# data[].attributes.headline
They had many war to get their independence. It was a hard battle between Portugal but it ended in 1824. Pedro and his brother had to fight for the crown after their father had died during the liberal wars.

# data[].attributes.subject
They had many war to get their independence. It was a hard battle between Portugal but it ended in 1824. Pedro and his brother had to fight for the crown after their father had died during the liberal wars.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Brazilian Independence | 3 Minute History

# data[].attributes.headline
The war lasted 8  years and they finally got their in dependence in February 1818. Chile is also the longest country in the world by being its 4,270 km long. Chile has most of the larges things in the world expect for the Puda its the smallest deer ever. They have a meeting ritual called the hens and rosters, its a national dance.

# data[].attributes.subject
The war lasted 8  years and they finally got their in dependence in February 1818. Chile is also the longest country in the world by being its 4,270 km long. Chile has most of the larges things in the world expect for the Puda its the smallest deer ever. They have a meeting ritual called the hens and rosters, its a national dance.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
History of the Holidays: Sep 18th, Chilean Independence Day

# data[].attributes.headline
Germany was spilt between 100's of states. The Napoleonic war stated at the beginning on the 19 century. Germany people started to volunteer to fight for Prussia against France. The revolutions started in 1848, and it spread across Germany.

# data[].attributes.subject
Germany was spilt between 100's of states. The Napoleonic war stated at the beginning on the 19 century. Germany people started to volunteer to fight for Prussia against France. The revolutions started in 1848, and it spread across Germany.

# data[].attributes.headline
The French and Napoleonic war affected Brazil very bigly. On March 7 1808 a new era happened for Brazil. The numbers of reforms decreased. A lot of them were Latin America's ad Spanish's speaking republics.

# data[].attributes.subject
The French and Napoleonic war affected Brazil very bigly. On March 7 1808 a new era happened for Brazil. The numbers of reforms decreased. A lot of them were Latin America's ad Spanish's speaking republics.

# data[].attributes.headline
The Chilean revolution started in 1819 and was in  progress for 3 quatres of the century. Their social and economics struggles started in 1891. The civil war was another big struggle for them. The congress had declined in 1890 the laws of force bills and appropriations for 1891.

# data[].attributes.subject
The Chilean revolution started in 1819 and was in  progress for 3 quatres of the century. Their social and economics struggles started in 1891. The civil war was another big struggle for them. The congress had declined in 1890 the laws of force bills and appropriations for 1891.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Discussion of the Chilean revolution of 1891 has been in progress for almost three-quarters of a century, yet, despite this considerable period of investigation and interpretation, the origins, character and consequences of the revolution and the figure of José Manuel Balmaceda, protagonist of the revolutionary drama, are still subjects of much dispute among historians. This article is in part a study of the historiography of the revolution and in part a contribution to it: it assumes a knowledge of the main outlines of events in Chile during Balmaceda's presidency, 1886-1891, and of the subsequent history of the republic.

Historians differ primarily on the question of responsibility for the revolution, but whereas the great majority see the struggle between Balmaceda and his Congress as a battle of political principles in which the contestants were activated by genuine conviction, others, who see the springs of political action primarily in social and economic circumstances, consider the basic issues in the conflict to have been about the economic organization and development of the republic. It is, therefore, possible and, indeed, convenient to speak of a dichotomy in the historiography of the revolution between "constitutional" historians on the one hand and "economic" historians on the other. These terms are not always mutually exclusive, but while the "constitutional" historian may not altogether ignore social and economic factors in the genesis of the revolution he does consider them relatively unimportant, whereas the "economic" historian may grant some validity to constitutional factors while still regarding them largely as a veneer.

The Congressional view was summarized by Pedro Montt in the pamphlet he wrote in the United States. He based his argument on the assumption that as Congressional approval was necessary for the passage of essential laws, "no minister can carry on the government or exercise its functions without the . . . confidence of the legislative body." This essential element of a parliamentary system, Montt continued, had been accepted even by Balmaceda, but the latter had broken with the practice in order to engineer the election of his chosen successor. Moreover, Congress had the power to remove the president if he were "unfit to discharge the duties of his office by reason of infirmity, absence or other grave cause." In Balmaceda's case, the "grave cause" was his openly unconstitutional act in declaring as laws the Appropriations and Forces Bills for 1891 which Congress had declined to pass in 1890. Montt asserted, in fact, that owing to the growth of unwritten precedent, a parliamentary system had developed in Chile which Balmaceda, for ulterior reasons, refused to acknowledge, he was, therefore, the real revolutionary and Congress the defender of the constitutional status quo.

Historiographically, both of these ex parte pamphlets are significant for their emphasis on constitutional and political matters, and neither dilates upon economic and social factors in the genesis of the revolution. Much other contemporary material bears the same stamp. The Congressional records for 1890, the year of crisis before the revolution, testify to the seriousness of the constitutional differences between president and Congress, and little space is devoted to economic issues. Finally, though perhaps most significant of all, in both his Manifesto to the Nation of January 1, 1891, and in his Political Testament of September 18, 1891, written shortly before his suicide, Balmaceda himself expressly stated that the issues involved in the war were political and constitutional, and in neither of these magisterial documents did he so much as mention social and economic factors.

The work of Bañados is the first important study of Balmaceda, not least because the author was in a unique position to write it. Despite its partisanship it is detailed and erudite and, as a discussion of the constitutional issues of the revolution, it has not been superseded. Bañados claims that the apparent causes of the revolution-Balmaceda's alleged denial of free elections, parliamentary rights, and individual liberties-were mere pretexts for Congressional action; the real causes were "political ambition in some and interest in others," for the history of the Balmaceda administration was "a struggle between men and circles to obtain predominance in the Government and to decide the candidature for the Presidency of the Republic in the election of 1891." He refutes Congressional arguments based on the written constitution of Chile, the opinions of eminent jurists, and the example of other states with similar systems. Bañados, however, also makes a number of allegations about the influence of foreign capital in Chile, asking rhetorically what influence the nitrate concessionaires had in the revolution. He also hints darkly at the link between the opposition to Balmaceda and the principal nitrate capitalist, John Thomas North. But he does not answer the tantalizing questions he poses, pleading the lack of such exact documentary evidence as would allow him to give other compromising details. It is noteworthy, however, that these questions and innuendo occupy a very small space in his book and, indeed, he devotes a mere twenty of his fifteen hundred pages to foreign interests in Chile, the emphasis throughout being on the personal ambitions of Chilean politicians.

In reply to Bañados, the great Brazilian, Joaquím Nabuco, published in the Jornal de Comércio of Rio de Janeiro a series of articles which subsequently appeared as a book. To Nabuco Balmaceda was an aspiring tyrant corrupted by power and the revolution "a matter of conscience not for the Dictator but for Congress." For Balmaceda was the real revolutionary with his idea of a so-called "popular representative system" as opposed to the parliamentary regimen in Chile, itself the best form of government. Nabuco stressed Balmaceda's increasing personalism throughout 1890, argued that his action in usurping the exclusive powers of Congress over supplies contained the seeds of dictatorship, and concluded that the fundamental cause of conflict was Balmaceda's quarrel with the oligarchy to which he belonged.

Any discussion of the Chilean revolution of 1891 must include the voluminous and controversial history of Francisco A. Encina. For him, the origins of the revolution stretch far back into Chile's past, but the immediate cause of crisis lay also in the character of Balmaceda. Encina argued that, throughout the nineteenth century, the autocratic structure of government was gradually weakened and the process was marked by an idealization of electoral liberty, by a doctrinaire attitude to politics and by conflicts on religious issues. Reform of the constitution of 1833 and an end to interference in elections became invested by the Congressional opposition with the ideal character of a universal panacea but, unfortunately, this movement of opinion and ideas reached its apogee under Balmaceda, a man who never realized the character or strength of the forces against him, who, fixing his eyes on the goal of Chile's material greatness, moved in a utopia unrestricted by realities, and whose character, complex and grandiose in the extreme, brought to a head the conflict between the political tendencies of the aristocracy and the established system of government. Balmaceda's errors crystallized the problem: on the one hand stood the Congressional majority, now seeking to bend him to its will and implant electoral liberty and parliamentary government, on the other the President and his supporters, convinced that the opposition was activated solely by sordid ambitions and selfish desires, fighting to preserve and perpetuate a system of government long since doomed. For Encina also, the revolution was not inspired by economic forces; in its origins it was "political and sentimental and not one of interests." Any belief in the influence of North's gold and the antagonism of bankers and landowners to Balmaceda as motivating forces in the revolution is completely misleading and utterly wrong.

In fact, however, some facets of the Chilean revolution of 1891 seem to establish a priori reasons for investigating social and economic issues, though here a few examples must suffice. In March, 1891, Patrick Egan, the American Minister to Chile, reported home that John Thomas North had alone contributed £100,000 to the revolutionary cause. Earlier the British Minister had written:

The special correspondent of The Times of London, Maurice Hervey, made scarcely-veiled references to North when he wrote from Chile:

What part have the nitrate potentates played in our parliamentary struggles . . . over the last five years? Are not the President and his party the victims of the zeal with which they have defended the interests of the state in the northernmost parts of the country?

And on May 2 the Deputy Acario Cotapos declared:

These random examples of contemporary statements implying the operation of economic factors in the genesis of the revolution can be multiplied, and they have been much used by later historians who are not satisfied with the "constitutional" interpretation. But the "economic" historiography of the revolution was really launched by Joaquín Villarino in his study of the Balmaceda administration. He asserted that the revolution, besides being a clash of ideas, was also a conflict of an economic and social kind with a sinister part being played by "the English nitrate entrepreneurs . . . with their lawyers and their deputies bought with high salaries." Balmaceda had offended the landowners, affronted the clergy, disturbed the bankers, and worried the nitrate capitalists, particularly North, who had been thwarted in his desire to make a kind of "South American India" of Tarapacá. Similar assertions, especially about the corrupting influence of foreign gold, were made by a more prominent Balmacedist, José Miguel Valdes Carrera, a former Finance Minister, who, in a pamphlet written in exile, alleged that North and others had spent large sums of money in Chile to bribe public men to defend foreign interests at the expense of those of the state.

These Balmacedist apologias were the starting-point of an "economic" interpretation of the revolution, though, in fact, this aspect of the historiography did not have the continuity of the "constitutional" view. Perhaps naturally, considerable attention has been paid by later writers to the alleged role of foreign nitrate capitalists in 1891 and, in this connection, it is interesting to note that the Chilean Radical Party declared in 1936 "that the enslaving of Chile to the foreign conquerors has only been made possible because of the treachery of a reactionary oligarchy, sold out to the gold of London and New York . . .," a declaration remarkably similar in spirit, if not exactly in circumstance, to the Balmacedist propaganda during 1891. But substantive evidence is lacking and, consequently, some writers assert much but prove little. Thus, H. B. Williams claims that Chilean politicans could not accept Balmaceda's policies for the nitrate industry because they derived such benefits from foreign nitrate companies, but he offers no substantiation. E. Freí Montalva points out that Balmacedist propaganda was on economic as much as constitutional lines, but does not dispute the validity of it.

By far the most convincing theses on economic lines are those of the late Osgood Hardy and the Chilean historian, Hernán Ramírez Necochea. Hardy held that there was enough evidence to show that "British nitrate interests played a significant part in inspiring the Congresionalistas to rebel against the Balmacedistas." After an excellent survey of the growth of the British nitrate industry and North's key role in it, he went on to argue that Balmaceda had a policy for nitrates inimical of North's interests, and concluded that the latter and others helped to finance the revolution which replaced Balmaceda by those more favorable to the nitrate capitalists.

Unlike Hardy, who used mostly secondary sources, Ramírez brought in new material to support his case. The main argument of his first study of the subject was admirably expressed in the foreword by Guillermo Feliú Cruz, who stated that

To return, however, to the contribution of such writers as Hardy and Ramírez to the historiography of the revolution, it is important to recognize that, whatever their value, they are a reaction to views long held, and it is characteristic of such reactions that often no clear distinction is drawn between probabilities and possibilities. Simply because an interpretation is new is no criterion of its superior validity to the old. The remainder of this article, therefore, will attempt to put the economic interpretation of the revolution into perspective before finally considering whether some synthesis of the two aspects of its historiography is not now possible.

In the first place, the reliability of two key contemporary observers in 1891 on the role of British nitrate interests may be questioned, as both of them, Patrick Egan and Maurice Hervey, have been quoted approvingly by a number of historians. Egan's remarks must be set against his background and his purpose in Chile. His earlier relations with the British can hardly be called cordial, for he was a former Treasurer of the Irish Land League and a defendant of Charles Stuart Parnell at his trial in 1880. This connection had brought him into the news again shortly before his appointment to Santiago when, in 1888-1889, The Times accused Parnell of complicity in the notorious Phoenix Park murders of 1882. Secretary of State James G. Blaine appointed Egan to Chile partly to flatter Irish voters, but also because Egan probably seemed eminently suitable to forward Blaine's ideas for a more dynamic commercial policy in an area where British interests predominated. During 1891 Egan's sympathy for Balmaceda was used by the latter to put pressure on Great Britain, though the American minister was almost alone among the diplomatic corps in leaning towards the president. The occasion arose when Balmaceda decreed the Congressional-held northern ports closed to shipping in April, 1891, but both the British and German ministers refused to accept this "paper" blockade which Balmaceda could not enforce. Egan, however, undertook to induce his government to recognize it. The attitude of the European diplomats was particularly galling to the Chilean government since it rendered ineffective its attempt to deprive the Congressionalists of revenue from nitrate shipments and of supplies, and the British minister often found himself under pressure. Thus, in May, 1891, Foreign Minister Ricardo Cruzat pointedly told him that the United States "had always shown readiness to assist the Chilean Government in all ways in their efforts to suppress the . . . revolution," and he added that Chile might well look to that country "for protection and assistance against the demands and pretentions [sic] of European powers." Kennedy believed Cruzat was bluffing, though Egan certainly thought his country would benefit from his attitude. How far Egan's attitude was prompted solely by considerations of national interest is conjectural, but it seems reasonable to question, in the light of it, his past history, and the purposes for which he had been appointed, whether he may really be considered an impartial witness, especially when his statements about North's alleged complicity in the revolution derived from Balmacedist sources.

Stronger doubts are permissible about Hervey. He was appointed special correspondent of The Times with orders "to report faithfully, and without unfair bias in favour or against any particular interest or view." He reached Chile in March and stayed there four months, during which, according to Kennedy:

Now, Hervey's first dramatic report was written in Santiago on March 19. We have his own testimony that he left Buenos Aires on March 5, reached Mendoza three days later and crossed the Andes on March 10-11, so that, whatever his precise timetable thereafter, he cannot have been in Santiago much more than a week before he was emphatically convinced of the truth about the revolution. His later and more sensational reports drew a strong protest from the leading British commercial houses in Chile. Only one, Antony Gibbs & Sons, had nitrate interests, and this was the very firm which had attacked North's Nitrate Railway Company in representations to the Foreign Office in 1890. The head of another, Williamson, Balfour & Co., also wrote to The Times in March, pointing out Hervey's lack of knowledge of Chile and suggesting that he seemed to be "under the influence of the President and his associates." This writer, Stephen Williamson, had no regard for North, for in a letter to his manager at Valparaiso in 1889 he described North as a "regular charlatan," said that the nitrate interests had so abused their privileges in Chile that some check should be placed on them, and recommended expropriation of the Nitrate Railway. To the present writer, there is some significance in the fact that British interests in Chile who had no brief for the parvenu North should, nevertheless, come to the latter's defence against Hervey, who, incidentally, told his paper that Williamson had been "bought by the Nitrate interest." Hervey was recalled in April, 1891, because his reports were so at variance with all other sources of information. He was subsequently given leave to stay in Chile to make a trip with the Balmacedist torpedo-boats, but was finally recalled on May 28 and requested to bring back proofs of his allegations against British capitalists. Though, in his book, Hervey cited verbatim most of the telegrams he received from The Times in 1891, of the last he noted that he was requested to "start at once for London with certain documentary evidence," but did not mention nitrates or British capitalists in this context at all. Dismissed by The Times in August, shortly after his return, Hervey then wrote the book which has exercised considerable influence on the "economic" historians of the revolution.

This caveat against two oft-quoted contemporary witnesses on economic issues in the revolution applies also in part to later writers who have used them, notably Hardy and Ramírez. Villarino and other contemporary Balmacedists who argued on economic lines are not in the same category, their work being largely a continuation of the wartime diatribes of the government, polemical in tone, apologist in intent, and singularly lacking in proof. It is, however, some measure of their contribution that Hardy and Ramírez deserve serious consideration, though both can be challenged on grounds of detail and interpretation.

Actually, Balmaceda was not elected president until six months later, and he was not even in the ministry under Santa María when the concession was annulled. Moreover, North did not become involved with the Railway Company until 1887 and Chairman of its Board until 1889. And, while Hardy is right in claiming the issue to be a bone of contention between Balmaceda and North, he over-personalizes it, as opposition to the Railway's monopoly owed as much to other British nitrate interests as it did to the government. More important, Hardy's interpretation of Balmaceda's speeches on the nitrate industry suggests that he did not consider them as a whole. Thus, of the most famous speech at Iquique on March 9, 1889, he says that Balmaceda "outlined in clear terms his attitude towards the nitrate problem," which he summarizes under three headings: nationalization of the industry, prohibition of any monopoly which might limit production to raise prices, and expropriation of the Tarapacá railroads. But Balmaceda explicitly rejected nationalization, saying that "an industrial monopoly of nitrate is not an undertaking for the State, whose fundamental mission is to guarantee the rights of property and liberty. . .," though he added that the state should conserve forever enough nitrate grounds to frustrate "an industrial dictatorship." As to the railway, Balmaceda hoped that all the lines in Tarapacá would become national property, with the qualification that "the railway question ought to be equitably arranged without injuring lawful private interests or harming the convenience and rights of the State." And, in fact, the government's method of solving the Nitrate Railway question was to award a concession for a competing line to the Agua Santa Company in which the controlling interest was held by the British firm of Campbell, Outram and Co. This obeyed political as well as economic objectives in that several Chilean politicians, interested in the Agua Santa Company, gave their support to Balmaceda, probably in return for the concession, when he was in acute political difficulties in 1890. One of them, Lauro Barros, became Minister of Finance in Balmaceda's "personal" ministry of October, composed when Balmaceda's differences with Congress had reached a nadir from which they never recovered. Furthermore, by this action, the government ignored the advice of the Deputy Luis Martiano Rodríguez, an adviser of the Nitrate Railway Company, who, in Congress, had urged that the competing line should be built by the state itself rather than by a private firm.

If Hardy's interpretation of this issue is somewhat misleading, a similar criticism may be made of his treatment of other matters. For example, he says that

On June 8, 1888, Balmaceda sought Congressional approval for the auction of some state nitrate grounds. In the debate which followed, the Senators for Tarapacá and Talca, Luis Aldunate and Luis Pereira, opposed open auction in view of the powerful competition of foreign capital, and Aldunate pleaded eloquently for nationalization of the nitrate industry. For the government, however, the Minister of Finance, Enrique Sanfuentes, who was subsequently to play the part of Lord Bute to Balmaceda's George III, stressed the advantages of laissez faire over state control: "to us," he said on August 1, "falls the honour of defending commercial liberty with all its inestimable benefits," and he added "let us stimulate private interests so that they make their logical contribution to the development of the nitrate industry." This speech was reminiscent of those made during 1882 in defence of the government decision to return the industry to private hands after the War of the Pacific, a decision for which, as Aldunate pointed out and Sanfuentes acknowledged, Balmaceda, then Minister of the Interior, bore some responsibility. The project then remained in abeyance until, in his message to Congress on June 1, 1889, three months after his visit to Iquique, Balmaceda resuscitated it, now with some amendments, proposing the reservation of some nitrate grounds solely to Chileans and not transferable to foreigners. But, in fact, the president submitted no concrete proposals to Congress on the lines thus adumbrated and, while it may be argued that political preoccupations prevented this, it is suggested rather that the apparent expressions of "economic nationalism" by Balmaceda in 1889 obeyed other objectives, both economic and political.

In the first place, the late 1880's saw such a saturation of the world nitrate market that there were fears of an utter collapse unless remedial measures were taken. This had happened before, after the War of the Pacific, and nitrate producers then agreed to restrict output until the market improved, as happened in 1887. But in the next two years nitrate production rose dramatically, largely the result of the flotation of new companies by North and his friends, and, by 1889, the circumstances surrounding the formation of a restrictive combine were about to be repeated. But the times had changed. The Chilean government's dependence on the revenue from nitrate shipments had increased vastly under Balmaceda, whose large and expensive program of public works was the keystone of his internal policy. He could scarcely view with equanimity the prospect of unilateral action by foreigners which might well jeopardize that program. It was in these economic circumstances that the speech at Iquique and the presidential message were given, and it may, therefore, be legitimate to suggest that one of their purposes was as a warning to nitrate interests which were already contemplating a restrictive combine; in that event, a studied vagueness, inducing hesitancy, would be more useful than explicit condemnation. At the same time, even when Balmaceda seemed to suggest preferential treatment for Chileans in nitrate matters, a few months later he sought Congressional approval to spend $150,000 on advertizing the fertilizer abroad, a move which suggests his recognition that the basic problem of the industry was the disequilibrium between world supply and demand.

This prophetic utterance was borne out as Balmaceda progressively lost the support of various political groups for a variety of reasons and, with them, majority support in Congress. By 1889 he had decided to depend entirely on the Liberal Party, a party strong in numbers but weak in talent, with many professional politicians but few public figures. It was at this time, his position in Santiago gravely weakened, that Balmaceda made his progress to the north, and it is suggested that one reason for this and for the kind of speeches he made was the political objective of increasing his popularity in the country and, simultaneously, seeking to divert the country's attention from the serious political difficulties in which he found himself.

There is one other reason why Hardy's interpretation is not convincing, apart from this suggested alternative. This turns on his view that the meetings between Balmaceda and North in 1889 left the latter "with the knowledge that the foundations of his kingdom were not entirely secure," for this is largely subjective since firsthand sources are strictly limited. William Howard Russell, who was present in 1889, reported that

The work of Ramírez Necochea is much more detailed and, at first sight, convincing. His study of the development of the nitrate industry is well-documented and sound, apart from its Marxist overtones; his survey of Balmaceda's policies is full of interesting facts, and his material on the relations between Chilean public men and foreign capitalists shows in detail what relationships existed. But his thesis seems to the present writer rather to strain the evidence to fit the case, and to ignore or minimize the value of material which might prove embarrassing to it. A few examples will illustrate these points, though it is not proposed to deal with his treatment of Balmaceda's alleged nitrate policy, which largely follows Hardy in giving Balmaceda credit for a cohesive policy he did not possess.

No doubt both Harvey and North, who dominated the Company's Board until his death in 1896, believed this was so, but the reports of the enquiry created a furore in Chile and "great public indignation." The Chilean Legation in London issued a statement refuting the evidence heard at the enquiry, and pointed out that no Chileans had been named but simply referred to by initials. But to anyone acquainted with the Company, the Mr. Z. most often mentioned was easily identified as Julio Zegers, the Company's counsel in Chile for ten years and a prominent lawyer-politician. Zegers himself petitioned the Comisión Conservadora of the Chilean Congress for a full investigation, but one was never held, and he lived out his life in the shadow of public scandal.

Other information came out of the case which Ramírez does not mention but which is very relevant. Manby, who had seen Balmaceda with North in 1889, mentioned the Patillos Railway in his evidence. This was a line from the Lagunas nitrate grounds to the port of Patillos, some forty miles south of Iquique, a line on which both the government and the Peruvian firm of Montero, the original owners of the Nitrate Railway, had claims. The Nitrate Railways Company had bought half the Montero shares in the Patillos line in order to keep it closed and their railway monopoly inviolate, but there was always a danger that the government would press its claim, open the line, and threaten the Company's privileges. Manby said that in 1889 Balmaceda raised the matter of his government's claim, "and he said it amounted to 150,000 1. [ sic] and he would be glad to enter into some arrangement with the Nitrate Railways Company about it. . .," adding later that "something ought to be done, that it was our interest to acquire the railway," and North said he would look into the matter. Robert Harvey's testimony on this issue was that, though the government made no claim on the line, "negotiations were going on when Balmaceda was President through Colonel North's friends, to see what he would take, and he said he would take 100,000 1. in bonds bearing 5 per cent." If, as seems likely, Harvey was no less frank here than he had been earlier, Balmaceda was either trying to come to an arrangement with the leading nitrate capitalist over his monopoly transport position in Tarapacá, or deliberately misleading North to part with a large sum of money to no purpose. Either picture contrasts strangely with that of the economic nationalist fighting a nefarious combination of corrupt native politicians and lawyers and unscrupulous British capitalists, and it also lends more credence to the view that when North's monopoly was breached by the Agua Santa concession in 1890, political reasons then played a large part. This aspect of the Nitrate Railways case illustrates the danger of relying too heavily upon a purely economic interpretation of Balmaceda's presidency.

Later, he pointed out that

In 1894, when the nitrate combination collapsed, a number of state nitrate fields were auctioned off and Chilean investors spent one-third of the capital involved. This development pleased the British minister, who thought that this would provide "a satisfactory guarantee against vexatious state interference" and also blunt criticism of the degree of British control over the industry. Chileans were elated at this turn of events and so was the government. During the post-revolutionary period, therefore, the evidence suggests not that the Congressionalist victors of 1891 paid court to the foreign nitrate interests, but rather the contrary, and, finally on this issue, though Ramírez is right to point out that by 1898 there was a foreign hegemony over nitrates, this was not a consequence of the revolution. In 1884, British capital invested in nitrates represented 34 per cent of the total, having stood at 13 per cent in 1878; in 1895 it stood at almost 60 per cent, and in 1902 at between 40 and 50 per cent. To support Ramírez the rise from 34 to 60 per cent between 1884 and 1895 should have taken place largely after 1891, but, in fact, it was between 1884 and 1889 that the most dramatic increase in British capital investment in nitrates took place, much of it grossly inflated. The foreign hegemony dates from the presidencies of Santa María and Balmaceda.

More space would permit the citation of other aspects of the thesis put forward by Ramírez which show similar traits of suggestio falsi, for example his treatment of Balmaceda and banking interests. But perhaps the above is sufficient to east some doubts on a total acceptance of his economic interpretation. It seems to the present writer that the only reasonable verdict possible at present on such questions as the collusion of British nitrate interests and antagonism between Balmaceda and his Congress on economic grounds as motivating forces in the revolution is "not proven." However important new lines of approach may be, historical interpretation demands rigorous attention to detail and a willingness to modify a priori assumptions where the evidence conflicts with them.

Finally, is a synthesis of the "constitutional" and "economic" interpretations of the revolution now possible? The answer must be a qualified 'no,' for a number of prerequisites are still lacking. We need a series of studies on such issues as the social structure of Chile in the nineteenth century, most imperatively a detailed investigation on biographical lines of the aristocracy and its economic interests such as land, banking, and mining; the role of professional men-lawyers, journalists and commercial figures-and their political outlook and affiliations; the precise part played by foreign capital in Chilean development, and Chile's place in a wider world economy, and, not least, a whole range of regional studies which might well throw light on much more than regional issues. The raison d'être of such studies would obviously not be limited to adding to our knowledge of the revolution of 1891, but they would manifestly contribute to our interpretation of it, and that event has some ground for being considered as the critical one in the modern history of the republic, in which many tendencies and developments of the nineteenth century reached their climax and from which flowed consequences still felt in the national life. For these reasons, it is hoped that it will continue to engage the attention of historians in the future as much as it has done in the past.

Author notes

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Chilean Revolution of 1891 and Its Historiography1

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Discussion of the Chilean revolution of 1891 has been in progress for almost three-quarters of a century, yet, despite this considerable period of investigation and interpretation, the origins, character and consequences of the revolution and the figure of José Manuel Balmaceda, protagonist of the revolutionary drama, are still subjects of much dispute among historians.

# data[].attributes.headline
The year 1923 was a rough year for Germany. They were suffering from high inflation, economics, living conditions, and work environment were all very bad. Germany was defeated in world war 1. They had to pay 33 billion dollars to France after the war, and they didn't so France and Belgium occupied the heart of Germany Their steel and coal industry.

# data[].attributes.subject
The year 1923 was a rough year for Germany. They were suffering from high inflation, economics, living conditions, and work environment were all very bad. Germany was defeated in world war 1. They had to pay 33 billion dollars to France after the war, and they didn't so France and Belgium occupied the heart of Germany Their steel and coal industry.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The Hamburg Uprising started on October 13, 1923, during the Weimar Republic in Germany. Post-World War I Germany was suffering economically and socially, resulting in poor working and living conditions and high inflation. The social and political environment created useful conditions for the rise of socialist movements in Germany. Particularly, it increased the popularity of the communist party, the KPD, which tried to launch a "German October" and establish communism. The attempts to take control with military means failed as it lacked support from the rest of Germany and the Soviet Union.

The government brutally suppressed the insurrection, which was over in a day. The communist insurgency soon disintegrated. Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky later referred to the Hamburg uprising as "a classic demonstration of how it is possible to miss a perfectly exceptional revolutionary situation of world-historic importance." Even though the exact details of the rebellion remain highly vague, it is clear that the failed Hamburg uprising became a useful tool for the government to establish greater control over society and laid the foundation for Adolf Hitler's rise to power in a few years.

Germany Before the Uprising

Germany was soundly defeated in World War I. In addition to the tremendous cost of human life and material resources for waging war, Germany was obliged to pay 132 billion gold Marks (US $33 billion) to France and other major powers under the Versailles Treaty signed in 1919. The reparations were meant to cover the civilian damage caused by Germany during World War I. Germany's post-World War I period was characterized by revolutionary upheavals and political turbulence.

On January 11, 1923, in response to Germany's refusal to pay the reparation payments required by the Treaty of Versailles, France and Belgium occupied the heavily industrialized Ruhr Valley, the heart of Germany's steel and coal industry. The occupation of the Ruhr worsened Germany's political and social crisis and increased workers' dissatisfaction with the existing establishment.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD), under the presidency of Friedrich Ebert, supported the far-right German government led by industrialist Wilhelm Cuno (Cuno himself was not a member of the SPD nor any other political entity), responded to the crisis by encouraging passive resistance. In reality, this meant that businesses and municipal government entities in the Ruhr boycotted the occupation forces. The local government's salaries were still being paid, and to make up for the losses, the government provided subsidies to the coal and steel businessmen.

The German currency completely collapsed due to these massive expenditures and the lack of desperately needed coal and steel from the Ruhr. Both workers and those living on a pension lost all means of subsistence. During 1923, the Mark dropped from 21,000 to the US dollar at the beginning of the year to 6 trillion at the end.

However, certain groups of manufacturers and speculators profited from inflation. Due to the low salaries, anyone with access to foreign money or gold could sell German goods to other countries and make enormous profits. These were mainly the forces behind the ruling party. As a result of social division and the demise of the middle-class, political polarization became intense. The SPD swiftly lost supporters and voters and eventually fell apart.

By the autumn of 1923, hyperinflation reached its peak, giving the Communist Party (the KPD) a boost in popularity as the Social Democratic Party of Germany lost its strength gradually. The trade unions, which had been a crucial driving force of the party, disintegrated as most of the German workers left the associations. Within a year, the KPD grew its membership from 225,000 to 295,000 as the Social Democratic Party's power declined.

The Cuno strikes were a nationwide wave of strikes in Germany in response to the high inflation and poor economic conditions. Rebels demanded the resignation of Reich chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, protesting his policy of passive resistance to the Belgian and French occupation of the Ruhr that had resulted in high inflation and the collapse of the Mark, even though Reichsmark remained in use till 1948.

The strikes began in June 1923 and were opposed by the Social-Democratic leaders, who warned that the dangers of disruption might only contribute to enhancing the Communists' influence. These strikes also highlighted the factory councils' growing influence. Their "Committee of Fifteen" challenged the existing leadership of the unions. On June 16, the Committee addressed the working class of Germany, describing the catastrophe that was threatening German society as a whole, and reaffirmed that only the working class could solve the crises:

In June and August, strikes and demonstrations broke out, demanding the Cuno government's resignation. The communist party KPD tried to initiate a general strike and bring down the Cuno government. On the other hand, the SPD was pressuring the trade union to reject the call for a more massive general strike. Nevertheless, even within the SPD, some supported the demonstrations.

The wave of strikes spread to other regions of Germany, such as Hamburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Communist workers occupied factories and work fields. It is estimated that approximately 3.5 million workers went on strike. Even the KPD leadership's expectations for the strike's response were exceeded. Cuno and his government were forced to resign on August 11, 1923, and the strikes ended peacefully. Gustav Stresemann took over the leadership.

In the Soviet Union, the Cuno strikes fueled the vision of a German revolution. Leon Trotsky and other influential members of the key communist organizations, including the Political Bureau (Politburo) and COMINTERN, believed that the timing for initiating a socialist revolution in Germany was ideal. Heinrich Brandler, the leader of the KPD, disagreed, but despite his reservations, the Soviet Politburo started to endorse the plan for a "German October." The communists aimed to take over and spark a new wave of revolutions in Central Europe by imitating the 1917 Russian October Revolution that established communist rule.

To prepare for a communist revolution in Germany, the Political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party formed a "Commission for International Affairs" to supervise the preparatory works in Germany. Among others, the Commission consisted of high-level communist leaders, including Joseph Stalin, Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, and Lev Kamenev.

Before the actual uprising, there were numerous discussions and correspondence with the Soviet and KPD leaders. Financial, logistical, and military support was organized. Finally, organizers chose November 9 for the uprising. But things began to progress rapidly.

Following Chancellor Stresemann's announcement to end the passive resistance against the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr on September 16, the German government issued an act abolishing the eight-hour working day. Thus, the already tense political environment between the extreme right and the government was accompanied by increasing working-class resistance, particularly in Saxony and Thuringia. In these two states, the communist KPD formed a coalition with the left-wing SPD government to strengthen its position for simplified access to weapons if needed.

However, the commander of the Reichswehr in Saxony, General Müller, did not recognize their authority and, with Berlin's consent, began to subordinate the police forces under his command. Threatened by these developments, the KPD initiated a congress in Chemnitz, Saxony on October 2 and called for a general strike in Germany.

However, the representatives of the leftist Social Democrats disagreed, and the leader of KPD, Heinrich Brandler, decided to cancel the uprising. He thought that the situation and the political environment were not mature enough to bring victory for communists in Germany. The decision to call off the rebellion did not reach Hamburg on time. There, an insurrection was already organized but appeared isolated and thus defeated within days.

On October 22, 1922, Hugo Urbahns and Hans Kippenberger, who coordinated the insurrection in Hamburg, received an order for the rebellion from the regional party leadership of KPD. Even though the Hamburg KPD had nearly 14,000 members, only 1,300 actively participated in the uprising. On October 23 at 5:00 AM, the communist rebellions attacked 26 police stations and took weapons. In some parts of Hamburg, communists blockaded train tracks and streets. In the small town of Bargteheide, insurgents captured local government leaders.

In Schiffbek, where the KPD enjoyed more support, rebellions urged the residents to support the uprising, declaring, " Long live Soviet Germany! Long live the Federation of Soviet states of the world! Long live the world revolution! "

In a few hours, the majority of the revolt was suppressed but continued in Schiffbek until noon. In Barmbek, where the KPD had earned about 20% of the vote in the previous election, residents helped erect barricades and brought them food. Despite the constant armed confrontation, the rebels were able to hold their position the entire day. But at night, persuaded of the futility of their position, they gave up and left the site. The police launched a major offensive on abandoned barricades the following day.

The Hamburg uprising resulted in the deaths of 61 civilians, 21 rebels, and 17 police officers. Around 70 policemen and 175 rebels were injured. Fourteen hundred people were detained, and 443 were tried in a special court trial. Because of disturbances in Schiffbeck, where the KPD received 32.4% of the vote in the May 1924 election, 191 persons were detained and later convicted at the Altona Landgericht in February 1925, becoming the largest trial against the insurgents.

The Legacy of the Failed Revolution

The attempts of communists to organize a mass uprising in Germany during the Hamburg uprising failed and resulted in the demoralization and disorganization of the whole KPD. The failed uprising diminished the communist support within the German middle class, which became more attracted to anti-communist rhetoric as a result. Hence, in 1924 when the Hamburg elections were held, the German National People's Party's votes increased from 12% to about 20%. It also created a basis for the ruling elite and military establishment to consolidate power over German society. Capitulation without a fight was certainly the worst possible outcome for the future of communism in Germany.

Within Soviet leadership, the failed revolution was disguised as the sole responsibility of KPD and, particularly, Brandler, who could not lead the uprising. He was replaced by young intellectuals from bourgeois backgrounds, Ruth Fischer and Arkadi Maslow, who did not have a revolutionary past and could not deal with the future challenges of the KPD, paving the way to Adolf Hitler's rise to power ten years later.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Hamburg Uprising: A Missed Revolution in Germany

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The Hamburg uprising was an armed rebellion of the Hamburg proletariat in 1923 that paved the way for Adolf Hitler's authoritarian leadership.