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For General information - The History Channel

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For General information - The History Channel

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Rwandan Genocide - Facts, Response & Trials

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The Rwandan genocide, also known as the genocide against the Tutsi, occured in 1994 when members of the Hutu ethnic majority in the east-central African nation of Rwanda murdered as many as 800,000 people, mostly of the Tutsi minority. Started by Hutu nationalists in the capital of Kigali, the genoc…

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The genocide lasted for 100 days, and most people would call it that 100 days of slaughter. For background, the genocide started because of ethnic tensions between the Hutus and Tutsi. During the genocide, statistically 5 1/2 Tutsi would be killed each minute and a total of 333 1/3 would be killed in one hour. Now after the genocide, many people were left behind kids were orphaned and young adults felt displaced. The entire infrastructure of their country was destroyed and 96% of the country is now suffering from PTSD.

The cause of the end of the ending of the genocide was that the Tutsi gained power back by dominating the rebel movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and captured Kigali.

"The new government announced a policy of “unity and reconciliation.” It adopted a new constitution that guaranteed equal rights for all Rwandans regardless of their group. "

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In 1994, Rwanda's population was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Approximately 85 percent of the country was Hutu, while 14 percent was Tutsi and one percent was Twa.

Rwanda was ruled by leaders of the Hutu majority from the time it gained independence in 1962 until the genocide in 1994. During this period, the country's Tutsi minority suffered systematic discrimination. They were also the targets of periodic outbreaks of mass violence. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis fled the country in the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1990, a Tutsi rebel force invaded Rwanda from the north. Hard-line Hutu politicians accused Rwandan Tutsis of supporting the rebels. After the war reached a stalemate, Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana signed a peace agreement. The terms enabled Rwanda to transition to a government in which Hutus and Tutsis would share power. The agreement angered Hutu extremists. In response, they armed Hutu paramilitary forces and waged a vicious propaganda campaign against the Tutsis.

The One Hundred Day Genocide

On the evening of April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana was killed. A surface-to-air missile shot down his plane as it was landing in Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Who fired the missile remains in dispute. However, extremist leaders of Rwanda's Hutu majority seized the assassination as the opportunity to launch a carefully planned campaign to wipe out the country's Tutsis. They also targeted moderate Hutu leaders who might have opposed this program of genocide.

Political and other high profile leaders who might have been able to prevent the genocide were killed immediately. Violence spread through the capital and into the rest of the country. The genocide continued for roughly three months.

As the level of violence escalated, groups of Tutsis fled to places that in previous times of turmoil had provided safety: churches, schools, and government buildings. Many of these refuges became the sites of major massacres. The Rwandan military and Hutu paramilitary forces carried out the massacres using guns and explosives.

In addition to mass killings, thousands and thousands of Tutsis and people suspected of being Tutsis were killed in their homes and fields and on the road. Militias set up roadblocks across the country to prevent the victims from escaping. In cities, towns, and even the tiniest villages, Hutus answered the call of their local leaders to murder their Tutsi neighbors. Entire families were killed at a time, often hacked to death with machetes. Women were systematically and brutally raped.

Hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutus participated in the genocide. As many as one million people, mostly Tutsis, were slaughtered in 100 days.

Aftermath

The genocide ended when the Tutsi-dominated rebel movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), captured Kigali. The RPF overthrew the Hutu government and seized power. The new government announced a policy of "unity and reconciliation." It adopted a new constitution that guaranteed equal rights for all Rwandans regardless of their group.

More than one million Hutus, including many of the genocidaires, fled to neighboring countries. In Zaire, today the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the refugees' presence helped spark two international conflicts and ongoing insurgencies. More than five million people have died in the violence.

Justice

Seven months after the genocide began, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Its mission was to bring to justice those accused of high level crimes. The ICTR was held in neighboring Arusha, Tanzania.

On September 2, 1998, the ICTR delivered the first conviction for genocide by an international court. It ruled that Jean-Paul Akayesu was guilty of inciting and leading acts of violence against Tutsi civilians in the town where he served as mayor. This judgment was also the first by an international court to define rape as a crime in international law and to recognize rape as a means of committing genocide.

In another landmark case, the ICTR convicted a newspaper publisher and a radio station owner of the crime of incitement to genocide (a third defendant was found guilty as well, but was acquitted on appeal). It was the first time since the Nuremberg trial of the major German war criminals that an international court examined the responsibility of the media for mass atrocities.

In all, the ICTR indicted 93 persons and convicted 62 for crimes in connection with the genocide. Those prosecuted included high-level military and government officials, politicians and businessmen, and religious, media, and militia leaders.

Within Rwanda, the national courts tried more than 10,000 persons for planning the genocide or committing atrocities. In 2005, the government also implemented the traditional community court system known as gacaca (pronounced ga-CHA-cha). These courts heard the cases of the additional hundreds of thousands of Rwandans accused of participating in the genocide. In communities throughout the country, locally elected judges heard victims and witnesses testify. The judges also gave the defendants the opportunity to confess and ask for forgiveness. The gacaca courts tried more than 1.2 million cases before they closed in 2012.

Last Edited: Apr 5, 2021

Author(s): United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC

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In 1994, Rwanda's population was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Approximately 85 percent of the country was Hutu, while 14 percent was Tutsi and one percent was Twa. Rwanda was ruled by leaders of the Hutu majority from the time it gained independence in 1962 until the genocide in 1994.

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Britannica.com - using for more basic research

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Britannica.com - using for more basic research

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Background

The major ethnic groups in Rwanda are the Hutu and the Tutsi, respectively accounting for more than four-fifths and about one-seventh of the total population. A third group, the Twa, constitutes less than 1 percent of the population. All three groups speak Rwanda (more properly, Kinyarwanda), suggesting that these groups have lived together for centuries.

The area that is now Rwanda is believed to have been initially settled by the Twa, who were closely followed by the Hutu, probably sometime between the 5th and 11th centuries, and then by the Tutsi, likely beginning in the 14th century. A long process of Tutsi migrations from the north culminated in the 16th century with the emergence of a small nuclear kingdom in the central region, ruled by the Tutsi minority, that persisted until the arrival of Europeans in the 19th century.

Social differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi traditionally were profound, as shown by the system of patron-client ties ( buhake, or "cattle contract") through which the Tutsi, with a strong pastoralist tradition, gained social, economic, and political ascendancy over the Hutu, who were primarily agriculturalists. Still, identification as either Tutsi or Hutu was fluid. While physical appearance could correspond somewhat to ethnic identification (the Tutsi were generally presumed to be light-skinned and tall, the Hutu dark-skinned and short), the difference between the two groups was not always immediately apparent, because of intermarriage and the use of a common language by both groups.

During the colonial era, Germany and later Belgium assumed that ethnicity could be clearly distinguished by physical characteristics and then used the ethnic differences found in their own countries as models to create a system whereby the categories of Hutu and Tutsi were no longer fluid. The German colonial government, begun in 1898 and continuing until 1916, pursued a policy of indirect rule that strengthened the hegemony of the Tutsi ruling class and the absolutism of its monarchy. That approach continued under Belgium, which took control of the colony after World War I and administered it indirectly, under the tutelage of the League of Nations.

Some Hutu began to demand equality and found sympathy from Roman Catholic clergy and some Belgian administrative personnel, which led to the Hutu revolution. The revolution began with an uprising on Nov. 1, 1959, when a rumour of the death of a Hutu leader at the hands of Tutsi perpetrators led groups of Hutu to launch attacks on the Tutsi. Months of violence followed, and many Tutsi were killed or fled the country. A Hutu coup on Jan. 28, 1961, which was carried out with the tacit approval of the Belgian colonial authorities, officially deposed the Tutsi king (he was already out of the country, having fled the violence in 1960) and abolished the Tutsi monarchy. Rwanda became a republic, and an all-Hutu provisional national government came into being. Independence was proclaimed the next year.

The transition from Tutsi to Hutu rule was not peaceful. From 1959 to 1961 some 20,000 Tutsi were killed, and many more fled the country. By early 1964 at least 150,000 Tutsi were in neighbouring countries. Additional rounds of ethnic tension and violence flared periodically and led to mass killings of Tutsi in Rwanda, such as in 1963, 1967, and 1973.

Tension between Hutu and Tutsi flared again in 1990, when Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels invaded from Uganda. A cease-fire was negotiated in early 1991, and negotiations between the RPF and the government of longtime president Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, began in 1992. An agreement between the RPF and the government, signed in August 1993 at Arusha, Tanz., called for the creation of a broad-based transition government that would include the RPF. Hutu extremists were strongly opposed to that plan. Dissemination of their anti-Tutsi agenda, which had already been widely propagated via newspapers and radio stations for a few years, increased and would later serve to fuel ethnic violence.

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Rwanda genocide of 1994 | Summary, Background, Deaths, & Facts

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Rwanda genocide of 1994, planned campaign of mass murder in Rwanda that occurred over the course of some 100 days in April-July 1994. The genocide was conceived by extremist elements of Rwanda's majority Hutu population who planned to kill the minority Tutsi population. More than 800,000 civilians were killed.

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The genocide in Rwanda, like all genocides, was a complex phenomenon that resulted from a combination of long-term structural factors as well as more immediate decisions taken by powerful actors. Of course none of these circumstances—whether poverty, land scarcity, a population of two groups of very different size, a history of colonial rule, or a misreading of history—in and of itself caused the genocide, no more than did the introduction of multiparty politics or the start of war. But all these circumstances formed the context in which Rwandans made decisions in this period of crisis, and so must be taken into account in trying to analyze the genocide.

Rwanda was very poor, and in the years just before the genocide it had become poorer. Some 90 percent of the population lived off the land, and with significant population growth in recent decades most farmers lacked sufficient land to provide for themselves and their families. In the late 1980s economic conditions worsened because of drought, a sharp drop in world market prices for coffee and tea (the export crops that provided the major sources of foreign exchange), and limits on government spending imposed by international financial institutions.

Of the three groups that comprised the population, one, the Twa, was so small as to play no political role. Of the other two, the Hutu was by far the larger group. Hutu and Tutsi shared a common culture and language and occasionally intermarried. Neither group had moved into what is now Rwanda in a single mass and at an identifiable moment in time. Rather, small clusters of people drifted in over centuries and coalesced. As the Rwandan state developed, an elite took shape and its members were called Tutsi; the masses became known as Hutu.

The colonial administrations, first German, then Belgian, used and were used by the Tutsi in a process that extended and intensified the control by the Tutsi-dominated central state over areas—both Hutu and Tutsi—that had previously maintained considerable autonomy. During these years of colonial rule the categories of Hutu and Tutsi became increasingly clearly defined and opposed to each other, with the Tutsi elite seeing itself as superior and having the right to rule, and the Hutu seeing themselves as an oppressed people.

Influenced by European ideas about race and the peopling of Africa, Rwandans came to accept a distorted version of history. It held that Tutsi, a conquering group from northeast Africa, had swept into Rwanda centuries before and had established the Rwandan state through military prowess, through self-serving marriage alliances, and through an exploitative clientage system based on the grant of cattle. It depicted Hutu as the consistent losers in major battles as well as in the ordinary power struggles of daily life.

In the mid-twentieth century, as the colonialists were preparing to leave, Hutu overthrew the Tutsi elite and established a Hutu-led republic. In the process they killed some twenty thousand Tutsi and drove another three-hundred thousand into exile. This event, known as the 1959 revolution, was remembered by Tutsi as a tragic and criminal event, while for Hutu it was seen as a heroic battle for liberation, to be celebrated with pride. Just before and during the 1994 genocide, Hutu political leaders insisted on the importance of protecting the "gains of the revolution," which meant not just control of political power but also the lands and jobs once held by Tutsi and distributed to Hutu after 1959.

During the 1960s some of the Tutsi in exile led incursions into Rwanda, seeking to unseat the new Hutu leadership. Within Rwanda officials incited and, in some cases, led attacks against Tutsi still resident in the country, accusing them of supporting the incursions. Most of the twenty-thousand Tutsi counted as victims of the revolution actually died in these reprisal attacks and not in early combat surrounding the change in power.

Hutu leaders from central and southern Rwanda and from the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri led the 1959 revolution and established the first republic. Within a decade leaders from the center and south had taken control of the most important government jobs and associated benefits. In 1973 military officers led by Juvenal Habyarimana and representing the interests of the northwestern prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri overthrew leaders of the first republic and established the second republic. Over time, Habyarimana and his group executed or caused the deaths through starvation and ill-treatment of the first president and some fifty others. Hutu of central and southern Rwanda resented their loss of power and saw the killing of the first generation of Hutu leaders as a betrayal of these leaders of the revolution.

[2] At the time of the genocide, Rwanda was divided into eleven prefectures, each headed by a prefect. The administrative unit below the prefecture was the commune, headed by a burgomaster, and below that was the sector, headed by a councilor.

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The genocide in Rwanda, like all genocides, was a complex phenomenon that resulted from a combination of long-term structural factors as well as more immediate decisions taken by powerful actors.

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General how it started, how it ended, timeline

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General how it started, how it ended, timeline

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In just 100 days in 1994, about 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda by ethnic Hutu extremists. They were targeting members of the minority Tutsi community, as well as their political opponents, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Warning: Contains graphic images.

How did the genocide start?

About 85% of Rwandans are Hutus but the Tutsi minority has long dominated the country. In 1959, the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and tens of thousands of Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries, including Uganda.

A group of Tutsi exiles formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda in 1990 and fighting continued until a 1993 peace deal was agreed.

On the night of 6 April 1994 a plane carrying then-President Juvenal Habyarimana, and his counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi - both Hutus - was shot down, killing everyone on board.

Hutu extremists blamed the RPF and immediately started a well-organised campaign of slaughter. The RPF said the plane had been shot down by Hutus to provide an excuse for the genocide.

With meticulous organisation. Lists of government opponents were handed out to militias who went and killed them, along with all of their families.

Neighbours killed neighbours and some husbands even killed their Tutsi wives, saying they would be killed if they refused.

At the time, ID cards had people's ethnic group on them, so militias set up roadblocks where Tutsis were slaughtered, often with machetes which most Rwandans kept around the house.

Thousands of Tutsi women were taken away and kept as sex slaves.

Why was it so vicious?

Rwanda has always been a tightly controlled society, organised like a pyramid from each district up to the top of government. The then-governing party, MRND, had a youth wing called the Interahamwe, which was turned into a militia to carry out the slaughter.

Weapons and hit-lists were handed out to local groups, who knew exactly where to find their targets.

The Hutu extremists set up a radio station, RTLM, and newspapers which circulated hate propaganda, urging people to "weed out the cockroaches" meaning kill the Tutsis. The names of prominent people to be killed were read out on radio.

Even priests and nuns have been convicted of killing people, including some who sought shelter in churches.

By the end of the 100-day killing spree, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been killed.

The UN and Belgium had forces in Rwanda but the UN mission was not given a mandate to stop the killing.

A year after US troops were killed in Somalia, the US was determined not to get involved in another African conflict. The Belgians and most UN peacekeepers pulled out after 10 Belgian soldiers were killed.

The French, who were allies of the Hutu government, sent a special force to evacuate their citizens and later set up a supposedly safe zone but were accused of not doing enough to stop the slaughter in that area.

Paul Kagame, Rwanda's current president, has accused France of backing those who carried out the massacres - a charge denied by Paris.

How did it end?

The well-organised RPF, backed by Uganda's army, gradually seized more territory, until 4 July 1994, when its forces marched into the capital, Kigali.

Some two million Hutus - both civilians and some of those involved in the genocide - then fled across the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo, at the time called Zaire, fearing revenge attacks. Others went to neighbouring Tanzania and Burundi.

Human rights groups say RPF fighters killed thousands of Hutu civilians as they took power - and more after they went into DR Congo to pursue the Interahamwe. The RPF denies this.

In DR Congo, thousands died from cholera, while aid groups were accused of letting much of their assistance fall into the hands of the Hutu militias.

What happened in DR Congo?

The RPF, now in power in Rwanda, embraced militias fighting both the Hutu militias and the Congolese army, which was aligned with the Hutus.

The Rwanda-backed rebel groups eventually marched on DR Congo's capital, Kinshasa, and overthrew the government of Mobutu Sese Seko, installing Laurent Kabila as president.

But the new president's reluctance to tackle Hutu militias led to a new war that dragged in six countries and led to the creation of numerous armed groups fighting for control of this mineral-rich country.

An estimated five million people died as a result of the conflict which lasted until 2003, with some armed groups active until now in the areas near Rwanda's border.

Has anyone faced justice?

Instead, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Tanzanian town of Arusha to prosecute the ringleaders.

A total of 93 people were indicted and after lengthy and expensive trials, dozens of senior officials in the former regime were convicted of genocide - all of them Hutus.

Within Rwanda, community courts, known as gacaca, were created to speed up the prosecution of hundreds of thousands of genocide suspects awaiting trial.

Correspondents say up to 10,000 people died in prison before they could be brought to justice.

For a decade until 2012, 12,000 gacaca courts met once a week in villages across the country, often outdoors in a marketplace or under a tree, trying more than 1.2 million cases.

Their aim was to achieve truth, justice and reconciliation among Rwandans as "gacaca" means to sit down and discuss an issue.

What is Rwanda like now?

President Kagame has been hailed for transforming the tiny, devastated country he took over through policies which encouraged rapid economic growth. He has also tried to turn Rwanda into a technological hub and is very active on Twitter.

But his critics say he does not tolerate dissent and several opponents have met unexplained deaths, both in the country and abroad.

The genocide is obviously still a hugely sensitive issue in Rwanda, and it is illegal to talk about ethnicity.

The government says this is to prevent hate speech and more bloodshed but some say it prevents true reconciliation.

Charges of stirring up ethnic hatred have been levelled against some of Mr Kagame's critics, which they say is a way of sidelining them.

He won a third term in office in the most recent election in 2017 with 98.63% of the vote.

All photographs belong to the copyright holders as marked

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In just 100 days in 1994, some 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda by ethnic Hutu extremists - how did the genocide happen?

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The 1959 revolution came about because of power struggles and the dislike by the Hutu that the minority Tutsi were the ones ruling. Because Belgium chose the Tutsis to help them run the government, the Hutus had to be the workers, the lowerclassmen. They had to work long, exhausting hours and often didn't get the same treatment when it came to things like education. Belgium also put in place things like ID cards which prevented Hutus/Tutsis from being able to identify as the opposite. The Hutus wanted more power, so they launched an attack and many people lost their lives. Soon, some Tutsi generals/officials/gov workers were replaced with Hutus and all was good, for a time. Eventually, the Tutsis fought back too, but were unsuccessful and the Hutus fought back even harder. Between Dec 1962 and Jan 1963, thousands of Tutsis were killed and many fled. Because of the amount of Tutsis exiles, many of them started forming groups and periodically targeting the borders of Rwanda. Because of these attacks, Tutsis inside Rwanda were killed and more fled. The attacks were turned against the Tutsis and they faced discrimination and death. By 1991, the Tutsi population was half of what it was before the Hutu revolution.

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In commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide and the National Security Archive launched the first phase of a multiyear initiative titled Failure to Prevent: International Decision Making in the Age of Genocide. The first phase includes a series of "electronic briefing books" that provide in-depth background to pivotal events before and during the Rwandan genocide when international action could have made a difference. This is the fourth briefing book in the series.
Introduction

In the months leading up to the genocide in Rwanda, UN officials and western diplomats grew increasingly concerned about the threat to political stability posed by millions of refugees and internally displaced persons in the Great Lakes region. Attempts by the international community to address this refugee crisis became enmeshed in political infighting inside the country.

The documents posted here show the refugee crisis was compounded by a lack of reliable intelligence and a shortage of military personnel and international monitors. An ambitious refugee resettlement program negotiated as part of the Arusha Accords by the Hutu-led government of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was never actually implemented.

The documents are drawn from the records of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, known as UNAMIR, and US State Department records released in response to Freedom of Information Act requests submitted by the National Security Archive.

A State Department fact sheet issued in March 1994 on the eve of the genocide summarizes three overlapping refugee crises in Rwanda and neighboring Burundi:

Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. The State Department estimated there were 550,000 refugees, predominantly Tutsis, in Central Africa, most of whom fled Rwanda in the pogroms that followed the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in 1959. The largest exile communities were in Uganda (200,000) and Burundi (245,000).

Internally displaced persons fleeing RPF incursions into northern Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 and 1993. The State Department estimated 350,000 Rwandans (predominantly Hutus, but also Tutsis) remained displaced as a result of fighting between the Rwandan government and the RPF.

Hutu refugees from Burundi. An October 1993 coup attempt in Burundi and the assassination of the country's democratically elected Hutu president by Tutsi army officers resulted in an exodus of refugees, predominantly Hutus, from Burundi. According to the State Department, about 287,000 Burundian refugees remained in southern Rwanda in March 1994.

Each of these three groups had its own distinct grievances and aspirations, dating back many decades. The Tutsi diaspora served as a natural recruiting ground for the RPF. According to a former US diplomat in Kigali, Joyce Leader, Hutu refugees from Burundi were "radicalized" by their experiences and were "potential recruits" for the Interahamwe militia groups who were responsible for some of the worst episodes of the genocide in Rwanda.

The documents posted here show that international officials devoted considerable diplomatic attention to the refugee problem in Rwanda. The Rwandan government and the RPF signed a protocol settling refugee issues in June 1993 as part of the Arusha negotiations. Instead of implementing the agreement, UN peacekeepers were overwhelmed by a fresh wave of refugees from Burundi following the October 1993 assassination of that country's president, Melchior Ndadaye.

The documents suggest that UN officials were wary of providing assistance to Tutsi refugees and internally displaced persons in northern Rwanda for fear of creating a "pull factor" that would result in even larger numbers of refugees.
Next: Documents 1-8: Summaries and Links

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The Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Before the Genocide: Part I

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In commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide and the National Security Archive launched the first phase of a multiyear initiative titled Failure to Prevent: International Decision Making in the Age of Genocide.

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During the genocide, roughly 2 million rwandanese citizens fled and didn't come back until late 1996 - early 1997. Once the people started coming back the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) started trials against higher ranked officials who were guilty for organizing and partaking in the genocide. This is the trial of 2008, where 4 generals/officials who previously had power are tried for inhumane crimes.

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This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

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My narrative, it's not amazing but its a rough draft and it can give some inspo

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My narrative, it's not amazing but its a rough draft and it can give some inspo

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From 1894 to 1918, Rwanda, along with Burundi, was part of German East Africa. After Belgium became the administering authority under the mandates system of the League of Nations, Rwanda and Burundi formed a single administrative entity; they continued to be jointly administered as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi until the end of the Belgian trusteeship in 1962. By then, however, the two states had evolved radically different political systems. Rwanda had declared itself a republic in January 1961 and forced its monarch ( mwami), Kigeri, into exile. Burundi, on the other hand, retained the formal trappings of a constitutional monarchy until 1966.

The Rwanda revolution was rooted partly in a traditional system of stratification based on an all-embracing "premise of inequality" and partly in a colonial heritage that greatly increased the oppressiveness of the few over the many. Tutsi hegemony was unquestionably more burdensome under Belgian rule than at any time prior to European colonization. By the end of World War II, a growing number of colonial civil servants and missionaries had come to recognize the legitimacy of Hutu claims against the ruling Tutsi minority. The proclamation of the republic a year and a half before the country acceded to independence testifies to the substantial support extended by the trusteeship authorities to the revolution.

Independence and the 1960s

What began as a peasant revolt in November 1959 eventually transformed itself into an organized political movement aimed at the overthrow of the monarchy and the vesting of full political power in Hutu hands. Under the leadership of Grégoire Kayibanda, Rwanda's first president, the Party for Hutu Emancipation (Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation du Peuple Hutu) emerged as the spearhead of the revolution. Communal elections were held in 1960, resulting in a massive transfer of power to Hutu elements at the local level. And in the wake of the coup (January 1961) in Gitarama in central Rwanda, which was carried off with the tacit approval of the Belgian authorities, an all-Hutu provisional government came into being. Therefore, by the time that independence was proclaimed in July 1962, the revolution had already run its course. Thousands of Tutsi began fleeing Rwanda, and by early 1964-following a failed Tutsi raid from Burundi-at least 150,000 were in neighbouring countries.

With the elimination of Tutsi elements from the political arena, north-south regional competition among Hutu politicians arose, reflecting the comparatively privileged position of those from the central and southern regions within the party, the government, and the administration. Regional tensions came to a head in July 1973, when a group of army officers from the north overthrew the Kayibanda regime in a coup and installed a northerner, Maj. Gen. Juvénal Habyarimana. Habyarimana gave a distinctly regional coloration to the institutions of the state during his 21 years in power.

North-south polarities eventually gave way to subregional factions within the northern establishment. By 1980 the principal factions were the Bashiru and Bagoyi elements, respectively identified with the Bushiru and Bugoyi subregions. Habyarimana sided with the Bashiru faction and was the target of an abortive Bagoyi-inspired coup in April 1980. Habyarimana remained in power, reelected in 1983 and 1988 when, as the sole candidate, voters purportedly were overwhelmingly in favour of him continuing as president.

Tension between the Hutu and Tutsi flared in 1990, when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique Rwandais; FPR) rebels invaded from Uganda. A cease-fire was negotiated in early 1991, and negotiations between the FPR and the government began in 1992. In the meantime, revisions were made to the 1978 constitution, and the new document, allowing multiparty participation in the government, was promulgated in June 1991. An agreement between the government and the FPR was signed in August 1993 at Arusha, Tanz., that called for the creation of a broad-based transition government that would include the FPR; Hutu extremists were strongly opposed to this plan.

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Rwanda - Rwanda under German and Belgian control

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Rwanda - Rwanda - Rwanda under German and Belgian control: From 1894 to 1918, Rwanda, along with Burundi, was part of German East Africa. After Belgium became the administering authority under the mandates system of the League of Nations, Rwanda and Burundi formed a single administrative entity; they continued to be jointly administered as the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi until the end of the Belgian trusteeship in 1962.

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https://docs.google.com/document/d/1szs43NL7qUtxT3vt0rlIujgEbevjElMKMbEc_qnD9z8/edit that is my new one

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The role women played was different from men because they were treated differently in trials and not fully considered responsible, unless they did crimes comparable to men, then tehy were called "monsters", or "non - women". In that case, then they would face the ful force of the courts where other women weren't subject to the same treatment.

Many women were raped and killed or taken as sex workers for the militas responsible for the killings. Between 250,000 - 500,000 women were raped and roughly 20,000 kids were born due to that.

Some women faced the full force of the courts because they sold the positions of the Tutsi's to the Hutu militas and led them to their deaths. Some of the women also helped the Hutu extremists by bringing the tutsis who had ID cards labeling them as tutsi to the extremists.

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On the 20 th anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch stands in solidarity with the victims and with those who survived.

The Rwandan genocide was exceptional in its brutality, in its speed, and in the meticulous organization with which Hutu extremists set out to destroy the Tutsi minority.

Twenty years on, a significant number of perpetrators of the genocide, including former high-level government officials and other key figures behind the massacres, have been brought to justice. The majority have been tried in Rwandan courts. Others have gone before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or domestic courts in Europe and North America.

Rwanda's community-based gacaca courts finished their work in 2012; the ICTR is expected to complete its own in 2014; and with new momentum for prosecution of Rwandan genocide suspects in foreign countries, the 20 th anniversary of the genocide provides an opportune moment to take stock of progress, both at national and international levels, in holding to account those who planned, ordered, and carried out these horrific crimes.

This paper provides an overview of these achievements, focusing on progress made in the area of justice. Recognizing efforts made over the past 20 years to ensure accountability for the crimes committed during the genocide, Human Rights Watch encourages Rwanda and other countries to build on these achievements. The paper also recalls the shameful international failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda and reflects on the lasting impact of the genocide on the broader Great Lakes region of Africa, with a particular focus on accountability.

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and the Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down over the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The plane crash triggered ethnic killings across Rwanda on an unprecedented scale. Orchestrated by Hutu political and military extremists, the genocide that followed claimed more than half a million lives and destroyed approximately three quarters of Rwanda's Tutsi population in just three months. Many Hutu who attempted to hide or defend Tutsi and those who opposed the genocide were also targeted and killed. Members of the Rwandan security forces, the notorious interahamwe militia attached to the ruling party, as well as tens of thousands of ordinary Hutu civilians hunted down and slaughtered Tutsi men, women, and children across the country. It was one of the most efficient and terrifying episodes of targeted ethnic violence in recent international history.

II. Justice for the Genocide: An Overview of Progress Since 1994

1. Trials in Rwanda: Conventional Courts and Gacaca

Delivering justice for mass atrocities is a daunting challenge in any country, and the scale of the Rwandan genocide would have overwhelmed even the best-equipped judicial system. In Rwanda, the task was made more difficult by the fact that many judges, lawyers, and other judicial staff were killed during the genocide, and much of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. Despite these challenges, the Rwandan government embarked on an ambitious and unprecedented approach to delivering justice, using both conventional domestic courts and community-based gacaca courts.

Compared with most other countries emerging from mass violence, Rwanda's determination to see justice done and its progress in trying so many alleged perpetrators in less than 20 years have been impressive. But some have paid a high price. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, in particular, thousands of people were arbitrarily arrested, and many were charged and tried in the absence of solid evidence against them. Some might have been wrongly convicted. The lack of safeguards against abusive prosecutions in a weak judicial system heightened the risk of unfair trials.

In 1996, Rwanda adopted a new law governing the prosecution of genocide-related crimes. Genocide trials began in December the same year in a highly charged environment. The legal framework for these prosecutions was established, but the day-to-day demands on the newly reformed justice system were unmanageable. Numerous defendants were convicted without legal assistance as defence lawyers were scarce and often too afraid to defend genocide suspects. The international nongovernmental organization Lawyers without Borders ( Avocats sans frontières) provided important assistance through a pool of national and foreign lawyers, but the needs far outweighed their capacity.

The caseload created by the huge number of people who participated in the genocide completely overwhelmed the courts, and the prisons began overflowing. Thousands of prisoners died as a result of extreme overcrowding and life-threatening prison conditions as they waited year after year for their cases to be processed. In 1998, 22 people were publicly executed, many after summary trials and some without legal assistance.[7] These were the only formal executions carried out in connection with genocide trials. Other defendants were sentenced to death after these executions, but their sentences were commuted when Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007.

By 1998, the total prison population had reached about 130,000, but only 1,292 people had been tried. It became apparent that it would take decades to prosecute all those suspected of involvement in the genocide.[8]

To overcome this challenge, the Rwandan government devised a novel system for trying genocide cases: gacaca. Gacaca took its name from a community-based dispute resolution mechanism traditionally used to resolve minor disputes, but drew heavily on a more conventional model of punitive justice. Its objectives included not only delivering justice, but also strengthening reconciliation, and revealing the truth about the genocide.

Judges elected by the population, who did not have prior legal training, were to try cases in front of members of the local community, who were expected to speak out about what they knew regarding the defendants' actions during the genocide. As the government developed the gacaca model-a complex and time-consuming task-trials in conventional courts ground to a near halt for almost two years. A gacaca pilot phase began in 2002, but it was not until 2005 that gacaca courts began functioning across the country. Gacaca courts then processed almost two million cases until their closure in June 2012.

In 2011, Human Rights Watch published a detailed report on gacaca based on its field research over nine years. The conclusion was that gacaca left a mixed legacy. Its positive achievements included the courts' swift work in processing a huge number of cases; the participation of local communities; and the opportunity for some genocide survivors to learn what had happened to their relatives. Gacaca might also have helped some survivors find a way of living peacefully alongside perpetrators. However, many gacaca hearings resulted in unfair trials. There were limitations on the ability of the accused to effectively defend themselves; numerous instances of intimidation and corruption of defence witnesses, judges and other parties; and flawed decision-making due to inadequate training for lay judges who were expected to handle complex cases.

The expectation that gacaca could deliver national-level reconciliation in a matter of a few years, especially so soon after the genocide, was unrealistic from the outset. But gacaca's potential for contributing to reconciliation was hindered by difficulties in revealing the truth, as some participants lied or remained silent due to intimidation, corruption, personal ties, or fear of repercussions. In addition, gacaca did not deliver on its promises of reparations for genocide survivors: survivors received no compensation from the state, and little restitution and often overly formulaic apologies from confessed or convicted perpetrators-casting doubt on the sincerity of some of these confessions. While gacaca may have served as a first step to help some Rwandans on the long path to reconciliation, it did not manage to dispel distrust between many perpetrators and survivors of the genocide.

In addition to the large number of people tried by gacaca courts, to date at least 10,000 people have been tried for genocide-related crimes by the conventional courts,[12] the majority before gacaca started, others while gacaca was ongoing, and some since it closed in 2012.

2. Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

In response to the genocide, the United Nations Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, with a mandate to prosecute "persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994." At time of writing, the ICTR had tried 75 individuals in 55 cases; 49 individuals were convicted; 14 were acquitted; 12 were awaiting the outcome of appeals. The ICTR is currently winding down its operations and all proceedings are expected to conclude by the end of 2014, with the exception of one case in which the appeal is due to conclude in mid-2015.[16]

The ICTR was only ever expected to try a small number of suspects: primarily those who played a leading role in the genocide. To some extent, it has performed this task, and has tried and convicted several prominent figures, including former Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, former army Chief of Staff General Augustin Bizimungu, and former Ministry of Defence Chief of Staff Colonel Théoneste Bagosora. The ICTR also set important precedents in the development of international criminal law, such as the first-ever prosecution of rape as genocide in the case of a former bourgmestre (mayor), Jean-Paul Akayesu. However, the tribunal has inherent limitations, as is the case with most international tribunals, and attracted criticism, particularly by Rwandans, for the relatively small number of cases it has handled, its high running cost, bureaucratic processes, the length of time trials have taken, and the fact that it was located outside Rwanda.

ICTR Transfers to Rwanda

Since 2011, the ICTR has transferred several genocide cases to the Rwandan courts. The first was that of Jean Bosco Uwinkindi, who was sent to Rwanda in April 2012. Preliminary proceedings in his trial, as well as in the trial of Bernard Munyagishali who was sent to Rwanda in July 2013, have begun in the High Court in Kigali. The ICTR has also agreed to transfer several other cases to Rwanda, including those of six indicted individuals who are still at large.

These decisions have been controversial. In order to obtain the transfer of cases from the ICTR, as well as extraditions of genocide suspects from other countries (see below), the Rwandan government has undertaken a number of legislative reforms aimed at meeting international fair trial standards. Some of these have been important and positive, for example the abolition of the death penalty in 2007 and the creation of a witness protection unit. Nevertheless, ICTR judges turned down several earlier requests by the ICTR prosecutor to transfer cases to Rwanda, notably in 2008, as they did not consider that the Rwandan judiciary could guarantee a fair trial. In the face of this refusal, the Rwandan government introduced additional reforms, which eventually paved the way for the ICTR to agree to transfer cases to Rwanda for domestic prosecution.

Human Rights Watch has documented major legal reforms in Rwanda in the last few years, but maintains the view, on the basis of its own trial observations and research in Rwanda, that the Rwandan justice system still lacks sufficient guarantees of independence and that fair trials cannot be guaranteed in all cases. Although Human Rights Watch and other organizations brought these concerns to the attention of the ICTR, most recently in 2011, the tribunal ruled that it was safe to transfer these cases to the Rwandan courts on the basis that legislative reforms in Rwanda had addressed some of its earlier concerns.

3. Trials in Foreign Countries and Extraditions to Rwanda

Many Rwandans fled their country during and after the genocide in 1994 and sought asylum in various countries in Africa, Europe, North America, and elsewhere. Among those claiming to be refugees were individuals suspected of having participated in the genocide.

Over the past 20 years, national authorities in some of the countries where Rwandan genocide suspects are living have conducted investigations into these individuals' alleged involvement in genocide-related crimes, leading to a number of trials before the domestic courts of these countries, under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction refers to the ability of national courts to try people suspected of serious international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or torture, even if neither the suspect nor the victim is a national of the country where the court is located and the crimes took place outside that country.

Trials of Rwandan genocide suspects have taken place in several countries including Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France. Dozens of criminal investigations are ongoing against other Rwandan genocide suspects in these and other countries. In some cases, for example in the United States, Rwandan genocide suspects were charged and tried on immigration-related offenses for concealing their alleged role during the genocide.

In some of these countries, many years elapsed before trials began. For example, in France, a country to which a number of known genocide suspects had fled after the genocide, it was not until February 2014 that the first Rwandan genocide suspect-Pascal Simbikangwa, a former intelligence chief under the Habyarimana government-was tried. This was the first case brought to trial by a newly created war crimes unit in France. It was a significant moment, as France had backed the former government of Rwanda and supported and trained some of the forces which went on to commit genocide. On March 14, 2014, a court in Paris found Simbikangwa guilty of genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 25 years in prison. Just one month earlier, on February 18, 2014, a court in Germany delivered a guilty verdict in the case of former mayor Onesphore Rwabukombe and sentenced him to 14 years' imprisonment for aiding and abetting genocide. These cases are important milestones in the demonstration of international commitment to ensuring that perpetrators of the genocide are held accountable, wherever they are found.

Extraditions

In principle, Human Rights Watch agrees that it is best for grave international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity to be prosecuted where they were committed, close to the victims and the affected population. However, in the case of countries such as Rwanda where the justice system still lacks full independence and the government can influence the outcome of trials, especially in politically sensitive cases, Human Rights Watch has concerns about the opportunity for suspects to receive a fair trial in domestic courts.

III. Justice for RPF Crimes

In contrast to progress in trying perpetrators of the genocide, very few RPF members have been held to account for the war crimes and crimes against humanity they committed in 1994. These killings were not in any way equivalent to the genocide, but the victims and their families have a right to see justice done. Human Rights Watch believes that the impunity protecting most RPF members from prosecution for these crimes has not only led to a sense that the RPF is above the law, but may have hindered progress toward reconciliation in the aftermath of the genocide.

After the genocide, the new government formed by the RPF admitted that its troops had carried out killings in 1994, but sought to downplay these crimes, describing them as isolated cases of revenge and claiming that it was bringing those responsible to justice. To Human Rights Watch's knowledge, fewer than 40 RPF soldiers have been tried for these crimes, and most have received comparatively lenient sentences.[22] They include four officers charged with war crimes in connection with the murder of 15 civilians, including 13 clergy and a young boy, in 1994. In a case initially prepared by the ICTR then handed over to Rwanda by the ICTR prosecutor, a Rwandan military court in 2008 acquitted the two most senior officers and sentenced the two lower-ranking ones, who confessed to the killings, to eight years' imprisonment; their sentences were reduced to five years on appeal in 2009.

Under the original 2001 gacaca law, gacaca courts had jurisdiction over war crimes as well as genocide and crimes against humanity, so they could conceivably have handled cases of RPF crimes from 1994. However, the reference to war crimes was removed from the law in 2004 and the government let it be known publicly and unambiguously that gacaca would not cover RPF crimes.

IV. Accountability for the Aftermath of the Genocide in the Great Lakes Region

The Rwandan genocide has had a lasting impact on some of Rwanda's neighbors, particularly Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where its consequences are still felt today.

Burundi

Rwanda's genocide was inextricably linked with events in neighboring Burundi, a country with a similar ethnic make-up to Rwanda and a parallel, extremely bloody history. Not only was Burundi's president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, killed at the same time as Rwanda's president Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, but six months earlier, on October 21, 1993, Burundi's first Hutu democratically-elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, was also assassinated. Ndadaye's assassination unleashed a wave of ethnic massacres in Burundi in which tens of thousands of Tutsi and Hutu were killed in late 1993 and early 1994.

Democratic Republic of Congo

As the RPF defeated the genocidal forces in 1994, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, most of them Hutu, fled en masse from the advancing RPF troops. Many settled in huge refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaïre), while others fled to Tanzania and Burundi. The refugees were accompanied by people who had participated in the genocide, including members of the former government, army and interahamwe militia, who established control over some of the refugee camps. Little was done by the then Zairian government or United Nations agencies to demilitarize the camps which Hutu extremists used as bases for preparing attacks on Rwanda and pursuing anti-Tutsi propaganda campaigns.

In November 1996, the new Rwandan army formed by the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), backed by Uganda, invaded Congo to destroy the refugee camps, and, together with a hastily constituted Congolese rebel group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre ( Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre, AFDL), overthrew the country's president, Mobutu Sese Seko, who had backed the Rwandan Hutu extremists. The attacks on the refugee camps killed thousands and forced the return to Rwanda of many of the surviving Hutu refugees. Many were arrested on their return to Rwanda on accusations of genocide; others were among thousands killed by the RPA in counter-insurgency operations in northwestern Rwanda in the late 1990s.[29] Those refugees who did not return to Rwanda, including large numbers who had not been involved in the genocide, fled deep into the forests of Congo, where Rwandan and AFDL troops massacred tens of thousands of them.

Today, Congo remains unstable, and violence continues in the east. One reason is that some members of the former Rwandan army, interahamwe militia, and other individuals suspected of having participated in the genocide formed an armed group in eastern Congo. After using a succession of different names, this group became known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda ( Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda, FDLR). Many members of the FDLR today are too young to have participated in the genocide in Rwanda; however, their leaders and combatants still include some individuals believed to have participated in the genocide.

The FDLR, still predominantly a Rwandan Hutu armed group, conducted sporadic attacks in Rwanda after the genocide, but these have almost ceased in more recent years as the FDLR has become significantly weakened. However, the FDLR continues to commit horrific violence against Congolese civilians, sometimes in alliance with Congolese armed groups. Some of its members have returned to Rwanda through an official disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, overseen by the UN, but others have resisted return and continue to keep thousands of Rwandan refugees hostage in Congo.[31]

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted two FDLR leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Congo. The first, FDLR Executive Secretary Callixte Mbarushimana, was arrested in France in October 2010 on the basis of an ICC arrest warrant, but pre-trial judges declined to confirm the charges against him for lack of sufficient evidence, and he was released from the court's custody in December 2011. Mbarushimana is also under investigation by a French war crimes unit in relation to crimes allegedly committed during the genocide in Rwanda. The second, Sylvestre Mudacumura, military commander of the FDLR, was indicted by the ICC in May 2012; he remains at large in Congo at the time of writing.

V. The Legacy of International Responses to the Rwandan Genocide

Despite repeated warnings by Rwandan and international human rights organizations, diplomats, UN staff and others that a genocide was being prepared, governments and intergovernmental bodies, including the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), dramatically failed to act to prevent the genocide as it unfolded in 1994. The UN peacekeeping force that was present in Rwanda withdrew most of its troops at the height of the massacres, leaving the Rwandan civilian population without defense or protection. Given that many of the killings during the genocide were carried out by civilians using machetes and clubs, rather than by military using firearms, UN peacekeepers could have saved many lives by intervening at an early stage-all the more so if their numbers had been increased and their mandate strengthened. Instead, most of the peacekeepers withdrew, giving free rein to the genocidal killers.

Overwhelming guilt at their individual and collective failure to stop the genocide has been a defining factor in many governments' foreign policy towards Rwanda since that time. Twenty years on, it continues to color international perceptions of and reactions to events in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes region, especially in relation to the human rights situation in present-day Rwanda and Rwanda's repeated incursions into Congo.

In terms of justice, the genocide in Rwanda, together with the wars in the Balkans, marked a turning point in international commitment to including accountability and criminal trials as part of responses to grave crimes under international law. The creation of the ICTR in 1994, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia the year before, paved the way for international justice. One important and direct legacy of the genocide in Rwanda was the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. Today, there is a fledgling system of international justice with a "court of last resort" that is tasked with limiting the repetition of horrors of the kind Rwanda experienced in 1994 and trying perpetrators where the national courts are unable or unwilling to do so. The ICC is the first permanent international criminal court whose mandate is not limited to a specific situation but which has broad jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The ICC currently has 120 state parties and is investigating grave international crimes in eight countries.

VI. Conclusion

As the world's eyes turn to Rwanda once again 20 years after the genocide, political leaders, media and other observers will be reflecting on the horrific crimes committed in 1994 and on the shocking international failure to prevent them.

Twenty years on, significant progress has been achieved in bringing some of the perpetrators to justice, both nationally and internationally. The combination of national and international action to end impunity for the genocide in Rwanda has also marked a turning point in the development of justice for international crimes more broadly.

Human Rights Watch encourages the Rwandan government and other governments around the world to pursue efforts to arrest and prosecute-in fair and credible trials-other perpetrators who are still at large.

The Rwandan authorities should also bring to justice RPF members responsible for carrying out or ordering war crimes or crimes against humanity in 1994, and ensure that families of the victims of these crimes, as well as witnesses, are able to speak freely about these events without fear for their security.

Finally, Human Rights Watch encourages the Rwandan government to pursue its reforms of the justice system with a view to further strengthening its independence, and to enable those who suffered serious miscarriages of justice-whether defendants or survivors of the genocide-to seek a review of their cases within a reasonable period. This would not only provide an opportunity for redressing these errors, but demonstrate deeper commitment to delivering fair and credible justice for the genocide. It would also serve as an example to other countries in the region in terms of enforcing accountability for grave crimes.

The Work of Human Rights Watch in Rwanda

Human Rights Watch has been documenting and exposing human rights violations in Rwanda since the early 1990s. Its senior advisor in the Africa Division, Alison Des Forges, one of the world's foremost experts on Rwanda, dedicated her life to the struggle for human rights in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and to Rwanda in particular. In the period leading up to the genocide, she worked tirelessly to alert world powers to the impending crisis in Rwanda. Few would listen. By the time the genocidal forces had unleashed their sinister program and the world had woken up to the full horror that was unfolding in Rwanda, it was too late.

Alison Des Forges's efforts did not stop when the genocide ended. She continued painstakingly gathering information on the killings, rapes and other horrific crimes, which she compiled into what has become one of the main reference books on the Rwandan genocide: "Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda", an 800-page account of the genocide and of the events which preceded and succeeded it, published jointly by Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) in 1999.

Alison Des Forges also testified as an expert witness in 11 trials at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, as well as in domestic court proceedings involving Rwandan genocide suspects in several countries.

Alison Des Forges campaigned vigorously for justice for the genocide until her sudden death in a plane crash in the US on February 12, 2009. She also documented human rights abuses by the new government of Rwanda after the genocide and advocated for accountability for all abuses, past and present. Her death left a huge void in Rwanda and in the broader community of human rights activists, academics and friends of Rwanda.

Human Rights Watch has had a researcher and a small office in Rwanda since 1995. Initially, documentation of the genocide was one of the main tasks of the office, but there were also pressing, new human rights concerns in Rwanda: in the aftermath of the genocide, the government formed by the RPF was itself responsible for numerous abuses, some of which persist in Rwanda today.

Over the last 20 years, Rwanda has made huge strides in rebuilding the institutions and the infrastructure that were destroyed during the genocide, in delivering public services and in expanding its economy. As noted in this paper, there have also been significant improvements in the functioning of the justice system and in prison conditions. But these improvements have not been matched by progress in respect for civil and political rights: the government has imposed severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association and strongly resisted moves towards democracy. Human Rights Watch continues to document these and other concerns in Rwanda today. Trial observation and advocacy for legal reform also remain a central part of the organization's work in the country.

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Rwanda: Justice After Genocide-20 Years On

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On the 20th anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch stands in solidarity with the victims and with those who survived.

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In 1994, Rwanda's population was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Approximately 85 percent of the country was Hutu, while 14 percent was Tutsi and one percent was Twa.

Rwanda was ruled by leaders of the Hutu majority from the time it gained independence in 1962 until the genocide in 1994. During this period, the country's Tutsi minority suffered systematic discrimination. They were also the targets of periodic outbreaks of mass violence. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis fled the country in the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1990, a Tutsi rebel force invaded Rwanda from the north. Hard-line Hutu politicians accused Rwandan Tutsis of supporting the rebels. After the war reached a stalemate, Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana signed a peace agreement. The terms enabled Rwanda to transition to a government in which Hutus and Tutsis would share power. The agreement angered Hutu extremists. In response, they armed Hutu paramilitary forces and waged a vicious propaganda campaign against the Tutsis.

The One Hundred Day Genocide

On the evening of April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana was killed. A surface-to-air missile shot down his plane as it was landing in Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Who fired the missile remains in dispute. However, extremist leaders of Rwanda's Hutu majority seized the assassination as the opportunity to launch a carefully planned campaign to wipe out the country's Tutsis. They also targeted moderate Hutu leaders who might have opposed this program of genocide.

Political and other high profile leaders who might have been able to prevent the genocide were killed immediately. Violence spread through the capital and into the rest of the country. The genocide continued for roughly three months.

As the level of violence escalated, groups of Tutsis fled to places that in previous times of turmoil had provided safety: churches, schools, and government buildings. Many of these refuges became the sites of major massacres. The Rwandan military and Hutu paramilitary forces carried out the massacres using guns and explosives.

In addition to mass killings, thousands and thousands of Tutsis and people suspected of being Tutsis were killed in their homes and fields and on the road. Militias set up roadblocks across the country to prevent the victims from escaping. In cities, towns, and even the tiniest villages, Hutus answered the call of their local leaders to murder their Tutsi neighbors. Entire families were killed at a time, often hacked to death with machetes. Women were systematically and brutally raped.

Hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutus participated in the genocide. As many as one million people, mostly Tutsis, were slaughtered in 100 days.

The genocide ended when the Tutsi-dominated rebel movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), captured Kigali. The RPF overthrew the Hutu government and seized power. The new government announced a policy of "unity and reconciliation." It adopted a new constitution that guaranteed equal rights for all Rwandans regardless of their group.

More than one million Hutus, including many of the genocidaires, fled to neighboring countries. In Zaire, today the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the refugees' presence helped spark two international conflicts and ongoing insurgencies. More than five million people have died in the violence.

Seven months after the genocide began, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Its mission was to bring to justice those accused of high level crimes. The ICTR was held in neighboring Arusha, Tanzania.

On September 2, 1998, the ICTR delivered the first conviction for genocide by an international court. It ruled that Jean-Paul Akayesu was guilty of inciting and leading acts of violence against Tutsi civilians in the town where he served as mayor. This judgment was also the first by an international court to define rape as a crime in international law and to recognize rape as a means of committing genocide.

In another landmark case, the ICTR convicted a newspaper publisher and a radio station owner of the crime of incitement to genocide (a third defendant was found guilty as well, but was acquitted on appeal). It was the first time since the Nuremberg trial of the major German war criminals that an international court examined the responsibility of the media for mass atrocities.

In all, the ICTR indicted 93 persons and convicted 62 for crimes in connection with the genocide. Those prosecuted included high-level military and government officials, politicians and businessmen, and religious, media, and militia leaders.

Within Rwanda, the national courts tried more than 10,000 persons for planning the genocide or committing atrocities. In 2005, the government also implemented the traditional community court system known as (pronounced ga-CHA-cha). These courts heard the cases of the additional hundreds of thousands of Rwandans accused of participating in the genocide. In communities throughout the country, locally elected judges heard victims and witnesses testify. The judges also gave the defendants the opportunity to confess and ask for forgiveness. The gacaca courts tried more than 1.2 million cases before they closed in 2012.

Last Edited: Apr 5, 2021

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In 1994, Rwanda's population was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Approximately 85 percent of the country was Hutu, while 14 percent was Tutsi and one percent was Twa. Rwanda was ruled by leaders of the Hutu majority from the time it gained independence in 1962 until the genocide in 1994.

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1. Starting and ending dates of conflict

2. Participating countries, groups/parties

3. Causes of conflict

4. Leaders (prominent figures)

5. Major battles

6. Number of casualties (both civilian and military)

7. Resolution of conflict (How did it end?)

8. The soldier’s perspective on the conflict

9. The role of women in the conflict

10. The conflict’s impact on the people in the conflict area (How did it affect their lifestyle?)

11. Role of religious beliefs, technology, and weaponry in the conflict

12. How the conflict influenced literature, music, sculpting, painting, poetry, dance, theater, celebrities, athletes, scientists, humanitarians, and words/phrases from the native language during that time period

13. Tributes that bring honor to the victims of the conflict

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France backed the Rwandan government and hid the fact that they could have stopped the genocide. They had the power but didn't use it. They tried to stop it by making "safe houses", but after that failed, they stopped getting involved. Some people believe that France was directly involved in starting the genocide because of its lack of trying to stop it. In a report with over 250 witnesses, they state that France withheld important documents and files during the aftermath trials. After, France and Rwanda continued to have strained relations and tried many times to come to a mutual standing.

The Hutus - the majority of the rwandan population. Had a hatred of the Tutsis becaus ethey used to rule in the government before the 1959 revolution. More focused on farming.

Both had tensions over ruling.

Tutsis - the minority group. Used to have power in the government beofre the 1959 rev when the Hutus overthrew them. More focused on cattle rasing, etc. Although the minority, usually had higher social standing and money.

The Twa people - Often the forgotten population in Rwanda. They were also killed and grouped with the Tutsis. Had a strong culture in song and arts. They were throught to be the first group in Rwanda, not the Tutsis.

Belgium - Belgiun rule introduced ID cards and labeled the Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa people, leading to tensions within the groups as a whole. They placed only Tutsi people in power soley because of their genetic looks and wouldn't give Hutu's a chance. During their rule, Belgium gave the Tutsis superiority, they didn't have to work in fields, they didn't have to farm. They got better education and were exempt from a lot the Hutus weren't. Because the Hutus were forced to di such hard labor, they often couldn't tend to their fields, which led to famines. Belgium lost control of Rwanda in 1962, but the effects lasted. The Hutus continued to be hostile to the Tutsis becacuse of this, even when Hutus finally got the power. This caused many Tutsis to flee and gave Hutus the oppertunity to be the controlling group.

The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda - Led by Romeo Dallaire, they were a small group meant to keep the peace around the border, but as the presidesnt's plane was shot down they were roped into the genocide. Dallaire and his group tried to defend citezens and the next prime minister, but the prime minister and 10 belgian soldiers were found murdered and over 800,000 tutsis, moderate hutus, and twa people were killed. With over 2 million who fled to neighboring countries.

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In April 2021, a report commissioned by the Rwandan government placed " significant" responsibility on the French government for "enabling a foreseeable genocide". In April and May of 1994, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered by Hutu militia. Despite evidence of a planned Tutsi extermination, France willingly supported the Rwandan government and subsequently endeavoured to conceal its role in the aftermath of the genocide. While the report clears France of any complicity, it outlines France's stringent commitment to geopolitical aims in the face of a genocidal regime.

Years of ethnic tension and animosity culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where members of the Hutu ethnic majority set out to exterminate the minority Tutsi population. The genocide lasted for a period of around 100 days with shocking speed and brutality that left the world in categoric disbelief. In the aftermath, importance was placed on efforts to provide an understanding and awareness of the factors that contributed to such a horrifying reality. The most recent effort is the Rwandan-commissioned report.

The 600-page report, commissioned in 2017, was carried out by US law firm Levy Firestone Museand is based on documentary evidence from several sources and accounts of approximately 250 witnesses. It concludes that France enabled the 1994 genocide and accused the French government of withholding " critical documents and testimony " in the decades following the genocide. France's actions as a bystander meant it did nothing to stop the slaughter of ethnic Tutsi and therefore holds significant responsibility for the events that transpired.

ONE STEP CLOSER TO TRANSPARENCY

Widely seen as an effort to improve bilateral relations, the Rwandan commission came just weeks after a comparable report was published by the French government in which similar, albeit not identical, conclusions were reached. Commissioned by current French President Emmanuel Macron, the French report asserts that French authorities had been blind to the preparations for genocide and then reacted too slowly to appreciate the extent of the killings and to respond to them. The designation of "blind" is contentiously refuted in the Rwandan report, stressing greater culpability. In a blatant rebuttal, this report contended that the French government was "neither blind nor unconscious about the foreseeable genocide". As the President of Rwanda Paul Kagame put it, " Rwandan lives were just pawns in France's geopolitical game ".

Despite the differing thresholds of liability, both reports can be seen as solid efforts to move towards a more transparent view of history between the two countries. To further this effort, on April 7, the day of commemoration of the genocide, the French president announced the decision to declassify and make accessible to the public the archives from 1990-1994. Previously, all requests for these documents had been denied, as under French law, documents that regard military and foreign policies can remain classified for decades. This had been a source of great tension between Rwanda and France, thus the move to declassify signals the acknowledgement that transparency is needed in order to have a better understanding of the past.

It is the hope of both President Macron and President Kagame that a new relationship will be formed between the two countries, with transparency being the antidote to the poisonous relationship that existed because of France's role in enabling the Rwandan genocide. With a common understanding of the past, it is much easier to look towards a common future. Rwanda is a small but strategic country. Now France's geopolitical goals depend on the acknowledgement of its previous humanitarian failings when presented with geopolitical opportunity.

While the court of public opinion will be scrutinising this blossoming relationship, President Kagame now believes that France and Rwanda have reached a stage of " unprecedented political trust ".

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France's Role In The 1994 Rwandan Genocide - Human Rights Pulse

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A recent report commissioned by the Rwandan government highlights France's role in the 1994 genocide of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

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Diplomats and other officials deemed to never let people forget the genocide and the cruelty of it. They banned movies and TV shows, music, and sports for a week as people publicly mourned the event. Schools teach about the tragedy and there are many public memorials, where bones, clothes, weapons, and pictures are shown to help people remember how bad it was. When the RPF came back to Kigali to push the extremists out, many fled to neighboring countries like France or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Now, places like France are finding more people involved and suspected in the genocide and they are being convicted.

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Juvenal Habyarimana - the president of Rwanda, Hutu. His plane was shot down, killing everyone on board. It was spectated that the Hutu extremists shot down the plane, solely to blame the Tutsis. The extremists blamed it on the Tutsis, thus giving them a reason to begin their genocide against the Tutsis.

Mathieu Ngirumpatse - He was one of the leaders of the extremist group. He was convicted of genocide and acts against humanity.

Both men were part of a group organizing the killings and were responsible for the damage people under their organization did.

Edouard Karemera - He was the former vice president of the extremist group. He was also convicted of genocide and acts against humanity. He was charged with overseeing people involved in the genocide, as he was the minister of the interim government.

Joseph Nzirorera - He was the former secretary for the group, also convicted.

All three of the convicted pleaded not guilty during the trial.

Colonel Théoneste Bagosora - In 1993, he was appointed as the cabinet director of the defense ministry, and he was only to answer to the president. When President Habyarimana's plane was shot down, he took over state affairs and ordered the massacre to happen. After the genocide ended, he fled to Cameroon and was arrested there. He then went to court in Arusha, Tanzania. He was sentenced to life in prison but he made a request for it to be shortened. On the account of someone who once knew him, he "never accepted responsibility for the genocide, showing no sign of remorse or regret."

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Three former Rwandan Cabinet ministers went on trial Monday before a U.N. tribunal for their alleged roles in their country's 1994 genocide, and a fourth convicted earlier heard his appeal had been rejected.

The three who went on trial were leaders of the former ruling party that presided over the 100-day slaughter in 1994 at least half a million members of the Tutsi ethnic minority and political moderates from the Hutu majority.

Mathieu Ngirumpatse, president of the Hutu extremist National Revolutionary Movement for Democracy and Development; Edouard Karemera, the party's former vice president; and Joseph Nzirorera, its former secretary-general had pleaded not guilty to charges that include genocide and crimes against humanity.

As the trial began before the tribunal based in the northern Tanzanian city of Arusha, chief prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow accused the three of using their powers "to mount this nationwide campaign of terror."

The Hutu group was set up as Rwanda's sole political party by then-President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1974, a year after he seized power. All Rwandans were obliged to join.

The genocide erupted after Habyarimana's plane was shot down by unknown attackers on April 6, 1994.

Earlier Monday, an appeals court rejected the appeal of Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, the former minister for culture and higher education. The court is in the Hague, the Netherlands, and the ruling was relayed by a satellite video link to Arusha.

Fourth leader sentenced to life in prison
Kamuhanda was convicted in Arusha in January 2004, on charges of genocide and extermination and sentenced to life in prison. The appeals court ordered Kamuhanda, who was at the Hague hearing, to be transferred to Arusha while officials search for a country where he can serve the sentence.

Witnesses described seeing Kamuhanda arrive at a church compound in Gikomero in his car, bringing with him armed militiamen to kill Tutsis who had taken refuge there. The militiamen used machetes, guns and grenades in the massacre, the judge said.

The trial judge rejected Kamuhanda's alibi that he was at home when the massacres began on April 12, 1994.

Meanwhile, the chief prosecutor said officials from the U.N. tribunal and police in the central African nation of Gabon have arrested a former technical director of a radio station that promoted the genocide.

Joseph Serugendo was arrested Friday in Gabon's capital, Libreville, and will be transferred to Arusha for trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, Jallow said.

Serugendo was also a key leader of the Interahamwe militia, an extremist Hutu force that led the genocide.

During the genocide, broadcasters at Serugendo's Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, or RTLM, urged Hutus to kill Tutsis. Two of the top broadcasters from the station, along with a newspaper editor, were convicted in December 2003 by the U.N. tribunal for their roles in promoting the slaughter.

The station was shut down after President Paul Kagame's Rwanda Patriotic Front, a Tutsi-led rebel group, toppled the Hutu extremists and ended the genocide.

The U.N. Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994. It has convicted 22 people and acquitted three. The tribunal has 63 genocide suspects in its custody and 25 are standing trial.

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Leaders during Rwandan genocide face trial

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Three former Rwandan Cabinet ministers went on trial Monday before a U.N. tribunal for their alleged roles in Rwanda's 1994 genocide. A fourth convicted earlier heard his appeal had been rejected.

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I'm posting a couple of pictures of during the genocide/100 Days of Slaughter.

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I'm posting a couple of pictures of during the genocide/100 Days of Slaughter.

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I'm putting pictures just so we can get an idea of what it was like, and it's a good way to visualize and get ideas for future assignments.

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The country still struggles even though it has been 25 years since the genocide.

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The country still struggles even though it has been 25 years since the genocide.

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Here is an article that is helpful on the specific dates and context of how the war started and ended.

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Here is an article that is helpful on the specific dates and context of how the war started and ended.

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The conflict started late 1950s, with ethnic conflicts and tensions flaring up. In Rwanda, the 1950s was a great wave of decolonization. The Hutu ethnic group had a political movement going on to gain power but during this time the Tutsi ethnic group was trying to resist democratization and the loss of their certain privileges.

The conflict ended in 1994, the killings continued up to July 4 1994 when the RPF took control of the entire territory of Rwanda by using military control.

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October 1990

On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. Because of the RPF attacks which displaced thousands and a policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by the government, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors. Media, particularly radio, continued to spread unfounded rumours, which exacerbated ethnic problems.

August 1993

In August 1993, through the peacemaking efforts of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the governments in the region, the signing of the Arusha peace agreements appeared to have brought an end to the conflict between the then Hutu dominated government and the opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

October 1993

In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a mandate encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and general support for the peace process.

From the outset, however, the will to achieve and sustain peace was subverted by some of the Rwandan political parties participating in the Agreement. With the ensuing delays in its implementation, violations of human rights became more widespread and the security situation deteriorated. Later, evidence demonstrated irrefutably that extremist elements of the Hutu majority while talking peace were in fact planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Genocide - 6 April 1994

more than one million people are estimated to have perished and an estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped.

On 6 April 1994, the deaths of the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash caused by a rocket attack, ignited several weeks of intense and systematic massacres. The killings - more than one million people are estimated to have perished - shocked the international community and were clearly acts of genocide. An estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped. Members of the presidential guard started killing Tutsi civilians in a section of Kigali near the airport. Less than half an hour after the plane crash, roadblocks manned by Hutu militiamen often assisted by gendarmerie (paramilitary police) or military personnel were set up to identify Tutsis.

7 April

On 7 April, Radio Television Libres Des Mille Collines (RTLM) aired a broadcast attributing the plane crash to the RPF and a contingent of UN soldiers, as well as incitements to eliminate the "Tutsi cockroach". Later that day the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect her were brutally murdered by Rwandan government soldiers in an attack on her home. Other moderate Hutu leaders were similarly assassinated. After the massacre of its troops, Belgium withdrew the rest of its force.

21 April

On 21 April, after other countries asked to withdraw troops, the UNAMIR force reduced from an initial 2,165 to 270.

If the absence of a resolute commitment to reconciliation by some of the Rwandan parties was one problem, the tragedy was compounded by the faltering response of the international community. The capacity of the United Nations to reduce human suffering in Rwanda was severely constrained by the unwillingness of Member States to respond to the changed circumstances in Rwanda by strengthening UNAMIR's mandate and contributing additional troops.

22 June

On June 22, the Security Council authorized French-led forces to mount a humanitarian mission. The mission, called Operation Turquoise, saved hundreds of civilians in South West Rwanda, but is also said to have allowed soldiers, officials and militiamen involved in the genocide to flee Rwanda through the areas under their control. In other areas, killings continued until 4 July 1994 when the RPF took military control of the entire territory of Rwanda.

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Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations

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October 1990 On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. Because of the RPF attacks which displaced thousands and a policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by the government, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors.

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After roughly 100 days, RPF

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Romeo Dallaire was the leading commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda when President Habyarimara and his counterpart's plane, was shot down at the Kigali airport. This started the genocide and the UNAMIR was roped in. Because the president and his acting counterpart were killed, there was no one to rule and stop the genocide, so Dallaire sent 10 of his soldiers to protect the prime minister. Later they were found held hostage and murdered. Dallaire sent word back to New York, asking for reinforcements, but he was ignored and none came. He and his soldiers tried to protect as many people as possible but weren't able to do much help with the small number of soldiers. After the genocide ended, Dallaire relinquished his title of commander and went back to New York, joining the Land Force Command as a deputy commander and commander of the First Canadian Division. He was medically released from the military in 2000 due to PTSD. He later went on to write a book called Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, the book was soon turned into a documentary and he was given an offer to work at Harvard and continue his research. He was awarded with various things and was given a place in the Senate.

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It explains how it started, plus during the genocide

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It explains how it started, plus during the genocide

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October 1990

On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. Because of the RPF attacks which displaced thousands and a policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by the government, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors. Media, particularly radio, continued to spread unfounded rumours, which exacerbated ethnic problems.

August 1993

In August 1993, through the peacemaking efforts of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the governments in the region, the signing of the Arusha peace agreements appeared to have brought an end to the conflict between the then Hutu dominated government and the opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

October 1993

In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a mandate encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and general support for the peace process.

From the outset, however, the will to achieve and sustain peace was subverted by some of the Rwandan political parties participating in the Agreement. With the ensuing delays in its implementation, violations of human rights became more widespread and the security situation deteriorated. Later, evidence demonstrated irrefutably that extremist elements of the Hutu majority while talking peace were in fact planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Genocide - 6 April 1994

more than one million people are estimated to have perished and an estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped.

On 6 April 1994, the deaths of the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash caused by a rocket attack, ignited several weeks of intense and systematic massacres. The killings - more than one million people are estimated to have perished - shocked the international community and were clearly acts of genocide. An estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped. Members of the presidential guard started killing Tutsi civilians in a section of Kigali near the airport. Less than half an hour after the plane crash, roadblocks manned by Hutu militiamen often assisted by gendarmerie (paramilitary police) or military personnel were set up to identify Tutsis.

7 April

On 7 April, Radio Television Libres Des Mille Collines (RTLM) aired a broadcast attributing the plane crash to the RPF and a contingent of UN soldiers, as well as incitements to eliminate the "Tutsi cockroach". Later that day the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect her were brutally murdered by Rwandan government soldiers in an attack on her home. Other moderate Hutu leaders were similarly assassinated. After the massacre of its troops, Belgium withdrew the rest of its force.

21 April

On 21 April, after other countries asked to withdraw troops, the UNAMIR force reduced from an initial 2,165 to 270.

If the absence of a resolute commitment to reconciliation by some of the Rwandan parties was one problem, the tragedy was compounded by the faltering response of the international community. The capacity of the United Nations to reduce human suffering in Rwanda was severely constrained by the unwillingness of Member States to respond to the changed circumstances in Rwanda by strengthening UNAMIR's mandate and contributing additional troops.

22 June

On June 22, the Security Council authorized French-led forces to mount a humanitarian mission. The mission, called Operation Turquoise, saved hundreds of civilians in South West Rwanda, but is also said to have allowed soldiers, officials and militiamen involved in the genocide to flee Rwanda through the areas under their control. In other areas, killings continued until 4 July 1994 when the RPF took military control of the entire territory of Rwanda.

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Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations

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October 1990 On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. Because of the RPF attacks which displaced thousands and a policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by the government, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors.

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This has kinda what the soldiers/ Military officers acted like towards each other. Its also about the peacekeepers

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This has kinda what the soldiers/ Military officers acted like towards each other. Its also about the peacekeepers

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Ghana peacekeepers remember Rwanda’s genocide | Features | Al Jazeera

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About 800,000 to 1 million people were killed, with over 2 million fleeing to other countries. Mojority were Tutsi, but some were neutral Hutus and the smallest population of the three: the Twa people. When the RPF came back and took over the capital, they killed some of the people they belived to be guilty of genocide. By the time they had full control, ten thousand+ were killed by the RPF.

At least 10 UNAMIR soldiers killed.

Roughly 20,000 tutsis killed in the 1959 Hutu Peasent Revolution and over 300,000 forced to flee.

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Starting date: April 7, 1994

Ending date: July 15, 1994

Although the genocide mostly only lasted for 100 days, RPF took time to gain control and put the genocide to a full stop.

Causes:

Tensions over the minority Tutsi population having more power.

The switch in powers from the 1959 revolution

The tension from breaking away from Belgium

The president being killed

Built tensions from when Rwanda was under Belgian rule.

Major Battles:

The 1959 revolution showed how desperate the Hutus were for change and how far they would go for it. It showed how extreme they could be.

The 100 days of massacre - the days that are labeled as the genocide where roughly 6 men, women and children were killed per minute every hour for roughly 3 months.

How it ended: the genocide ended when the RPF forced back at the Hutus and invaded the capital and other areas, taking back control, killing hutus and forcing others to flee into neighboring countries.

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The conflicts impact the people in that designated area

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The conflicts impact the people in that designated area

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"Many women suffered the consequences of rape and sexual violence. Thousands of children were orphaned and had to fend for themselves. Countless survivors developed long-term psychological problems. However, over time Rwanda rebuilt itself and survivors played an important role in its development."

This article goes on to explain that after the genocide the surviving Tutsis were without families and the overall country was left in shambles. People were out of place and the basic infrastructure of everything was ruined. Even though the genocide was over 96% of people in the country suffered from PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder)

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Here is an article that is a personal story of a woman named Nishimwe who survived the Rwanda genocide as a teenager, she describes surviving the genocide as "being tested to her limits"

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Here is an article that is a personal story of a woman named Nishimwe who survived the Rwanda genocide as a teenager, she describes surviving the genocide as "being tested to her limits"

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Before I get into talking about this article she starts at the top by saying that she is telling her personal story to help her cope and heal.

Nishimwe is a 32-year-old woman who experienced the genocide as a teenager. She says that the country Rwanda was such a beautiful place before the genocide and that despite the ethnic tensions she was fortunate to have a lovely family and taken care of.

She says even way before being born there was discrimination against the Tutsi and that some were denied country and others simply went into exile. She said things got a little worse when joining school but it got really bad right before the genocide happened because on the radio Tutsis were called "Snakes" or "Cockroaches" that needed to be exterminated. Now a side note being called a cockroach or snake honestly does not sound scary at all but thinking of the time this is in and how the Hutus are now in control this is very scary for the Tutsis. The Hutus are explaining that they have gained more control and power over them and they can kill you and will.

She says she never expected the genocide to happen especially because she would have Hutu friends and go to their homes and see them at school so it was a bit of a shock. Nishimwe says her parents always tried to protect the family from what was being said but she could see their fear on their faces. She explains during the genocide the announcements on the radio got scarier and more alarming just each day and that it led to Tutsi families just like hers leaving to go hide. Her friends and family were killed and her father was the first to go. She heard people who killed him say they were happy he was dead and it made her want to die too. Nishimwe was just. teenager too and after her father's and brothers' death she was left with her mother and sisters and they just wanted to die. They were all surrounded by women and young girls who were raped and tortured and she finally contracted HIV she felt awful and never knew if she would be a normal teenager again. This is how just one person was affected and she explains more in the article.

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Religion about Christianity and its role in the Rwandan Genocide

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Religion about Christianity and its role in the Rwandan Genocide

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In a time span of one hundred days, between April and July 1994, Rwanda's political arena imploded. The country collapsed into chaos, and violence escalated into the genocide of one million people among members of the Tutsi ethnic group and moderate components of the Hutu ethnic majority in the country. The genocide occurred in one of Africa's most Christian regions, with ninety per cent of the population identifying itself as part of a Catholic, Protestant, or Seventh-day Adventist Church as of 1991 (Longman, 2001; Henning, 2001). Inevitably, in the aftershock of the genocide, many questioned the role, and attempted to fathom the association of Rwanda's Churches with the genocide. As a consequence, the Church has faced numerous criticisms from diverse fronts, and has been repeatedly blamed of culpability in the violence that occurred during those obscure months (Longman, 2010). However, it was only in 2017 that Pope Francis, upon meeting the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, officially asked for forgiveness for the Catholic Church's role in the 1994 genocide, stating that, in Rwanda, the "sins and failings of the Church and its members had ultimately disfigured the face of Catholicism".

To what degree were Christian Churches involved in the genocide of 1994? Does the Church's guilt lie merely in a sin of passivity, in the actions of few bad apples within the sacrosanct lines of the Clergy, or did it have a role on actively shaping the ethnic and political realities that made the genocide feasible and possible?

In the years following the genocide, a major denunciation has imputed the Church for its passivity and inaction in the face of the slaughters, committing a sin of omission and lack of action. Others have acknowledged the allegations against specific individuals within the clergy, yet deny the universal responsibility of the Church as an institution - including Pope John Paul II (The New York Times, 1996); in a communication released by the Vatican in 1996, John Paul affirmed that 'the Church could not be held responsible for the guilt of its members that have acted against the evangelic law'. In support to this claim, it has been argued that, in Rwanda, the Church 'was also one of martyrs' (The Tablet, 1994), and neglecting this aspect would certainly result in an unbalanced account of history. Yet, the case for Christian Churches' deep and direct implications in the Rwandan violence, with their responsibility going well beyond silence or the actions of a few, remained strong over the two decades following the genocide, and eventually prevailed with the statements made by Pope Francis in 2017 (Bartov & Mack, 2001; Longman, 2001, The Guardian, 2017). Whichever reading of history one should adopt, it remains undeniable the role of the Church in the Rwanda massacres was far from a simple phenomenon, but should instead be analysed as the result of a set of intricate dynamics.

A less immediate, yet fundamental element is the role performed by the Church in actively setting the grounds for the racial framework within which the genocide occurred (Longman, 2001; 2010; Ahlbäck, 2006; Van 't Spijker, 1997). Peculiarly, in the context of Rwanda, religious convictions did not function as organizers of group identity (Longman, 2010). The genocide was not pursued on the dividing lines between religious groups, as it happened in other theatres of violence such as Lebanon, India, Sudan, Sri Lanka, or Northern Ireland (Ibid). Nevertheless, Christianity and its proselytizers were essential in defining and crystalizing lines between ethnicities in a context where ethnic differentiation would have otherwise been negligible (Katongole, 2005). Eventually, the genocide was pursued by the regime precisely on the base of this racialization of ethnicity.

Surely the first Christian missionaries to reach Rwanda did not construct ethnicities from scratch (Longman, 2010). Yet, in pre-colonial Rwanda the terms Tutsi and Hutu were empty of racial significance. Instead, these groupings represented mainly trans-ethnic identities and established societal classifications on which communities in Rwanda centred their economical and power interactions (Vail, 1989; Katongole, 2005). Otherwise, the groups formed 'a single cultural community of Kinyarwanda speakers' (Mamdani cited in Katongole, 2005, p.71) not only united under a common language, but also costumes, traditions, and beliefs. In their attempt to comprehend the local organization of society, the first missionaries - known as White Fathers - applied their very own European understandings of race and ethnicity, and managed to solidify previously elastic social categories into rigid ethnic ones (Longman, 2010). In fact, the White Fathers applied misleading sociobiological theories to local social constructions. This was seen with the so-called "Hamitic narrative" and its racist interpretation of Rwandan society. This narrative assumes that "Negroid" populations - from which European's claimed the Hutu descended from given their physical characteristics - were inferior to pastoral "Hamitic" groups of "Caucasoid" origin, distantly related to Europeans (Ibid), from which the Tutsis were believed to originate. This racist interpretation of Rwandan society - even if a less immediate factor in the historical analysis - set a fundamental premise for the 1994 genocide because it promoted and directed the internalization of these notions in the country (Ahlbäck, 2006).

The crystallization of ethnic lines is a necessary but insufficient condition to understand the Rwandan massacres and to assess the involvement of the Church in such events. To fully grasp the dynamics behind the Church's role, it is essential to reflect on a number of more immediate aspects.

By openly supporting the political regime and legitimizing ethnic discriminations, the Church was crucial in rendering the action of the Hutu government morally justifiable, and the participation in the genocide ethically acceptable to the rest of the population (Longman, 2001; 2010). Only one year after the genocide, historian Doris Bergen, pursued research on the role of religion in the Holocaust. She claimed that 'Christianity did play a critical role, not perhaps in motivating the top decision makers, but in making their commands comprehensible and tolerable' (Bergen, 1994, p.329). These findings are also valid regarding the Rwandan genocide. In the overwhelmingly Christian country, most of the population assumed that the bloodbaths of Tutsis were coherent with the teachings of the Church (Longman, 2001). In the eyes of the persecutors of the massacres 'God had abandoned the Tutsis' (McGreal, 2014). Furthermore, a number of disturbing testimonies of local ecclesiastics, gathered by Timothy Longman (2001; 2010) throughout years of remarkable field research, depict how death squads would attend mass, prey, and kneel in front of the altar. Subsequently, the same people would commit massacres, at times at the foot of those same consecrated altars - not out of a lack of respect for the Christian faith, rather driven by the politicized and discriminatory nature of Christian institutions in Rwanda (Ibid). As a Tutsi priest reported, 'people came to mass each day to pray, then they went out to kill' (in Ibid, p. 3).

From these accounts, it appears evident that the Catholic Church in Rwanda not only failed to forcefully condemn the massacres but also played a main part in the legitimization of the government's actions in the eyes of its people. At the same time, it also chased a hazardous pattern of encouraging popular submission to governmental authority (Longman, 2010).

The rationale driving these dynamics is multi-faceted. Since the colonial era, the Church had participated actively in struggles of political nature and was deeply incorporated into the Rwanda's structures of power (Bartov & Mack, 2001). Religious groups in Rwanda operated as complex and layered interest groups, and members of the clergy maintained close personal ties with political and business figures both at the local and national levels (Longman, 2001). In the local context, pastors and priests often covered administrative posts in the prefecture councils and were personally linked to local authorities. At the national level, Church leaders stood as influential public figures, habitually associated with the government in command. For instance, the Catholic archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumva, regularly appeared at public events in company of President Habyarimana before his assassination; served as the personal confessor of the President's wife; and sat on the central committee of the Revolutionary National Movement for Development (MRND) for more than a decade while the body implemented the discriminatory policies that eventually led to the genocide (Ibid; Stier & Landres, 2006). Similarly, the leaders of the Anglican, Baptist, and Presbyterian Churches were all associated with the ruling elite through personal links of friendship, interest, or blood (Longman, 2001). Understandably, this multi-layered, intimate, and interest-driven cooperation between the State and the Church led to an elevated prospective for gaining extensive profits on both sides. While political authorities controlled the means to increase the status and the wealth of the clerics, the members of the Church had ample social influence to consolidate popular support for the government, and even to suppress opposition against a corrupted political realm (Bartov & Mack, 2001). Ultimately, maintaining the status quo was fundamental for a large majority within the Church personnel as they enjoyed open and privileged access to corrupt Rwandan political actors.

However, since the late 1980s, the power of this pyramidal network of personal connections has trembled. During this time, the churches of Rwanda had rooted into sites of social struggles and turned into vital arteries for the emerging energetic civil society (Longman, 2010). As reported by Longman (Ibid, p. 115):

In the 1980s, the influence of liberation theologies, church institutional reforms, the expansion and re-conceptualization of church-sponsored development activities, and the emergence of new church-related organizations fostered the growth of a democratic sentiment within the churches.

This wide-breath call for democratization arose from an expanding network of individuals operating either within or just outside the churches. Essentially, this malleable network intended to contest the dysfunctional structures of power on which secular and religious realms in Rwanda were grounded. Therefore, the movement for democratization that developed between the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s placed substantial pressure on governmental authorities as well as on the religious ones (Ibid). A mounting popular mass of people within the Church, increasingly aware of the fundamental unfairness of a fraudulent system of power relations, began questioning and contesting both secular and religious authorities for corruption, unscrupulousness, and voracity (Bartov & Mack, 2001).

Eventually, the conflict between conformist and democratizing voices within the Churches became increasingly politicized. The conservative establishment (a large majority within the clerical ranks), responded by supporting violence, repression, and eventually genocide vis-à-vis an imminent process of reform and democratization inside and outside the religious structures (Ibid). In this context, a vast majority of the clergy sustained from affiliating with the regime as a means to preserve privileges enjoyed throughout past decades (Henning, 2001). A deep crisis occurred within the power structures of the Church. This resulted from conflict within the dynamics of individual churches. It was also a result of a vital interest the Church had in preserving the status quo in order to maintain privilege and socio-political prestige. These conditions are necessary to comprehend the nature and the depth of the Church's involvement in the Rwandan Genocide.

In the aftershock of the genocide, some sympathisers with the Church have suggested a picture of the Church in Rwanda as a frail institution unable to challenge the State in the context of the genocide (reported in Bartov & Mack, 2001). Yet, such a perception is misleading. The potential for State-Church conflict existed, and Churches could have hypothetically opposed the slaughters (Ibid). To neglect such a possibility would be to 'grossly misconstrue the relationship between Church and State in Rwanda and ignore the substantial independent power that the Churches enjoyed' (Ibid, p. 149). Catholic Churches represented major centres of power in Rwanda, in control of significant monetary and human capital (Ibid; Longman, 2001; 2010). For instance, the Church stood as the largest off-farm employer in peripheral areas, and autonomously offered social services such as distributing resources while running health and education facilities in a country with high levels of malnutrition and poverty (Bartov & Mack, 2001). With such an independent base of power, Churches had maintained a formal autonomy from the State both during the colonial and post-colonial periods (Longman, 2010). Nonetheless, the point made here should not be misinterpreted. It is not to argue that the Church could have independently prevented the genocide if it had simply chosen to do so. However, it could be argued that the Church in Rwanda undeniably stood as the best-suited autonomous centre of power to challenge the systematic massacres from occurring (Bartov & Mack, 2001). This statement is made on the assumption that the genocide was never 'a foregone conclusion' (Longman, 2010, p.197). To follow the line of thought of Longman (2010, p.197):

Churches could have played an important role in supporting those who resisted the genocide, in informing the world about what was happening in Rwanda, and in making genocide more difficult to execute.

In conclusion, the role of the Church in the Rwandan genocide was key in the escalation of violence. This essay has argued that the Church is to blame for its passivity in respect to the slaughters. Its culpability does not rest on the actions of a few within the clergy. Rather, the Church is to blame as an institutional entity. Misreading's of the Church's history in Rwanda have resulted in 20 years of misinterpretations on the elements that permitted the tragedy. Ultimately, the Church alone could not have prevented the genocide from occurring. Yet, it represented the only institution within civil society in possession of enough autonomy and influence to attempt to deviate the course of the events, oppose the regime and, at the same time, create awareness and put pressure on the international community (Ibid). Its reluctance and often outright refusal to do so has come to represent one of heaviest failures of Christian ethics and of the institutions that profess and practice its commandments.
Bibliography
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Bartov, O. and Mack, P. (2001). In God's name - genocide and religion in the 20th century. New York: Berghahn Books.

Bergen, D. (1994). Catholics, Protestants, and Christian Antisemitism in Nazi Germany. CCC, 27(03).

Bloxham, D. and Moses, A. (2010). The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. Oxford: OUP Oxford.

Henning, R. (2001). The Cross and the Genocide. Afrol News. [online] Available at: https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201-rwanda/39210.html [Accessed 7 Mar. 2016].

Katongole, E. (2005). Christianity, Tribalism, and the Rwandan Genocide: A Catholic Reassessment of Christian Social Responsibility. Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, 8(3), pp.67-93.

Longman, T. (2001). Church, Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda. Journal of Religion in Africa, 31(2), pp.163-186.

Longman, T. (2010). Christianity and genocide in Rwanda. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

McGreal, C. (2014). The Catholic Church must apologise for its role in Rwanda's genocide. The Guardian. [online] Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/08/catholic-church-apologise-failure-rwanda-genocide-vatican [Accessed 3 Mar. 2016].

Redekop, V. and Gasana, O. (2007). The Contexts of Religion and Violence - Implication of Religious Leaders in Mimetic Structures of Violence. Journal of Religion & Society, [online] supplement series (2), pp.117-137. Available at: http://moses.creighton.edu/jrs/2007/2007-9.pdf [Accessed 7 Mar. 2016].

Shillinger, K. (2000). Bishop's Acquittal seen raising Rwanda distrust. The Boston Globe.

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The New York Times, (1996). Pope Says Church Is Not to Blame in Rwanda. [online] Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/21/world/pope-says-church-is-not-to-blame-in-rwanda.html [Accessed 7 Mar. 2016].

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Van 't Spijker, G. (1997). The Churches and the Genocide in Rwanda. Exchange, 26(3), pp.233-255.

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Written at: King's College London
Written for: Flavia Gasbarri
Date written: March 2016 (revised in July 2020)
Further Reading on E-International Relations

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Accepting the Unacceptable: Christian Churches and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

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In a time span of one hundred days, between April and July 1994, Rwanda's political arena imploded. The country collapsed into chaos, and violence escalated into the genocide of one million people among members of the Tutsi ethnic group and moderate components of the Hutu ethnic majority in the country.

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The role religious leaders played was crucial because it illistrates the unwillingness of others to help. Because majority of the Rwandan population was religious, the curches could very well have stopped the genocide or at least tried to tame it. But, they decided to not involve with it; some of the religious leaders and clergy even took part in the killings. The curches later apologized during reconciliation.

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The Rwandan genocide tragically represents humanity's capacity for violence among one another. It also highlights the shortcomings of the international community's dedication to protecting the innocent, including how the institutions that purport to value human life can be corrupted. The Catholic Church is one such institution. The Church not only failed to protect human life but witnessed its members playing an active role in the killing of the Tutsi people. This project seeks to answer the three core questions: What was the role of the Catholic Church in the Rwandan genocide? How has its role affected the Church's post-genocide reconciliation efforts? What can be learned from this case about the influence of religious institutions in both conflict and conflict resolution?

Bibliography

Carney, J. J. "A Generation After Genocide: Catholic Reconciliation in Rwanda." Theological Studies 76, no. 4 (December 2015): 785-812.

Carney, J. J. Rwanda before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Court, Anthony. "Can the Rwandan Catholic Church Overcome Its History of Politicization? A Reply to Philippe Denis." Journal for the Study of Religion 32, no. 2 (2019): 1-37.

Denis, Philippe. "Christian Gacaca and Official Gacaca in Post-Genocide Rwanda." Journal for the Study of Religion 32, no. 1 (2019): 1-27.

Longman, Timothy Paul. Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Rittner, Carol, Hubert Locke, and John K. Roth, eds. Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches? Minneapolis, MN: Paragon House, 2004.

Seah, Audrey. "Reconciliation after Betrayal and Violence: Lessons from the Church in Post-Genocide Rwanda." Liturgy 34, no. 1 (January 2019): 48-57.

Van Hoyweghen, Saskia. "The Disintegration of the Catholic Church of Rwanda: A Study of the Fragmentation of Political and Religious Authority." African Affairs 95, no. 380 (1996): 379-401.

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Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs

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The Role of the Catholic Church in the Rwandan Genocide and Post-Genocide Reconciliation

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The Rwandan genocide tragically represents humanity's capacity for violence among one another. It also highlights the shortcomings of the international community's dedication to protecting the innocent, including how the institutions that purport to value human life can be corrupted. The Catholic Church is one such institution.

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Post - genocide, technology brought Rwanda back and made it prosper much farther than when it was farming based.

After the genocide, roughly 15% of the population was killed and Rwanda's economy was in shambles. Schools, hospitals, jobs, all discarded and the people were only more anxious to start the process of rebuilding. Because Rwanda is landlocked, there weren't many options for how they could rebuild. Science and the growth in technology seemed to be the only answer, so shcools were put back into work and more were built, all with the main focus of science. Rwanda made a strong comeback and, from 1996 - 2015, their per capita gross domestic product nearly tripled. Many tenchnological advancements were and are being made. Things like climate observation are being done and oppertunites are fruitful.

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Two decades after the genocide in Rwanda, the country is harnessing science and technology to rebuild its economy.

First-time visitors to Kigali, Rwanda's capital, usually remark that they cannot believe they are in a country that a little over 20 years was in the midst of a civil war. The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi resulted in the slaughter of up to one million people - around 15% of the population. But the landlocked country is developing rapidly. Where gravel roads once dominated, paved streets are now the rule. Internet connections are fast and stable. Buildings are constructed at breakneck speed, and airy, reliably scheduled public buses and shuttles have replaced cramped, unpredictable minivans.

For Jimmy Gasore, a Rwandan physics graduate who left the country in 2011 to pursue a PhD at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, each trip home throws up new advances. For instance, the year he left, he had to spend ten hours on a bus to Uganda's capital, Kampala, to register for the standardized tests needed for his MIT application, but these exams can now be taken all over Rwanda - an indication of the central role that the government has given to science and education in the country's development strategy.

Rwanda has used investment in science, technology and innovation as a springboard to grow and diversify its economy. Between 1996 and 2015, its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) more than tripled to US$1,756 - outpacing some bigger and more resource-rich African countries with fast-growing economies, such as Kenya, whose per capita GDP merely doubled over the same period. As a result, Rwanda is often held up as a model of what can be achieved if clear ambitions are backed up with strong political leadership. Although the country's economic activity remains modest - its private sector is still largely informal - the rapid modernization of its infrastructure is attracting both foreigners and Rwandan expats to the country.

Gasore is one of them. In 2017, after he attains his PhD, he is planning to return to Rwanda to keep working on the cutting-edge climate observatory that he helped to set up, which is perched 2,500 metres above sea level on Mount Mugogo. The station, the first of its kind in Africa, uses high-frequency monitoring systems to detect greenhouse gases and air pollutants all across the continent.

He says that scientists like him see opportunities in Rwanda. "There are more institutions to teach in, more start-ups to join and more people to partner with. In short, it creates a sort of market in science and technology," he says.

Rwanda's remarkable journey started after the genocide, when stitching the war-torn nation back together seemed like an insurmountable task. The country's economy, which was small and agriculture-based to begin with, was in tatters. Farm workers had fled their homes and abandoned their fields. Worse, the social fabric of the country had unravelled: schools, health centres, and water and transport infrastructure were in ruins, and survivors had to live alongside perpetrators.

Rwanda's new leaders realized that education, including science education, would be essential to the nation's rebirth. The country needed a positive development trajectory to follow, but it had no oil or gas reserves, no diamonds or valuable minerals, and no vast forests suitable for logging to exploit. What it did have was the offer of assistance from the international community, which had failed to prevent the atrocities in the country, and a population thirsty for peace and prosperity.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who will seek re-election for his third term in 2017, has driven the science push. After becoming president in 2000, one of his first moves was to appoint Romain Murenzi as science minister. The Rwandan mathematical physicist had been working on multidimensional continuous wavelet transforms - which can be used in image compression - at Clark Atlanta University in Georgia, where he had spent most of the 1990s. When he took up the post in 2001, Murenzi started by drawing up a national policy on science, technology and innovation. The policy, adopted in 2005, focused not on doing science as an end in itself, but as a vehicle for development. It emphasized that Rwanda should not try to 'reinvent the wheel', but apply existing knowledge to solve its national challenges.

"What was special about Rwanda was that their ideas were so on target," says Alfred Watkins, who led the team from the World Bank that helped to draw up Rwanda's science and technology plans. In his experience, many governments of developing countries want their national science plans to feature prestigious projects. "We were not talking about studying black holes or doing wonderful scientific research. The main gist of it was to create practical solutions to mundane everyday problems: how to improve agricultural yield, how to provide clean drinking water, how to manage the country's geothermal resources intelligently," Watkins says.

One such problem was how to combat a pest that was damaging the country's coffee crops - a key source of income for more than 400,000 Rwandan farmers. Potato taste defect (PTD) leaves coffee with a mealy potato taste, and is linked to the antestia bug ( Antestiopsis spp.). Until a few years ago, little was known about how the defect occurred and why. But in 2011, working with the US-based non-profit the Global Knowledge Initiative (GKI), Rwandan researchers established a global network of scientists, as well as companies such as Starbucks - which took part in taste experiments - to study the scourge. Although the network has yet to eliminate PTD, the research, including successful work on insecticides, combined with an awareness-raising programme for farmers, has led to a decline in its occurrence, says Andrew Gerard, a programme officer at the GKI.

In addition to recruiting scientists to solve Rwandan problems, Kagame and Murenzi have developed a culture of using science and innovation to inform evidence-based policymaking in government. During the mid-2000s, Murenzi would hold a meeting of government ministers every two or three months; one by one, he would ask them how they were using science, technology and innovation to carry out and improve their work. Watkins would also attend these meetings to provide World Bank support.

In the first few meetings, the ministers' answers were feeble, Watkins recalls. But it didn't take long for their responses to become competent. The agriculture minister would talk about terracing fields to prevent erosion or using tissue culture to enhance crop yields. "Previously, they didn't know what to say," he recalls. "Now all of a sudden, they had examples."

Agriculture was a key focus for science and education investments. Agricultural research and development spending by the government and non-profit organizations grew by nearly 50%, from $18.6 million in 2005 to $27.2 million in 2011. Most African countries struggle with an ageing academic population, but two-thirds of Rwanda's agricultural researchers are under the age of 41 years - one of the youngest pools in Africa.

Kagame also revamped the higher-education system in an effort to produce the graduates with the science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills that the country now needed. The country's seven tertiary institutions were merged into a single University of Rwanda, which was launched in 2013. The university has 14 campuses nationwide and more than 30,000 students - one-fifth of them studying science or engineering.

Mindful of Rwanda's limited financial resources, the government looked to the rest of the world to help it pursue its development goals. And some of the partnerships it formed were groundbreaking. In 2012, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, became the first world-ranked university to establish a campus in central Africa.

"CMU didn't choose Rwanda, Rwanda chose CMU," says Bruce Krogh, director of CMU-R, as the partnership is known. The foundations were laid when Rwanda's government approached CMU in 2007; the university was selected partly because of its high performance in computer science and information technology. The first crop of students graduated in 2014. In 2016, CMU-R had 480 applications from 19 African countries for its August intake. Krogh says that of these, 40-50 students will be accepted.

In the future, Rwanda will have to stand more firmly on its own feet. As its scientific and technological prowess grows, so does its ambitions for scientific output and excellence. The national university is aiming high: in a draft strategic plan published this year, it aims to be among the top ten universities in Africa by 2025.

Climate science is one area in which Rwanda is busy carving out a globally competitive niche. Data from the climate observatory on Mount Mugogo will open up a new frontier in climate science - historically, Africa has been very poorly covered by climate-data surveys, says Ronald Prinn, an atmospheric scientist at MIT and one of the people behind the observatory. The observatory will be the first African station to join the Advanced Global Atmospheric Gases Experiment, which has a dozen other stations spread across the world, from the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard to Tasmania in Australia. The Rwandan station can track pollution and greenhouse gases across vast ranges - from South Africa to the Middle East and even the western coast of India.

It is hoped that the higher peak Mount Karisimbi, which towers 4,500 metres over sea level, will be the final site for the observatory. But access to this mountain is tricky, especially because its slopes are home to Rwanda's endangered mountain gorillas. A proposal is under discussion for a cable car that could transport researchers to the top, as well as serve ecotourists - Rwanda is also looking to expand its tourism industry.

I have never met students so serious about giving back to their country as in Rwanda.

Despite its many advances, Rwanda still faces major problems. For one, the country remains very poor: in 2014, less than one in five Rwandans had access to electricity, and about 40% of Rwandans lived in poverty, according to the United Nations Development Programme. And the small size of the country's private sector means that employment can be hard to come by. For example, Krogh says that although most graduates from CMU-R land jobs easily, they struggle to find work in Rwanda. This is something that President Kagame has indicated needs to change. But economic growth will need to come from inside the country, and from business investments, to a greater extent than it has hitherto. There are indications that international financial aid, on which the country depends on for some 30-40% of its budget, may be drying up. What the country does have, however, is loyal young people. "I have never met students so serious about giving back to their country as in Rwanda," says Prinn.

To Gasore, whose generation has been shaped by Rwanda's science, technology and engineering drive, the future is bright. Since his undergraduate degree, he has observed a shift in the courses being taught, from theoretical to more practical and applied science, as access to laboratories and computers has increased. This, he thinks, will further encourage Rwandans to innovate, which in turn will help the economy to grow. "It's very clear," Gasore says, "that technology and vocational training will be the real seeds for the science- and technology-based economy."

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Rwanda: From killing fields to technopolis - Nature

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Nature - Two decades after the genocide in Rwanda, the country is harnessing science and technology to rebuild its economy.

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In most households, machetes were found. This was bacause they could be used for farming; Rwanda's economy at the time. They became the main weapon for the killings; although, firearms were used too.

The leaders of the extremists handed out some firearms; but the militias and other hutus wanting to fight were trained to use machetes, spears and other traditional weapons.

The training and weapons used were important because if they weren't trained and had nothing to use, the killing rate and amount would have been much lower.

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A MARTÍNEZ, HOST:

Chef Dieuveil Malonga wants to create a revolution in African cuisine. At his restaurant, Meza Malonga, he's combining local ingredients with fine dining techniques honed in Europe. All Things Considered co-host Juana Summers stopped by his restaurant during a recent reporting trip in Kigali.

JUANA SUMMERS, BYLINE: Chef Dieuveil Malonga describes his restaurant as his laboratory. And if this restaurant is a culinary laboratory, this floor-to-ceiling shelf is bursting with ingredients for experimentation. There are rows full of wide-mouthed glass jars full of seeds, spices and fermented fruits. Malonga reaches for one jar and pops off the lid. This one is full of a spice called pebe (ph).

DIEUVEIL MALONGA: So this is one very complex spices, and you find it more in sale in a country like Mali, Niger, and it tastes more garlic. Like, you can just smell.

SUMMERS: Oh, my gosh, it smells so good. It's very close to almost like a fried garlic that you might smell.

MALONGA: It's close to a garlic and fried onions. After fermentation, then it gives you all this amazing parfum.

SUMMERS: Malonga was born in Congo-Brazzaville but spent his teenage years in Germany. He started his career working in top European restaurants, but then he took a two-year tour of the African continent, seeking inspiration for his own. He opened Meza Malonga in 2020. He takes a jar full of peppercorns off the shelf. They're from Cameroon, and he says he thinks these peppercorns are the best on the continent. I want to know why.

MALONGA: Just the parfum - it is not much aggressive. I love the parfum. It's a little fruit, little smoky, you know?

SUMMERS: And you can really get the smokiness as soon as you smell it.

MALONGA: Yeah. I mean, I use it more in pastry.

SUMMERS: Pastries?

MALONGA: Yeah, we do sorbet. And also when we do, like, a pineapple confit or when we do, like, a mango or - just that much more with passion fruit. Yeah.

SUMMERS: When you're cooking, do you prefer to make recipes that are sweet or recipes that are more savory?

MALONGA: The good thing, like, for me, Africa is the garden of the world. This is my version. So and in Rwanda we have a very diverse ecosystem. You can farm everything.

SUMMERS: So you get to play with every kind of flavor, every kind of texture, it sounds like.

The key to being able to play with such a wide array of flavors and ingredients is exposure. He tells me that the restaurant is only open for eight months out of the year. For the other four months, he and his team travel to experience different cuisines firsthand and source unique ingredients. He has visited 48 African countries.

MALONGA: Most of them, like - after thinking about ingredients we use and we try, OK, which country must put on a map because we have a different spices from different countries. And so, OK, we focus more, like, on West African cuisine. And we have some recipes, like old recipe from grandmother. We try to do the original how the grandmothers do that in the village, and after we try to bring our modernity side and using all this new technology.

SUMMERS: He brings new technology to old recipes. And this idea of the grandmother's cuisine is one that Malonga brings up repeatedly as we talk. His own grandmother owned a restaurant, and he says his love for food and cooking started there. For Malonga, it's about sharing history and culture from generation to generation, through the kinds of recipes that just can't be found in a book. The restaurant is a beehive of activity. It is less than an hour before dinner service. The windows are wide open, and you can hear the sounds of Kigali below. Sous chef Frank Wehijiro (ph) guides us through the prep area.

FRANK WEHIJIRO: Like, here - when we start here will be gazpacho over tomatoes and pineapple.

SUMMERS: That's absolutely beautiful. The colors in the dish are so marvelous and bright against the tan of the dish.

WEHIJIRO: Thank you. Thank you. As you can see, they are doing the gazpacho over tomatoes. This one is like a splash of tomatoes with some pineapple to give some richer acidic. And they are doing a rosette with lemon and edible flowers.

SUMMERS: Oh, that looks delicious. It's, like, this tan crisp with this beautiful bright green detailed sauce on it.

Malonga wants to carve out a space for African food in the global fine dining scene. There is not a single Michelin-starred restaurant on the African continent. Michelin does not cover Africa. Those types of accolades aren't what motivate Malonga.

MALONGA: Me, I have another philosophy that for me don't play a big role. The very important for me is, like, my community. I want that the business work well, that I can pay my people. I can pay my farmer. So I cook that to create an ecosystem. And our really ambitions now is, like, to promote what we have and to do business, because at the end of the day, it's business. And I think if we are happy, the guests will feel it already. That is very important. If it's time shall come (ph), wow, it's good.

SUMMERS: When our team sets down for dinner, plate after plate comes out in quick succession. The chefs present each course.

UNIDENTIFIED CHEF: So this one is a beef fillet. On top, we have cream of garlic and the suya spices from Nigeria. We have butternut. Also, we have a sweet potato puree and vanilla sauce. Enjoy.

SUMMERS: Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED CHEF: All right.

SUMMERS: I mean, it's hard to describe how beautiful this course is. It's on this slate, almost white warm plate. There's a small fillet. There's a vanilla sauce. The colors are bright green. There's radish, the vivid orange. There's a sauce drizzled all over it. It's perfectly composed at the center of the plate. It looks incredible. Can't wait to try it.

Diners at Meza Malonga have no menu. The meal changes based on seasonally available ingredients. There's cauliflower with a bright peanut sauce, tree tomato sorbet cooled by liquid nitrogen, a moist honey cake for one of two dessert courses. Chef Malonga stops by our table at the end of the meal.

Thank you so much for everything. This has been a very memorable experience, and I love getting to see the kind of the map of Africa spread out across your courses.

MALONGA: That's amazing. Thank you so much.

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MARTÍNEZ: That was All Things Considered co-host Juana Summers reporting from Rwanda. To hear more stories from her recent trip, use the NPR app or visit npr.org.

(SOUNDBITE OF MUSIC)

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A chef in Rwanda wants to create a revolution in African cuisine

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Meza Malonga, a restaurant in Rwanda's capital Kigali, serves innovative Afro-fusion cuisine. Chef Dieuvel Malonga opened it in 2020, after years of working in high-end European restaurants.

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In The Mountains of Western Rwanda, a Resistance Led By Elders

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At one point in the horrific spring of 1994, Narcisse Gasimba had given up. Since April, Gasimba and other resistors in the mountains of western Rwanda had been using stones and spears to fend off wave after wave of Hutu attacks against Tutsis on the Bisesero hillside, but by the end of June their efforts felt fruitless. Tens of thousands, including members of Gasimba’s own family, had been massacred by Hutu attackers.

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The Rwandan refugee camp in Benako, Tanzania, in 1994. Credit... Sebastiao Salgado

It was a paroxysm that inscribed new chapters in the annals of genocide and turned a spotlight on the failure of international peacekeepers to come anywhere close to living up to their name.

Twenty-five years ago, on April 7, 1994, the dominant Hutus of Rwanda turned with well-planned violence on the Tutsi minority whom they held to be traitors. One hundred days later, when the killing finally stopped, the death toll stood at as many as one million, mostly Tutsis but also including some moderate Hutus who had opposed the bloodletting.
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The scale of the fatalities was shocking, but more was to come as the torrent of killings washed into the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, igniting years of strife in Africa's Great Lakes region. And, along this bloodstained way, sexual violence became woven into the horrors of war. Women suffered untold rapes and gang rapes, accelerating the spread of AIDS. The offspring of these assaults were stigmatized as "children of the killers."

In the same year in which Nelson Mandela was installed as South Africa's first black president - the very emblem of a continent's hope and triumph over adversity - Africa was also in the public eye for cataclysmic anarchy and violence.

But Africa had no monopoly on blame.

The United States, scarred by the killing and humiliation of its soldiers in Somalia during the Battle of Mogadishu a few months earlier, had no appetite to intervene. President Bill Clinton, who was in office as the killings unfolded half a world away, said years later during a visit to Rwanda, "I don't think we could have ended the violence, but I think we could have cut it down. And I regret it."

France, a significant player in French-speaking Africa, has long faced charges that it supported the Hutu leadership before and even during the massacres. President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has called French soldiers "actors" in the genocide - a charge denied by the former French prime minister, Édouard Balladur, as "a self-interested lie." But on Friday, President Emmanuel Macron of France ordered a two-year government study of France's role in the Rwandan genocide.

The United Nations, which had a modest force of some 2,500 troops in Rwanda in the days leading up to the killings, was accused of refusing permission for its local commander, the Canadian Maj. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, to raid a Hutu arms cache that had been set aside for use in the atrocities. At the time, Kofi Annan, who later became the secretary general of the United Nations, was in charge of peacekeeping operations. Years later he said of the killing, "All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it."

History suggests, however, that Rwanda's lessons were an insufficient deterrent. Just a year after the Rwandan genocide, events far away in Europe - in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica - offered another alarming example of the toxic combination of genocidal urges and United Nations caution: 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were murdered despite the presence of Dutch peacekeepers.

And, for its part, an African panel found many culprits for Rwanda's agony, from the Roman Catholic Church to Belgium, a former colonial power.

The ostensible trigger for the genocide came on April 6, 1994, when an airplane carrying the country's Hutu president, Juvenal Habyarimana, and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of neighboring Burundi was shot down as it approached Kigali, Rwanda's capital. It has never been clearly established who brought the plane down or whether the genocide had been planned well in advance and needed only a spark to ignite its lethal tinder.

But within hours, the killing had started. Elite government forces, supported by a dreaded Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, which translates roughly as "those who work together," rounded up and executed Tutsi military and political leaders. Roadblocks were thrown up to filter out Rwandans whose official ID tagged them as Tutsis - a distinction introduced in the 1930s by the Belgian colonial authorities. Like their imperial German predecessors, Belgian officials had favored a Tutsi elite until the Hutu majority rose up in 1959.

In rural areas, where Hutus and Tutsis had intermingled and sometimes intermarried, pervasive government propaganda in radio broadcasts and newspaper articles urged Hutus to take any weapon they could find - machetes, clubs - to kill or maim their neighbors. Foreigners working in the country were evacuated, but not their Rwandan staff. People were massacred in churches and homes, fields and roadside ditches, stadiums and checkpoints.

As in Cambodia after the atrocities by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s, future generations inherited a national nightmare, memorialized in the exhibited skulls of victims stacked in rows.

In 1994, the genocide also ruptured a cease-fire in a civil war that had been raging since 1990 between government forces and insurgents from the Rwanda Patriotic Front, led by the Tutsi Mr. Kagame (who was to become Rwanda's president).

The Patriotic Front launched a broad attack to take the capital, Kigali, in early July. The killing in Rwanda itself came to a halt, but not the ethnic recriminations. With the land ruined, crops untended and the population diminished by the killing of Tutsis and the subsequent flight of Hutu refugees into Congo, Rwanda entered a new, gradually prospering but ambiguous era. The following years raised questions about post-genocide justice and the price Rwandans paid for well-being and stability under Mr. Kagame.

Internationally, the Rwandan leader, who took over the presidency in 2000, became a darling of Western leaders and donors, including Mr. Clinton and Bill Gates. His cities boasted clean streets and low crime. His economy grew rapidly. Admirers compared him to Lee Kuan Yew, the Singaporean leader who fused authoritarian rule with prosperity.

And, as Mr. Kagame's regime grew ever more entrenched and ever more intolerant of dissent, he often got a pass. "Western states that did nothing to prevent the massacres have treated Rwanda with kid gloves ever since, in part out of a frequently acknowledged sense of guilt," the author and journalist Michela Wrong wrote in The Guardian.

Mr. Kagame was limited to two terms in office, but like his regional peers in Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo - and rulers much farther afield - he chafed at the restriction. A referendum in 2015 changed the Constitution, enabling him to remain in office until 2034. In elections in 2017 he won with a staggering 98.8 percent of the vote. (Of his two major opponents, Diane Rwigara was disqualified, later to be jailed, and Victoire Ingabire was already in prison.)

Rights groups have chronicled abuses inside Rwanda and have accused the authorities of hunting down adversaries and critics in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa and Europe. In 2014, Patrick Karegeya, Mr. Kagame's former chief of external intelligence and a known dissident, was found murdered in a luxury hotel in Johannesburg, although the government in Kigali has denied suggestions that it was behind the killing.

In 2014, as Rwanda marked the 20th anniversary of the genocide, an editorial in The New York Times hailed the country as "an island of order and relative prosperity in a poor and politically volatile region."

But, listing a tally of restrictions on civil and political rights, including detentions and torture, disappearances and killings, the article concluded: "Addressing the poisonous legacies of Rwanda's genocide is the only way to avert future tragedy, and it is the best way to honor Rwanda's dead."

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Rwanda Marks 25 Years Since the Genocide. The Country Is Still Grappling With Its Legacy.

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It was a paroxysm that inscribed new chapters in the annals of genocide and turned a spotlight on the failure of international peacekeepers to come anywhere close to living up to their name. Twenty-five years ago, on April 7, 1994, the dominant Hutus of Rwanda turned with well-planned violence on the Tutsi minority whom they held to be traitors.

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Rwanda Officials Cleared Of Habyarimana Crash

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A French inquiry led by Judges Marc Travidic and Nathalie Poux has absolved the current government officials of blame in the plane crash that killed President Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1994.

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October 1990

On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. Because of the RPF attacks which displaced thousands and a policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by the government, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors. Media, particularly radio, continued to spread unfounded rumours, which exacerbated ethnic problems.

August 1993

In August 1993, through the peacemaking efforts of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the governments in the region, the signing of the Arusha peace agreements appeared to have brought an end to the conflict between the then Hutu dominated government and the opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

October 1993

In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a mandate encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and general support for the peace process.

From the outset, however, the will to achieve and sustain peace was subverted by some of the Rwandan political parties participating in the Agreement. With the ensuing delays in its implementation, violations of human rights became more widespread and the security situation deteriorated. Later, evidence demonstrated irrefutably that extremist elements of the Hutu majority while talking peace were in fact planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Genocide - 6 April 1994

more than one million people are estimated to have perished and an estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped.

On 6 April 1994, the deaths of the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash caused by a rocket attack, ignited several weeks of intense and systematic massacres. The killings - more than one million people are estimated to have perished - shocked the international community and were clearly acts of genocide. An estimated 150,000 to 250,000 women were also raped. Members of the presidential guard started killing Tutsi civilians in a section of Kigali near the airport. Less than half an hour after the plane crash, roadblocks manned by Hutu militiamen often assisted by gendarmerie (paramilitary police) or military personnel were set up to identify Tutsis.

7 April

On 7 April, Radio Television Libres Des Mille Collines (RTLM) aired a broadcast attributing the plane crash to the RPF and a contingent of UN soldiers, as well as incitements to eliminate the "Tutsi cockroach". Later that day the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect her were brutally murdered by Rwandan government soldiers in an attack on her home. Other moderate Hutu leaders were similarly assassinated. After the massacre of its troops, Belgium withdrew the rest of its force.

21 April

On 21 April, after other countries asked to withdraw troops, the UNAMIR force reduced from an initial 2,165 to 270.

If the absence of a resolute commitment to reconciliation by some of the Rwandan parties was one problem, the tragedy was compounded by the faltering response of the international community. The capacity of the United Nations to reduce human suffering in Rwanda was severely constrained by the unwillingness of Member States to respond to the changed circumstances in Rwanda by strengthening UNAMIR's mandate and contributing additional troops.

22 June

On June 22, the Security Council authorized French-led forces to mount a humanitarian mission. The mission, called Operation Turquoise, saved hundreds of civilians in South West Rwanda, but is also said to have allowed soldiers, officials and militiamen involved in the genocide to flee Rwanda through the areas under their control. In other areas, killings continued until 4 July 1994 when the RPF took military control of the entire territory of Rwanda.

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Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations

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October 1990 On 1 October 1990, the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force of 7,000 fighters. Because of the RPF attacks which displaced thousands and a policy of deliberately targeted propaganda by the government, all Tutsis inside the country were labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition parties were labeled as traitors.

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Numbers
Establishing a reliable toll of those killed in the genocide and its aftermath is important to counter denials, exaggerations, and lies. The necessary data have not been gathered but speculation about death tolls continues anyway, usually informed more by emotion than by fact. In July 1998, the Rwandan government announced plans for a census of genocide survivors.

Even the size of the Tutsi population in Rwanda on April 6, 1994 is debated. Demographer William Seltzer, who has studied the data, estimates the number as 657,000, a figure extrapolated from 1991 census data. Some critics assert that the number of Tutsi was underreported in that census and in the prior census of 1978 because the Habyarimana government wanted to minimize the importance of Tutsi in the population. Although frequently said, no documentation has been presented to support this allegation. The 1991 data show Tutsi as forming 8.4 percent of the total population. This figure seems to accord with extrapolations from the generally accepted census data of 1952, taking into account the population loss due to death and flight during the 1960s and the birth rate, which was lower for Tutsi than for Hutu.

Whether or not census data were purposely altered to reduce the number of Tutsi, the figures underestimated the Tutsi population because an undetermined number of Tutsi arranged to register as Hutu in order to avoid discrimination and harassment. Although many Rwandans know of such cases, there is at present no basis for estimating how many persons they represented.

Deliberate misrepresentation of ethnicity complicates assessing how many of the victims were actually Tutsi. At a reburial ceremony for a family slain during the genocide, the only two survivors, both priests, talked separately with our researchers. One maintained that his family was Tutsi but claimed to be Hutu while the other declared that the family was really Hutu, but was said to be Tutsi by neighbors who coveted their wealth. In addition to such cases of questionable identity, there are Hutu who were killed because they looked like Tutsi.

A U.N. expert evaluating population loss in Rwanda estimated that 800,000 Rwandans had died between April and July 1994, but this figure included those who had died from causes other than the genocide. Seltzer estimated the number of persons killed in the genocide as at least one half million. Professor Gérard Prunier estimated that 130,000 Tutsi were alive in July, but his figures did not include those in Zaire or Tanzania, perhaps another 20,000. If this number of 150,000 survivors is subtracted from an estimated population of 657,000 Tutsi, this leaves 507,000 Tutsi killed, close to Seltzer's minimum assessment, and representing the annihilation of about 77 percent of the population registered as Tutsi. Using other data from Butare prefecture, our researchers computed an estimated loss of 75 percent of the Tutsi population in that prefecture. Based onthese preliminary data, we would conclude that at least half a million persons were killed in the genocide, a loss that represented about three quarters of the Tutsi population of Rwanda.

Estimates of persons killed at any one site vary widely, often by a factor of ten or more, perhaps because most have been made by untrained observers. At the parish of Rukara, for example, estimates ranged from 500 to 5,000. In 1995, a Rwandan government commission set the death toll at the Murambi Technical School in Gikongoro at some 20,000, a figure which some have since raised to 70,000, although the bodies exhumed there at the time of the 1996 commemoration of the genocide numbered in the range of 5,000. As many as 50,000 have been said to have perished at Bisesero, but a recent list of persons killed at that site totaled just over 5100 names. Similarly, some claim that 35,000 were slain in the Nyamata church, which appears to have a capacity of some 3,000.

Establishing the number of persons killed in the genocide will not help much in assessing the number of people involved in their execution. The circumstances of the crimes varied enormously: there were professional soldiers armed with machine guns or grenade-launchers firing into crowds, each of whom may have killed dozens, if not hundreds, of people, and there were groups of assailants armed with clubs or sharpened pieces of bamboo who jointly killed a single person. There can be no simple formula to assess how many killers murdered one victim or how many victims were slain by one killer.

The first estimate of numbers slain by the RPF was made by Gersony in his 1994 report. He concluded that the RPF killed between 25,000 and 45,000 persons in the months of April to August 1994. Seth Sendashonga, former minister of the interior and early member of the RPF, estimated that the RPF killed some 60,000 people between April 1994 and August 1995, with more than half killed in the first four months of that period. It seems likely, although not certain, that these estimates include persons killed in the course of combat, both civilians and militia.

Although our research indicates considerable killing of civilians by RPF forces during this period, including massacres and executions, we have too little data to confirm or revise these estimates. In any case, they appear more likely to be accurate than claims that the RPF killed hundreds of thousands of people from April to August 1994.

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Numbers (HRW Report - Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999)

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Numbers Establishing a reliable toll of those killed in the genocide and its aftermath is important to counter denials, exaggerations, and lies. The necessary data have not been gathered but speculation about death tolls continues anyway, usually informed more by emotion than by fact.

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Interviews - General Romeo Dallaire | Ghosts Of Rwanda | FRONTLINE | PBS

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He commanded the U.N. force sent to Rwanda in 1993 to help enforce the peace. In this interview, he chronicles his time there - from the “gloom that came in” soon after arriving and sensing trouble coming, to the sudden collapse of his mission once the killing began, to the moral burden of the life…