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5/12/2017                Unit 1 Chapter 1 Textbook

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5/12/2017                Unit 1 Chapter 1 Textbook

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Read pages 1-12 and answer questions 1-30

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30/11/2017              VCE Geography Study Design

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30/11/2017              VCE Geography Study Design

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1/12/2017                         Mackillop School Zone

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1/12/2017                         Mackillop School Zone

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To be mapped onto personal map of student locations and paragraph written about the distribution of students compared to the zone.

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Introduction to Google Maps – Mapping Activity

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5/12/2017                        World Map label exercise

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5/12/2017                        World Map label exercise

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World map label exercise

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1/12/2017                              Introductory PowerPoint

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1/12/2017                              Introductory PowerPoint

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Pattern, quantify and exception

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--Complete world mapping activity.
--Read pages 6-10 of Unit 1 Hazards and Disasters Textbook.
--Answer questions 10-30 on pages 11 and 12

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7/12/2017          Holiday Homework Questions

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7/12/2017          Holiday Homework Questions

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Attached are the questions in digital form to be completed as holiday homework.

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19/6/2018                                    Unit 2 Geography Timetable

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19/6/2018                                    Unit 2 Geography Timetable

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Here's a timetable outlining all of our classes and some particular dates. Feel free to use this.

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Monday 5/1/2018                                             Hazards and Disasters + Classifying Hazards

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Monday 5/1/2018                                             Hazards and Disasters + Classifying Hazards

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Read the powerpoint (summary of pages 14-19)

1. Create notes explaining the defining characteristics of each type of hazard and give an example of each type of hazard (Geological/geophysical, hydro-meteorological, biological and technological)

2. Complete the questions from the end of the slides in your books.

3. Extension: research the recent heavy rainfall in  Northern Australia (Broome), which may be considered a hazard, but was it a disaster? (find out).
What weather patterns cause this type of weather?
Is this weather caused by seasonal change?  You may wish to use the following website to gain an understanding in to the reading of weather: http://www.bom.gov.au/lam/Students_Teachers/pressure.shtml

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5/2/2017      Completed Holiday Homework Questions

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5/2/2017      Completed Holiday Homework Questions

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Wednesday 7/2/2018 Hazards, disasters and natural processes + more hazards? + potential benefits 

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Wednesday 7/2/2018 Hazards, disasters and natural processes + more hazards? + potential benefits 

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Read pages 20-23 (as whole class)

1. HOMEWORKAnswer questions 1abc, 2, 3ab, 4ab,5, and 6 (p.23)

2.HOMEWORK Select one of the natural disasters from figure 2.7. Explain the following:
-Cause
-Impact
-Scale of effects
-Government response/s to the disaster

3.EXTENSION  "Climate Change and global warming"
a. explain the process that results in global warming

b. What hazards could climate change make more likely in Australia? Explain the process that results in these hazards

c. the previous pages have explained that hazards can bring benefits. Find a place or region that will benefit from climate change/global warming and explain why this is the case.

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Hazards and Disasters Overview: 3 lessons

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Hazards and Disasters Overview: 3 lessons

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Friday 9/2/2018 Bangladesh: Hazard Nation/Spatial info tech and hazards/ Responding to hazard events and disasters

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Friday 9/2/2018 Bangladesh: Hazard Nation/Spatial info tech and hazards/ Responding to hazard events and disasters

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Read pages 24-27

1. Answer questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7ab, 8abcd, 9, 10 and 11
(note: q.8b should read "15 000" not 1500)

If you don't understand term or word, look in the glossary (p.124) or google it!

What isn't done becomes homework.

Extension:
Watch the following video on natural disasters in Bangladesh: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5aVuuClqOic

What hazards and hazard events can you identify?
What responses to the situations have developed?
Do you think these responses will be effective in the long term?

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Hazards and Disasters

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Natural disasters and extreme weather | World news | The Guardian

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The latest news and comment on natural disasters and extreme weather

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Topic:
What is a bushfire?

Read:
Pages 8-25

Answer:
Questions 1-11

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Pick one of the articles to the right to read.

Present in a PowerPoint an explanation of what has occurred:

-What type of hazard has occurred and the place of the hazard and the region impacted. Include a map.

-The process that caused the event. (physical causes)

-Any change that has occurred (impacts-positive or negative)

-The response to the hazard

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At least 17 people have been killed, with the death toll expected to rise, after heavy rains caused a violent mudslide exacerbated by recent wildfire damage

The mud cascaded down scorched, blackened slopes still blanketed with ash. With no trees or vegetation to slow the surge it swept rocks and boulders from the Verdugo mountains into a thunderous river.

Jeannette Abney, 88, watched in horror not believing slopes could so quickly turn to sludge and so quickly surround her home in La Tuna canyon.

"Oh God, the rain was terrible, terrible. Outside it was like a war zone, like Niagara Falls. It pushed my big truck 60ft across the road. It sounded like a freight train. I've never experienced anything like that."

Abney escaped Tuesday's mudslide in this rural corner of Los Angeles with her two dogs and spoke on Wednesday from an American Red Cross evacuation center. It offered cots, blankets, food and instant coffee. A cool breeze flapped posters declaring "disaster services".

Swaths of southern California are in need after nature's latest battering, this time in the form of heavy rains which unleashed massive debris flows, a grim sequel to a record drought and record wildfires.

At least 17 people died, mostly in Montecito, a wealthy enclave north-west of LA. The avalanche buried homes and swept others from their foundations, which in addition to the dead left at least 25 people injured, 24 missing and hundreds marooned, authorities said.

Rescue crews in helicopters plucked survivors from waist-high mud, including a 14-year-old girl. "I thought I was dead for a minute there," she told them.

"All hell broke loose," Peter Hartmann, a dentist, told AP. "Power lines were down, high-voltage power lines, the large aluminum poles to hold those were snapped in half. Water was flowing out of water mains and sheared-off fire hydrants." He watched rescuers revive a toddler pulled unresponsive from the muck. "It was a freaky moment to see her just covered in mud."

The death toll was expected to rise as search-and-rescue teams took advantage of the storm's ebbing to scour several dozen damaged and destroyed homes. "Right now our assets are focused on determining if anyone is still alive in any of those structures that have been damaged," Sheriff Bill Brown of Santa Barbara county told reporters.

The storm - the first of the rainy season - turned devastating because huge wildfires in recent months charred mountains and canyons, leaving soil unable to efficiently absorb water.

Authorities anticipated the danger and issued evacuation orders in recently burned areas of Santa Barbara, Ventura and Los Angeles counties. Only an estimated 10 to 15% of people in a mandatory evacuation area of Santa Barbara county heeded the warning.

I've always been more scared of fires but now I think you have to worry more about mud - it's silent and faster

Diana Kalaitzian, resident

The harrowing consequences rekindled a perennial debate about the Golden State occupying a thin line between fortune and disaster, and the lottery of never knowing which will strike.

"We've been dodging bullets and got lucky again," said Tom Suchner, 63, a car mechanic, as he walked his dog down Kagel canyon. "It was a nice, steady rain. It got rid of a lot of the ash."

In this part of the Verdugo mountains, a rugged patch of nature on LA's outskirts, residents woke up on Wednesday to marshy soil and not much worse.

But just a few miles away a mudflow traced a burnt ridgeline and smashed into an affluent neighbourhood lining La Tuna canyon road.

"It was a full river, boulders floating down, hitting cars," said one resident, Diana Kalaitzian, 45. "I've always been more scared of fires but now I think you have to worry more about mud because you don't see it coming. It's silent and faster."

Helicopters hovered as Kalaitzian stood outside her home, surveying the aftermath: sludge in every direction, a landscape overnight turned brown. Neighbours were shovelling sludge.

At one end of the road earth-movers were clearing lanes and imposing some order on the mud. At the other, higher up in the canyon, there was no way for cars to pass and mud-splattered police were riding mountain bikes, inspecting damage.

Kalaitzian's home escaped but she was braced for a season of anxiety. "You know there's more to come."

California has just endured its worst and most expensive wildfire season. The Thomas fire, which encompassed the land around Montecito, burned more than 280,000 acres, the biggest in the state's modern history.

This followed a five-year- drought - by some measures the worst in a millennium - which emptied reservoirs and parched the countryside.

It ended in 2016 with record rainfall which counterintuitively aggravated last year's fire season by producing vegetation - fuel. It turned tinder dry last summer, the hottest on record.

So many records in so short a time has convinced many scientists that climate change is a factor.

Elizabeth Terry, 63, a caregiver who lives in a boarding home in the Verdugo mountains, has had to evacuate three times: a wildfire in 2016, another in 2017, then this week's mudslides.

"California is a wonderful place to live - depending where you live," she said, speaking from a Red Cross evacuation centre. Terry can't afford to live in a safer area. "Lord knows I'm trying to move, desperately."
Topics

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Deadly California mudslide 'like Niagara falls' as hills turn to rivers of debris

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At least 17 people have been killed, with the death toll expected to rise, after heavy rains caused a violent mudslide exacerbated by recent wildfire damage The mud cascaded down scorched, blackened slopes still blanketed with ash. With no trees or vegetation to slow the surge it swept rocks and boulders from the Verdugo mountains into a thunderous river.

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City faces lengthy cleanup as water reaches 5.84 metres, just shy of levels seen in 2016

The swollen Seine has peaked at more than four metres above its normal level, leaving a lengthy mop-up job for Parisians after days of rising waters.

The river rose to 5.84 metres (19.2ft) early on Monday morning, causing problems for commuters as well as people living near its overflowing banks.

The Vigicrues flooding watchdog said the river would stay at its current level throughout the day before beginning to recede on Tuesday.

Around 1,500 people have been evacuated from their homes, according to police, while a similar number of properties remain without electricity.

The capital's famous Bateaux Mouches rivercraft service was suspended and only emergency services were authorised to use the river.

The Seine did not quite reach its 2016 high of 6.1 metres, when priceless artworks had to be evacuated from the Louvre.

But the world's most visited museum was still on alert on Sunday, along with the Musée d'Orsay and Orangerie galleries, with the lower level of the Louvre's Islamic arts wing closed to visitors until at least Monday.

A statue of an Algerian French army soldier from the Crimean war known as a Zouave that has guarded the river at the Pont d'Alma bridge in central Paris since 1910 was drenched up to its thighs in the muddy waters.

" Fluctuat nec mergitur [tossed but not sunk] but it's cooold," the Zouave statue tweeted from an account set up in its name by an anonymous admirer, using the city's Latin motto.

Police again warned against bathing or canoeing in the river, saying it was "forbidden and extremely dangerous".

More favourable weather is expected for the week ahead, but even once the water levels start to recede forecasters and officials say it will be a slow process, as much of the ground in northern France is already waterlogged.

"If we're talking about things getting completely back to normal, that's going to take weeks," said Jérôme Goellner, regional head of environmental services.

The December-January period is now the third wettest on record since data collection began in 1900, according to France's meteorological service.

A main commuter line, the RER C, will not stop in the city until at least 5 February, and some expressways that run alongside the Seine have been closed.

However, fears of flooding like that seen in 1910, which saw the Seine rise to 8.62 metres and shut down much of Paris's basic infrastructure, appeared unfounded.

In the city centre, the Seine flows through a deep channel, limiting the potential flooding damage.

But several areas on the city's outskirts were underwater, including the southern suburb of Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, where some residents were getting around by boat and dozens have been evacuated from their homes.
Topics

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City faces lengthy cleanup as water reaches 5.84 metres, just shy of levels seen in 2016 The swollen Seine has peaked at more than four metres above its normal level, leaving a lengthy mop-up job for Parisians after days of rising waters.

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Winds of more than 230km/h recorded as parliament building flattened and power lines brought down

The islands of Tonga in the South Pacific have been devastated by Tropical Cyclone Gita with winds of 230km/h flattening parts of Parliament House and causing significant damage and injuries across the kingdom.

Gita hit Tonga around 8pm on Monday night and peaked between 11pm and 2am, slamming on to the south coast of the main island of Tongatapu, bringing down electricity lines, smashing churches and levelling fruit trees and crops vital to the island's livelihood.

At its peak, winds reached 233km/h - far stronger than predicted, despite Gita not reaching a category five storm as anticipated.

According to the British Met office, Gita is the worst cyclone to pass so close to Tonga's main islands in 60 years, and communications were lost overnight as Gita ripped the roof off the Tonga meteorological office as well as taking the national broadcaster off air for a time.

Met Office Storms (@metofficestorms)
Cyclone #Gita is now moving away from #Tonga. It is the strongest cyclone to pass so close to the main islands of Tonga in the modern record (at least 60 years). pic.twitter.com/oqWtovKKWk

Graham Kenna from Tonga's National Emergency Management Office told Radio New Zealand the damage was widespread and severe, and could be the worst in the outer islands where information was slow to obtain.

"I've been involved in disaster responses for 30 plus years and it's the worst situation I have been in," Kenna said.

"A lot of the landmark buildings are extremely badly damaged or even destroyed, the landmark tree ... near the palace, has been been destroyed ... it's quite a bad situation."

New Zealand has released NZ$750,000 in emergency relief funding, and prime minister Jacinda Ardern said the defence force was on standby to deploy as soon as Tongan authorities specified what assistance they required from her government.

Newshub Pacific correspondent Michael Morrah, who is in the capital Nuku'alofa, reported dozens of houses had been destroyed by the storm. He captured widespread flooding and wreckage across the capital and reported the levelling of a number of significant landmarks, most notably Parliament House.

Michael Morrah (@MichaelMorrah)
Damage following #TCGita #Tonga @NewshubNZ pic.twitter.com/RgXGGW2qjF

Elizabeth V Kité (@ElizabethVKite)
A hopeless feeling waking up to aftermath of Cyclone Gita in #Tonga from abroad . To our loved ones back home we stand beside you as Tonga rebuilds & recovers. Image below is what used to be Tonga's Parliament House ❤️🇹🇴 pic.twitter.com/mrI1PYN6QW

Solomone Savelio (@SolomoneSavelio)
#TCGita damages from Nuku'alofa @TongaUpdates pic.twitter.com/11DDEoWdJz

Tonga's emergency response team said they were struggling to assess damage around the capital and the islands due to debris blocking roads and downed power lines, and were not likely to have a comprehensive assessment of the disaster until Wednesday.

Mary Fonua, the managing editor of the online news website Matangi Tonga, remained awake in her family home overnight, pacing the house and watching the windows blow out and the solar panels ripped from the roof.

"The wind was terrifying, it was tearing overhead and we could hear roofs being lifted. Amazingly, emergency services were still going out," Fonua told Radio New Zealand.

Sione Taumoefolau, the secretary general of the Red Cross in Tonga, said he had dispatched his teams at first light to begin assessing the damage and clearing ruined streets. He said by initial estimates the damage in the capital was severe.

"At this stage we have no reports of causalities and only minor injuries, so I think we can be grateful for that. But we do not have good information on the outer islands, so we will have to wait and see what we find today. It was a frightening night, the entire house was shaking."

The Kingdom of Tonga is made up on 176 islands, though only 40 are inhabited.

Gita was picking up pace as it banked south for Fiji, and was expected to hit the Lau Islands south of the mainland around midday on Tuesday.

New Zealand's foreign affairs minister, Winston Peters, said emergency supplies had been prepared on Monday and were ready to be dispatched to the islands at the first call from the Tongan government.

"Initial assessments of the damage are still coming in. However, it is clear that Cyclone Gita has caused significant damage," Peters said.

"This is an initial contribution that will enable us to respond quickly to requests from the government of Tonga to meet immediate needs, such as emergency shelter, water and sanitation. We stand ready to provide additional support as the extent of the damage becomes clear."

Unicef New Zealand also said it was prepared to respond to the disaster and had already dispatched some emergency supplies to Fiji.
Topics

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Cyclone Gita: Tonga devastated by worst storm in 60 years

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Winds of more than 230km/h recorded as parliament building flattened and power lines brought down The islands of Tonga in the South Pacific have been devastated by Tropical Cyclone Gita with winds of 230km/h flattening parts of Parliament House and causing significant damage and injuries across the kingdom.

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Cape Town faces Day Zero: what happens when the city turns off the taps?

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In 10 weeks engineers will turn off water for a million homes as this South African city reacts to a one-in-384-year drought. The rich are digging boreholes, more are panic-buying bottled water, and the army is on standby

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Read the following article and explain in a paragraph how Indigenous Australians shaped Australia with fire.

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Indigenous Australians systematically burnt grasslands to reduce fuel and stop fires raging out of control. Flickr/pietroizzo

Aboriginal people worked hard to make plants and animals abundant, convenient and predictable.

By distributing plants and associating them in mosaics, then using these to lure and locate animals, Aborigines made Australia as it was in 1788, when Europeans arrived.

Where it suited they worked with the country, accepting or consolidating its character, but if it didn't suit they changed the country, sometimes dramatically, with fire or no fire.

"No fire" because a conscious decision not to burn also regulates plants and animals. They judged equally what to burn and what not, when, how often, and how hot. They cleared undergrowth, and they put grass on good soil, clearings in dense and open forest, and tree or scrub clumps in grassland.

A common management system can be recognised in enough dispersed places to say that the system was universal - that Australia was, as the title says, a single estate, and that in this sense Aborigines made Australia.

A history of observation

Observant travellers such as Edward Eyre, Ludwig Leichhardt and Thomas Mitchell reported what Rhys Jones later neatly called "fire-stick farming": grass burnt in mosaics to reduce fuel and to bring on green pick to lure grazing animals.

From the late 1960s researchers like Duncan Merrilees, Ian Thomas and Eric Rolls revived this insight, and Sylvia Hallam showed conclusively that Aborigines managed southwest Australia intensively and systematically.

Ted Strehlow, Debbie Rose, Peter Sutton and others offered insights on Aboriginal belief and practice, especially in the centre and north where traditional management survives best.

I learnt too from seeing in the bush how plant responses to fire or no fire declared their history, and from how people like Alfred Howitt, Bill Jackson, Beth Gott, Peter Latz and Daphne Nash related this to Aboriginal management.

Building on these resources

Bushes and trees, as well as grass, were necessarily associated and distributed. Grass eaters seek shelter as well as feed, and feed-shelter associations ("templates") must be carefully placed so as not to disrupt each other, as this would make target animals unpredictable and the system pointless.

Given how long eucalypts live, templates might take centuries to set up. Each needed several distinct fire regimes, continuously managed and integrated with neighbours, to maintain the necessary conditions for fire-stick farming.

This system could hardly have land boundaries. There could not be a place where it was practised, and next to it a place where it wasn't. Australia was inevitably a single estate, albeit with many managers.

Two factors blended to entrench this, one ecological, the other religious. Ecologically, once you lay out country variably to suit all other species, you are committed to complex and long-term land management. Aboriginal religious philosophy explained and enforced this, chiefly via totems. All things were responsible for others of its totem and their habitats.

For example, emu people must care for emus and emu habitats, and emus must care for them. There was too a lesser but still strong responsibility to other totems and habitats, ensuring that all things were always under care.

Totems underwrote the ecological arrangement of Australia, creating an entire continent managed under the same Law for similar biodiverse purposes, no matter what the vegetation.

Despite vastly different plant communities, from spinifex to rainforest, from Tasmania to the Kimberleys, there were the same plant patterns - the same relationship between food or medicine plants and shelter plants.

Blinkered to the obvious

Why has it taken so long to see the obvious?

Put simply, farming peoples see differently. Like our draught horses, we wear the blinkers agriculture imposes. Australia is not like the northern Europe from which most early settlers came. Burn Australia's perennials and they come back green; burn Europe's annuals and they die.

Again, you can predictably lure and locate Australia's animals because there were almost no predators, whereas Europe's many predators scattered prey, so the notion of using fire to locate resources was foreign there.

But above all we don't see because farmers don't think like hunter-gatherers. For us "wilderness" lies just beyond our boundaries; for them wilderness does not exist. Fences on the ground make fences in the mind.

Until Europeans came, Australia had no wilderness, and no terra nullius.

Today, amid the wreck of what Aborigines made, there remain relics of their management. They depended not on chance, but on policy. They shaped Australia to ensure continuity, balance, abundance and predictability. All are now in doubt.

In the face of such doubt, so basic and so sweeping, can we really say we are managing our country? Can we really say we are Australian?

Bill Gammage is the author of The Biggest Estate on Earth: How Aborigines made Australia

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The biggest estate on earth: how Aborigines made Australia

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Aboriginal people worked hard to make plants and animals abundant, convenient and predictable. By distributing plants and associating them in mosaics, then using these to lure and locate animals, Aborigines made Australia as it was in 1788, when Europeans arrived.

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Topic: How do bushfires behave?

Read: pages 40-48

Answer: Qs 1-8

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Topic: When and where do bushfires occur?

Read: pages 26-35

Answer: Qs 1-6

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1. What is this map showing?
2. What is a conclusion you can make from this map?

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Friday 1/3      Australia's climates compared to other countries

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Friday 1/3      Australia's climates compared to other countries

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Friday 1/3         Australia climate map

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Friday 1/3         Australia climate map

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Wednesday 27/2  World Climate map (simple)

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Wednesday 27/2  World Climate map (simple)

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Monday 5/3                             Homework discussion

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Monday 5/3                             Homework discussion

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Read: pages 26-35

Answer: Qs 1-6

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Topic: Impacts of Bushfires on the natural environment

Read: pages 65-76

Answer: Qs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6ab, 7, 8ab, 9 and 10

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Read: pages 65-76

Answer: Qs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6ab, 7, 8ab, 9 and 10

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Topic: Impacts of Bushfires on people

Read: 78-89

Answer: Questions: 1, 2, 3a, 4, 5, 6

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Topic: Marysville Black Saturday and responses to fire

Read: p.57-59 of Unit 1 book

Answer:
1. Find the average monthly temperatures for Melbourne in January  and February and compare these to the days between 28/1/09 and 8/2/09. Explain why the CFA were warning of extreme fire danger prior to Black Saturday.

Q. 3 and 6 from p. 59 of textbook

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Research the 1983 Ash Wednesday Bushfire

Create a map using Google maps showing the progression of the fire (with shapes) throughout the 16th February 1983 along the Surf Coast (Otways) near Lorne.

On your map include:
-Shapes annotated with:
- Times of progression of the fire front
- Prevailing wind direction at the time (note any wind change)
-The distance covered between certain points (use task completed on 5/3)
-Description of the movement of the fire (fire speed can even be included in kmph)

-Markers on places impacted by the fire with images and a written description of the impact in these places, such as damages and lives lost (Lorne, Airey's Inlet and Anglesea)
-Use Trove NLA to find this information in news articles or even google images
-You can also include video links from youtube

-A summary of the conditions and processes that lead to the fire and made it hard to fight
-Use knowledge of what makes a fire severe such as weather, fuel and topography

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Australia’s free online research portal. Trove is a collaboration between the National Library of Australia and hundreds of Partner organisations around Australia.

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Clear skies and rising temperatures were observed on the morning of Ash Wednesday, 16 February 1983. A front (or band) of cold air was located in the Great Australian Bight off the coast of South Australia. The front caused the hot air in the centre of Australia to be drawn southwards, creating a hot, dry northerly wind over Victoria.

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On February 16, 1983, a series of bushfires swept across South Australia and Victoria resulting in the loss of 75 lives and the destruction of more than 3,000 buildings.

Residents recall the day was part of a heatwave during a 10-month drought, with very low humidity, temperatures as high as 43C and winds reaching more than 100 kilometres per hour.

The first fire of the day was reported south of Adelaide mid-morning. Within hours, more than 180 fires had broken out across two states.

They would eventually raze 400,000 hectares - an area four times the size of metropolitan Melbourne.

"The whole hills were alight," remembers Susan Laundy, a resident of Mylor, a small community inland from Adelaide.

"Somebody said it was like Dante's Inferno; it was like getting a glimpse inside the gates of hell.

"We were up at five o'clock in the morning and you knew something bad was going to happen. There were sirens going then and by 10 o'clock we could not see anywhere around here because of the dust and you couldn't tell what was dust and what was fires."

CFS volunteer Russell Grear did most of his work that day in a helicopter, coordinating crew and making observations from the air. He says he was astounded by what he saw.

"There was one fire front that I reckon was 10 kilometres long and there wasn't a soul to be seen in relation to firefighting or anything else," he said.

"People had tried to do what they could to save their houses but it was just moving too fast."

After a wind change, which turned the long fire flank into a massive fire front, the blaze was throwing up so much dust and smoke that Mr Grear and his team were forced to land their chopper in a paddock for two hours while the fire passed.

Country Fire Authority firefighters recall the Melbourne metropolitan area being surrounded by a ring of bushfires.

Now-retired fire brigade captain Eric Bumpstead was on duty in the Dandenong Ranges when strong winds whipped up a huge fire.

"As soon as I saw the column of smoke I knew we were in trouble," he said.

The fire surged though the tinder-dry bush and into the town of Upper Beaconsfield. Then the wind changed and "it was a matter of everyone for themselves".

Crew and residents found themselves caught in a firestorm which would claim 21 lives, most of them firefighters.

"It was like a hail storm, but it wasn't hail. It was red hot coals and twigs and all [of that] was burning you.

"[You] had to turn your back to it and you were getting pelted with that. It was a devastating fire."

Bruce Medwin lost contact with his wife and daughter that day.

"I then went back [home] the next morning when it was daylight to hunt around again and I found their charred bodies huddled together," he said.

"It was very hard to deal with but I've built a new life now. I'm hopeful that other people can move on now."

'She sang nursery rhymes as she held her children in a dam'

Murray Fullerton fought the blaze in Mt Macedon where 400 homes were destroyed.

"The fire was completely around us ... the bush was alight everywhere ... we were just out there all night. It was a very long night," he said, his voice cracking with the reliving of the experience.

It was the first major fire he had dealt with, and he has spent his career ensuring the lessons of that day are never forgotten.

ABC Open's Amelda De Courtney was also on Mt Macedon that day and wrote that dangers lurked even after the fire had passed:

"Gas cylinders could explode, roots of trees burned underground. As we bucketed water over scorched plants in a friend's historic garden, someone warned that the cores of giant cypress trees nearby were smouldering and could 'go up' at any time.

"People were telling and re-telling their fire stories. Of being separated from children, of getting phone calls saying goodbye as an impossible fire front approached. One mother had sung nursery rhymes for hours as she held her children in a dam. One man was ashamed that he had cried because 'I never cry'. A silence surrounded any mention of lost pets.

"I remember feeling an irrational anger when people in Melbourne complained of ash in their swimming pool or the smell of the fires - or even spoke of anything other than the fire. Emotional security in those early days lay in the shared experience of the mountain. The 'stress caravan', staffed from a Melbourne hospital, initially closed its door about 6:00pm each evening. Someone laughed about psychologists drawing that arbitrary line. But a disaster on that scale was no doubt new to them as well."

Firefighters in East Gippsland were worn out before Ash Wednesday even started. They had been battling a huge blaze near Cann River all summer and were looking forward to some time off. The chief ranger for that area at the time, Dennis Matthews, remembers the incident controller bringing the crews together to deliver some bad news.

"With a blackboard and a piece of chalk he started to write down the locations of places affected by the run of fire west of Melbourne and around Melbourne," Mr Matthews recalled.

"And he started to write down the numbers of people killed and the numbers of houses known to be destroyed.

"In a very simple, symbolic way he explained to us why we weren't going home. At that point we just accepted that, said no more and got on with the job. It was a profound moment."

There's wide acknowledgement that the events on that day shaped bushfire management policy in the years that followed.

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On February 16, 1983, a series of bushfires swept across South Australia and Victoria resulting in the loss of 75 lives and the destruction of more than 3,000 buildings. Residents recall the day was part of a heatwave during a 10-month drought, with very low humidity, temperatures as high as 43C and winds reaching more than 100 kilometres per hour.

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Ash Wednesday printable ma resource for scale

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Ash Wednesday printable ma resource for scale

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Bushfire - Ash Wednesday, 1983 | Australian Disaster Resilience Knowledge Hub

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Prior to the events on Ash Wednesday a ten month drought had dried out the eastern Australian forests. On 16 February, there was low humidity, heat wave conditions and strong to gale force winds. Temperatures varied between high thirties and mid forties over most of eastern South Australia and Victoria with relative humidity generally less than 15 per cent.

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Fires research SLV Victoria: resource collection

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Fires research SLV Victoria: resource collection

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Research Guides: Bushfires in Victoria: 1983

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Find books, government reports, websites, statistics, newspaper articles and images about Victorian bushfires from 1851 to today.

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Catalyst: why some places burn and others do not

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Catalyst: why some places burn and others do not

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Catalyst: Knowing the enemy - ABC TV Science

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What does make a bushfire so destructive and how we can engineer our homes for a better chance of survival? Mark Horstman examines the essence of flame itself to find out

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Catalyst: Fighting fire with fire - ABC TV Science

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Paul Willis examines the history of fire in Australia and how best to manage bushfires He explores the volatile debate of prescribe burning does it reduce the risk to life and property or simply

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Access the document and complete the mini-inquiry.
You will also need to download "Google Earth Pro" to complete the exercise.

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Monday 19/3                         Study sheet for SAC one

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Monday 19/3                         Study sheet for SAC one

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Friday 23/3                                 Phoenix Fire management

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Friday 23/3                                 Phoenix Fire management

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Phoenix fire modelling explained

Q.1 How could this tool be used in fire management?

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Phoenix Rapid Fire (Phoenix) is a research tool developed by the University of Melbourne (Kevin Tolhurst and Derek Chong). It has been used by fire agencies for both incident prediction (State Control Centre) and as a key tool for bushfire risk assessment and strategic bushfire management planning.

The following video explains what Phoenix is:

The following video is a recreation of the Kilmore Black Saturday fire:

All modelling has limitations however Phoenix is a useful tool in analysing landscape scale bushfire risk.

Phoenix can be set to simulate bushfires in different weather conditions and with different fire histories and vegetation accumulation (or fuel loads).

The use of Phoenix is coordinated through an agreement between DELWP, the University of Melbourne and the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre.

Phoenix simulation outputs may not reflect actual fire spread. There are several input layers and submodels within Phoenix, each of which needs to be validated. The model is sensitive to minor differences or shifts in weather, fuel accumulation and other factors.
Residual Risk
Using Phoenix we can model the risk of bushfire to localities within the Latrobe Valley based on fires that have occurred historically and burning that is scheduled for the future.

Identifying the maximum level of bushfire risk possible is based on modelling how many houses could be impacted in a scenario where fuels are at their maximum and there is no history of fire. Comparing the impact of various fuel reduction scenarios with this maximum shows how much fuel treatments have reduced the risk and hence what is the risk remaining - which is known as the residual risk.

The following graphics help explain this concept:

Using this approach we can identify areas of high risk in the landscape.

Read an interview with Kevin Tolhurst at the University of Melbourne site, in which he goes into detail about how Phoenix Rapid Fire was developed.

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Phoenix Rapid Fire - Community Bushfire Connection

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Phoenix Rapid Fire (Phoenix) is a research tool developed by the University of Melbourne (Kevin Tolhurst and Derek Chong). It has been used by fire agencies for both incident prediction (State Control Centre) and as a key tool for bushfire risk assessment and strategic bushfire management planning.

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Within two minutes of a bushfire being reported in Victoria, a computer program has mapped out where the fire is likely to spread, helping managers decide if they should send firefighters or evacuate communities.

That computer program, Phoenix RapidFire, is the brainchild of researchers Kevin Tolhurst and Derek Chong. And it's been 40 years in the making.

Tolhurst started studying forestry in the Victorian town of Creswick in 1974. Over time, he noticed a gap in how bushfires were managed. Predicting where a fire would spread was "largely intuition", he says. There were computerised models of fire prediction in the northern hemisphere but they didn't work in Australia's eucalypt-dominated bush. Managers had to do manual calculations and make a best guess of how to fight fires.

Tolhurst saw bushfires first-hand as a field forester, began researching fire in 1984, and joined the University of Melbourne in 1997. He began working on a computer program which could predict likely fire spread in a more rational, consistent way - and give people hours of warning that a bushfire was heading their way.

Within seconds, the program crunches data on weather, wind, vegetation, the slope of the land and how dry the bush is. It turns this into a map of where the fire is likely to go, overlaid on Google Earth, and displays the results as a video. The program also diagnoses the type of fire - how hot will it burn? How high will the flames go? Where might embers land? Trained fire analysts monitor and act on the results.

The software, which Tolhurst developed with colleague Derek Chong, was tested in 2009 and is now used across Victoria, NSW, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Hundreds of fire analysts have been trained to use it.

"A lot of what I've learnt about fire and fire behaviour I've tried to capture in a consistent way in Phoenix," says Tolhurst, now an Associate Professor in Forest and Ecosystem Science at the Creswick campus where he started studying 40 years ago (it's now part of the University of Melbourne).

"The computer allows you to capture a lot more of the detail and the complexity ... I think it will save lives, yes."

Tolhurst hopes the software will lead to a better understanding of fire. "To try and control fire - it's too powerful an agent to be able to do that with," Tolhurst says. "You need to be able to live with it, you need to respect it, you need to understand it."

The program also diagnoses the type of fire - how hot will it burn? How high will the flames go? Where might embers land?

Some people may want every bushfire extinguished, but as Tolhurst points out, the bush will burn at some point. Putting out almost every fire means fuel - dry wood and leaves - builds up, contributing to megafires like Victoria's 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. As temperatures topped 48 degrees Celsius and winds gusted to 115 km/h, these fires killed 173 people. Tolhurst's research shows climate change exacerbates the risk of megafires like Black Saturday.

Tolhurst was in Melbourne's State Fire Control Centre that day, mentoring fire analysts and testing Phoenix. "It was my day off," he recalls.

Tolhurst hopes Phoenix, which was funded by the Victorian government and the Bushfires Co-operative Research Centre, will be used to make strategic decisions about which fires can be left to burn. He's also using the software to educate the public, speaking to community groups, fire authorities and government departments.

"It's always been my driving force to produce knowledge and change in the way people understand and behave," he explains.

Tolhurst may have spent many years at the Creswick campus, but he's not done researching forests and fires just yet. His team is testing and refining Phoenix and improving the way it factors in wind. They're tweaking it so it can be used to manage planned burns, where fires are lit in cool weather to reduce fuel.

Tolhurst also wants to change the way fire managers work. Rather than focus on losses and disasters, he wants them to use Phoenix to measure successes; where lives are saved, what factors helped?

Above all, Tolhurst wants fire to be understood rather than simply feared. "I enjoy trying to understand it, I find it endlessly fascinating," Tolhurst says. "I think it's magnificent ... it's so much bigger than you are that it provides a certain amount of respect."

Since this story, Prof Kevin Tolhurst has been made an officer of the Order of Australia (AM) in the general division. He was awarded the Queen's Birthday honors for his significant service to science through land and bushfire management, and to the community through providing expert advice at fire emergencies.

Watch Kevin Tolhurst discuss fire while on a bush trip.
Media

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Within two minutes of a bushfire being reported in Victoria, a computer program has mapped out where the fire is likely to spread, helping managers decide if they should send firefighters or evacuate communities. That computer program, Phoenix RapidFire, is the brainchild of researchers Kevin Tolhurst and Derek Chong.

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Friday 23/3                            Sentinel Hotspots Australia

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Friday 23/3                            Sentinel Hotspots Australia

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A government service showing the location of recent fires as well as different layers that can be placed on the map to understand fire vulnerability

Q.1a Looking at the map discuss the current distribution of fires in Australia
Q. 1b Use the topography, land cover and Nexis LGA layers to identify 3 vulnerable regions in Australia.

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Australia Sentinel Hotspots Mapping System

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Friday 23/3                                                                                                       NASA FIRM (Fire information resource management)

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Friday 23/3                                                                                                       NASA FIRM (Fire information resource management)

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FIRMS was developed to provide near real-time active fire locations to natural resource managers that faced challenges obtaining timely satellite-derived fire information.

Q.1. Turn on the countries layer on overlays and look at which country looks most affected by fire in the world currently.
Search the country's name and "fire" in google news and explain why the country is so affected by fire.

Q.2. Click on "active fire data" and find a KML file of any fire to download and open in Google Earth. Zoom in and describe landscape and land uses around the fire. Explain how geographical features around the fire may contribute to the fire's spread and the chance for disaster

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Fire Information for Resource Management System

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Friday 23/3                              Vic Emergency                                 

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Friday 23/3                              Vic Emergency                                 

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If you have phone data, dowload the VicEmergency app and create a watch zone in your area.

Q.1 Explain how this tool would be useful to residents in fire prone zones.

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Victoria's combined source of emergency information and warnings, helping the community to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies across the state.

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Where are the states of the USA?

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The U.S.: 50 States - Map Quiz Game - Seterra

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With 50 states in total, there are a lot of geography facts to learn about the United States. This map quiz game is here to help. See how fast you can pin the location of the lower 48, plus Alaska and Hawaii, in our states game!

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Flags of the World

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How Many Of These Flags Of The World Can You Identify?

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How well do you know the flags of each country? Will you be able to recognize the flags of countries like Switzerland, Germany, France, Portugal and South Africa?

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Capitals of the world

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Can you name the capital cities of these countries, from most- to least-commonly known? Test your knowledge on this geography quiz to see how you do and compare your score to others.

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Countries of the world

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How many countries can you name? As you answer, the map will be filled in.

Use the common, English name. Has to be a sovereign nation, so Scotland and England don't count, etc...

Last updated: June 18, 2020

You have not attempted this quiz yet.

Keep scrolling down for answers and more stats ...

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How many countries do you know? In this quiz, you've got 15:00 to name as many as you can. An interactive map fills in with every country answered.

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Directions/Bearings

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Directions/Bearings

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Read page 1 and draw a sixteen point compass

Complete Geoskills 4.5 orally with class.

Complete Geoskills 4.6 questions:
1, 2, 3 and 4

Read page 3 and complete notes on true, grid and magnetic north

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Scale

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Scale

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Read pages 1-3

Complete Geoskills 4.10 question 1-3

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Grid Coordinates

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Grid Coordinates

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Read page 1 and look at page 2

Complete Geoskills 4.15 q. 1-2

Complete Geoskills 4.16 q.1-2

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Longitude/Latitude

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16/4/18                                     GeoSkills Longitude/Latitude

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Read pages 1-3

Complete questions 1-2

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18/4/18                           Representing topography

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18/4/18                           Representing topography

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Representing topography
Read pages 74-75

Write in glossary terms and definitions for:
-distribution
-topography
-contour interval
-contour line
-spot height

Complete Geoskills 7.1 qs 1-8

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18/4/18                                              Relief and Gradient

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18/4/18                                              Relief and Gradient

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Relief and Gradient
Read pages 76-77

Write in glossary terms and definitions for:
-gradient
-relative relief
-relief

Complete Geoskills 7.2 qs 1-2

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18/4/18                   Locating features and measuring distance

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18/4/18                   Locating features and measuring distance

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Locating features
Read pages 78-79

Write in glossary terms:
-area reference
-grid reference

Complete Geoskills 7.4 qs 1-8

Measuring distance
Complete geoskills 7.5 qs 1-2

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18/4/18                                                                   Mapping Practical uses: Moorookhouseboat tour

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18/4/18                                                                   Mapping Practical uses: Moorookhouseboat tour

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Complete Geoskills qs 1-8

Extension: Qs 9-10

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2/5/18                                                         Fieldwork Report SAC

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2/5/18                                                         Fieldwork Report SAC

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To what extent have built environments, people and natural envirnnments recovered in the Kinglake area following the Black Saturday bushfires in 2009?

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10/5/18                    Four Corners: Japan's Nuclear Nightmare

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10/5/18                    Four Corners: Japan's Nuclear Nightmare

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Watch this as an introduction to the Fukushima disaster.

An introduction to the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster through a current affairs program filmed at the time of the unfolding disaster in 2011.

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Using the internet and your own research find the definitions of the following words:

Nuclear reactor
Fuel rod
Nuclear fission
Nuclear meltdown
Nuclear fallout
Sievert

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10/5/18                              Catylyst: Nuclear Fallout

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10/5/18                              Catylyst: Nuclear Fallout

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Watch this video to see the long lasting effects of nuclear fallout

A video explaining the situation in Fukushima and Japan three years after the  earthquake and tsunami that broke down the Fukushima Nuclear plant

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Catalyst: Radiation Fallout - ABC TV Science

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Mark Horstman travels to Fukushima Prefecture in Japan to investigate where the radioactive fallout has travelled since the Daichi nuclear power plant accident over three years ago

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Watch this to see the ongoing effects of the disaster.

Two years after the Fukushima plant meltdown the effects of the disaster are still being felt.

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WILLACY: It's been more than two and a half years since the earth shook and the waves came, and like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, Fukushima became an infamous place name for nuclear cataclysm. It's been a huge and devastating drama but it's fair to say it's been the defining story during my time here in Japan.

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10/5/18            Catalyst: what is radiation?

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10/5/18            Catalyst: what is radiation?

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A video explaining what radiation is and whether humans should be worried about it.

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Catalyst: Radiation 101 - ABC TV Science

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What exactly is radiation? How and why does this invisible menace poison people and the environment? In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear incident many questions are being asked about the risks of exposure to radiation and if Australians should be concerned.

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10/5/18             National Geographic: Japan's Nuclear Nightmare

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10/5/18             National Geographic: Japan's Nuclear Nightmare

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Watch this as an introduction to the Fukushima disaster.

An introduction to the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster through a current affairs program filmed at the time of the unfolding disaster in 2011.

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14/5/18                              Nuclear Power Hazards Fukushima                                

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14/5/18                              Nuclear Power Hazards Fukushima                                

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-Read pages 109-113 of your Unit 1 textbook on Hazards and Disasters

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(p.109) What is nuclear energy?
-Why is nuclear energy "cleaner" than other alternatives?
-Define fission
-Explain the process that makes nuclear energy

(p.109) What is nuclear waste?
-How long does it take high level waste to lose its radioactivity?
-What's the problem with storing high level nuclear waste?
-What is the lifespan of the average nuclear reactor?

(p.109) Global distribution of nuclear power plants
-Name the top 5 countries by nuclear power plants and how many each country has

(p.110) Reducing nuclear hazards
-What does defence in depth mean?
-Define a nuclear accident according to the IAEA. Give an example of this
-When and where were the three nuclear accidents the World Nuclear Association lists?
-What are some ways we are exposed to low levels of radiation everyday?
-Describe three ways Humans can be exposed to radioactive material (see figure 6.25 the movement of radioactivity through the earth's spheres)

(p.111) Case Study Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan
-Why does Japan rely on imports of energy? What percentage of its energy mix comes from nuclear plants?
-When did the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant occur?
-Provide a summary of why this happened (at least three sentences)

(p.111-112) Environmental impacts
-What specific contamination came from the power plant?
-How does this radioactive contamination move through the environment?
-What was the specific impact of this in Tokyo?
--What was the impact on agriculture in the region?
-Why are contaminated areas proving difficult to clean up?

(p.112-113) Impacts on people
-How many people were displaced by the disaster?
-How large was the evacuation radius?
-What could a future potential impact from radiation exposure be?
-How many deaths came about as a result of evacuation stress?
-In 2014 how many evacuees were still in evacuation centres?
-What are the estimates of the overall economic loss suffered?

(p.113) Responses to the disaster
Summarise the responses with  at each of the following scales (ensure you clarify what precisely the action is in response to)
-Local scale
-National scale
-Global scale

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Read the article before formulating your own brief persuasive piece in your book.

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Nuclear energy is still a stupid idea for Australia

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You don't even need to monger any scares about radiation: nuclear energy isn't remotely the solution to Australia's self-created energy problem

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Read the article before formulating your own brief persuasive piece in your book.

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1. Open the Internet Browser

2. Click Tools (or "gear" icon at top right hand corner) > Internet Options > Privacy > Advanced

3. Check Override automatic cookie handling

4. For First-party Cookies and Third-party Cookies click Accept

5. Click OK and OK

Enabling Cookies in Internet Explorer 10, 11

1. Open the Internet Browser

2. Click the Tools button, and then click Internet Options.

3. Click the Privacy tab, and then, under Settings, move the slider to the bottom to allow all cookies, and then click OK.

Enabling Cookies in Google Chrome

1. Open the Google Chrome browser

2. Click Tools icon Or type in Go to chrome://settings/ to the URL window, hit enter

3. Click 'Advanced settings' > Select Privacy > Content settings

4. Check 'Allow local data to be set (recommended)'

5. Click 'Done'

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Open the Internet Browser Click Tools (or "gear" icon at top right hand corner) > Internet Options > Privacy > Advanced Check Override automatic cookie handling For First-party Cookies and Third-party Cookies click Accept Click OK and OK Enabling Cookies in Internet Explorer 10, 11 Open the Internet Browser Click the Tools button, and then click Internet Options.

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14/5/18                                                                                                                         Nuclear Power: for or against?

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14/5/18                                                                                                                         Nuclear Power: for or against?

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Read both articles and see the "how to form an argument" template to give your own opinion on whether Australia should or should not employ the use of nuclear power

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Use the attached format to make your own argument on the issue

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16/05/18                                 Discussion of previous lesson's questions and redaing

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16/05/18                                 Discussion of previous lesson's questions and redaing

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It's time to talk about nuclear energy, disasters and people's responses to such disasters.

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16/05/18                                         Evaluating the responses to the Fukushima disaster                                     

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16/05/18                                         Evaluating the responses to the Fukushima disaster                                     

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Use the template below to guide your response to this lesson's research question

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A Tepco guide explained this was because the central plant grounds had been deforested and paved over, sealing in contaminated soil.

During a recent visit, the mood within the plant was noticeably more relaxed, though movements were still tightly controlled and everyone was required to wear radiation-measuring badges. Inside a "resting building," workers ate in a large cafeteria and bought snacks in a convenience store.

At the plant's entrance, a sign warned: "Games like Pokemon GO are forbidden within the facility."

"We have finished the debris cleanup and gotten the plant under control," said the guide, Daisuke Hirose, a spokesman for Tepco's subsidiary in charge of decommissioning the plant. "Now, we are finally preparing for decommissioning."

In September, the prime minister's office set a target date of 2021 - the 10th anniversary of the disaster - for the next significant stage, when workers begin extracting the melted fuel from at least one of the three destroyed reactors, though they have yet to choose which one.

The government admits that cleaning up the plant will take at least another three to four decades and tens of billions of dollars. A $100 million research center has been built nearby to help scientists and engineers develop a new generation of robots to enter the reactor buildings and scoop up the melted fuel.

At Chernobyl, the Soviets simply entombed the charred reactor in concrete after the deadly 1986 accident. But Japan has pledged to dismantle the Fukushima plant and decontaminate the surrounding countryside, which was home to about 160,000 people who were evacuated after accident.

Many of them have been allowed to return as the rural towns around the plant have been decontaminated. But without at least starting a cleanup of the plant itself, officials admit they will find it difficult to convince the public that the accident is truly over.

They also hope that beginning the cleanup will help them win the public's consent to restart Japan's undamaged nuclear plants, most of which remain shut down since the disaster.

Tepco and the government are treading cautiously to avoid further mishaps that could raise doubts that the plant is under control.

"They are being very methodical - too slow, some would say - in making a careful effort to avoid any missteps or nasty surprises," said David Lochbaum, director of the nuclear safety project at the Union of Concerned Scientists, who was a co-author of a book on the disaster.

"They want to regain trust. They have learned that trust can be lost much quicker than it can be recovered."

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fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant (japan)

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Six Years After Fukushima, Robots Finally Find Reactors' Melted Uranium Fuel

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A Tepco guide explained this was because the central plant grounds had been deforested and paved over, sealing in contaminated soil. During a recent visit, the mood within the plant was noticeably more relaxed, though movements were still tightly controlled and everyone was required to wear radiation-measuring badges.

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Updated March 02, 2018 18:11:47

Japanese Government officials have not figured out what to do with more than 1 million tonnes of radioactive water sitting at the site of the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant.

Just days shy of the seventh anniversary of the nuclear disaster, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) revealed it successfully slowed the rate of contaminated water reaching the reactor facilities, but the amount was still increasing.

"A few years a go [the radioactive water was increasing by] 400 tonnes per day, but the increase per day has now gone down to around 100 tonnes per day," said Naohiro Masuda, TEPCO's chief decommissioning officer.

"A few years ago we had to create one new tank every two or three days but now we need to increase one new tank every seven to 10 days, so in that sense we think it is progress, to a certain degree, in the sense it is a more stabilised situation," he said.

There are more than 1,000 tanks of contaminated water now at the site - and Government authorities have still not decided what to do with the water.

Ice wall of limited effect

TEPCO revealed earlier this week that its underground frozen soil wall - what was expected to be the main defence against groundwater contamination - had only had a limited effect.

The 1.5-kilometre-long barrier is designed to keep groundwater from flowing into reactor buildings that were damaged by the disaster.

The wall cost more than $US300 million to build and costs $US10 million to operate.

Mr Masuda said it was important to note that the combination of the company's measures to prevent contamination meant that the situation was less volatile overall.

So while the level of contaminated water is still increasing - albeit at a slower rate - the Japanese Government is yet to agree on what to do with it.

One controversial option includes decontaminating the water as much as possible and then gradually release it into the ocean.

Experts advising the Government have urged a gradual release of the water to the nearby Pacific Ocean.

Treatment can remove all the radioactive elements except tritium, which they say is safe in small amounts.

But local fishermen have balked at the idea, fearing a devastating impact to the reputation of their produce.

Satoru Toyomoto from the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said a Government sub-committee was still considering its options.

"You may think after as many as seven years [this should be decided], but we have done our utmost and we have done all possible things and we have finally come to a stage where we can consider this," he said.

"After the accident occurred [in 2011] it was like a field hospital on a battlefield - but finally we have reached a situation where we can calmly think about the long-term future.

"A taskforce two years ago considered various options including geological disposal, vaporisation, burial underground, hydrogen release or release into the sea.

"Of those five options, we are trying to make a comprehensive assessment looking at options, but also reputational measures."

Topics: nuclear-accident, nuclear-issues, environment, japan

First posted March 02, 2018 18:07:16

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Japan undecided on what to do with 1 million tonnes of radioactive water

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Updated March 02, 2018 18:11:47 Japanese Government officials have not figured out what to do with more than 1 million tonnes of radioactive water sitting at the site of the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant.

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Workers at Fukushima in January 2018. Behrouz Mehri/AFP

On March 11, 2011, a nuclear disaster struck Japan. The 9.0 magnitude Tohoku earthquake triggered a 15-meter tidal wave, which hit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant approximately 45 minutes later. The plant's power was knocked out and the backup generators crippled. After the emergency batteries were exhausted, three of the plant's six reactors soon overheated, and at least two of the cores melted down, releasing immense amounts of radiation. While the reactors are now in theory stabilised, the work to understand and contain the damage continues.

In the seven years that have elapsed since the disaster, much has been written and said about its causes. Yet expert reports have paid little attention to the extensive testimony of Masao Yoshida, who was plant manager at the time and passed away in 2013.

One can only wonder about the decisions Yoshida had to make between March 11 and 15, 2011, to avoid the worst. And his gripping account calls into question some of the keystone principles of nuclear safety.

A 'made in Japan' disaster?

The international community and the Japanese themselves quickly characterized the disaster as one that was "made in Japan", meaning it was enabled by two circumstances specific to Japan: the country's exposure to environmental hazards (earthquakes and tsunamis) and its cultural acceptance of collusion - real or imaginary - between corporations and government.

Management of the accident, both by its operator, the Tepco Group, and the Japanese government, has been condemned as ineffectual. Serious failings were attributed to Tepco, which was unable to prevent a nuclear meltdown and subsequent explosions. A rare bright point was the heroism of those working on the ground, who risked their own lives to avert an even greater disaster.

Calling Fukushima a "made in Japan" disaster focuses attention on the failures of a socio-technical system apparently disconnected from industry good practices and the norms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, its extraordinary scale allows it to be filed in the same historic category as another "aberrant" accident, Chernobyl. The latter was attributed to gross Soviet negligence, implicitly reinforcing a utopian vision of a safe and reliable nuclear industry. But do the nature of the Fukushima disaster and the specificity of its causes really make it an exception?

There have been a wide range of official inquiries. In Japan, reports were issued by both a governmental investigation and a parliamentary commission. Investigations were also conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.

These analyses chiefly focused on the impact of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami on the nuclear power plant, the way the crisis was managed by the operator and the authorities, and on the cooperation between those onsite (emergency services) and offsite (Tepco staff). Hundreds of thousands of pages of reports have been published as a result. Ultimately, authorities unanimously concluded that upholding IAEA norms alone guarantees nuclear safety.

But the majority of the thousand-plus hearings given by the people involved have remained confidential. This is troubling: Why would a democratic society allow hearings given to a parliamentary commission to remain secret?

During the Japanese government's investigation, Fukushima Daiichi plant manager Masao Yoshida was interviewed for more than 28 hours, over 13 sessions. His testimony was only made public in September 2014 after critical reporting by Japanese media. Printed in Japanese on A4 paper, it filled more than 400 pages.

Shedding new light on the story

Jiji Pres/AFP

The Risk and Crisis Research Centre of the Mines ParisTech engineering school translated Yoshida's testimony into French, the first complete version in a language other than Japanese. (A partial English translation exists, made available by the Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun, but it proved to be inaccurate on several crucial points, and is highly controversial.)

Given that France generates 76% of its electricity with nuclear power, the task of a complete translation should have been undertaken by a nuclear-sector operator. None volunteered, however, no doubt asserting that all had already been said and settled. The Fukushima investigators all followed a pre-set formula, apparently designed solely to confirm hypotheses that would put events down to purely technical causes. Yet Yoshida responded to the investigators' questions from an entirely different point of view, attributing his decisions and actions to the brutal struggle between men (himself and his staff) and technology or, more precisely, the machines (the reactors) that had suddenly gone out of control.

The brutal reality of the situation in March 2011 was that it was no longer a question of managing a crisis, applying established procedures or rolling out plan A or plan B. Day after agonising day, the Fukushima Daiichi power plant was an island, plunged into darkness, without electricity or emergency diesel generators, and almost completely devoid of resources.

Largely left to their own devices, Yoshida and the plant's staff risked their lives at every moment. Wearing stiflingly hot protective wear and buffeted by aftershocks, they searched for slightest sound or visual clue in the absence of measurement data. Groping around the labyrinth of the ruined plant, they sought, more or less with success, to protect themselves from radioactive contamination in order to continue their work.

During the hearings, Yoshida confided his fears, doubts and beliefs. He lauded the commitment of his colleagues inside the plant, even as he deplored the absence or incompetence of those outside - Tepco headquarters, the government, the regulatory authority, and so on.

IAEA/Flickr, CC BY

The emotional intensity of his account is both striking and moving. It shatters the all-too-bureaucratic certitudes that underestimate the complexities of situations, to the point of ignoring our humanity: the workers were facing the possibility of their own deaths and, above all, the deaths of their colleagues, their families and everything dear to them.

Almost miraculously, after four days of desperate efforts, the worst - the explosion of the Daiichi reactors, which could have threatened those at the close-by Daini and Onagawa plants as well - was narrowly avoided. Yet we have learnt almost nothing from this catastrophe, and the much larger one that was averted.

Beyond safety margins

Of course, re-examining safety standards is important, as are "hard core" safety systems (a kind of fortified line of defence against external onslaughts) and the costly installation of diverse backup power generators. Such measures certainly increase safety margins, but what about the bigger picture?

The creation of "special nuclear forces", such as France's nuclear rapid action force (FARN), is a perfect example of such a mind-set. They are on-call to restore installations in accordance with regulations on radiation exposure. But what will such teams do if levels of radioactivity are above those set out in the legislation? Could we count on their commitment, as Japan did for that of Masao Yoshida and his staff, at once heroes and victims, sacrificed willingly or under orders, in order to prevent a nuclear apocalypse?

Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for Fast for Word and Leighton Walter Kille.

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Fukushima seven years later: case closed?

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On March 11, 2011, a nuclear disaster struck Japan. The 9.0 magnitude Tohoku earthquake triggered a 15-meter tidal wave, which hit the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant approximately 45 minutes later. The plant's power was knocked out and the backup generators crippled.

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Following a major earthquake, a 15-metre tsunami disabled the power supply and cooling of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors, causing a nuclear accident on 11 March 2011. All three cores largely melted in the first three days.

The accident was rated 7 on the INES scale, due to high radioactive releases over days 4 to 6, eventually a total of some 940 PBq (I-131 eq).

Four reactors were written off due to damage in the accident - 2719 MWe net.

After two weeks, the three reactors (units 1-3) were stable with water addition and by July they were being cooled with recycled water from the new treatment plant. Official 'cold shutdown condition' was announced in mid-December.

Apart from cooling, the basic ongoing task was to prevent release of radioactive materials, particularly in contaminated water leaked from the three units. This task became newsworthy in August 2013.

There have been no deaths or cases of radiation sickness from the nuclear accident, but over 100,000 people were evacuated from their homes to ensure this. Government nervousness delays the return of many.

Official figures show that there have been well over 1000 deaths from maintaining the evacuation, in contrast to little risk from radiation if early return had been allowed.

The Great East Japan Earthquake of magnitude 9.0 at 2.46 pm on Friday 11 March 2011 did considerable damage in the region, and the large tsunami it created caused very much more. The earthquake was centred 130 km offshore the city of Sendai in Miyagi prefecture on the eastern cost of Honshu Island (the main part of Japan), and was a rare and complex double quake giving a severe duration of about 3 minutes. An area of the seafloor extending 650 km north-south moved typically 10-20 metres horizontally. Japan moved a few metres east and the local coastline subsided half a metre. The tsunami inundated about 560 sq km and resulted in a human death toll of about 19,000 and much damage to coastal ports and towns, with over a million buildings destroyed or partly collapsed.

Eleven reactors at four nuclear power plants in the region were operating at the time and all shut down automatically when the quake hit. Subsequent inspection showed no significant damage to any from the earthquake. The operating units which shut down were Tokyo Electric Power Company's (Tepco) Fukushima Daiichi 1, 2, 3, and Fukushima Daini 1, 2, 3, 4, Tohoku's Onagawa 1, 2, 3, and Japco's Tokai, total 9377 MWe net. Fukushima Daiichi units 4, 5&6 were not operating at the time, but were affected. The main problem initially centred on Fukushima Daiichi units 1-3. Unit 4 became a problem on day five.

The reactors proved robust seismically, but vulnerable to the tsunami. Power, from grid or backup generators, was available to run the residual heat removal (RHR) system cooling pumps at eight of the eleven units, and despite some problems they achieved 'cold shutdown' within about four days. The other three, at Fukushima Daiichi, lost power at 3.42 pm, almost an hour after the quake, when the entire site was flooded by the 15-metre tsunami. This disabled 12 of 13 back-up generators on site and also the heat exchangers for dumping reactor waste heat and decay heat to the sea. The three units lost the ability to maintain proper reactor cooling and water circulation functions. Electrical switchgear was also disabled. Thereafter, many weeks of focused work centred on restoring heat removal from the reactors and coping with overheated spent fuel ponds. This was undertaken by hundreds of Tepco employees as well as some contractors, supported by firefighting and military personnel. Some of the Tepco staff had lost homes, and even families, in the tsunami, and were initially living in temporary accommodation under great difficulties and privation, with some personal risk. A hardened emergency response centre on site was unable to be used in grappling with the situation, due to radioactive contamination.

Three Tepco employees at the Daiichi and Daini plants were killed directly by the earthquake and tsunami, but there have been no fatalities from the nuclear accident.

Among hundreds of aftershocks, an earthquake with magnitude 7.1, closer to Fukushima than the 11 March one, was experienced on 7 April, but without further damage to the plant. On 11 April a magnitude 7.1 earthquake and on 12 April a magnitude 6.3 earthquake, both with epicenter at Fukushima-Hamadori, caused no further problems.

The two Fukushima plants and their siting

The Daiichi (first) and Daini (second) Fukushima plants are sited about 11 km apart on the coast, Daini to the south.

The recorded seismic data for both plants - some 180 km from the epicentre - shows that 550 Gal (0.56 g) was the maximum ground acceleration for Daiichi, and 254 Gal was maximum for Daini. Daiichi units 2, 3 and 5 exceeded their maximum response acceleration design basis in E-W direction by about 20%. The recording was over 130-150 seconds. (All nuclear plants in Japan are built on rock - ground acceleration was around 2000 Gal a few kilometres north, on sediments).

The original design basis tsunami height was 3.1 m for Daiichi based on assessment of the 1960 Chile tsunami and so the plant had been built about 10 metres above sea level with the seawater pumps 4 m above sea level. The Daini plant was built 13 metres above sea level. In 2002 the design basis was revised to 5.7 metres above, and the seawater pumps were sealed. In the event, tsunami heights coming ashore were about 15 metres, and the Daiichi turbine halls were under some 5 metres of seawater until levels subsided. Daini was less affected. The maximum amplitude of this tsunami was 23 metres at point of origin, about 180 km from Fukushima.

In the last century there have been eight tsunamis in the region with maximum amplitudes at origin above 10 metres (some much more), these having arisen from earthquakes of magnitude 7.7 to 8.4, on average one every 12 years. Those in 1983 and in 1993 were the most recent affecting Japan, with maximum heights at origin of 14.5 metres and 31 metres respectively, both induced by magnitude 7.7 earthquakes. The June 1896 earthquake of estimated magnitude 8.3 produced a tsunami with run-up height of 38 metres in Tohoku region, killing more than 27,000 people.

The tsunami countermeasures taken when Fukushima Daiichi was designed and sited in the 1960s were considered acceptable in relation to the scientific knowledge then, with low recorded run-up heights for that particular coastline. But some 18 years before the 2011 disaster, new scientific knowledge had emerged about the likelihood of a large earthquake and resulting major tsunami of some 15.7 metres at the Daiichi site. However, this had not yet led to any major action by either the plant operator, Tepco, or government regulators, notably the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). Discussion was ongoing, but action minimal. The tsunami countermeasures could also have been reviewed in accordance with IAEA guidelines which required taking into account high tsunami levels, but NISA continued to allow the Fukushima plant to operate without sufficient countermeasures such as moving the backup generators up the hill, sealing the lower part of the buildings, and having some back-up for seawater pumps, despite clear warnings.

A report from the Japanese government's Earthquake Research Committee on earthquakes and tsunamis off the Pacific coastline of northeastern Japan in February 2011 was due for release in April, and might finally have brought about changes. The document includes analysis of a magnitude 8.3 earthquake that is known to have struck the region more than 1140 years ago, triggering enormous tsunamis that flooded vast areas of Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures. The report concludes that the region should be alerted of the risk of a similar disaster striking again. The 11 March earthquake measured magnitude 9.0 and involved substantial shifting of multiple sections of seabed over a source area of 200 x 400 km. Tsunami waves devastated wide areas of Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefectures.
(See also background on Earthquakes and Seismic Protection for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan)
Events at Fukushima Daiichi 1-3 & 4

It appears that no serious damage was done to the reactors by the earthquake, and the operating units 1-3 were automatically shut down in response to it, as designed. At the same time all six external power supply sources were lost due to earthquake damage, so the emergency diesel generators located in the basements of the turbine buildings started up. Initially cooling would have been maintained through the main steam circuit bypassing the turbine and going through the condensers.

Then 41 minutes later, at 3:42 pm, the first tsunami wave hit, followed by a second 8 minutes later. These submerged and damaged the seawater pumps for both the main condenser circuits and the auxiliary cooling circuits, notably the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling system. They also drowned the diesel generators and inundated the electrical switchgear and batteries, all located in the basements of the turbine buildings (the one surviving air-cooled generator was serving units 5 & 6). So there was a station blackout, and the reactors were isolated from their ultimate heat sink. The tsunamis also damaged and obstructed roads, making outside access difficult.

All this put those reactors 1-3 in a dire situation and led the authorities to order, and subsequently extend, an evacuation while engineers worked to restore power and cooling. The 125-volt DC back-up batteries for units 1 & 2 were flooded and failed, leaving them without instrumentation, control or lighting. Unit 3 had battery power for about 30 hours.

At 7.03 pm Friday 11 March a Nuclear Emergency was declared, and at 8.50pm the Fukushima Prefecture issued an evacuation order for people within 2 km of the plant. At 9.23 pm the Prime Minister extended this to 3 km, and at 5.44 am on 12th he extended it to 10 km. He visited the plant soon after. On Saturday 12th he extended the evacuation zone to 20 km.

Inside the Fukushima Daiichi reactors

The Fukushima Daiichi reactors are GE boiling water reactors (BWR) of an early (1960s) design supplied by GE, Toshiba and Hitachi, with what is known as a Mark I containment. Reactors 1-3 came into commercial operation 1971-75. Reactor capacity is 460 MWe for unit 1, 784 MWe for units 2-5, and 1100 MWe for unit 6.

When the power failed at 3.42 pm, about one hour after shutdown of the fission reactions, the reactor cores would still be producing about 1.5% of their nominal thermal power, from fission product decay - about 22 MW in unit 1 and 33 MW in units 2&3. Without heat removal by circulation to an outside heat exchanger, this produced a lot of steam in the reactor pressure vessels housing the cores, and this was released into the dry primary containment (PCV) through safety valves. Later this was accompanied by hydrogen, produced by the interaction of the fuel's very hot zirconium cladding with steam after the water level dropped.

As pressure started to rise here, the steam was directed into the suppression chamber/ wetwell under the reactor, within the containment, but the internal temperature and pressure nevertheless rose quite rapidly. Water injection commenced, using the various systems provide for this and finally the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). These systems progressively failed over three days, so from early Saturday water injection to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) was with fire pumps, but this required the internal pressures to be relieved initially by venting into the suppression chamber/ wetwell. Seawater injection into unit 1 began at 7pm on Saturday 12th, into unit 3 on 13th and unit 2 on 14th. Tepco management ignored an instruction from the prime minister to cease the seawater injection into unit 1, and this instruction was withdrawn shortly afterwards.

Inside unit 1, it is understood that the water level dropped to the top of the fuel about three hours after the scram (about 6 pm) and the bottom of the fuel 1.5 hours later (7.30 pm). The temperature of the exposed fuel rose to some 2800°C so that the central part started to melt after a few hours and by 16 hours after the scram (7 am Saturday) most of it had fallen into the water at the bottom of the RPV. After that, RPV temperatures decreased steadily.

As pressure rose, attempts were made to vent the containment, and when external power and compressed air sources were harnessed this was successful, by about 2.30 pm Saturday, though some manual venting was apparently achieved at about 10.17 am. The venting was designed to be through an external stack, but in the absence of power much of it apparently backflowed to the service floor at the top of the reactor building, representing a serious failure of this system (though another possibility is leakage from the drywell). The vented steam, noble gases and aerosols were accompanied by hydrogen. At 3.36 pm on Saturday 12th, there was a hydrogen explosion on the service floor of the building above unit 1 reactor containment, blowing off the roof and cladding on the top part of the building, after the hydrogen mixed with air and ignited. (Oxidation of the zirconium cladding at high temperatures in the presence of steam produces hydrogen exothermically, with this exacerbating the fuel decay heat problem.)

In unit 1 most of the core - as corium comprised of melted fuel and control rods - was assumed to be in the bottom of the RPV, but later it appeared that it had mostly gone through the bottom of the RPV and eroded about 65 cm into the drywell concrete below (which is 2.6 m thick). This reduced the intensity of the heat and enabled the mass to solidify.

Much of the fuel in units 2&3 also apparently melted to some degree, but to a lesser extent than in unit 1, and a day or two later. In mid-May 2011 the unit 1 core would still be producing 1.8 MW of heat, and units 2&3 would be producing about 3.0 MW each.

In mid-2013 the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) confirmed that the earthquake itself had caused no damage to unit 1.

In unit 2, water injection using the steam-driven back-up water injection system failed on Monday 14th, and it was about six hours before a fire pump started injecting seawater into the RPV. Before the fire pump could be used RPV pressure had to be relieved via the wetwell, which required power and nitrogen, hence the delay. Meanwhile the reactor water level dropped rapidly after back-up cooling was lost, so that core damage started about 8 pm, and it is now provisionally understood that much of the fuel then melted and probably fell into the water at the bottom of the RPV about 100 hours after the scram. Pressure was vented on 13th and again on 15th, and meanwhile the blowout panel near the top of the building was opened to avoid a repetition of unit 1 hydrogen explosion. Early on Tuesday 15th, the pressure suppression chamber under the actual reactor seemed to rupture, possibly due to a hydrogen explosion there, and the drywell containment pressure inside dropped. However, subsequent inspection of the suppression chamber did not support the rupture interpretation. Later analysis suggested that a leak of the primary containment developed on Tuesday 15th. Most of the radioactive releases from the site appeared to come from unit 2.

In Unit 3, the main back-up water injection system failed at about 11 am on Saturday 12 th and early on Sunday 13 th, water injection using the high pressure system failedalsoand water levels dropped dramatically. RPV pressure was reduced by venting steam into the wetwell, allowing injection of seawater using a fire pump from just before noon. Early on Sunday venting the suppression chamber and containment was successfully undertaken. It is now understood that core damage started about 5:30 am and much or all of the fuel melted on the morning of Sunday 13 th and fell into the bottom of the RPV, with some probably going through the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel and onto the concrete below.

Early on Monday 14 th PCV venting was repeated, and this evidently backflowed to the service floor of the building, so that at 11 am a very large hydrogen explosion here above unit 3 reactor containment blew off much of the roof and walls and demolished the top part of the building. This explosion created a lot of debris, and some of that on the ground near unit 3 was very radioactive.

In defuelled unit 4, at about 6 am on Tuesday 15 March, there was an explosion which destroyed the top of the building and damaged unit 3's superstructure further. This was apparently from hydrogen arising in unit 3 and reaching unit 4 by backflow in shared ducts when vented from unit 3.

Units 1-3: Water has been injected into each of the three reactor units more or less continuously, and in the absence of normal heat removal via external heat exchanger this water was boiling off for some months. In the government report to IAEA in June it was estimated that to the end of May about 40% of the injected water boiled off, and 60% leaked out the bottom. In June 2011 this was adding to the contaminated water on site by about 500 m ³ per day. In January 2013 4.5 to 5.5 m ³/hr was being added to each RPV via core spray and feed water systems, hence 370 m3 per day, and temperatures at the bottom of RPVs were 19°C in unit 1 and 32°C in units 2&3, at little above atmospheric pressure.

There was a peak of radioactive release on 15th, apparently mostly from unit 2, but the precise source remains uncertain. Due to volatile and easily-airborne fission products being carried with the hydrogen and steam, the venting and hydrogen explosions discharged a lot of radioactive material into the atmosphere, notably iodine and caesium. NISA said in June that it estimated that 800-1000 kg of hydrogen had been produced in each of the units.

Nitrogen is being injected into the containment vessels (PCVs) of all three reactors to remove concerns about further hydrogen explosions, and in December this was started also for the pressure vessels. Gas control systems which extract and clean the gas from the PCV to avoid leakage of caesium have been commissioned for all three units.

Throughout 2011 injection into the RPVs of water circulated through the new water treatment plant achieved relatively effective cooling, and temperatures at the bottom of the RPVs were stable in the range 60-76°C at the end of October, and 27-54°C in mid-January 2012. RPV pressures ranged from atmospheric to slightly above (102-109 kPa) in January, due to water and nitrogen injection. However, since they are leaking, the normal definition of "cold shutdown" does not apply, and Tepco waited to bring radioactive releases under control before declaring "cold shutdown condition" in mid-December, with NISA's approval. This, with the prime minister's announcement of it, formally brought to a close the 'accident' phase of events.

The AC electricity supply from external source was connected to all units by 22 March. Power was restored to instrumentation in all units except unit 3 by 25 March. However, radiation levels inside the plant were so high that normal access was impossible until June.

Event sequence following earthquake (timing from it: 14:46, 11 March)

Tepco has written off the four reactors damaged by the accident, and is decommissioning them.

By March 2016 total decay heat in units 1-3 had dropped to 1 MW for all three, about 1% of the original level, meaning that cooling water injection - then 100 m ³/d - could be interrupted for up to two days.

Results of muon measurements in unit 2 in 2016 indicate that most of the fuel debris in unit 2 is in the bottom of the reactor vessel.

Summary: Major fuel melting occurred early on in all three units, though the fuel remains essentially contained except for some volatile fission products vented early on, or released from unit 2 in mid-March, and some soluble ones which were leaking with the water, especially from unit 2, where the containment is evidently breached. Cooling is provided from external sources, using treated recycled water, with a stable heat removal path from the actual reactors to external heat sinks. Temperatures at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessels have decreased to well below boiling point and are stable. Access has been gained to all three reactor buildings, but dose rates remain high inside. Nitrogen is being injected into all three containment vessels and pressure vessels. Tepco declared "cold shutdown condition" in mid-December 2011 when radioactive releases had reduced to minimal levels.

(See also background on nuclear reactors at Fukushima Daiichi.)

Fuel ponds: developing problems

Used fuel needs to be cooled and shielded. This is initially by water, in ponds. After about three years under water, used fuel can be transferred to dry storage, with air ventilation simply by convection. Used fuel generates heat, so the water is circulated by electric pumps through external heat exchangers, so that the heat is dumped and a low temperature maintained. There are fuel ponds near the top of all six reactor buildings at the Daiichi plant, adjacent to the top of each reactor so that the fuel can be unloaded under water when the top is off the reactor pressure vessel and it is flooded. The ponds hold some fresh fuel and some used fuel, the latter pending its transfer to the central used/spent fuel storage on site. (There is some dry storage on site to extend the plant's capacity.)

At the time of the accident, in addition to a large number of used fuel assemblies, unit 4's pond also held a full core load of 548 fuel assemblies while the reactor was undergoing maintenance, these having been removed at the end of November, and were to be repplaced in the core.

A separate set of problems arose as the fuel ponds, holding fresh and used fuel in the upper part of the reactor structures, were found to be depleted in water. The primary cause of the low water levels was loss of cooling circulation to external heat exchangers, leading to elevated temperatures and probably boiling, especially in heavily-loaded unit 4. Here the fuel would have been uncovered in about 7 days due to water boiling off. However, the fact that unit 4 was unloaded meant that there was a large inventory of water at the top of the structure, and enough of this replenished the fuel pond to prevent the fuel becoming uncovered - the minimum level reached was about 1.2 m above the fuel on about 22 April.

After the hydrogen explosion in unit 4 early on Tuesday 15 March, Tepco was told to implement injection of water to unit 4 pond which had a particularly high heat load (3 MW) from 1331 used fuel assemblies in it, so it was the main focus of concern. It needed the addition of about 100 m ³/day to replenish it after circulation ceased.

From Tuesday 15 March attention was given to replenishing the water in the ponds of units 1, 2, 3 as well. Initially this was attempted with fire pumps but from 22 March a concrete pump with 58-metre boom enabled more precise targeting of water through the damaged walls of the service floors. There was some use of built-in plumbing for unit 2. Analysis of radionuclides in water from the used fuel ponds suggested that some of the fuel assemblies might be damaged, but the majority were intact.

There was concern about structural strength of unit 4 building, so support for the pond was reinforced by the end of July.

New cooling circuits with heat exchangers adjacent to the reactor buildings for all four ponds were commissioned after a few months, and each reduced the pool temperature from 70°C to normal in a few days. Each has a primary circuit within the reactor and waste treatment buildings and a secondary circuit dumping heat through a small dry cooling tower outside the building.

The next task was to remove the salt from those ponds which had seawater added, to reduce the potential for corrosion.

In July 2012 two of the 204 fresh fuel assemblies were removed from the unit 4 pool and transferred to the central spent fuel pool for detailed inspection to check damage, particularly corrosion. They were found to have no deformation or corrosion. Unloading the 1331 spent fuel assemblies in pond 4 and transferring them to the central spent fuel storage commenced in mid-November 2013 and was completed 13 months later. These comprised 783 spent fuel plus the full fuel load of 548.

The next focus of attention was the unit 3 pool. In 2015 the damaged fuel handling equipment and other wreckage was removed from the destroyed upper level of the reactor building. Toshiba has built a 74-tonne fuel handling machine for transferring the 566 fuel assemblies into casks and to remove debris in the pool, and a crane for lifting the fuel transfer casks. Installation of a cover over the fuel handling machine was completed in February 2018.

The onsite central spent fuel pool in 2011 held about 60% of the Daiichi used fuel, and is immediately west (inland) of unit 4. It lost circulation with the power outage, and temperature increased to 73°C by the time mains power and cooling were restored after two weeks. In late 2013 this pond, with capacity for 6840*, held 6375 fuel assemblies, the same as at the time of the accident. The older ones will be transferred to 65 casks in dry storage, with total capacity of at least 2930 assemblies - each dry cask holds 50 fuel assemblies. Eventually these will be shipped to JNFL's Rokkasho reprocessing plant or to Recyclable Fuel Storage Company's new Mutsu facility. The dry storage area held 408 fuel assemblies at the time of the accident, and 1004 have been transferred there since (to mid-2014).

Summary: The spent fuel storage pools survived the earthquake, tsunami and hydrogen explosions without significant damage to the fuel or significant radiological release, or threat to public safety. The new cooling circuits with external heat exchangers for the four ponds are working well. Temperatures are normal. Analysis of water has confirmed that most fuel rods are intact. All fuel assemblies have been removed from unit 4 pool. Those at unit 3 will be removed next.

(See also background on Fukushima Fuel Ponds and Decommissioning section below.)

Radioactive releases to air

Regarding releases to air and also water leakage from Fukushima Daiichi, the main radionuclide from among the many kinds of fission products in the fuel was volatile iodine-131, which has a half-life of 8 days. The other main radionuclide is caesium-137, which has a 30-year half-life, is easily carried in a plume, and when it lands it may contaminate land for some time. It is a strong gamma-emitter in its decay. Cs-134 is also produced and dispersed, it has a two-year half-life. Caesium is soluble and can be taken into the body, but does not concentrate in any particular organs, and has a biological half-life of about 70 days. In assessing the significance of atmospheric releases, the Cs-137 figure is multiplied by 40 and added to the I-131 number to give an "iodine-131 equivalent" figure.

As cooling failed on the first day, evacuations were progressively ordered, due to uncertainty about what was happening inside the reactors and the possible effects. By the evening of Saturday 12 March the evacuation zone had been extended to 20 km from the plant. From 20 to 30 km from the plant, the criterion of 20 mSv/yr dose rate was applied to determine evacuation, and is now the criterion for return being allowed. 20 mSv/yr was also the general limit set for children's dose rate related to outdoor activities, but there were calls to reduce this.In areas with 20-50 mSv/yr from April 2012 residency is restricted, with remediation action taken. See later section on Public health and return of evacuees.

A significant problem in tracking radioactive release was that 23 out of the 24 radiation monitoring stations on the plant site were disabled by the tsunami.

There is some uncertainty about the amount and exact sources of radioactive releases to air. (See also background on Radiation Exposure.)

Japan's regulator, the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), estimated in June 2011 that 770 PBq (iodine-131 equivalent) of radioactivity had been released, but the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC, a policy body) in August lowered this estimate to 570 PBq. The 770 PBq figure is about 15% of the Chernobyl release of 5200 PBq iodine-131 equivalent. Most of the release was by the end of March 2011.

Tepco sprayed a dust-suppressing polymer resin around the plant to ensure that fallout from mid-March was not mobilized by wind or rain. In addition it removed a lot of rubble with remote control front-end loaders, and this further reduced ambient radiation levels, halving them near unit 1. The highest radiation levels on site came from debris left on the ground after the explosions at units 3&4.

Reactor covers

In mid-May 2011 work started towards constructing a cover over unit 1 to reduce airborne radioactive releases from the site, to keep out the rain, and to enable measurement of radioactive releases within the structure through its ventilation system. The frame was assembled over the reactor, enclosing an area 42 x 47 m, and 54 m high. The sections of the steel frame fitted together remotely without the use of screws and bolts. All the wall panels had a flameproof coating, and the structure had a filtered ventilation system capable of handling 40,000 cubic metres of air per hour through six lines, including two backup lines. The cover structure was fitted with internal monitoring cameras, radiation and hydrogen detectors, thermometers and a pipe for water injection. The cover was completed with ventilation systems working by the end of October 2011. It was expected to be needed for two years. In May 2013 Tepco announced its more permanent replacement, to be built over four years. It started demolishing the 2011 cover in 2014 and finished in 2016. It then plans to remove concrete and other rubble on the top floor of the building. A crane and other equipment for fuel removal would then be installed in a new cover over the building, similar to that over unit 4.

More substantial covers were designed to fit around units 3&4 reactor buildings after the top floors were cleared up in 2012.

A cantilevered structure was built over unit 4 from April 2012 to July 2013 to enable recovery of the contents of the spent fuel pond. This is 69 x 31 m cover (53 m high) and it was fully equipped by the end of 2013 to enable unloading of used fuel from the storage pond into casks, each holding 22 fuel assemblies, and removal of the casks. This operation was accomplished under water, using the new fuel handling machine (replacing the one destroyed by the hydrogen explosion) so that the used fuel could be transferred to the central storage on site. Transfer was completed in December 2014. Animation video of the process here.

A different design of cover is being built over unit 3, and foundation work had begun in 2012. Large rubble removal took place from 2013 to 2015, including the damaged fuel handling machine. An arched cover has been prefabricated, 57 m long and 19 m wide, to be supported by the turbine building on one side and the ground on the other. A crane to remove the 566 fuel assemblies from the pool will be fitted, with its operation removing some remaining rubble. Toshiba's 74-tonne fuel handling machine for transferring the fuel assemblies into casks is expected be installed in 2017, and the fuel is to be removed from mid-2018. Fuel debris retrieval from within the reactor is scheduled from about 2021, after that from units 1&2 is started.

Spent fuel removal from units 1&2 pools is scheduled in 2018, and fuel debris retrieval from within the reactors from 2020.

Tests on radioactivity in rice have been made and caesium was found in a few of them. The highest levels were about one quarter of the allowable limit of 500 Bq/kg, so shipments to market are permitted.

Maps from MEXT aerial surveys carried out approximately one year apart show the reduction in contamination from late 2011 to late 2012. Areas with colour changes in 2012 showed approximately half the contamination as surveyed in 2011, the difference coming from decay of caesium-134 (two year half-life) and natural processes like wind and rain. In blue areas, ambient radiation is very similar to global background levels at <0.5uSv/h which is equal to <4.38 mSv/y.

Summary: Major releases of radionuclides, including long-lived caesium, occurred to air, mainly in mid-March. The population within a 20km radius had been evacuated three days earlier. Considerable work was done to reduce the amount of radioactive debris on site and to stabilise dust. The main source of radioactive releases was the apparent hydrogen explosion in the suppression chamber of unit 2 on 15 March. A cover building for unit 1 reactor was built and is now being dismantled, a more substantial one for unit 4 was built to enable fuel removal during 2014. Radioactive releases in mid-August 2011 had reduced to 5 GBq/hr, and dose rate from these at the plant boundary was 1.7 mSv/yr, less than natural background.

Sequence of evacuation orders based on the report by The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission:

11 March
14:46 JST The earthquake occurred.
15:42 TEPCO made the first emergency report to the government.
19:03 The government announced nuclear emergency.
20:50 The Fukushima Prefecture Office ordered 2km radius evacuation.
21:23 The government ordered 3km evacuation and to keep staying inside buildings in the area of 3-10km radius.

12 March
05:44 The government ordered 10km radius evacuation.
18:25 The government ordered 20km evacuation.

15 March
11:01 The government ordered to keep staying inside buildings in the area of 20-30km from the plant.

25 March The government requested voluntary evacuation in the area of 20-30km.

21 April The government set the 20km radius no-go area.

Radiation exposure on the plant site

By the end of 2011, Tepco had checked the radiation exposure of 19,594 people who had worked on the site since 11 March. For many of these both external dose and internal doses (measured with whole-body counters) were considered. It reported that 167 workers had received doses over 100 mSv. Of these 135 had received 100 to 150 mSv, 23 150-200 mSv, three more 200-250 mSv, and six had received over 250 mSv (309 to 678 mSv) apparently due to inhaling iodine-131 fume early on. The latter included the two unit 3-4 control room operators in the first two days who had not been wearing breathing apparatus. There were up to 200 workers on site each day. Recovery workers are wearing personal monitors, with breathing apparatus and protective clothing which protect against alpha and beta radiation. So far over 3500 of some 3700 workers at the damaged Daiichi plant have received internal check-ups for radiation exposure, giving whole body count estimates. The level of 250 mSv was the allowable maximum short-term dose for Fukushima Daiichi accident clean-up workers through to December 2011, 500 mSv is the international allowable short-term dose "for emergency workers taking life-saving actions". Since January 2012 the allowable maximum has reverted to 50 mSv/yr.

Tepco figures submitted to NRA for the period to end January 2014 showed 173 workers had received more than 100 mSv (six more than two years earlier) and 1578 had received 50 to 100 mSv. This was among a total of 32,024, 64% more than had worked there two years earlier. Since April 2013 none of the 13,154 who had worked on site had received more than 50 mSv, and 96% of these had less than 20 mSv dose. Early in 2014 there were about 4000 on site each weekday.

No radiation casualties (acute radiation syndrome) occurred, and few other injuries, though higher than normal doses were being accumulated by several hundred workers on site. High radiation levels in the three reactor buildings has hindered access there.

Monitoring of seawater, soil and atmosphere is at 25 locations on the plant site, 12 locations on the boundary, and others further afield. Government and IAEA monitoring of air and seawater is ongoing. Some high but not health-threatening levels of iodine-131 were found in March, but with an eight-day half-life, most I-131 had gone by the end of April 2011.

A radiation survey map of the site made in March 2013 revealed substantial progress: the highest dose rate anywhere on the site was 0.15 mSv/h near units 3 and 4. (Soon after the accident a similar survey put the highest dose rate at 300 mSv/h near rubble lying alongside unit 3.) The majority of the power plant area was at less than 0.01 mSv/h. These reduced levels are reflected in worker doses: during January 2013, the 5702 workers at the site received an average of 0.86 mSv, with 75% of workers recorded as receiving less than 1 mSv. In total, only about 2% of workers received over 5 mSv and the highest dose in January was 12.65 mSv for one worker.

Media reports have referred to "nuclear gypsies" - casual workers employed by subcontractors on a short-term basis, and allegedly prone to receiving higher and unsupervised radiation doses. This transient workforce has been part of the nuclear scene for at least four decades, and at Fukushima their doses are very rigorously monitored. If they reach certain levels, e.g. 30 mSv but varying according to circumstance, they are reassigned to lower-exposure areas.

Summary: Six workers received radiation doses apparently over the 250 mSv level set by NISA, but at levels below those which would cause radiation sickness.

Radiation exposure and fallout beyond the plant site

On 4 April 2011, radiation levels of 0.06 mSv/day were recorded in Fukushima city, 65 km northwest of the plant, about 60 times higher than normal but posing no health risk according to authorities. Monitoring beyond the 20 km evacuation radius to 13 April showed one location - around Iitate - with up to 0.266 mSv/day dose rate, but elsewhere no more than one-tenth of this. At the end of July the highest level measured within 30km radius was 0.84 mSv/day in Namie town, 24 km away. The safety limit set by the central government in mid-April for public recreation areas was 3.8 microsieverts per hour (0.09 mSv/day).

In June 2013, analysis from Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) showed that the most contaminated areas in the Fukushima evacuation zone had reduced in size by three-quarters over the previous two years. The area subject to high dose rates (over 166 mSv/yr) diminished from 27% of the 1117 km ² zone to 6% over 15 months to March 2013, and in the 'no residence' portion (originally 83-166 mSv/yr) no areas remained at this level and 70% was below 33 mSv/yr. The least-contaminated area is now entirely below 33 mSv/yr.

In August 2011 The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution was enacted and it took full effect from January 2012 as the main legal instrument to deal with all remediation activities in the affected areas, as well as the management of materials removed as a result of those activities. It specified two categories of land:
- Special Decontamination Areas consisting of the "restricted areas" located within a 20 km radius from the Fukushima Daiichi plant, and "deliberate evacuation areas" where the annual cumulative dose for individuals was anticipated to exceed 20 mSv. The national government promotes decontamination in these areas. These areas are subdivided into three: dose 1- 20 mSv/yr (green) dose 20-50 mSv/yr (yellow) and dose over 50 mSv/yr and over 20 mSv/yr average over 5 years (red).
- Intensive Contamination Survey Areas including the so-called Decontamination Implementation Areas, where an additional annual cumulative dose between 1mSv and 20mSv was estimated for individuals. Municipalities implement decontamination activities in these areas.

In May 2013, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) reported, following a detailed study by 80 international experts. It concluded that "Radiation exposure following the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi did not cause any immediate health effects. It is unlikely to be able to attribute any health effects in the future among the general public and the vast majority of workers." The only exception are the 146 emergency workers that received radiation doses of over 100 mSv during the crisis. They will be monitored closely for "potential late radiation-related health effects at an individual level." UNSCEAR's follow-up white paper in October 2015 said that none of the new information appraised after the 2013 report "materially affected the main findings in, or challenged the major assumptions of, the 2013 Fukushima report."

By contrast, the public was exposed to 10-50 times less radiation. Most Japanese people were exposed to additional radiation amounting to less than the typical natural background level of 2.1 mSv per year.

People living in Fukushima prefecture are expected to be exposed to around 10 mSv over their entire lifetimes, while for those living further away the dose would be 0.2 mSv per year. The UNSCEAR conclusion reinforces the findings of several international reports to date, including one from the World Health Organisation (WHO) that considered the health risk to the most exposed people possible: a postulated girl under one year of age living in Iitate or Namie that did not evacuate and continued life as normal for four months after the accident. Such a child's theoretical risk of developing any cancer would be increased only marginally, according to WHO's analysis.

Eleven municipalities in the former restricted zone or planned evacuation area, within 20 km of the plant or where annual cumulative radiation dose is greater than 20 mSv, are designated Special Decontamination Areas, where decontamination work is being implemented by the government. A further 100 municipalities in eight prefectures, where dose rates are equivalent to over 1 mSv per year are classed as Intensive Decontamination Survey Areas, where decontamination is being implemented by each municipality with funding and technical support from the national government. In the Special Decontamination Areas, decontamination is proceeding and was complete to target levels in one municipality by June 2013.

In October 2013 a 16-member IAEA mission reported on remediation and decontamination in the Special Decontamination Areas. Its preliminary report said that decontamination efforts were commendable but driven by unrealistic targets. If annual radiation dose was below 20 mSv, such as generally in Intensive Decontamination Survey Areas, this level was "acceptable and in line with the international standards and with the recommendations from the relevant international organisations, e.g. ICRP, IAEA, UNSCEAR and WHO." The clear implication is that people in such areas should be allowed to return home. Furthermore the government should increase efforts to communicate this to the public, and should explain that its long-term goal of achieving an additional individual dose of 1 mSv/yr is unrealistic and unnecessary in the short term. Also, there is potential to produce more food safely in contaminated areas.

Radioactivity, primarily from caesium-137, in the evacuation zone and other areas beyond it has been reported in terms of kBq/kg (compared with kBq/m ² around Chernobyl. A total of 3,000 km was contaminated above 180 kBq/m ², compared with 29,400 km from Chernobyl). However the main measure has been presumed doses in mSv/yr. The government has adopted 20 mSv/yr as its goal for the evacuation zone and more contaminated areas outside it, and supports municipal government work to reduce levels below that. The total area under consideration for attention is 13,000 km ². In 2016 the Ministry of Environment announced that material with less than 8 kBq/kg caesium would no longer be specified as waste, and subject to restrictions on disposal. It allowed use of contaminated soil for embankments, where the activity was less then 8 kBq/kg, and unrestricted use if less than 100 Bq/kg. Most of the stored wastes have decayed to below the 8 kBq/kg level.

Summary: There have been no harmful effects from radiation on local people, nor any doses approaching harmful levels. However, some 160,000 people were evacuated from their homes and only from 2012 were allowed limited return. In October 2013, 81,000 evacuees remained displaced due to government concern about radiological effects from the accident.

Public health and return of evacuees

Permanent return remains a high priority, and the evacuation zone is being decontaminated where required and possible, so that evacuees (81,000 from this accident according to METI) can return without undue delay. There are many cases of evacuation stress including transfer trauma among evacuees, and once the situation had stabilised at the plant these outweighed the radiological hazards of returning, with over 1000 deaths reported (see below). There were also 267,000 tsunami survivor refugees remaining displaced in February 2014.

In December 2011 the government said that where annual radiation dose would be below 20 mSv/yr, the government would help residents return home as soon as possible and assist local municipalities with decontamination and repair of infrastructure. In areas where radiation levels are over 20 mSv/yr evacuees will be asked to continue living elsewhere for "a few years" until the government completes decontamination and recovery work. The government said it would consider purchasing land and houses from residents of these areas if the evacuees wish to sell them.

In November 2013 the NRA decided to change the way radiation exposure was estimated. Instead of airborne surveys being the basis, personal dosimeters would be used, giving very much more accurate figures, often much less than airborne estimates. The same criteria would be used, as above, with 20 mSv/yr being the threshold of concern to authorities.

In February 2014 the results of a study were published showing that 458 residents of two study areas 20 to 30 km from the plant and a third one 50 km northwest received radiation doses from the contaminated ground similar to the country's natural background levels. Measurement was by personal dosimeters over August-September 2012.

By October 2012, over 1000 disaster-related deaths that were not due to radiation-induced damage or to the earthquake or to the tsunami had been identified by the Reconstruction Agency < http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/>, based on data for areas evacuated for no other reason than the nuclear accident. About 90% of deaths were for persons above 66 years of age. Of these, about 70% occurred within the first three months of the evacuations. (A similar number of deaths occurred among evacuees from tsunami- and earthquake-affected prefectures. These figures are additional to the 19,000 that died in the actual tsunami.)

The premature deaths reported in 2012 were mainly related to the following: (1) somatic effects and spiritual fatigue brought on by having to reside in shelters; (2) Transfer trauma - the mental or physical burden of the forced move from their homes for fragile individuals; and (3) delays in obtaining needed medical support because of the enormous destruction caused by the earthquake and tsunami. However, the radiation levels in most of the evacuated areas were not greater than the natural radiation levels in high background areas elsewhere in the world where no adverse health effect is evident, so maintaining the evacuation beyond a precautionary few days was evidently the main disaster in relation to human fatalities.
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20121102_sinsaikanrensi.pdf
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/240821_higashinihondaishinsainiokerushinsaikanrenshinikansuruhoukoku.pdf

Fukushima prefecture provided a further report early in 2014 which said that the 'indirect' deaths in the prefecture were greater than the number (1607) killed in the quake and tsunami. It put the figure at 1656 as determined by municipal panels that examine links between the disaster's aftermath and death. The figure is greater than for Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, with 434 and 879 respectively, though they had much higher loss of life in the quake and tsunami - about 14,200. The disparity is attributed to the older age group involved among Fukushima's evacuated quake/tsunami survivors, about 90% of indirect deaths being of people over 66. Causes of indirect deaths include physical and mental stress stemming from long stays at shelters, a lack of initial care as a result of hospitals being disabled by the disaster, and suicides. The high rate of these deaths continues three years later as the evacuation is maintained for about 135,000 people - apparently some 75,000 from the nuclear accident and 60,000 from the natural disaster itself. Evaluation of 'indirect deaths' is according to a model developed by Niigata prefecture after the 2004 earthquake there. ( Japan Times 20/2/14)

Evacuees receive JPY 100,000 ($1,030) per month in psychological suffering compensation. The money is tax-exempt and paid unconditionally. In October 2013, about 84,000 evacuees received the payments. Statistics indicate that an average family of four has received about JPY 90 million ($900,000) in compensation from Tepco. The average compensation for real estate was JPY 49.1 million ($490,000), JPY 10.9 million ($110,000) for lost wages, and JPY 30 million ($300,000) as "consolation money" for pain and suffering. (Asahi Shimbun 26/10/13)

The Fukushima prefecture has 17,000 government-financed temporary housing units for some 29,500 evacuees from the accident. The prefectural government said residents could continue to use these until March 2015. The number compares with very few built in Miyagi, Iwate and Aomori prefectures for the 222,700 tsunami survivor refugees there. (Japan Times 17/11/13) Another reported contrast from the Reconstruction Agency is that some $30 billion had been paid to 84,000 nuclear accident refugees but only some $20 billion to 300,000 tsunami survivors in the Tohoku region.

Evacuation orders have been progressively lifted, apart from some 300 km designated areas with annual dose levels above 20 mSv with continuous occupation.

According to a survey released by the prefectural government in April 2017, the majority of people who voluntarily evacuated their homes after the accident and who are now living outside of Fukushima prefecture do not intend to return. A Mainichi report said that 78.2% of respondents to the survey preferred to continue living in the area to which they had moved, while only 18.3% intended to move back to the prefecture. Of the voluntary evacuees still living in Fukushima prefecture, 23.6% planned to stay where they were, while 66.6% hoped to return to their original homes.

An August 2012 Reconstruction Agency report also considered workers at Fukushima power plant. Of almost 1500 surveyed, many were stressed, due to evacuating their homes (70%), believing they had come close to death (53%), the loss of homes in the tsunami (32%), deaths of colleagues (20%) and of family members (6%) mostly in the tsunami. The death toll directly due to the nuclear accident or radiation exposure remained zero, but stress and disruption due to the continuing evacuation remains high.

Tokyo's Board of Audit reported in October 2013 that 23% of recovery funding - about JPY 1.45 trillion ($14.5 billion) - had been misappropriated. Some 326 out of about 1400 projects funded had no direct relevance to the natural disaster or Fukushima Daiichi accident. (Mainichi 1/11/13)

Summary: Many evacuated people remain unable to fully return home due to government-mandated restrictions based on conservative radiation exposure criteria. However, over 1000 premature deaths have been caused by maintaining the evacuation beyond a prudent week or so. Decontamination work is proceeding while radiation levels decline naturally. The October 2013 IAEA report makes it clear that many evacuees should be allowed to return home.

A journalist article is in line with the World Nuclear Association's understanding of the situation in 2015.

Managing contaminated water

Removing contaminated water from the reactor and turbine buildings had become the main challenge in week 3, along with contaminated water in trenches carrying cabling and pipework. This was both from the tsunami inundation and leakage from reactors. Run-off from the site into the sea was also carrying radionuclides well in excess of allowable levels. By the end of March all storages around the four units - basically the main condenser units and condensate tanks - were largely full of contaminated water pumped from the buildings. Some 1000 storage tanks were set up progressively, including initially 350 steel tanks with rubber seams, each holding 1200 m ³. A few of these developed leaks in 2013.

Accordingly, with government approval, Tepco over 4-10 April released to the sea about 10,400 cubic metres of slightly contaminated water (0.15 TBq total) in order to free up storage for more highly-contaminated water from unit 2 reactor and turbine buildings which needed to be removed to make safe working conditions. Unit 2 is the main source of contaminated water, though some of it comes from drainage pits. NISA confirmed that there was no significant change in radioactivity levels in the sea as a result of the 0.15 TBq discharge.

Tepco built a new wastewater treatment facility to treat contaminated water. The company used both US proprietary adsorbtion and French conventional technologies in the new 1200 m ³/day treatment plant. A supplementary and simpler SARRY plant to remove caesium using Japanese technology and made by Toshiba and Shaw Group was installed and commissioned in August 2011. These plants reduce caesium from about 55 MBq/L to 5.5 kBq/L - about ten times better than designed. Desalination is necessary on account of the seawater earlier used for cooling, and the 1200 m ³/day desalination plant produces 480 m ³ of clean water while 720 m ³ goes to storage. A steady increase in volume of the stored water (about 400 m ³/d net) is due to groundwater finding its way into parts of the plant and needing removal and treatment.

Early in 2013 Tepco started to test and commission this Advanced Liquid Processing System ( ALPS), developed by EnergySolutions and Toshiba. Each of six trains is capable of processing 250 m ³/day to remove 62 remaining radioisotopes. By the end of 2014, an Advanced ALPS of 500 m ³/d had been added, making total capacity 2000 m ³/d. NRA approved the extra capacity in August 2014.

The ALPS is a chemical system which will remove radionuclides to below legal limits for release. However, because tritium is contained in water molecules, ALPS cannot remove it, which gives rise to questions about the discharge of treated water to the sea. Tritium is a weak beta-emitter which does not bio-accumulate (half-life 12 years), and its concentration has levelled off at about 1 MBq/L in the stored water, with dilution from groundwater balancing further release from the fuel debris.

The clean tritiated water was the focus of attention in 2014. A September 2013 report from the Atomic Energy Society of Japan recommended diluting the ALPS-treated water with seawater and releasing it to the sea at the legal discharge concentration of 0.06 MBq/L, with monitoring to ensure that normal background tritium levels of 10 Bq/L are not exceeded. (WHO drinking water guideline is 0.01 MBq/L tritium) The IAEA is reported to support release of tritiated water to the ocean, as does Dr Dale Klein, chairman of Tepco's nuclear reform monitoring committee (NRMC) and former chairman of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The government had an expert Task Force considering the options.

In 2016 Kurion (now owned by Veolia) completed a demonstration project for tritium removal at low concentrations, with its new Modular Detritiation System (MDS),* in response to a JPY 1 billion commission from METI.
* In this, an electrolyser produces hydrogen and oxygen, with the tritium reporting in the hydrogen. This is fed through a catalytic exchange column with a little water which preferentially takes up the tritium. The concentrated tritiated water is fed through a 'getter bed' of dry metal hydrate, where the tritium replaces hydrogen, and the material is stored, being stable up to 500°C. It can be incorporated into concrete and disposed as low-level waste. The tritium is concentrated 1000 to 20,000 times. The MDS is the first system to be able economically to treat large volumes of water with low tritium concentrations, and builds on existing heavy water tritium removal systems. Each module treats up to 7200 litres per day.
In 2014 a new Kurion (now owned by Veolia) strontium removal system was commissioned. This is mobile and can be moved around the tank groups to further clean up water which has been treated by ALPS.

In June 2015, 108 m ³/day of clean water was being circulated through each reactor (1-3). Collected water from them, with high radioactivity levels, was being treated for caesium removal and re-used. Apart from this recirculating loop, the cumulative treated volume was then 1.232 million cubic metres. In storage onsite was 459,000 m ³ of fully treated water (by ALPS), and 190,000 m ³ of partially-treated water (strontium removed), which was being added to at 400 m ³/day due to groundwater inflow. Almost 600 m ³ of sludge from the water treatment was stored in shielded containers.

In October 2018 Tepco announced that some 80% of its 900,000 m ³ of stored water from reactor buildings remained above legal limits for discharge to the sea. Treatment using ALPS is ongoing at about 210 m ³/day.

By the end of June 2011, Tepco had installed 109 concrete panels to seal the water intakes of units 1-4, preventing contaminated water leaking to the harbour. From mid-June some treatment with zeolite of seawater at 30 m ³/hr was being undertaken near the water intakes for units 2&3, inside submerged barriers installed in April. From October, a steel water shield wall was built on the sea frontage of units 1-4. It extends about one kilometre, and down to an impermeable layer beneath two permeable strata which potentially leak contaminated groundwater to the sea. The inner harbour area which has some contamination is about 30 ha in area. The government in September 2013 said that "At present, statistically-significant increase of radioactive concentration in the sea outside the port of the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS has not been detected." And also that "The results of monitoring of sea water in Japan are constantly below the standard of 10 Bq/L" (the WHO standard for Cs-137 in drinking water). In 2012 the Japanese standard for caesium in food supply was dropped from 500 to 100 Bq/kg. In July-August 2014 only 0.6% of fish caught offshore from the plant exceeded this lower level, compared with 53% in the months immediately following the accident.

Apart from the above-ground water treatment activity, there is now a groundwater bypass to reduce the groundwater level above the reactors by about 1.5 metres, pumping from 12 wells and from May 2014, discharging the uncontaminated water into the sea. This prevents some of it flowing into the reactor basements and becoming contaminated. In addition, an impermeable wall is being constructed on the sea-side of the reactors, and inside this a frozen soil wall will further block water flow into the reactor buildings.

In October 2013 guidelines for rainwater release from the site allowed Tepco to release water to the sea without specific NRA approval as long as it conformed to activity limits. Tepco has been working to 25 Bq/L caesium and 10 Bq/L strontium-90.

Summary: A large amount of contaminated water has accumulated on site and has been treated to remove all but traces of tritium, which limits the potential to release treated water to the sea. Some radioactivity has been released to the sea, but this has mostly been low-level and it has not had any significant impact beyond the immediate plant structures. Concentrations outside these structures have been below regulatory levels since April 2011.

IRID and NDF involvement

The International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning ( IRID) was set up in August 2013 Japan by JAEA, Japanese utilities and reactor vendors, with a focus on Fukushima 1-4.

In September 2013 IRID called for submissions on the management of contaminated water at Fukushima. In particular, proposals were sought for dealing with: the accumulation of contaminated water (in storage tanks, etc); the treatment of contaminated water including tritium removal; the removal of radioactive materials from the seawater in the plant's 30 ha harbour; the management of contaminated water inside the buildings; measures to block groundwater from flowing into the site; and, understanding the flow of groundwater. Responses were submitted to the government in November.

In December 2013 IRID called for innovative proposals for removing fuel debris from units 1-3 about 2020.

In August 2014 the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF) was set up by government as a planning body with management support for R&D projects, taking over IRID's planning role. It will work closely with IRID, whose focus now is on developing mid- and long-term decommissioning technologies. NDF will also work closely with Tepco Fukushima Daiichi D&D Engineering Co. which has responsibility for operating the actual decommissioning work there. The NDF will be the main body interacting with government (METI) to implement policy.

Fukushima Daiichi 5&6

Units 5&6, in a separate building, also lost power on 11 March due to the tsunami. They were in 'cold shutdown' at the time, but still requiring pumped cooling. One air-cooled diesel generator at Daiichi 6 was located higher and so survived the tsunami and enabled repairs on Saturday 19th, allowing full restoration of cooling for units 5 and 6. While the power was off their core temperature had risen to over 100°C (128°C in unit 5) under pressure, and they had been cooled with normal water injection. They were restored to cold shutdown by the normal recirculating system on 20th, and mains power was restored on 21-22nd.

In September 2013 Tepco commenced work to remove the fuel from unit 6. Prime Minister Abe then called for Tepco to decommission both units. Tepco announced in December 2013 that it would decommission both units from the end of january 2014. Unit 5 is a 760 MWe BWR the same as units 2-4, and unit 6 is larger - 1067 MWe. They entered commercial operation in 1978 and 1979 respectively. It is proposed that they will be used for training.

Meanwhile Tepco and Mitsubishi plan to build and operate two new 500 MWe coal-burning power plants near Fukushima Daiichi at Hirono Town and Iwaki City. This will partly compensate for the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi units. The investment is expected to be JPY 300 billion ($3 billion). The plants will be state-of-the-art integrated combined gasification cycle with less atmospheric pollution than the coal plants now operating in Japan. The companies planned to apply for a government subsidy to help defray costs. (Mainichi 23/11/13)

Remediation on site and decommissioning units 1-4

Tepco published a six- to nine-month plan in April 2011 for dealing with the disabled Fukushima reactors, and updated this several times subsequently. Remediation over the next couple of years proceeded approximately as planned. in August 2011 Tepco announced its general plan for proceeding with removing fuel from the four units, initially from the spent fuel ponds and then from the actual reactors. At the end of 2013 Tepco announced the establishment of an internal entity to focus on measures for decommissioning units 1-6 and dealing with contaminated water. The name of the new company is Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company, and it commenced operations in April 2014.

In June 2015 the government revised the decommissioning plan or roadmap for the second time, though without major change. It clarified milestones to accomplish preventive and multilayered measures, involving the three principles of removing the source of the contamination, isolating groundwater from the contamination source, and preventing leakage of the contaminated water. It included a new goal of cutting the amount of groundwater flowing into the buildings to less than 100 m ³ per day by April 2016. The schedule for fuel removal from the pond at unit 1 was postponed from late FY17 to FY20, while that for unit 2 was delayed from early FY20 to later the same fiscal year, and that at unit 3 from early FY15 to FY17. Fuel debris removal was to begin in 2021, as before. Tepco affirmed the revised plan.

In September 2017 the government updated the June 2015 decommissioning roadmap, with no changes to the framework, and confirming first removal of fuel debris from unit 1 in 2021. Treatment of all contaminated water accumulated in the reactor buildings is to be completed by 2020.

Tepco has a website giving updates on decommissioning work and environmental monitoring.

Storage ponds: First, debris has been removed from the upper parts of the reactor buildings using large cranes and heavy machinery. Covers will be built as required, and overhead cranes and fuel handling machines necessary to remove the spent fuel assemblies will be reinstalled, as already at unit 4. The fuel handling machine for unit 3 was built by Toshiba in January 2016 and delivered to the port at the plant. It is being fitted in 2017, with a cover, for the 566 fuel assemblies to be removed by mid-2018. Casks to transfer the removed fuel to the central spent fuel facility have been designed and manufactured using existing cask technology.

In July 2012 two unused fuel assemblies were removed from unit 4 pond, and were found to be in good shape, with no deformation or corrosion. Tepco started removal of both fresh and used fuel from the pond in November 2013, 22 assemblies at a time in each cask, with 1331 used and 202 new ones to be moved. This was uneventful, and the task continued through 2014. By 22 December 2014, all 1331 used as well as all 202 new fuel assemblies had been moved in 71 cask shuttles without incident, with weekly updates having been published. All of the radioactive used fuel was removed by early November, eliminating a significant radiological hazard on the site. The used fuel went to the central storage pond, from which older assemblies were transferred to dry cask storage - 1004 moved since the accident by mid 2014 to make way for new inputs from unit 4. The fresh fuel assemblies are stored in the pool of the undamaged unit 6.

From 2018 Tepco expects to move 514 used fuel assemblies from unit 3 to the central pool, as well as 52 new ones and then 292 used fuel assemblies and 100 new ones from unit 1. Finally unit 2 will have its 587 used assemblies and 28 fresh ones moved. The NRA has expressed concern about the unit 1 used fuel.

Reactors 1-3: First it is necessary to identify the locations of leaks from the primary containment vessels (PCVs) and reactor buildings using manual and remotely controlled dosimeters, cameras, etc., and indirectly analyse conditions inside the PCVs from the outside via measurements of gamma rays, echo soundings, etc. Any leakage points will be repaired and both reactor vessels (RPVs) and PCVs filled with water sufficient to achieve shielding. Then the vessel heads will be removed. The location of melted fuel and corium will then be established. In particular, the distribution of damaged fuel believed to have flowed out from the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) into PCVs will be ascertained, and it will be sampled and analysed. After examination of the inside of the reactors, states of the damaged fuel rods and reactor core internals, sampling will be done and the damaged core material will be removed from the RPVs as well as from the PCVs. The whole process will be complex and slow, since safety remains paramount. In December Tepco estimates that the fuel will be removed from the reactors within 25 years - in line with US experience at Three Mile Island, though other estimates suggest ten years. Updated plans are on the IRID website.

The four reactors will be completely demolished in 30-40 years - much the same timeframe as for any nuclear plant. As noted above units 5-6 were decommissioned in 2014 and will be used for training.

Earlier, consortia led by both Hitachi-GE and Toshiba submitted proposals to Tepco for decommissioning units 1-4. This would generally involve removing the fuel and then sealing them for a further decade or two while the activation products in the steel of the reactor pressure vessels decay. They can then be demolished. As noted above, removal of the very degraded fuel will be a long process in units 1-3, but will draw on experience at Three Mile Island in USA. In January 2012 it was reported that an industry consortium (Hitachi GE Nuclear Energy, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba) would determine how to locate fuel debris inside units 1-3 and how to fill the pressure vessels with water.

Tepco has allocated ¥207 billion ($2.53 billion) in its accounts for decommissioning units 1-4. The government has allocated ¥1150 billion ($15 billion) for decontamination in the region, with the promise of more if needed.

The new International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) has a focus on Fukushima 1-4. See section above. Its schedule for units 1-4 is:
FY 20XX ends the following March
The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) has calculated that as of January 2017 Tepco needs an estimated ¥22,000 billion ($191 billion), double the original estimate, to implement fuel debris removal, cleanup and for compensation to firms and individuals in Fukushima prefecture. Of this amount, Tepco will pay ¥16,000 billion. Other Japanese nuclear operators will pay ¥4,000 billion through the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corp (NDF), and the Japanese government will pay ¥2,000 billion for cleanup in Fukushima prefecture.

A 12-member international expert team assembled by the IAEA at the request of the Japanese government has reported on remediation strategies for contaminated land. The mission focused on the remediation of the affected areas outside of the 20 km restricted area. The team said that it agreed with the prioritization and the general strategy being implemented, but advised the government to focus on actual dose reduction. They should "avoid over-conservatism" which "could not effectively contribute to the reduction of exposure doses" to people. It warned the government against being preoccupied with "contamination concentrations rather than dose levels," since this "does not automatically lead to reduction of doses for the public." The team's report calls on the Japanese authorities to "maintain their focus on remediation activities that bring best results in reducing the doses to the public."

Fukushima Daini plant

Units 1-4 were shut down automatically due to the earthquake. The tsunami - here only 9 m high - affected the generators and there was major interruption to cooling due to damaged heat exchangers, so the reactors were almost completely isolated from their ultimate heat sink. Damage to the diesel generators was limited and also the earthquake left one of the external power lines intact, avoiding a station blackout as at Daiichi 1-4. Staff laid and energised 8.8km of heavy-duty electric cables in 30 hours to supplement power.

In units 1, 2 & 4 there were cooling problems still evident on Tuesday 15th. Unit 3 was undamaged and continued to 'cold shutdown' status on 12th, but the other units suffered flooding to pump rooms where the equipment transfers heat from the reactor heat removal circuit to the sea. Pump motors were replaced in less than 30 hours. All units achieved 'cold shutdown' by16 March, meaning core temperature less than 100°C at atmospheric pressure (101 kPa), but still requiring some water circulation. The almost complete loss of ultimate heat sink for a day proved a significant challenge, but the cores were kept fully covered.

Radiation monitoring figures remained at low levels, little above background.

There is no technical reason for the Fukushima Daini plant not to restart. restart. However, Tepco in October 2012 said it planned to transfer the fuel from the four reactors to used fuel ponds, and this was done. In February 2015 the prime minister said that restarting the four units was essentially a matter for Tepco to decide. Local government is in favour of decommissioning. Tepco has not announced any decision about whether to retire or move towards restarting the four units.

International Nuclear Event Scale assessment

Japan's Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency originally declared the Fukushima Daiichi 1-3 accident as Level 5 on the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) - an accident with wider consequences, the same level as Three Mile Island in 1979. The sequence of events relating to the fuel pond at unit 4 was rated INES Level 3 - a serious incident.

However, a month after the tsunami the NSC raised the rating to 7 for units 1-3 together, 'a major accident', saying that a re-evaluation of early radioactive releases suggested that some 630 PBq of I-131 equivalent had been discharged, mostly in the first week. This then matched the criterion for level 7. In early June NISA increased its estimate of releases to 770 PBq, from about half that, though in August the NSC lowered this estimate to 570 PBq

For Fukushima Daini, NISA declared INES Level 3 for units 1, 2, 4 - each a serious incident.

Accident liability and compensation

Beyond whatever insurance Tepco might carry for its reactors is the question of third party liability for the accident. Japan was not party to any international liability convention but its law generally conforms to them, notably strict and exclusive liability for the operator. Early in 2015 Japan ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). Two laws governing liability are revised about every ten years: the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Law on Contract for Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage. Plant operator liability is exclusive and absolute (regardless of fault), and power plant operators must provide a financial security amount of JPY 120 billion (US$ 1.46 billion) - it was half that to 2010. The government may relieve the operator of liability if it determines that damage results from "a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character" (which it did not do here), and in any case total liability is unlimited.

In mid-April 2011, the first meeting was held of a panel to address compensation for nuclear-related damage. The panel established guidelines for determining the scope of compensation for damage caused by the accident, and to act as an intermediary. It was established within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and was led by Law Professor Yoshihisa Nomi of Gakushuin, University in Tokyo.

On 11 May 2011, Tepco accepted terms established by the Japanese government for state support to compensate those affected by the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The scheme includes a new state-backed institution to expedite payments to those affected by the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The body receives financial contributions from electric power companies with nuclear power plants in Japan, and from the government through special bonds that can be cashed whenever necessary. The government bonds total JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion). Tepco accepted the conditions imposed on the company as part of the package. That included not setting an upper limit on compensation payments to those affected, making maximum efforts to reduce costs, and an agreement to cooperate with an independent panel set up to investigate its management.

This Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, established by government and nuclear plant operators, includes representatives from other nuclear generators and will also operate as an insurer for the industry, being responsible to have plans in place for any future nuclear accidents. The provision for contributions from other nuclear operators is similar to that in the USA. The government estimates that Tepco will be able to complete its repayments in 10 to 13 years, after which it will revert to a fully private company with no government involvement. Meanwhile it will pay an annual fee for the government support, maintain adequate power supplies and ensure plant safety. Tepco estimated its extra costs for fossil fuels in 2011-12 (April-March) would be about JPY 830 billion ($10.7 billion).

On 14 June 2011, Japan's cabinet passed the Nuclear Disaster Compensation Bill, and a related budget to fund post-tsunami reconstruction was also passed subsequently.

In September 2011 the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation started by working with Tepco to compile a business plan for the next decade. This was approved by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) so that some JPY 900 billion ($11.5 billion) could be released to the company through bonds issued to the Nuclear Damage Facilitation Fund to cover compensation payments to March 2012. The plan also involved Tepco reducing its own costs by JPY 2545 billion ($32.6 billion) over the next ten years, including shedding 7400 jobs. This special business plan was superseded by a more comprehensive business plan in March 2012, involving compensation payments of JPY 910 billion ($11.6 billion) annually. Tepco wanted to include an electricity rate increase of 17% in the plan, to cover the additional annual fuel costs for thermal power generation to make up for lost capacity at idled nuclear power plants.

In February 2012 METI approved a further JPY 690 billion ($8.9 billion) in compensation support from the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund, subject to Tepco's business plan giving the government voting rights. In June 2012 shareholders voted to sell the Japanese government 50.11% of Tepco's voting shares and an additional 25.73% with no voting rights, for JPY 1 trillion (about $12.5 billion), paid through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund. This was effected at the end of July, so that Tepco then became government-controlled, at least temporarily. Tepco said it appreciated the chance to 'transform to New Tepco'.

The government and 12 utilities are contributing funds into the new institution to pay compensation to individuals and businesses claiming damages caused by the accident. It received JPY 7 billion ($91 million) in public funds as well as a total of JPY 7 billion from 12 nuclear plant operators, the Tepco share of JPY 2379 million ($30 million) being largest. The percentage of utility contributions was fixed in proportion to the power output of their plants, so Kansai Electric Power Co. provided JPY 1229 million, followed by JPY 660 million by Kyushu Electric Power Co. and JPY 622 million by Chubu Electric Power Co. Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., which owns a used nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture, provided JPY 117 million to the entity. The utility companies also pay annual contributions to the body. Tepco is required to make extra contributions, with the specific amount to be decided later.

In June 2013 Tepco requested a further JPY 666 billion ($6.7 billion) in government support through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund, bringing the total amount requested by Tepco to JPY 3.79 trillion ($38 billion). The company said that more than half of the latest request - some JPY 370 billion ($3.7 billion) - resulted from the re-evaluation of the evacuation zone around the damaged plant and a re-examination of the estimated amount "regarding compensation for mental damages, loss or depreciation of valuables such as housing lands and buildings." About JPY 43 billion ($431 million) was due to a higher estimate of compensation coming from damages to the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries, as well as the food processing and distribution industries. This, it said, also resulted from "harmful rumours" about the possible health effects of consuming food products from the region near the damaged power plant. As restrictions on the transport of foodstuffs from the Fukushima area seemed set to continue, an additional JPY 240 billion ($2.4 billion) was included to cover for the further compensation claims resulting from this.

By mid-May 2014, Tepco had paid JPY 3808 billion ($38 billion) in compensation, fairly evenly split between businesses and individuals, based on decisions of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, and covered by loans from the NDLF Fund. Some $16 billion of this was distributed evenly among 85,000 evacuees - $188,200 each person including children, as directed early in 2011.

In July 2015 the government approved Tepco's recovery plan, including compensation payments of JPY 7075 billion ($57.2 billion), enabling it to receive JPY 950 billion more than the JPY 6125 billion estimated in April, according to METI.

In December 2013 the government raised the upper limit of its financial assistance to Tepco from JPY 5 trillion to JPY 9 trillion ($86 billion). Early in 2014 the government estimated it would take JPY11 trillion and 40 years to clean up the Fukushima site. The 2013 Japan trade deficit was JPY 11.5 trillion.

Inquiries and reports: the accident itself and decommissioning

In October 2014 the NRA published its Analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident, Interim Report. A provisional translation in English was published in February 2015. This focuses on a number of questions which remained unexplained in the 2012 National Diet Investigation Commission report.

In May 2011 a team of 18 experts from 12 countries spent a week at the plant on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and that mission's final report was presented to the IAEA Ministerial Conference in Vienna in June. At the IAEA General Conference in 2012 the Director General promised a comprehensive report which would be "an authoritative, factual and balanced assessment, addressing the causes and consequences of the accident as well as the lessons learned." The IAEA published this report in September 2015, accompanied by five technical volumes.

In February 2015 the IAEA completed its third review mission (as follow-up to that of late 2013, and involving some 180 experts from 42 IAEA member states and other organizations over two years) and reported on decommissioning to METI. In May 2015 its final report was delivered to member states, and was published in September. It is broadly positive regarding progress since 2013, but said that some challenging issues remain. It contains advisory points on topics such as long-term radioactive waste management, measures concerning contaminated water, and issues related to the removal of used fuel and fuel debris.

The Foreword to the Director General's report in 2015 states: "A major factor that contributed to the accident was the widespread assumption in Japan that its nuclear power plants were so safe that an accident of this magnitude was simply unthinkable. This assumption was accepted by nuclear power plant operators and was not challenged by regulators or by the government. As a result, Japan was not sufficiently prepared for a severe nuclear accident in March 2011." The accident exposed "certain weaknesses" in Japan's regulatory framework, with responsibilities divided among a number of bodies. It also said there were certain weaknesses "in plant design, in emergency preparedness and response arrangement and in planning for the management of a severe accident".

The Director General said: "I am confident that the legacy of the Fukushima Daiichi accident will be a sharper focus on nuclear safety everywhere. I have seen improvements in safety measures and procedures in every nuclear power plant that I have visited. There is widespread recognition that everything humanly possible must be done to ensure that no such accident ever happens again." He added: "This is all the more essential as global use of nuclear power is likely to continue to grow in coming decades." Furthermore, "there can be no grounds for complacency about nuclear safety in any country. Some of the factors that contributed to the Fukushima Daiichi accident were not unique to Japan. Continuous questioning and openness to learning from experience are key to safety culture and are essential for everyone involved in nuclear power."

The Executive Summary includes recommendations, but the following paragraphs indicate some salient points from the actual investigation.

Before the accident, there was a basic assumption in Japan that the design of nuclear power plants and the safety measures that had been put in place were sufficiently robust to withstand external events of low probability and high consequences. Because of the basic assumption that nuclear power plants in Japan were safe, there was a tendency for organizations and their staff not to challenge the level of safety. The reinforced basic assumption among the stakeholders about the robustness of the technical design of nuclear power plants resulted in a situation where safety improvements were not introduced promptly.

Before the accident, the operator had conducted some reassessments of extreme tsunami flood levels, using a consensus based methodology developed in Japan in 2002, which had resulted in values higher than the original design basis estimates. Based on the results, some compensatory measures were taken, but they proved to be insufficient at the time of the accident.

There were no indications that the main safety features of the plant were affected by the vibratory ground motions generated by the earthquake on 11 March 2011. This was due to the conservative approach to earthquake design and construction of nuclear power plants in Japan, resulting in a plant that was provided with sufficient safety margins. However, the original design considerations did not provide comparable safety margins for extreme external flooding events, such as tsunamis.

Despite the efforts of the operators at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to maintain control, the reactor cores in units 1-3 overheated, the nuclear fuel melted and the three containment vessels were breached. Hydrogen was released from the reactor pressure vessels, leading to explosions inside the reactor buildings in units 1, 3 and 4 that damaged structures and equipment and injured personnel. Radionuclides were released from the plant to the atmosphere and were deposited on land and on the ocean. There were also direct releases into the sea.

Venting of the containment was necessary to relieve pressure and prevent its failure. The operators were able to vent units 1 and 3 to reduce the pressure in the primary containment vessels. However, this resulted in radioactive releases to the environment. Even though the containment vents for units 1 and 3 were opened, the primary containment vessels for units 1 and 3 eventually failed. Containment venting for unit 2 was not successful, and the containment failed, resulting in radioactive releases.

People within a radius of 20 km of the site and in other designated areas were evacuated, and those within a radius of 20-30 km were instructed to shelter before later being advised to voluntarily evacuate. Restrictions were placed on the distribution and consumption of food and the consumption of drinking water. At the time of writing, many people were still living outside the areas from which they were evacuated.

No early radiation induced health effects were observed among workers or members of the public that could be attributed to the accident.

Earlier reports 2011-2012

Early in June 2011 the independent Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations ( ICANPS), a panel of ten experts, mostly academics and appointed by the Japanese cabinet, began meeting. It has two technological advisers. An initial report was published in December 2011 and a final report in July 2012. The panel set up four teams to undertake investigations on the causes of the accident and ensuing damage and on measures to prevent the further spread of damage caused by the accident, but not to pursue the question of responsibility for the accident.

The national Diet later set up a legally-constituted Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission ( NAIIC, or National Diet Investigation Commission) of ten members which started its work in December 2011. One of the purposes of NAIIC is to provide suggestions including the "re-examination of an optimal administrative organization" for nuclear safety regulation based on its investigation of the accident. NAIIC reported in July 2012, harshly criticizing the government, the plant operator and the country's national culture. After conducting 900 hours of public hearings and interviews with more than 1,100 people and visiting several nuclear power plants, the commission's report concluded that the accident was a "manmade disaster," the result of "collusion between the government, the regulators and Tokyo Electric Power Co." It said the "root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions." The NAIIC criticized the regulator for insufficiently maintaining independence from the industry in developing and enforcing safety regulations, the government for inadequate emergency preparedness and management, and Tepco for its poor governance and lack of safety culture. The report called for fundamental changes across the industry, including the government and regulators, to increase openness, trustworthiness and focus on protecting public health and safety.

The NAIIC Chairman wrote: "What must be admitted - very painfully - is that this was a disaster 'Made in Japan.' Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to 'sticking with the program'; our groupism; and our insularity." The mindset of government and industry led the country to avoid learning the lessons of the previous major nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. "The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that supported it can be found across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us (every Japanese citizen) should reflect on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society."

NAIIC reported that Tepco had been aware since 2006 that Fukushuima Daiichi could face a station blackout if flooded, as well as the potential loss of ultimate heat sink in the event of a major tsunami. However, the regulator, NISA, gave no instruction to the company to prepare for severe flooding, and even told all nuclear operators that it was not necessary to plan for station blackout. During the initial response to the tsunami, this lack of readiness for station blackout was compounded by a lack of planning and training for severe accident mitigation. Plans and procedures for venting and manual operation of emergency cooling were incomplete and their implementation in emergency circumstances proved very difficult as a result. NISA was also criticised for its "negligence and failure over the years" to prepare for a nuclear accident in terms of public information and evacuation, with previous governments equally culpable. Then Tepco's difficulty in mitigation was compounded by government interference which undermined NISA.

On 7 June 2011 the government submitted a 750-page report to IAEA compiled by the nuclear emergency taskforce, acknowledging reactor design inadequacies and systemic shortcomings. It said that "In light of the lessons learned from the accident, Japan has recognized that a fundamental revision of its nuclear safety preparedness and response is inevitable."

On 11 September 2011 a second report was issued by the government and submitted to the IAEA, summarising both on-site work and progress and off-site responses. It contained further analysis of the earthquake and tsunami, the initial responses to manage and cool the reactors, the state of spent fuel ponds and the state of reactor pressure vessels. It also summarised radioactive releases and their effects.

Meanwhile a July 2011 report from MIT's Centre for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems provided a useful series of observations, questions raised, and suggestions. Its Appendix has some constructive comment on radiation exposure and balancing the costs of dose avoidance in circumstances of environmental contamination.

In November 2011 the US Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO) released its Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, with timeline. This 97-page report gives a valuable and detailed account of events.

Also in November 2011 the Japan Nuclear Technology Institute published a 280-page report on the accident, with proposals to be addressed in the future.

On 2 December 2011 Tepco released its interim investigation report on the accident (in Japanese).

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) is undertaking a 12-month study on the magnitude of radioactive releases to the atmosphere and ocean, and the range of radiation doses received by the public and workers.

An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment in March 2012 said that if best practices from other countries had been adopted by Tepco and NISA at Fukushima, the serious accident would not have happened, underlining the need for greater international regulatory collaboration.

In April 2012 the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) published Fukushima Daiichi Accident - Technical Causal Factor Analysis, which identified the root cause beyond the flooding and its effects as a failure to consider the possibility of the rupture of combinations of geological fault segments in the vicinity of the plant.

Inquiries and reports: radiation effects

A preliminary report from the World Health Organisation (WHO) in May 2012 estimated the radiation doses that residents of Japan outside the evacuated areas received in the year following the accident. The report's headline conclusion is that most people in Fukushima prefecture would have received a radiation dose of between 1 and 10 mSv during the first year after the accident. This compares with levels of about 2.4 mSv they would have received from unavoidable natural sources. In two places the doses were higher - between 10 and 50 mSv, still below any harmful level. Almost all were "below the internationally-agreed reference level for the public exposure due to radon in dwellings" (about 10 mSv/yr).

The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in May 2012 reported that despite skin contamination of several workers, no clinically-observable effects have been reported and there is no evidence of acute radiation injury in any of the 20,115 workers who participated in Tepco's efforts to mitigate the accident at the plant. Eighteen UNSCEAR member states provided 72 experts for the assessment. UNSCEAR also surveyed Fukushima prefecture tol compare its data with Japanese measurements of exposures of some 2 million people living there at the time of the accident.

The results of UNSCEAR's 12-month study on the magnitude of radioactive releases to the atmosphere and ocean, and the range of radiation doses received by the public and workers were announced in May 2013 are reported above in the subsection on Radiation Exposure.

UNSCEAR's final report of radiation effects was released in April 2014. This concluded that the rates of cancer or hereditary diseases were unlikely to show any discernible rise in affected areas because the radiation doses people received were too low. People were promptly evacuated from the vicinity of the nuclear power plant, and later from a neighbouring area where radionuclides had accumulated. This action reduced their radiation exposure by a factor of ten, to levels that were "low or very low." Overall, people in Fukushima are expected on average to receive less than 10 mSv due to the accident over their whole lifetime, compared with the 170 mSv lifetime dose from natural background radiation that people in Japan typically receive. "The most important health effect is on mental and social well-being, related to the enormous impact of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, and the fear and stigma related to the perceived risk of exposure to radiation." UNSCEAR's follow-up white paper in October 2015 said that none of the new information appraised after the 2013 report "materially affected the main findings in, or challenged the major assumptions of, the 2013 Fukushima report."

In October 2013 a 16-member IAEA mission visited at government request and reported on remediation and decontamination in particular. Its preliminary report said that decontamination efforts were commendable but driven by unrealistic targets.

'Stress tests' on Japanese reactors and new regulatory authority

The government ordered nuclear risk and safety reassessments - so-called 'stress tests' - based on those in the EU for all Japan's nuclear reactors except Fukushima's before they restart following any shutdown, including for routine checks. These were in two stages, and are described in the Japan Nuclear Power paper.

The government then created a separate Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) under the authority of the Environment Ministry and combining the roles of NISA and NSC, commissioned in September 2012. A new Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) replaced the NSC and will review the effectiveness of the NRA and be responsible for the investigation of nuclear accidents.

Notes & references

General sources

Tepco
NISA
IAEA
METI
JAIF
NSC
Acton J.M. & Hibbs M, Why Fukushima was preventable, March 2012 Carnegie Paper.
INPO 11-005 Addendum, Aug 2012, Lessons learned from the Nuclear Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
Government's Decision on Addressing the Contaminated Water Issue at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS, 3 Sept 2013, on Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
K. Tateiwa, Jan 2014, Decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi NPS
UNSCEAR webpage on The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant accident
IAEA Report by the Director General on The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, STI/PUB/1710 (ISBN:978-92-0-107015-9), September 2015
A. Komori, Current status and the future of Fukushima Daiichi NP station, World Nuclear Association 2015 Symposium presentation

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Following a major earthquake, a 15-metre tsunami disabled the power supply and cooling of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors, causing a nuclear accident on 11 March 2011. All three cores largely melted in the first three days. The accident was rated 7 on the INES scale, due to high radioactive releases over days 4 to 6, eventually a total of some 940 PBq (I-131 eq).

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More than seven years after the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis, radioactive water is continuing to flow into the Pacific Ocean from the crippled No. 1 plant at a rate of around 2 billion becquerels a day, a study has found.

The amount of leaking cesium 137 has decreased from some 30 billion becquerels in 2013, Michio Aoyama, a professor at the Institute of Environmental Radioactivity at Fukushima University, said in his study, which was presented Wednesday at an academic conference in Osaka.

The study said the concentration of radiation - 0.02 becquerel per liter of seawater found in samples collected near a coastal town 8 km south of the No. 1 plant - is at a level that does not affect the local fishing industry.

The radioactive water is generated in a process to cool melted nuclear fuel at three damaged reactors at the complex. The reactors experienced core meltdowns after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

"It can be assumed that there is a path from the complex to the ocean" through which contaminated water flows, Aoyama said.

The water accumulates in the basements of the buildings at the site after being used to cool the melted fuel.

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc., the operator of the Fukushima complex, has been trying to prevent contaminated water from increasing within the facilities by building an underground ice wall in an effort to block ground water. It has also built a seawall aimed at preventing contaminated water from entering the ocean.

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Seven years on, radioactive water at Fukushima plant still flowing into ocean, study finds | The Japan Times

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More than seven years after the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis, radioactive water is continuing to flow into the Pacific Ocean from the crippled No. 1 plant at a rate of around 2 billion becquerels a day, a study has found.

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(Mainichi)

A subterranean ice wall surrounding the nuclear reactors at the stricken Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant to block groundwater from flowing in and out of the plant buildings has approached completion.

This photo shows pipes to freeze soil for the ice wall next to the No. 4 reactor at TEPCO's Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, on June 1, 2016. (Mainichi)

Initially, the ice wall was lauded as a trump card in controlling radioactively contaminated water at the plant in Fukushima Prefecture, which was crippled by meltdowns in the wake of the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami. But while 34.5 billion yen from government coffers has already been invested in the wall, doubts remain about its effectiveness. Meanwhile, the issue of water contamination looms over decommissioning work.

In a news conference at the end of July, Naohiro Masuda, president and chief decommissioning officer of Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Co., stated, "We feel that the ice wall is becoming quite effective." However, he had no articulate answer when pressed for concrete details, stating, "I can't say how effective."

A worker makes checks with a hammer on an impermeable wall near TEPCO's No. 4 reactor in the town of Okuma in Fukushima Prefecture on Feb. 24, 2017. (Mainichi)

The ice wall is created by circulating a coolant with a temperature of minus 30 degrees Celsius through 1,568 pipes that extend to a depth of 30 meters below the surface around the plant's reactors. The soil around the pipes freezes to form a wall, which is supposed to stop groundwater from flowing into the reactor buildings where it becomes contaminated. A total of 260,000 people have worked on creating the wall. The plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) began freezing soil in March last year, and as of Aug. 15, at least 99 percent of the wall had been completed, leaving just a 7-meter section to be frozen.

Soon after the outbreak of the nuclear disaster, about 400 tons of contaminated water was being produced each day. That figure has now dropped to roughly 130 tons. This is largely due to the introduction of a subdrain system in which water is drawn from about 40 wells around the reactor buildings. As for the ice wall, TEPCO has not provided any concrete information on its effectiveness. An official of the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) commented, "The subdrain performs the primary role, and the ice wall will probably be effective enough to supplement that." This indicates that officials have largely backtracked from their designation of the ice wall as an effective means of battling contaminated water, and suggests there is unlikely to be a dramatic decrease in the amount of decontaminated groundwater once the ice wall is fully operational.

TEPCO ordered construction of the ice wall in May 2013 as one of several plans proposed by major construction firms that was selected by the government's Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment. In autumn of that year Tokyo was bidding to host the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games, and the government sought to come to the fore and underscore its measures to deal with contaminated water on the global stage.

Using taxpayers' money to cover an incident at a private company raised the possibility of a public backlash. But one official connected with the Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment commented, "It was accepted that public funds could be spent if those funds were for the ice wall, which was a challenging project that had not been undertaken before." Small-scale ice walls had been created in the past, but the scale of this one -- extending 1.5 kilometers and taking years to complete -- was unprecedented.

At first, the government and TEPCO explained that an ice wall could be created more quickly than a wall of clay and other barriers, and that if anything went wrong, the wall could be melted, returning the soil to its original state. However, fears emerged that if the level of groundwater around the reactor buildings drops as a result of the ice wall blocking the groundwater, then tainted water inside the reactor buildings could end up at a higher level, causing it to leak outside the building. Officials decided to freeze the soil in stages to measure the effects and effectiveness of the ice wall. As a result, full-scale operation of the wall -- originally slated for fiscal 2015 -- has been significantly delayed.

Furthermore, during screening by the NRA, which had approved the project, experts raised doubts about how effective the ice wall would be in blocking groundwater. The ironic reason for approving its full-scale operation, in the words of NRA acting head Toyoshi Fuketa, was that, "It has not been effective in blocking water, so we can go ahead with freezing with peace of mind" -- without worrying that the level of groundwater surrounding the reactor buildings will decrease, causing the contaminated water inside to flow out.

Maintaining the ice wall will cost over a billion yen a year, and the radiation exposure of workers involved in its maintenance is high. Meanwhile, there are no immediate prospects of being able to repair the basement damage in the reactor buildings at the crippled nuclear plant.

Nagoya University professor emeritus Akira Asaoka commented, "The way things stand, we'll have to keep maintaining an ice wall that isn't very effective. We should consider a different type of wall."

In the meantime, TEPCO continues to be plagued over what to do with treated water at the plant. Tainted water is treated using TEPCO's multi-nuclide removal equipment to remove 62 types of radioactive substances, but in principle, tritium cannot be removed during this process. Tritium is produced in nature through cosmic rays, and nuclear facilities around the world release it into the sea. The NRA takes the view that there is no problem with releasing treated water into the sea, but there is strong resistance to such a move, mainly from local fishing workers who are concerned about consumer fears that could damage their businesses. TEPCO has built tanks on the grounds of the Fukushima No. 1 plant to hold treated water, and the amount they hold is approaching 800,000 metric tons.

In mid-July, TEPCO Chairman Takashi Kawamura said in an interview with several news organizations that a decision to release the treated water into the sea had "already been made." A Kyodo News report on his comment stirred a backlash from members of the fishing industry. TEPCO responded with an explanation that the chairman was not stating a course of action, but was merely agreeing with the view of the NRA that there were no problems scientifically with releasing the treated water. However, the anger from his comment has not subsided.

Critical opinions emerged in a subsequent meeting that the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry held in the Fukushima Prefecture city of Iwaki at the end of July regarding the decontamination of reactors and the handling of contaminated water. It was pointed out that prefectural residents had united to combat consumer fears and that they wanted officials to act with care. One participant asked whether the TEPCO chairman really knew about Fukushima.

The ministry has been considering ways to handle the treated water, setting up a committee in November last year that includes experts on risk evaluation and sociology. As of Aug. 15, five meetings had been held, but officials have yet to converge on a single opinion. "It's not that easy for us to say, 'Please let us release it.' It will probably take some time to reach a conclusion," a government official commented.

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High-priced Fukushima ice wall nears completion, but effectiveness doubtful - The Mainichi

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A subterranean ice wall surrounding the nuclear reactors at the stricken Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant to block groundwater from flowing in and out of the plant buildings has approached completion.

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VCE Year 11 Geography Fukushima Response Evaluation.pdf

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Read pages 28-31 (unit 1 textbook)
-Complete questions 1 and 2 on page 33

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-Read pages 34- 37 (unit 1 textbook)
-Create notes on the material read

Keep in mind: What is it? Why does it happen? What are its impacts?

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-Read pages 38-39 (unit 1 textbook)
-Complete questions 1-6 on page 39

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3. The location of the world’s tectonic plates (see Padlet kmz) (1)
(1 mark)

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24/5/18                                                         Fukushima Mapping Case Study SAC 3

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24/5/18                                                         Fukushima Mapping Case Study SAC 3

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Title your work: [NameSurname]_FukushimaMappingCaseStudy_SAC3

Share immediately with: dcoates@mackillop.vic.edu.au

Allowed sites/tools:

Padlet (links too)                     Unit 1 textbook                      Google images                       Google Maps

Task overview: In 100 minutes create a map using Google maps that includes the following layers and information regarding the Fukushima disaster in 2011.

See attached document or questions to see marking scheme

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A 20km radius around Fukushima Daiichi (see radius generator on Padlet) (2)
o Label this layer (1)
o From the below Encylopedia Brittanica article, identify this zone’s original purpose https://www.britannica.com/event/Fukushima-accident (1)
(4 marks)

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You can use this tool to find the radius around a point on the map. First type in the radius required in kilometers or miles and then click on the map at the center of where you wish the circle to appear. You can then create as many radii as you wish.

Options

Instructions

1. Type in a radius required in the text box above.

2. [Zoom and Pan to find the required area on the map then click on the map to draw a circle] OR [Type a location into the text box and click Draw Radius] OR [Input the latitude and longitude of the location in decimal format].

3. Click as many times as necessary to draw multiple circles.

4. You can use the [Clear Map] button to erase all markers and radii and start again.

Use the "URL to last radius" text box to find a URL that will show the most recent radius on this page when opened in a web browser. This URL can be sent to anyone if you wish to forward it on.

Google Earth KML Output

You can now export all the drawn radii on the map to Google Earth for improved display and printing. You must have Google Earth installed (or another application capable of importing KML files). You need to have a radius displayed on the map before the output will work. Please report any bugs.

The procedure to Export to KML is as follows:

1. Draw one or more radii on the map as you see fit

2. Once ready, click the [Generate KML] button. You will probably need to scroll down the page to find this!

3. After a short delay, the KML file with download

4. You can then open the KML file in application such as Google Earth

Currently, the KML will include:

1. The same radius size and shape

2. Transparency of 50%

It will not include:

1. Shading colour (blue only, but you can change this once it is loaded into Google Earth)

2. Line colour (you can change this once it is loaded into Google Earth)

3. Line thickness (you can change this once it is loaded into Google Earth)

These features may be added later depending on feedback.

CSV Upload

The CSV option allows you to upload bulk points to the map. To do this you must format your points using the convention of latitude,longitude,radius per line where latitude and longitude are in decimal format and radius in km. Make sure to strip out any whitespace. You can upload as many lines as you wish, however more lines will take more time and every web browser will have its limits on the maximum number of lines (hence circles drawn) before things slow to a halt.

For Example...

51.538611,-0.016389,10
51.538611,-0.016389,15

..should add two radii around the Olympic stadium in London for 10km and 15km

Future Ideas

Ability to input nautical miles

URL link includes settings to show/hide the radius centre marker and resize grip

URL link to include the data for multiple radius

Version History

18th February 2018 - User settings are stored between settings. Radius, map type, fill color, line color and line thickness

11th October 2017 - KML output now includes the label (if defined) for each radius

2nd March 2017 - KML output now includes fill and line colours for each radius

2nd November 2016 - New CSV Output panel displays parameters of all radius drawn

31st October 2016 - New button to draw radius at current location

19th August 2016 - Bug fix : URL for multiple radius didn't appear when only drawing radius by place name

21st July 2016 - URL is now available for all radius drawn

25th February 2016 - URL now contains information about the map type so you can load the radius with different map types

4th May 2015 - Update to allow a resize after using method 2 or 3 to recalculate the Radius Distance

7th May 2013 - 2 new options added : URL loads full screen? AND URL loads unclickable map?

13th January 2013 - Label on marker now displays radius. You can now annotate markers.

15th February 2012 - Updates to layout of options

8th January 2012 - Added search for location text box

7th January 2012 - Resolved issue where the specified fill colour was not used if the draw by address or latitude/longitude was used

22nd December 2011 - Added full screen option. Fixed issue when dragging the centre point of a smaller radius

15th September 2011 - Added option to upload CSV text for bulk upload of multiple points

13th June 2011 - Fixed issue with clear fill having the same colour as the previously selected colour

7th June 2011 - Option to hide the resize grip

3rd June 2011 - Radii can now be resized while onscreen

23rd May 2011 - Radii can now be clicked to be drawn inside an existing radius

10th May 2011 - Static map output now uses Google Static Maps API V2. No key required. Will not output an URL > 2048 characters

9th May 2011 - Fixed issue with clear fill having a grey shade

15th April 2011 - Allow the last radius to be deleted (not just all at once)

3rd February 2011 - Export to KML now copes with multiple radii

20th January 2011 - Circumference and area now also output in miles and acres

29th December 2010 - Click on a marker to delete it

29th December 2010 - Allow markers to be dragged

29th December 2010 - Converted to Google Maps API V3

2nd June 2010 - Moved the scale control to the top of map to stop conflict with Google Search bar

27th January 2010 - Added Google Earth KML Output

13th October 2009 - Overlapping radii now supported

29th September 2009 - Added Google Search Bar to map. Added radius display on marker when you hover over the marker

24th September 2009 - Added URL to last radius function

17th September 2009 - Added Google Maps Static API Image Output

3rd January 2009 - Added latitude and longitude input option

29th September 2008 - Added clear fill option

9th September 2008 - Added Place radius by location name option and reworked some other functions

21st January 2008 - Improved circle reliability and added fill colour

15th October 2007 - Added area and circumference output

25th September 2007 - Added different colour's, change thickness, show/hide center marker, change map height and print the page

13th September 2007 - Now works with IE

22nd July 2008 - Added option to use miles as radius input

30th June 2007 - Clear Map button added

29th June 2007 - Page created with basic functionality

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You can use this tool to find the radius around a point on the map. First type in the radius required in kilometers or miles and then click on the map at the center of where you wish the circle to appear. You can then create as many radii as you wish.

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6. The current exclusion zone (see Padlet kmz) (1)
o Label this layer (1)

o Explain the reasoning behind/purpose of this zone in the description after reading the Encyclopedia Britannica excerpt https://www.britannica.com/event/Fukushima-accident (3)
(5 marks)

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Around the same time last year, Aizu-Wakamatsu in Fukushima was the highlight of my Japan trip so I thought that for my trip this year, I should return again to Fukushima. The Real Fukushima website popped up during my travel research and the next thing I know is that I scored myself a private tour [...]

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Transition of evacuation designated zones - 福島県ホームページ

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The Difficult-to-Return zones have beeen recognized in the Plans for Reconstruction and Revitalization for Special Zones. Accordingly, reconstruction and revitalization even in the Difficult-to-Return zones are already showing steady progress with remediation and construction underway.

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1.  The location of Fukushima Daiichi plant (see padlet) (1)
o  Label and change the icon to a “radioactive” icon (1)
o  Include an image of the plant following the disaster (1)

o  Explain the causes of the disaster (4)
(7 marks)

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The epicentre of the earthquake  (1)
o  Label and change the icon to “epicentre” (1)
o  Outline the process that caused the earthquake and subsequent tsunami (3)

o Describe the impact that the earthquake and subsequent tsunami had on humans and built environments (4)
(9 marks)

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4. The population within 75km of nuclear plants (see Padlet kmz) (1)
o With reference to the distribution of (i) tectonic plates, (ii) Japan’s nuclear plants and (iii) population density discuss why Japan is at risk of disasters such as Fukushima. (Write this on Fukushima power plant on this layer) (10)
(11 marks)