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Poll taxes in the United States - Wikipedia

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A poll tax is a tax levied as a fixed sum on every liable individual. Although often associated with states of the former Confederacy, poll taxes were also in place in some northern and western states, including California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wisconsin.

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The Slocum Massacre occurred on July 29, 1910 in Slocum, Texas, an unincorporated community in southeast Anderson County. The city used to be home to a thriving African American community with several businesses and farms owned by black residents. Leading up to the massacre, a … Read MoreThe Slocum…

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Colored Carnegie Library, Houston, Texas (1913-1961) •

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The Colored Carnegie Library was a segregated branch of the Houston Lyceum and Carnegie Library (later the Houston Public Library). It opened in 1913 in Houston’s Fourth Ward and was one of the first public libraries for African-Americans west of the Mississippi River. It was … Read MoreColored Carn…

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In response to the Springfield riot, a group of black and white activists, Jews and gentiles, met in New York City to address the deteriorating status of African Americans. Among them were veterans of the Niagara Movement (a civil rights group), suffragists, social workers, labor reformers, philanthropists, socialists, anti-imperialists, educators, clergymen, and journalists-some with roots in abolitionism. In the abolitionist tradition, they proposed to fight the new color-caste system with a "new abolition movement"-the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The NAACP pledged "to promote equality of rights and eradicate caste or race prejudice among citizens of the United States; to advance the interest of colored citizens; to secure for them impartial suffrage; and to increase their opportunities for securing justice in the courts, education for their children, employment according to their ability, and complete equality before the law." The NAACP pursued this mission through a variety of tactics including legal action, lobbying, peaceful protest, and publicity.

Journalist Ray Stannard Baker

Ray Stannard Baker (1870-1946) was known as a leading muckraking journalist. From 1899 to1905, he was an associate editor of McClure's, and from 1906 to1915 he coedited American Magazine. As a muckraker, he reported on social and economic problems from a liberal perspective. After the Atlanta riot, he traveled throughout the South and North conducting interviews for Following the Color Line (1908), a groundbreaking book on race relations. Baker vacillated between the philosophies of Booker T. Washington and the NAACP. He joined the NAACP and attended meetings, but declined committee service. In his notebook he revealed that he "instinctively" agreed with Washington's "emphasis on duty and service" as a prerequisite for civil rights. Baker won the Pulitzer Prize for his biography of Woodrow Wilson in 1940. In this letter, NAACP founder William Wallings asks for Baker's support in convening a national conference on the Negro.

NAACP Leader Oswald Garrison Villard

Oswald Garrison Villard (1872-1949), publisher of the New York Evening Post and The Nation, was the son of railroad tycoon Henry Villard and grandson of abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison. He used his fortune to promote liberal causes, including women's suffrage, anti-imperialism, and Negro uplift. Villard originally supported Booker T. Washington, believing education was the solution to the "Negro problem," but the Brownsville affair and Atlanta riot convinced him of the need for a more militant strategy. The "Committee for the Advancement of the Negro Race" (1906) he envisioned became the blueprint for the NAACP. Villard funded the NAACP's budget and provided free office space in the Evening Post building. He resigned as NAACP chairman in 1914 due to irreconcilable differences with W. E. B. Du Bois, but remained a board member until his death in 1949.

First Issue of The Crisis

In November 1910 the NAACP launched The Crisis, an official organ under the editorship of W.E.B. Du Bois. The journal's title was inspired by James Lowell's poem "The Present Crisis." Through The Crisis Du Bois reported the NAACP's activities and rallied support, while articulating his views on race and politics. For the largely black readership he personified the NAACP. The Crisis also served as an open forum for discourse on race relations and black life and culture. The monthly issues included articles on current events, editorial commentary, short stories and poems, art work, and reports on the achievements of people of color worldwide.

Constitution and By-Laws of the NAACP

In 1911 Albert E. Pillsbury, former Massachusetts attorney general and nephew of abolitionist Parker Pillsbury, drafted the NAACP's constitution and by-laws. A second constitution and new by-laws were drafted in 1912 and approved in 1914. The by-laws established a board of directors to govern the organization, with each director serving three-year terms. The board elected officers: a chairman, president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer; and created all standing and special committees, departments, bureaus, branches, and other units. It held an annual meeting in January and met monthly to consider reports from committees. The NAACP constitution states that "the Annual Convention shall have the power to establish polices and programs. All actions on the question of policy and program shall be binding on the board, officers, branches, and other units of the Association."

NAACP Victory in Guinn v. United States

Many southern and border states devised legal barriers to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment and prohibit black voting. These barriers included poll taxes, literacy tests, "grandfather clauses," and the "white primary." In 1910 Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment, which held that only residents whose grandfathers had voted in 1865 could vote, thus disqualifying the descendants of slaves. The NAACP persuaded the U.S. attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of the "grandfather clause," encouraged by a Maryland Circuit Court decision in 1913. Oklahoma appealed the case to the Supreme Court. Moorfield Storey was granted permission to argue the case on behalf of the NAACP. In June 1915, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Guinn v. United States that the "grandfather clause" was in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.

The Amenia Conference Pamphlet

In 1916, one year after the death of Booker T. Washington, the NAACP issued a call for a conference of black leaders to unite Washington's supporters and NAACP activists behind a common program. W.E.B. Du Bois and Joel Spingarn held the conference August 24-26, at Troutbeck, Spingarn's estate near Amenia, New York. The roughly fifty conferees adopted a "Unity Platform" that affirmed all forms of education for blacks and political freedom. They also pledged to work together to improve race relations and forget old "hurts and enmities." The Anemia Conference marked the NAACP's ascent as the dominant force in the civil rights movement.

The Amenia Conference, 1916

This photograph shows some of the men and women who attended the Amenia Conference in 1916. Included are NAACP activists Addie Hunton, Mary Church Terrell, Mary Talbert (Second row, left to right: 1st, 3rd, and 4th), Arthur Spingarn, William Pickens, and Charles W. Chesnutt (First row, left to right: 1st, 2nd, and 4th). Among the other conferees were Booker T. Washington allies Henry Hunt, Emmet J. Scott, Fred Moore, J. Rosamond Johnson, and James Weldon Johnson; Niagarites Charles E. Bentley, L.M. Hershaw, and Mason Hawkins; and educators Kelly Miller and Lucy Laney (Second row, left to right: 5th and 7th).

Buchanan v. Warley

The NAACP sought out cases that infringed on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in order to set legal precedents and ultimately secure the constitutional rights of African Americans. An early victory was Buchanan v. Warley, a case involving residential segregation in Louisville, Kentucky. Louisville and other cities passed ordinances to prevent people of color from residing in white neighborhoods. Moorfield Storey, the NAACP's first president and a constitutional attorney, argued the case before the Supreme Court in April 1917. The Court reversed the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, ruling that the Louisville ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of the ruling, whites resorted to private restrictive covenants, in which property owners agreed to sell or rent to whites only.

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NAACP: A Century in the Fight for Freedom Founding and Early Years

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In response to the Springfield riot, a group of black and white activists, Jews and gentiles, met in New York City to address the deteriorating status of African Americans. Among them were veterans of the Niagara Movement (a civil rights group), suffragists, social workers, labor reformers, philanthropists, socialists, anti-imperialists, educators, clergymen, and journalists-some with roots in abolitionism.

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Jesse Washington was a seventeen-year-old African-American farmhand who was lynched in the county seat of Waco, Texas, on May 15, 1916, in what became a well-known example of racially motivated lynching. Washington was convicted of raping and murdering Lucy Fryer, the wife of his white employer in rural Robinson, Texas. He was chained by his neck and dragged out of the county court by observers. He was then paraded through the street, all while being stabbed and beaten, before being held down and castrated. He was then lynched in front of Waco's city hall.

Over 10,000 spectators, including city officials and police, gathered to watch the attack. There was a celebratory atmosphere among whites at the spectacle of the murder, and many children attended during their lunch hour. Members of the mob cut off his fingers, and hung him over a bonfire after saturating him with coal oil. He was repeatedly lowered and raised over the fire for about two hours. After the fire was extinguished, his charred torso was dragged through the town. A professional photographer took pictures as the event unfolded, providing rare imagery of a lynching in progress. The pictures were printed and sold as postcards in Waco.

Although the lynching was supported by many Waco residents, it was condemned by newspapers around the United States. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) hired Elisabeth Freeman to investigate; she conducted a detailed probe in Waco, despite the reluctance of many residents to speak about the event. Freeman concluded that white residents were generally supportive of Washington's lynching. She also concluded that Washington killed Fryer. After receiving Freeman's report on the lynching, NAACP co-founder and editor W. E. B. Du Bois published an in-depth report featuring photographs of Washington's charred body in , and the NAACP featured his death in their anti-lynching campaign.

Historians have noted that Washington's death helped alter the way lynching was viewed. The widespread negative publicity helped curb public support for the practice. In the 1990s and 2000s, some Waco residents lobbied for a monument to Washington's lynching, but this idea failed to garner wide support in the city. On the centenary of the event, in May 2016, the mayor of Waco held a formal ceremony to apologize to Washington's descendants and the African-American community. A historical marker has been installed to memorialize the lynching.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, thousands of lynchings occurred in the Southern United States, primarily of African Americans in the states of Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas. Between 1890 and 1920, about 3,000 African Americans were killed by lynch mobs in cases where they were alleged perpetrators of crimes. They were conducted outside the legal system: suspects were taken from jail and courtrooms or killed before arrest. Supporters of lynching justified the practice as a way to assert dominance over African Americans, to whom they attributed a criminal nature. Lynching also provided a sense of white solidarity in a culture with changing demographics and power structures. Although lynching was tolerated by much of southern society, opponents of the practice emerged, including some religious leaders and the nascent National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

In 1916, Waco, Texas, was a prosperous city with a population of more than 30,000. After it became associated with crime in the 19th century, community leaders sought to change its reputation, sending delegations across the U.S. to promote it as an idyllic locale. By the 1910s, Waco's economy had become strong and the city had gained a pious reputation. A black middle class had emerged in the area, along with two black colleges. In the mid-1910s, blacks comprised about twenty percent of the Waco population. In her 2006 study of lynching, journalist Patricia Bernstein describes the city as then having a "thin veneer" of peace and respectability. Racial tension was present in the city: local newspapers often emphasized crimes committed by African Americans, and Sank Majors, a black man, was lynched and hanged from a bridge near downtown Waco in 1905. A small number of anti-lynching activists lived in the area, including the president of Waco's Baylor University. In 1916, several factors led to an increase in local racism, including the screening of The Birth of a Nation, a movie that glorified the Ku Klux Klan, and the sale of photographs of a recently lynched black man in Temple, Texas.

In Robinson, Texas, Lucy Fryer was murdered while alone at her house on May 8, 1916. She was found clubbed to death, sprawled across the doorway of the farm's seed shed. It was a grisly scene that included signs of sexual assault. Officials determined a blunt instrument was used as the murder weapon. She and her husband George were English immigrants, and had become well respected in the rural community where they operated a farm. News of the death quickly reached the McLennan County Sheriff, Samuel Fleming, who immediately investigated with a team of law enforcement officers, a group of local men, and a doctor. The doctor determined that Fryer had been killed by blunt-force trauma to the head. The local men suspected that Jesse Washington, a seventeen-year-old black youth who had worked on the Fryers' farm for five months, was responsible. One man said that he had seen Washington near the Fryer house a few minutes before Lucy's body was discovered.

That night, sheriff's deputies traveled to Washington's home, finding him in front of the house wearing blood-stained overalls. He said the stains were from a nosebleed. Jesse, his brother William, and their parents were taken to nearby Waco to be questioned by the county sheriff's department; although Jesse's parents and brother were released after a short time, he was held for further interrogation, without an attorney or his parents present. His questioners in Waco reported that he denied complicity in Fryer's death, but offered contradictory details about his actions. Rumors spread after Washington's arrest that the youth had been in an altercation with a white man a few days before the murder.

On May 9, Sheriff Fleming took Washington to Hill County to prevent vigilante action. The Hill County sheriff, Fred Long, questioned Washington with Fleming. Washington eventually told them he had killed Fryer following an argument about her mules, and described the murder weapon and its location. Long brought Washington to Dallas, Texas, while Fleming returned to Robinson. Fleming soon reported that he found a bloody hammer where Washington had indicated. In Dallas, Washington dictated and signed a statement that described the rape and murder of Fryer; the confession was published the next day in Waco newspapers. Newspapers sensationalized the murder, describing Fryer's attempts to resist Washington's attack. But the doctor who had examined her body concluded that she was killed before any assault. A lynch mob assembled in Waco that night to search the local jail, but dispersed after failing to find Washington. A local paper praised their effort. That night, a small private funeral and burial were held for Lucy Fryer.

A grand jury was assembled on May 11 in McLennan County and quickly returned an indictment against Washington; the trial was scheduled for May 15. The Times-Herald of Waco published a notice on May 12 requesting that residents let the justice system determine Washington's fate. Sheriff Fleming traveled to Robinson on May 13 to ask residents to remain calm; his address was well received. Washington was assigned several inexperienced lawyers. His lawyers prepared no defense, and noted that he appeared placid in the days before the trial.

On the morning of May 15, Waco's courthouse quickly filled to capacity in anticipation of the trial: the crowd almost prevented some jurors from entering. Observers also filled the sidewalks around the courthouse; more than two thousand spectators were present. Attendees were almost entirely white, but a few quiet members of Waco's black community were present. As Washington was led into the courtroom, one audience member pointed a gun at him, but was quickly overpowered. As the trial commenced, Judge Richard Irby Munroe attempted to keep order, insisting that the audience remain silent. Jury selection proceeded quickly: the defense did not challenge any selections of the prosecution. Judge Munroe asked Washington for a plea, and explained the potential sentences. Washington muttered a response, possibly "yes", interpreted by the court as a guilty plea.

The prosecution described the charges, and the court heard testimony from law enforcement officers and the doctor who examined Fryer's body. The doctor discussed how Fryer died, but did not mention rape. The prosecution rested, and Washington's attorney asked him whether he had committed the offense. Washington replied, "That's what I done" and quietly apologized. The lead prosecutor addressed the courtroom and declared that the trial had been conducted fairly, prompting an ovation from the crowd. The jury was sent to deliberate.

After four minutes of deliberation, the jury's foreman announced a guilty verdict and a sentence of death. The trial lasted about one hour. Court officers approached Washington to escort him away, but were pushed aside by a surge of spectators, who seized Washington and dragged him outside. Washington initially fought back, biting one man, but was soon beaten. A chain was placed around his neck and he was dragged toward city hall by a growing mob; on the way downtown, he was stripped, stabbed, and repeatedly beaten with blunt objects. By the time he was taken to city hall, a group had prepared wood for a bonfire next to a tree in front of the building. Washington, semiconscious and covered in blood, was doused with oil, hanged from the tree by a chain, and lowered to the ground. Members of the crowd cut off his fingers, toes, and genitals. The fire was lit and Washington was repeatedly raised and lowered into the flames until he burned to death. German scholar Manfred Berg posits that the executioners attempted to keep him alive to increase his suffering. Washington attempted to climb the chain, but was unable to do so without fingers. The fire was extinguished after two hours, allowing bystanders to collect souvenirs from the site of the lynching, including Washington's bones and links of the chain. One attendee kept part of Washington's genitalia; a group of children snapped the teeth out of Washington's head to sell as souvenirs. By the time the fire was extinguished, parts of Washington's arms and legs had been burned off, his torso and head were charred and his cranium was exposed. His body was removed from the tree and dragged behind a horse throughout the town. Washington's remains were transported to Robinson, where they were publicly displayed until a constable obtained the body late in the day and buried it.

The spectacle of the lynching drew a large crowd estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 at its peak, including the mayor, John Dollins, and the chief of police, Guy McNamara, although lynching was illegal in Texas. Sheriff Fleming told his deputies not to try to stop the lynching, and no one was arrested after the event. Bernstein speculates that Fleming may have wanted to be seen as dealing harshly with crime to help his candidacy for re-election that year. Mayor John Dollins may have also encouraged the mob for political benefit.

Residents had telephoned acquaintances to spread word of the lynching, allowing spectators to gather more quickly and in greater numbers than before the advent of telephones. Local media reported that "shouts of delight" were heard as Washington burned, although they noted that some attendees disapproved. The Waco Semi-Weekly Tribune maintained that a number of black Waco residents attended, a claim that historian Grace Hale of the University of Virginia thinks is dubious. Waco residents, who likely had no connection with the rural Fryer family, comprised most of the crowd. Some people from nearby rural communities traveled to the city before the trial to witness the events. As the lynching occurred at midday, children from local schools walked downtown to observe, some climbing into trees for a better view. Many parents approved of their children's attendance, hoping that the lynching would reinforce a belief in white supremacy. Some Texans saw participation in a lynching as a rite of passage for young white men.

Fred Gildersleeve, a Waco-based professional photographer, arrived at city hall shortly before the lynching, possibly at the mayor's request, and photographed the event. His photographs provide rare depictions of a lynching in progress, rather than typical lynching photography, which shows only dead victims. Gildersleeve's photographs include views of the crowd shot from a building and close images of Washington's body; some may have been taken by an assistant. Gildersleeve produced postcards featuring images of adolescents, some as young as twelve, gathered around Washington's body. The individuals in the photographs made no attempt to hide their identities. Berg believes that their willingness to be photographed indicates that they knew that no one would be prosecuted for Washington's death. Although some Waco residents sent the cards to out-of-town relatives, several prominent local citizens persuaded Gildersleeve to stop selling them, fearing that the images would come to characterize the town.

In the days after the lynching, newspapers fiercely condemned the event. Within a week, news of the lynching was published as far away as London. A New York Times editorial opined that, "in no other land even pretending to be civilized could a man be burned to death in the streets of a considerable city amid the savage exultation of its inhabitants". In the New York Age, James Weldon Johnson described the members of the lynch mob as "lower than any other people who at present inhabit the earth". Although many southern newspapers had previously defended lynching as a defense of civilized society, after Washington's death, they did not cast the practice in such terms. The Montgomery Advertiser wrote that, "no savage was ever more cruel ... than the men who participated in this horrible, almost unbelievable episode". In Texas, the Houston Chronicle and the Austin American criticized the lynch mob, but spoke highly of Waco. The Morning News of Dallas reported the story, but did not publish an accompanying editorial. In Waco, the Times-Herald refrained from editorializing about the lynching. The Waco Morning News briefly noted disapproval of the lynching, focusing criticism on papers they felt had attacked the city unfairly. They cast the condemnatory editorials in the aftermath of the lynching as "Holier than thou" remarks. A writer for the Waco Semi-Weekly Tribune defended the lynching, stating that Washington deserved to die and that blacks should view Washington's death as a warning against crime. The paper later carried an editorial from the Houston Post condemning the lynching, characterizing the column as part of an attack on the city.

Some residents condemned the lynching, including ministers and leaders of Baylor University. The judge who presided over Washington's trial later stated that members of the lynch mob were "murderers"; the jury's foreman told the NAACP that he disapproved of their actions. Some who witnessed the lynching recorded persistent nightmares and psychological trauma. A few citizens contemplated staging a protest against the lynching, but declined to do so owing to concerns about reprisals or the appearance of hypocrisy. After the lynching, town officials maintained that it was attended by a small group of malcontents. Although their claim is contradicted by photographic evidence, several histories of Waco have repeated this assertion. There were no negative repercussions for Mayor Dollins or Police Chief Guy McNamara; although they made no attempt to stop the mob, they remained well respected in Waco. As was common with such attacks, no one was prosecuted for the lynching.

Although leaders of Waco's black community gave public condolences to the Fryer family, they complained about Washington's lynching only in private. One exception was the Paul Quinn Weekly newspaper, of Texas' Paul Quinn College, a black college. It published several articles that criticized the lynch mob and city leadership. In one article, the author proclaimed that Jesse Washington was innocent and George Fryer was guilty. A. T. Smith, the paper's editor, was subsequently convicted of libel. George Fryer also sued the college for libel; his vehemence caused some Robinson residents to suspect that he played a part in his wife's death. Bernstein states that it is "highly unlikely" that George Fryer played a role in Lucy's murder, but notes that there is the "shadow of a possibility" that he bore some guilt.

On May 11, 1953, an F5 tornado tore right through Downtown Waco, killing 114 people and injuring 593 others. In the aftermath of the disaster, some people in the local African-American community saw the tornado as divine retribution for the lynching of Jesse Washington over thirty years prior.

The NAACP hired Elisabeth Freeman, a women's suffrage activist based in New York City, to investigate the lynching. She had traveled to Texas in late 1915 or early 1916 to help organize the suffrage movement, and was already in Dallas for a statewide convention in early May. Freeman began her assignment in Waco soon after the lynching, posing as a journalist and attempting to interview people about the events. She found that most residents were reluctant to discuss the event. She spoke with town officials and obtained pictures of the lynching from Gildersleeve, who was initially reluctant to provide them. Although she feared for her safety, she enjoyed the challenge of the investigation. When speaking with city leaders, Freeman convinced them that she planned to defend Waco against criticism when she returned to the North. Some journalists soon grew suspicious of her and warned residents not to talk to outsiders. Local African Americans, however, gave her a warm reception.

Freeman interviewed both Sheriff Fleming and the judge who presided over the trial; each said that he did not deserve blame for the lynching. A schoolteacher who had known Washington told Freeman that the young man was illiterate, and that all attempts to teach him to read had been futile. Freeman concluded that white residents were generally supportive of Washington's lynching after his conviction, although many were upset that he had been mutilated. She determined that the mob that took him from the courtroom was led by a bricklayer, a saloonkeeper, and several employees of an ice company. The NAACP did not publicly identify them. Freeman concluded that Washington killed Fryer, and suggested he had resented her domineering attitude towards him.

W. E. B. Du Bois had been incensed by news of the brutal attack, saying "any talk of the triumph of Christianity, or the spread of human culture, is idle twaddle as long as the Waco lynching is possible in the United States". After receiving Freeman's report, he placed a photograph of Washington's body on the cover of , the NAACP's newsletter, in a special issue that discussed the event. The issue was titled "The Waco Horror" and was published as an eight-page supplement to the July edition. Du Bois popularized "Waco Horror" as a name for Washington's lynching; the Houston Chronicle and the New York Times had previously used the word "horror" to describe the event. In 1916, The Crisis had a circulation of about 30,000, three times the size of the NAACP's membership.

Although The Crisis had campaigned against lynching in the past, this was the first issue to publish images of an attack. The NAACP's board was initially hesitant to publish such graphic content, but Du Bois insisted on doing so, arguing that uncensored coverage would push white Americans to support change. The issue included accounts of the lynching that Freeman had obtained from Waco residents. Du Bois wrote The Crisis' article on the lynching; he edited and organized Freeman's report for publication, but did not credit her in the issue. Du Bois's article concluded with a call to support the anti-lynching movement. The NAACP distributed the report to hundreds of newspapers and politicians, a campaign that led to wide condemnation of the lynching. Many white observers were disturbed by photos of the southerners who celebrated the lynching. The Crisis included more images of lynchings in subsequent issues. Washington's death received continued discussion in The Crisis. Oswald Garrison Villard wrote in a later edition of the paper that "the crime at Waco is a challenge to our American civilization".

Other black newspapers also carried significant coverage of the lynching, as did liberal monthly magazines such as The New Republic and . Freeman traveled around the U.S. to speak to audiences about her investigation, maintaining that a shift in public opinion could accomplish more than legislative actions. Although there were other lynchings as brutal as Washington's, the availability of photographs and the setting of his death made it a cause célèbre. Leaders of the NAACP hoped to launch a legal battle against those responsible for Washington's death, but abandoned the plan owing to the projected cost.

The NAACP had struggled financially around that time. Their anti-lynching campaign helped them raise funds, but they scaled back the campaign as the U.S. entered World War I. NAACP president Joel Elias Spingarn later said that the group's campaign placed "lynching into the public mind as something like a national problem". In her 2006 study of lynching, Bernstein describes this anti-lynching campaign as the "barest beginnings of a battle that would last many years".

The number of lynchings in the U.S. increased in the late 1910s, particularly in the postwar period. In addition, in the summer and fall of 1919, called Red Summer, racial riots of whites against blacks broke out in numerous large cities, including in the Northeast and Midwest, due in part to tensions related to competition for jobs and housing in the postwar period as veterans struggled to re-enter society. Particularly in Chicago and Washington, DC, blacks fought back fiercely in the riots but suffered the most casualties and property losses. They believed their war service should have earned them better treatment as citizens.

More lynchings took place in Waco in the 1920s, partially owing to the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. By the late 1920s, however, Waco authorities had begun to protect blacks from lynching, as in the case of Roy Mitchell. Authorities feared that negative publicity generated by lynchings-such as the NAACP's campaign following Washington's death-would hinder their efforts to attract business investors. The NAACP fought to portray lynching as a savage, barbaric practice, an idea which eventually gained traction in the public mind. Bernstein credits the group's efforts with helping to end "the worst public atrocities of the racist system" in the Waco region.

In 2011, Manfred Berg speculated that Washington probably murdered Fryer, but doubted that he raped her. The same year, Julie Armstrong of the University of South Florida argued that Washington was possibly innocent of both charges. In her 2006 book, Patricia Bernstein noted that Washington's motives have never been established clearly, although he did confess to having a dispute about mules with Fryer and there was a witness who alleged to have seen a dispute, as noted previously. She also states that his confession could have been coerced, and that there is evidence of limited intellectual capacity. She suggests that the murder weapon-perhaps the strongest evidence against him-could have been planted by authorities.

Bernstein states that Washington's lynching was a unique event because of its scale and location; not only did it occur in a larger city with a reputation for progressiveness, but it was attended by 10,000 spectators who were excited by the brutal torture. Similar acts of mob violence typically occurred in smaller towns with fewer spectators. William Carrigan of Rowan University argues that the culture of central Texas had glorified retributive mob violence for decades before Washington's lynching, maintaining that this culture of violence explains how such a brutal attack could be publicly celebrated. Hale posits that Washington's death signaled a transition in the practice of lynching, demonstrating its acceptance in modernized, 20th-century cities. She notes that Washington's lynching illustrates how technological innovations, such as telephones and inexpensive photographs, could empower lynch mobs but also increase society's condemnation of their actions.

In their 2004 study of lynching, Peter Ehrenhaus and A. Susan Owen compare the lynching to a blood sacrifice, arguing Waco residents felt a sense of collective righteousness after Washington's death, as they saw him as the presence of evil in the community. Bernstein compares the public brutality of the lynch mob to the medieval English practice of hanging, drawing, and quartering people convicted of high treason.

Amy Louise Wood of Illinois State University writes that the event was "a defining moment in the history of lynching", arguing that with Washington's death, "lynching began to sow the seeds of its own collapse". Although the spectacle of violent mob attacks had previously benefited white supremacists, Wood contends that after Washington's death was publicized, the anti-lynching movement included images of racially motivated brutality in their campaigns. Carrigan notes that Washington's death may have received more public attention than any other lynching in the United States, and sees the event as a "turning point in the history of mob violence in Central Texas". Although the outcry it provoked did not end the practice, it helped bring an end to public support of such attacks by city leaders. Carrigan states that the lynching was "the most infamous day in the history of central Texas" until the Waco siege of 1993.

After the practice of lynching was suppressed in central Texas, it received little attention from local historians. However, Waco developed a reputation for racism-propagated in part by American history textbooks-to the vexation of the city's white residents. In the years following the lynching, African Americans often held Waco in disdain, and some viewed the 1953 Waco tornado outbreak as divine retribution. White leaders of Waco took a non-violent approach in response to demonstrations during the Civil Rights Movement, possibly owing to a desire to avoid stigmatizing the city again.

Blues musician Sammy Price recorded a version of " Hesitation Blues" that referenced Washington's lynching. Price lived in Waco as a child, possibly at the time of Washington's death. Waco-based novelist Madison Cooper featured a lynching, thought to be based on Washington's death, as a key event in his 1952 novel Sironia, Texas.

In the 1990s, Lawrence Johnson, a member of Waco's city council, viewed pictures of the Washington lynching at the National Civil Rights Museum, and began to lobby for a monument to the lynching. In 2002, Lester Gibson, another member of the city council, proposed that a plaque be installed at the courthouse where Washington was lynched. He further stated that the plaque should carry an apology from the city. The ideas were discussed, but were not developed. In the 2000s, the idea of a memorial was revived by a McLennan County commissioner and the Waco Chamber of Commerce; the Waco Herald Tribune has editorialized in support of a historical marker on the site of the lynching. Some descendants of Fryer objected to the proposed memorial.

On the centenary of the lynching, May 15, 2016, the mayor of Waco apologized in a formal ceremony to Washington's relatives and issued a proclamation condemning Washington's lynching and noting the anniversary of the event. A historical marker is being erected at the site.

In the 2018 film BlacKkKlansman, Harry Belafonte portrays a witness to the lynching who describes the event at a civil rights rally in 1970s Colorado Springs.

Nevels, Cynthia Skove (2007). Lynching to Belong: Claiming Whiteness Through Racial Violence. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-1-58544-589-9.

Rice, Anne P. (2003). Witnessing Lynching: American Writers Respond. Rutgers University Press. ISBN 978-0-8135-3330-8.

Bills, E. R. (2015). Black Holocaust: The Paris Horror and a Legacy of Texas Terror. Eakin Press. ISBN 978-1-68179-017-6.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (July 1916). "The Waco Horror" (PDF). The Crisis. Archived by the Modernist Journals Project. 12 (Supplement to no. 3): 1-8. Archived from the original (PDF) on April 1, 2013. ()

Fair, Richard H. "'The Good Angel of Practical Fraternity:' The Ku Klux Klan in McLennan County, 1915-1924", 2009, Baylor University master's thesis.

Goodwyn, Wade. "Waco Recalls a 90-Year-Old 'Horror'", National Public Radio. May 13, 2006. (Transcript of radio story)

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Lynching of Jesse Washington - Wikipedia

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Jesse Washington was a seventeen-year-old African-American farmhand who was lynched in the county seat of Waco, Texas, on May 15, 1916, in what became a well-known example of racially motivated lynching. Washington was convicted of raping and murdering Lucy Fryer, the wife of his white employer in rural Robinson, Texas.

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U.S. Supreme Court
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)Smith v. Allwright No. 51 Argued November 10, 12, 1943 Reargued January 12, 1944 Decided April 3, 1944 321 U.S. 649 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
1. The right of a citizen of the United States to vote for the nomination of candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives in a primary which is an integral part of the elective process is a right secured by the Federal Constitution, and this right of the citizen may not be abridged by the State on account of his race or color. P. .

2. Whether the exclusion of citizens from voting on account of their race or color has been effected by action of the State -- rather than of individuals or of a political party -- is a question upon which the decision of the courts of the State is not binding on the federal courts, but which the latter must determine for themselves. P. .

3. Upon examination of the statutes of Texas regulating primaries, held: that the exclusion of Negroes from voting in a Democratic primary to select nominees for a general election -- although, by resolution of a state convention of the party, its membership was limited to white citizens -- was State action in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Grove v. Townsend, , overruled. Pp. , .

When, as here, primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and federal, the same tests to determine

Page 321 U. S. 650

the character of discrimination or abridgment should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election. P. .

4. While not unmindful of the desirability of its adhering to former decisions of constitutional questions, this Court is not constrained to follow a previous decision which, upon reexamination, is believed erroneous, particularly one which involves the application of a constitutional principle, rather than an interpretation of the Constitution to evolve the principle itself. P. .

131 F.2d 593, reversed.

Certiorari, 319 U.S. 738, to review the affirmance of a judgment for the defendants in a suit for damages under 8 U.S.C. § 43.

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

This writ of certiorari brings here for review a claim for damages in the sum of $5,000 on the part of petitioner, a Negro citizen of the 48th precinct of Harris County, Texas,

Page 321 U. S. 651

for the refusal of respondents, election and associate election judges, respectively, of that precinct, to give petitioner a ballot or to permit him to cast a ballot in the primary election of July 27, 1940, for the nomination of Democratic candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and Governor and other state officers. The refusal is alleged to have been solely because of the race and color of the proposed voter.

The actions of respondents are said to violate §§ 31 and 43 of Title 8 [ Footnote 1] of the United States Code, 8 U.S.C. §§ 31 and 43, in that petitioner was deprived of rights secured by §§ 2 and 4 of Article I [ Footnote 2] and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments

Page 321 U. S. 652

to the United States Constitution. [ Footnote 3] The suit was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas, which had jurisdiction under Judicial Code § 24, subsection 14. [ Footnote 4]

The District Court denied the relief sought, and the Circuit Court of Appeals quite properly affirmed its action on the authority of Grovey v. Townsend, . [ Footnote 5] We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve a claimed inconsistency between the decision in the Grovey case and that of United States v. Classic, . 319 U.S. 738.

The State of Texas by its Constitution and statutes provides that every person, if certain other requirements are met which are not here in issue, qualified by residence

Page 321 U. S. 653

in the district or county "shall be deemed a qualified elector." Constitution of Texas, Article VI, § 2; Vernon's Civil Statutes (1939 ed.), Article 2955. Primary elections for United States Senators, Congressmen and state officers are provided for by Chapters Twelve and Thirteen of the statutes. Under these chapters, the Democratic Party was required to hold the primary which was the occasion of the alleged wrong to petitioner. A summary of the state statutes regulating primaries appears in the footnote. [ Footnote 6] These nominations are to be made by the qualified voters of the party. Art. 3101.

Page 321 U. S. 654

The Democratic Party of Texas is held by the Supreme Court of that state to be a "voluntary association," Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 534, protected by § 27 of the Bill of Rights, Art. 1, Constitution of Texas, from interference by the state except that:

"In the interest of fair methods and a fair expression by their members of their preferences in the selection of their

Page 321 U. S. 655

nominees, the State may regulate such elections by proper laws."

P. 545. That court stated further:

"Since the right to organize and maintain a political party is one guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of this state, it necessarily follows that every privilege essential or reasonably appropriate to the exercise of that right is likewise

Page 321 U. S. 656

guaranteed, including, of course, the privilege of determining the policies of the party and its membership. Without the privilege of determining the policy of a political association and its membership, the right to organize such an association would be a mere mockery. We think these rights, that is, the right to determine the membership of a political party and to determine its policies, of necessity are to be exercised by the State Convention of such party, and cannot, under any circumstances, be conferred upon a state or governmental agency."

P. 546. Cf. Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S.W. 180.

The Democratic party, on May 24, 1932, in a state convention adopted the following resolution, which has not since been "amended, abrogated, annulled or avoided":

"Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to membership in the

Page 321 U. S. 657

Democratic party and, as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations."

It was by virtue of this resolution that the respondents refused to permit the petitioner to vote.

Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of the United States Constitution or in conflict with powers delegated to and exercised by the National Government. [ Footnote 7] The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from making or enforcing any law which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States and the Fifteenth Amendment specifically interdicts any denial or abridgement by a state of the right of citizens to vote on account of color. Respondents appeared in the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals and defended on the ground that the Democratic party of Texas is a voluntary organization, with members banded together for the purpose of selecting individuals of the group representing the common political beliefs as candidates in the general election. As such a voluntary organization, it was claimed, the Democratic party is free to select its own membership and limit to whites participation in the party primary. Such action, the answer asserted, does not violate the Fourteenth, Fifteenth or Seventeenth Amendment, as officers of government cannot be chosen at primaries, and the Amendments are applicable only to general elections, where governmental officers are actually elected. Primaries, it is said, are political party affairs, handled by party, not governmental, officers. No appearance for respondents is made in this Court. Arguments presented here by the Attorney General of Texas and the Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Texas, as amici

Page 321 U. S. 658

curiae, urged substantially the same grounds as those advanced by the respondents.

Page 321 U. S. 659

In Grovey v. Townsend, , this Court had before it another suit for damages for the refusal in a primary of a county clerk, a Texas officer with only public functions to perform, to furnish petitioner, a Negro, an absentee ballot. The refusal was solely on the ground of race. This case differed from Nixon v. Condon, supra, in that a state convention of the Democratic party had passed the resolution of May 24, 1932, hereinbefore quoted. It was decided that the determination by the state convention of the membership of the Democratic party made a significant change from a determination by the Executive Committee. The former was party action, voluntary in character. The latter, as had been held in the Condon case, was action by authority of the State. The managers of the primary election were therefore declared not to be state officials in such sense that their action was state action. A state convention of a party was said not to be an organ of the state. This Court went on to announce that to deny a vote in a primary was a mere refusal of party membership, with which "the state need have no concern," loc.cit. , while for a state to deny a vote in a general election on the ground of race or color violated the Constitution. Consequently, there was found no ground for holding that the county clerk's refusal of a ballot because of racial ineligibility for party membership denied the petitioner any right under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

Since Grovey v. Townsend and prior to the present suit, no case from Texas involving primary elections has been before this Court. We did decide, however, United States v. Classic, . We there held that § 4 of Article I of the Constitution authorized Congress to regulate primary, as well as general, elections, 313 U.S. at , ,

Page 321 U. S. 660

"where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery." 313 U.S. at =. Consequently, in the Classic case, we upheld the applicability to frauds in a Louisiana primary of §§ 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code. Thereby, corrupt acts of election officers were subjected to Congressional sanctions because that body had power to protect rights of Federal suffrage secured by the Constitution in primary as in general elections. 313 U.S. at . This decision depended, too, on the determination that, under the Louisiana statutes, the primary was a part of the procedure for choice of Federal officials. By this decision, the doubt as to whether or not such primaries were a part of "elections" subject to Federal control, which had remained unanswered since Newberry v. United States, , was erased. The Nixon cases were decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without a determination of the status of the primary as a part of the electoral process. The exclusion of Negroes from the primaries by action of the State was held invalid under that Amendment. The fusing by the Classic case of the primary and general elections into a single instrumentality for choice of officers has a definite bearing on the permissibility under the Constitution of excluding Negroes from primaries. This is not to say that the Classic case cuts directly into the rationale of Grovey v. Townsend. This latter case was not mentioned in the opinion. Classic bears upon Grovey v. Townsend not because exclusion of Negroes from primaries is any more or less state action by reason of the unitary character of the electoral process, but because the recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the state. When Grovey v. Townsend was written, the Court looked upon the denial of a vote in a primary as a

Page 321 U. S. 661

mere refusal by a party of party membership. 295 U.S. at . As the Louisiana statutes for holding primaries are similar to those of Texas, our ruling in Classic as to the unitary character of the electoral process calls for a reexamination as to whether or not the exclusion of Negroes from a Texas party primary was state action.

The statutes of Texas relating to primaries and the resolution of the Democratic party of Texas extending the privileges of membership to white citizens only are the same in substance and effect today as they were when Grovey v. Townsend was decided by a unanimous Court. The question as to whether the exclusionary action of the party was the action of the State persists as the determinative factor. In again entering upon consideration of the inference to be drawn as to state action from a substantially similar factual situation, it should be noted that Grovey v. Townsend upheld exclusion of Negroes from primaries through the denial of party membership by a party convention. A few years before, this Court refused approval of exclusion by the State Executive Committee of the party. A different result was reached on the theory that the Committee action was state authorized, and the Convention action was unfettered by statutory control. Such a variation in the result from so slight a change in form influences us to consider anew the legal validity of the distinction which has resulted in barring Negroes from participating in the nominations of candidates of the Democratic party in Texas. Other precedents of this Court forbid the abridgement of the right to vote. United States v. Reese, , ; Neal v. Delaware, , ; Guinn v. United States, , ; Myers v. Anderson, , ; Lane v. Wilson, .

It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote

Page 321 U. S. 662

in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at ; Myers v. Anderson, ; Ex parte Yarbrough, , et seq. By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment, that right may not be abridged by any state on account of race. Under our Constitution, the great privilege of the ballot may not be denied a man by the State because of his color.

We are thus brought to an examination of the qualifications for Democratic primary electors in Texas, to determine whether state action or private action has excluded Negroes from participation. Despite Texas' decision that the exclusion is produced by private or party action, Bell v. Hill, supra, Federal courts must for themselves appraise the facts leading to that conclusion. It is only by the performance of this obligation that a final and uniform interpretation can be given to the Constitution, the "supreme Law of the Land." Nixon v. Condon, , ; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, , ; Bridges v. California, ; Lisenba v. California, , ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, , ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, , ; Chambers v. Florida, , . Texas requires electors in a primary to pay a poll tax. Every person who does so pay and who has the qualifications of age and residence is an acceptable voter for the primary. Art. 2955. As appears above in the summary of the statutory provisions set out in note 6 Texas requires by the law the election of the county officers of a party. These compose the county executive committee. The county chairmen so selected are members of the district executive committee and choose the chairman for the district. Precinct primary election officers are named by the county executive committee. Statutes provide for the election by the voters of precinct

Page 321 U. S. 663

delegates to the county convention of a party and the selection of delegates to the district and state conventions by the county convention. The state convention selects the state executive committee. No convention may place in platform or resolution any demand for specific legislation without endorsement of such legislation by the voters in a primary. Texas thus directs the selection of all party officers.

Primary elections are conducted by the party under state statutory authority. The county executive committee selects precinct election officials and the county, district or state executive committees, respectively, canvass the returns. These party committees or the state convention certify the party's candidates to the appropriate officers for inclusion on the official ballot for the general election. No name which has not been so certified may appear upon the ballot for the general election as a candidate of a political party. No other name may be printed on the ballot which has not been placed in nomination by qualified voters who must take oath that they did not participate in a primary for the selection of a candidate for the office for which the nomination is made.

The state courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction of contested elections and of mandamus proceedings to compel party officers to perform their statutory duties.

We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legislative directions an agency of the state in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election. The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political party. The plan of the Texas primary follows substantially that of Louisiana, with the exception that, in

Page 321 U. S. 664

Page 321 U. S. 665

of the party the action of the state. In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions. [ Footnote 8] However, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment, and not upon legislative action, this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been accepted practice, [ Footnote 9] and this practice has continued to this day. [ Footnote 10] This is particularly true when the decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional principle, rather

Page 321 U. S. 666

than an interpretation of the Constitution to extract the principle itself. [ Footnote 11] Here, we are applying, contrary to the recent decision in Grovey v. Townsend, the well established principle of the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the abridgement by a state of a citizen's right to vote. Grovey v. Townsend is overruled.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the result.

8 U.S.C. § 31:

"All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding."

"§ 43:"

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

Constitution, Art. I:

"Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."

"Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."

Constitution:

"Article XIV. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

"Article XV. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

"Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

"Article XVII. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures."

A declaratory judgment also was sought as to the constitutionality of the denial of the ballot. The judgment entered declared the denial was constitutional. This phase of the case is not considered further, as the decision on the merits determines the legality of the action of the respondents.

Smith v. Allwright, 131 F.2d 593.

The extent to which the state controls the primary election machinery appears from the Texas statutes, as follows: Art. 3118, Vernon's Texas Statutes, provides for the election of a county chairman for each party holding a primary by the "qualified voters of the whole county," and of one member of the party's county executive committee by the "qualified voters of their respective election precincts." These officers have direct charge of the primary. There is, in addition, statutory provision for a party convention: the voters in each precinct choose delegates to a county convention, and the latter chooses delegates to a state convention. Art. 3134. The state convention has authority to choose the state executive committee and its chairman. Art. 3139, 1939 Supp. Candidates for offices to be filled by election are required to be nominated at a primary election if the nominating party cast over 100,000 votes at the preceding general election. Art. 3101. The date of the primary is fixed at the fourth Saturday in July; a majority is required for nomination, and if no candidate receives a majority, a run-off primary between the two highest standing candidates is held on the fourth Saturday in August. Art. 3102. Polling places may not be within a hundred yards of those used by the opposite party. Art. 3103. Each precinct primary is to be conducted by a presiding judge and the assistants he names. These officials are selected by the county executive committee. Art. 3104. Absentee voting machinery provided by the state for general elections is also used in primaries. Art. 2956. The presiding judges are given legal authority similar to that of judges at general elections. Compare Art. 3105 with Art. 3002. The county executive committee may decide whether county officers are to be nominated by majority or plurality vote. Art. 3106. The state executive committee is given power to fix qualifications of party membership, Art. 3107; Art. 2955, 1942 Supp., requires payment of a poll tax by voters in primary elections, and Art. 3093(3) deals with political qualifications of candidates for nomination for United States Senator. But cf. Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W.2d 113. Art. 3108 empowers the county committee to prepare a budget covering the cost of the primary and to require each candidate to pay a fair share. The form of the ballot is prescribed by Art. 3109. Art. 3101 provides that the nominations be made by the qualified voters of the party. Cf. Art. 3091. Art. 3110 prescribes a test for voters who take part in the primary. It reads as follows:

"No official ballot for primary election shall have on it any symbol or device or any printed matter, except a uniform primary test, reading as follows:"

" I am a . . . (inserting name of political party or organization of which the voter is a member) and pledge myself to support the nominee of this primary;"

"and any ballot which shall not contain such printed test above the names of the candidates thereon, shall be void and shall not be counted."

This appears, however, to be a morally, rather than a legally, enforceable pledge. See Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515, 70 A.L.R. 1484.

Arts. 3092 and 3111 to 3114 deal with the mechanics of procuring a place on the primary ballot for federal, state, district, or county office. The request for a place on the ballot may be made to the state, district, or county party chairman, either by the person desiring nomination or by twenty-five qualified voters. The ballot is prepared by a subcommittee of the county executive committee. Art. 3115. A candidate must pay his share of the expenses of the election before his name is placed on the ballot. Art. 3116. Art. 3116, however, limits the sum that may be charged candidates for certain posts, such as the offices of district judge, judge of the Court of Civil Appeals, and senator and representative in the state and federal legislatures, and for some counties fees are fixed by Arts. 3116a-3116d, 1939 Supp., and 3116e, 3116f, 1942 Supp. Supplies for the election are distributed by the county committee, Art. 3119, and Art. 3120 authorizes the use of voting booths, ballot boxes and guard rails, prepared for the general election,

"for the organized political party nominating by primary election that cast over one hundred thousand votes at the preceding general election."

The county tax collector must supply lists of qualified voters by precincts; and these lists must be used at the primary. Art. 3121. The same precautions as to secrecy and the care of the ballots must be observed in primary as in general elections. Art. 3122. Arts. 3123-3125 cover the making of returns to the county and state chairmen and canvass of the result by the county committee. By Art. 3127, a statewide canvass is required of the state executive committee for state and district officers and a similar canvass by the state convention, with respect to state officers, is provided by Art. 3138. The nominations for district offices are certified to the county clerks, and for state officers to the Secretary of State. Arts. 3127, 3137, 3138. Ballot boxes and ballots are to be returned to the county clerk, Art. 3128, 1942 Supp., and, upon certification by the county committee, the county clerk must publish the result. Art. 3129, 1942 Supp. If no objection is made within five days, the name of the nominee is then to be placed on the official ballot by the county clerk. Art. 3131, 1942 Supp. Cf. Arts. 2978, 2984, 2992, 2996. Arts. 3146-3153, 1942 Supp., provide for election contests. The state district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction, and the Court of Civil Appeals has appellate jurisdiction. The state courts are also authorized to issue writs of mandamus to require executive committees, committeemen, and primary officers to discharge the duties imposed by the statute. Art. 3142; cf. Art. 3124.

The official ballot is required to contain parallel columns for the nominees of the respective parties, a column for independent candidates, and a blank column for such names as the voters care to write in. Arts. 2978, 2980. The names of nominees of a party casting more than 100,000 votes at the last preceding general election may not be printed on the ballot unless they were chosen at a primary election. Art. 2978. Candidates who are not party nominees may have their names printed on the ballot by complying with Arts. 3159-62. These sections require applications to be filed with the Secretary of State, county judge, or mayor, for state and district, county, and city offices, respectively. The applications must be signed by qualified voters to the number of from one to five percent of the ballots cast at the preceding election, depending on the office. Each signer must take an oath to the effect that he did not participate in a primary at which a candidate for the office in question was nominated. While this requirement has been held to preclude one who has voted in the party primary from appearing on the ballot as an independent, Westerman v. Mims, 111 Tex. 29, 227 S.W. 178; see Cunningham v. McDermett, (Civ.App.), one who lost at the primary may still be elected at the general election by a write-in vote. Cunningham v. McDermett, supra.

The operations of the party are restricted by the state in one other important respect. By Act. 3139, 1939 Supp., the state convention can announce a platform of principles, but its submission at the primary is a prerequisite to party advocacy of specific legislation. Art. 3133.

See cases collected in the dissenting opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., , .

[ Footnote 10]

See e.g., United States v. Darby, , overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, ; California v. Thompson, , overruling Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, , overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, ; Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., , overruling Gillespie v. Oklahoma, , and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., ; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, , 16 Pet. 1; Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, , overruling Day and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, ; O'Malley v. Woodrough, , overruling Miles v. Graham, ; Madden v. Kentucky, , overruling Colgate v. Harvey, ; Helvering v. Hallock, , overruling Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., , and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., ; Nye v. United States, , overruling Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, ; Alabama v. King & Boozer, , overruling Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, , and Graves v. Texas Co., ; Williams v. North Carolina, , overruling Haddock v. Haddock, ; State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, , overruling First National Bank v. Maine, ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, , overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, .

[ Footnote 11]

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS.

In 1923, Texas adopted a statute which declared that no negro should be eligible to participate in a Democratic Primary election in that State. A negro, a citizen of the United States and of Texas, qualified to vote, except for the provisions of the statute, was denied the opportunity to vote in a primary election at which candidates were to be chosen for the offices of senator and representative in the Congress of the United States. He brought action against the judges of election in a United States court for

Page 321 U. S. 667

In 1927, the legislature of Texas repealed the provision condemned by this court and enacted that every political party in the State might, through its Executive Committee, prescribe the qualifications of its own members and determine in its own way who should be qualified to vote or participate in the party, except that no denial of participation could be decreed by reason of former political or other affiliation. Thereupon, the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party in Texas adopted a resolution that white Democrats, and no other, should be allowed to participate in the party's primaries.

The opinion was written with care. The court refused to decide whether a political party in Texas had inherent power to determine its membership. The court said, however: "Whatever inherent power a state political party has to determine the content of its membership resides in the state convention," and referred to the statutes of Texas to demonstrate that the State had left the Convention free to formulate the party faith. Attention was directed to the fact that the statute under attack did not leave to the party convention the definition of party membership, but placed it in the party's State Executive Committee, which could not, by any stretch of reasoning, be

Page 321 U. S. 668

held to constitute the party. The court held, therefore, that the State Executive Committee acted solely by virtue of the statutory mandate and as delegate of State power, and again struck down the discrimination against negro voters as deriving force and virtue from State action -- that is, from statute.

In 1932, the Democratic Convention of Texas adopted a resolution that

"all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the state shall be eligible to membership in the Democratic party, and, as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations."

A negro voter qualified to vote in a primary election, except for the exclusion worked by the resolution, demanded an absentee ballot which he was entitled to mail to the judges at a primary election except for the resolution. The county clerk refused to furnish him a ballot. He brought an action for damages against the clerk in a state court. That court, which was the tribunal having final jurisdiction under the laws of Texas, dismissed his complaint, and he brought the case to this court for review. After the fullest consideration by the whole court, an opinion was written representing its unanimous views and affirming the judgment. Grovey v. Townsend, (1935).

I believe it will not be gainsaid the case received the attention and consideration which the questions involved demanded, and the opinion represented the views of all the justices. It appears that those views do not now commend themselves to the court. I shall not restate them. They are exposed in the opinion, and must stand or fall on their merits. Their soundness, however, is not a matter which presently concerns me.

Page 321 U. S. 669

The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of current decisions, that the opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the subject. In the present term, the court has overruled three cases.

In the present case, as in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., the court below relied, as it was bound to, upon our previous decision. As that court points out, the statutes of Texas have not been altered since Grovey v. Townsend was decided. The same resolution is involved as was drawn in question in Grovey v. Townsend. Not a fact differentiates that case from this except the names of the parties.

It is suggested that Grovey v. Townsend was overruled sub silentio in United States v. Classic, . If so, the situation is even worse than that exhibited by the outright repudiation of an earlier decision, for it is the fact that, in the Classic case, Grovey v. Townsend was distinguished in brief and argument by the Government without suggestion that it was wrongly decided, and was relied on by the appellees not as a controlling decision, but by way of analogy. The case is not mentioned in either of the opinions in the Classic case. Again and again, it is said in the opinion of the court in that case that the voter who was denied the right to vote was a fully qualified voter. In other words, there was no question of his being a person entitled under state law to vote in the primary. The offense charged was the fraudulent denial of his conceded right by an election officer because of his race. Here, the question is altogether different. It is whether, in a Democratic primary, he who tendered his vote was a member of the Democratic Party.

Page 321 U. S. 670

I do not stop to call attention to the material differences between the primary election laws of Louisiana under consideration in the Classic case and those of Texas which are here drawn in question. These differences were spelled out in detail in the Government's brief in the Classic case and emphasized in its oral argument. It is enough to say that the Louisiana statutes required the primary to be conducted by State officials and made it a State election, whereas, under the Texas statute, the primary is a party election conducted at the expense of members of the party and by officials chosen by the party. If this court's opinion in the Classic case discloses its method of overruling earlier decisions, I can only protest that, in fairness, it should rather have adopted the open and frank way of saying what it was doing than, after the event, characterize its past action as overruling Grovey v. Townsend though those less sapient never realized the fact.

It is regrettable that, in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions.

* The court was composed of Hughes, C.J., Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo, JJ.

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Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) Smith v. Allwright No. 51 Argued November 10, 12, 1943 Reargued January 12, 1944 Decided April 3, 1944 321 U.S. 649 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1.

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Story Links RIO GRANDE VALLEY - On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.

The decision was the beginning of a long road to desegregate schools, particularly in the South. The decision also helped to push the still developing civil rights movement forward.

Still, it was another 14 years before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and even longer until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

It wasn't until 1976 that the Supreme Court ruled that private schools, not including religious schools, could not deny admission to students on the basis of race in Runyon v. McCrary.

However, it was only a few months after the initial Brown v. Board of Education decision that legacy institution Pan American University welcomed the first African American collegiate student-athlete in the history of the State of Texas, D. Joe Williams, who competed in baseball, cross country and track & field.

A member of the Rio Grande Valley Sports Hall of Fame, as well as the Texas and El Paso Baseball Halls of Fame, Williams broke the color barrier as the center fielder for the 1954 baseball team, hitting .262 to help the team to the Big State Conference Championship. Williams also won a pair of individual conference championships with the track & field team, taking the titles in the 880-yard and one-mile runs.

Williams came to Pan American after competing at Booker T. Washington High School in McAllen, a segregated school that existed from 1941-57, where he stole 26 bases as a position player and went 10-3 with 78 strikeouts as a pitcher. This led to him getting scouted by the St. Louis Browns in 1953.

Born in Dobbin on March 4, 1936, Williams moved to McAllen as a child, where he picked up baseball at the age of 10. He became one of the first African Americans to play in the Junior League in the late 1940s, where he hit over .400 as a first baseman and once pitched a one-hitter with one eye closed due to injury. He also played in a semi-pro Negro League at the age of 16.

After finishing his time at Pan American, Williams coached at Charlie Brown High School in West Columbia for five years before moving to the El Paso area, where he was a teacher and coach for 47 years at Fabens, Socorro and Tornillo High Schools. He led Fabens to three district titles in five years, advancing to the regional finals each time. He coached several players who went on to play in the Mexican League and in minor league baseball.

During his time at Fabens, Williams formed, coach and played for a semi-pro baseball team, the Viejos, for whom Williams was a two-time All-Star. He led the league in strikeouts in 1979, his second to last season as a player.

Williams also played fast-pitch softball, where he was an outstanding pitcher. After his playing career was over, Williams spent time as an umpire at several levels of baseball.

Williams was an original member of the Board of Directors for the El Paso Baseball Hall of Fame, and at one point, served as the president.

He passed away on Dec. 15, 2013 at the age of 77, but Williams' legacy lives on.

After Williams broke the color barrier, Pan American remained at the forefront of integrating college athletics.

The men's basketball team, for example, won the 1963 NAIA National Championship with two Black starters - Mitchell Edwards and Luke Jackson. One of the top players off the bench was Walter Yates, a Black player who started as a freshman before Edwards, who played the same position, arrived.

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The First African American Collegiate Student-Athlete in Texas Competed Here - UTRGV Athletics

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Story Links RIO GRANDE VALLEY - On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. The decision was the beginning of a long road to desegregate schools, particularly in the South.

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In 1955, the Texas State Fair in Dallas was segregated, a tradition that dated back to 1889 when planners first set aside a day for African Americans to attend the fair. Then called Colored People's Day, it was discontinued in 1910 and renamed Negro Achievement Day in 1936.

A collaboration between the Negro Chamber of Commerce and the State Fair Board, Negro Achievement Day featured a parade decked out with floats and fair Queens, the presentation of the Most Distinguished Negro Citizen Award, and high school and college football games. The day drew African American visitors from all over the state.

In 1953, the fair announced that African Americans could attend the fair on any day, but could only fully participate in the fair's enjoyments on Negro Achievement Day. Juanita Craft, NAACP Youth Council advisor for the Dallas branch, spearheaded a movement to end discrimination at the fair so that any person of any race could participate on any day they chose. Craft and members of the Youth Council decided to stage a boycott of the fair to draw attention to discriminatory practices. Teenagers, equipped with signs proclaiming "TODAY IS NEGRO APPEASEMENT DAY AT THE FAIR," picketed the parade that began at the local black high school. In an interview given in 1974, Craft remembered, "Those kids went to the starting point at Lincoln High School and boarded the floats right along with the queens and everybody else and rode down the streets saying, 'Stay out. Don't sell your pride for a segregated ride.' The kids were on top of people's houses along the route of the parade with megaphones telling about the segregated policy out there and to stay out."

When the parade reached the picket line at the entrance of the fair, participants turned and refused to enter. The picket line lasted throughout the day and into the night. While the Youth Council did not succeed in ending Negro Achievement Day, they were able to draw attention to the discrimination African Americans faced. The Youth Council was given an award by the NAACP for their well organized and peaceful demonstration. In later years, adults took over picketing the fair. Achievement Day (fair planners dropped the "Negro" in 1957) officially ended in 1961, followed by the full desegregation of the fair later in the '60s.

The boycott, and the majority of other civil rights activity in Dallas, was captured on film by photographer R. C. Hickman. Born in the East Texas town of Mineloa in 1922, Hickman moved to Dallas with his family in the 1930s. After attending Tillotson College in Austin, he served as an Army photographer in World War II, then returned to Dallas to work as a photographer for the Dallas Star Post. As the unofficial photographer of the African American community in Dallas in the 1950s, he captured pivotal moments in the city's civil rights history, including visits by Martin Luther King Jr. and Thurgood Marshall.

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NAACP Picket the Texas State Fair in 1955

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In 1955, members of the NAACP Youth Council formed a picket line to protest segregation at the Texas State Fair in Dallas.

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1967 election of barbara jordan to the texas  state senate