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CNN: CNN confirms Osama bin Laden is dead

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How the US created a disaster in Afghanistan

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FRONTLINE Presses Taliban Officials About Conditions in Afghanistan | America and the Taliban

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nato (north atlantic treaty organization)

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The Taliban surged back to power two decades after U.S.-led forces toppled their regime in what led to the United States' longest war.

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Pablo's death To stop Pablo, the U.S trained a Colombian special task force called the Search Bloc. On December 2, 1993 with the aid of the U.S, the Search Bloc finds Pablo on the run shooting him dead. There has been a lot of controversy over the death of Pablo. The fatal shot

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Iran's Revolutions: Crash Course World History 226

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U.S. and Iran's rocky history explained in five minutes

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U.S.-Iran Relationship Status: It's Complicated

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The targeted killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani brought into focus Iran's secretive Quds Force, which he headed.

Tehran has vowed to avenge the death of the general, one of its most powerful military and political figures.

What does the Quds Force do?

The Quds Force is part of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, or CFR.

Founded after Iran's 1979 revolution, the Guard defends the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Quds Force performs "operations external to Iran to advance the Islamic revolution," Dr. Jack Watling, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, told NBC News.

Where is the Quds Force based?

Run from Tehran, the Quds Force has developed ties with armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories.

Iranian operatives were blamed for both the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the attack on barracks housing American and French service members, which claimed the lives of 307 people.

Later, President George W. Bush said the Quds Force coordinated with Shiite militants to plant roadside bombs to kill U.S. troops in Iraq.

More recently, its members have served as military advisers to forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, according to the CFR.

After the Islamic State militant group gained a foothold in both Syria and Iraq, the Quds Force also helped to mobilize and lead tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen against the terror group.

How big is the Quds Force?

Estimates vary, but Watling said it was likely a "divisional strength military formation" of around 17,000 to 21,000 members, "which is split into regionally aligned brigades of soldiers."

But he said the numbers become "very vague" because it can pull in people from the wider Guard corps and proxy actors.

"When they put teams together and get technical experts or media experts, those people might not be trained soldiers who are part of that regionally aligned brigade structure," Watling said. "They might be from elsewhere, but they're recruited on a mission basis."

As a result, "numbers become quite difficult to predict," he added. "It is just difficult to break down who is an employee of the Quds Force rather than who is an agent of the Quds Force."

What impact will Soleimani's death have on the Quds Force?

His death "is unlikely to disrupt Iran's operational capabilities," Dr. Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, another research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said.

She added that it was "likely to continue carrying out its previous strategy in terms of reliance on proxies and nonconventional capabilities."

Iran acted quickly to replace Soleimani but whether his successor, Gen. Esmail Ghaani, can be as effective is open for debate.

"One of the standard challenges in all these proxy relationships is that the proxy wants to serve their interests rather than the patron's interests," Professor Stephen Biddle, an adjunct senior fellow at the CFR, said.

"One of the things that Soleimani was surely unusually good at was managing those relationships. His personality was surely important in that process. So, with Soleimani gone, a replacement who is unlikely to have his personal charisma probably won't be as effective at the margins."

Who is Gen. Esmail Ghaani?

While Ghaani has comparable military experience to Soleimani, having served extensively in the war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s, compared to his predecessor, Watling said he "is quite quiet, quite reserved and when he does speak publicly, it tends to be from a script."

Ghaani, who served in counterintelligence, had a "very established personal relationship" with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he said.

"He was one of the critical liaisons between Soleimani and Iran's supreme leadership, so if anything that makes that tie closer,"Watling added.

Whereas Soleimani was very focused on Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Watling said that Ghaani had worked mostly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"The picture is a quite competent but reserved manager ... He has quite a different style of leadership," he added.

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After a U.S. strike killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, NBC News looks at the secretive Quds Force that he headed and his successor, Maj. Gen. Esmail Ghaani.

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US President Donald Trump authorized an overnight airstrike in Baghdad that killed Iran's top general, Qasem Soleimani on Friday, Jan. 3. Soleimani was the second most powerful person in Iran, following Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He was also behind Iran's growing influence in the region.

The strike came after the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia attacked the US Embassy in Iraq on Dec. 31. Kataib Hezbollah was founded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an adviser to Soleimani who was also killed in the attack.

Trump issued the airstrike without Congressional approval or authorization of military force against Iran, and many experts said they fear this assassination could spark further violence and military escalation. Iran threatened Friday to respond harshly, and the US deployed thousands of additional troops to the region.

Despite some periods of cooperation, the US and Iran have long been in conflict. Indeed, the longest currently active US national emergency concerns sanctions on Iran issued by former President Jimmy Carter in 1979. But significant US involvement dates back to 1953, when the US orchestrated a coup to overthrow Iran's prime minister. Here's a brief timeline of major events in US-Iranian relations.

1953: The coup

US and British intelligence agencies orchestrate a coup, overthrowing democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and restoring power to the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. As prime minister, Mossadegh worked to nationalize Iranian oil against British interests, which had exploited the country's resources for decades. Failing to bend Mossadegh's will, the British worked to bring about his outster, enlisting US support. With the help of a few key Iranians, they unleashed a propaganda campaign against the prime minister and persuaded the Shah to participate in the coup. Eventually, the coup was hailed in Washington as a success - but it sowed strong resentment and distrust against the US, and set Iran from the path toward democracy to that of a dictatorship.

1957: Nuclear cooperation

The US and Iran sign the Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms, a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, through the Atoms for Peace program. An initiative of US President Dwight Eisenhower, the program shared nuclear technology and education with states around the world - including Israel, Pakistan and Iran. The program provided Iran with the foundation for its current, highly controversial nuclear program.

1959: Nuclear research

Reza Shah Pahlavi opens the Tehran Nuclear Research Center at the University of Tehran and begins seeking materials and technology from the US.

1967: Nuclear materials

The US provides Iran with a five-megawatt nuclear reactor and weapons-grade enriched uranium fuel.

1968: Nuclear non-proliferation

Iran becomes a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified in 1970. In exchange for a commitment to not acquire nuclear weapons, Iran is permitted to maintain a civil nuclear program.

1963-1973: Decade of growth

In the aftermath of the coup, the US pours resources into Iran, shoring up its military and political power. Iran enjoys a decade of impressive economic growth in the 1960s and 70s. But the Shah's autocracy grows as well, espoused in his notorious secret police, SAVAK, which grew out of CIA training.

In 1972, US President Richard Nixon visits the Shah to ask him to guarantee US security interests in the region, allowing Iran to buy any weapon system it wants in return. As the 1973 Arab-Israeli War sent oil prices surging, the Shah buys huge quantities of high-tech weaponry. US officials are unsettled but have no alternative plan.

In the background, resentment against the Shah - and the US - is building through mosques. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is key to this religious opposition and is sent into forced exile in 1964, and eventually settles in Iraq. But he continues to preach against the Shah and the US; his sermons are smuggled into Iran. The US doesn't take religious opposition seriously at the time - which proves to be a serious mistake.

1977-1978: Carter's visit

Carter visits Iran on New Year's Eve, toasting the Shah and demonstrating how out of touch America is with the realities on the ground. "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world," Carter said. "This is a great tribute to you, your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you."

Within days, the first of the demonstrations that would culminate in the revolution begin. A popular movement with widespread appeal emerges with Khomeini at its head.

September 8, 1978: Black Friday

Government troops open fire on demonstrators in Jaleh Square in downtown Tehran. Hundreds of people are killed. The US is distracted by a Camp David summit over the Arab-Israeli War and can do little to stem the momentum of the revolution.

1979: Iranian Revolution

On January 16, 1979, the Shah announces he is leaving Iran to go on vacation. The Iranian people react as if it is the end of his reign. Before leaving, he appoints Shapour Bakthiar from the opposition as prime minister. But Iranians continue their mass protests.

From France, Khomeini speaks about his plans for an Islamic republic. On February 1, 1979, just weeks after the Shah leaves, Khomeini makes a triumphant return to Iran to a crowd of millions. Within days, revolutionaries are in control of the military, ministries and media. The Islamic Republic of Iran becomes official April 1, following an overwhelmingly popular referendum.

1979-1981: Iran hostage crisis

After a brutal revolution, the US and Khomeini's pick for prime minister, the relatively moderate Medhi Bazargan, work to normalize relations. But in the fall of 1979, Carter allows the Shah - who is dying of cancer - to enter the US for medical treatment. Though assured it was a humanitarian gesture - not a political one - Iranians who supported the revolution feared a new conspiracy between the US and the Shah.

On Nov. 4, 1979, a mob of students overruns the US embassy in Tehran, taking 66 American diplomats and marines hostage. Khomeini backs the hostage-takers, but 13 are released after a short period of time, many women and African Americans - those who Khomeini says already face "the oppression of American society." Another is released for health reasons. The students demand the US turn the Shah over for trial and threaten to put hostages on trial. Fearing another coup, one of their goals is to sabotage the relationship between Tehran and Washington.

Carter imposes sanctions on Iran and freezes $12 billion in Iranian assets. He appeals to the UN, but international condemnation yields little. In April, five months after the embassy is seized, Carter breaks off diplomatic relations. An attempted rescue mission fails, killing eight American crewmen.

In January 1981, Carter announces that the US and Iran have agreed on a settlement. But the hostage crisis has irrevocably damaged the Carter presidency. The final Americans are allowed to return home only on the day of US President Ronald Reagan's inauguration after 444 days in captivity. Iran becomes a pariah state.

1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War

Iraq, hoping to capitalize on chaos in Iran, starts the war in 1980. The US fears Iranians will be able to defeat Iraq and continue a takeover of the region. The Reagan administration provides Baghdad with intelligence and resources. When Iraq uses chemical weapons against Iran, the US condemns the action, but continues to support Saddam Hussein.

1984: Sponsor of terrorism

The US designates Iran a state sponsor of terrorism and unleashes severe sanctions. The CIA documents more than 60 Iran-backed attacks against the US, France and moderate Arabs in 1984, including an attack on the US Embassy in Lebanon.

1985-1986: Iran-Contra affair

Despite an arms embargo, Reagan administration officials continues to sell weapons to Iran, allegedly to secure the release of hostages in Lebanon. The revenue from the weapons sales circumvent US Congress to fund Contra guerrillas fighting against the left-wing Sandinista government in Nicaragua in a US effort to stop the spread of socialism in Latin America. The scandal later becomes known as the Iran-Contra affair and Reagan administration officials are charged with lying to Congress about the backdoor efforts to sell weapons to Iran.

July 3, 1988: Passenger plane downed

In the midst of a skirmish with Iranian ships in the Persian Gulf, US Navy Vincennes warship shoots down Iran Air Flight 655. The Airbus A300 is a passenger plane carrying many pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All 290 people on board are killed. Americans say the large plane was mistaken for an F-14 fighter jet.

1992-1997: US sanctions ramp up

In 1992, Congress passes the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, imposing sanctions on goods or technology that could contribute to advanced weaponry. In 1996, Congress passes the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, later known as the Iran Sanctions Act, penalizing investments in Iran's petroleum industry. In the mid 1990s, US President Bill Clinton issues executive orders that expand sanctions and generally ban the exchange of goods and services between the US and Iran.

1997-2000: Signs of change?

Reformist cleric Mohammed Khatami is elected president in Iran in May 1997, an event Clinton calls "hopeful." Reformers in Iran continue to make gains in elections. Secretary of State Madeline Albright makes a groundbreaking speech in 2000, acknowledging the US role in the 1953 coup and "shortsighted" foreign policy in the region, as well as announcing steps to allow some trade. But hardliners in Tehran rejected Albright's overture and the Clinton initiative fizzled out.

2001-2002: 9/11 and the 'Axis of Evil'

After the terrorist attacks in the US, the Bush administration establishes a back channel with Iran against a mutual enemy: the Taliban. But in 2002, US President George W. Bush includes Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil" in his State of the Union. Later, international inspectors confirm Iran has enriched uranium. Iran says it is being used for energy capabilities, not weapons.

2000s: Nuclear negotiations and sanctions

The decade continues with international negotiations and sanctions against hardliner Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In 2006, Washington says it is willing to join multilateral nuclear talks with Iran if it verifiably suspends nuclear enrichment.

2009: Obama takes office

US President Barack Obama takes office and tells Iran's leaders he would extend a hand if they would "unclench their fist" and persuade the West they were not trying to build a nuclear bomb. Britain, France and the United States announce that Iran is building a secret uranium-enrichment site at Fordow, near the city of Qom. Iran says it disclosed the site to the UN nuclear watchdog earlier in the week.

2009-2012: Stalled

Nuclear negotiations between major powers and Iran largely stall.

2012-2013: Economic downturn and upturn in negotiations

US law goes into effect giving Obama the power to sanction foreign banks, including the central banks of US allies, if they fail to significantly reduce their imports of Iranian oil. The result is a drastic reduction in Iranian oil sales and a sharp downturn in the Iranian economy.

US and Iranian officials begin secret talks, which intensify in 2013, on the nuclear issue.

Pragmatist Hassan Rouhani is elected Iran's president on a platform of improving Iran's relations with the world and its economy, something that can only be achieved by easing sanctions. On Sept. 28, Obama and Rouhani speak by telephone in the highest-level contact between the two countries in three decades.

On Nov. 23, with the groundwork laid by the secret US-Iran talks, Iran and six major powers reach an interim pact called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) under which Iran agreed to curb its nuclear work in return for limited sanctions relief. The six powers are the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia.

2015: JCPOA

On July 14, Iran and the six powers strike an agreement, under which Iran agreed to take a series of steps, including slashing its number of centrifuges and disabling a key part of its Arak nuclear reactor - in return for significant easing of US, UN and EU sanctions.

The deal is called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

2016: Sanctions lift

On Jan. 14, Iran releases 10 US sailors, who ended up in Iranian territorial waters on two small boats, less than 24 hours after Iran took them into custody. On Jan. 16, the United States and Iran announce a prisoner swap. Four Americans imprisoned in Iran are freed in return for clemency for at least seven Iranians, most of whom are dual U.S.-Iranian nationals, who were convicted or awaiting trial in the United States. A fifth American is released separately.

Later, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirms Iran had taken steps to restrict its nuclear activities required under the JCPOA. The United States lifts nuclear-related sanctions on Iran.

2017: Trump administration

US President Donald Trump makes a speech holding Iran responsible for global extremism in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on his first foreign visit since taking office.

2018: Trump walks away from Iran deal

US President Donald Trump announces he is walking away from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposes crippling sanctions. Trump says the deal did nothing to limit Iran's ballistic missile program or its regional aggressions.

2019: Iranian aggression goes unchecked

In April, the US designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a "terrorist organization."

In May, exactly one year after Trump pulls the US out of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran announces Wednesday that it will relax some of the curbs the deal imposed on its nuclear program.

Throughout the spring and summer, Iran carries out a series of attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf region. It is also believed to be behind the September attacks on oil installations in Saudi Arabia.

In December, attacks on US military bases in Iraq kill a US citizen. The US blames an Iranian-backed militia inside Iraq, and fires on its bases in retaliation.

Iranian backed militias protest outside the US Embassy in Baghdad, storming the security post.

Jan. 3, 2020: Commander killed

Trump authorizes an airstrike that kills Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani without congressional approval.
Editor's note: A previous version noted 55 hostages released after Reagan's innaguration; 52 hostages were held 444 days and released when Reagan entered the White House. Others were released prior. The World's Jeb Sharp and Shirin Jaafari contributed reporting. Reuters contributed to this report.

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The history of US-Iran relations: A timeline

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Despite some periods of cooperation, the US and Iran have long been in conflict. Here's a brief timeline of major events in US-Iranian relations.

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What does the future look like for Iran-U.S. relations?

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The U.S. and Iran have a complicated history dating back decades.

From the U.S. involvement in the shah's 1953 coup of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh, to the Iran hostage crisis in 1979, to the U.S. killing of one of Iran's top generals in January 2020, the U.S. and Iran's conservative religious and political leaders have often found themselves in stark opposition to one another about their visions for both Iran's own future and larger interests in the Middle East.

Throughout the years, there have been periods of decreased tensions, but there have also been times where the two countries have found themselves on the brink of war.

Here's a look back at U.S.-Iran relations.
1921- Reza Khan names himself shah of Persia
Reza Khan, a military officer in Persia's Cossack Brigade, names himself shah of Persia after staging a coup, backed by the British, against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. He begins to implement a series of reforms aimed at modernizing the country, which include building a national railroad system and implementing a secular education system. At the same time, he censors the press, suppresses trade unions and bans political parties. Later in his rule, he bans the hijab and encourages western dress.
1925- Ahmad Shah is deposed
Already living in exile, Ahmad Shah, the Qajar dynasty's final ruler, is deposed, and an assembly votes in Reza Khan (who had adopted the last name Pahlavi) as the new shah.
1935 - Persia is officially renamed Iran
Reza Khan asks other nations to call Persia "Iran" in formal diplomatic correspondence. Also, by the mid-'30s, Reza Khan's dictatorial approach begins to cause dissent.
1941 - Reza Khan is forced out
Although Reza Khan declares Iran a neutral power during World War II, Iran's British-controlled oil interests are largely maintained by German engineers and technicians, and Khan refuses to expel German citizens despite a request by Britain. In September 1941, following British and Soviet occupation of western Iran, Reza Shah is forced out of power. His son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, succeeds him on the throne.
1949 - The shah's powers are expanded
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi survives an assassination attempt. Afterward, he calls for the convening of a Constituent Assembly. The group amends the nation's constitution to give the shah the power to dissolve the parliament.
1951 - Nationalizing the oil industry
Lawmaker Mohammed Mosaddegh, who has gained considerable political power, pushes through a measure that nationalizes the British-owned oil industry in Iran. The same year, the nation's legislative body overwhelmingly nominates Mossadeq as prime minister, forcing the shah to appoint him to the post.
1953- Mosaddegh overthrown
The power struggle between Mosaddegh and the shah comes to a head when the shah attempts to dismiss Mosaddegh from his position-a move urged by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Protesters take to the streets, forcing the shah to flee the country. But the shah returns to Iran when Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi - with backing from the CIA - overthrows Mosaddegh in an August coup d'etat.
1957 - The creation of Iran's intelligence organization
U.S. and Israeli intelligence officers work with Iran to set up SAVAK, an Iranian intelligence organization. The organization is later blamed for the torture and execution of thousands of political prisoners and violent suppression of dissent, according to Amnesty International.
1963 - The White Revolution
The shah implements the "White Revolution," an aggressive campaign of social and economic Westernization that included redistribution of land, increased rights for women and attempts to improve literacy and health in rural areas. The changes are met with opposition from the clerical rules and landlords. Popular nationalist Ayatollah Khomeini is arrested in one of many crackdowns on the shah's opponents.
September 8, 1978 - Black Friday
A day earlier, the shah had imposes martial law in an attempt to quell ongoing protests against his authoritarian rule. On September 8, thousands gather in Jaleh Square in Tehran, and security forces fire on the protesters. The death toll is unknown. Estimates range from several dozens to hundreds killed.
January 16, 1979 - The shah flees
Protests continue and the shah, who was seen by many as a puppet of the U.S. and the UK, is forced to flee Iran amid the intensifying unrest. He travels to a number of countries before entering the U.S. to receive cancer treatment.
February 1, 1979 - Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile
Islamic nationalist Ayatollah Khomeini returns from France, where he was exiled for more than 14 years because of his opposition to the shah's regime. He encourages the brewing revolution.
April 1, 1979 - Iran becomes a theocratic republic
Under Ayatollah Khomeini's guidance, Iran declares itself a theocratic republic guided by Islamic principles, and a referendum is held to name it the Islamic Republic of Iran.
May 5, 1979 - The Revolutionary Guard Corps is formed
Ayatollah Khomeini issues a decree calling for the formation of a force that would apprehend people involved in counterrevolutionary activities, defend Iran against foreign forces and support revolutionary movements around the world. In the 1980s, one of the now-eight branches of the IRCG- the Quds Force- is created. The group of elite military forces specializes in foreign operations.
November 4, 1979 - Storming of the embassy
Islamic students who were followers of Ayatollah Khomeini storm the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking hostage 52 American employees and demand that the shah return from receiving medical treatment in the United States to face trial in Iran. The hostage situation ignites a crisis between the United States and Iran.
April 1980 - The hostage crisis
Iran and the United States sever diplomatic ties over the hostage crisis.
July 1980 - The shah dies
After traveling from the U.S. to Panama and then to Egypt, the shah dies in exile.
September 1980 - The Iran-Iraq War
Iraq invades Iran after years of disagreements over territory, notably oil-rich border regions and the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
1981 - U.S. hostages are released
Following negotiations mediated by Algeria, the U.S. hostages were released after 444 days of captivity, just minutes after Ronald Reagan is sworn in as president.
1985 - Hezbollah is formed
Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based political party and militant group, issues its founding manifesto. The group, which opposes Israel and Western involvement in the Middle East, receives substantial financial support and training from Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is largely seen as a proxy for Iran, and the U.S. has designated it a terrorist organization.
1985 - 1987 - Iran-Contra
The United States covertly seeks to sell arms to Iran. The money from the sales was supposed to be in exchange for seven American hostages being held by Iranian-backed militants in Lebanon, but some of the money is used to fund militia groups known as the Contras, which were trying to overthrow the socalist regime in Nicaragua. The revelation of the administration's plan, which went against a Congressionally approved law banning federal money from being given to the Contras, becomes the biggest scandal of the Reagan presidency. The scandal becomes known as the Iran-Contra affair.
July 1988 - U.S. shoots down Iranian airplane
An American navy ship, the USS Vincennes, shoots down an Iranian civilian plane in the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 passengers and crew. The U.S. later apologizes and agrees to financial compensation for the victims families, saying the civilian plane was mistaken for an attacking military jet.
July 1988 - Iran-Iraq War ceasefire
Iran accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, leading to a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War.
June 1989 - Ayatollah Khomeini dies

Khomeini, believed to be 89 years old, dies after having surgery for digestive system bleeding. After his death, an elected body of senior clerics - the Assembly of Experts - chooses the outgoing president of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, to succeed Khomeini as the national religious leader.
August 1989 - Hashemi Rafsanjani becomes president
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of Iran's parliament, is elected president. Rafsanjani was an influential member of the Council of Islamic Revolution of Iran in the Islamic Republic's early days.
1995 - U.S. imposes broader sanctions
The Clinton administration expands sanctions that were put in place on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, placing a complete oil and trade embargo on Iran. The U.S. accuses Iran of sponsoring terrorism, committing human rights abuses and seeking to sabotage the Arab-Israeli peace process.
1997 - Khatami elected president and Soleimani heads the Quds

Mohammad Khatami, who ran on pledges of political, social and economic reform, is elected as Iran's president. This year, Gen. Qassem Soleimani also becomes the head of the Quds Force.
2000 - Reform candidates make gains
Pro-reform candidates and allies of President Khatami win a substantial number of seats in Iran's parliament, setting the stage for reformers to control the legislature for the first time since the 1979 Islamic revolution.
2002 - "Axis of evil"
In his January State of the Union speech, U.S. President George W. Bush refers to Iran as part of an "axis of evil," saying the country is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction. The speech is met with anger in Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi responds by calling President Bush's comments "arrogant" and saying Iran sees them as "interference in its internal affairs."
2003 - Iran admits to plutonium production
The International Atomic Energy Agency says Iran admits to plutonium production, but the agency says there is no evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Iran agrees to more rigorous U.N. inspections of nuclear facilities.
2004 - Conservatives regain parliament
Conservatives reclaim control of Iran's parliament after controversial elections that were boycotted by reformists.
2005 - Ahmadinejad becomes president of Iran
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the hardline Islamic mayor of Tehran, who campaigned as a champion of the poor and pledged to return to the values of the revolution of 1979, defeats one of Iran's elder statesmen in presidential elections.
2006 - Ahmadinejad reaches out to Bush
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sends a letter to President Bush calling for ways to ease tensions over Iran's nuclear program, but continues to defy U.N. deadlines to halt uranium enrichment activities. Ahmadinejad insists the nuclear program is for civilian energy purposes only.
2007 - Ahmadinejad visits the U.S.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits the United States and accuses Israel of occupation and racism during a speech to the U.N. General Assembly.

The United Nations announces new economic sanctions against Iran, targeted to impact the country's military and halt Tehran's disputed nuclear program.

A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate report finds that Iran stopped developing nuclear weapons in 2003, but continues to enrich uranium and could still develop atomic arms in the future.
2008 - IAEA calls Iran's uranium enrichment a 'serious concern'
The International Atomic Energy Agency releases a report saying Iran's suspected research into the development of nuclear weapons remained "a matter of serious concern." European Union nations agree to impose new sanctions against Iran.
2009 - Obama administration agrees to talks with Iran
The Obama administration announced it would participate in talks with Iran and the United nation's five permanent members, breaking from the Bush administration. The talks eventually led to the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the JCPOA.
June - July, 2010 - U.S. and allies impose new sanctions
The U.N., U.S. and the European Union place further sanctions on Iran for its uranium enrichment activity.
June 15, 2013 - Rouhani is elected
Hassan Rouhani, who was described as a moderate, is elected president of Iran.
September 27, 2013 - Obama calls Rouhani
President Barack Obama called Iranian President Rouhani, which was the highest level of contact between the U.S. and Iran since 1979. The two discussed Iran's nuclear program on the call.
January 2014 - Beginnings of a nuclear deal reached
Iran and the five U.N. permanent member nations reach an initial agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program. In the coming months the first steps of that deal were implemented and negotiations for a more comprehensive plan continued.
March 2015 - Civil war breaks out in Yemen
Civil war breaks out in Yemen when a Saudi-led coalition launches airstrikes against Houthi rebels who have taken control of the capital city of Sana'a. The Houthis are supported by Iran, and Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally in the Middle East, supports the Yemeni government. The U.S. sells weapons to Saudi Arabia, which are then used in the armed conflict. Five years later, the U.S. will try and fail to kill a senior Iranian military commander in Yemen the same day it successfully killed an Iranian general in Iraq.
WATCH: Inside Yemen, behind the scenes of "the forgotten war" July 14, 2015- U.S., Iran and other nations announce nuclear deal
Iran, the U.S. and the four other U.N. permanent members announce they have reached a comprehensive deal regarding Iran's nuclear program. Iran agrees to limit its uranium enrichment and allow international inspectors into the country in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.
July 16, 2016 - Lifting of sanctions
The U.S. and Europe lifted sanctions on Iran as promised in the nuclear deal. The very next day, the Obama administration issued new sanctions against 11 people and companies with links to Iran's ballistic missile program.
2017 - Trump extends sanctions waivers
The Trump administration renewed sanctions waivers that were part of the Iran nuclear deal.
May 8, 2018 - U.S. withdraws from the Iran nuclear deal
President Donald Trump announces the U.S. will withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement and implements a "maximum-pressure campaign" in an attempt to force Iran to negotiate a new deal. In response, Iran says it will exceed the caps for uranium enrichment as outlined in the Iran nuclear deal. International nuclear watchdogs later confirm Iran has exceeded the limits.
April 8, 2019- Trump designates the IRGC a terrorist organization
The Trump administration announces it will designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It is the first time the U.S. declares part of another nation's government as a terrorist organization.
May - October 2019 - U.S.-Iran tension ramp up amid attacks on oil tankers
A series of attacks on oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz spark increased tensions between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. blames Iran for attacks on oil tankers that were sailing under the Saudi Arabian, Japanese, Panamanian and British flags. In response, the U.S. attempts to seize an Iranian oil tanker.
November 2019 - Iranians riot over economic concerns
Over the course of four days, Iranians riot in the streets in opposition to an increase in oil prices. Amnesty International estimates more than 300 people were killed in the government's crackdown on the demonstrations. The Trump administration sharply criticizes the Iranian government for how it handles the protests.
December 31, 2019 - Militia members attack U.S. embassy in Baghdad
Iraqi demonstrators and Iran - backed militia members break into the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and set fires in response to the American airstrike that killed members of an Iran-backed militia the previous weekend.
January 3, 2020 - U.S. kills Gen. Soleimani
U.S. kills Iran's top general Qassem Soleimani as well as Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a drone strike at a Baghdad airport.
January 8, 2020 - Iran strikes bases in Iraq housing U.S. soldiers
Iran launches missiles on two bases in Iraq where U.S. soldiers are stationed in retaliation for Soleimani's killing; no casualties are reported. The same morning, a Ukrainian airliner crashes after taking off from Iran. A U.S. official says Iran shot down the plane with two Russian surface-to-air missiles.
January 9, 2020 - U.S. retaliates with sanctions
Trump announces his administration will impose new sanctions on Iran in response to the missile strike. The next day, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin outline the details of the sanctions, which target the construction, manufacturing, mining, and textiles industries. The sanctions also name eight Iranian officials.
January 11, 2020 - Iran admits it shot down a civilian plane
Iran admits it shot down the Ukrainian airliner by mistake. The admissions sparks protests in Tehran and elsewhere against Iranian leaders.
Layla Quran contributed to this story.

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The U.S. and Iran have a complicated history dating back decades. From the U.S. involvement in the shah's 1953 coup of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh, to the Iran hostage crisis in 1979, to the U.S. killing of one of Iran's top generals in January 2020, the U.S.

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Onetime allies, the United States and Iran have seen tensions escalate repeatedly in the four decades since the Islamic Revolution.

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Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was the pioneer in industrial-scale cocaine trafficking. Known as "El Patrón," Escobar led the Medellín Cartel from the 1970s to the early 1990s. He oversaw each step of cocaine production, from sourcing coca base paste in Andean nations to feeding a booming US market for the drug. He also successfully challenged the State on extradition, showing that extreme violence could force governments to negotiate.

History

Escobar then entered the cocaine trade, founding the Medellín Cartel in the 1970s and the Ochoa Vásquez brothers (Jorge Luis, Juan David and Fabio). The Ochoa brothers were initially the business brains of the outfit. Meanwhile, Escobar first oversaw the group's "protection" before emerging as its undisputed leader.

During the Medellín Cartel's zenith in the 1980s and early 1990s, Escobar controlled nearly the entire cocaine supply chain. He oversaw the import of large, multi-ton shipments of coca base from Andean nations Peru and Bolivia into Colombia, where it was processed into cocaine in jungle labs. The criminal enterprise then stored the drug in Colombia before flying it to the United States. In the 1980s, the organization is estimated to have supplied over 80 percent of all cocaine shipped to the country, sending across some 15 tons per day.

In this period, kidnappings made by guerrilla groups led the State to collaborate with criminal groups. The 1981 kidnapping of the sister of the Ochoas led to the creation of a Medellín Cartel-funded paramilitary group known as Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores - MAS).

In the mid-1980s, Escobar's hold on Medellín increased when he founded a criminal debt collection service known as the " Oficina de Envigado." This was an office in the town hall of Envigado, a small municipality next to Medellín where Escobar grew up. Escobar used the municipal office to collect debts owed to him by drug traffickers and set the "sicarios" or hired killers on those who refused.

Despite his opulent lifestyle, Escobar presented himself as a populist figure, persecuted by the upper classes for his own social background and efforts to help the poor. He attempted to stir up anti-establishment sentiment and win over disadvantaged communities by opening a public zoo, constructing 70 community soccer fields and building housing for the poor.

He could not break into Medellín's upper social classes, which blocked his application to join the city's top social club. His attempts to join the political elite were also crushed in the early 1980s when he was expelled from Colombia's Liberal Party and thrown out of his position as a deputy congressman.

These tensions escalated in the mid-1980s when the Medellín Cartel declared war on the Colombian state. In April 1984, the nation's then Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was shot dead by sicarios working for Escobar. The Colombian state responded by immediately signing into law Escobar's extradition to the United States. In response, Escobar's hitmen murdered dozens of judges, police and several journalists in the late 1980s. During the 1989 presidential elections, Escobar's assassins murdered the Liberal Party candidate Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento. They then made a failed attempt to kill Galán's replacement, Liberal Party presidential candidate César Augusto Gaviria Trujillo.

Using these tactics, Escobar eventually pushed the State to ban the extradition of Colombian nationals in the 1991 Constitutional Assembly. He managed to negotiate his surrender to authorities and took up residence in a jail known as the " Cathedral," which he built. It was a jail only in name. Escobar controlled the guards and had a playhouse built on the grounds for when his daughter went to visit. He used his first year behind bars to reorganize the Medellín Cartel.

But his influence in the organization was dwindling. Resentment against Escobar grew when he raised a "tax" on cartel members, making them pay between $200,000 and $1 million in fees.

And in July 1992, Escobar's men found a stash of $20 million on a property belonging to cartel member Fernando Galeano. Escobar summoned Galeano and another associate, Gerardo Moncada, for a meeting at the Cathedral. Both were then killed by two of Escobar's sicarios.

On hearing of the killings, President César Gaviria ordered for Escobar to be sent from the Cathedral to a military base in Colombia's capital, Bogotá. Before he could be transferred, Escobar escaped.

Rumors have circulated for years around his death. Former paramilitary leader and mafia boss Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias "Don Berna," claimed his brother fired Escobar's shot.

Criminal Activity

Escobar was instrumental in setting up the Medellín Cartel, feeding booming demand in the United States during the 1980s.

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, Escobar oversaw each step of the cocaine supply chain as the Medellín Cartel's undisputed leader. The organization sourced coca leaf from primary production points in Peru and Bolivia, processed it in Colombian jungle labs, then shipped cocaine to the United States, where operatives sold it on the streets.

He focused on international markets for cocaine and never sold the drug domestically to Colombians for consumption. Instead, Escobar initially used a Caribbean air route to feed the US market.

Escobar also ordered contract killings to target police, judges, politicians and journalists. On the other hand, the Medellín Cartel maintained high-level allies in security and justice institutions that largely protected its members from prosecution.

He dipped into extortion, too. While he was at the "Cathedral," he made his money by shaking down other drug traffickers, who had to pay him a fixed sum every month.

Geography

Escobar headed the Medellín Cartel, named after the Colombian city where it was based. However, his influence extended to as far as the United States, where he ran distribution networks.

Medellín has paid a high cost in blood for its role in the international cocaine trade. The city's murder rate was the highest in the world during Escobar's day.

To ensure the smooth transfer of cocaine from coca leaf to consumer, Escobar's ties extended to Andean production nations (including Bolivia, Peru) and the United States and Canada.

Allies and Enemies

Escobar's success in the underworld relied on alliances far and wide. His actions, wealth and public profile also meant he had many enemies, whose eventual alliance would ultimately lead to his downfall.

The Medellín Cartel also formed alliances with Mexican groups to traffic cocaine into the United States. Escobar allied with leader of the Juárez Cartel, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, alias "El Señor de los Cielos," or " Lord of the Skies." Carrillo Fuentes used his fleet of aircraft to transport drugs belonging to Escobar as part of the Guadalajara Cartel.

One of Escobar's most consistent enemies was the Cali Cartel. The Cali Cartelinitially cooperated with the Medellín Cartel during the early 1980s to stabilize the drug market and divide territory in the United States. However, by 1988 the cartels were fighting a vicious turf war in Colombia.

PEPES membership included the founders of what became the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC): the brothers Fidel Antonio Castaño Gil, alias "Rambo," Carlos Castaño Gil, and José Vicente Castaño Gil, alias "El Profe," as well as "Don Berna," who joined the AUC later.

Former allies of Escobar, the Castaños grew distant from him for many reasons. These included his stated affinity for left-wing guerrillas, his alleged links to the M-19 rebel movement and the National Liberation Army ( Ejército de Liberación Nacional - ELN).

Meanwhile, Don Berna turned on Escobar after El Patrón killed his boss, Fernando Galeano. Don Berna and his PEPES associates tracked down Escobar's family and connections, killing many of them. The police used Don Berna for information, leading to the capture of several Escobar associates, seizure of properties, and freezing his bank accounts. Don Berna claimed he and other members of PEPES were with the police that located Escobar on the day of his death.

To bring down Escobar, the PEPES worked alongside the Search Bloc, an elite police unit formed in 1989 made up of around 600 members and based out of the Carlos Holguín Police School in Medellín. When Escobar surrendered in 1991, its members were dispersed. It reformed following his escape from prison in 1992 and hunted him until his death in 1993.

Legacy and Influence

Escobar's death signaled the end of one era of drug trafficking and the birth of another. Mystique surrounding the drug lord has grown since 1993, and endless myths have circulated.

The Medellín Cartel no longer exists, nor does the cartel structure Escobar help to found, which involved controlling all the links in the drug chain from production to retail.

While the Colombian department of Antioquia, of which Medellín is the capital, remains pivotal to the nation's cocaine trade, today's drug lords bear little resemblance to Escobar.

Following Escobar's downfall, the structure of Colombia's underworld -- and Medellín's especially - shifted. It gradually went from being hierarchical and dominated by a few key actors to more federal, fragmented and horizontal. The " Oficina" - which had its roots in Envigado - transformed into a mafia federation that now regulates almost all criminal activity in Medellín.

Since Escobar, a new generation of "Invisible" traffickers has emerged. They have learned that demonstrating a luxury lifestyle and using extreme public violence is counterproductive. Instead, anonymity is their protection plan. This new generation of drug traffickers looks like young entrepreneurs or highly qualified businessmen. They are unrecognizable from those who dominated in Escobar's day.

Escobar achieved a level of state penetration which helped members of his cartel to avoid capture for years. The fact he was elected to Congress as an alternate tells us about how deeply he could achieve this.

Drug traffickers still have links to state institutions. Political elites have been historically linked to drug trafficking and corruption. Other institutions continue to be penetrated at a more local level. The Urabeños, one of Colombia's most influential criminal groups, for example, have worked through corruption networks linked to local governments in Colombia.

The US Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act may also be considered as another legacy of Escobar's influence. Made law in 1999, it permits "the identification of and worldwide sanctions against foreign narcotics traffickers whose activities threaten US security, foreign policy, or the economy." Its purpose is to prevent foreign drug traffickers from trading with US companies or individuals.

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Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was the pioneer in industrial-scale cocaine trafficking. Known as "El Patrón," Escobar led the Medellín Cartel from the 1970s to the early 1990s. He oversaw each step of cocaine production, from sourcing coca base paste in Andean nations to feeding a booming US market for the drug.

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China to develop dredger 'more powerful than South China Sea island-builder'

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Self-propelled suction machine will feature a 10,000kW reamer, adding to the country's fleet.

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In North Korea, all authority flows from Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. He has reinstated the party as the central hub to consolidate his power and bring elites to heel.

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North Korea in 2020 remained one of the most repressive countries in the world. Under the rule of Kim Jong Un, the third leader of the nearly 75-year Kim dynasty, the totalitarian government deepened repression and maintained fearful obedience using threats of execution, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and forced labor. Due to the border closures and travel restrictions put in place to stop the spread of Covid-19, the country became more isolated than ever, with authorities intensifying already tight restrictions on communication with the outside world.

The government continued to sharply curtail all basic liberties, including freedom of expression, religion and conscience, assembly, and association, and ban political opposition, independent media, civil society, and trade unions.

Authorities in North Korea routinely send perceived opponents of the government to secretive prison camps where they face torture, starvation rations, and forced labor. Fear of collective punishment is used to silence dissent. The government systematically extracts forced, unpaid labor from its citizens to build infrastructure and public works projects. The government also fails to protect the rights of children and marginalized groups including women and people with disabilities.

North Korea's failures to promote economic rights resulted in increased harms to the population in 2020. On January 1, at a major party meeting, Kim Jong Un stated that North Koreas would need to "tighten our belts" and find ways to become self-reliant. However, the government continued its prioritization of strategic weapons development, leading the UN Security Council to maintain severe economic sanctions.

The economic impact of those sanctions, which was intensified by the Covid-19 lockdown-as well as severe floods that hit the country between June and September and destroyed crops, roads, and bridges-undermined the country's agricultural production plan. The government continued to rebuff international diplomatic engagement and repeatedly rejected offers for international aid.

Freedom of Movement and Information

Moving from one province to another or abroad without prior approval remains illegal in North Korea. North Korea continued jamming Chinese mobile phone services at the border and arresting persons caught communicating with people outside the country, a violation of the right to information and free expression.

Networks that facilitate North Koreans' escape to safe third countries reported extreme difficulties due to Covid-19 health measures and checkpoints on top of surveillance and other existing obstacles to movement in countries through which people transit. Many North Koreans in China reportedly had to stay hidden in safe houses for months, with the Chinese government continuing to catch North Korean refugees and trying to return them, violating China's obligation to protect them under the Refugee Convention.

Despite the Covid-19 health measures, the Chinese government reportedly forcibly returned North Koreans until March. South Korean media with contacts in North Korea reported instances of the North Korean government rejecting Chinese proposals to return North Korean refugees in February and October.

The Ministry of Social Security considers defection to be a crime of "treachery against the nation." North Koreans fleeing to China are protected under international law as refugees sur place, since those forcibly returned by China face violations that a 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry ( COI) on human rights in North Korea has condemned as crimes against humanity. While several thousand people escaped North Korea annually earlier this decade, the numbers have decreased in recent years. Just over one thousand North Koreans fled to the south in 2019, but only 195 did so between January and September of 2020.

Forced Labor

The North Korean government routinely and systematically requires forced, uncompensated labor from most of its population-including women and children through the Women's Union or schools; workers at state-owned enterprises or deployed abroad; detainees in hard labor detention centers ( rodong dallyeondae); and prisoners at ordinary prison camps ( kyohwaso) and political prison camps ( kwanliso)-to control its people and sustain its economy. A significant number of North Koreans must perform unpaid labor, often called "portrayals of loyalty," at some point in their lives.

The government routinely compels many North Koreans, who are not free to choose their own job, to join paramilitary labor brigades ( dolgyeokdae) that the ruling party controls and operates, working primarily on buildings and infrastructure projects. In theory, they are entitled to a salary, but in many cases, the dolyeokdae do not compensate them.

North Korea remained in 2020 one of only seven UN member states that has not joined the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Pretrial Detention, Due Process Violations, and Torture

The North Korean government's pretrial detention and criminal investigation system remained arbitrary, violent, cruel, and degrading. Ordinary citizens have no access to North Korea's laws, which are vaguely worded and lack definitions. Law enforcement agencies and courts are controlled by the Workers' Party of Korea, and connections and money are important determinants of whether one is detained or receives better treatment or shorter sentences. People in pretrial detention are subjected to beatings, torture, dangerous and unhygienic conditions, and other mistreatment in interrogation facilities ( kuryujang), with women and girls particularly targeted for sexual violence.

Marginalized Groups

The North Korean government uses , a socio-economic political classification system created at the country's founding that groups people into varying classes including "loyal," "wavering," or "hostile," discriminating against lower classed persons in areas including employment, residence, and schooling. Pervasive corruption allows some maneuvering around the strictures of the songbun system, with government officials accepting bribes to allow exceptions to songbun rules, expedite or provide permissions, provide access to certain market activities, or avoid possible punishments.

Women and girls in North Korea suffer widespread gender discrimination, high levels of sexual violence and harassment, and constant exposure to government-endorsed stereotyped gender roles, in addition to the abuses suffered by the population in general.

Human traffickers and brokers, often linked to government officials, subject women to forced labor, sexual exploitation, and sexual slavery in China, including through forced marriage. On July 28, 2020, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report that said women forcibly repatriated from China to North Korea were imprisoned without due process or a fair trial and then subjected to egregious human rights abuses. While in detention, the women experienced food deprivation, sexual violence, infanticide, and forced labor and were held in overcrowded prisons with dangerous conditions.

Covid-19

In 2020, the North Korean government imposed various restrictions in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. While some measures that limited rights were justified by public health exigencies, others were not necessary or not proportionate and permitted grave abuses under the pretext of protecting against the spread of Covid-19.

For instance, the government intensified enforcement of a ban on "illegal" travel to China, including by executing persons caught while attempting to escape. In August, the government created buffer zones one to two kilometers from the northern border, with guards ordered to "unconditionally shoot" on sight anyone entering without permission. Also under the pretext of Covid-19 prevention, on September 22, the North Korean navy shot and killed a 47-year-old South Korean fisheries official on a boat near North Korea's western sea border.

The government also implemented drastic quarantines for anybody arriving from overseas at border cities, ports, and airports. North Koreans reentering the country through northern border cities did not have the option to quarantine at home and reportedly were quarantined in government-designated facilities with little food (three meals a day consisting of a bowl of boiled rice and crushed corn and some soup), inadequate medical treatment, and lack of basic needs products like electricity, some for up to 40 or 50 days.

North Korea maintains there are no Covid-19 cases in the country, but South Korean media with sources inside North Korea reported several deaths featuring coronavirus-like symptoms. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as of October 29, North Korea had tested 12,072 people for Covid-19, with all resulting "negative" for the virus, and as of August 20, a total of 30,965 people had been placed under quarantine and as of October 29, 32,182 released.

The government also strengthened restrictions on travel domestically, issuing fewer official travel permits, imposing new temporary road checkpoints, and enhancing enforcement to prevent "illegal" travel. These measures, though justified on public health grounds, severely reduced people's ability to access food, medicine, and other basic goods. Schools delayed their scheduled start from March until June.

On June 9, Tomás Ojea-Quintana, special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, recommended that the North Korean government seek more international assistance to prevent the spread of the virus, and make all public health data publicly available, allow citizens free access to electronic communication and global news, and permit international humanitarian organizations access to the country. The government did not respond.

Key International Actors

North Korea has ratified five human rights treaties, but it has ignored its obligations under all of them. A 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea found that the government committed gross, systematic, and widespread rights abuses, including extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence. It recommended the UN Security Council refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The North Korean government has repeatedly denied the commission's findings and refused to cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Seoul or the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea.

On June 22, 2020, the UN Human Rights Council adopted without a vote a resolution emphasizing the advancement of accountability efforts and mechanisms. As recommended by the Commission of Inquiry and mandated by subsequent council resolutions, the UN high commissioner for human rights continued to gather evidence of human rights abuses and crimes against humanity committed by the government. In November 2020, the UN General Assembly's third committee passed without a vote a resolution condemning human rights in North Korea.

Although the US-led efforts to place North Korea's human rights violations on the UN Security Council agenda as a threat to international peace and security between 2014 and 2017, since 2018 its mission to the UN failed to do so, and there was no formal council discussion of North Korea's record in 2020. However, the US government continued to impose human rights-related sanctions on North Korean government entities, as well as on Kim Jong Un and on several other top officials. The US also continued to fund organizations promoting human rights in North Korea.

Despite North Korea's rejection of any diplomatic engagement, South Korean President Moon Jae-in's administration attempted to develop better relations with Pyongyang in 2020, apparently to placate North Korea. The South Korean government has not adopted a clear policy on North Korean human rights issues and in 2020 it did not co-sponsor key resolutions on North Korea's human rights record at the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly.

On 6 July, the UK introduced new human rights sanctions, including against two North Korean entities in charge of the forced labor, torture, and murder that takes place in the country's political prison camps ( kwanliso) and ordinary prison camps ( kyohwaso).

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World Report 2021: Rights Trends in North Korea

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North Korea in 2020 remained one of the most repressive countries in the world. Under the rule of Kim Jong Un, the third leader of the nearly 75-year Kim dynasty, the totalitarian government deepened repression and maintained fearful obedience using threats of execution, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, and forced labor.

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The daily life in North Korea is focused on obeying the "The Workers' Party's Ten Principles of the Establishment of a Unitary Ideology System".

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How the North Korean Famine Changed North Korea Forever

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Tensions in the South China Sea increased last April when a Chinese coast guard ship sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands-a fiercely disputed territory in the South China Sea. Disputes over island territories in the region have endured for decades, with China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei all making overlapping territorial claims. The region is rich in natural resources and biodiversity, holding vast fish stocks and an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 cubic feet of natural gas.

Simmering Tension between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea

Tensions in the South China Sea increased last April when a Chinese coast guard ship sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands-a fiercely disputed territory in the South China Sea. Disputes over island territories in the region have endured for decades, with China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei all making overlapping territorial claims. The region is rich in natural resources and biodiversity, holding vast fish stocks and an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 cubic feet of natural gas.

The increased strain in Vietnam and China's relationship was evident even before the April incident. In recent years, China has pressured Vietnam out of oil and gas exploration, implemented fishing bans in disputed waters near Vietnam and the Paracel Islands, and increased its military presence in the Paracel and Spratly Islands-another disputed archipelago strategically located along major shipping routes and rich in resources.

China's claims in the region extend into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Vietnam.

China's claims in the region extend into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Vietnam. EEZs are 200-mile buffer zones off the coast of sovereign nations established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea within which countries have some exclusive rights over resources. This has sparked greater conflict between the two countries over resource utilization, with Vietnam working to strike a balance between asserting its territorial claims and maintaining a cooperative relationship with the Chinese government, with which Vietnam shares political and economic ties. In late 2019, for the first time, Vietnam threatened to bring legal action against China over disputes in the South China Sea. And just last month, Vietnam raised concerns over security in the region at the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Biodiversity Loss in the South China Sea

The strained relationship between China and Vietnam has not been the only consequence of the conflict. Increased military activity and commercial fishing in the South China Sea have taken a heavy toll on the region's biodiversity.

The South China Sea is a global hotspot for biodiversity, home to important marine ecosystems, mangrove forests, and thousands of fish and sponge species. In fact, scientists believe the region holds " some of the highest marine biodiversity on earth, with 571 known species of coral reef alone."

A key strategy of territory claimants has been to build islands in order to increase military presence in the region. Among the various countries involved in the conflict, China has been the most aggressive in building islands and is responsible for the majority of environmental damages caused by such projects. In total, China has built an estimated 3,200 acres of artificial islands, most of which are located in the Spratly Islands archipelago.

The dredging process involved in building these artificial islands has significant environmental consequences. Dredging breaks up coral reefs, disturbs ecosystems by changing wave patterns, and disrupts the migration corridor of many species through the South China Sea, including tuna. Sand plumes from dredging can also kill coral reefs by blocking sunlight or burying them.

The dredging process involved in building these artificial islands has environmental consequences.

Aside from creating manmade islands, Vietnam and China have also increased commercial fishing to strengthen territorial claims. China has expanded its fishing practices in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in order to bolster historical claims to the territories, going so far as to pay fishermen to maintain presence in its Spratly outposts. The use of fishing vessels as political pawns has led to conflicts such as the sinking of the Vietnamese fishing boat earlier this year and the arrests of several Chinese fishermen for illegal fishing in Vietnam in 2001.

Overfishing in the South China Sea has caused fish stocks to decline by an estimated 70-95 percent since the 1950s. Despite overfishing problems, the artificial islands have provided an opportunity to expand fishing in the region into waters that were previously too difficult to access. Additionally, the dredging process used to build these islands is harming fish larvae populations along the coral reefs. The combination of increased commercial fishing in the South China Sea and the endangerment of fish larvae from dredging is putting the South China Sea's fish stocks at great risk.

Fossil Fuels as Threat Multipliers

The presence of oil and gas reserves in the region has exacerbated the environmental and political consequences of the conflict. In July, Vietnam canceled an offshore oil and gas exploration project after ongoing pressure from China. This pressure is seen as part of a larger effort by China to block non-Chinese oil and gas development in the South China Sea-estimated to be worth $2.5 trillion.

Oil and gas resources in the region also increase the potential for environmental harm. Ecosystems in the South China Sea, already polluted by military activity and shipping, will be put at risk as the region's oil and gas reserves are exploited. Increased shipping activity and potential oil and gas leaks also heighten the risk of pollution.

While China and Vietnam may have conflicting claims over island territories in the South China Sea, they also have a shared interest in sustaining the availability of natural resources in the region. However, with the pace of environmental degradation from the conflict, there will not be much left for either country unless they can find a way to cooperate.
Ryan McNamara is a Sources: Asian Times, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Georgetown Environmental Law Review, Lawfare, Nikkei Asia, The Straits Times, United Nations, Yale Environment 360 Photo Credit: Pair of Oriental butterflyfish in the coral reef with a scuba diver, Spratly Islands, South China Sea. Courtesy of Shutterstock.com, All Rights Reserved. current undergraduate student at Duke University, studying Economics, Environmental Science, and Chinese. He is a former Fellow with the Economic Policy Team at Friends of the Earth U.S.

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The Environmental Collateral Damage of the South China Sea Conflict

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Tensions in the South China Sea increased last April when a Chinese coast guard ship sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands-a fiercely disputed territory in the South China Sea. [...]

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Here's why so many nations want to control the South China Sea — and what China wants to do

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Barbie tiptoes into geopolitical drama with tiny detail resulting in Vietnam ban | Newshub

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2rhjcF7Tvg

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World Reactions to Mahsa Amini’s Death in Iran - 24th September 2022

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Last month, during a conference on China's maritime ambitions, I was asked a question I often get about Beijing's artificial island bases in the South China Sea. That question goes something like this: Couldn't the United States easily neutralize these remote outposts in a conflict, negating their value? The assumption is understandable given how seemingly remote the facilities are and how accustomed Americans have become to uncontested dominance over the sea and air. But it is flawed. In fact, China, not the United States, would control the sea and airspace of the South China Sea at the outbreak of hostilities thanks to its artificial island bases. And given current American force posture in the region, it would be prohibitively costly for the United States to neutralize those outposts during the early stages of a conflict. That would make the South China Sea a no-man's land for most U.S. forces (submarines excepted) during the critical early stages of any conflict - giving the islands considerable military value for Beijing.

This answer provoked enough of a stir among conference attendees that I took to Twitter to see what fellow South China Sea watchers and security experts thought. Their responses were overwhelmingly consistent with my argument and added several concerns for the United States that I had overlooked. This confirmed a worrying disconnect. Most of those who follow the South China Sea most closely see China's artificial island bases as major gamechangers in any future Sino-U.S. conflict. Yet the conventional wisdom throughout Washington still seems to be that they can be safely dismissed as lacking strategic value. That's wrong.

The main purpose of China's artificial islands is not to help fight a war against the United States. Beijing's primary strategy in the South China Sea is to use civilian and paramilitary pressure to coerce its Southeast Asian neighbors into abandoning their rights. Thanks to the facilities on its island bases, hundreds of militia vessels and a large number of coast guard ships are based hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast for months at a time. They engage in frequent harassment of civilian and law enforcement activities by neighboring states, making it prohibitively risky for Southeast Asian players to operate in the South China Sea. The threat of Chinese naval and airpower, meanwhile, dissuades neighboring states from using more forceful military responses against these illegal actions. Left unchallenged, this primarily nonmilitary strategy will secure Chinese control over the waters and airspace of the South China Sea in peacetime and undermine America's role as a regional security provider. It will make clear to Southeast Asian partners that a security relationship with the United States cannot safeguard their interests in the face of a rising China and will thereby undercut the rationale for governments like the Philippines and Singapore to support the U.S. military presence in the region.

But China also recognizes that its strategy might fail. It could miscalculate, provoking a violent conflict with the United States. Or a fight could start in Northeast Asia and spread south. The People's Liberation Army has therefore invested in facilities and deployments in the Spratly Islands that not only support its current peacetime coercion but also favorably shift the balance of power in any future conflict. As a result, the islands not only guarantee China air and surface dominance in the South China Sea in the opening stages of a conflict, but they are also far more difficult to neutralize than conventional wisdom suggests. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS has exhaustively documented the growth of these capabilities using commercial satellite imagery and other remote sensing tools.

China has constructed 72 fighter jet hangars at its three airbases in the Spratlys - Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs - along with another 16 on Woody Island in the Paracels. It has so far held off on deploying combat aircraft to the Spratlys but rotates J-11 fighters frequently through Woody. Assuming it was the first mover in a conflict, it would be able to deploy combat aircraft rapidly to the airfields in the Spratlys, instantly establishing air dominance in the theater. Unless the Chinese happened to pick a fight when U.S. forces were engaged in a major exercise like Balikatan in the Philippines, the closest U.S. ground-based combat aircraft would be in Okinawa and Guam, approximately 1,300 and 1,500 nautical miles away, respectively. The only U.S. military planes in the region would be patrol aircraft in the Philippines and potentially Malaysia.

China has, meanwhile, deployed YJ-12B and YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles to its outposts in the Spratlys and Paracels, backed by longer-range missile capabilities from the mainland. And it has invested heavily in radar and signals intelligence capabilities on all the islands, making it a safe bet that it sees just about anything moving on or above the South China Sea. A U.S. Navy vessel sailing in those waters would be well within the range of Chinese fire when hostilities broke out. Lacking supporting ground-based fire or air cover, the only rational option would be to pull back to the Sulu and Celebes Seas, and probably beyond, as quickly as possible. This would be especially true of any U.S. aircraft carrier that happened to be in the theater, since it would be far too valuable to leave in such an indefensible position.

In the face of these Chinese advantages, could the United States still neutralize the island bases early in a fight? Probably, but not at an acceptable cost. Doing so would require expending a lot of ordnance likely desperately needed in Northeast Asia, diverting important air and naval platforms and placing them at risk out of proportion to the potential battlefield gains.

The island facilities are considerably larger than many observers seem to realize. As Thomas Shugart, then a visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, once pointed out, most of the District of Columbia inside the I-495 beltway could fit inside the lagoon at Mischief Reef. Pearl Harbor Naval Base could fit inside Subi Reef. The critical infrastructure that would need to be hit to seriously degrade Chinese capabilities is spread out across a considerable area. That amounts to a lot of ordnance to drop, even if the goal were just to hit critical nodes like sensors, hangars, ammunition depots, and command and control facilities.

Disabling the airstrips themselves would be an even taller order. The United States fired 59 Tomahawks at the Shayrat Air Base in Syria in 2017, all but one of which hit, yet the runway was back in operation just a few hours later. Considering that China has deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and constructed point defenses at all these bases, some percentage of missiles fired would never reach their target. And much of the infrastructure has been hardened, including China's missile shelters, larger hangars, and buried ammunition depots. The most effective means of cratering the runways themselves would be to drop heavier ordnance from the air, but that would put high-value U.S. bombers at unacceptable risk in a secondary theater (more on that below). So a safer bet would be to just focus on hitting key information nodes with longer-range munitions. A hundred cruise missiles per outpost would not be an unreasonable estimate to effectively disable the bases. That amounts to 300 missiles just for the major bases in the Spratlys, another 100 for Woody Island, and dozens more if the United States wanted to disable smaller facilities (for instance, the heliport on Duncan Island that would likely be used for anti-submarine warfare operations).

What platforms would launch these hundreds of cruise missiles? The only thing safely operating in the theater after hostilities started would be U.S. submarines. They would find it a lot harder to remain undetected in the face of active Chinese anti-submarine operations once they started shooting. Every launch would put them at some risk. And in that environment, U.S. subs would likely be busy attacking Chinese surface ships and other high-value platforms, not trying to blanket thousands of acres of infrastructure at Mischief or Subi Reefs with valuable ordnance with no guarantee of success. Anything else sent into the theater - long-range bombers from Guam, surface ships, etc. - would be operating at high risk given Chinese dominance of the sea and air space.

No matter how the ordnance was delivered, the math would be the same. Effectively neutralizing China's bases would require hundreds of missiles, emptying the magazines of valuable U.S. platforms that don't have ordnance to spare. And it would do so in what is sure to be a secondary theater. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which the United States would be seriously considering kinetic strikes on Chinese bases in the South China Sea that would not also involve fighting in Northeast Asia. That would mean that anything the United States launched against the Spratlys would be something it could not use for operations in defense of U.S. and Japanese forces or for the relief of Taipei.

This punishing math could be changed, especially by the full implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement to allow rotational deployments of key U.S. capabilities in the Philippines. These should include combat aircraft at Basa Air Base on Luzon and Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa to contest Chinese air dominance over the South China Sea. And it should include preparations to rapidly stand up U.S. fire bases at these and other facilities in case of hostilities to hold Chinese outposts and ships in the South China Sea at risk.

Barring an unexpected change of heart, these plans are unlikely while Rodrigo Duterte remains president of the Philippines through 2022. In the meantime, the United States can lay the groundwork for full implementation of the defense cooperation agreement by undertaking more ambitious infrastructure projects at agreed-upon sites and pushing the Armed Forces of the Philippines to support those upgrades. It should also push for more opportunities to deploy combat aircraft to defense cooperation sites as part of bilateral exercises, as American F-16s were for the first time at Basa last year. This would help acclimate both sides to U.S. fighters operating from these bases and, if frequent enough, could strengthen deterrence by giving the United States some rapid-response capability in the South China Sea. But these steps will not fundamentally alter the math.

Without the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or some undiscovered (and unlikely) stand-in, U.S. forces would have little choice but to concede the waters and airspace of the South China Sea to China in the opening stages of a conflict. The logistics and maintenance hurdles China would face during wartime would likely prevent its island bases from effectively operating over the long-term. But for several weeks at least - time that would be critical in a Taiwan contingency, for instance - they would pay huge dividends for Beijing. So long as the United States lacks ground-based combat aircraft and fire bases along the South China Sea, American planning needs to acknowledge that reality.
Gregory B. Poling is director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and a fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Image: Wiki Commons

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The Conventional Wisdom on China's Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong - War on the Rocks

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Last month, during a conference on China's maritime ambitions, I was asked a question I often get about Beijing's artificial island bases in the South China Sea. That question goes something like this: Couldn't the United States easily neutralize these remote outposts in a conflict, negating their value?

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The History of Taiwan: From Ancient Origins to Modern Times

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The Spratly Islands ( Tagalog: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan; Mandarin Chinese: 南沙群島/南沙群岛; pinyin: Nánshā Qúndǎo ; Malay, Indonesian: Kepulauan Spratly; Vietnamese: Quần đảo Trường Sa) are a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. Composed of islands, islets, cays, and more than 100 reefs, sometimes grouped in submerged old atolls, the archipelago lies off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, and southern Vietnam. Named after the 19th-century British whaling captain Richard Spratly who sighted Spratly Island in 1843, the islands contain less than 2 km ² (490 acres) of naturally occurring land area, which is spread over an area of more than 425,000 km ² (164,000 sq mi).

The Spratly Islands are one of the major archipelagos in the South China Sea which complicate governance and economics in this part of Southeast Asia due to their location in strategic shipping lanes. The islands are largely uninhabited, but offer rich fishing grounds and may contain significant oil and natural gas reserves, and as such are important to the claimants in their attempts to establish international boundaries. Some of the islands have civilian settlements, but of the approximately 45 islands, cays, reefs and shoals that are occupied, all contain structures that are occupied by military forces from Malaysia, Taiwan (ROC), China (PRC), the Philippines or Vietnam. Additionally, Brunei has claimed an exclusive economic zone in the southeastern part of the Spratly Islands, which includes the uninhabited Louisa Reef.

Geographic and economic overview

The Spratly Islands

In 1939, the Spratly Islands were coral islets mostly inhabited by seabirds. Despite the Spratly Islands naturally consisting of 19 islands (see below), according to a Chinese 1986 source, the Spratly Islands consist of 14 islands or islets, 6 banks, 113 submerged reefs, 35 underwater banks and 21 underwater shoals.

The northeast part of the Spratly Islands is known as Dangerous Ground and is characterised by many low islands, sunken reefs, and degraded, sunken atolls with coral often rising abruptly from ocean depths greater than 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) - all of which makes the area dangerous for navigation.

The islands are all of similar nature; they are cays (or keys): sand islands formed on old degraded and submerged coral reefs.

Natural resources include fish, guano, oil and natural gas. Economic activity has included commercial fishing, shipping, guano mining, oil and gas exploitation, and more recently, tourism. The Spratly Islands are located near several primary shipping lanes.

The islands and cays, listed in descending order of naturally occurring area, are:

The total area of the archipelago's naturally occurring islands is 177 ha (440 acres) and 200 ha (490 acres) with reclaimed land.

A geographic map of Spratly Islands[a]

The Spratly Islands consist of islands, reefs, banks and shoals made up of biogenic carbonate. These accumulations of biogenic carbonate lie upon the higher crests of major submarine ridges that are uplifted fault blocks known by geologists as horsts. These horsts are part of a series of half-grabens and rotated fault-blocks which lie parallel and en echelon. The long axes of the horsts, rotated fault blocks and half- grabens form well-defined linear trends that lie parallel to magnetic anomalies exhibited by the oceanic crust of the adjacent South China Sea. The horsts, rotated fault blocks, and the rock forming the bottoms of associated grabens consist of stretched and subsided continental crust that is composed of Triassic, Jurassic, and Cretaceous strata that include calc-alkalic extrusive igneous rocks, intermediate to acid intrusive igneous rocks, sandstones, siltstones, dark-green claystones, and metamorphic rocks that include biotite- muscovite- feldspar- quartz migmatites and garnet- mica schists.

The dismemberment and subsidence of continental crust into horsts, rotated fault blocks and half-grabens that underlie the Spratly Islands and surrounding sea bottom occurred in two distinct periods. They occurred as the result of the tectonic stretching of continental crust along underlying deeply rooted detachment faults. During the Late Cretaceous and Early Oligocene, the earliest period of tectonic stretching of continental crust and formation of horsts, half-grabens, and rotated fault-blocks occurred in association with the rifting and later sea-floor spreading that created the South China Sea. During the Late Oligocene-Early Miocene additional stretching and block faulting of continental crust occurred within the Spratly Islands and adjacent Dangerous Ground. During and after this period of tectonic activity, corals and other marine life colonised the crests of the horsts and other ridges that lay in shallow water. The remains of these organisms accumulated over time as biogenic carbonates that comprise the current day reefs, shoals and cays of the Spratly Islands. Starting with their formation in Late Cretaceous, fine-grained organic-rich marine sediments accumulated within the numerous submarine half-grabens that underlie sea bottom within the Dangerous Ground region.

In some cays in the Spratly Islands, the sand and pebble sediments form the beaches and spits around the island. Under the influence of the dominant wind direction, which changes seasonally, these sediments move around the island to change the shape and size of the island. For example, Spratly Island is larger during the northeast monsoon (about 700 × 300 meters), and smaller during the southwest monsoon (approximately 650 × 320 meters).

Some islands may contain fresh groundwater fed by rain. Groundwater levels fluctuate during the day with the rhythm of the tides.

Phosphates from bird faeces ( guano) are mainly concentrated in the beach rocks by the way of exchange- endosmosis. The principal minerals bearing phosphate are podolite, lewistonite and dehonite.

Coral reefs

Coral reefs are the predominant structures of these islands; the Spratly group contains over 600 coral reefs in total. In April 2015 the New York Times reported that China were using "scores of dredgers" to convert Fiery Cross Reef and several other reefs into military facilities.

Vegetation

Little vegetation grows on these islands, which are subject to intense monsoons. Larger islands are capable of supporting tropical forest, scrub forest, coastal scrub and grasses. It is difficult to determine which species have been introduced or cultivated by humans. Taiping Island (Itu Aba) was reportedly covered with shrubs, coconut, and mangroves in 1938; pineapple was also cultivated there when it was profitable. Other accounts mention papaya, banana, palm, and even white peach trees growing on one island. A few islands that have been developed as small tourist resorts had soil and trees brought in and planted where there was none.

A total of 2,927 marine species have been recorded in the Spratly Sea, including 776 benthic species, 382 species of hard coral, 524 species of marine fish, 262 species of algae and sea grass, 35 species of seabirds, and 20 species of marine mammals and sea turtles. Terrestrial vegetation in the islands includes 103 species of vascular plants of magnolia branches ( Magnoliophyta) of 39 families and 79 genera. The islands that do have vegetation provide important habitats for many seabirds and sea turtles. Both the green turtle ( Chelonia mydas, endangered) and the hawksbill turtle ( Eretmochelys imbricata, critically endangered) formerly occurred in numbers sufficient to support commercial exploitation. These species reportedly continue to nest even on islands inhabited by military personnel (such as Pratas) to some extent, though it is believed that their numbers have declined.

Seabirds use the islands as resting, breeding, and wintering sites. Species found here include streaked shearwater ( Calonectris leucomelas), brown booby ( Sula leucogaster), red-footed booby ( S. sula), great crested tern ( Sterna bergii), and white tern ( Gygis alba). Little information is available regarding the current status of the islands' seabird populations, though it is likely that birds may divert nesting sites to smaller, less disturbed islands. Bird eggs cover the majority of Southwest Cay, a small island in the eastern Danger Zone. A variety of cetaceans such as dolphins, orcas, pilot whales, and sperm whales are also present around the islands.

Ecological hazards

Political instability, tourism and the increasing industrialisation of neighbouring countries has led to serious disruption of native flora and fauna, over-exploitation of natural resources, and environmental pollution. Disruption of nesting areas by human activity and/or by introduced animals, such as dogs, has reduced the number of turtles nesting on the islands. Sea turtles are also slaughtered for food on a significant scale. The sea turtle is a symbol of longevity in Chinese culture and at times the military personnel are given orders to protect the turtles.

Heavy commercial fishing in the region incurs other problems. Although it has been outlawed, fishing methods continue to include the use of bottom trawlers fitted with chain rollers. In 1994 a routine patrol by Taiwan's marine navy confiscated more than 200 kg of potassium cyanide solution from fishermen who had been using it for cyanide fishing. These activities have a devastating impact on local marine organisms and coral reefs.

Some interest has been taken in regard to conservation of these island ecosystems. J.W. McManus, professor of marine biology and ecology at the University of Miami's Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science, has explored the possibilities of designating portions of the Spratly Islands as a marine park. One region of the Spratly Archipelago, named Truong Sa, was proposed by Vietnam's Ministry of Science, Technology, and the Environment (MOSTE) as a future protected area. The site, with an area of 160 km ² (62 sq mi), is currently managed by the Khánh Hòa Provincial People's Committee of Vietnam.

Military groups in the Spratly Islands have engaged in environmentally damaging activities such as shooting turtles and seabirds, raiding nests and fishing with explosives. The collection of rare medicinal plants, collecting of wood, and hunting for the wildlife trade are common threats to the biodiversity of the entire region, including these islands. Coral habitats are threatened by pollution, over-exploitation of fish and invertebrates, and the use of explosives and poisons as fishing techniques.

The average price of sand imported by Singapore was US$3 per tonne from 1995 to 2001, but the price increased to US$190 per tonne from 2003 to 2005. Although the Philippines and China had both ratified the UNCLOS III, in the case of and Johnson South Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, the PRC dredged sand for free in the EEZ the Philippines had claimed from 1978 arguing this is the "waters of China's Nansha Islands".

Although the consequences of substrate mining are hidden, they are tremendous. Aggregate particles that are too fine to be used are rejected by dredging boats, releasing vast dust plumes and changing water turbidity.

John McManus, a professor of marine biology and ecology at the Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science, said: "The worst thing anyone can do to a coral reef is to bury it under tons of sand and gravel ... There are global security concerns associated with the damage. It is likely broad enough to reduce fish stocks in the world's most fish-dependent region." He explained that the reason "the world has heard little about the damage inflicted by the Peoples [] Republic of China to the reefs is that the experts can't get to them" and noted "I have colleagues from the Philippines, Taiwan, PRC, Vietnam and Malaysia who have worked in the Spratly area. Most would not be able to get near the artificial islands except possibly some from PRC, and those would not be able to release their findings."

The Velarde map shows actual Philippine control over Scarborough Shoal, as well as islands off of Palawan, identified as the Spratly Islands. The map was one of the key evidences in the Philippines v. China international case that debunked China's so-called nine-dash line claims.[36]

The Spratlys labeled as "Los Bajos de Paragua" off the coast of Palawan (Paragua) on the 1734 Murillo Velarde map. Some shoals in the Spratlys were then considered part of Palawan in the Philippines v. China arbitration case.

Records show the islands as inhabited at various times in history by Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen. In 1888 the Central Borneo Company were granted a lease to work guano 'on Sprattly island and Amboyna Cay' During the Second World War troops from French Indochina and Japan were in occupation. However, there is no record of large settlements on the islands until 1956, when Filipino adventurer Tomás Cloma, Sr., decided to "claim" a part of Spratly islands as his own, naming it the " Free Territory of Freedomland".

Evidence of human presence in the region extends back nearly 50,000 years at Tabon Caves on Palawan. Therefore, it is difficult to say when humans first came upon this island group. Within historical times, several groups may have passed through or occupied the islands. Between 600 BC to 3 BC there was an east to west migration by members of the seafaring Sa Huỳnh culture. This may have led them through the Spratly Islands on their way to Vietnam. These migrants were the forebears of the Cham people, an Austronesian-speaking people that founded the Old Champa empire that ruled what was known for centuries as the Champa Sea.

Early records and cartography

Mao Kun map, Spratly Islands is suggested to be the islands at the bottom right (石星石塘; shíxīng shítáng ).[44] Others however believe the islands may refer to the Paracel Islands or Macclesfield Bank.[45][46]

In the Song Dynasty work by Zhao Rugua, the name "Thousand Li Stretch of Sands" ( Qianli Changsha, ) and the "Ten-Thousand Li of Stone Pools/Beds" ( Wanli Shitang , or Wanli Shichuang ) were given, interpreted by some to refer to Paracel and Spratly respectively. Wanli Shitang is also recorded in the History of Yuan to have been explored by the Chinese during the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty and may have been considered by them to have been within their national boundaries. However, the Yuan also ruled over Korea, Outer Mongolia, and parts of modern Russia. They are also referenced, sometimes with different names, in the Ming dynasty. For example, in the Mao Kun map dating from Zheng He's voyage of the early 15th century, Shixing Shitang () is taken by some to mean Spratly, however different authors interpret the identities of these islands differently. Another Ming text, Haiyu (海語, On the Sea), uses Wanli Changsha () for Spratly and noted that it is located southeast of Wanli Shitang (Paracels). When the Ming Dynasty collapsed, the Qing dynasty continued to include the territory in maps compiled in 1724, 1755, 1767, 1810, and 1817, but did not officially claim jurisdiction over these islands.

An 1801 Cary Map of the East Indies and Southeast Asia, with isles similar to those in the Mao Kun map. The isles are not the Paracels or Spratly Islands, but are instead identified as "Pulo Taya" and "Amphitrite".

An 1838 Unified Dai Nam map marking Trường Sa and Hoàng Sa, which are considered as Spratly and Paracel Islands by some Vietnamese scholars; yet they share different latitude, location, shape and distance. The Paracel claim may have been correctly identified, however, the "Spratly" claim on the map may instead be islands nearer to Vietnamese shores[which? ], instead of the actual Spratly Islands.

A Vietnamese map from 1834 also combines the Spratly and Paracel Islands into one region known as "Vạn Lý Trường Sa", a feature commonly incorporated into maps of the era (萬里長沙) ‒ that is, the same as the aforementioned Chinese island name Wanli Changsha. According to Hanoi, Vietnamese maps record Bãi Cát Vàng ( Golden Sandbanks, referring to both the Spratly and Paracel Islands), which lay near the coast of the central Vietnam, as early as 1838. In Phủ Biên Tạp Lục ( The Frontier Chronicles) by scholar Lê Quý Đôn, both Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa were defined as belonging to the Quảng Ngãi District. He described it as where sea products and shipwrecked cargoes were available to be collected. Vietnamese text written in the 17th century referenced government-sponsored economic activities during the Lê dynasty, 200 years earlier. The Vietnamese government conducted several geographical surveys of the islands in the 18th century.

A striking large black and white British chart of the sea in northern Borneo, first issued in 1881 and corrected to 1935.

Despite the fact that China and Vietnam both made a claim to these territories simultaneously, at the time, neither side was aware that its neighbour had already charted and made claims to the same stretch of islands.

An early European map, A correct chart of the China Seas of 1758 by William Herbert, left the Spratly Islands region (known then as the Dangerous Ground) as largely blank, indicating that region has yet to be properly surveyed, although some islands and shoals at its western edge were marked (one appears at the same place as Thitu Island). A number of maps of the South China Sea were later produced, but the first map that gives a reasonably accurate delineation of the Spratly Islands region (titled [South] China Sea, Sheet 1) was only published in 1821 by the hydrographer of the East India Company James Horsburgh after a survey by Captain Daniel Ross. A later 1859 edition of the map named the Spratly Island as Storm Island. The islands were sporadically visited throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries by mariners from different European powers (including Richard Spratly, after whom the island group derives its most recognisable English name, who visited the group in the 1840s in his whaler Cyrus). However, these nations showed little interest in the islands. In 1883, German boats surveyed the Spratly and the Paracel Islands but eventually withdrew the survey, after receiving protests from the Guangdong government representing the Qing dynasty. China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands.

In the 1950s, a group of individuals claimed sovereignty over the islands in the name of Morton F. Meads, supposedly an American descendant of a British naval captain who gave his name to Meads Island (Itu Aba) in the 1870s. In an affidavit made in 1971, the group claimed to represent the Kingdom of Humanity/ Republic of Morac-Songhrati-Meads, which they asserted was in turn the successor entity for a supposed Kingdom of Humanity established between the two world wars on Meads Island, allegedly by the son of the British captain. This claim to this would-be micronation fell dormant after 1972, when several members of the group drowned in a typhoon.

Military conflicts and diplomatic dialogues

The following are political divisions for the Spratly Islands claimed by various area nations (in alphabetical order):

Conflicts in the 19th century

Chinese scholars and officials often try to claim that the 1887 Sino-French Tonkin Boundary convention signed between France and China after the Sino-French War recognised the sovereignty of China over of the Spratly and Paracel islands. However, it is very clear that the Convention never mention a single word about Spratly and Paracel islands, nor South China Sea. Professor Zou Keyuan, after examining carefully the text of the Convention, concluded that there was no mention of the Gulf of Tonkin and only part of the Gulf close to the land was shown on the attached map. Thus the representatives from both parties had no authorisation and/or intention to delimit the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. A similar argument can be made with respect to a determination of sovereignty of the South China Sea islands. Chinese and French negotiators clearly did not have the authorisation or the intent to make such a determination in 1887. France had already expressed the similar view in a diplomatic note dated back to October 10, 1937:

The provisions of the 1887 Treaty... had no other object but to fix the maritime frontier between China and Tonkin in the region of Monkai, attaching to China some territories and islands situated east of the mouth of the River Monkai and which were formerly under Annam. To simplify matters, the 105°43' Paris meridian was chosen as the demarcation line. However, the text of the agreement clearly shows that the clause at issue specifically refers to the Monkai region. To seek to apply it to the Paracels, which are situated almost 300 nautical miles south‐east, would amount to saying that everything east of the 105°43' meridian belongs to China. China could therefore lay claim to most of the coastal islands of Indochina, Poulo Condor among them! The absurd consequences of such an argument clearly show that only local scope and significance should be given to the clause in the 1887 Convention.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also try to claim that a 1883 incident involving a German ship conducting surveys in the South China Sea without China's consent was protested with Berlin and the Germans terminated the survey. Western scholars have determined, however, that this incident is not based on verifiable references and is inconsistent with other Chinese inaction during the same time period given that, in 1885, the German Admiralty published a two‐sheet chart entitled Die Paracel‐Inseln (The Paracel Islands). The chart documented the work of a German expedition to the Paracels between 1881 and 1884.

Conflicts in the 20th century until 1945

China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands. The Qing dynasty's successor state, the Republic of China, claimed the Spratly and Paracel islands under the jurisdiction of Hainan.

In 1933, France asserted its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands[citation needed ] on behalf of its then-colony French Indochina. It occupied a number of the Spratly Islands, including Taiping Island, built weather stations on two of the islands, and administered them as part of French Indochina. This occupation was protested by the Republic of China (ROC) government because France admitted finding Chinese fishermen there when French warships visited nine of the islands. In 1935, the ROC government also announced a sovereignty claim on the Spratly Islands. Japan occupied some of the islands in 1939 during World War II, and it used the islands as a submarine base for the occupation of Southeast Asia. During the Japanese occupation, these islands were called Shinnan Shoto (), literally the New Southern Islands, and together with the Paracel Islands (), they were put under the governance of the Japanese colonial authority in Taiwan.

Japan occupied the Paracels and the Spratly Islands from February 1939 to August 1945. Japan annexed the Spratly Islands via Taiwan's jurisdiction and the Paracels via Hainan's jurisdiction. Parts of the Paracels and Spratly Islands were again controlled by Republic of China after the 1945 surrender of Japan, since the Allied powers assigned the Republic of China to receive Japanese surrenders in that area, however no successor was named to the islands.

Conflicts in the 20th century after World War II

China's (now ROC and PRC) nine-dash line claim over the South China Sea, 1947

In November 1946, the ROC sent naval ships to take control of the islands after the surrender of Japan. It had chosen the largest and perhaps the only inhabitable island, Taiping Island, as its base, and it renamed the island under the name of the naval vessel as Taiping. Also following the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II, the ROC re-claimed the entirety of the Spratly Islands (including Taiping Island) after accepting the Japanese surrender of the islands based on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. The Republic of China then garrisoned Itu Aba (Taiping) island in 1946 and posted Chinese flags. The aim of the Republic of China was to block the French claims. The Republic of China drew up the map showing the U-shaped claim on the entire South China Sea, showing the Spratly and Paracels in Chinese territory, in 1947. Japan had renounced all claims to the islands in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty together with the Paracels, Pratas and other islands captured from the Chinese, and upon these declarations, the government of the Republic of China reasserted its claim to the islands. The Chinese Kuomintang force withdrew from most of the Spratly and Paracel Islands after they retreated to Taiwan from the opposing Chinese Communist Party due to their losses in the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Taiwan quietly withdrew troops from Taiping Island in 1950, but then reinstated them in 1956 in response to Tomás Cloma's sudden claim to the island as part of Freedomland. As of 2013, Taiping Island is administered by Taiwan.

After pulling out its garrison in 1950 when the Republic of China evacuated to Taiwan, when the Filipino Tomas Cloma uprooted an ROC flag on Itu Aba laid claim to the Spratly Islands and, Taiwan again regarrisoned Itu Aba in 1956. In 1946, the Americans allegedly reminded the Philippines at its independence that the Spratly Islands were not Philippine territory, both to not anger Chiang Kai-shek in China and because the Spratly Islands were not part of the Philippines per the 1898 treaty Spain signed with the United States. However, no document was found to that effect. The Philippines then claimed the Spratly Islands in 1971 under President Marcos, after Taiwanese troops attacked and shot at a Philippine fishing boat on Itu Aba.

Taiwan's garrison from 1946 to 1950 and 1956-now on Itu Aba represents an "effective occupation" of the Spratly Islands. China established a coastal defence system against Japanese pirates or smugglers.

Territorial monument of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) on Southwest Cay, Spratly Islands, defining the cay as part of Vietnamese territory (Phước Tuy Province). Used from 22 August 1956 until 1975, when replaced by another one from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (successor state after the Fall of Saigon)

In 1958, China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters that encompassed the Spratly Islands. North Vietnam's prime minister, Phạm Văn Đồng, sent a formal note to Zhou Enlai, stating that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) respected the Chinese decision regarding the 12 nmi (22 km; 14 mi) limit of territorial waters. While accepting the 12-nmi principal with respect to territorial waters, the letter did not actually address the issue of defining actual territorial boundaries. North Vietnam recognised China's claims on the Paracels and Spratly Islands during the Vietnam War as it was being supported by China. Only after winning the war and conquering South Vietnam did North Vietnam retract its recognition and admitted it recognised them as part of China to receive aid from China in fighting the Americans.

In 1987, China installed a small military structure on Fiery Cross Reef under the pretext of building an oceanic observation station and installing a tide gauge for the Global Sea Level Observing System.[verification needed ] After a deadly skirmish with the Vietnamese Navy, China installed some military structures on more reefs in the vicinity of the Philippines and Vietnamese occupied islands and this led to escalating tensions between these countries and China over the status and ownership of reefs.

Under President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan stated that "legally, historically, geographically, or in reality", all of the South China Sea and Spratly islands were Taiwan's territory and under Taiwanese sovereignty, and denounced actions undertaken there by Malaysia and the Philippines, in a statement on 13 July 1999 released by the foreign ministry of Taiwan. Taiwan and China's claims "mirror" each other; during international talks involving the Spratly islands, China and Taiwan have cooperated with each other since both have the same claims.

It was unclear whether France continued its claim to the islands after World War II, since none of the islands, other than Taiping Island, was habitable. The South Vietnamese government took over the Trường Sa administration after the defeat of the French at the end of the First Indochina War. "The French bestowed its titles, rights, and claims over the two island chains to the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) in accordance with the Geneva Accords", said Nguyen Hong Thao, Associate Professor at Faculty of Law, Vietnam National University.

In 1999, a Philippine navy ship (Number 57 - BRP Sierra Madre) was purposely run aground near Second Thomas Shoal to enable establishment of an outpost. As of 2014 it had not been removed, and Filipino marines have been stationed aboard since the grounding.

Conflicts in the 21st century

Taiwan and mainland China are largely strategically aligned on the Spratly islands issue, since they both claim exactly the same area, so Taiwan's control of Itu Aba (Taiping) island is viewed as an extension of China's claim. Taiwan and China both claim the entire island chain, while all the other claimants only claim portions of them. China has proposed co-operation with Taiwan against all the other countries claiming the islands. Taiwanese lawmakers have demanded that Taiwan fortify Itu Aba (Taiping) island with weapons to defend against the Vietnamese, and both China and Taiwanese NGOs have pressured Taiwan to expand Taiwan's military capabilities on the island, which played a role in Taiwan expanding the island's runway in 2012. China has urged Taiwan to co-operate and offered Taiwan a share in oil and gas resources while shutting out all the other rival claimants. Taiwanese lawmakers have complained about repeated Vietnamese aggression and trespassing on Taiwan's Itu Aba (Taiping), and Taiwan has started viewing Vietnam as an enemy over the Spratly Islands, not China. Taiwan's state run oil company CPC Corporation's board director Chiu Yi has called Vietnam as the "greatest threat" to Taiwan. Taiwan's airstrip on Taiping has irritated Vietnam. China views Taiwan's expansion of its military and airstrip on Taiping as benefiting China's position against the other rival claimants from southeast Asian countries. China's claims to the Spratly Islands benefit from legal weight because of Taiwan's presence on Itu Aba, while America on the other hand has regularly ignored Taiwan's claims in the South China Sea and does not include Taiwan in any talks on dispute resolution for the area.

Taiwan performed live fire military exercises on Taiping island in September 2012; reports said that Vietnam was explicitly named by the Taiwanese military as the "imaginary enemy" in the drill. Vietnam protested against the exercises as violation of its territory and "voiced anger", demanding that Taiwan stop the drill. Among the inspectors of the live fire drill were Taiwanese national legislators, adding to the tensions.

In May 2011, Chinese patrol boats attacked two Vietnamese oil exploration ships near the Spratly Islands. Also in May 2011, Chinese naval vessels opened fire on Vietnamese fishing vessels operating off East London Reef (Da Dong). The three Chinese military vessels were numbered 989, 27 and 28, and they showed up with a small group of Chinese fishing vessels. Another Vietnamese fishing vessel was fired on near Fiery Cross Reef (Chu Thap). The Chief Commander of Border Guards in Phú Yên Province, Vietnam, reported that a total of four Vietnamese vessels were fired upon by Chinese naval vessels.[failed verification ] These incidents involving Chinese forces sparked mass protests in Vietnam, especially in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, and in various Vietnamese communities in the West (namely in the US state of California and in Paris) over attacks on Vietnamese citizens and the intrusion into what Vietnam claimed was part of its territory.

In June 2011, the Philippines began officially referring to parts of the South China Sea as the " West Philippine Sea" and the Reed Bank as "Recto Bank".

In 2010, it was reported that the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad believed Malaysia could profit from China's economic growth through co-operation with China, and said that China "was not a threat to anyone and was not worried about aggression from China", as well accusing the United States of provoking China and trying to turn China's neighbours against China. Malaysian authorities displayed no concern over China conducting a military exercise at James Shoal in March 2013, with its Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein suggested they might work with China and saying that Malaysia had no problem with China patrolling the South China Sea, and telling ASEAN, America, and Japan that "Just because you have enemies, doesn't mean your enemies are my enemies". However, until present Malaysia still maintained a balance relations with the countries involved in this dispute. But since China has started encroaching its territorial waters, Malaysia has become active in condemning China.

The editorial of the Taiwanese news website Want China Times accused America of being behind the May 2014 flareup in the South China Sea, saying that Vietnam rammed a Chinese vessel on 2 May over an oil rig drilling platform and the Philippines detained 11 Chinese fishermens occurred because of Obama's visit to the region and that they were incited by America "behind the scenes". Want China Times claimed America ordered Vietnam on 7 May to complain about the drilling platform, and noted that a joint military exercise was happening at this time between the Philippines and America, and also noted that the American New York Times newspaper supported Vietnam.

In a series of news stories on 16 April 2015, it was revealed, through photos taken by Airbus, that China had been building an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef, one of the southern islands. The 10,000-foot-long (3,048 m) runway covers a significant portion of the island, and is viewed as a possible strategic threat to other countries with claims to the islands, such as Vietnam and the Philippines.

Champa historically had a large presence in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese broke Champa's power in an invasion of Champa in 1471, and then finally conquered the last remnants of the Cham people in an invasion in 1832. A Cham named Katip Suma who received Islamic education in Kelantan declared a Jihad against the Vietnamese, and fighting continued until the Vietnamese crushed the remnants of the resistance in 1835. The Cham organisation Front de Libération du Champa was part of the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, which waged war against the Vietnamese for independence in the Vietnam War along with the Montagnard and Khmer Krom minorities. The last remaining FULRO insurgents surrendered to the United Nations in 1992.

The Vietnamese government fears that evidence of Champa's influence over the disputed area in the South China Sea would bring attention to human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 and 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought into the dispute, since the Vietnamese conquered the Hindu and Muslim Cham people in a war in 1832.

Various incidents of fishing boats being harassed by Chinese warships have occurred. At least 2 vessels were rammed or sunk. One was a Vietnamese ship attacked by a Chinese coastguard vessel, and another was a Fillipino ship rammed and sunk by a Chinese fishing boat who let the Fillipino fishermen drift at sea without giving aid. The stranded fishermen were later rescued by a Vietnamese ship.

2016 arbitration

In January 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) across a range of issues, including the latter's historic rights claims over parts or all of the Spratly Islands inside the nine-dash line. A tribunal of arbitrators constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS appointed the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as registry to the proceedings.

On 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines on most of its submissions. While it would not "rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and would not delimit any maritime boundary between the Parties", it concluded that China had not historically exercised exclusive control within the nine-dash line, hence has "no legal basis" to claim "historic rights" to resources. It also concluded that China's historic rights claims over the maritime areas (as opposed to land masses and territorial waters) inside the nine-dash line would have no lawful effect outside of what is entitled to under UNCLOS. It criticized China's land reclamation projects and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, saying that they had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment". Finally, it characterized Taiping Island and other features of the Spratly Islands as "rocks" under UNCLOS, and therefore are not entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. The award was ruled as final and non-appealable by either country. China rejected the ruling, calling it "ill-founded". Taiwan, which currently administers Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, also rejected the ruling. Eight governments have publicly called for the ruling to be respected, 35 have issued generally positive statements without calling for parties to abide by it, and eight have publicly rejected it. The eight governments in support were Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, United Kingdom, and the United States; the eight in opposition were China, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, and Vanuatu. The United Nations itself does not have a position on the legal and procedural merits of the case or on the disputed claims, and the Secretary-General expressed his hope that the continued consultations on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China under the framework of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will lead to increased mutual understanding among all the parties.

Transportation and communication

Telecommunications

In 2005, a cellular phone base station was erected by the Philippines' Smart Communications on Pag-asa Island.

References

Further reading

Bonnet, François-Xavier (2012) Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal, Irasec, 14.

Bouchat, Clarence J. (2013) Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 258-261. ISBN 9788498922578.

Dzurek, Daniel J. and Clive H.Schofield. (1996) The Spratly Islands dispute: who's on first?. IBRU. ISBN 978-1-897643-23-5

Hogan, C. Michael (2011) "South China Sea", Encyclopedia of Earth, National Council for Science and the Environment, Washington, D.C..

Menon, Rajan (11 September 2012) "Worry about Asia, Not Europe", The National Interest, Issue: Sept-Oct 2012.

External links

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The Spratly Islands ( Tagalog: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan; Mandarin Chinese: 南沙群島/南沙群岛; pinyin: Nánshā Qúndǎo ; Malay, Indonesian: Kepulauan Spratly; Vietnamese: Quần đảo Trường Sa) are a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. Composed of islands, islets, cays, and more than 100 reefs, sometimes grouped in submerged old atolls, the archipelago lies off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, and southern Vietnam.

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The Conflict in the South China Sea: A Focus on a Possible Solution | Beyond the Horizon ISSG

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Over the last 10 years, the conflict in the South China Sea has been constantly in the spotlight. As China builds islands in the middle of the South China Sea, once underwater reefs have become sandy islands with airfields, roads, buildings, and bases for missile systems. In less than two years, China has turned seven reefs into seven military bases, making the South China Sea one of the most contentious areas of sea in the world (Damn, 2020).

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China has sent warships, including an aircraft carrier, into the seas around Taiwan.

Beijing's latest show of military force followed a meeting on Wednesday in California between Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen and US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy.

China sees self-ruled Taiwan as a breakaway province that will eventually be under Beijing's control.

But Taiwan sees itself as distinct from the Chinese mainland, with its own constitution and democratically-elected leaders.

Where is Taiwan?

Taiwan is an island, roughly 100 miles from the coast of south-east China.

It sits in the so-called "first island chain", which includes a list of US-friendly territories that are crucial to US foreign policy.

But China insists that its intentions are purely peaceful.

Historical sources suggest that the island first came under full Chinese control in the 17th Century when the Qing dynasty began administering it. Then, in 1895, they gave up the island to Japan after losing the first Sino Japanese war.

China took the island again in 1945 after Japan lost World War Two.

But a civil war erupted in mainland China between nationalist government forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong's Communist Party.

The communists won in 1949 and took control in Beijing.

Chiang Kai-shek and what was left of the nationalist party - known as the Kuomintang - fled to Taiwan, where they ruled for the next several decades.

China points to this history to say that Taiwan was originally a Chinese province. But the Taiwanese point to the same history to argue that they were never part of the modern Chinese state that was first formed after the revolution in 1911 - or the People's Republic of China that was established under Mao in 1949.

The Kuomintang has been one of Taiwan's most prominent political parties ever since - ruling the island for a significant part of its history.

Currently, only 13 countries (plus the Vatican) recognise Taiwan as a sovereign country.

China exerts considerable diplomatic pressure on other countries not to recognise Taiwan, or to do anything which implies recognition.

Can Taiwan defend itself?

China could attempt to bring about "reunification" by non-military means such as strengthening economic ties.

But in any military confrontation, China's armed forces would dwarf those of Taiwan.

China spends more than any country except the US on defence and could draw on a huge range of capabilities, from naval power to missile technology, aircraft and cyber attacks.

Much of China's military power is focused elsewhere but, in overall terms of active duty personnel for example, there is a huge imbalance between the two sides.

That help could come from the US which sells arms to Taiwan.

Until now, Washington's policy of "strategic ambiguity" has meant the US has been deliberately unclear about whether or how it would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack.

Diplomatically, the US currently sticks to the "One-China" policy, which recognises only one Chinese government - in Beijing - and has formal ties with China rather than Taiwan.

But in May last year, US President Joe Biden appeared to harden Washington's position.

Asked whether the US would defend Taiwan militarily, Mr Biden replied: "Yes."

The White House insisted that Washington had not changed its position.

Is the situation getting worse?

Relations between Taiwan and China deteriorated sharply following a visit to the island by the then US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, in August 2022.

Beijing condemned Ms Pelosi's visit as "extremely dangerous".

China launched a series of military exercises, including the firing of ballistic missiles, focused on six danger zones around Taiwan, three of which overlapped the island's territorial waters.

Taiwan said the move, which forced ships and planes to find routes around those areas, violated its sovereignty and amounted to a blockade.

Tensions between China and Taiwan had already been increasing.

In 2021, China appeared to ramp up pressure by sending military aircraft into Taiwan's Air Defence Zone, a self-declared area where foreign aircraft are identified, monitored, and controlled in the interests of national security.

The numbers of aircraft reported peaked in October 2021 at 56 incursions in a single day, with Taiwan's defence minister saying relations were the worst they had been for 40 years.

Since then there have been 22 days with more than 20 incursions reported.

Taiwan made data on plane incursions public in 2020.

China's coastguard claims it has the legal authority to stop and inspect shipping in the area around Taiwan.

On Wednesday, it said "on-site inspections" on some vessels would commence.

Taiwan has objected to the move and has instructed Taiwanese vessels not to co-operate with attempts to board and inspect them.

Taiwan's economy is hugely important.

Much of the world's everyday electronic equipment - from phones to laptops, watches and games consoles - is powered by computer chips made in Taiwan.

TSMC is a so-called "foundry" - a company which makes chips designed by consumer and military customers. It is a vast industry, worth almost $100bn (£73bn) in 2021.

A Chinese takeover in Taiwan could give Beijing some control over one of the world's most important industries.

Are the Taiwanese people worried?

Despite the recent tensions between China and Taiwan, research suggests that many Taiwanese people are relatively untroubled.

Almost two thirds (64.3%) replied that they did not.

Separate research indicates that most people in Taiwan identify as Taiwanese - embracing a distinctly different identity.

This article was amended in July 2022 to provide more historical background about Taiwan's status.

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Tension between China and Taiwan has risen and what happens next matters to us all.

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China Tracker | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative

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AMTI's Island Tracker, featuring high-resolution satellite imagery and information on China's 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and 7 outposts in the Spratly Islands.

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Map of various national outposts in the Spratly Islands in 2008

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve conflicting island and maritime claims in the region by several sovereign states, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The disputes involve the islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and various boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. The waters near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which some regard as geographically part of the South China Sea, are disputed as well. Maritime disputes also extend beyond the South China Sea, as in the case of the Senkaku Islands and the Socotra Rock, which lie in the East China Sea.

An estimated US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the South China Sea annually, which accounts for a third of the global maritime trade. 80 percent of China's energy imports and 39.5 percent of China's total trade passes through the South China Sea. Claimant states are interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing stocks, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping lanes. Maritime security is also an issue, as the ongoing disputes present challenges for shipping.

In 1932, France formally claimed both the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China and Japan both protested. On 6 April 1933, France occupied the Spratlys, announced their annexation, and formally included them in French Indochina.

In 1947, the Republic of China, the government of then China, announced the majority of the South China Sea was its territory. In 1949, the incoming government of China, which overthrew the Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War, announced that it had inherited this claim.

In 2013, the PRC began island building in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands region. According to Reuters, island building in the South China Sea primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines has been going on for decades on a small scale; while China has come late to the island building game, its efforts have been on an unprecedented scale as it had from 2014 to 2016 constructed more new island surface than all other nations have constructed throughout history and as of 2016 placed military equipment on one of its artificial islands unlike the other claimants. A 2019 article in Voice of America which compared China and Vietnam's island building campaign in the South China Sea similarly reported the reason why Vietnam in contradistinction to China has been subject to little international criticism and even support was because of the slower speed and widely perceived defensive nature of its island-building project.

China's actions in the South China Sea have been described as part of its " salami slicing"/" cabbage wrapping" strategies, and since 2015 the United States and other states such as France and the United Kingdom have conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) in the region. In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims in Philippines v. China. The tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries. Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants. In January 2022, the United States Department of State called China's claims in the South China Sea "unlawful."

The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and islands. There are several disputes, each of which involves a different collection of countries:

1. The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of China (1912-1949), later the People's Republic of China (PRC), which covers most of the South China Sea and overlaps with the exclusive economic zone claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

2. Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

3. Maritime boundary north of Borneo between the PRC, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan.

4. Islands, reefs, banks and shoals in the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands, Pratas Island and the Vereker Banks, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts of the area also contested by Malaysia and the Philippines.

5. Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands between the PRC, Indonesia, Taiwan and Vietnam.

6. Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

7. Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah, including Ambalat, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

8. Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

A document kept in the French archive dated April 10, 1768 titled "Note sur l'Asedemandés pas M. de la bonde à M. d'Etaing" said that at that time the Vietnamese navy was patrolling. regular patrol between the coast of Vietnam and the Hoang Sa archipelago. Admirald'Estaing described the Vietnamese defenses as having many cannons, most of them bearing the Portuguese insignia, dated 1661, and smaller guns bearing the insignia of Cambodia and the inscription "British" India company" (Brifishcompany of India). These small cannons were collected in the Paracels. There are also authors Le Poivre (1740), J Chaigneau (1816-1819), Taberd (1833), Gutzlagip (1840)... also asserted that Hoang Sa belongs to Vietnam's sovereignty. Even Chinese authors have written books before saying that the Paracels and Spratlys belong to Vietnam. Monk Thich Dai San, in his 1696 book, Overseas, confirmed that the Nguyen lords annually let boats exploit products from shipwrecks in the Van Ly Truong Sa area (i.e. Hoang Sa of Vietnam). The Chinese document "The Fall of the South Sea and the islands of historical records" edited by Han Chan Hoa, page 115 of the first chapter, also records traces on Vinh Hung Island (Phu Lam) in the Paracels where there is a temple called the temple. is Hoang Sa. (Hoang Sa itself was built by King Minh Mang of the Nguyen Dynasty). In 1932, France formally claimed both the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China and Japan both protested. On 6 April 1933, France occupied the Spratlys, announced their annexation, formally included them in French Indochina, and built a couple of weather stations on them.

South-east facing aerial view of PRC-settled Woody Island. The island is also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.

By May 1939, the Japanese had laid claim and occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands. During World War II, the Empire of Japan used the islands in the South China Sea for various military purposes and asserted that the islands were not claimed by anyone when the Imperial Japanese Navy took control of them. Historical accounts note that at least France had controlled some of the features in the region during the 1930s. In August 1951, Zhou Enlai, then the PRC's Foreign Minister, responding to the draft of the Treaty of San Francisco, outlined Beijing's position on the South China Sea as follows:

In fact, the 1904 Qing Dynasty map clearly states that the southernmost point of China is Hainan Island, so historically China has never owned the South China Sea as well as the two archipelagos of Paracels and Spratlys. From this we infer that China's nine-dash line is a violation of international law. And later maps have all been added by the Chinese government to the nine-dash line for the purpose of propaganda and distorting history. Meanwhile, the map of Vietnam from 1460-1497 onward included these two archipelagos, and even the Chinese state at that time recognized it. In the eighteenth century in the "Dai Nam Nhat Thong Toan Do" it was clearly stated that Hoang Sa and Truong Sa belonged to Vietnam.

Chinese claims in the South China sea are delineated in part by the nine-dash line. This was originally an "eleven-dashed-line," first indicated by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its claims to the South China Sea. When the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine dashes/dots, as endorsed by Zhou Enlai. China's 1958 declaration described China's claims in the South China Sea islands based on the nine-dotted line map. The legacy of the nine-dash line is viewed by some PRC government officials, and by the PRC military.

The Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the First Indochina War, gave South Vietnam control of the Vietnamese territories south of the 17th Parallel, which included the islands in the Paracels and Spratlys.

In 1974, when a North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War began to seem probable, the PRC used military force in the Paracel Islands and took Yagong Island and the Crescent group of reefs from South Vietnam. The government of the PRC wanted to prevent the Paracel islands from falling under the control of North Vietnam, which at the time was an ally of the Soviet Union. After not resisting during the initial Vietnamese attack, the PRC launched what they regarded as a "counterattack in self-defense". The United States, in the middle of détente with the PRC, gave a non-involvement promise to the PRC, which enabled the People's Liberation Army Navy to take control of the South Vietnamese islands.

In 1988, the PRC and Vietnam fought each other near the Johnson Reef. The PRC had obtained a permit from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission to build five observation posts for the conduction of ocean surveys, and one of the permitted observation posts was allowed to be located in the Spratly islands region. The PRC chose to built its observation post on the Fiery Cross Reef, which was isolated from the other islands in the region and was not occupied by any state at the time. When it started to build the observation post in the terra nullius Fiery Cross Reef, Vietnam sent its navy to the area to monitor the situation. The two states clashed near the Johnson Reef, and after the clash, China occupied the Johnson Reef.

Fiery Cross Reef being transformed by the PRC in May 2015

In 1994, the PRC occupied Mischief Reef, located some 250 miles from the Philippine coast. Occupation was made in the middle of an energy resources race in the Spratlys, where China lacked a presence while the other countries were starting their oil exploration businesses. Mischief Reef marked the first time when the PRC had a military confrontation with the Philippines, an ally of the United States.

The occupation and/or control of most parts of the Spratly and Paracel islands has not changed significantly from the 90s through to the 2000s. The PRC controls all of the features in the Paracels. In the Spratlys, Vietnam controls most features with 29 in total, while the Philippines has control of eight features, Malaysia with 5, the PRC with 5, and the ROC with 1.

Since 2011 however, tensions started to increase again in the territory. In February, Chinese frigate Donguan fired three shots at Philippine fishing boats near Jackson atoll. In May, the Vietnamese Binh Minh 02 oil and gas survey ship clashed with three Chinese maritime patrol vessels some 600 km south of China's Hainan island.

2012 marked the increased militarization of the islands. The ROC started the construction of an antenna tower and runway on the Taiping island in February, allowing the island to accommodate various military aircraft. On the Vietnam occupied Sand Cay and West Reef islands, upgrades and land reclamation projects were also started at this time. In April, the PRC took the Scarborough Shoal as a response to the Philippine navy's actions of stopping Chinese fishing boats in the area.

In September 2018, a South Korean navy destroyer traveled into what China saw as its territorial waters. A South Korean government official said the navy destroyer was taking refuge from a typhoon and not challenging maritime claims, but he declined to comment on whether Seoul believed the disputed waters belonged to China. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman said the ship broke Chinese law by entering its 12-nautical-mile-wide territorial sea around the Paracel Islands without seeking prior permission, but said Beijing accepted South Korea's explanation.

On 22 December 2020, the PRC claimed that the guided missile destroyer John S McCain had been "expelled" after it "trespassed" into Chinese territorial waters close to the Spratly Islands. However this claim has been disputed by the US Navy.

In March 2021, 220 Chinese fishing boats were seen moored around Whitsun Reef in the Spratly Islands, a reef claimed by the Philippines as part of its exclusive economic zone. Philippines Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana accused China of "provocative action of militarizing the area".

The agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries". Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime", although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains unresolved. "Following the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China and ASEAN countries actively advanced the consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea," with the forecast that the COC will be completed by 2021.

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship was entering PRC waters. A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."

"As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have told us and we have conveyed this to the Chinese." The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times.

In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea was "an area of 'core interest' that is as non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda. However, Beijing appeared to have backed away from that assertion in 2011.

In October 2011, the PRC's Global Times tabloid editorialised on the South China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced incidents earlier that year involving the Philippines and South Korea detaining PRC fishing boats in the region. "If these countries don't want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved." Responding to questions about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."

In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as saying that the Chinese government appeared to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.

From 2013 to the beginning of 2018, China carried out land reclamation in the South China Sea. The construction of the islands has been completed. The three island airports of Meiji Reef, Zhubi Reef, and Yongshu Reef have been completed.

In August 2019, China's paramount leader Xi Jinping told Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte that China would not recognise or abide by the Arbitration decision. China rejects the arbitration proceedings as illegitimate because China excluded itself from compulsory arbitration in its ratification of the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS). Xi made his comments during a visit by Duterte to Beijing, with discussions between the two leaders. This stance by Beijing is in line with the July 2019 publishing of a Chinese White Paper, "China's National Defense in the New Era," which details China's armed strength and repeatedly mentions deployment in the South China Sea. On 22 September 2020, in a recorded speech at the opening of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, the Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte reaffirmed the Hague ruling rejecting most of China's claims to disputed waters, and said "The award is now part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond the reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish, or abandon."

The area is said to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly varied. The Chinese Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion barrels of crude oil, compared to the oil rich country of Kuwait which has 13 billion barrels. In the years following the announcement by the PRC ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified. However, other sources claim that the proven reserves of oil in the South China Sea may only be 7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion barrels. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South China Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to a PRC figure of 125 billion barrels. The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".

The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.

Competing claims in the oil and gas-rich South China Sea have stifled the development and exploitation of these resources. To break from this, the Philippines and China agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development in November 2018, where joint-use of, and not ownership over assets underlies the agreement. In the past, aggressive Chinese naval patrols deterred Manila from exploring gas deposits in disputed waters, like the Reed Bank, such that this type of agreement may allow for the claimant states to jointly develop the natural gas in the offshore area. The mechanism of joint agreements is not new, with Malaysia and Vietnam having forged a similar mechanism in 1992, while Malaysia and Thailand reached understandings in 1979 and 1990 over the development of gas-rich disputed waters.

The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount. In 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well. However, the PRC's complaints halted the exploration. On 27 March 1984, the first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea. These oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South China Sea. By 2012 Vietnam had concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies. In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil fields. Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased Vietnam's proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the country is a net importer of oil products. In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of Vietnamese government income, down from 24 percent in 2004.

In 2017, after Chinese pressure, the Vietnamese government ordered Spain's Repsol to stop drilling in the disputed area. A joint-venture of Japanese Inpex and Petrovietnam plans to start drilling in the disputed area in 2021.

China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (). The major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and affiliates (6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%). It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320 kilometres (200 mi) southeast of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people. On 2 May 2014 the platform was moved near to the Paracel Islands, a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims. Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters surrounding the Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.

Prior to the territorial disputes, fishermen from involved countries tended to enter each other's controlled islands and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leading to conflicts with the authorities that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact borders. As well, due to depletion of the fishing resources in their maritime areas, they were forced to fish in the neighbouring countries' areas.

In 2006 the captain of a Taiwanese fishing boat was shot dead and a crewman wounded when their boat was reportedly attacked by pirates wearing military uniforms. Philippine authorities assured the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs that no Filipino naval or coast guard personnel were involved in the incident.

A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the coast guard of the Philippines in May 2013.

In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam clashed again over China's Haiyang Shiyou oil rig in Vietnam's EEZ. The incident left seventeen Vietnamese injured and damaged ships of both countries.

Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodo became President of the country in 2014, he instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign fishermen were caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be destroyed. The president wanted to make maritime resources, especially fisheries, a key component of his administration's economic policy. Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from many neighbouring countries were destroyed by Indonesian authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41 fishing vessels from China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed. On 19 March 2016, the China Coast Guard prevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian authorities after Chinese fishermen were caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, leading to a protest by Indonesian authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently summonsed as China had considered the areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds". Further Indonesian campaigns against foreign fishermen resulted in the destruction of 23 fishing boats from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April 2016.

Out of the 556 ships Indonesia had destroyed from October 2014 to 2019 for violating rules, 312 of them were from Vietnam, 91 were from the Philippines, 87 were from Malaysia, 26 were local, and 3 were from China. The areas in the South China Sea had also become known for Indonesian pirates, with frequent attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as well as leading to hijacking such as the MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing war against foreign fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by Vietnam in late 2016, when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities. Attacks have also come from Filipino and Moro pirates arriving from the Sulu Sea; a Vietnamese fisherman was killed by Filipino pirates in late 2015.

In 2017, two Vietnamese fishermen died from gunshot wounds from a pursuing Philippine Navy patrol boat about 40 miles off the city of Bolinao, Pangasinan. A police report said that the boats had collided after the navy had fired warning shots; the Philippine government Philippine government said on Monday that it had promised Vietnam a "fair and thorough" investigation.

Teodoro Locsin Jr., the Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs, said the Philippines was building a maritime fleet that could swarm areas in the South China Sea. He said the fleet build up was because of China which was also doing the same thing. He also said if one of the vessels got hit, the Filipino defense treaty with the United States would also be activated.

The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues surrounding the Asia-Pacific region. The South China Sea territorial disputes has dominated proceedings at the conference in recent years. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.

In February 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama initiated the US-ASEAN Summit at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California for closer engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its joint statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and for international law". Analysts believe it indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.

The vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claims based on legal and historical evidence are invalid.

Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji said in a journal article that when it came to China's advance in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, the assumption amongst many Japanese people that the territory of the Philippines was being invaded was incorrect. He pointed out that the Spratly islands were not part of the Philippines, when the US acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898. It has been argued that the U.S. acquired prior Spanish claim to the islands by the 1900 Treaty of Washington. However, when the Japanese-ruled Taiwan itself had annexed the Spratly islands in 1938, the US -ruled Philippines did not challenge the move and never asserted that it was their territory. He also pointed out that other countries did not need to do full land reclamation since they already control islands, and that the reason China engaged in extensive land reclamation is because they needed it to build airfields since China only has control over reefs.

According to China analyst Isaac B. Kardon in China's Law of the Sea: The New Rules of Maritime Order, the Chinese government sees itself as fundamentally above the law and beyond accountability to others, especially smaller states.

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an internationally agreed arbitration tribunal sitting in the Hague and constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ruled comprehensively against the People's Republic of China's South China Sea maritime claims in Philippines v. China. This tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries.

In response to the ruling, Graham Allison stated, "None of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have ever accepted any international court's ruling when (in their view) it infringed their sovereignty or national security interests. Thus, when China rejects the Court's decision in this case, it will be doing just what the other great powers have repeatedly done for decades."

Ships of the Malaysian, Singapore, British, Australian and New Zealand Navy in the South China Sea during Exercise Bersama Lima, 2018

On 25 July 2020 Australia rejected China's claims to the South China Sea and filed a statement with the United Nations that said: "Australia rejects any claims to internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf based on such baselines," and there is "no legal basis" to draw the nine-dash line around the Four Sha archipelagos, Paracel and Spratly Islands or low-tide maritime zones. They encourage the claimants to resolve their disputes peacefully.

Cambodia has backed China over the dispute in ASEAN meetings, preventing consensus over unified ASEAN action. Anti-Vietnamese sentiment due to Vietnam's conquest of previously Cambodian lands, giving the Vietnamese a privileged status and encouragement of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia during French colonial rule, and the occupation of Cambodia after the ousting of the Khmer Rouge has led to anti-Vietnamese feelings against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and against Vietnam, and in turn has led to pro-China sentiment among the Cambodian government and the Cambodian opposition, including in the South China Sea.

India says that the South China Sea was "part of global commons and India has an abiding interest in peace and stability in the region... We firmly stand for the freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded lawful commerce in these international waterways, in accordance with international law, notably UNCLOS." This was seen as largely backing the US position.

Indonesian Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon flying over what appeared to be a Chinese Navy Type 903 replenishment ship on the disputed region off the coast of Natuna Islands, Riau Islands

Since early in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia has repeatedly asserted its position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute, and often positioned itself as an "honest broker". However, parts of China's unilaterally claimed nine-dash line overlap Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands. Although China has acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna islands, the PRC has argued that the waters around the Natuna islands are Chinese "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesia quickly dismissed China's claim, asserting that China's nine-dash line claim over parts of the Natuna islands has no legal basis. In November 2015, Indonesia's security chief Luhut Pandjaitan said Indonesia could take China before an international court. Indonesia filed a comment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding China's claim in the case of Philippines v. China.

Chinese fishing vessels - often escorted by Chinese coastguard ships - have repeatedly been reported to have breached Indonesian waters near the Natuna islands. On 19 March 2016, for example, Indonesian authorities tried to capture a Chinese trawler accused of illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, and arrested the Chinese crew. They were prevented from towing the boat to harbour by a Chinese coast guard vessel which reportedly "rammed" the trawler in Indonesian waters. "To prevent anything else occurring, the Indonesian authorities let go of the Chinese boat and then left toward Natuna, still with eight fishermen and the captain on board," said Arrmanatha Nasir, a spokesman for Indonesia's Foreign Ministry. Indonesia still has the Chinese crew in custody. On 21 March 2016, minister for fisheries and maritime affairs Susi Pudjiastuti summoned the Chinese ambassador, Xie Feng, and discussed this matter. Indonesia insists that they have the right to prosecute the Chinese trawler crew, despite Beijing's demand to release their eight fishermen. Arif Havas Oegroseno, the government official of maritime security, said that the Chinese claim of "traditional fishing grounds" was not recognised under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This incident prompted security minister Luhut Pandjaitan to deploy more troops and patrol boats, and to strengthen the Ranai naval base in the area.

KRI Sutedi Senoputra 378 (background), KRI Tjiptadi 381 (centre), and KRI Teuku Umar 385 (foreground). These ships are often stationed in the Natuna Regency to protect Indonesian territory and its EEZ.

Indonesia's EEZ extends 200 nautical miles (370 km) from its shores, which around Natuna means it is slightly intersected by China's nine-dash line, defining its widely disputed claim to most of the South China Sea. In 2014-2015, the presence of the TNI on the islands was reinforced, which the Indonesian government hoped would reduce the chance of any conflict. Then in early 2020, a further 600 troops were deployed and eight navy warships from the Indonesian Navy including Ahmad Yani-class frigates, Bung Tomo-class corvettes, and Kapitan Pattimura-class ASW corvettes were sent to the area with support from the Indonesian Navy Naval Aviation CN-235 MPA, the Indonesian Air Force also sent 4 F-16 and a Boeing 737-2x9 Surveillance, and put BAE Hawk aircraft nearby on alert after Chinese fishing vessels increased illegal activity within the EEZ, escorted by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. A recent visit to the area by President Joko Widodo displayed Indonesia's resolve to not overlook such incursions.

Japan has used "normative power" via strategic foreign aid to certain claimants in the dispute such as the Philippines and Vietnam in order to assert its presence in the region as promoting the " rule of law at sea."

Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and has offered to play a neutral role in being a constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant states. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said during his official visit to the US that he hoped all countries will respect international law and the outcome of arbitration. The spokesperson of China Hua Chunying responded in a press conference said that the award by the Arbitral Tribunal was "illegal" and "invalid", and thus not binding at all. She urged Singapore to respect China's position, stay objective and impartial.

SOUTH CHINA SEA: UP FOR GRABS (INR, 1971)

In 1974, the PRC got a non-involvement promise from the United States when it occupied the Yagong Island and the Crescent Group from South Vietnam. The United States officially addressed the South China Sea dispute for the first time in 1995, when its statement focused on the peaceful resolution of disputes, peace and stability, freedom of navigation, neutrality over the question of sovereignty, and respect of maritime norms. The 1995 statement did not name any states by their names.

The 1995 policy was changed in 2010, when the administration of the President Obama felt that even though the United States cannot take sides in the dispute, it still has to make a statement that it is not passively accepting the assertive actions taken in the region. At the July 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on resolving the disputes in the region without coercion and unequivocally stating that the South China Sea was a matter of U.S. national interest. Her comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," and he warned the United States against making the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.

In 2012, a United States State Department press statement identified the PRC as an assertive state in the region and communicated United States concerns about the developments in the area. Also in 2012, Secretary Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen U.S. ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area. On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes." In July 2012, the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.

In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law for these extensive maritime claims." USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged American support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC. The Chinese Foreign Ministry asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue. In 2014 and 2015, the United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea. Sources closer to the Pentagon have also said that the US administration is planning to deploy some more naval assets within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In response to this announcement, Beijing issued a warning and said that she would not allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of Navigation". In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned China to halt its rapid island-building. On 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operations". This was the first time since 2012 that the US has directly challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit. On 8-9 November 2015, two US B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission undeterred.

The USS Carl Vinson underway in the South China Sea, 2017

President Trump's administration increased the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. In June 2020, US Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft sent a letter to the U.N. secretary general explaining the US position on China's "excessive maritime claims." On 14 July 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared China's claims and coercions of in parts of the South China Sea "completely unlawful". On 26 August 2020, the US sanctioned individuals and 24 Chinese companies linked to construction and militarization of the artificial islands.

Publications by US think tanks have made recommendations for courses of actions that the United States could take in response to PRC activities in the South China Sea.

The US Navy has conducted freedom of navigation drills in the South China Sea to counter Vietnamese claims in the region, particularly around the Côn Đảo islands.

One observer, writing while a visiting visiting assistant professor of international lww at De La Salle University, Philippines, remarked:

While the PRC, ROC and Vietnam claim the entire Spratly archipelago because of what they perceive to be their "historical right" to the area, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines base their respective claims on the stipulations regarding continental shelves outlined in UNCLOS. [...] While some would argue that the historical claims of the PRC, ROC, and Vietnam should be discarded because they do not conform to the stipulations of UNCLOS, this is unrealistic. The notion of historical entitlement sits at the foundation of their claims to the Spratly archipelago and are unlikely to dissipate simply because analysts choose to ignore them. As a result, any proposed framework must address such concerns.

That observer concludes, "UNCLOS must be applied to the Spratly question in a way that accounts for the unique characteristics of the dispute."

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Townsend-Gault, Ian; Miller, Meredith; Schofield, Clive; Storey, Ian; Cook, Tim; Djalal, Hasjim (July 2011). "From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia". NBR Special Report. The National Bureau of Asian Research. 30.

Cook, Tim (17 June 2011). "Rising Tensions in the South China Sea - An interview with Ian Storey". The National Bureau of Asian Research.

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Territorial disputes in the South China Sea - Wikipedia

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Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve conflicting island and maritime claims in the region by several sovereign states, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

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Why Korea Split Into North and South Korea

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The Business - Colombian Traffickers | Drug Wars | FRONTLINE | PBS

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Since the 1970's, Colombia has been home to some of the most violent and sophisticated drug trafficking organizations in the world. What started as a small cocaine smuggling business has, in the last thirty years, blossomed into an enormous multi-national cocaine empire.

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(New York) - Certain extremist armed opposition groups are imposing strict and discriminatory rules on women and girls that have no basis in Syrian law, Human Rights Watch said today. The harsh rules that some groups are administering in areas under their control in northern and northeastern Syria violate women's and girls' human rights and limit their ability to carry out essential daily activities.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 43 refugees from Syria in Iraqi Kurdistan and conducted telephone interviews with two refugees from Syria in Turkey in November and December 2013. The refugees interviewed said that the extremist armed groups Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) have enforced their interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law, by requiring women and girls to wear headscarves ( hijabs) and full-length robes ( abayas), and threatening to punish those who do not comply. In some areas, the groups are imposing discriminatory measures prohibiting women and girls, particularly those who do not abide by the dress code, from moving freely in public, working, and attending school.

"Extremist groups like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are undermining the freedoms that Syria's women and girls enjoyed, which were a longtime strength of Syrian society," said Liesl Gerntholtz, women's rights director at Human Rights Watch. "What kind of victory do these groups promise for women and girls who are watching their rights slip away."

The regulations imposed on women by Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS have a far-reaching impact on women's and girls' daily lives, affecting their ability to obtain education, provide for their families and even procure basic necessities crucial to survival. Some refugees reported abductions of women by these groups, and one refugee said that a widowed neighbor and her three young children died during fighting because a prohibition on leaving her home without a male guardian left her afraid to flee the area.

The refugees from Syria in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey told Human Rights Watch that, between September 2012 and November 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS imposed restrictions on women's and girls' dress and movement in the Sheikh Maksoud neighborhood in the city of Aleppo, the towns of Afrin and Tel Aran in Aleppo governorate, the city of Hassakeh, the town of Ras al-Ayn in Hassakeh governorate, the city of Idlib, and the town of Tel Abyad in Raqqa governorate. These areas include religiously diverse communities of Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, Alawites, Syriac Christians, and Armenian Christians.

Interviewees said that members of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS insisted that women follow a strict dress code that mandated the abaya and hijab and prohibited jeans, close-fitting clothing, and make-up. According to interviewees, members of these groups forbade women from being in public without a male family member in Idlib city, Ras al-Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran. Women and girls who did not abide by the restrictions were threatened with punishment and, in some cases, blocked from using public transportation, accessing education, and buying bread.

Interviewees from Idlib city, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran also said that Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS banned women from working outside the home in these areas.

While interviewees were not always able to distinguish among members of various extremist armed groups with absolute certainty, reports from media sources and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights support the refugees' contentions that Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS have imposed these restrictions. Human Rights Watch cannot confirm whether other extremist armed groups present in the areas mentioned were involved in imposing restrictions.

Syria does not have a state-mandated religion and its constitution protects freedom of religion. While the Syrian penal code and personal status laws, which govern matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, contain provisions that are discriminatory to women and girls, the Syrian constitution guarantees gender equality. Public protests in June 2009 led the government to abandon an effort to introduce more regressive personal status laws. Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that, in the past, women and girls were largely able to participate in public life, including work and school, and exercise freedom of movement, religion, and conscience.

Refugees said that Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS also imposed limitations on male dress and movement in the village of Jindires in Afrin and in Ras al Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran, but all said that greater restrictions were placed on women and girls. Former residents of Tel Abyad and Tel Aran said that the armed groups did not permit males to wear jeans or fitted pants, but that the groups imposed a less specific dress code on males than on females.

Interviewees said that restrictions on movement for men and boys in the village of Jindires in Afrin and in Ras al Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran were part of universal restrictions on movement, such as evening curfews; they said that, in October 2012 in Ras al Ayn and July and August 2013 in Tel Aran, armed extremist groups including Jabhat al-Nusra exerted control by announcing that no one could go out in public after 5 p.m. In no cases were limitations on dress or freedom of movement applied solely to men and boys.

While unjustified restrictions on dress and freedom of movement for anyone violate their rights and should be rescinded, restrictions that apply to and affect women and girls disproportionately are discriminatory.

Commanders of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS should immediately and publicly rescind all policies that violate women's rights, including mandatory dress codes and limitations on freedom of movement. The groups should cease punishing and threatening women and girls whose dress or behavior does not conform to the strict rules imposed by these groups. They should also halt unlawful interference in women's and girls' rights to privacy, autonomy, and freedom of expression, religion, thought and conscience, enforce adherence to international human rights law, and punish those under their command who restrict women's dress and access to work, education, or public space. Any concerned governments with influence over these groups should also press them to put an end to these discriminatory restrictions on women, Human Rights Watch said.

"Groups like ISIS and al-Nusra claim to be part of a social movement, yet they seem more focused on diminishing freedom for women and girls than providing any social benefit," Gerntholtz said. "As we have seen in situations in Somalia, Mali, and elsewhere, these kinds of restrictions often mark the beginning of a complete breakdown of women's and girls' rights."
Clothing Restrictions
Eleven interviewees told Human Rights Watch that, between September 2012 and October 2013, they saw or heard announcements by Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS at mosques, on pamphlets or posters, or to individuals in Aleppo's Sheikh Maksoud neighborhood, Ras Al Ayn, Tel Abyad and Tel Aran, stating that women must cover themselves from head to foot by wearing the abaya and hijab. In some cases the groups demanded that women wear the niqab, a veil covering all of the face apart from the eyes. The restrictions also forbade women wearing jeans, tight-fitting clothing, skirts or dresses above the ankle and make-up. In some areas, the groups ordered women not to style their hair or visit hair salons.

Basmah (all names have been changed at the request of interviewees), who had been studying at a university in Syria, said that after extremist armed groups gained control of Ras al-Ayn in the fall of 2012, they insisted that women wear the abaya and hijab in public and could not wear jeans or makeup. "We were very afraid," Basmah said. She used the term "ISIS" to refer to all members of armed extremist groups in the area. "If I went anywhere ISIS were and I didn't wear the long dress that they said I should wear, then they would say, 'You should never be here in this dress; you should wear what we want.'" According to media reports, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ghurabah al-Sham took control of Ras al-Ayn from the Syrian government in battles in November 2012. Since January 2013, media and independent monitoring groups have reported ongoing clashes between the armed wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and extremist armed opposition groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, which are fighting for control of the area.

A woman from Tel Abyad and a man from Tel Aran said that in July and August 2013 they saw members of Jabhat al-Nusra compel civilian men to rebuke women who did not comply with the dress code. Media reports indicate that fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS were in the towns at this time. Rashid, 27, from Tel Abyad, said that if women did not abide by the restrictions, fighters whom he and his wife both identified as members of Jabhat al-Nusra would visit the women's homes and threaten their male relatives to make them enforce the rules. "They would say, 'This time we are saying this to you; next time we will take action,'" Rashid said.

Refugees from the Sheikh Maksoud neighborhood of Aleppo city and Ras al-Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran told Human Rights Watch that Jabhat al-Nusra fighters threatened women with punishment if they did not comply with clothing restrictions. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Jabhat al-Nusra took control of Tel Aran in late July and continues to control the town. According to reports from media and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in late November and December, ISIS controlled areas of Tel Abyad, even forcing evictions of Kurdish families, and continued to fight Kurdish armed groups for complete control of the region. As of January 6, however, media reported that attacks on ISIS by other armed opposition groups threatened their position of power in Tel Abyad.
Restrictions on Movement
A total of 14 men and women told Human Rights Watch that Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS imposed restrictions on women's movement in Jindires village in Afrin, Sheikh Maksoud in Aleppo, Idlib city, Ras al Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran. Rihab, 39, from Tel Aran, said women's lives changed dramatically in July 2013 after fighters whom she identified as members of Jabhat al-Nusra announced restrictions on women's movement. The group no longer allowed women to appear in public alone and required a male relative to accompany them.

"We could not go visit our friends," she said. "We could not go to the market. Freedom was gone for us [women]. It was like we were in jail. We couldn't even go outside near our house. If we went outside, Jabhat al-Nusra would tell us to go back in our houses." Rihab said that when fighters in her neighborhood would not permit her to leave her house to visit her family in a different village, she obeyed. "I was too afraid," she said.

Refugees from Idlib city, Tel Abyad, and Ras al-Ayn, said that armed groups prohibited women from appearing in public unaccompanied by a male relative. They also said that Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS banned women from driving in Tel Abyad and Idlib city. Mohammed, 57, said that fighters whom he identified as members of Jabhat al-Nusra forbade bus drivers in the Sheikh Maksoud area of Aleppo from accepting female passengers who were not wearing the hijab.

Faiza, 24, and Rihab, 39, both from Tel Aran, said that in July and early August Jabhat al-Nusra fighters took up a position in the bakery and barred them from purchasing bread for their families during Ramadan. "If any woman went in, they would tell us, 'Go back,' and, 'You should not bring bread; you are a woman,'" Faiza said.

Refugees from Tel Abyad and Tel Aran said that, between September 2012 and July 2013, female-headed households in these towns were trapped without access to work or supplies or had to take extreme measures to support themselves, such as traveling to far-away villages where extremist armed groups were not present to shop for food and necessities, despite ongoing clashes in the area. Hana, 19, from Tel Abyad, said that Jabhat al-Nusra threatened her female neighbors if they violated the dress code when going out to get supplies while their husbands or male family members were away working.

Faiza said that her widowed neighbor became stranded with her children, ages 3, 4, and 6, when Jabhat al-Nusra fighters in Tel Aran prohibited women from leaving their homes without a male guardian. As clashes intensified in July 2013, many townspeople retreated to a large open space away from the town center. "We asked her, 'Why don't you leave with us?'" Faiza said. "And she replied, 'I don't have any relatives or support. I will stay in my house with my children. I can't go with you.'" The widow and her children died when a shell hit their home. "All of our houses were destroyed," Faiza said. "Their bodies were trapped under the rubble for four days before anyone could take them out."

Refugees from Sheikh Maksoud in Aleppo, Ras al Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran told Human Rights Watch that most women comply with the restrictions due to fear of punishment or repercussions for themselves or family members. Inhibiting rules and the resulting climate of fear has contributed to families' decisions to flee Syria for neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan, they said. Members of six families told Human Rights Watch that they decided to leave specifically due to the presence of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, fearing the consequences of defying restrictions and the establishment of an even more severely restricted environment.
Restrictions on Employment and Access to Necessities
Refugees from Idlib city, Tel Abyad, and Tel Aran said that Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS banned women from working outside the home. Isma, 25, a former hairdresser in Ras al-Ayn, told Human Rights Watch that in July and August 2013 all of the hair salons, which had mainly employed women, were closed in the neighborhoods controlled by extremist fighters, whom she identified as Jabhat al-Nusra. Media and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that Jabhat al Nusra was fighting for control of Ras al Ayn in July alongside at least six extremist armed splinter groups.

Abda, 20, and her father, Ahmed, said that fighters at checkpoints identified themselves as Jabhat al-Nusra and that the same group announced restrictions on women's employment in Tel Abyad in 2013. "Women could only do work in the home, such as knitting and tailoring," Abda said. "Before, it was normal for women to work outside the home, like as engineers."

Due to limitations on freedom of movement and their ability to work, a woman from Tel Abyad and another from Tel Aran told Human Rights Watch that they became wholly dependent on male family members.
Restrictions on Access to Education
Women and girls also face increasing obstacles to accessing education in areas where Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS are present. Yasmina, 20, from the village of Yabseh near Tel Abyad, said that men she identified as members of Jabhat al-Nusra prevented her and other female students from registering for national university exams. "We saw that Nusra was running the [registration] office," she said. "They refused to talk to me, even though I was wearing a headscarf. I was wearing Western clothes and they said this was not acceptable."

People interviewed said that school attendance by both males and females declined with the increased presence of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS due to fear of armed clashes, but the impact on female students was compounded by the imposed restrictions and a perceived heightened risk to women's and girls' personal safety. Zahra, 20, who was a student in the city of Hassakeh, said that 10 of the 30 female students in her class at the Secondary School of Business stopped attending after Jabhat al-Nusra established a presence in the city in July and August 2013. Hana, the 19-year-old from Tel Abyad, also said that she and her female friends no longer attended class because they were afraid of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters in the area. Reports from media and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights indicate that, in schools in Tweihineh, Saraqeb, and Tariq al-Bab in Idlib governorate, ISIS is requiring girls to abide by strict Islamic dress codes, distributing leaflets promoting Islamic religious classes, and pressuring school authorities to separate the sexes, including prohibiting male teachers from instructing girls.
Abductions and a Climate of Fear for Women and Girls
Women told Human Rights Watch they felt unsafe due to threats of punishment and reports of abductions of women by Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, which created a climate of fear in their communities. Two women told Human Rights Watch that they had been abducted by fighters they believed belonged to Jabhat al-Nusra. Arwa, 22, said that as she was leaving Firat University in Hassakeh by taxi in August 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra fighters abducted her from a checkpoint and held her for several hours. Ghadah, 44, said that an Islamist armed group in Tel Hassel abducted her during a raid on her home in which they killed her husband and nephew. They held her for two days with 10 of her and her relatives' children. The group released her husband's second wife after 16 days. Eight other interviewees told Human Rights Watch that Islamist groups had kidnapped or detained women on the road from Aleppo to Afrin and in Afrin, Aleppo, Ras al Ayn, and Tel Aran.

Six men and women also told Human Rights Watch that Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS made public announcements in Ras al Ayn, Tel Abyad, and Azaz declaring Kurdish women and property "halal" for their fighters. The interviewees universally interpreted this to mean that leaders of these groups were giving their fighters freedom to abduct local women without consequence.
International Standards
Human rights law guarantees the right to freedom of religion, including the right to manifest one's religious beliefs through dress, worship, observance, practice, and teaching in private and in public.Human Rights Watch takes no position on Sharia-inspired norms or cultural dress practices per se, but opposes all laws or policies that impinge on basic rights, including public dress codes mandated by governments or other groups.

The enforcement of a compulsory and restrictive dress code on women and girls in Syria violates their rights to private life, personal autonomy, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion, thought, and conscience. These and restrictions on women's and girls' freedom of movement also constitute a form of gender-based discrimination prohibited under international treaties to which Syria is a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

De facto authorities are responsible for respecting fundamental human rights in areas under their control and holding those who abuse them to account. Human Rights Watch has previously criticized governments and armed groups in Chechnya, Indonesia, Somalia, Mali, and Afghanistan for imposing regulations including mandatory Islamic dress codes and restrictions on women's liberties. Human Rights Watch has also criticized the governments of Germany, France, and Turkey for violating religious freedoms by banning religious symbols in schools and denying Muslim women the right to choose to wear headscarves in schools and universities. Women and girls should be free to decide whether or not to wear religious or traditional dress.

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Syria: Extremists Restricting Women's Rights

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(New York) - Certain extremist armed opposition groups are imposing strict and discriminatory rules on women and girls that have no basis in Syrian law, Human Rights Watch said today. The harsh rules that some groups are administering in areas under their control in northern and northeastern Syria violate women's and girls' human rights and limit their ability to carry out essential daily activities.

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10. Pakistan

There's some debate between the 2021 WPS Index and the 2020 UN Gender Inequality Index as to Pakistan 's place when it comes to women's rights. The latter ranks the country 135th out of 162. It's not a clean bill of health, but also not one of the top ten or even top 25 worst countries for women's rights. But Women, Peace, and Society Index ranks Pakistan country as 167th out of 170, citing:

Low levels of financial inclusion for women (7%)

Just under four years of schooling for women

An employment rate of just over 21% for women

A largely discriminatory set of social norms and legal frameworks, and high incidences of intimate partner violence

Part of the WPS's low ranking for Pakistan is due to the discrepancies between women's rights at the province level. The lowest-ranking provinces in the country performed almost four times as poorly as the highest-ranking provinces. These are disparities that, the WPS says, "national averages conceal." WPS links this to the income and poverty rates within provinces. They also link extreme poverty to gender inequality in Pakistan.

Rubina Baloch vaccinates a group of women and children at a health camp in Sindh Province. (Photo: Ingenius Captures/Concern Worldwide)

9. Central African Republic

Conditions for women have improved somewhat in the Central African Republic, mainly thanks to a decrease in organized violence that improved a sense of community safety in the 2021 WPS Index. This is a drop in the bucket, however. A crisis in the Central African Republic has entered its tenth year in 2022 and has a disproportionate effect on women. According to the WPS:

Women in the CAR generally only have 3 years of schooling

Their representation in local parliament is less than 9%

Organized violence has gone down. Still, one out of every five Central African women still faces violence from an intimate partner.

In addition to the data that forms the heart of the WPS Index, there are other indicators of and barriers to women's rights in CAR. Harmful gender practices like early marriage mean that 61% of married women were in a union before their 18th birthday. Women of reproductive age are also restricted in terms of their sexual and reproductive health and rights. According to UN Women, just over a quarter of Central African women were able to access modern family planning resources in 2019.

Between 50 and 80 pregnant mothers and children attend Concern's mobile clinic in the village of Gbawi, CAR. Held twice a month, the clinic serves just over 3,000 people - around 600 of whom are under the age of five. (Photo: Chris de Bode/Concern Worldwide)

8. Somalia

Somalia ranks twelfth on the 2021 WPS Index. Highlights from their report:

Somalia has greater political representation for women than CAR (23% of the country's Parliament is female)

However, the number of women in the workforce is drastically lower (23% compared to 68%)

In some cases, the indicators to meeting the Sustainable Development Goal of gender equality in the country are incomplete, due in part to Somalia's protracted cycle of crisis. There are worrisome gaps in reporting, including data on women's land ownership rights, harassment and violence against women, and the gender pay gap.

Other indicators that the United Nations reports on do not suggest positive results in these areas. More than a third of Somali women were married before they turned 18. Only 2% of women in the country were able to access safe and modern family planning and birth control resources. This has led to one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world: For every 100,000 live births, 829 Somali women will die.

Fowzia Hassan (pictured on the left in purple) is part of a women's self-help group in Somalia. Since 2018, the women have learned how to survive hardships such as drought. They have weekly meetings to discuss issues raised by members and how to address these challenges. (Photo: Mustafa Saeed / Concern Worldwide)

7. Sierra Leone

Even higher than Somalia's maternal mortality rate is Sierra Leone, where 1,120 women out of every 100,000 will die due to complications from pregnancy or childbirth. This has been a longstanding issue - one that Concern has addressed in part through our project, Innovations for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health (2009-2016). While many in the country are pushing to overturn outdated and outmoded gender norms, crises have interrupted progress, such as the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic leading to an increase in unplanned teen pregnancies.

While Sierra Leone has enjoyed relative peace for the last 20 years, gender-based violence is still a fact of life in many areas. According to the WPS Index:

Only 45.8% of Sierra Leonean women feel safe walking home at night in their communities

Most women also receive fewer than three years of an education.

School-related GBV is also a rule rather than an exception in Sierra Leone. (Concern is currently working to address this through the Safe Learning Model.)

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is common among 90% of women and girls ages 15-49

Concern Worldwide works in the Sierra Leonean capital of Freetown to address health challenges facing urban communities. Especially women and young children. Part of the strategy is to train and support a team of community health workers. Here, they learn to address issues such as malnutrition and maternal mortality. (Photo: Kieran McConville / Concern Worldwide)

6. Sudan

The summer of 2019 brought several advances in women's rights to Sudan, including:

The criminalization of FGM

The repeal of laws restricting women's rights in terms of what they wore, where they could go, and what they could do for work

A target of 40% female representation in the country's transitional parliament

This is a promising advancement for the country, though progress may be delayed given the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, only 22% of parliament was female-led (although this is already a huge step forward).

Abda attends a training session on infant and young child feeding practices led by Concern Sudan. (Photo: Maad Mohammed Salih / Concern Worldwide)

5. Chad

Of the 162 countries ranked on the United Nations' Gender Inequality Index for 2020, Chad ranks 160. Chad passed its Reproductive Health Law 20 years ago, which has led to a significant decrease in practices like FGM. However, child marriage is still common - one report conducted by Concern in 2015 showed that the median age for a first marriage was 16 for girls and 22 for boys. In one focus group for this report, a participant noted: "Early marriage is a custom in our community, but a real danger for the girl: pregnancy, surgery, death, and also several cases of running away."

"Early marriage is a custom in our community, but a real danger for the girl: pregnancy, surgery, death, and also several cases of running away." - Concern Chad focus group participant, 2015

Since that report, we've seen numbers like the percentage of women reporting intimate partner violence drop. However there's still a lot of work to be done:

Women complete less than two years of school in Chad

Women are also chronically underrepresented in Chadian parliament

Chad also has the second-highest maternal mortality rate in the world, with 1,140 deaths for every 100,000 live births

4. Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo ranks 163 out of 170 on the 2021 WPS Index and 150 out of 162 on the UN's 2020 Gender Inequality Index. Progress on gender equality in the DRC has been slow, with inequalities existing across all sectors. Many of these discrepancies exist at the legislative level. The WPS estimates 25% of national laws have some level of bias towards men. This has harsh ripple effects on gender equality in the DRC:

An estimated 51% of women in the DRC will experience violence from an intimate partner in their lifetime

37% have reported so in the last 12 months

37% of Congolese women also were married before their 18th birthday

For every 1,000 girls in the DRC, 124 will become mothers between ages 15 and 19

These numbers are reflected in the education discrepancy between genders: Men are almost twice as likely as women to go beyond primary education in the DRC - 65.8% of men versus 36.7% of women.

Adrenise Lusa, 60, from Manono Territory, DRC. In 2019, she joined Concern's Graduation project and attended several trainings on entrepreneurship and income generation.

3. South Sudan

Harmful gender norms as a result of a patriarchal culture have left women in South Sudan excluded from decision-making and political activity. Women have few decision-making powers within the household. A lack of resource ownership and land rights is at the heart of power imbalances between the genders.

Less than 5% of women are financially included within their communities and society

In 2020, the United Nations did not have enough data to accurately rank South Sudan on its Gender Inequality Index

It did, however report that the country has the highest maternal mortality rate in the world. More than 1% of pregnant South Sudanese woman will die due to complications from pregnancy or childbirth.

The 2021 WPS Index works with a bit more data on South Sudan, enough to rank it 165th out of 170 countries for women's rights and security. A longstanding conflict in the country makes it less safe for women both in their communities and with their domestic partners - one in four South Sudanese women have reported intimate partner violence.

Chagawa* walks with Concern midwife Rebekka at a Mobile Health Clinic in a remote rural area of Aweil, South Sudan. The clinic visits five locations once a week. Chagawa has eight children and is 9 months pregnant with her ninth. She comes to the clinic every time it is here. She had back and stomach pain, and almost miscarried, but she went to the Concern-led clinic."I wasn't worried, I had medical people taking care of me!"

2. Syria

Before war broke out in 2011, gender dynamics in Syria were traditionally patriarchal: Women only gained the right to vote in national elections in the mid-1950s, and, while they were allowed to work, they made up a small percent of the pre-war workforce. Many Syrian women, particularly in the country's then-thriving middle class, opted to stay at home and raise families. Syrians still view marriage as a contract between the husband and the wife's father. It was only in 2020 that the country criminalized honor killings.

The protracted Syrian crisis has exacerbated many of these gender norms, while also introducing many of the gendered complications that come with conflict. One of the reasons Syria ranks so low on the WPS Index owes to ongoing conflict.

75 out of every 100,000 Syrian women are killed in organized violence

Only 16.9% of women feel safe in their own communities

Georgetown University qualifies the number of conflict-related incidences of sexual violence as "massive"

Nearly 25% of Syrian women have reported experiencing violence from an intimate partner

These numbers are even higher for Syrian refugee women. Syria performs slightly better on the UN's Gender Inequality Index, however some of the determining factors - including years of education between men and women - are a bit skewed, as conflict has prevented an entire generation of Syrian girls and boys from having a basic education.

50-year-old Maha* was a primary school teacher in Syria before she fled to Lebanon in 2014. She now lives on her own in a concrete collective center housing ten refugee families. It was originally built to house chickens. She attended a 12-week women's group organized by Concern to discuss their shared experiences. It provided psychosocial support, and helped promote gender equality, reduce gender-based violence, and manage protection issues. "I love to sit with other women in the group and talk together. When we share our problems, I see mine as small." (Photo: Darren Vaughan)

1. Afghanistan

Afghanistan ranks last out of 170 countries on the WPS Index and 157th out of 162 on the UN Gender Inequality Index. More than four decades of conflict and crisis combined with regressive gender norms have left many Afghan women and girls uneducated.

Afghan girls who are allowed to attend school generally don't stay for more than two years

This reflects in financial inclusion for women in the country; which the WPS ranks at just 7.2%

The country also ranks among the highest for gender-based violence. 35 out of every 100 women are exposed to violence at the hands of an intimate partner.

Along with neighboring Pakistan, honor killings are illegal here, but still widely prevalent.

Women's Rights: Your Concern In Action

None of the issues listed in these countries, which rank among the worst for women's rights, can be fixed overnight or through policy change alone. Change and progress towards gender equality happens at the community, family, and even individual level - questioning intrinsic gender norms held by and for both women and men, what it means to be a woman or a man, and how equity can coexist with tradition.

Yet we also see how deep the connections go between gender inequality and issues like poverty, hunger, conflict, and climate change. At Concern, gender transformation is at the heart of all of our programs, whether they're designed to address agricultural challenges, help individuals build small businesses, respond to an acute crisis, or end hunger. As an international team of over 4,000, and with the millions of people we serve each year, critically examine and challenge gender dynamics in order to make greater, more sustainable progress towards ending extreme poverty. Where it makes sense, we also build and strengthen systems to support that level of equality.

These initiatives include mandatory gender training - for men and women - for participants in our Graduation program, a multi-year, multi-million Euro project to develop a safe learning model for schools in Sierra Leone, and advocating at the policy level with local and national representatives to ensure that new policies help to restore gender parity.

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10 of the worst countries for women's rights

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Compiling data from Georgetown University's Women, Peace and Security Index and United Nations' Gender Inequality Index, we look at ten of the worst countries for women's rights where Concern is currently working.

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https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-sinaloa-cartel-rules/

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How the Sinaloa Cartel rules | Brookings

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In a new series, Vanda Felbab-Brown outlines the way Mexico's two largest cartels take over and rule local people, economies, and territories. Here she focuses on the strategies, choices, and approaches to rule of the Sinaloa Cartel.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinaloa_Cartel

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The Sinaloa Cartel (Spanish: Cártel de Sinaloa, CDS, after the native Sinaloa region), also known as the Guzmán-Zambada Organization, the Federation, the Blood Alliance,[4][5][6] or the Pacific Cartel,[7] is a large, international organized crime syndicate based in the city of Culiacán, Sinaloa[8], that specializes in illegal drug trafficking and money laundering. It was established in Mexico during the late 1980s as one of a various number of subordinate “plazas” operating under a predecessor organization known as the Guadalajara Cartel.[9][10][11] It is currently headed by Ismael Zambada García and is based in the city of Culiacán, Sinaloa,[12] with operations in many world regions but primarily in the Mexican states of Sinaloa, Baja California, Durango, Sonora, and Chihuahua.[4][13] and presence in a number of other regions in Latin America as well as in cities across the U.S.[14][15] The United States Intelligence Community generally considers the Sinaloa Cartel to be the largest and most powerful drug trafficking organization in the world, making it perhaps even more influential and capable than Pablo Escobar’s infamous Medellín Cartel of Colombia was during its prime.[16][17] According to the National Drug Intelligence Center and other sources within the U.S. the Sinaloa Cartel is primarily involved in the distribution of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, cannabis and MDMA.[18]

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ismael_%22El_Mayo%22_Zambada

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Ismael Mario Zambada García (born 1 January 1948) is a Mexican suspected drug lord and alleged leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, an international crime syndicate based in Sinaloa, Mexico. Before he assumed leadership of the entire cartel, he allegedly served as the logistical coordinator for its Zambada-García faction, which has overseen the trafficking of cocaine and heroin into Chicago and other US cities by aircraft, narcosubs, container ships, go-fast boats, fishing vessels, buses, rail cars, tractor trailers, and automobiles.

The former farmer turned drug lord began his criminal career by smuggling as little as a few kilograms of drugs at a time; however, it was only to gain a foothold before he went about increasing his gang's production of heroin and marijuana while also solidifying his position as a trafficker. When Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo was arrested in 1989, his organization split into two opposing factions: the Tijuana Cartel whose leadership was inherited by his nephews and heirs, the Arellano Félix brothers; and the Sinaloa Cartel whose leadership fell to former lieutenants Héctor Luis Palma Salazar, Adrián Gómez González, Ismael Zambada García, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, and Joaquín Guzmán Loera ( El Chapo). The Sinaloa Cartel drug lords were active in the states of Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, Sonora, Nuevo León, and Nayarit.

In 2006, the administration of President Felipe Calderón launched an offensive against Mexico's drug trafficking networks. The Arellano Felix Organization ( Tijuana Cartel), the largest and most sophisticated of the Mexican cartels at the time, received the brunt of the blows. Taking advantage of the pressure being placed on the Tijuana Cartel, other drug bosses, most notably Ismael Zambada and Joaquín Guzmán, began to encroach on strongholds in northwestern Mexico, leading to full-scale war.

Zambada has historically worked closely with the Juárez Cartel and the Carrillo Fuentes family, while maintaining independent ties to Colombian cocaine suppliers. Zambada has been wanted by Mexico's attorney general's office since 1998, when it issued bounties totaling $2.8 million USD on him and five other leaders of the Juárez Cartel. He headed the Sinaloa Cartel in partnership with Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, until 2016 when El Chapo was captured. Zambada has now possibly assumed full command of the Sinaloa Cartel. Zambada is likely Mexico's most enduring and powerful drug lord. He may have had plastic surgery and disguised himself to move throughout Mexico.

Zambada García's organization, the Sinaloa Cartel, receives multi-ton quantities of cocaine, mostly by sea from Colombian sources. After receipt of the cocaine, the Sinaloa cartel uses a variety of methods, including airplanes, trucks, cars, boats, and tunnels to transport the cocaine to the United States. Members of the cartel smuggle the cocaine to distribution cells in Arizona, Atlanta, California, Illinois, and New York.

Zambada operates primarily in the States of Sinaloa and Durango, but exerts influence along a large portion of Mexico's Pacific coast, as well as in Cancun, Quintana Roo, Sonora, and Nuevo Leon.

Ismael Zambada has been featured on America's Most Wanted, and the FBI is offering up to US$5 million for information leading to his capture.

On 20 October 2010, some of his relatives were arrested in Mexico City on drug trafficking charges: Ismael's brother, Jesus "The King" Zambada, along with Ismael's son and nephew. His son, Ismael "Mayito" Zambada Jr. has been sought for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in the United States. His other son, Vicente Zambada Niebla, was arrested by the Mexican Army on 18 March 2009.

On 24 June 2020, it was revealed that Zambada had been willing to give former top Mexican drug lords Rafael and Miguel Caro Quintero high ranking positions in the Sinaloa Cartel if they agreed to join. However, the effort to recruit the Caro Quintero brothers faltered as Zambada's health declined and El Chapo's sons, who were less willing to grant them leadership, gained more influence.

His wife Rosario Niebla Cardoza, brother Jesús, sons Jakade Divelo Niebla (alias "El Syphus De Sinaloa"), Serafín Zambada-Ortiz (alias "el Sera", arrested and released), and Ismael Zambada-Imperial (alias "el Mayito gordo", convicted), as well as his four daughters, María Teresa, Midiam Patricia, Mónica del Rosario, and Modesta played an active role in narcotics' distribution and money laundering. His son-in-law, Juan Gabriel González Ibarra, husband of Midiam Patricia, died after suffering an electric shock at his home in Culiacán on 18 June 2014.

Ismael Zambada relies on currency shipments to move drug proceeds across the United States-Mexico border.

In June 2020, former DEA agent Mike Vigil revealed that Zambada was "sick with diabetes."

Bibliography

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Ismael Mario Zambada García (born 1 January 1948) is a Mexican suspected drug lord and alleged leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, an international crime syndicate based in Sinaloa, Mexico.

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https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/08/as-mexicos-epidemic-of-violence-rages-on-authorities-seem-powerless-to-stop-it

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The news came almost as fast as the bullets were fired: a judge murdered in cold blood; cartel members attempting a prison break; five people killed at a bar in a popular port city.

The surge in violence over a single weekend in Mexico brought a torrent of headlines that are increasingly familiar as powerful gangs battle for control of the country: shootouts, cars set on fire, bodies lying in the street.

It has become a steady drumbeat of conflict that underscores the ongoing failure of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador 's security strategy - and the inability of his government to tackle the scourge.

"There's this false sense that we are moving away from a latent state of armed, violent, lethal conflict," said Falko Ernst, a Mexico security analyst at the International Crisis Group. "But we must be conscious that we're talking about a staggering level of homicides and other lethal practices that are still the norm in Mexico."

A burnt-out truck blocks a highway on Monday after an attempted prison break in Zacatecas state. Photograph: Reuters

Despite campaigning on a promise to take the military off the streets, López Obrador, or Amlo as he's commonly known, has increasingly relied on the armed forces to tackle the violence, deploying the army and the national guard across the country.

On Monday the Mexican president addressed the weekend's wave of attacks in Zacatecas state, where, a day after a judge was shot dead, cars were set on fire and roads blocked off as inmates at a prison tried to escape.

"This weekend, there were these very unfortunate events: the loss of life, the murder of a judge," the president said during his morning news conference, before blaming the violence on the inaction of previous governments. "We are improving, we are advancing, we will not stop protecting the people."

But the very next day, the carnage continued.

On Tuesday a shooting near a kindergarten in Sinaloa state left two dead; a video shared on social media showed children cowering under their desks as their teacher tried to comfort them with the music of Taylor Swift.

On Wednesday morning another shootout between the military and members of an organized crime gang in the border city of Nuevo Laredo left seven people dead, just over a week after shootouts forced schools in the city to cancel classes.

Preliminary figures from the Mexican government show that there have been an average of 78 murders a day this month in Mexico - about three killings an hour.

Amlo has pointed to a slight drop in murders since he took office as sign his strategy is working. Overall homicides dropped by about 7% in the first 10 months of 2022, compared with the same period last year, official figures show.

But given that more than 26,000 Mexicans have been murdered this year, such a dip is hardly a victory, analysts say.

Members of the justice department bearing the coffin of a judge killed in Zacatecas on Sunday. Photograph: Reuters

"We're still going to come out north of 30,000 homicides that have been officially counted by any standard this year," said Ernst. "We're still talking about this staggeringly high level. I think that selling that as a success is politically convenient, but it has its own perverted logic."

Zacatecas state has become a focal point for the violence as powerful organized crime groups compete for the strategically significant region, with highways that head both toward the northern border and the Pacific coast.

Between 2015 and 2021, the number of murders in the state increased by a staggering 400%. In January this year, an SUV with 10 dead bodies was dumped in front of the offices of the state governor, David Monreal Ávila, in the state capital, also called Zacatecas.

"The issue of violence is terrifying," said Victor Piña, a lifelong resident of Zacatecas state who lives in the city of Fresnillo. "The situation is out of control."

On Sunday, as reports emerged of violence erupting in the city after the failed prison break, Piña sheltered at home with his son, listening to the sirens that have become a common soundtrack in this city.

The next day, driving out of town, Piña saw the aftermath: burned carcasses of trucks set on fire as roadblocks, which, according to the state security secretary, Adolfo Marín Marín, had been set up to draw attention away from the attempted prison break.

"It terrifies me," Piña said of the violence. "It fills me with rage, with indignation."

Calderón sends in the army
Mexico's "war on drugs" began in late 2006 when the president at the time, Felipe Calderón, ordered thousands of troops onto the streets in response to an explosion of horrific violence in his native state of Michoacán.

Calderón hoped to smash the drug cartels with his heavily militarized onslaught but the approach was counter-productive and exacted a catastrophic human toll. As Mexico's military went on the offensive, the body count sky-rocketed to new heights and tens of thousands were forced from their homes, disappeared or killed.
Kingpin strategy
Simultaneously Calderón also began pursuing the so-called "kingpin strategy" by which authorities sought to decapitate the cartels by targeting their leaders.

That policy resulted in some high-profile scalps - notably Arturo Beltrán Leyva who was gunned down by Mexican marines in 2009 - but also did little to bring peace. In fact, many believe such tactics served only to pulverize the world of organized crime, creating even more violence as new, less predictable factions squabbled for their piece of the pie.

Under Calderón's successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, the government's rhetoric on crime softened as Mexico sought to shed its reputation as the headquarters of some the world's most murderous mafia groups.

But Calderón's policies largely survived, with authorities targeting prominent cartel leaders such as Sinaloa's Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán.

When "El Chapo" was arrested in early 2016, Mexico's president bragged: "Mission accomplished". But the violence went on. By the time Peña Nieto left office in 2018, Mexico had suffered another record year of murders, with nearly 36,000 people slain.
"Hugs not bullets"
The leftwing populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador took power in December, promising a dramatic change in tactics. López Obrador, or Amlo as most call him, vowed to attack the social roots of crime, offering vocational training to more than 2.3 million disadvantaged young people at risk of being ensnared by the cartels.

"It will be virtually impossible to achieve peace without justice and [social] welfare," Amlo said, promising to slash the murder rate from an average of 89 killings per day with his "hugs not bullets" doctrine.

Amlo also pledged to chair daily 6am security meetings and create a 60,000 strong "National Guard". But those measures have yet to pay off, with the new security force used mostly to hunt Central American migrants.

Mexico now suffers an average of about 96 murders per day, with nearly 29,000 people killed since Amlo took office.

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Zacatecas has become a focus for Amlo's chief security strategy, with the government announcing last November that it would be sending about 4,000 members of the military and national guard to tackle organized crime in the state.

But more than a year later, with violence again overwhelming the state, the limits of the president's strategy has been laid bare, according to analysts.

"It's another example of the failed policy of military deployment," said Catalina Pérez Correa, a law professor at Mexico City's CIDE university. "There are areas of the country that are simply out of state control."

And as the strategy of militarization fails, residents like Piña are left to deal with unending violence.

"I love my home profoundly," he said. "And I see that it's going through the worst crisis in its history."

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As Mexico's epidemic of violence rages on, authorities seem powerless to stop it

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The news came almost as fast as the bullets were fired: a judge murdered in cold blood; cartel members attempting a prison break; five people killed at a bar in a popular port city.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_in_Mexico#:~:text=High%20levels%20of%20corruption%20in,Mexico%27s%20achieving%20a%20stable%20democracy

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https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/geography/countries/article/el-salvador#:~:text=This%20mountainous%20country%20is%20bordered,coastline%20on%20the%20Caribbean%20Sea. National geographic

https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-countries-border-el-salvador.html world atlas

https://www.britannica.com/place/El-Salvador/Economy Britannica

cfr.org/in-brief/why-has-gang-violence-spiked-el-salvador-bukele

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Qf0rbuEvyg&pp=ygUbY3JpbWluYWwgdmlvbGVuY2UgaW4gbWV4aWNv

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Mexico violence: Homicide rate reached record numbers in 2019

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican_drug_war#:~:text=The%20fighting%20between%20rival%20drug,has%20steadily%20worsened%20since%202000

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Mexican drug war

The Mexican military raiding a house allegedly owned by a drug trafficker in the border city of Matamoros, 2012

Date

December 11, 2006 - present
(16 years, 6 months, 4 weeks and 1 day)

Location

Throughout Mexico, with occasional spillover across international borders into Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California,[12][13] and also into the Central and South American countries of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Belize, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala[14][15][16]

Status

Ongoing

Belligerents

Mexico

Consulting and training support by:

United States through the Mérida Initiative
Colombia through the National Police of Colombia
Australia through the Australian Federal Police[3]
Canada through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP)[4]

Mexican cartels:

Commanders and leaders

Strength

Mexico

368,000 police officers[17]

260,000 soldiers[18]

70,000 National Guard members

Cartels:
100,000+ individuals[19][20][21]

Casualties and losses

Mexico:
400 servicemen killed and 137 missing[22]
4,038 federal, state, and municipal police killed[23]
66 members of the Policía Comunitaria killed[24]
EPR:
2 EPR members killed[25]

Cartels:
12,456 cartel members killed (2006-2010)[26]
121,199 cartel members detained (2006-2009)[27]
8,500 cartel members convicted (2006-2010)[28]

Total casualties:
41,034 dead in war conflicts between identified parties 2006-2019[29] (total 350,000-400,000 dead from organized crime homicides 2006-2021)[30]
60,000+ missing[31]

The Mexican drug war (also known as the Mexican war on drugs; Spanish: Guerra contra el narcotráfico en México) is an ongoing asymmetric low-intensity conflict between the Mexican government and various drug trafficking syndicates. When the Mexican military began to intervene in 2006, the government's main objective was to reduce drug-related violence. The Mexican government has asserted that their primary focus is dismantling the cartels, and preventing drug trafficking demand along with American functionaries. Therefore, the conflict has been described as a Mexican theater of the global war on drugs, as led by the United States federal government.

Violence escalated soon after the arrest of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo in 1989. He was the leader and the cofounder of the first major Mexican drug cartel; the Guadalajara Cartel, an alliance of the current existing cartels (which included the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juarez Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel, and the Sonora Cartel with Aldair Mariano as the leader). After his arrest, the alliance broke and high-ranking members formed their own cartels, fighting for control of territory and trafficking routes.

Although Mexican drug trafficking organizations have existed for several decades, their influence increased after the demise of the Colombian Cali and Medellín cartels in the 1990s. Mexican drug cartels dominate wholesale illicit drug markets and in 2007 controlled 90% of the cocaine entering the United States. Arrests of key cartel leaders, particularly in the Tijuana and Gulf cartels, have led to increasing drug violence as cartels fight for control of the trafficking routes into the United States.

Federal law enforcement has been reorganized at least five times since 1982 in various attempts to control corruption and reduce cartel violence. During the same period, there have been at least four elite special forces created as new, corruption-free soldiers who could do battle with Mexico's endemic bribery system. Analysts estimate that wholesale earnings from illicit drug sales range from $13.6 to $49.4 billion annually. The U.S. Congress passed legislation in late June 2008 to provide Mexico with US$1.6 billion for the Mérida Initiative as well as technical advice to strengthen the national justice systems. By the end of President Felipe Calderón's administration (December 1, 2006 - November 30, 2012), the official death toll of the Mexican drug war was at least 60,000. Estimates set the death toll above 120,000 killed by 2013, not including 27,000 missing. Since taking office in 2018, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador declared that the war was over. His comment was criticized, as the homicide rate remains high. Recently, cartels in Northeastern Mexico have been thinking of teaming up against the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

Due to its location, Mexico has long been used as a staging and transshipment point for narcotics and contraband between Latin America and U.S. markets. Mexican bootleggers supplied alcohol to the United States' gangsters throughout Prohibition in the United States, and the onset of the illegal drug trade with the U.S. began when prohibition came to an end in 1933. Near the end of the 1960s, Mexicans started to smuggle drugs on a major scale.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico was part of both Operation Intercept and Operation Condor, developed between 1975 and 1978, with the pretext to fight against the cultivation of opium and marijuana in the "Golden Triangle", particularly in Sinaloa.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, Colombia's Pablo Escobar was the main exporter of cocaine and dealt with organized criminal networks all over the world. While Escobar's Medellin Cartel and the Cali Cartel would manufacture the products, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo's Guadalajara Cartel would oversee distribution. When enforcement efforts intensified in South Florida and the Caribbean, the Colombian organizations formed partnerships with the Mexico-based traffickers to transport cocaine by land through Mexico into the United States.

This was easily accomplished because Mexico had long been a major source of heroin and cannabis, and drug traffickers from Mexico had already established an infrastructure that stood ready to serve the Colombia-based traffickers. By the mid-1980s, the organizations from Mexico were well-established and reliable transporters of Colombian cocaine. At first, the Mexican gangs were paid in cash for their transportation services, but in the late 1980s, the Mexican transport organizations and the Colombian drug traffickers settled on a payment-in-product arrangement.

Transporters from Mexico usually were given 35% to 50% of each cocaine shipment. This arrangement meant that organizations from Mexico became involved in the distribution, as well as the transportation of cocaine, and became formidable traffickers in their own right. In recent years, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel have taken over trafficking cocaine from Colombia to the worldwide markets.

The fighting between rival drug cartels began in earnest after the 1989 arrest of Félix Gallardo, who ran the cocaine business in Mexico. There was a lull in the fighting during the late 1990s but the violence has steadily worsened since 2000.

The dominant PRI party ruled Mexico for around 70 years until 2000. During this time, drug cartels expanded their power and political influence, and anti-drug operations focused mainly on destroying marijuana and opium crops in mountainous regions. There were no large-scale high-profile military operations against their core structures in urban areas until the 2000 Mexican election, when the right-wing PAN party gained the presidency and started a crackdown on cartels in their own turf.

In 2000, Vicente Fox, from the right-wing PAN party, became the first Mexican president since the Mexican Revolution not to be from the PRI; his presidency passed with relative peace, having a crime index not too different from that of previous administrations, and Mexican public opinion was mainly optimistic with the regime change, with Mexico showing a decline in homicide rates from 2000 to 2007. One of the Fox's administration's strongest criticisms arose from its management of the peasant unrest in San Salvador Atenco.

During this time, activities of Mexican criminal organizations were not widely reported by the media, although key conflicts took place, including the Sinaloa Cartel attacks and advance on the Gulf Cartel's main regions in Tamaulipas.

It is estimated that in the first eight months of 2005 about 110 people died in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas as a result of the fighting between the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels. The same year, there was another surge in violence in the state of Michoacán as La Familia Michoacana drug cartel established itself, after splintering from its former allies, the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas.

On December 11, 2006, newly elected President Felipe Calderón, from the PAN party, dispatched 6,500 Mexican Army soldiers to Michoacán, his home state, to end drug violence. This action is regarded as the first major deployment of government forces against cartels, and is generally viewed as the starting point of the Mexican drug war. As time passed, Calderón continued to escalate his anti-drug campaign. By 2008, there were about 45,000 troops involved along with state and federal police forces.

The government was initially successful in detaining drug lords. Drug-related violence spiked markedly in contested areas along the U.S. border such as Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana, and Matamoros. Some analysts, including U.S. Ambassador in Mexico Carlos Pascual, argued that this rise in violence was a direct result of Felipe Calderón's military measures. Since Calderón launched his military strategy against organized crime, there was an alarming increase in violent deaths related to organized crime: more than 15,000 people died in suspected drug cartel attacks since it was launched at the end of 2006. More than 5,000 people were murdered in Mexico in 2008, followed by 9,600 murders in 2009; 2010 saw more than 15,000 homicides across the country.

In 2012, newly elected president Enrique Peña Nieto, from the PRI party, emphasized that he did not support the involvement of armed American agents in Mexico and was only interested in training Mexican forces in counter-insurgency tactics. Peña Nieto stated that he planned to deescalate the conflict, focusing in lowering criminal violence rates, as opposed to the previous policy of attacking drug-trafficking organizations by arresting or killing the most-wanted drug lords and intercepting their shipments.

In the first 14 months of his administration, between December 2012 and January 2014, 23,640 people died in the conflict.

In 2013 Mexico saw the rise of the controversial Grupos de Autodefensa Comunitaria (self-defence groups) in southern Mexico, para-military groups led by land-owners, ranchers and other rural inhabitants that took up arms against the criminal groups that wanted to impose dominance in their towns, entering a new phase in the Mexican war on drugs. This strategy, allegedly proposed by General Óscar Naranjo, Peña Nieto's security advisor from Colombia, crumbled when autodefensas started to have internal organization struggles and disagreements with the government, as well as infiltration by criminal elements, that deprived the government forces the ability to distinguish between armed-civilian convoys and drug-cartel convoys, forcing Peña Nieto's administration to distance from them.

Peña Nieto's handling of the 2014 Iguala mass kidnapping and the 2015 escape of drug lord Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán from the Altiplano maximum security prison sparked international criticism.

A great part of Peña Nieto's strategy consisted in making the Mexican Interior Ministry solely responsible for public security and the creation of a national military level police force called the National Gendarmerie. In December 2017, the Law of Internal Security was passed by legislation but was met with criticism, especially from the National Human Rights Commission, accusing it gave the President a blank check.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the President from the Center-left National Regeneration Movement party, took office on December 1, 2018. One of his campaign promises was a controversial "strategy for peace", which would give amnesty to Mexicans involved in drug production and trafficking as a way to stop the drug trade and the resulting turf violence. His aides explained that the plan was not to pardon real criminals, like violent drug cartel members, but to prevent other people from following that path, especially low-income people, farmers forced into drug cultivation by cartels, and young people that may end up in jail for drug possession. Obrador pointed out that the past approaches failed because they were based on misunderstanding the core problem. According to him, the underlying issue was Mexico's great social disparities which previous governments' economic policies did not reduce.

For law enforcement, he promised to hold a referendum for the creation of a temporary national guard, merging elite parts of the Federal police, Military police, Navy, Chief of Staff's Guard and other top Mexican Security agencies, intending to finally give a legal framework to the military grade forces that have been doing police work in the last years. He promised not to use arms to suppress the people, and made an announcement to free political prisoners. His approach is to pay more attention to the victims of violent crime and he wants to revisit two previously taken strategies. In 2019, the promised Mexican National Guard was created.

Despite the new government's planned strategy changes, during the first two months of the new presidency the violence between drug trafficking organizations sustained the same levels as previous years. On July 15, 2022 authorities captured Rafael Caro-Quintero, a former leader of the Guadalajara cartel, but lost fourteen soldiers in an aircraft crash in the remote mountains near Sinaloa's border with Chihuahua.

On January 30, 2019, Obrador declared the end of the Mexican war on drugs, stating that he would now focus on reducing spending, and direct its military and police efforts primarily on stopping the armed gasoline theft rings -locally called huachicoleros- that had been stealing more than 70 thousand barrels of oil, diesel and gasoline daily, costing the Mexican state-owned company Pemex around 3 billion dollars every year.

On October 17, 2019, based on an extradition request sent to Mexico by a Washington, D.C. judge and misinformation provided to Mexican authorities, a failed operation to capture alleged kingpin Ovidio Guzmán López was carried by the Mexican National Guard, in which fourteen people died (mostly from the armed forces and cartel enforcers and one civilian bystander). Guzmán was released after approximately 700 cartel enforcers, armed with .50 caliber rifles, Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and 40 mm grenades took multiple hostages, including the housing unit where military families live in Culiacan. The cartels used burning vehicles to block roads, a tactic taken from militant protesters, with the event described as a mass insurrection. Obrador defended the decision to release Ovidio Guzmán, arguing it prevented further loss of life, and insisted that he wants to avoid more massacres. He further stated that the capture of one drug smuggler cannot be more valuable than the lives of innocent civilians, and that even though they underestimated the cartel's manpower and ability to respond the criminal process against Ovidio is still ongoing, During 2019, the federal forces deployed 8,000 troops and police reinforcements to restore peace in Culiacan.

This strategy of avoiding armed confrontations while drug organizations have continued violent altercations has been controversial. One of the strongest critics of the new strategy and a firm proponent of continuing the armed struggle is former President Felipe Calderón, who originally started the military operations against traffickers in 2006. Calderón's militaristic strategy to capture cartel heads has also been criticised by local and foreign experts, as well as by multiple media outlets.

President López Obrador, known for his strong criticism of the previous administrations' approach to public security through militarization, campaigned on the promise of removing the military from the streets and returning them to the barracks. However, under the López Obrador administration, deployments and military expenditures have reached unprecedented levels. The current number of soldiers deployed for security duties is 76% higher than during Felipe Calderón's presidency, whom López Obrador holds responsible for the militarization of the drug war. Consequently, defense spending has surged by 87% between 2012, Calderón's last year in office, and 2022.

The U.S. State Department estimates that 90 percent of cocaine entering the United States is produced in Colombia (followed by Bolivia and Peru) and that the main transit route is through Mexico. Drug cartels in Mexico control approximately 70% of the foreign narcotics flow into the United States.

Mexican cartels distribute Asian methamphetamine to the United States. It is believed that almost half the cartels' revenues come from cannabis. Cocaine, heroin, and increasingly methamphetamine are also traded.

Although Mexico accounts for only a small share of worldwide heroin production, it supplies a large share of the heroin distributed in the United States.

Since 2003 Mexican cartels have used the dense, isolated portions of U.S. federal and state parks and forests to grow marijuana under the canopy of thick trees. Billions of dollars' worth of marijuana has been produced annually on U.S. soil. "In 2006, federal and state authorities seized over 550,000 marijuana plants worth an estimated 1 billion dollars in Kentucky's remote Appalachian counties". Cartels profited from marijuana growing operations from Arkansas to Hawaii.

A 2018 study found that the reduction in drugs from Colombia contributed to Mexican drug violence. The study estimated, "between 2006 and 2009 the decline in cocaine supply from Colombia could account for 10%-14% of the increase in violence in Mexico."

Illicit drug use in Mexico is low compared to the United States, but is on the rise. With Mexico's increased role in the trafficking and production of illicit drugs, the availability of drugs has slowly increased locally since the 1980s. In the decades before this period, consumption was not generalized - reportedly occurring mainly among persons of high socioeconomic status, intellectuals and artists.

The export rate of cocaine to the U.S. has decreased following stricter border control measures in response to the September 11 attacks.

This has led to a surplus of cocaine which has resulted in local Mexican dealers attempting to offload extra narcotics along trafficking routes, especially in border areas popular among North American tourists.

Drug shipments are often delayed in Mexican border towns before delivery to the U.S., which has forced drug traffickers to increase prices to account for transportation costs of products across international borders, making it a more profitable business for the drug lords, and has likely contributed to the increased rates of local drug consumption.

With increased cocaine use, there has been a parallel rise in demand for drug user treatment in Mexico.

One of the main factors driving the Mexican drug war is widespread poverty. From 2004 to 2008 the portion of the population who received less than half of the median income rose from 17% to 21% and the proportion of population living in extreme or moderate poverty rose from 35 to 46% (52 million persons) between 2006 and 2010.

Among the OECD countries, Mexico has the second highest degree of economic disparity between the extremely poor and extremely rich. The bottom ten percent in the income hierarchy disposes of 1.36% of the country's resources, whereas the upper ten percent dispose of almost 36%. OECD also notes that Mexico's budgeted expenses for poverty alleviation and social development is only about a third of the OECD average.

A problem that goes hand in hand with poverty in Mexico is the level of schooling. In the 1960s, when Mexican narcotic smugglers started to smuggle drugs on a major scale, only 5.6% of the Mexican population had more than six years of schooling.

More recently, researchers from the World Economic Forum have noted that despite the Mexican economy ranking 31st out of 134 economies for investment in education (5.3% of its GDP), as of 2009, the nation's primary education system is ranked only 116th, thereby suggesting "that the problem is not how much but rather how resources are invested". The WEF further explained: "The powerful teachers union, the SNTE, the largest labor union in Latin America, has been in large part responsible for blocking reforms that would increase the quality of spending and help ensure equal access to education." The result of the high levels of poverty, lack of well paid jobs, government corruption, and the systemic failure of Mexico's schools has been the appearance of ninis, a youth underclass of school-dropouts who neither work nor study, who might have ended up as combatants on behalf of the cartels.[dubious ]

Teachers' unions have opposed reforms that propose their testing and grading on their students' performance with standardized tests that do not take into account the socioeconomic differences between middle class urban schools and under-equipped poor rural schools, which has an important effect on the students performance. Also, teachers unions have argued the legislation is ambiguous, focuses exclusively on teachers, without evaluating the Education Ministry, and will allow more abuses and political corruption.

The birth of most Mexican drug cartels is traced to former Mexican Judicial Federal Police agent Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo ( Spanish: El Padrino, 'The Godfather'), who founded the Guadalajara Cartel in 1980 and controlled most of the illegal drug trade in Mexico and the trafficking corridors across the Mexico-U.S. border along with Juan García Ábrego throughout the 1980s. He started off by smuggling marijuana and opium into the U.S., and was the first Mexican drug chief to link up with Colombia's cocaine cartels in the 1980s. Through his connections, Félix Gallardo became the person at the forefront of the Medellín Cartel, which was run by Pablo Escobar. This was accomplished because Félix Gallardo had already established a marijuana trafficking infrastructure that stood ready to serve the Colombia-based cocaine traffickers.

There were no other cartels at that time in Mexico. He oversaw operations with his cronies and the politicians who sold him protection. The Guadalajara Cartel suffered a major blow in 1985 when the group's co-founder Rafael Caro Quintero was captured, and later convicted, for the murder of DEA agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena. Félix Gallardo then kept a low profile and in 1987 he moved with his family to Guadalajara. According to Peter Dale Scott, the Guadalajara Cartel prospered largely because it enjoyed the protection of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS), under its chief Miguel Nazar Haro.

Félix Gallardo was arrested on April 8, 1989. He then divested the trade he controlled as it would be more efficient and less likely to be brought down in one law enforcement swoop. In a way, he was privatizing the Mexican drug business while sending it back underground, to be run by bosses who were less well known or not yet known by the DEA. Félix Gallardo sent his lawyer to convene the nation's top drug traffickers at a house in Acapulco where he designated plazas or territories.

The Tijuana route would go to his nephews the Arellano Felix brothers. The Ciudad Juárez route would go to the Carrillo Fuentes family. Miguel Caro Quintero would run the Sonora corridor. Meanwhile, Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Ismael Zambada García would take over Pacific coast operations, becoming the Sinaloa Cartel. Guzmán and Zambada brought veteran Héctor Luis Palma Salazar back into the fold. The control of the Matamoros, Tamaulipas corridor-then becoming the Gulf Cartel -would be left undisturbed to its founder Juan García Ábrego, who was not a party to the 1989 pact.

Drug trafficking tunnel under the U.S.-Mexico border used by the Sinaloa Cartel from the Ejido Tampico

The Sinaloa Cartel began to contest the Gulf Cartel's domination of the coveted southwest Texas corridor following the arrest of Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas in March 2003. The "Federation" was the result of a 2006 accord between several groups located in the Pacific state of Sinaloa. The cartel was led by Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, who was Mexico's most-wanted drug trafficker with an estimated net worth of U.S. $1 billion. This made him the 1140th richest man in the world and the 55th most powerful, according to his magazine profile. He was arrested and escaped in July 2015, and re-arrested in January 2016. In February 2010, new alliances were formed against Los Zetas and Beltrán-Leyva Cartel.

The Sinaloa Cartel fought the Juárez Cartel in a long and bloody battle for control over drug trafficking routes in and around the northern city of Ciudad Juárez. The battle eventually resulted in defeat for the Juárez Cartel, resulting in the deaths of between 5,000 and 12,000 people. During the war for the turf in Ciudad Juárez the Sinaloa Cartel used several gangs (e.g. Los Mexicles, the Artistas Asesinos and Gente Nueva) to attack the Juárez Cartel. The Juárez Cartel similarly used gangs such as La Línea and the Barrio Azteca to fight the Sinaloa Cartel.

As of May 2010, numerous reports by Mexican and U.S. media stated that Sinaloa had infiltrated the Mexican federal government and military, and colluded with it to destroy the other cartels. The Colima, Sonora and Milenio Cartels are now branches of the Sinaloa Cartel.

Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán was arrested on January 8, 2016, and extradited to the United States a year later. On February 4, 2019, in Brooklyn, NY, he was found guilty of ten counts of drug trafficking and sentenced to life imprisonment. Guzman unsuccessfully attempted to convince prosecutors that he has assumed charges on behalf of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada "El Chapo" alleged that he had paid former presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Felipe Calderón bribes, which was quickly denied by both men. In March 2019, El Chapo's successor, Ismael Zambada García, alias "El Mayo," was reported to be Mexico's "last Capo" and even more feared than his closest rival Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias "El Mencho," who serves as leader of the Jalisco Cartel New Generation.

The Beltrán-Leyva Cartel was a Mexican drug cartel and organized crime syndicate founded by the four Beltrán Leyva brothers: Marcos Arturo, Carlos, Alfredo and Héctor. In 2004 and 2005, Arturo Beltrán Leyva led powerful groups of assassins to fight for trade routes in northeastern Mexico for the Sinaloa Cartel. Through corruption or intimidation, the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel infiltrated Mexico's political, judicial and police institutions to feed classified information about anti-drug operations, and even infiltrated the Interpol office in Mexico.

Following the December 2009 death of the cartel's leader Arturo Beltrán Leyva by Mexican Marines the cartel entered into an internal power struggle between Arturo's brother, Héctor Beltrán Leyva, and Arturo's top enforcer Edgar Valdez Villarreal. Meanwhile, the cartel continued to dissolve with factions such as the South Pacific Cartel, La Mano Con Ojos, Independent Cartel of Acapulco, and La Barredora forming and the latter two cartels starting yet another intra-Beltrán Leyva Cartel conflict.

The Juárez Cartel controls one of the primary transportation routes for billions of dollars' worth of illegal drug shipments annually entering the United States from Mexico. Since 2007, the Juárez Cartel has been locked in a vicious battle with its former partner, the Sinaloa Cartel, for control of Ciudad Juárez. La Línea is a group of Mexican drug traffickers and corrupt Juárez and Chihuahua state police officers who work as the armed wing of the Juárez Cartel. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes headed the Juárez Cartel until his arrest in 2014.

The CDG was strong at the beginning of 2011, holding off several Zetas incursions into its territory. As the year progressed, internal divisions led to intra-cartel battles in Matamoros and Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. The infighting resulted in several arrests and deaths in Mexico and in the United States. The CDG has since broken apart, and it appears that one faction, known as Los Metros, has overpowered its rival Los Rojos faction and is now asserting its control over CDG operations.

The infighting has weakened the CDG, but the group seems to have maintained control of its primary plazas, or smuggling corridors, into the United States. The Mexican federal government has made notable successes in capturing the leadership of the Gulf Cartel. Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, his brothers Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, Mario Cárdenas Guillén, and Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez have all been captured and incarcerated during Felipe Calderón's administration.

In 1999, Gulf Cartel's leader, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, hired a group of 37 corrupt former elite military soldiers to work for him. These former Airmobile Special Forces Group ( GAFE), and Amphibian Group of Special Forces (GANFE) soldiers became known as Los Zetas and began operating as a private army for the Gulf Cartel. During the early 2000s the Zetas were instrumental in the Gulf Cartel's domination of the drug trade in much of Mexico.

La Familia Michoacana was a major Mexican drug cartel based in Michoacán between at least 2006 and 2011. It was formerly allied to the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas, but split off and became an independent organization.

Map of Mexican drug cartels presence in Mexico based on a May 2010 Stratfor report[201][202]

In 2009-10, a counter-narcotics offensive by Mexican and U.S. government agencies produced the arrest of at least 345 suspected La Familia members in the U.S., and the incorrectly presumed death of one of the cartel's founders, Nazario Moreno González, on December 9, 2010. The cartel then divided into the Knights Templar Cartel and a José de Jesús Méndez Vargas-led faction, which kept the name La Familia. Following the cartel's fragmentation in late 2010 and early 2011, the La Familia Cartel under Méndez Vargas fought the Knights Templar Cartel but on June 21, 2011, Méndez Vargas was arrested by Mexican authorities and in mid-2011 the attorney general in Mexico (PGR) stated that La Familia Cartel had been "exterminated", leaving only the splinter group, the Knights Templar Cartel.

In February 2010, La Familia forged an alliance with the Gulf Cartel against Los Zetas and Beltrán-Leyva Cartel.

The Knights Templar drug cartel (Spanish: Caballeros Templarios) was created in Michoacán in March 2011 after the death of the charismatic leader of La Familia Michoacana cartel, Nazario Moreno González. The Cartel is headed by Enrique Plancarte Solís and Servando Gómez Martínez who formed the Knights Templar due to differences with José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, who had assumed leadership of La Familia Michoacana.

After the emergence of the Knights Templar, sizable battles flared up during the spring and summer months between the Knights Templar and La Familia. The organization has grown from a splinter group to a dominant force over La Familia, and at the end of 2011, following the arrest of José de Jesús "El Chango" Méndez Vargas, leader of La Familia, the cartel appeared to have taken over the bulk of La Familia's operations in Mexico and the U.S. In 2011 the Knights Templar appeared to have aligned with the Sinaloa Federation in an effort to root out the remnants of La Familia and to prevent Los Zetas from gaining a more substantial foothold in the Michoacán region of central Mexico.

Alliances or agreements between drug cartels have been shown to be fragile, tense and temporary. Mexican drug cartels have increased their co-operation with U.S. street and prison gangs to expand their distribution networks within the U.S. On March 31, 2014, Enrique Plancarte Solís, a high-ranking leader in the cartel, was killed by the Mexican Navy.

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel ( Spanish: Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG, Los Mata Zetas and Los Torcidos) is a Mexican criminal group based in Jalisco and headed by Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes ("El Mencho"), one of Mexico's most-wanted drug lords. Jalisco New Generation Cartel started as one of the splits of Milenio Cartel, beside La Resistencia. La Resistencia accused CJNG of giving up Oscar Valencia (El Lobo) to the authorities and called them Los Torcidos (The Twisted Ones). Jalisco Cartel defeated La Resistencia and took control of Millenio Cartel's smuggling networks. Jalisco New Generation Cartel expanded its operation network from coast to coast in only six months, making it one of the criminal groups with the greatest operating capacity in Mexico as of 2012. Through online videos, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel has tried to seek society's approval and tacit consent from the Mexican government to confront Los Zetas by posing as a "righteous" and "nationalistic" group. Such claims have stoked fears that Mexico, just like Colombia a generation before, may be witnessing the rise of paramilitary drug gangs. By 2018 the CJNG was hyped as the most powerful cartel in Mexico. though Insight Crime has said the Sinaloa Cartel is still the most powerful cartel and called the CJNG its closest rival. In 2019, the group was greatly weakened by infighting, arrests of senior operatives, and a war with the Sinaloa Cartel and its allies,

CJNG co-founder Érick Valencia Salazar (alias "El 85") and former high-ranking CJNG leader Enrique Sánchez Martínez (alias "El Cholo") had also departed from the CJNG and formed a rival cartel known as the Nueva Plaza Cartel. Since 2017, the cartel has been engaged in a war with the CJNG. The Nueva Plaza Cartel has also become aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel to fight the CJNG.

Criminal organizations in Mexico are heavily involved in information warfare. These groups have a variety of tools they use to influence public opinion, such as food handouts, sponsoring of community development, social media posts, filmed press release-style video communications, physical narco messages, narco corridos, and private messaging such as WhatsApp chats. The goal of narco propaganda is to influence public opinion, threaten or accuse rivals, and generally communicate with those outside their organization. Many cartels have controlled the information environment by threatening journalists, bloggers, and others who speak out against them.

Their primary method of communication is the physical narco message, which can range from professionally-printed banners to hastily written messages on cardboard or paper. They are commonly displayed in public places, such as bridges, town centers, and highways. Many are often also left at crime scenes, such as after an assassination.

Some cartels, such as the CJNG, have sophisticated propaganda arms capable of producing large numbers of professional styled narco messages to advance their interests. These messages use stock phrases or slogans, cartel logos, and have cohesive messaging.

In 2011, then President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) met with Mexico's major media outlets to discuss their role in what he argued was sensationalizing the violence and providing free press coverage to cartels and their messages. They agreed to limit coverage of the drug war and the messaging of criminal groups.

Women in the Mexican drug war have been participants and civilians. They have served for and or been harmed by all belligerents. There have been female combatants in the military, police, cartels, and gangs. Women officials, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, paralegals, reporters, business owners, social media influencers, teachers, and non-governmental organizations directors and workers have also been involved in different capacities. Women citizens and foreigners, including migrants, have been raped, tortured, and murdered in the conflict.

Cartels and gangs fighting in the conflict carry out sex trafficking in Mexico as an alternative source of profits. Some members of the criminal organizations also abduct women and girls to use as their personal sex slaves and carry out sexual assault of migrants from Latin America to the United States.

AK-47 (locally called Cuerno de chivo, Spanish for "goat horn", for its curved magazine)

M4 Carbine with grenade launcher (locally called Chanate, Mexican Spanish for "great-tailed grackle")

Beta C-Mag double drum magazine (locally called Huevos de Toro, Spanish for "bull testicles") on an M4 Carbine

Mexicans have a constitutional right to own firearms, but legal purchase from the single Mexican gun shop in Mexico City is extremely difficult. Firearms that make their way to Mexico come primarily from the American civilian market. Most grenades and rocket-launchers are smuggled through Guatemalan borders, as leftovers from past conflicts in Nicaragua. Some grenades are also smuggled from the U.S. to Mexico or stolen from the Mexican military.

The most common weapons used by the cartels are the AR-15, M16, M4, AK-47, AKM and Type 56 assault rifles. Handguns are very diverse, but the FN Five-seven (dubbed Matapolicías or Cop-killer by criminals) is a popular choice due to its armor-piercing capability. Grenade launchers are known to have been used against Mexican security forces, while H&K G36s and M4 carbines with M203 grenade launchers have been confiscated.

Some researchers have asserted that most weapons and arms trafficked into Mexico come from gun dealers in the United States. There is strong evidence for this conclusion, indicating that many of the traceable weapons come from the failed American government Operation " Fast and Furious", and there is a geographic coincidence between the supposed American origin of the firearms and the places where these weapons are seized, mainly in the northern Mexican states. Most grenades and rocket-launchers are smuggled through Guatemalan borders from Central America. Some grenades are also smuggled from the US to Mexico or stolen from the Mexican military. United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials have stated that the statistic is misleading: out of approximately 30,000 weapons seized in drug cases in Mexico in 2004-2008, 7,200 appeared to be of U.S. origin, approximately 4,000 were found in ATF manufacturer and importer records, and 87 percent of those-3,480-originated in the United States.

In 2015, official reports of the U.S. government and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) revealed that over the last years, Mexican cartels improved their firearm power, and that 71% of their weapons come from the U.S. Many of those guns were manufactured in Romania and Bulgaria, and then imported into the U.S. The Mexican cartels acquire those firearms mainly in the southern states of Texas, Arizona and California. After the United States, the top five countries of origin of firearms seized from Mexico were Spain, China, Italy, Germany and Romania. These five countries represent 17% of firearms smuggled into Mexico. Some cartels such as the Beltrán Leyva Cartel use counterfeit M16s made with aftermarket parts.

ATF Project Gunrunner has stated that the official objective is to stop the sale and export of guns from the United States into Mexico in order to deny Mexican drug cartels the firearms considered "tools of the trade". In February 2011, it brought about a scandal when the project was accused of accomplishing the opposite by ATF permitting and facilitating " straw purchase" firearm sales to traffickers, and allowing the guns to "walk" and be transported to Mexico. Allegedly, the ATF allowed to complete the transactions to expose the supply chain and gather intelligence. It has been established that this operation violated long-established ATF policies and practices and that it is not a recognized investigative technique. Several of the guns sold under the Project Gunrunner were recovered from crime scenes in Arizona, and at crime scenes throughout Mexico, resulting in considerable controversy.

One notable incident was the "Black Swan operation" where Joaquín Guzmán Loera was finally captured. The ATF confirmed that one of the weapons the Mexican Navy seized from Guzmán's gunmen was one of the many weapons that were "lost" during the Project Gunrunner.

Many weapons from Project Gunrunner were found in a secret compartment in the "safe house" of José Antonio Marrufo "El Jaguar", one of Guzmán's most sanguinary lieutenants. He is accused of many killings in Ciudad Juárez, including the notorious massacre of 18 patients of the rehabilitation center "El Aliviane". It is believed that Marrufo armed his gunmen with weapons purchased in the United States.

Operation Michoacán

Although Calderón set out to end the violent warfare between rival cartel leaders, critics argue that he inadvertently made the problem worse. The methods that Calderón adopted involved confronting the cartels directly. These aggressive methods have resulted in public killings and torture from both the cartels and the country's own government forces, which aids in perpetuating the fear and apprehension that the citizens of Mexico have regarding the war on drugs and its negative stigma. As cartel leaders are removed from their positions, by arrest or death, power struggles for leadership in the cartels have become more intense, resulting in enhanced violence within the cartels themselves.

Calderón's forces concentrate on taking down cartel members that have a high ranking in the cartel in an attempt to take down the whole organization. The resulting struggle to fill the recently vacated position is one that threatens the existence of many lives in the cartel. Typically, many junior-level cartel members then fight amongst one another, creating more and more chaos. The drug cartels are more aggressive and forceful now than they were in the past and at this point, the cartels hold much of the power in Mexico. Calderón relies heavily on the military to defend and fight against cartel activity. Calderón's military forces have yet to yield significant results in dealing with the violent cartels due in part to the fact that many police working for the Mexican government are suspected of corruption. There is suspicion that cartels have corrupted and infiltrated the military at a high level, influencing many generals and officers. Mexico's National Human Rights Commission has received nearly 5,800 complaints regarding military abuse since the beginning of the drug war in 2006. Additionally, the National Human Rights Commission has completed nearly 90 in-depth reports since 2007, addressing the many human rights violations of civilians that have occurred while the military officers were actively participating in law enforcement activities.

Violence in May 2012 in which nearly 50 bodies were found on a local highway between the Mexico-United States border and Monterrey has led to the arrests of 4 high-ranking Mexican military officials. These officials were suspected of being on the cartel payrolls and alerting them before military action against them. Such actions demonstrate that Calderón's significant military offensive will continue to reveal mixed results until the military itself is rid of the corrupting influences of the cartels whom they supposedly aim to persecute.[neutrality is disputed]

Escalation (2008-12)

These accusations sent shock waves through state government. Many of the more than 50 accused officials quit or fled. The progress against drug cartels in Mexico has been hindered by bribery, intimidation, and corruption; four months later the General was relieved of his command.

On April 26, 2008, a major battle took place between members of the Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels in the city of Tijuana, Baja California, that left 17 people dead.

In March 2009, President Calderón called in an additional 5,000 Mexican Army troops to Ciudad Juárez. The DHS also said that it was considering using state National Guard troops to help the U.S. Border Patrol counter the threat of drug violence in Mexico from spilling over the border into the U.S. The governors of Arizona and Texas have encouraged the federal government to use additional National Guard troops from their states to help those already there supporting state law enforcement efforts against drug trafficking.

No longer mere intermediaries for Colombian producers, Mexican cartels are now powerful organized-crime syndicates that dominate the drug trade in the Americas.

Mexican cartels control large swaths of Mexican territory and dozens of municipalities, and they exercise increasing influence in Mexican electoral politics. Cartels have waged violent turf battles over control of key smuggling corridors from Matamoros to San Diego. Mexican cartels employ hitmen and groups of enforcers, known as sicarios. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reports that the Mexican drug cartels operating today along the border are far more sophisticated and dangerous than any other organized criminal group in U.S. law enforcement history. The cartels use grenade launchers, automatic weapons, body armor, Kevlar helmets, and sometimes unmanned aerial vehicles. Some groups have also been known to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

On October 7, 2012, the Mexican Navy responded to a civilian complaint reporting the presence of armed gunmen in Sabinas, Coahuila. Upon the navy's arrival, the gunmen threw grenades at the patrol from a moving vehicle, triggering a shootout that left Lazcano and another gunman dead and one marine slightly wounded. The vehicle was found to contain a grenade launcher, 12 grenades, possibly a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and two rifles, according to the navy. The Navy confirmed his death through fingerprint verification and photographs of his corpse before handing the body to the local authorities. Lazcano is the most powerful cartel leader to be killed since the start of Mexico's drug war in 2006, according to Reuters.

This death came just hours after the navy arrested a high-ranking Zeta member in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Salvador Alfonso Martínez Escobedo.

The apparent death of Lazcano may benefit three parties: the Mexican Navy, who scored a significant blow to organized crime with the death of Lazcano; Miguel Treviño Morales, who rose as the "uncontested" leader of Los Zetas; and Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and the main rival of Los Zetas. El Chapo is perhaps the biggest winner of the three, since his primary goal is to take over the smuggling routes in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, the headquarters of Treviño Morales. If the body had not been stolen, it would also be a symbolic victory for Felipe Calderón, who can say that his administration took down one of the founders and top leaders of Los Zetas and consequently boost the morale of the Mexican military.

It is often not clear what deaths are part of the Mexican drug war versus general criminal homicides, and different sources give different estimates. Casualties are often measured indirectly by estimated total deaths from organized crime in Mexico. This amounts to about 115,000 people in the years 2007-2018. From 2018 to 2020, it was estimated that there were 11,400 reports of gang violence, and over 80% of the attacks targeted civilians, resulting in 13,000 related-deaths during the period.

The Mexican attorney general's office has claimed that 9 of 10 victims of the Mexican drug war are members of organized-crime groups, although this figure has been questioned by other sources. Deaths among military and police personnel are an estimated 7% of the total. The states that suffer from the conflict most are Baja California, Guerrero, Chihuahua, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, Nuevo León and Sinaloa.

By January 2007, these various operations had extended to the states of Guerrero as well as the so-called " Golden Triangle States" of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa. In the following February the states of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas were included as well.

Seizures and arrests have jumped since Calderón took office in December 2006, and Mexico has extradited more than 100 people wanted in the U.S.

On July 10, 2008, the Mexican government announced plans to nearly double the size of its Federal Police force to reduce the role of the military in combating drug trafficking. The plan, known as the Comprehensive Strategy Against Drug Trafficking, also involves purging local police forces of corrupt officers. Elements of the plan have already been set in motion, including a massive police recruiting and training effort intended to reduce the country's dependence in the drug war on the military.

On July 16, 2008, the Mexican Navy intercepted a 10-meter long narco-submarine travelling about 200 kilometers off the southwest of Oaxaca; in a raid, Special Forces rappelled from a helicopter onto the deck of the submarine and arrested four smugglers before they could scuttle their vessel. The vessel was found to be loaded with 5.8 tons of cocaine and was towed to Huatulco, Oaxaca, by a Mexican Navy patrol boat.

One escalation in this conflict is the traffickers' use of new means to claim their territory and spread fear. Cartel members have broadcast executions on YouTube and on other video sharing platforms or shock sites. Cartels have also hung banners on streets stating demands and warnings.

The 2008 Morelia grenade attacks took place on September 15, 2008, when two hand grenades were thrown onto a crowded plaza, killing ten people and injuring more than 100. Some see these efforts as intended to sap the morale of government agents assigned to crack down on the cartels; others see them as an effort to let citizens know who is winning the war. At least one dozen Mexican norteño musicians have been murdered. Most of the victims performed what are known as narcocorridos, popular folk songs that tell the stories of the Mexican drug trade-and celebrate its leaders as folk heroes.

Teachers in the Acapulco region were "extorted, kidnapped and intimidated" by cartels, including death threats demanding money. They went on strike in 2011.

Major wars, 10,000 or more deaths in current or past year

Mexican cartels advance their operations, in part, by corrupting or intimidating law enforcement officials. Mexican municipal, state, and federal government officials, along with the police forces, often work together with the cartels in an organized network of corruption. A Pax Mafioso, is a specific example of corruption which guarantees a politician votes and a following in exchange for not impeding a particular cartel.

The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reports that although the central government of Mexico has made concerted efforts to reduce corruption in recent years, it remains a serious problem. Some agents of the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI) are believed to work as enforcers for various cartels, and the Attorney General (PGR) reported in December 2005 that nearly 1,500 of AFI's 7,000 agents were under investigation for suspected criminal activity and 457 were facing charges.

Under the 'Cleanup Operation' performed in 2008, several agents and high-ranking officials have been arrested and charged with selling information or protection to drug cartels; some high-profile arrests were: Victor Gerardo Garay Cadena, (chief of the Federal Police), Noé Ramírez Mandujano (ex-chief of the Organized Crime Division (SEIDO)), José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos (ex-chief of the Organized Crime Division (SEIDO)), and Ricardo Gutiérrez Vargas who is the ex-director of Mexico's Interpol office. In January 2009, Rodolfo de la Guardia García, ex-director of Mexico's Interpol office, was arrested. Julio César Godoy Toscano, who was just elected July 6, 2009, to the lower house of Congress, is charged with being a top-ranking member of La Familia Michoacana drug cartel and of protecting this cartel. He is now a fugitive.

The drug control policies Mexico has adopted to prevent drug trafficking and to eliminate the power of the drug cartels have adversely affected the human rights situation in the country. These policies have given the responsibilities for civilian drug control to the military, which has the power to not only carry out anti-drug and public security operations but also enact policy. According to the U.S. State Department, the police and the military in Mexico were accused of committing serious human rights violations as they carried out government efforts to combat drug cartels.

Some groups are especially vulnerable to human rights abuses collateral to drug law enforcement. Specifically in northern border states that have seen elevated levels of drug-related violence, human rights violations of injection drug users (IDUs) and sex workers by law enforcement personnel include physical and sexual violence, extortion, and targeting for accessing or possession of injection equipment or practicing sex work, although these activities are legal. Such targeting is especially deleterious because members of these marginalized communities often lack the resources and social or political capital to enforce their rights.

The emergence of internal federal agencies that are often unregulated and unaccountable also contributes to the occurrence of human rights violations. The AFI of Mexico had been involved with numerous human rights violation cases involving torture and corruption. In one case, detainee Guillermo Velez Mendoza died while in the custody of AFI agents. The AFI agent implicated in his death was arrested and escaped on bail.

Similarly, nearly all AFI agents evaded punishment and arrest due to the corrupt executive and judiciary system and the supremacy of these agencies. The Attorney General's Office reported in December 2005 that one-fifth of its officers were under investigation for criminal activity, and that nearly 1,500 of AFI's 7,000 agents were under investigation for suspected criminal activity and 457 were facing charges. The AFI was finally declared a failure and was disbanded in 2009.

Another major concern is the lack of implementation of the Leahy Law in U.S. and the consequences of that in worsening the human rights situation in Mexico. Under this U.S. law, no member or unit of a foreign security force that is credibly alleged to have committed a human rights violation may receive U.S. security training. It is alleged that the U.S., by training the military and police force in Mexico, is in violation of the Leahy Law. In this case, the U.S. embassy officials in Mexico in charge of human rights and drug control programs are blamed with aiding and abetting these violations. In December 1997, a group of heavily armed Mexican special forces soldiers kidnapped twenty young men in Ocotlan, Jalisco, brutally torturing them and killing one. Six of the implicated officers had received U.S. training as part of the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE) training program.

"The social fabric is so destroyed that it cannot be healed in one generation or two because wounds become deeply embedded...Mexico has a humanitarian tragedy and we have not grasped how big it is."-Elena Azaola, Centre for Social Anthropology High Studies and Research

As a result of "spillover" along the U.S.-bound drug trafficking routes and more stringent border enforcement, Mexico's northern border states have seen increased levels of drug consumption and abuse, including elevated rates of drug injection 10 to 15 times the national average. These rates are accompanied by mounting rates of HIV and STIs among injection drug users (IDUs) and sex workers, reaching a 5.5% prevalence in cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, which also report STI rates of 64% and 83%, respectively. Violence and extortion of IDUs and sex workers directly and indirectly elevate the levels of risk behavior and poor health outcomes among members of these groups. Marginalization of these vulnerable groups by way of physical and sexual violence and extortion by police threatens the cross-over of infection from high-prevalence groups to the general population. In particular, decreased access to public health services such as syringe exchange programs and confiscation of syringes can precipitate a cascade of health harms. Geographic diffusion of epidemics from the northern border states elsewhere is also possible with the rotation of police and military personnel stationed in drug conflict areas with high infection prevalence.

The increase in violence related with organized crime has significantly deteriorated the conditions in which local journalism is practiced. In the first years of the 21st century, Mexico was considered the most dangerous country in the world to practice journalism, according to groups like the National Human Rights Commission, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Between 2000 and 2012, several dozen journalists, including Miguel Ángel López Velasco, Luis Carlos Santiago, and Valentín Valdés Espinosa, were murdered there for covering narco-related news.

The offices of Televisa and local newspapers have been bombed. The cartels have also threatened to kill news reporters in the U.S. who have done coverage on the drug violence. Some media networks simply stopped reporting on drug crimes, while others have been infiltrated and corrupted by drug cartels. In 2011, Notiver journalist Miguel Angel Lopez Velasco, his wife, and his son were murdered in their home.

Since harassment neutralized many traditional media outlets, anonymous, sensationalized blogs like Blog del Narco took on the role of reporting on events related to the drug war. The drug cartels responded by murdering bloggers and social media users. Twitter users have been tortured and killed for posting and denouncing information of the drug cartels' activities. In September 2011, user NenaDLaredo of the website Nuevo Laredo Envivo was allegedly murdered by Los Zetas.

In May 2012, several journalist murders occurred in Veracruz. Regina Martinez of was murdered in Xalapa. A few days later, three Veracruz photojournalists were tortured and killed and their dismembered bodies were dumped in a canal. They had worked for various news outlets, including Notiver, Diario AZ, and TV Azteca. Human rights groups condemned the murders and demanded the authorities investigate the crimes.

Since the start of the Mexican drug war in 2006, the drug trafficking organizations have slaughtered their rivals, killed policemen, and have increasingly targeted politicians - especially local leaders. Most of the places where these politicians have been killed are areas plagued by drug-related violence. Part of the strategy used by criminal groups behind the killings of local figures is the weakening of the local governments. For example, María Santos Gorrostieta Salazar, former mayor of Tiquicheo, Michoacán, who had survived three earlier assassination attempts and the murder of her husband, was abducted and beaten to death in November 2012. Extreme violence puts politicians at the mercy of the cartels, allowing them to increase their control of government structures and expand their influence.

Cartels have engaged in kidnapping, ransom, murder, robbery, and extortion of migrants traveling from Central America through Mexico on their way to the United States and Canada. Cartels have also forced migrants to join their organization and work for them, a situation that has been described as slavery. Mass graves have been also discovered in Mexico containing bodies of migrants. In 2011, 177 bodies were discovered in a mass grave in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, the same area where the bodies of 72 migrants were discovered in 2010, where most victims "died of blunt force trauma to the head."

The U.S. State Department says that the practice of forced labor in Mexico is larger in extent than forced prostitution. Mexican journalists like Lydia Cacho have been threatened and forced into exile for reporting on these events.

Concerns about European security and the trafficking of drugs through the European continent have grown in recent years, and, in December of 2022, Europol (the law enforcement agency of the EU) and the DEA released a joint report on the situation involving Mexican drug trafficking through the EU.

In December 2011, the government of Spain remarked that Mexican cartels had multiplied their operations in that country, becoming the main entry point of cocaine into Europe.

In 2012, it was reported that Mexican drug cartels had joined forces with the Sicilian Mafia, when Italian officials unearthed information that Palermo's black market, along with other Italian ports, was used by Mexico's drug cartels as a conduit to bring drugs to the European market, in which they had been trafficking drugs, particularly cocaine, throughout the Atlantic Ocean for over 10 years to Europe.

In 2016, investigation into transatlantic drug trafficking revealed that the Kinahan Clan, Ireland's largest drug trafficker, among other prominent drug traffickers in Mexico, South America, West Africa, and Europe had created an informal a "Super Cartel" in an attempt to improve business and increase buyers. However, the extent of the prevalence of the Super Cartel is largely unknown, since many trafficking relationships may exist without any real central plan.

The 2017 guest list to the wedding of Daniel Kinahan led to the discovery of most of the key players in the Super Cartel Alliance. Those that have been most investigated include top underworld figures such as: Ridouan Taghi, Ricardo Riquelme Vega, aka El Rico, caged assassin Noufal Fassih and Italian Camorra boss Raffaele Imperiale.

In 2022/2023 - In January of 2023, two alleged drug lords said to be kingpins in the mostly European Super Cartel were released just two months after being arrested in Dubai. Edin Gacanin, (Tito) a Dutch-Bosnian national described by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as one of the top 50 drug traffickers in the world, and Zuhair Belkhair, a Dutch-Moroccan accused of trafficking huge amounts of cocaine through the port of Rotterdam, were among 49 suspects arrested in a massive, highly-publicised, international police operation. Most of the others arrested are awaiting trial or have pled guilty.

In February 2009, Los Zetas threatened to kill the president of Guatemala, Álvaro Colom. On March 1, 2010, Guatemala's chief of national police and the country's top anti-drugs official were arrested over alleged links to drug trafficking. A report from the Brookings Institution warns that, without proactive, timely efforts, the violence will spread throughout the Central American region.

According to the United States government, Los Zetas control 75% of Guatemala through violence, political corruption and infiltration in the country's institutions. Sources mentioned that Los Zetas gained ground in Guatemala after they killed several high-profile members and the supreme leader of Los Leones, an organized crime group from Guatemala.

Patricio Pazmiño, the Interior Minister of Ecuador, stated that the February 2021 riots at three prisons that took 79 lives were related to Mexican and Colombian drug gangs. The government intercepted a record 126 tons of cocaine in 2020.

On September 8, 2021 National Prosecutor Jorge Abbott declared that Mexican cartels were attempting to establish themselves in Chile. It is known that Sinaloa Cartel has attempted to use Chile as a transit route for the shipment of cocaine to Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The activity of Jalisco New Generation Cartel includes an attempt at establishing a drug laboratory in Iquique as well as the import of marihuana through the port of San Antonio.

Special reaction team (SRT) during operation against the Sinaloa Cartel in the Arizona's western desert, October 2011

The U.S. Justice Department considers the Mexican drug cartels to be the "greatest organized crime threat to the United States." During the first 18 months of Calderón's presidency, the Mexican government spent about US$7 billion in the war against drugs. In seeking partnership from the United States, Mexican officials point out that the illicit drug trade is a shared problem in need of a shared solution, and remark that most of the financing for the Mexican traffickers comes from American drug consumers. On March 25, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that "[America's] insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade", and that "the United States bears shared responsibility for the drug-fueled violence sweeping Mexico."

U.S. State Department officials knew that Mexican ex-president Felipe Calderón's willingness to work with the United States was unprecedented on issues of security, crime and drugs, so the U.S. Congress passed legislation in late June 2008 to provide Mexico and Central American countries with US$1.6 billion for the Mérida Initiative, a three-year international assistance plan. The Mérida Initiative provides Mexico and Central American countries with law enforcement training and equipment, as well as technical advice to strengthen the national justice systems. The Mérida Initiative does not include cash or weapons.

Currently, the Mexican drug cartels already have a presence in most major U.S. cities. In 2009, the Justice Department reported that Mexican drug cartels distribute drugs in nearly 200 cities across the United States, including Los Angeles, Chicago and Atlanta. Gang-related activity and violence has increased along the U.S. Southwest border region, as U.S.-based gangs act as enforcers for Mexican drug cartels.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command noted in a December 2008 report that in terms of worst-case scenarios, Mexico bears some consideration for sudden collapse in the next two decades as the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. The Joint Forces Command stated concern that the conflict will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state over the next several years, and therefore would demand an American response based on the implications for homeland security alone. After the JFC broached this issue in its 2008 report, several journalists and academics have discussed the possibility that Mexico could become a failed state.

The Mexican government responded negatively to the U.S. government raising the prospect of Mexico becoming a failed state. In a February 2009 interview with the Associated Press, President Calderón said it was "absolutely false" to label his country a failed state. To smooth over relations with Mexico over this issue, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton personally visited Mexico City in March 2009, followed by a visit by President Barack Obama a month later.

In March 2009, the U.S. DHS said that it was considering using the National Guard to counter the threat of drug violence in Mexico from spreading to the U.S. The governors of Arizona and Texas have asked the federal government to send additional National Guard troops to help those already there supporting local law enforcement efforts against drug trafficking. Calls for National Guard deployment on the border greatly increased after the 2010 murder of Arizona rancher Robert Krentz, possibly at the hands of Mexican drug smugglers.

In March 2009, the Obama administration outlined plans to redeploy more than 500 federal agents to border posts and redirect $200 million to combat smuggling of illegal drugs, money and weapons. On May 25, 2010, President Obama authorized deployment of 1,200 National Guard troops to the U.S. border with Mexico to assist with border protection and enforcement activities, as well as help train additional Customs and Border Protection agents. The Washington Office on Latin America said the U.S. southwest border region remained calm, with a homicide rate lower than the national average.

In October 2013, two former federal agents and an ex-CIA contractor told an American television network that CIA operatives including Félix Rodríguez were involved in the kidnapping and murder of DEA covert agent Enrique Camarena, because he was a threat to the agency's drug operations in Mexico. According to the three men, the CIA was collaborating with drug traffickers moving cocaine and marijuana to the United States, and using its share of the profits to finance Nicaraguan Contra rebels attempting to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government. A CIA spokesman responded, calling it "ridiculous" to suggest that the Agency had anything to do with the murder of a U.S. federal agent or the escape of his alleged killer.

According to former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and César Gaviria of Colombia, the United States-led drug war is pushing Latin America into a downward spiral; Mr. Cardoso said in a conference that "the available evidence indicates that the war on drugs is a failed war". The panel of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy commission, headed by Cardoso, stated that the countries involved in this war should remove the "taboos" and re-examine the anti-drug programs. Latin American governments have followed the advice of the U.S. to combat the drug war, but the policies had little effect. The commission made some recommendations to United States President Barack Obama to consider new policies, such as decriminalization of marijuana and to treat drug use as a public health problem and not as a security problem. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs states it is time to seriously consider drug decriminalization and legalization, a policy initiative that would be in direct opposition to the interests of criminal gangs.

Despite the fact that Mexican drug cartels and their Colombian suppliers generate, launder and remove $18 billion to $39 billion from the United States each year, the U.S. and Mexican governments have been criticized for their unwillingness or slow response to confront the various cartels' financial operations, including money laundering.

The U.S. DEA has identified the need to increase financial investigations relating to the movement of illegal drug funds to Mexico. The DEA states that attacking the financial infrastructure of drug cartels has to play a key role in any viable drug enforcement strategy. The U.S. DEA has noted that the U.S. and Mexican financial services industry continues to be a facilitator for drug money movement.

Following suit, in August 2010 President Felipe Calderón proposed sweeping new measures to crack down on the cash smuggling and money laundering. Calderón proposes a ban on cash purchases of real estate and of certain luxury goods that cost more than 100,000 pesos (about US$8,104.) His package would also require more businesses to report large transactions, such as real estate, jewelry and purchases of armor plating. In June 2010, Calderón "announced strict limits on the amount in U.S. dollars that can be deposited or exchanged in banks", but the proposed restrictions to financial institutions are facing tough opposition in the Mexican legislature.

In 2011, Wachovia, at one time a major U.S. bank, was implicated in laundering money for Mexican drug lords. In a settlement, Wachovia paid federal authorities $110 million in forfeiture. A U.S. Senate report from the permanent subcommittee for investigations revealed in July 2012 that HSBC - one of Europe's biggest banks- moved $7 billion in bulk cash from Mexico to the U.S., most of it suspected to assist Mexican drug lords and U.S. drug cartels in moving money to the U.S. While money laundering problems at HSBC have been flagged by regulators for nearly a decade, the bank continued to avoid compliance. On December 12, 2012, HSBC settled for a $1.93 billion fine.

In FY2011, the Obama administration requested approximately $5.6 billion to support demand reduction. This includes a 13% increase for prevention and almost a 4% increase for treatment. The overall FY2011 counter-drug request for supply reduction and domestic law enforcement is $15.5 billion with $521.1 million in new funding.

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Mexican drug war The Mexican military raiding a house allegedly owned by a drug trafficker in the border city of Matamoros, 2012 Date December 11, 2006 - present (16 years, 6 months, 4 weeks and 1 day) Location Throughout Mexico, with occasional spillover across international borders into Texas, Arizona, New

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https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/criminal-violence-mexico

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Criminal Violence in Mexico | Global Conflict Tracker

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Learn about the world’s top hotspots with this interactive Global Conflict Tracker from the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels

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Introduction

Mexican authorities have been waging a deadly battle against drug cartels for more than a decade, but with limited success. Thousands of Mexicans-including politicians, students, and journalists-die in the conflict every year. The country has seen more than 360,000 homicides since 2006, when the government declared war on the cartels.

The United States has partnered closely with its southern neighbor in this fight, providing Mexico with billions of dollars to modernize its security forces, reform its judicial system, and fund development projects aimed at curbing migration at Mexico's southern border. Washington has also sought to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by bolstering security and monitoring operations along its border with Mexico.

What drugs do the cartels traffic?

Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)-sometimes referred to as transnational criminal organizations-dominate the import and distribution of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine in the United States. Mexican suppliers are responsible for most heroin and methamphetamine production, while cocaine is largely produced in Colombia and then transported to the United States by Mexican criminal organizations. Mexico, along with China, is also a leading source of fentanyl, a synthetic opioid up to fifty times more potent than heroin. The amount of fentanyl seized by Mexican authorities nearly quintupled between 2019 and 2020.

The amount of fentanyl seized by Mexican authorities nearly quintupled between 2019 and 2020.

At the same time, the cartels smuggle vast quantities of marijuana into the United States, even though some U.S. jurisdictions have legalized it. Conversely, California's booming cannabis industry has prompted traffickers to smuggle U.S.-grown marijuana across the border to Mexico, where lawmakers have yet to fully legalize the drug.

Which are the largest cartels?

Mexico's drug cartels are in a constant state of flux. Over the decades, they have grown, splintered, forged new alliances, and battled one another for territory. The cartels that pose the most significant drug trafficking threats [PDF] to the United States, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are:

Sinaloa Cartel. Formerly led by Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, Sinaloa is one of Mexico's oldest and most influential drug trafficking groups. With strongholds in nearly half of Mexico's states-particularly those along the Pacific coast in the northwest and near the country's southern and northern borders-and operations in as many as fifty countries, it has a larger international footprint than any of its Mexican rivals. In 2017, Mexican authorities extradited Guzmán to the United States, where he is serving a life sentence for multiple drug-related charges. In 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden imposed sanctions on eight members of the group, which is now led by Ismael Zambada García and El Chapo's sons, known as "Los Chapitos."

Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). Jalisco splintered from Sinaloa in 2010 and is among Mexico's fastest-growing cartels, with operations in more than two-thirds of the country. According to the DEA, the "rapid expansion of its drug trafficking activities is characterized by the group's willingness to engage in violent confrontations" with authorities and rival cartels. U.S. officials estimate that CJNG supplies more than one-third of the U.S. drug market.

Beltrán-Leyva Organization (BLO). The group formed when the Beltrán-Leyva brothers split from Sinaloa in 2008. Since then, all four brothers have been arrested or killed, but their loyalists continue to operate throughout Mexico. The organization's splinter groups have become more autonomous and powerful, maintaining ties to Jalisco, Juárez, and Los Zetas.

Los Zetas. Originally a paramilitary enforcement arm for the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas was singled out by the DEA in 2007 as the country's most " technologically advanced, sophisticated, and violent " group of its kind. It splintered from the Gulf Cartel in 2010 and held sway over swaths of eastern, central, and southern Mexico. However, it has lost power in recent years and fractured into rival wings, the most prominent being the Northeast Cartel.

Guerreros Unidos (GU). Based in southwestern Mexico, Guerreros Unidos (United Warriors) broke away from the BLO in 2009 and became involved in the heroin trade. The group is known to have a partnership with the CJNG, using the same transportation networks to move drug shipments to and from the United States.

Gulf Cartel. Its base of power is in northeast Mexico, especially the states of Tamaulipas and Zacatecas, and it is thought to be working with CJNG members in those areas. In the past decade, the group has splintered into various factions, diluting its strength as it battles for territory with Los Zetas. In 2021, three warring Gulf factions announced they had reached a truce, insisting that they wanted to maintain peace in Tamaulipas.

Juárez Cartel. A long-standing rival of Sinaloa, Juárez has its stronghold in the north-central state of Chihuahua, across the border from New Mexico and Texas. In recent years, the group has splintered into several factions, including La Línea, which controls street-level enforcement.

La Familia Michoacána (LFM). Formed in the 1980s, LFM has its base in western Mexico's Michoacán State. In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama designated the group's members as " significant foreign narcotics traffickers " and imposed financial sanctions on it under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. While still active, LFM has weakened and fragmented in recent years.

Los Rojos. Another splinter group of the BLO, Los Rojos operates in central and southwestern Mexico and relies largely on kidnapping and extortion. Although several of its leaders were arrested between 2019 and 2020, the group remains active, and along with Guerreros Unidos, has been linked to the 2014 disappearance and murder of forty-three students from a university in Guerrero State.

What led to the cartels' growth?

Experts point to both domestic and international forces. In Mexico, the cartels use a portion of their vast profits to pay off judges, officers, and politicians. They also coerce officials into cooperating; assassinations of journalists and public servants by the cartels are relatively common. Dozens of politicians were killed ahead of the country's midterm elections in 2021, with many of the deaths attributed to the cartels.

The cartels flourished during the seven decades that Mexico was ruled by a single party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Within this centralized political structure, drug trafficking groups cultivated a wide network of corrupt officials through which they were able to gain distribution rights, market access, and protection.

The PRI's unbroken reign finally ended in 2000 with the election of President Vicente Fox of the conservative National Action Party (PAN). With new politicians in power, cartels ramped up violence against the government in an effort to reestablish their hold [PDF] on the state.

Cartels use a portion of their vast profits to pay off judges, officers, and politicians.

At the international level, Mexican cartels began to take on a much larger role in the late 1980s, after U.S. government agencies broke up Caribbean networks used by Colombian cartels to smuggle cocaine. Mexican gangs eventually shifted from being couriers for Colombian criminal organizations, including the infamous Cali and Medellín cartels, to being wholesalers. By 2007, Mexican cartels controlled an estimated 90 percent [PDF] of the cocaine entering the United States.

The U.S. government, despite waging a "war on drugs" and conducting other counternarcotics efforts abroad, has made little progress in reducing demand. In 2017, Americans spent $153 billion [PDF] on illegal drugs, including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. The growing use of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, has contributed to a public health crisis.

How are drugs smuggled into the United States?

Most of the illicit drugs entering the United States that are seized by authorities are discovered at official ports of entry, of which there are more than three hundred.

Traffickers employ various tactics to evade detection by U.S. authorities at the border. These include hiding or disguising drugs in vehicles or maritime vessels, smuggling them into the United States through underground tunnels, and flying them over border barriers using drones or other aircraft. After Mexican traffickers smuggle wholesale shipments of drugs into the United States, local groups and street gangs manage retail-level distribution in cities throughout the country.

What measures has Mexico taken to stem the drug trade?

Recent Mexican administrations have responded to cartels primarily by deploying security forces, often spurring more violence:

Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). President Calderón declared war on the cartels shortly after taking office. Over the course of his six-year term, he deployed tens of thousands of military personnel to supplement and, in many cases, replace local police forces he viewed as corrupt. With U.S. assistance, the Mexican military captured or killed twenty-five of the top thirty-seven drug kingpins in Mexico. The militarized crackdown was a centerpiece of Calderón's tenure.

However, some critics say Calderón's decapitation strategy created dozens of smaller, more violent drug gangs. Many also argue that Mexico's military is ill-prepared to perform police functions. The government registered more than 120,000 homicides [PDF] over the course of Calderón's term, nearly twice as many as during his predecessor's time in office. ( Experts estimate that between one-third and one-half of the homicides in Mexico are linked to cartels.)

Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). Calderón's successor said he would focus more on reducing violence against civilians and businesses than on removing the leaders of cartels. Still, President Peña Nieto relied heavily [PDF] on the military, in combination with the federal police, to battle the cartels. He also created a new national police force, or gendarmerie, of several thousand officers.

Homicides declined in the first years of Peña Nieto's presidency. But 2015 saw an uptick, and by the end of his term, the number of homicides had risen to the highest level in modern Mexican history. Experts attribute this to the continued fallout from the kingpin strategy, territorial feuds, and cartel fragmentation.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-present). Shortly after taking office, President López Obrador, also known as AMLO, announced that his government would move away from militarized attempts to apprehend cartel leaders and instead focus on improving regional security cooperation and reducing homicide rates. His " hugs not bullets " approach seeks to address the socioeconomic drivers of organized crime by creating job opportunities. Since 2018, his administration has launched an anticorruption drive and disrupted cartel finances; it has also proposed decriminalizing all illegal drugs and offering amnesty to low-level cartel members.

Though AMLO has framed his strategy as a novel approach, some experts say his actions-including deploying a new military-led national guard to boost security-echo his predecessors' tactics and are unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the homicide rate continues to hover around record levels.

What has been the toll on human rights?

Civil liberties groups, journalists, and foreign officials have criticized the Mexican government's war with the cartels for years, accusing the military, police, and cartels of widespread human rights violations, including torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances. More than seventy-nine thousand people have disappeared since 2006, primarily at the hands of criminal organizations such as the cartels, though government forces also play a role. Local search efforts to find the missing and prosecute those responsible have often been stymied by cartel-related violence, government incompetence and corruption, and other factors.

One of the most chilling examples of these abuses occurred in the southern state of Guerrero in 2014, when forty-three student protesters were abducted and presumably killed, though remains of only three students have been definitively identified. The incident prompted mass demonstrations, with protesters demanding answers about the abductions and expressing their exhaustion with Mexico's endemic corruption, violence, and other crime. Investigations into the students' disappearances have purportedly found evidence that authorities, including the police and military, conspired with cartel members in the crimes; the government launched a new inquiry after the students' families, human rights groups, and independent experts questioned the handling of the previous investigation. In August 2022, a judge ordered the former attorney general who oversaw the original investigation to stand trial on charges of forced disappearance, failure to report torture, and misconduct.

In recent years, vigilante groups known as autodefensas have sought to fill in where security forces have failed to protect communities from criminal groups. They have become a formidable force against the cartels in states including Guerrero and Michoacán. However, some vigilantes have committed rights abuses, including the recruitment of child fighters; allegedly maintained ties to cartels in exchange for weapons and protection; and even turned to organized crime themselves.

What assistance has the U.S. government provided?

The United States has cooperated with Mexico on security and counternarcotics to varying degrees over the past several decades. Recent efforts have centered on the Mérida Initiative; since Presidents George W. Bush and Calderón launched the partnership [PDF] in 2007, the United States has appropriated more than $3 billion for it. This assistance has gone toward purchases of military aircraft, surveillance software, and other equipment.

The initiative has evolved to reflect the priorities of national leaders. The Bush administration focused heavily on providing Mexico with security-related assistance, including counternarcotics and counterterrorism support. President Obama widened the scope of aid to target fundamental reforms to Mexico's justice system and to develop crime-prevention programs at the community level, among other efforts, in what became known as "Mérida 2.0" [PDF].

President Donald Trump shifted U.S. priorities for Mérida to issues including border security and combating drug production and money laundering. In a highly controversial move in February 2019, Trump declared a national emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border and ordered the deployment of thousands of active-duty military troops there, citing an influx of illicit drugs, criminals, and undocumented immigrants. Mexico later deployed twenty-five thousand National Guard members to secure its borders, which some experts say increased violence and diminished the country's cartel-fighting capacity.

The U.S.-Mexico relationship took a major hit in October 2020, when U.S. authorities arrested General Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, a former Mexican defense minister, in Los Angeles for drug trafficking and money laundering. Though the United States later dropped the charges and allowed Cienfuegos to return to Mexico, the Mexican government responded by restricting U.S. law enforcement agents' power to operate in the country.

President Biden inherited a tense security relationship with Mexico, with bilateral cooperation focused mostly on migration, COVID-19, and trade. In October 2021, Presidents Biden and López Obrador announced the creation of a bilateral framework to replace the Mérida Initiative that will seek to address both insecurity in Mexico and the opioid crisis in the United States. But just six months later, the AMLO administration drew outcry from U.S. officials by disbanding a DEA-trained anti-narcotics force that had worked closely with U.S. law enforcement for decades.

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Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels

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Violence continues to rage more than a decade after the Mexican government launched a war against drug cartels.

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https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-treasury-sanctions-10-allegedly-involved-sinaloa-cartel-fentanyl-network-2023-07-12/

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MEXICO CITY, July 12 (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday imposed sanctions on 10 Mexican nationals and one company in the country for their alleged involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel's fentanyl trafficking network, its latest effort to stem imports of the drug.

The 10 people sanctioned are allegedly linked to accused suppliers of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl, which has been attributed to a sharp uptick in U.S. overdose deaths.

The sanctioned list includes Noel Lopez Perez, the brother of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman's second wife, and Ricardo Paez Lopez, a cousin to the youngest of El Chapo's sons.

The sons, known as "Los Chapitos," are accused of leading a faction of the Sinaloa Cartel after their father's capture. The fourth son, Ovidio Guzman Lopez, was captured in Mexico earlier this year.

The U.S. Treasury also sanctioned an import-export company, REI Compania Internacional, and its majority shareholder for allegedly receiving chemical shipments from China.

The Biden administration has been seeking increased cooperation from Mexico and China in stemming the flow of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals.

Reporting by Kylie Madry; Editing by Sarah Morland

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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U.S. slaps sanctions against Sinaloa Cartel fentanyl network

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The United States on Wednesday imposed sanctions on 10 Mexican nationals and one company in the country for their alleged involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel's fentanyl trafficking network, its latest effort to stem imports of the drug.

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Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it

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They fought two wars over it and are now nuclear armed - but what’s at the root of the dispute?

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The Silent Epidemic of Femicide in the United States

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Every day, nearly 3 women are killed by an intimate partner — making the United States one of the deadliest countries for women and girls.

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Vision of Humanity

Vision of Humanity is brought to you by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), by staff in our global offices in Sydney, New York, The Hague, Harare and Mexico. Alongside maps and global indices, we present fresh perspectives on current affairs reflecting our editorial philosophy.

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Understanding the dynamics of femicide in Mexico | Mexico Peace Index

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Femicide in Mexico rose by 135% between 2015 - 2021. Read the expert analysis on the dynamics of femicide in Mexico.

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Women hold up signs with the image of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died while in the custody of Iranian authorities, during a demonstration denouncing her death outside the UN offices in Arbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on September 24.
SAFIN HAMED/AFP/Getty Images

O ne of the most powerful women in 2022 died unaware of her impact on the world.

On September 13, 22-year-old Jina "Mahsa" Amini was arrested by Iran's morality police for "improperly" wearing her hijab, and according to her family and local media, severely beaten. She died three days later while still in police custody.

After reports of the horrific incident emerged (thanks in part to reporters Niloofar Hamedi and Elahe Mohammadi, whom the Iranian regime has since jailed), protests erupted across Iran. They were led by women who tore off their hijabs, cut their hair and adopted a rallying cry of "women, life, freedom."

The power of Amini's death, however-and the reason for her inclusion on the Forbes list of the World's 100 Most Powerful Women-is that what started as an outcry against the regime's treatment of women has evolved into a revolutionary movement calling for regime change, recognized throughout the world. Amini's name has not only become synonymous with the theocratic government's repression of its citizens, it's also transformed into a hashtag that, as of November 30, had been used 79 million times.

"Mahsa Amini is now a global symbol for freedom, not just in Iran," says Nina Ansary, a historian and women's rights activist.

Ansary and other members of the Iranian diaspora say it's important to remember that this 80-day-long protest defies an entrenched regime that, by law, treats women as second-class citizens. On March 8, 1979, less than a month after the Islamic Revolution consolidated its control, thousands of women poured into the streets of Tehran to protest the new government's proposed policies, which went beyond the compulsory hijab or clothing that covers a woman's entire body.

"The laws introduced after the revolution basically established institutionalized discrimination," says Roya Boroumand, the cofounder and executive director of Iranian rights organization Abdorrahman Boroumand Center. "Here, their life is valued at half of that of a man, their testimony is valued half of that of a man, and they have lost the right to divorce, the right to the custody of their children."

"Mahsa Amini is now a global symbol for freedom, not just in Iran."

Nina Ansary, historian and women's rights activist

Other moments have brought calls for change. A 2006 campaign sought to gather one million signatures to change Iran's discriminatory laws, and for the last eight years, journalist and activist Masih Alinejad has posted videos of smaller groups of women engaging in acts of civil disobedience such as walking in the street without hijabs.

But it took Amini's violent death to galvanize the Iranian people anew and focus the world's attention. Why?

"Mahsa is a Kurdish girl," Alinejad says, referring to the ethnic minority group in Iran. "If it was not for the Kurdish people turning her funeral into massive protests against the compulsory hijab and the Islamic Republic, I don't think that we would have expected such an uprising across Iran."

Amini's other power is that she was an ordinary woman to whom thousands could relate. "She wasn't an activist," says Hadi Ghaemi, the founder of the Center for Human Rights in Iran. "Her face and her experience were very intimately and tangibly familiar to every family in Iran, because every time their mothers, sisters, and their daughters go out of the house, they have been harassed by the morality police, or detained or even beaten."

Amini is not the first person to die in custody of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, nor was she the last. Iranian government officials say some 300 people have been killed amid their crackdowns on the protests, though human rights groups say the death toll is closer to 500. Last month, the United Nations Human Rights Council agreed to launch an investigation into alleged human rights violations.

DOHA, QATAR - NOVEMBER 25: Fans hold up a shirt with the name of Mahsa Amini and a flag advocating for women's rights prior to the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Group B match between Wales and IR Iran at Ahmad Bin Ali Stadium on November 25, 2022 in Doha, Qatar. People have continued demonstrating in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini in September. Mahsa Amini fell into a coma and died after being arrested in Tehran by morality police, for allegedly violating the country's hijab rules. (Photo by Matthias Hangst/Getty Images)
Getty Images

Support from the international community gives Ansary and others hope that this moment will finally bring true reform to Iran. "Women won't relent," she says. "They haven't sacrificed decades, and this moment, the last two and a half months, only to go back and go back to their homes." But the power of the regime cannot be underestimated. It has successfully strong-armed protesters in the past. Ghaemi warns the world that the government could put on a charm offensive, agreeing to surface-level improvements without actually making meaningful change.

On Sunday, December 4, his prediction came true. Some reports emerged that Iran's attorney general said the morality police had been disbanded, though details have been vague and news reports indicate it's far too soon to write the morality police's obituary.

The people of Iran may have to gird themselves for a longer fight, one that could get worse before it gets better. Alinejad believes in the power of Iranian women -and also, sadly, the power of despair. She tells the story of a teenage girl whose mother cautioned her against joining the protests for fear she would be killed.

I can't choose what I wear, the teen told her mom. I don't have the right to dance in public. By law, I'm not allowed to be myself. "'I'm already dead,'" Alinejad says the girl told her mother. "'But when I go to the streets, I have a dream. And that makes me alive.'"

MORE FROM FORBES

MORE FROM FORBES The World's 100 Most Powerful Women 2022

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Mahsa Amini: The Spark That Ignited A Women-Led Revolution

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Jina 'Mahsa' Amini is No. 100 on the 2022 Forbes list of the World's 100 Most Powerful Women as a representative of the women who've defied Iran's theocratic regime by insisting on their fundamental rights as human beings. Their courage and resolve has sent inspiration rippling around the world.

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Logo of Iran's Judiciary

Women have long faced legal, political, economic and social challenges in Iran. Iran's 1906 constitution, written by its first parliament, promised "equal rights before the law" for all Iranians, but it said nothing specific about women. Between 1967 and 1975, women gained new rights-to vote, initiate divorce, run for office, inherit property-during the monarchy. The legal age of marriage was also raised to 18. The second constitution, written by Islamic revolutionaries and passed overwhelmingly in a referendum in 1979, specifically stipulated that women were "equally protected." But in practice, it gave women fewer social rights and personal liberties.

The Islamic Republic annulled many of the monarchy's reforms, although it did not revoke the right to vote or run for office. It adopted a civil code based on conservative Islamic law or Sharia, dropped the age of marriage to 13, and eliminated a woman's right to divorce her husband. The Islamic Republic imposed new restrictions on women's dress, child custody, inheritance and foreign travel.

Female activists and civil society organizations faced "harassment, intimidation, detention, and smear campaigns," the State Department reported in 2019. Iranian courts have imposed harsh sentences on dozens of activists who challenged compulsory hijab laws. Between 2018 and 2020, the best-known cases included:

Narges Mohammadi, who was sentenced to 11 years for leading a human rights organization, "colluding against national security," and "generating propaganda against the state." She was released in October 2020 after a court commuted her sentence.

Nasrin Sotoudeh, who was sentenced to 38 years for representing a woman protesting the compulsory hijab covering, "espionage" and "collusion against national security." Sotoudeh will be eligible for parole after 12 years in 2030.

Sepideh Gholian, who was sentenced to to 19 years and six months for reporting on labor protests, "publishing false news," and "propaganda against the state. Her sentenced was commuted to five years and she was released on bail in October 2019.

Yasman Ariani, her mother Monireh Arabshahi, and Mojgan Keshavarz, who were sentenced to a total of 16 years for protesting the dress code, "collusion" against national security," "propaganda against the state," and "encouraging" moral corruption and prostitution.

Saba Kordafshari, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison for "encouraging" for moral corruption and prostitution, collusion against national security, and "propaganda against the state."

Sahar Khodayari, who was arrested for trying to enter a stadium to watch football and charged with "wearing improper hijab" and "confrontation with the police." She set herself on fire in front of the courthouse after she was threatened with a six-month imprisonment.

Zahra Rahnavard, who has been under house arrest since February 2011 for her role as the spokesperson of the opposition Green Movement and wife of reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. She and her husband tested positive for COVID-19 in November 2020.

More in this series:
Discriminatory Laws

Marriage: The Islamic Republic initially lowered the age of marriage to nine for girls. In 2002, parliament raised the age to 13. The judiciary has blocked subsequent efforts to raise the age of marriage higher.

Divorce: A woman could only get a divorce in court with a judge's order, while a man could get divorce by declaring it verbally. In 2002, the parliament amended the law to allow a woman to divorce her husband if he were imprisoned, mentally ill, physically abusive or an addict.

Dress Code: All females are required to cover their hair and dress modestly from the age of puberty. The law vaguely defined what constitutes acts against morality, and authorities have long prosecuted hundreds of people for such acts, as well as for consensual extramarital sex.

Child Custody: A divorced woman forfeited child custody if she remarries, even if her husband died.

Nationality: For 40 years, women could not pass their nationality to foreign-born spouses or their children. In 2019, parliament passed a law allowing women married to foreign men to request Iranian citizenship for children under age 18.

Travel: A married woman could not obtain a passport or travel outside Iran without her husband's written permission. A husband could choose where the couple lives and prevent his wife from taking certain jobs that he deemed against "family values."

Inheritance: A widow only inherits one-eighth of her husband's estate, but a widower inherits his wife's entire estate. A son inherits twice as much as a daughter. In 2009, parliament voted to let women inherit land.

The following are specific laws on women in the constitution and enacted by parliament. They differ in the language of the law and how they are applied in practice.

Marriage

A Wedding at Martyrs Fallah Hall in Karaj

In the law: The rules on marriage are the most discriminatory. A man can marry up to four women at one time; women can only marry one husband. A woman needs a male guardian's consent - either from her father or paternal grandfather-to marry. Muslim women cannot marry non-Muslim men, while Muslim men can marry Jews, Christians or Zoroastrians. The revolutionary government lowered the age of marriage for women from 18 to 13 (in 1979) then to nine (in 1982). In 2002, the Majles raised the age of marriage back to 13 for girls (and to 15 for boys). In a marriage contract, women are required to be obedient to receive funds for housing, clothes, food and furniture.

In practice: Polygamy is not common among men. Most women also do not marry until their twenties. In 2014, the average age of marriage for women was 23, although hundreds of girls under 13, even under 10, were forcibly married by their families. The average age for men was 28, the government reported.
Text of the laws:
Article 1041 of the Civil Code: "Marriage before the age of puberty is prohibited. (Marriage before puberty by the permission of the Guardian and on condition of taking into consideration the ward's interest is proper)."

Article 1041 of the Civil Code (amended in 2002): "Marriage of girls before reaching the age of 13 full solar years and boys before reaching the age of 15 full solar years is subject to the permission of the Guardian and on condition of taking the child's best interest into consideration and approval of the relevant court."

Article 1043 of the Civil Code: "The marriage of a girl who has not married previously is dependent on the permission of her father or her paternal grandfather even if she has reached the full age of puberty. If, however, the father or the paternal grandfather withhold the permission without justifiable reason, the girl can refer to the Special Civil Court giving full particulars of the man whom she wants to marry and also the terms of the marriage and the dowry money agreed upon and notify her father or her paternal grandfather through that Court."

Article 1059 of the Civil Code: "Marriage of a female Muslim with a non-Muslim is not allowed."

Article 1061 of the Civil Code: "The Government can make the marriage of certain Government servants and officials and students supported by the Government with a female foreign national dependent upon special permission."

Articles 1106 to 1108 of the Civil Code: "The cost of maintenance of the wife is at the charge of the husband in permanent marriages. Cost of maintenance includes dwelling, clothing, food, furniture in proportion to the situation of the wife, on a reasonable basis, and provision of a servant if the wife is accustomed to have servants or if she needs one because of illness or defects of limbs. If the wife refuses to fulfil duties of a wife without legitimate excuse, she will not be entitled to the cost of maintenance."

Divorce

In the law:Women also face discrimination in divorce. Females can only get a divorce in a court, while a man can get a divorce simply by declaring it verbally-and not even necessarily in her presence. In 1982, judges were empowered to grant a divorce to a woman facing "difficult and undesirable conditions." The Majles amended the law in 2002 to allow a woman to divorce her husband if he was imprisoned for five or more years, mentally ill, physically abusive or an addict.

In practice: Divorce cases often end in mutual agreement between husband and wife in court. Women must prove that their husband is physical abusive or psychologically unstable, if the man is unwilling to divorce. In 1992, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani approved a bill allowing women to claim alimony payments, if husbands initiated a divorce. In 2014, more than 20 percent of all marriages ended in divorce.

Article 1130 of the Civil Code (amended in December 1982): "In the following circumstances, the wife can refer to the Islamic judge and request for a divorce. When it is proved to the Court that the continuation of the marriage causes difficult and undesirable conditions, the judge can for the sake of avoiding harm and difficulty compel the husband to, divorce his wife. If this cannot be done, then the divorce will be made on the permission of the Islamic judge."

Article 1130 of the Civil Code (amended in 2002): "The osr-va-haraj (difficult and undesirable conditions) mentioned in this article refers to the conditions that make the continuation of [marital] life intolerable and difficult for the wife; the following circumstances, if proved in the relevant court, shall be considered as a case of osr-va-haraj:

1: The husband's leaving of marital life for, at least, six consecutive months, or, nine alternative months in a one year period, without any acceptable reason.

2: The husband's addiction to any kind of drugs or alcohol that, damages the marital life, and his refusal, or impossibility of compelling him, to quit the addiction in a period prescribed by the doctor. If the husband does not fulfill his promise [to quit], or, again begins his abuse, the divorce shall be granted by the request of the wife.

3: Final conviction of the husband to five years, or more, imprisonment.

4: Wife battery or any kind of mistreatment of the wife that is intolerable in the wife's condition.

5: Husband's affliction to incurable mental illnesses or contagious disease or any kind of incurable diseases that disrupts the marital life.

The circumstances mentioned in this article are not exhaustive and the court may grant the divorce in other cases that osr-va-haraj is proved in the court."

Article 1133 of the Civil Code: "A man can divorce his wife whenever he wishes to do so."

Child Custody

A mother and her child at a film festival in Isfahan

In the law: Women have preferential custody over children under seven. Courts determined whether a mother or father gets custody of children older than seven. A divorced woman forfeits child custody if she remarries, even if her husband is dead.

In practice: Divorced women are likely to lose custody of their children, especially if they are financially dependent on alimony.

Article 21 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: "The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity with Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals... the awarding of guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to protect the interests of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian."

Article 1168 to 1170 of the Civil Code: "Custody of children is both the right and duty of the parents. A mother has preference over others for two years from the birth of her child for the custody of the child and after the lapse of this period custody will devolve on the father expect in the case of a daughter who will remain under the custody of the mother till 7 years. If the mother becomes insane or marries another man during her period of custody, the custody will devolve on the father."

Article 1169 of the Civil Code (amended in 2002): "For the custody of children whose parents are separated, the mother has priority until the age of seven; and then, custody will devolve upon the father. After reaching seven years of age, in the case of dispute, considering the best interest of the child, the court will decide who receives custody of the child."

Dress Code

In the law: Women face restrictions on dress and severe punishment for violations. The Islamic Republic mandated wearing head covering, or hijab, in public. Violators face punishments that include up to two months in prison, fines of up to 500,000 rials and up to 74 lashes.

In practice: Fewer women in major cities wear the all-enveloping black chadors, while many young women wear scarves that barely cover their hair. So many women started wearing tight leggings that lawmakers summoned the interior minister in June 2014 to question the lax enforcement of the dress code.

Public opinion has shifted significantly, the Parliamentary Research Center reported in 2018. In 2006, 55 percent of respondents said that state should "confront" women who disobey hijab; by 2014, only 40 percent said that the state should confront violators.

In May 2017, women launched the White Wednesday protests against hijab by removing their headscarves in public places and waving them on a stick. Many were arrested and charged with crimes, such as collusion against national security, propaganda against the state, and encouraging moral corruption and prostitution. They risked fines or lashings.
Text of the laws:
Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code: "Anyone in public places and roads who openly commits a harām (sinful) act, in addition to the punishment provided for the act, shall be sentenced to two months' imprisonment or up to 74 lashes; and if they commit an act that is not punishable but violates public prudency, they shall only be sentenced to ten days to two months' imprisonment or up to 74 lashes."

"Women, who appear in public places and roads without wearing an Islamic hijab [veil], shall be sentenced to ten days to two months' imprisonment or a fine of fifty thousand to five hundred Rials.

Nationality

In 2020, Reyhaneh was the first child of a non-Iranian father to gain citizenship

In the law: Women can't automatically transfer citizenship to children or spouses.

In practice: Women have gradually gained rights on citizenship issues involving family members. In 2019, parliament passed a law allowing the children of women married to foreigners to apply for Iranian citizenship. In the past, many have effectively been stateless. The law went into effect in 2020.
Text of the law:
Article 976 of the civil code: "The following persons are considered to be Iranian subjects... Persons born in Iran of a father of foreign nationality who have resided at least one more year in Iran immediately after reaching the full age of 18."

Article 1 of law amending citizenship of children (2019): "Children born to legal marriage of Iranian women to non-Iranian men who were born or will be born before or after the adoption of this law before reaching the age of eighteen ... [can] become citizens of Iran at the request of the Iranian mother. The above-mentioned children can apply for Iranian citizenship after reaching the age of 18, if the Iranian mother does not apply."

Travel

Zahra Nemati, a two-time Paralympic gold medalist, was permitted to travel abroad without her husband's permission.

In the law: Women face restrictions on travel abroad. A woman requires a husband's permission to obtain a passport or travel outside the country.

In practice: Husbands could choose to provide blanket permission for his wife's travel or require her to ask for permission for each trip abroad. Single women over the age of 18 could obtain a passport without permission but still required their guardian's approval to leave the country. Women arriving at airports would sometimes find their permission to travel abroad had been revoked by their husband or male guardian and were prevented from boarding flights. In rare circumstances, authorities would intervene to allow female athletes to compete abroad over a husband's objections.

Article 18 of the Passport Law of 1973: "A passport shall be issued for the following persons according to this article...Married women, even if under 18 years old, with the written agreement of their husbands."

In the law: Under Islamic inheritance law, a man is granted his deceased wife's entire estate, while a widow receives only one-eighth of her husband's estate. A son inherits twice as much as a daughter. Until 2009, widows could not inherit land. Parliament then voted to let women inherit land.

In practice: Affluent families have circumvented the law by transferring the property titles before death. In some cases, men have also bought property in the names of their wives or children in case they die first to avoid civil code requirements.

Article 949 of the Civil Code: "If the deceased has left no living children, and no living children's children of whatever degree, either of the parents, if alone, takes the whole estate; and if the father and mother of the deceased are both alive, the mother takes one - third and the father two - thirds. But if the mother comes after someone else, one-sixth of the estate belongs to the mother and the rest to the father."

Article 907 of the Civil Code: "If the deceased leaves no parents, but has one or more children, the estate will be divided as follows:

"If the offspring consists of only one, whether son or daughter, the whole of the estate belongs to that child. If there are several children, but all are sons or all daughters, the estate will be divided equally among them.

"If there are several children, some being sons and some daughters each son takes twice as much as each daughter."

Article 908 of the Civil Code: "If the father or the mother of the deceased, or both parents, are alive, together with one daughter, the share of each one of the father and the mother will be one-sixth of the estate.; and the share of the daughter will be one - half there of. The remainder must be divided among all the rest of the heirs in proportion to the share of each; unless the mother comes after someone else, in which case the mother takes no portion of the remainder."

Article 909 of the Civil Code: "If the father or the mother, or both the parents of the deceased are alive, together with several daughters, the share of the whole of the daughters will be two-thirds of the estate ,which is to be divided equally among them; and the 'share' of each one of the father and the mother will be one - sixth . And if there be a remainder it will be divided among all the heirs in proportion to their shares unless the mother comes after someone else, in which case the mother will not take any portion of the remainder."

Article 911 of the Civil Code: " If the deceased leaves no sons or daughters, his grandchildren are the legal representatives of his sons or daughters, and in this way are reckoned as belong in to the first degree of descendants, and take inheritance with each one of the parents who are alive.

"The division of the inheritance among the grandchildren will take place in accordance with their sex, that is to say, each individual will take the portion the person through whom he claims descent from the deceased; hence, the children of a son take twice as much as the children of a daughter.

"In the division among individuals of each sex, a boy takes twice as much as a girl."

Article 913 of the Civil Code: "In all the conditions mentioned in this subsection, whichever of the married pair is the survivor takes his or her, share and this share means one half of the estate for the surviving husband and one-quarter for the surviving wife, provided that the deceased left no children or grandchildren; and it means one - quarter of the estate for the husband and one - eighth for the wife if the deceased left children or children's children. And the remainder of the estate is to be divided among the other heirs in accordance with the preceding Articles."

Article 914 of the Civil Code: "If, owing to the existence of several persons entitled to shares, the estate of the deceased be not sufficient to satisfy of them, the deficiency falls on the daughter or the two daughters; and if, after deduction of the portion of those entitled to shares there still remains something, and there be no heirs entitled to take the remainder by way of relationship, this remainder will be divided among the persons entitled to shares in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Articles; but the husband and the wife in all case, and the mother if she comes after someone else, take no part of the remainder."

Article 945 of the Civil Code (amended in 2009): "If a man marries a woman when he is ill, and dies of that disease before consummation of the marriage, the wife does not take inheritance from him; but if he dies after consummation, or after recovery from that disease, the wife takes inheritance from him."

Article 946 of the Civil Code: "The husband takes inheritance from the whole of the estate of the deceased wife; and the wife inherits one-eighth of the actual movable property and one-eighth of the price of immovable property including site and buildings, if the deceased husband has children. If the husband has children, the share of the wife will be one-fourth of the property stipulated as follows.

Article 949 of the Civil Code: "If there is no other heir except for the husband or wife, the husband takes the whole of the estate of his late wife; but the wife takes only her portion, and the rest of the estate of the husband is considered as the estate of a man without any heir, and will be dealt with in accordance with Article 866."
Photo Credits: Judiciary Logo via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY SA 4.0); Zahra Nemati via Tasnim News Agency (CC BY 4.0), Wedding via Tasnim News Agency (CC By 4.0), Mother and Child via Tasnim News Agency (CC By 4.0), Rayhaneh via ILNA

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Women have long faced legal, political, economic and social challenges in Iran. Iran's 1906 constitution, written by its first parliament, promised "equal rights before the law" for all Iranians, but it said nothing specific about women. Between 1967 and 1975, women gained new rights-to vote, initiate divorce, run for office, inherit property-during the monarchy.

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https://www.ushistory.org/navigation/women.html

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An overview of the resources on the history of women's rights available on ushistory.org

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https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1hslIQMMGBvkm_qzoNm-_p42sKVm9rdS16LtPB9ogu6w/edit?pli=1#slide=id.p

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https://docs.google.com/document/d/10UJBtVpyV-MHiT4mA_5CMq09W2kE9Tcc3loNhEelkCo/edit

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Create a new document and edit with others at the same time -- from your computer, phone or tablet. Get stuff done with or without an internet connection. Use Docs to edit Word files. Free from Google.

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https://nationalwomenshistoryalliance.org/resources/womens-rights-movement/detailed-timeline/

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1701 The first sexually integrated jury hears cases in Albany, New York.

1769 American colonies based their laws on the English common law, which was summarized in the Blackstone Commentaries. It said, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law? The very being and legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of her husband under whose wing and protection she performs everything."

1777 All states pass laws which take away women's right to vote.

1789 United States Constitution ratified. The terms "persons," "people" and "electors" are used, allowing the interpretation of those beings to include men and women.

1839 The first state (Mississippi) grants women the right to hold property in their own name, with their husbands' permission.

1848 At Seneca Falls, New York, 300 women and men sign the Declaration of Sentiments, a plea for the end of discrimination against women in all spheres of society.

1855 In Missouri v. Celia, a Slave, a Black woman is declared to be property without a right to defend herself against a master's act of rape

1866 The 14th Amendment is passed by Congress (ratified by the states in 1868), saying "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective members, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. . . .But when the right to vote . . .is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State . . . the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in proportion." It is the first time "citizens" and "voters" are defined as "male" in the Constitution.

1869 The first woman suffrage law in the U.S. is passed in the territory of Wyoming.

1870 The 15th Amendment receives final ratification, saying, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." By its text, women are not specifically excluded from the vote.

1870 The first sexually integrated grand jury hears cases in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The chief justice stops a motion to prohibit the integration of the jury, stating: "It seems to be eminently proper for women to sit upon Grand Juries, which will give them the best possible opportunities to aid in suppressing the dens of infamy which curse the country."

1873 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872): The U.S. Supreme Court rules that a state has the right to exclude a married woman (Myra Colby Bradwell) from practicing law.

1875 Minor v Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875): The U.S. Supreme Court declares that despite the privileges and immunities clause, a state can prohibit a woman from voting. The court declares women as "persons," but holds that they constitute a "special category of _nonvoting_ citizens."

1879 Through special Congressional legislation, Belva Lockwood becomes first woman admitted to try a case before the Supreme Court.

1890 The first state (Wyoming) grants women the right to vote in all elections.

1900 By now, every state has passed legislation modeled after New York's Married Women's Property Act (1848), granting married women some control over their property and earnings.

1908 Muller v State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908): The U.S. Supreme Court upholds Oregon's 10-hour workday for women. The win is a two-edged sword: the protective legislation implies that women are physically weak.

1916 Margaret Sanger tests the validity of New York's anti-contraception law by establishing a clinic in Brooklyn. The most well-known of birth control advocates, she is one of hundreds arrested over a 40-year period for working to establish women's right to control their own bodies.

1918 New York v. Sanger, 222 NY 192, 118 N.E. 637 (Court of Appeals 1917), National Archives, Records of the U.S. Supreme Court, RG 267 (MSDME-CDS C 15:298). Margaret Sanger wins her suit in New York to allow doctors to advise their married patients about birth control for health purposes.

1920 The Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is ratified. It declares: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."

1923 National Woman's Party proposes Constitutional amendment: "Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and in every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

1924 Radice v. New York, a New York state case, upholds a law that forbade waitresses from working the night shift but made an exception for entertainers and ladies' room attendants.

1925 American Indian suffrage granted by act of Congress.

1932 The National Recovery Act forbids more than one family member from holding a government job, resulting in many women losing their jobs.

1936 United States v. One Package of Japanese Pessaries, 13 F. Supp.334 (E.D.N.Y 1936) aff'd 86 F 2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1936), won judicial approval of medicinal use of birth control.

1937 The U.S. Supreme Court upholds Washington state's minimum wage laws for women.

1938 The Fair Labor Standards Act establishes minimum wage without regard to sex.

1947 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), the U.S. Supreme Court says women are equally qualified with men to serve on juries but are granted an exemption and may serve or not as women choose.

1961 In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961): The U.S. Supreme Court upholds rules adopted by the state of Florida that made it far less likely for women than men to be called for jury service on the grounds that a "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life."

1963 The Equal Pay Act is passed by Congress, promising equitable wages for the same work, regardless of the race, color, religion, national origin or sex of the worker.

1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act passes including a prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.

1965 Weeks v. Southern Bell, 408 F. 2d. 228 (5th Cir. 1969), marks a major triumph in the fight against restrictive labor laws and company regulations on the hours and conditions of women's work, opening many previously male-only jobs to women.

1965 In Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, the Supreme Court overturns one of the last state laws prohibiting the prescription or use of contraceptives by married couples.

1968 Executive Order 11246 prohibits sex discrimination by government contractors and requires affirmative action plans for hiring women.

1969 In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir.1969), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rules that women meeting the physical requirements can work in many jobs that had been for men only.

California adopts the nation's first "no fault" divorce law, allowing divorce by mutual consent.

1971 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542: The U.S. Supreme Court outlaws the practice of private employers refusing to hire women with pre-school children.

1971 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71: The U.S. Supreme Court holds unconstitutional a state law (Idaho) establishing automatic preference for males as administrators of wills. This is the first time the court strikes down a law treating men and women differently. The Court finally declares women as "persons," but uses a "reasonableness" test rather than making sex a "suspect classification," analogous to race, under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1972 Title IX (Public Law 92-318) of the Education Amendments prohibits sex discrimination in all aspects of education programs that receive federal support.

1972: In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, the Supreme Court rules that the right to privacy encompasses an unmarried person's right to use contraceptives.

1973 Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973): The U.S. Supreme Court bans sex-segregated "help wanted" advertising as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended.

1973 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179: The U.S. Supreme Court declares that the Constitution protects women's right to terminate an early pregnancy, thus making abortion legal in the U.S.

1974 Housing discrimination on the basis of sex and credit discrimination against women are outlawed by Congress.

1974 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), determines it is illegal to force pregnant women to take maternity leave on the assumption they are incapable of working in their physical condition.

The Women's Educational Equity Act, drafted by Arlene Horowitz and introduced by Representative Patsy Mink (D-HI), funds the development of nonsexist teaching materials and model programs that encourage full educational opportunities for girls and women.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Justice and Labor Departments, and AT&T sign a consent decree banning AT&T's discriminatory practices against women and minorities.

1975 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), denies states the right to exclude women from juries.

1976 General Elec. Co v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), the Supreme Court upholds women's right to unemployment benefits during the last three months of pregnancy.

1976 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190: The U.S. Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a state law permitting 18 to 20-year-old females to drink beer while denying the rights to men of the same age. The Court establishes new set of standards for reviewing laws that treat men and women differently-an "intermediate" test stricter than the "reasonableness" test for constitutionality in sex discrimination cases.

1978 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act bans employment discrimination against pregnant women.

1981 The U.S. Supreme Court rules that excluding women from the draft is constitutional.

1981 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-60, overturns state laws designating a husband "head and master" with unilateral control of property owned jointly with his wife.

1981 Sandra Day O'Connor is appointed by President Ronald Reagan to serve as the first woman on the Supreme Court.

1984 In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), sex discrimination in membership policies of organizations, such as the Jaycees, is forbidden by the Supreme Court, opening many previously all-male organizations (Jaycees, Kiwanis, Rotary, Lions) to women.

The state of Mississippi belatedly ratifies the 19th Amendment, granting women the vote.

1984 Hishon v. King and Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984): The U.S. Supreme Court rules that law firms may not discriminate on the basis of sex in promoting lawyers to partnership positions.

1986 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a hostile or abusive work environment can prove discrimination based on sex.

1987 Johnson v. Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987): The U.S. Supreme Court rules that it is permissible to take sex and race into account in employment decisions even where there is no proven history of discrimination but when evidence of a manifest imbalance exists in the number of women or minorities holding the position in question.

1989 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Supreme Court affirms the right of states to deny public funding for abortions and to prohibit public hospitals from performing abortions.

1993 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) The U.S. Supreme Court rules that the victim did not need to show that she suffered physical or serious psychological injury as a result of sexual harassment.

The Family and Medical Leave Act goes into effect.

1994 Congress adopts the Gender Equity in Education Act to train teachers in gender equity, promote math and science learning by girls, counsel pregnant teens, and prevent sexual harassment.

1994 The Violence Against Women Act funds services for victims of rape and domestic violence, allows women to seek civil rights remedies for gender-related crimes, provides training to increase police and court officials' sensitivity and a national 24-hour hotline for battered women.

1996 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), affirms that the male-only admissions policy of the state-supported Virginia Military Institute violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

1997 Elaborating on Title IX, the Supreme Court rules that college athletics programs must actively involve roughly equal numbers of men and women to qualify for federal support.

1998 Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America agrees to pay $34 million to settle an E.E.O.C. lawsuit contending that hundreds of women were sexually harassed.

1998 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742 (1998): The Supreme Court balances employee and employer rights. It rules that employers are liable for sexual harassment even in instances when a supervisor's threats are not carried out. But the employer can defend itself by showing that it took steps to prevent or promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior and the employee did not take advantage of available opportunities to stop the behavior or complain of the behavior.

2000 CBS Broadcasting agrees to pay $8 million to settle a sex discrimination lawsuit by the E.E.O.C. on behalf of 200 women.

2000 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court invalidates those portions of the Violence Against Women Act permitting victims of rape, domestic violence, etc. to sue their attackers in federal court.

2003 Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 538 U.S. 721 (2003). The Supreme Court rules that states can be sued in federal court for violations of the Family Leave Medical Act.

2005 Hillary Clinton becomes the first First Lady to be elected to public office as a U.S. Senator from New York. Condoleezza Rice becomes the first black female Secretary of State.

2005 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education 544 U.S. 167. The Supreme Court rules that Title IX prohibits punishing someone for complaining about sex-based discrimination.

2006 The Supreme Court upholds a ban on the "partial-birth" abortion procedure. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, a federal law passed in 2003, was the first to ban a specific abortion procedure.

2005 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. The 2005 reauthorization allocates federal funds to aid victims, provides housing to prevent victims from becoming homeless, ensures victims have access to the justice system, and created intervention programs to assist children who witnessed domestic violence and to those at risk of domestic violence.

2007 Nancy Pelosi becomes the first female speaker of the House.

2008 Hillary Clinton is the only First Lady to run for president.

2009 Sonia Sotomayor is nominated as the 111th U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Sotomayor becomes the first Hispanic American and the third woman to serve.

2009 Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act allows victims, usually women, of pay discrimination to file a complaint with the government against their employer within 180 days of their last paycheck.

2009 Hillary Clinton becomes Secretary of State on January 21, 2009. She is the third woman in U.S. history to hold this position. After four years, she stepped down.

2010 The Affordable Health Care Act is signed into law. Under this law, private health insurance companies must provide birth control without co-pays or deductibles. The law requires private insurance companies to cover preventive services.

2010 Elena Kagan is confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United States; Kagan is the fourth female to serve on the Supreme Court.

2013 The ban against women in military combat positions is removed; this overturned a 1994 Pentagon decision restricting women from combat roles.

2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. The new bill extends coverage to women of Native American tribal lands who are attacked by non-tribal residents, as well as lesbians and immigrants.

2013 United States v. Windsor 570 U.S. Supreme Court decides that a key part of DOMA, the law that restricts federal recognition of same-sex marriage, is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the constitution.

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Detailed Timeline - National Women's History Alliance

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Timeline of Legal History of Women in the United States 1701 The first sexually integrated jury hears cases in Albany, New York. 1769 American colonies based their laws on the English common law, which was summarized in the Blackstone Commentaries. It said, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law?

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