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Planning-Execution: The Bde HQ can plan all she wants. However, the execution is primarily by sub-units (i.e. Bns). The need to translate the plan and to ensure sub-units' ability to fully execute based on intent, with the plan as the anchor.

Enemy Logic: At the Bde level, breaking enemy logic requires collaboration with HHQ. The specific enemy is usually bounded by orders and intent of their HHQ too.

Maneouvre-Support Plans: Each plan is as important. For example, the bridging plan is as important as maneouvre. Bridging assets can significantly impact the maneouvre's ability to be fast and smooth.

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The collective ownership of support planners coupled with differing perspectives and sub task studies allow details to first discussed at the micro level. With the considerations raised and shared across the Bde HQ, conversations can be elevated easier for a collective discussion which facilitates the swift decisions made.

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Integration from the staffs to collectively sensemake and thereafter to implement an ops plan is critical to the success of the Bde.

The success of the Bde is due to the alternative opinion from staffers to view issues from a different lens.

Contingency plan was detailed and provided a framework and logic to adjustments in the ops plan.

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(1) Importance of G&T Table, from Adds & Dets to Task in General/Detail. To minimize uncertainty/ambiguity on the ground, state in clear up front
AHA Moment: A poor G&T Table leads to more Implied Tasks to the sub-units

(2) CPX tried to emulate the realism of the battle, but don’t understand the time delay of comms between HQ and ground units (Comms Reporting/Fog of War/Issue of Frag Os etc.)

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1. Intelligence Analysis
a. S2 should not be too technical on his brief and also elevate the conversation to a more conceptual view and use the examples to support them. On how to elevate, we should see at our intent and aim to help narrate the story. Also not to be affected by Ops demand and continue to be just share on the assessment based on the Int collection and Information Fused.

2. Contingency Planning:
a. If the delay/ obstacles impacts the 10-20% of the total mission time, we should start consider the need to execute Cont Planning.
b. Detail Cont Planning is important and if we execute too much Cont Planning, is our Ops Plan robust enough?

3. Integration with CONHUB
a. Information can be push and pull from CONHUB to ensure the latest update based on the intelligence assets and analysis done from Bn all the way up to Div and to work closely with them, will ensure a more holistic view of intelligence and also share on the potential reserve forces that would come to our AO.

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The Bde tends to be task-oriented and thus fixated on “fixing” the situation, i.e, whether to return the Cbt Tm to 243 BAR or not. This is understandable and completely justified, given the mission that we have to fulfil in the grander scheme of things. Many have highlighted potential C2 issues with trying to swing such a manoeuvre especially in nighttime, but I personally felt that how the morale of 231 BIR would be affected if we took the Cbt Tm away at such a critical juncture just as they were about to assualt PACKER could be considered as well. Although the SWOT analysis we carried out did not consider any morale elements, it is stated in the SO&P that own forces morale can be considered a strength as well. Ultimately, as we plan at a higher echelon, we have to be mindful of both the kinetic and non-kinetic effects our decisions have on the ground.

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A robust ECA will drive a robust Ops Plan that will cover variations and adjustments to the Ops Plan, instead of having to derive many contingency plans. With a simple plan and fewer contingency plans activated, there will be less churn to the executing units.

The Bde HQ could also have kept track of critical timings better to determine key decision points such as if we should continue to let the original plan play out or make fundamental adjustments to the plan such as changing the terminal objective for the Bns. While exploiting success is advantageous, we should also keep in mind that the original plan had already taken into account certain scenarios and letting the original plan play out was also an option (BRG 1015).

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More robust Course of Action Analysis during the Battle Procedure, before a plan is decided, can lead to firmer ideas about decision points and potential contingency plans. We deviated from the plan very early based on some information about enemy action, which may have been anticipated with more robust COA analysis. From this playing out of the COA during a COA analysis phase, we may have had a decision point locked and loaded before we got to it in real time.

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Observation - En Div Res 1 remain in AMA4 after Army and Div targeting to do spoiling counterattack as part of Our cont plan. We activated our cont plan and led to more attrition to the En Div Res 1.

Reflection - I felt this was a good seize of opportunity to ride on the success of HHQs' targeting which resulted in an attrited and possibly low morale enemy. This allow us to give a decisive blow to the En Div Res 1 with our forces that are relatively fresh and have less concern about the En Div Res in the later phase of the combat. This also allow us to achieve Div Comd's intent to draw the Div Res 1 away from the Main effort at the south.

Recommendations - To have a robust ECA and include Enemy alternative actions as cont plans to brief sub units to allow quick activation of the cont plans. Seize the opportunity of elimating reserves early to prevent a RCP tilt later in the battle.

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1. Realistic Execution Time?
- Observation: Pre-launch focus group was conducted 30mins before launch.
- Reflection: There are many works to be done before the units can execute, eg churn out and issue fragO; unit CO to review/adjust plans and brief sub-units. The lead-time given by syndicate to do all these are short and seem unrealistic.
- Recommendation: To study into and establish relevant planning norms for focus group or equivalent.

2. Conditions to Activate ConPlan.
- Observation: Many ConPlan were developed and some are very tactical, eg tasks that Bn can handle. The development of ConPlan are planned in silo without the involvement of relevant support planners.
- Reflection: The Bde HQ lost focus and got sucked in to manage 1001 things. The Bde HQ need to better invest the time on larger (operational) issues for sound decision making.
- Recommendation: To review on what constitutes Bde-level focus and what not. DSes can also share from either doctrine or past Bde experience to enhance learning.

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Observation: The team had to change our ops plan at a late stage for 243 to take 2S and 231 to take 3S instead.

Reflection: We wanted to exploit opportunity of securing 1015 intact but i felt we got too excited that we forgot our Aim which was to secure woodpine-edwin junction. And our ops plan would have addressed it regardless whether bridge 1015 was intact or not.

Recommendation: Paste the Aim statement somewhere to remind ourselves and good to always stick to the original plan to reduce churn on the ground.

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Speaking from hindsight:

Thought that analysing the EN logic thoroughly was critical in shaping the ops plan (e.g. planting abbatis along major axis could have influenced the original ops plan to factor in time penalties).

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Int assessment can be very dynamic and as a lot of things are postulations with regards to En intent, actions and reaction, more often than not, there will be errors in populations and analysis. It’s practically telling the future and what the opponent will do. Certain logic still need to hold but there are a myriad of permutation. This is why the ECA being drastically different will prevent us from being fundamentally throw anyone off even when postulations are not accurate as the permutations would have possibly addressed the postulations. This is where the contingency planning coincide with the permutations to answer to possibilities.

I also noted how the processes at Bde Hub is dependent on the analysis and fusion of the Int cell and how that would drive the ops actions and changes if any. Focus is always on what is the effect on us and how that can be mitigated.

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I will summaries my 3 learning points with "E"xercise "S"teel "T"orrent.  - Tys

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I will summaries my 3 learning points with "E"xercise "S"teel "T"orrent.  - Tys

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"E" xecution of Plan - En don't sign contract.. when the first Rd out we have "struggled" bet adjustment of plan vs con plan. Is it the condition to activate con plan is not clear? What can we do to upfront prevent such scenario to happen/ minimise it.

"S" - Security + 4xS (Slow is Smooth, Smooth is Swift) . I think we have placed great emphasis (in fact we done very well to ensure our force protection) in leveraging combine armed to complement the weakness. E.g. combat team as vanguard for Mot and punching out mech force to clear the AO before mot coming in.

"T" Terrain. We have also demonstrated effective use of terrain to our favour in our manoeuvre to effectively swing our mech force to the depth. When the battle unfold towards PACKER, we continue to adjust our manoeuvre based on our terrain study and approaches mmeffectively and "on-the-go" optimise our assets (bridging and forces configuration) to achieve MSN success.

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I felt that the real game changer is the deployment of obstacles.
It determines not just the time penalty for BAF, but also the cont plan of the BAF.
With proper coordination of Reserves to the affected obstacles, it really forces the bde comd to make timely decisions to command the COs in theatre.

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The brought up by SDS about having the conversations at the appropriate level for Bde resonates with me. This is something that we often also try to emphasise in planning exercises in the RBAF. Firstly, Although discussing the mechanics of manouvre is useful and important, we must also not lose sight of the bigger picture. Secondly, the staff must be aware of distinguishing between the issues that effect the overall plan and those that do not. This ensures that the Bde Comd team is not sucked in to minor details and can focus their energies on critical issues or events that have a fundamental impact on the operation.