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Hello Everyone!
In the next slice, I'm going to explain about the history of bilingual education.
¡Hola a todos!
En la siguiente página, voy a explicar acerca de la historia de la educacción bilingue.

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A case in which the Court held that state-mandated segregation laws did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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Plessy v. Ferguson: Background and Context

After the Compromise of 1877 led to the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, Democrats consolidated control of state legislatures throughout the region, effectively marking the end of Reconstruction.

Southern Black people saw the promise of equality under the law embodied by the 13th Amendment, 14th Amendment and 15th Amendment to the Constitution receding quickly, and a return to disenfranchisement and other disadvantages as white supremacy reasserted itself across the South.

As historian C. Vann Woodward pointed out in a 1964 article about Plessy v. Ferguson, white and Black Southerners mixed relatively freely until the 1880s, when state legislatures passed the first laws requiring railroads to provide separate cars for "Negro" or "colored" passengers.

Florida became the first state to mandate segregated railroad cars in 1887, followed in quick succession by Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana and other states by the end of the century.

Black Resistance to Segregation

As Southern Black people witnessed with horror the dawn of the Jim Crow era, members of the Black community in New Orleans decided to mount a resistance.

At the heart of the case that became Plessy v. Ferguson was a law passed in Louisiana in 1890 "providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races." It stipulated that all passenger railways had to provide these separate cars, which should be equal in facilities.

Homer Adolph Plessy, who agreed to be the plaintiff in the case aimed at testing the law's constitutionality, was of mixed race; he described himself as "seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood."

On June 7, 1892, Plessy bought a ticket on a train from New Orleans bound for Covington, Louisiana, and took a vacant seat in a whites-only car. After refusing to leave the car at the conductor's insistence, he was arrested and jailed.

Convicted by a New Orleans court of violating the 1890 law, Plessy filed a petition against the presiding judge, Hon. John H. Ferguson, claiming that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Supreme Court Ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson

Over the next few years, segregation and Black disenfranchisement picked up pace in the South, and was more than tolerated by the North. Congress defeated a bill that would have given federal protection to elections in 1892, and nullified a number of Reconstruction laws on the books.

Then, on May 18, 1896, the Supreme Court delivered its verdict in Plessy v. Ferguson. In declaring separate-but-equal facilities constitutional on intrastate railroads, the Court ruled that the protections of 14th Amendment applied only to political and civil rights (like voting and jury service), not "social rights" (sitting in the railroad car of your choice).

In its ruling, the Court denied that segregated railroad cars for Black people were necessarily inferior. "We consider the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument," Justice Henry Brown wrote, "to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."

John Marshall Harlan's Dissent

Alone in the minority was Justice John Marshall Harlan, a former slaveholder from Kentucky. Harlan had opposed emancipation and civil rights for freed slaves during the Reconstruction era-but changed his position due to his outrage over the actions of white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan.

Harlan argued in his dissent that segregation ran counter to the constitutional principle of equality under the law: "The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race while they are on a public highway is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution," he wrote. "It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds."

Plessy v. Ferguson Significance

The Plessy v. Ferguson verdict enshrined the doctrine of "separate but equal" as a constitutional justification for segregation, ensuring the survival of the Jim Crow South for the next half-century.

Intrastate railroads were among many segregated public facilities the verdict sanctioned; others included buses, hotels, theaters, swimming pools and schools. By the time of the 1899 case Cummings v. Board of Education, even Harlan appeared to agree that segregated public schools did not violate the Constitution.

It would not be until the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, at the dawn of the civil rights movement, that the majority of the Supreme Court would essentially concur with Harlan's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson..

Writing the majority opinion in that 1954 case, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that "the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place" in public education, calling segregated schools "inherently unequal," and declaring that the plaintiffs in the Brown case were being "deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment."

Sources

C. Vann Woodward, " Plessy v. Ferguson: The Birth of Jim Crow," American Heritage (Volume 15, Issue 3: April 1964).
Landmark Cases: Plessy v. Ferguson, PBS: The Supreme Court - The First Hundred Years.
Louis Menand, "Brown v. Board of Education and the Limits of Law," The New Yorker (February 12, 2001).
Today in History - May 18: Plessy v. Ferguson, Library of Congress.

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Plessy v. Ferguson: Separate But Equal Doctrine | HISTORY

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Plessy v. Ferguson was a landmark 1896 U.S. Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation under the "separate but equal" doctrine.

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Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin. According to Title VI of this act: “No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” (Civil Rights Act, sec. 601, 1964).

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Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has played an important role in protecting the
educational rights of language-minority students in the United States (see Crawford, 2004;
E. Garcia, 2005; O. García, 2009a; and especially the National Clearinghouse for English
Language Acquisition [NCELA], 2006).

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(1968) Title VII: The Bilingual Education Act 

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(1968) Title VII: The Bilingual Education Act 

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In 1968, the U.S. Congress reauthorized the landmark Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the largest and most influential federal education policy to date. Title VII of that act, known as the Bilingual Education Act, established a federal goal of assisting “limited-English-speaking” students in the acquisition of English. At first, only poor students were eligible to participate. Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act did not require bilingual education.

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A group of Chinese American parents brought a judicial case against the San Francisco school board on the grounds that their children were not receiving an equitable education. The case was brought under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The case, known as Lau v. Nichols, was eventually appealed up to the U.S. Supreme Court and was decided on the basis of Title VI. Justice William O.

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LAU ET AL. v. NICHOLS ET AL.
No. 72-6520
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
414 U.S. 563
December 10, 1973, Argued
January 21, 1974, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY:

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

DISPOSITION:

483 F.2d 791, reversed and remanded.

SYLLABUS:

The failure of the San Francisco school system to provide English language instruction to approximately 1,800 students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak English, or to provide them with other adequate instructional procedures, denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the public educational program and thus violates ï¿½ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans discrimination based "on the ground of race, color, or national origin," in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," and the implementing regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Pp. 565-569.

Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 569. White, J., concurred in the result. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 571.

Opinions

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The San Francisco, California, school system was integrated in 1971 as a result of a federal court decree, 339 F.Supp. 1315. See Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215. The District Court found that there are 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry in the school system who do not speak English. Of those who have that language deficiency, about 1,000 are given supplemental courses in the English language. n1 About 1,800, however, do not receive that instruction.

note1 A report adopted by the Human Rights Commission of San Francisco and submitted to the Court by respondents after oral argument shows that, as of April 1973, there were 3,457 Chinese students in the school system who spoke little or no English. The document further showed 2,136 students enrolled in Chinese special instruction classes, but at least 429 of the enrollees were not Chinese but were included for ethnic balance. Thus, as of April 1973, no more than 1,707 of the 3,457 Chinese students needing special English instruction were receiving it.

This class suit brought by non-English-speaking Chinese students against officials responsible for the operation of the San Francisco Unified School District seeks relief against the unequal educational opportunities, which are alleged to violate, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment. No specific remedy is urged upon us. Teaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language is one choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is another. There may be others. Petitioners ask only that the Board of Education be directed to apply its expertise to the problem and rectify the situation. The District Court denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of ï¿½ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. ï¿½ 2000d, which excludes from participation in federal financial assistance, recipients of aid which discriminate against racial groups, 483 F.2d 791. One judge dissented. A hearing en banc was denied, two judges dissenting. Id., at 805. We granted the petition for certiorari because of the public importance of the question presented, 412 U.S. 938.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that "every student brings to the starting line of his educational career different advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, economic and cultural background, created and continued completely apart from any contribution by the school system," 483 F.2d, at 797. Yet in our view the case may not be so easily decided. This is a public school system of California and ï¿½ 71 of the California Education Code states that "English shall be the basic language of instruction in all schools." That section permits a school district to determine "when and under what circumstances instruction may be given bilingually." That section also states as "the policy of the state" to insure "the mastery of English by all pupils in the schools." And bilingual instruction is authorized "to the extent that it does not interfere with the systematic, sequential, and regular instruction of all pupils in the English language."

Moreover, ï¿½ 8573 of the Education Code provides that no pupil shall receive a diploma of graduation from grade 12 who has not met the standards of proficiency in "English," as well as other prescribed subjects. Moreover, by ï¿½ 12101 of the Education Code (Supp. 1973) children between the ages of six and 16 years are (with exceptions not material here) "subject to compulsory full-time education."

Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.

Basic English skills are at the very core of what these public schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively participate in the educational program, he must already have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public education. We know that those who do not understand English are certain to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and in no way meaningful. We do not reach the Equal Protection Clause argument which has been advanced but rely solely on ï¿½ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. ï¿½ 2000d, to reverse the Court of Appeals.

That section bans discrimination based "on the ground of race, color, or national origin," in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The school district involved in this litigation receives large amounts of federal financial assistance. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which has authority to promulgate regulations prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted school systems, 42 U. S. C. ï¿½ 2000d-1, in 1968 issued one guideline that "school systems are responsible for assuring that students of a particular race, color, or national origin are not denied the opportunity to obtain the education generally obtained by other students in the system." 33 Fed. Reg. 4956. In 1970 HEW made the guidelines more specific, requiring school districts that were federally funded "to rectify the language deficiency in order to open" the instruction to students who had "linguistic deficiencies," 35 Fed. Reg. 11595.

By ï¿½ 602 of the Act HEW is authorized to issue rules, regulations, and orders n2 to make sure that recipients of federal aid under its jurisdiction conduct any federally financed projects consistently with ï¿½ 601. HEW's regulations, 45 CFR ï¿½ 80.3 (b)(1), specify that the recipients may not

"(ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to others under the program;
. . . .
"(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program."

note2 Section 602 provides:
"Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. . . ." 42 U. S. C. ï¿½ 2000d-1.

Discrimination among students on account of race or national origin that is prohibited includes "discrimination . . . in the availability or use of any academic . . . or other facilities of the grantee or other recipient." Id., ï¿½ 80.5 (b).

Discrimination is barred which has that effect even though no purposeful design is present: a recipient "may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin." Id., ï¿½ 80.3 (b)(2).

It seems obvious that the Chinese-speaking minority receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority from respondents' school system which denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program -- all earmarks of the discrimination banned by the regulations. n3 In 1970 HEW issued clarifying guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 11595, which include the following:

note3 And see Report of the Human Rights Commission of San Francisco, Bilingual Education in the San Francisco Public Schools, Aug. 9, 1973.

"Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students."

"Any ability grouping or tracking system employed by the school system to deal with the special language skill needs of national origin-minority group children must be designed to meet such language skill needs as soon as possible and must not operate as an educational deadend or permanent track." Respondent school district contractually agreed to "comply with title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation" of HEW (45 CFR pt. 80) which are "issued pursuant to that title . . ." and also immediately to "take any measures necessary to effectuate this agreement." The Federal Government has power to fix the terms on which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed. Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.S. 127, 142-143. Whatever may be the limits of that power, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 et seq., they have not been reached here. Senator Humphrey, during the floor debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, said: n4

note4 110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (Sen. Humphrey, quoting from President Kennedy's message to Congress, June 19, 1963).

"Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination." We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for the fashioning of appropriate relief.

Reversed and remanded.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result.

Concurring Opinions

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the result.

It is uncontested that more than 2,800 schoolchildren of Chinese ancestry attend school in the San Francisco Unified School District system even though they do not speak, understand, read, or write the English language, and that as to some 1,800 of these pupils the respondent school authorities have taken no significant steps to deal with this language deficiency. The petitioners do not contend, however, that the respondents have affirmatively or intentionally contributed to this inadequacy, but only that they have failed to act in the face of changing social and linguistic patterns. Because of this laissez-faire attitude on the part of the school administrators, it is not entirely clear that ï¿½ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. ï¿½ 2000d, standing alone, would render illegal the expenditure of federal funds on these schools. For that section provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

On the other hand, the interpretive guidelines published by the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 11595, clearly indicate that affirmative efforts to give special training for non-English-speaking pupils are required by Tit. VI as a condition to receipt of federal aid to public schools:

"Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students." n1

note1 These guidelines were issued in further clarification of the Department's position as stated in its regulations issued to implement Tit. VI, 45 CFR pt. 80. The regulations provide in part that no recipient of federal financial assistance administered by HEW may "Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to others under the program; [or] "Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program." 45 CFR ï¿½ 80.3 (b)(1)(ii), (iv).

The critical question is, therefore, whether the regulations and guidelines promulgated by HEW go beyond the authority of ï¿½ 601. n2 Last Term, in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369, we held that the validity of a regulation promulgated under a general authorization provision such as ï¿½ 602 of Tit. VI n3 "will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.' Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-281 (1969)." I think the guidelines here fairly meet that test. Moreover, in assessing the purposes of remedial legislation we have found that departmental regulations and "consistent administrative construction" are "entitled to great weight." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1. The Department has reasonably and consistently interpreted ï¿½ 601 to require affirmative remedial efforts to give special attention to linguistically deprived children.

note2 The respondents do not contest the standing of the petitioners to sue as beneficiaries of the federal funding contract between the Department of Health, Education,and Welfare and the San Francisco Unified School District.

note3 Section 602, 42 U. S. C. ï¿½ 2000d-1, provides in pertinent part:
"Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. . . ."

The United States as amicus curiae asserts in its brief, and the respondents appear to concede, that the guidelines were issued pursuant to ï¿½ 602.

For these reasons I concur in the result reached by the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the result.

I join MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion and thus I, too, concur in the result. Against the possibility that the Court's judgment may be interpreted too broadly, I stress the fact that the children with whom we are concerned here number about 1,800. This is a very substantial group that is being deprived of any meaningful schooling because the children cannot understand the language of the classroom. We may only guess as to why they have had no exposure to English in their preschool years. Earlier generations of American ethnic groups have overcome the language barrier by earnest parental endeavor or by the hard fact of being pushed out of the family or community nest and into the realities of broader experience.

I merely wish to make plain that when, in another case, we are concerned with a very few youngsters, or with just a single child who speaks only German or Polish or Spanish or any language other than English, I would not regard today's decision, or the separate concurrence, as conclusive upon the issue whether the statute and the guidelines require the funded school district to provide special instruction. For me, numbers are at the heart of this case and my concurrence is to be understood accordingly.

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Overview of Lau v. Nichols decision of the United States Supreme Court.

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(1974) Reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act

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(1974) Reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act

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The educational services was expanded to include students of any socioeconomic status who had
limited English-speaking ability (LESA). The 1974 reauthorization also defined bilingual
education for the first time as “instruction given in, and study of, English and ( to the extent
necessary to allow a child to progress effectively through the education system ) the native language of the children of limited English speaking ability” (quoted in García, 2009a, p. 169; emphasis added). The subsequent 1978 reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act expanded eligibility for services even further, from students with LESA to students with more general limited English proficiency (LEP), while reinforcing the “transitional” nature of
bilingual education.

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The Castañeda lawsuit against the Raymondville Independent
School District (RISD) in Texas is representative of an earlier generation’s crusade that
materialized into today’s language minority student rights.

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the 1984 reauthorization of the
Bilingual Education Act also provided funding for programs that used only English in
educating English language learners, although only 4% of the funding was reserved for these
kinds of programs. The 1988 reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act further
expanded the funding for programs in which only English was used to 25% of programs
funded. Additionally, it imposed a 3-year limit on participation in transitional bilingual
education programs, meaning that schools had 3 years to move English language learners to
fluency in English.

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(1988) Reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act

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(1988) Reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act

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Reauthorization of the Bilingual Education Act further expanded the funding for programs in which only English was used to 25% of programs funded. Additionally, it imposed a 3-year limit on participation in transitional bilingual
education programs, meaning that schools had 3 years to move English language learners to
fluency in English.

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(1990) English-Only Education at the Polls

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(1990) English-Only Education at the Polls

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The use of the child’s home language to support learning came under political siege. The proposition prohibited the use of home language instruction in teaching emergent bilinguals.

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President George W. Bush in January 2002 signed into the law NCLB's definition of limited English proficient as referring to
those who could not meet proficiency levels in English on state assessments signaled a
significant shift in political culture and ideology.

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(2015) Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA)

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(2015) Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA)

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On December 10, 2015, President Barack Obama signed the new reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1968, which was called the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). This law continues the goal of preparing all students for
success in college and career, while providing flexibility for some of NCLB’s more prescriptive requirements.
As with NCLB, the needs of English learners are addressed in ESSA under Title III, “Language Instruction for English Learners and Immigrant Students.” According to Section 3003, “English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement,” the purposes of Title III of ESSA