD sites."

While that conclusion is based on a specific scenario-attacking a narrow, heavily defended corridor and with North Korea using chemical weapons-the wargames indicated that "South Korea grinds up much of its offensive striking power just to get through or clear out the Kaesong vicinity," Mazarr said. "That leaves a lot of ROK [Republic of Korea] capacity but not necessarily the sort that can punch through defenses. What that means in terms of a larger campaign we don't evaluate. My personal view is that indeed, the ROK alone would stall out long before getting to Pyongyang."

As for securing North Korean nuclear weapons, RAND conducted several wargames based on the premise that U.S. troops moved in to capture the nukes after Kim Jong-un died and his nation degenerated into civil war. But the wargames suggested any successors to the North Korean leader would have an incentive to keep control of the nukes as a matter of political power (and hiding them would be easy). Nor could airpower alone destroy them, just as aerial Scud-busting failed in Iraq.

"It surprised me at how easy it was for the North Koreans to hide, or make it difficult, for the United States and the ROK [South Korea] to find nuclear weapons or nuclear materials," Stacie Pettyjohn, co-director of RAND's Center for Gaming, told The National Interest.
Related: Mattis Explains What War With North Korea Would Look Like "
Those who believe that toppling Kim Jong-un's regime would solve the problem should pay attention to this finding in the RAND report: "In all the wargames, at least one of the North Korean factions employed a nuclear weapon during the conflict. While the United States may believe that securing North Korea's nuclear arsenal is a limited mission, some North Korean factions in the wargames tended to view U.S. intervention as the prelude to unification and thus an existential threat to North Korea as an independent entity. This put them in the situation of using their nuclear weapons-the ultimate guarantor of their security-or losing them."

Then there is the China question. During the RAND wargames, Chinese forces entered North Korea to secure the Sino-North Korean border as well as nuclear weapons facilities in the northern part of the country. In addition, a ground operation to destroy artillery batteries on the Kaesong Heights would also place U.S. and South Korean troops on the Kaesong corridor, one of the few invasion routes toward the Chinese border. In 1950, this provoked a massive Chinese response, and the same could happen again.

However, Mazarr cautions that a lot depends on the situation. "The behavior of China in our games both suggests and assumes that Beijing would want to stay out of a U.S.-North Korea clash as much as it could. The question becomes the origins of the clash and whether it feels its credibility is on the line at a critical moment as it seeks greater influence and status. So if North Korea begins an unprovoked artillery barrage on Seoul, clearance ops in Kaesong might not cause China to flinch. But what if we hit first and the North Korean shots are a response?"
This article originally appeared on The National Interest Read more from The National Interest: WATCH NEXT:

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Here's Exactly Why War With North Korea Would Be Hell, According To New War Games

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If war erupts with North Korea, then the U.S. military will have problems, according to a series of war games conducted by the RAND Corporation.Invading North Korea to capture or destroy Kim Jong-un's nuclear arsenal, or to knock out artillery batteries threatening Seoul, would overstretch and deple...

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As you can see in this tweet from President Trump it looks like a lot of dealing with North Korea comes down to what will China do about it. So far China has shown zero interest in helping denuclearize North Korea. But have been clear if anyone attacks North Korea that they would defend them.

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A big question is if America could easily take out North Korea's leader then why don't we just do it? This article explains that if we were to attack North Korea first then most likely China would come to the defense of North Korea. America is already on shaky ground with China currently and would destroy our relationship with China if this happened.

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If war erupts with North Korea, then the U.S. military will have problems, according to a series of war games conducted by the RAND Corporation.

Invading North Korea to capture or destroy Kim Jong-un's nuclear arsenal, or to knock out artillery batteries threatening Seoul, would overstretch and deplete American and South Korean forces. More ominously, this could also trigger Chinese military intervention.

RAND focused on the ability of the U.S. military-and especially the U.S. Army, which sponsored the research-to respond to three potential issues: the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons, the ability of North Korean conventional artillery to devastate Seoul, and the military and diplomatic challenges of securing Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal should the Communist regime collapse and North Korea degenerate into civil war.

"We simply don't have enough troops to search North Korea for loose nukes and perform all the other missions of a post-conflict or collapse scenario, and we can't get them into North Korea nearly quickly enough to avoid leakage," RAND researcher Michael Mazarr told the National Interest.
Related: This Is One Of US Military Planners' Greatest Fears In A War With North Korea "
Regarding nuclear weapons, the report pointed out an obvious but uncomfortable fact: a sufficiently large North Korea atomic arsenal will render an invasion and conquest of North Korea impossible. "Within five to eight years, North Korea is likely to have enough survivable nuclear capability to make any move into North Korea prohibitively costly in the absence of transformative new capabilities to neutralize the North Korean nuclear force." And regardless of U.S. policy, South Korea and Japan may be constrained by the prospect of North Korean nuclear retaliation.

As for the threat of North Korea's formidable artillery arsenal (reportedly more than ten thousand artillery pieces) turning Seoul into a sea of fire, RAND examined either knocking out the guns with air and artillery strikes, or a limited cross-border invasion to seize the Kaesong Heights where the weapons are emplaced. But air and artillery fire could take weeks to knock out the heavily fortified guns, while a ground invasion runs the risk of triggering use of North Korea's nuclear weapons.

A major problem is that even a limited invasion would require massive forces, including two full South Korean corps. And there is reason to question whether South Korea could sustain the effort. "In our wargames, it was not unusual for the equivalent of a corps to be destroyed in one week's fighting to achieve a single penetration, translating to tens of thousands of casualties," RAND noted. "Casualties at this scale would likely exhaust the South Korean military's capacity for follow-on missions, such as unifying the peninsula or securing WMD sites."

While that conclusion is based on a specific scenario-attacking a narrow, heavily defended corridor and with North Korea using chemical weapons-the wargames indicated that "South Korea grinds up much of its offensive striking power just to get through or clear out the Kaesong vicinity," Mazarr said. "That leaves a lot of ROK [Republic of Korea] capacity but not necessarily the sort that can punch through defenses. What that means in terms of a larger campaign we don't evaluate. My personal view is that indeed, the ROK alone would stall out long before getting to Pyongyang."

As for securing North Korean nuclear weapons, RAND conducted several wargames based on the premise that U.S. troops moved in to capture the nukes after Kim Jong-un died and his nation degenerated into civil war. But the wargames suggested any successors to the North Korean leader would have an incentive to keep control of the nukes as a matter of political power (and hiding them would be easy). Nor could airpower alone destroy them, just as aerial Scud-busting failed in Iraq.

"It surprised me at how easy it was for the North Koreans to hide, or make it difficult, for the United States and the ROK [South Korea] to find nuclear weapons or nuclear materials," Stacie Pettyjohn, co-director of RAND's Center for Gaming, told The National Interest.
Related: Mattis Explains What War With North Korea Would Look Like "
Those who believe that toppling Kim Jong-un's regime would solve the problem should pay attention to this finding in the RAND report: "In all the wargames, at least one of the North Korean factions employed a nuclear weapon during the conflict. While the United States may believe that securing North Korea's nuclear arsenal is a limited mission, some North Korean factions in the wargames tended to view U.S. intervention as the prelude to unification and thus an existential threat to North Korea as an independent entity. This put them in the situation of using their nuclear weapons-the ultimate guarantor of their security-or losing them."

Then there is the China question. During the RAND wargames, Chinese forces entered North Korea to secure the Sino-North Korean border as well as nuclear weapons facilities in the northern part of the country. In addition, a ground operation to destroy artillery batteries on the Kaesong Heights would also place U.S. and South Korean troops on the Kaesong corridor, one of the few invasion routes toward the Chinese border. In 1950, this provoked a massive Chinese response, and the same could happen again.

However, Mazarr cautions that a lot depends on the situation. "The behavior of China in our games both suggests and assumes that Beijing would want to stay out of a U.S.-North Korea clash as much as it could. The question becomes the origins of the clash and whether it feels its credibility is on the line at a critical moment as it seeks greater influence and status. So if North Korea begins an unprovoked artillery barrage on Seoul, clearance ops in Kaesong might not cause China to flinch. But what if we hit first and the North Korean shots are a response?"
This article originally appeared on The National Interest Read more from The National Interest: WATCH NEXT:

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Here's Exactly Why War With North Korea Would Be Hell, According To New War Games

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If war erupts with North Korea, then the U.S. military will have problems, according to a series of war games conducted by the RAND Corporation.Invading North Korea to capture or destroy Kim Jong-un's nuclear arsenal, or to knock out artillery batteries threatening Seoul, would overstretch and deple...

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This cartoon visual shows one of the reasons North Korea would most likely not attack anyone with their nukes. North Korea's nukes are more of a way to do as much damage as possible if they were to get attacked first.

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In this article, they go over some of the main reasons North Korea wants nukes and why they want to keep them. The article goes over wanting the regime to survive, and I think that is one of the main reasons the North Korean leader is choosing to keep his nukes and continue building them.

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Since assuming power in 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has exponentially increased testing of nuclear weapons and the missiles needed to deliver them against the United States and its allies. Experts assess that the regime now has 30 or more nuclear weapons. In 2017, North Korea tested a weapon at least 10 times more powerful than those used in 1945, indicating it has developed highly destructive hydrogen bombs.

North Korea likely already has the ability to hit South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles. The regime also has chemical and biological weapons programs, the latter demonstrated when it used deadly VX nerve agent to assassinate the leader's half-brother in a crowded civilian airport in Indonesia. Pyongyang is also nearing deployment of intermediate-range missiles to threaten critical U.S. military bases in Guam, a key node in the defense of U.S. allies in Asia.

North Korea is on the cusp of having the ability to reach the American homeland with nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Pyongyang has successfully tested missiles that can reach the entire continental United States all the way down to Florida. Earlier this year, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo warned that the regime may complete the program within "a handful of months."

Pyongyang has frequently threatened to use its nuclear weapons to turn Washington into a "sea of fire." The regime also announced that some of its missile launches were practicing nuclear airbursts against U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan.
Pyongyang's Multiple Objectives
For decades, debate has raged over North Korea's motivations for developing nuclear weapons. Initially, the dispute was whether Pyongyang was building a military capability or merely a negotiating chip to be bargained away for economic and diplomatic benefits. Today, some experts assess North Korea seeks only a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter a U.S. attack. Conversely, others perceive a desire to use nuclear weapons to achieve unification of the Korean Peninsula on the North's terms or to attack the United States.

The U.S. Intelligence Community has "long assessed that Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy." From Pyongyang's perspective, having nuclear weapons makes eminent sense since it concurrently fulfills several long-standing foreign policy objectives:

Regime survival, by deterring allied attacks or retaliations in response to North Korean provocations;

Source of national pride, by achieving equal status with the United States;

Domestic legitimacy and international prestige for the leadership;

Tremendous military power, overcoming deficiencies in conventional forces to achieve reunification;

Formidable leverage for coercive diplomacy, to wrest concessions and benefits;

Undermining of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, by sowing doubt that Washington would come to Seoul's defense once the American homeland is under nuclear threat.

Regime Survival. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un claims his nuclear force constitutes" a powerful deterrent that prevents [the United States] from starting an adventurous war." Pyongyang justifies its nuclear weapons as guaranteed protection against the U.S. "hostile policy" of intimidation, military attacks, and regime change against authoritarian regimes. The North Korean military supreme command declared: "This land is neither the Balkans nor Iraq and Libya."

Pyongyang's military threats, including the colorful taunt to turn Washington and Seoul into a "sea of fire," are usually issued in a conditional context, depicting them as a response to any U.S. attack. In his 2018 New Year's Day speech, Kim Jong-un declared: "As a responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes."

North Korea Stands Alone. Contrary to widespread misperception of a close Chinese-North Korean political relationship, Pyongyang feels threatened by its neighbor to the north as well as by the United States since Beijing has acquiesced to joining in sanctions against North Korea. All three generations of North Korean leadership have warned of the dangers of Chinese intimidation. A traditional Korean adage depicts the peninsula as a "shrimp amongst whales."

The North Korean nuclear program was born in the 1960s due to the perception that the regime couldn't rely on either of its superpower allies-the Soviet Union and China-for its defense. Moscow was seen as having abandoned Havana during the Cuban missile crisis, and Beijing refused to share information from its nuclear tests.

North Korea sees nuclear weapons as a means of gaining equal status with the United States. Pyongyang has long sought formal recognition as a nuclear weapons state in order to deal with Washington from a position of equity. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho told the UN General Assembly that Pyongyang's ultimate goal is to "establish the balance of power with the U.S."

Leadership Legitimacy. Even more than his father and grandfather, Kim Jong-un has linked his personal prestige to the country's nuclear and ICBM programs. Lacking the revolutionary credentials or lengthy government tenure of his predecessors, Kim embraces the programs and the breakthroughs in recent years as his exclusive contribution to fulfilling long-standing regime objectives and defending the country.

North Korean official media frequently release photos of Kim attending missile launches, lauding him as the visionary and driving force. Kim is thus able to convey an image of infallibility and invincibility which helps secure his control of power. By declaring that the nuclear button is on his desk, Kim portrays himself as uniquely qualified to defend the country.
North Korean troops march through Kim Il-sung square in Pyongyang on the eve of the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea.
credit: KCNA/UPI/Newscom
Military Capability. Nuclear devices are the ultimate weapon and give North Korea the power to wreak havoc on its neighbors and the United States. Pyongyang already has the ability to target South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons and is nearing completion of longer-range missiles to hit U.S. bases in Guam and the American homeland. Last year, the regime successfully tested two ICBM variants and an H-bomb with at least 10 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs.

North Korea has long sought to drive a wedge between the United States and its partners by depicting Seoul's alliance with Washington as the impediment to improved inter-Korean relations and eventual reunification.

North Korea is developing several means to ensure greater survivability of its missile forces, enhancing both a preemptive first-strike and retaliatory second-strike capability. Pyongyang is testing several different solid-fueled missiles which require less fueling time, along with mobile ground-based launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The regime has also practiced missile launches under wartime conditions by firing them from diverse locations throughout the country and conducting salvo launches of several missiles simultaneously.

Enhancing Coercive Diplomacy. Attaining an unambiguous nuclear ICBM capability could lead Pyongyang to perceive it has immunity from any international response. This might tempt the regime to act even more belligerently, trying to intimidate the United States and its allies into accepting North Korean diktats. The regime could also use rising international fear of its nuclear prowess to pressure other Six-Party Talks participants to abandon denuclearization as their goal and instead accept limitations on North Korea's nuclear programs in return for diplomatic and economic concessions.

Decoupling the Alliances. North Korea has long sought to drive a wedge between the United States and its partners by depicting Seoul's alliance with Washington as the impediment to improved inter-Korean relations and eventual reunification. Characteristically, Kim Jong-un declared in his 2018 New Year's Day speech: "the North and the South improve the relations between themselves and take decisive measures for achieving a breakthrough for independent reunification" without U.S. interference. Doing so, however, requires South Korea to "discontinue all the nuclear war drills they stage with outside forces [and] refrain from any acts of bringing in nuclear armaments and aggressive forces from the United States."

Pyongyang's approaching ability to target the continental United States with nuclear weapons has aggravated allied concerns about U.S. capability, resolve, and willingness to defend their countries. This trend is most prevalent in South Korea, which fears the United States "wouldn't trade Los Angeles for Seoul." This, coupled with growing anxiety that the United States is contemplating a preventive attack on North Korea, has led some in South Korea to advocate a more independent policy from Washington.
North Korean tanks take part in a parade to mark the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea in Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang on October 10, 2010.
credit: Kyodo/Newscom How Does North Korea Achieve Its Objectives?
For decades, North Korea was able to keep the world at bay as it pursued nuclear weapons and ICBM programs, first in secret and then in open defiance of UN resolutions. The regime was able to do so through a comprehensive multi-faceted strategy of "deny, deceive, and delay."

Preparing the Battlefield-Demanding a Price for Attending Negotiations. North Korea often achieved several objectives prior to even entering the negotiating venue. Pyongyang would fortify its bargaining position by conditioning its return on receiving preliminary concessions from its opponents as well as determining the agenda so that it reflected North Korean policy priorities.

By holding out the promise of returning to the talks rather than issuing an outright rejection, North Korea sought to portray itself as a reasonable negotiating partner. Pyongyang would signal it was interested in resuming negotiations while concurrently rejecting U.S. preconditions by characterizing them as insufficient. Doing so put Washington on the defensive and susceptible to additional pressure from China (and from South Korea, when it had Left-leaning governments) to provide greater U.S. "flexibility."

Pyongyang's approaching ability to target the continental United States with nuclear weapons has aggravated allied concerns about U.S. capability, resolve, and willingness to defend their countries.

"Good Cop, Bad Cop"-Creating the Illusion of Factionalism. North Korea long cultivated the image of factional infighting between "engagers" and "hardliners" as a negotiating tool. In fact, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense were simply playing the roles of good cop and bad cop in order to gain maximum diplomatic and economic benefits. In the words of a Korean adage, "the same animal has sharp claws and soft fur."

Raising Brinksmanship to an Art Form. Pyongyang escalated tensions to define negotiating parameters and extract maximum benefits for minimal concessions. North Korean brinksmanship raised the price of an eventual deal, slowed down the negotiating process until opponents were willing to meet North Korean terms, and created a parallel crisis to divert attention from a negotiating impasse.

North Korea's escalation is opportunistic rather than reactive to U.S. actions. By moving up the escalatory ladder, North Korea retains the initiative and controls the pace of the game, forcing the United States and others to respond. Raising tensions may gain Pyongyang what it desires or at least expose fault lines in a coalition that North Korea can then exploit. Pyongyang believes it can force the United States to negotiate either by applying leverage directly on Washington or indirectly through its allies.

Two-track Diplomatic Strategy. Pyongyang often used a combination of threats and assurances to garner diplomatic and economic support from China, Russia, and South Korea by raising the specter of a deteriorating security situation.

Pyongyang's two-track strategy complicated U.S. attempts to gain Chinese and Russian support for imposing sanctions. North Korea's seeming reasonableness encouraged Beijing and Moscow to resist tough enforcement of the trade sanctions, let alone U.S. demands for additional sanctions beyond those mandated by the UN.

Inching Across the Redline. Pyongyang used the years of negotiating foot-dragging and delays to augment its stockpile from an estimated one to two nuclear weapons at the end of the 1990s to enough fissile material for approximately 30 or more weapons today.

Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea's strategy had been to build slowly toward an escalatory act, thereby allowing the United States and its allies sufficient time to offer new diplomatic or economic inducements. On those occasions when North Korea carried out the act, it followed with several months of calm to allow all countries to become accustomed to the new elevated status quo prior to initiating the next lengthy provocation process.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un has eschewed engagement, maneuvering for negotiations, and charm offensives. Kim fils preferred an all-out sprint to cross the finish line of a viable nuclear weapons and ICBM capability. He lost an opportunity to induce liberal Presidents Obama and Moon Jae-in to offer benefits and move away from pressure tactics. Kim's hardline strategy drove the international community into greater consensus on the need to punish and pressure the recalcitrant regime.

But Kim's 2018 New Year Day speech may have marked a turning point. In it, he extended an olive branch to Seoul which was quickly grasped by President Moon in order to lower tensions on the peninsula. Bilateral discussions led to an agreement for a North Korean team to join the Olympics in South Korea. Skepticism abounds as to how sincere or effective Kim Jong-un's charm offensive will be, since all previous Korean reconciliation efforts collapsed.

Too High a Cost. If Kim shows a willingness to return to nuclear negotiations, it would come with a price. Pyongyang has always coupled diplomatic outreach with an ambitious list of demands, including:

Military: the end of U.S.-South Korean military exercises, removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, abrogation of the bilateral defense alliance between the United States and South Korea, cancellation of the U.S. extended-deterrence guarantee, and worldwide dismantlement of all U.S. nuclear weapons;

Political: establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the United States, signing of a peace treaty to end the Korean War, and no action on the U.N. Commission of Inquiry report on North Korean human rights abuses;

Law enforcement: removal of all U.N. sanctions, U.S. sanctions, EU sanctions, and targeted financial measures; and

Societal: restrictions on South Korean constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and assembly, including suppressing the publication of "insulting" articles by South Korean media and forbidding anti-North Korean public demonstrations in Seoul.

Conclusion
How one interprets the motivations driving North Korea's nuclear weapons program influences one's views on the appropriate U.S. policy response. A belief that the primary purpose is defensive leads to advocacy for pursuing a negotiated freeze on the regime's nuclear program. Theoretically, a freeze could lead to denuclearization.

At the other end of the spectrum, an assessment that Pyongyang's dominant reason for a nuclear arsenal is to invade South Korea and achieve Korean unification leads to advocacy for a U.S. preventive attack before Pyongyang achieves an ICBM capability. A middle viewpoint is that the North's nuclear weapons are more than a benign defense mechanism, but that the regime is unlikely to initiate an invasion as long as the U.S.-South Korean alliance remains strong. As such, the best policy for the U.S. is a comprehensive strategy of deterrence, containment, pressure, and eventual regime change.
Mr. Klingner is a senior research fellow on Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation.

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Since assuming power in 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has exponentially increased testing of nuclear weapons and the missiles needed to deliver them against the United States and its allies. Experts assess that the regime now has 30 or more nuclear weapons.

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As you can see in this photo, it shows that North Korea is almost like China's child that seems to be out of control. America has tried to do things about North Korea and its constant growth in the army and nukes. China is just standing by when they are probably the only country that could convince North Korea to give up its nukes.

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Even though we do not think North Korea would launch the first attack if they did, then they could do some severe damage before being defeated. As you can see in this photo the Korean's have a pretty big army. They have the largest army in the world and would do anything to keep their leader in power with their nukes.

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In this video they talk about what might happen if North Korea happened to launch nukes at the United States. Even though the people in the video do not beileve the North Korean leader would do that because it would be the end of his regime at that moment.

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What Would Happen If North Korea Launched A Nuclear Weapon