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Stalkers have always existed, but their tactics have evolved over the years to take advantage of the anonymity and wealth of information now available on the Internet. In fact, you are now more likely to be a victim of cyberstalking than you are to be stalked in real life. But this doesn't mean you are defenseless. There are ways to lower the odds of your child becoming a victim.

To keep your children safe from cyberstalkers, you need to learn all you can about it, including what it looks like, why it's dangerous, and how you can prevent it.

What is cyberstalking?

Cyberstalking is the repeated use of technology-such as emails, text messages, social media platforms, and search engines-over time to cause another person, or group of people, to fear for their safety. A form of cyberbullying, this behavior often involves an invasion of an individual's privacy and can be emotionally devastating to its victims.

Moreover, cyberstalking is not something that will go away on its own. In fact, statistics show that cyberstalking tends to escalate in over 70% (PDF) of cases.

Cyberstalkers use the following methods to harass their targets:

Tracking a person's location by secretly installing a GPS device on his or her car.

Sending (real or fake) sexual photos of someone to that person or his or her friends and family.

Doxing (posting an individual's personally identifying information online) someone.

Hacking an individual's email, texting, and social media accounts, and sending messages from these accounts to harass or blackmail that person.

Ordering goods and services on behalf of the targeted individual.

Sending threatening emails to someone or that person's loved ones.

Releasing confidential or fake information about someone to embarrass him or her.

Creating fake social media profiles, incendiary websites, and malicious blogs targeting an individual.

Recently, a Texas deputy sheriff was charged with cyberstalking a 12-year-old Massachusetts girl, whom he met while playing the online game Minecraft in 2014. He forced the girl to stay in contact with him for several years, demanding that she send him hundreds of explicit photos, threatening to publish the photos and to sexually assault her.

Another example of cyberstalking is that of Roni Jacobson, who met her cyberstalker when she was a young teenager in summer camp in 2001. What began as a friendship quickly turned into 15 years of harassment. He ended up writing damaging letters to her employer, spoofing her email address and phone number to send messages to her friends, and complaining about her to the FBI and FCC.

Kids don't understand the dangers of cyberstalkers

Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram are potential hunting grounds for cyberstalkers. Unfortunately, kids don't see the danger as real-nearly 40% of children don't bother enabling their social media privacy settings. This means anyone on the Internet can easily view the contents of their profiles.

Even if your child's profile is private, the people he or she has friended still have access to everything your child has ever posted. And this information can be used against him or her if a "friend" turns out to be dangerous, which is the case with most cyberstalking incidents. In fact, the Bureau of Justice Statistics puts the percentage at 75%.

Online safety tips

Beyond the standard online safety measures-like installing antivirus software, keeping your child's computer in a public area of the house, and talking to him or her about the dangers of engaging with strangers on the Internet-you should follow these additional steps to reduce your child's risk of being cyberstalked:

Explain to your child what kind of online behavior is unacceptable:Often, kids are unsure of their boundaries and what type of behavior violates those boundaries.

Find out what platforms your child is using: Kids tend to gravitate to social platforms that their parents don't know about yet.

Make sure your child knows he or she can always come to you: Your child needs to feel safe coming to you with his or her concerns. For example, don't threaten to take away your child's devices if he or she breaks any online safety rules. This will only discourage your child from ever reporting a problem. This is especially important regarding sexting behaviors, which children are often too ashamed to tell others about.

"Experimenting with sexting can make youth vulnerable, not only to predators, but also because shame can prevent them reaching out to adults for help when it's most needed. Consider using a sexting agreement."- Julia Hengstler

Search for your child's name on the Internet: You need to find out if any of your child's personal information is exposed to cyberstalkers, who could use it to track him or her online. Remove any items that reveal his or her location, age, school, or home address.

Tell your child to never share personal information online: The best reason to avoid sharing personal information is that once you post something online, there is always the chance that someone can find it again, even if you've deleted the original post. To be extra safe, teach your child to always think twice before he or she hits "send."

Keep your child's device secure: Tell your child to not let anyone else borrow his or her computer, tablet, or phone. Cyberstalkers can use tracking devices (sometimes secretly attached to the back of your child's computer) to monitor their targets.

"Devices can cyber-stalkers too, gathering our personal information in exchange for free info (or ads!)... be aware of what you share!"-Diana Graber, founder of Cyber Civics and Cyberwise and author of Raising Humans in a Digital World

Tell your child to always log out: Make sure your child always logs out of whatever program he or she is using before moving away from his or her device. Your child should also use password-enabled screensavers.

Safeguard your child's online calendars: Have your child make any online calendars private-or delete them entirely. A cyberstalker who gains access to this information will be able to know where your child will be at a certain time.

"Check your privacy settings. It's not about who you keep out, but who you let in!"- Joseph Yeager, cybersafety advocate and founder of Safety Net of PA.

Make your child's social media accounts private: This restricts who can see what your child posts. As part of this process, make sure your child changes the account settings to ensure that his or her profile doesn't appear in the search results for his or her name.

Turn off the location tagging in your child's photos: This location data in the photos your child posts on social media or photo-sharing sites can reveal sensitive information, such as when and where the picture was taken. And check to see that your child's pictures don't show your street address or the name of his or her school.

Teach your child to always change passwords when he or she breaks up with someone:It's a good idea for teenagers to change all of their passwords every time they split from a romantic partner-even if they think that their ex doesn't know any of their passwords.

How to tell if your child is being cyberstalked

To find out if your child is experiencing cyberstalking, you need to have a conversation with him or her about whether anyone is making him or her feel unsafe online.

You should also look for the following behaviors that might indicate your child has a cyberstalker:

He or she spends an unusual amount of time online, in private.

Your child is receiving phone calls at strange hours.

He or she acts suspiciously around you when he or she is online.

Someone you don't know is giving your child gifts.

If your child is showing signs of being cyberstalked, the most important thing you can do is to avoid judging him or her and get your child to open up to you. Regardless of the situation-the sooner you know all the details, the sooner you can stop it.

What to do if someone is cyberstalking your child

Most people's experience with cyberstalking lasts an average of two years. And this can significantly affect your mental and emotional health. Luckily, cyberstalking a crime in all 50 states, and many police departments have cybercrime units. This means that there are ways to make it stop.

If someone is cyberstalking your child, you should do the following:

1. Make copies of everything: Take screenshots and record phone calls, but don't alter them in any way. You should also keep copies of all communications with ISPs or law enforcement agencies.

2. Tell the person to stop: Clearly tell the cyberstalker that you want him or her to stop contacting your child.

3. Notify your local police: Make sure you bring two copies of every document you have. If you know the cyberstalker's location, you can notify the police department there or file a report with both precincts. Be sure to get a copy of any report you file.

4. Use someone else's phone or computer to seek help: If you suspect that your cyberstalker is tracking your communications, don't use your own devices to ask for help. Doing so might enrage the individual and place you in greater danger.

5. Block him or her: Your child can block people on his or her email, social media platforms, and phone.

Helpful resources

Whether your child is dealing with a cyberstalker or you are looking for more information about how to prevent it, there are plenty of resources available to help you, including the following:

To learn more about removing your personal information from the Internet, feel free to give us a call. We are available 24/7 to discuss your particular situation. We also offer the following articles on online privacy:

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How to protect your children from cyberstalking - ReputationDefender

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Stalkers have always existed, but their tactics have evolved over the years to take advantage of the anonymity and wealth of information now available on the Internet. In fact, you are now more likely to be a victim of cyberstalking than you are to be stalked in real life.

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An analysis of overlapping technologies used by cybercriminals and terrorist organizations

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An analysis of overlapping technologies used by cybercriminals and terrorist organizations

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Dark Motives Online: An Analysis of Overlapping Technologies Used by Cybercriminals and Terrorist Organizations

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Research on the common technologies used by cybercriminals and terrorists to benefit their cause, from the services they abuse to the tools they’ve homebrewed to streamline activities.

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Cyber-Criminals Found a Home on Social Media Sites

Cyber-Criminals Found a Home on Social Media Sites

Since 2011, cyber-criminals have found a haven in social media, where they perpetrate fraud. In the past six months, their numbers have increased 70 percent.

More Cyber-Crime on Social Media

Members of cyber-crime-related groups on social media platforms grew 70% in six months-from 179,447 to 305,677 individuals.

Geographic Hotspots

The geographic hotspots for fraud on social media channels are located in Brazil, Russia, China, India and Southeast Asia, Latin America and Nigeria.

Top Industries Affected by e-Commerce Fraud

Online money transfers: 19%, Travel and hospitality: 15%, Business services: 13%, Electronics: 10%

Time to Investigate Fraud

70% of retailers take days, or longer, to investigate the source of fraud activity on their website.

Mobile Is the New Target

60% of all fraud originates from a mobile device, and 45% of transaction volume originates from a mobile device.

Ransomware Attacks

One in 20 malware attacks involves ransomware.

Global Impact of Phishing

A new phishing attack is launched every 30 seconds. The annual cost of phishing to global organizations is $9.1 billion.

Mobile to Outpace Web Transactions

In 2017, for the first time, mobile transactions will outpace web transactions, and fraud will continue to grow rapidly.

Biometric Authentication Will Take off

Biometric authentication will become popular with mobile users. Fingerprint, voice and eyeprint, combined with risk-based transaction monitoring, will dominate for authentication and fraud management.

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How Cyber Criminals Target Social Media | CIO Insight

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Cyber-Criminals Found a Home on Social Media Sites Cyber-Criminals Found a Home on Social Media Sites Since 2011, cyber-criminals have found a haven in social media, where they perpetrate fraud. In the past six months, their numbers have increased 70 percent.

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The Problem

Social media platforms provide violent groups free access to vast audiences.

Terror groups have weaponized blogs, Facebook groups, news feeds, and tweets to fundraise, broadcast attacks, recruit new members, and provide training.

Social media algorithms fuel division and foster extremism, helping terror groups, white supremacists and violent nationalists identify and radicalize recruits.

The Specifics

User-friendly, reliable, and free platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Twitter provide direct access to pages managed by banned extremist groups including Hezbollah and ISIS as well as white nationalist groups in the United States and Europe.

Social media provides violent groups with a powerful mechanism to broadcast terrorist attacks, beheadings, instructional videos, and recruitment material targeting potential new members.

Examples of outreach and engagement include a 2019 Hezbollah crowd-funding campaign on Facebook to "Equip a Jihadi" and evidence that the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers learned how to build explosives from online ISIS material.

Designated terror groups including Hezbollah and the Pakistani Taliban have maintained ofﬁcial Facebook and Twitter accounts, which directly link to their websites, and vice versa.

Facebook became so instrumental to Hezbollah's public outreach that its "Electronic Resistance" actually incorporated the Facebook trademark into Hezbollah's iconic logo!

In 2017, Google's stock plunged by 4.5% and advertisers pulled hundreds of millions of dollars after news reports showed ads for commercial products played alongside violent ISIS content on YouTube.

How It Works

Terror-related material-including bomb recipes and instruction from virtual coaches-is easily found through simple search functions. It is not even necessary to join a private or secret group to access this content.

Social media sites also enable terror groups to raise funds through the sale of narcotics, looted antiquities, or other contraband.

Platforms even help extremist groups recruit by auto-recommending groups and matching members with similar interests.

Facebook tools sometimes inadvertently make use of terror images in auto-generated material that subsequently gets used by terrorists as propaganda material.

Key Facts and Figures

90 percent of terrorist activity on the Internet takes place using social networking tools.

According to the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE), a full half of 236 interviewees said internet-based recruitment and perusal of social media factored into their decision to join ISIS.

According to a June 2020 report from The Wall Street Journal, a 2016 internal Facebook study found that "64% of all extremist group joins are due to our recommendation tools" and that most of the activity came from the platform's "Groups You Should Join" and "Discover" algorithms.

Facebook claims its AI systems identify 99 percent of the terrorist content that is taken down before appearing on its platform.

But studies by ACCO member Counter Extremism Project indicate that terror content from groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda is ﬂagged and removed only about 38% of the time.

Current Law

Major tech ﬁrms have been accused of failing to adjust algorithms that accelerate violent extremism. Lawmakers have accused executives at social media ﬁrms of consistently prioritizing growth and revenue over safety and security.

Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA230) grants immunity to any provider of "interactive computer service" for user-generated content. This means that social media platforms can host illegal activity with complete immunity, even when they know it's there.

Proposed Legal Reform

By reforming CDA230, lawmakers could shift the responsibility for monitoring Internet platforms for illicit activity to tech ﬁrms, and regulate ﬁrms to hand over evidence of illegal activity to law enforcement. If this reform doesn't occur, current campaigns to improve user privacy could have the unintended consequence of making the Internet a safer place for violent extremist groups.

ACCO's Mission

The Alliance to Counter Crime Online is a team of security experts, academics, NGO leaders, and citizen investigators who have come together to push organized crime and terror activity off Internet platforms.

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Social media platforms provide violent groups free access to vast audiences. Terror groups have weaponized blogs, Facebook groups, news feeds, and tweets to fundraise, broadcast attacks, recruit new members, and provide training. Social media algorithms fuel division and foster extremism, helping terror groups, white supremacists and violent nationalists identify and radicalize recruits.

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ABSTRACT
Some scholars and others are skeptical of a significant role for the Internet in processes of violent radicalization. There is increasing concern on the part of other scholars, and increasingly also policymakers and publics, that easy availability of violent extremist content online may have violent radicalizing effects. This article identifies a number of core questions regarding the interaction of violent extremism and terrorism and the Internet, particularly social media, that have yet to be adequately addressed and supplies a series of six follow-up suggestions, flowing from these questions, for progressing research in this area. These suggestions relate to (1) widening the range of types of violent online extremism being studied beyond violent jihadis; (2) engaging in more comparative research, not just across ideologies, but also groups, countries, languages, and social media platforms; (3) deepening our analyses to include interviewing and virtual ethnographic approaches; (4) up-scaling or improving our capacity to undertake "big data" collection and analysis; (5) outreaching beyond terrorism studies to become acquainted with, for example, the Internet Studies literature and engaging in interdisciplinary research with, for example, computer scientists; and (6) paying more attention to gender as a factor in violent online extremism.

The "slick" and "glossy" nature of the so-called Islamic State's (IS) online content and its resultant potential attractiveness to, and resonance with, discontented "digital natives" (i.e., young people who have grown up with the Internet) has been widely reported on in the world's press and is now a source of considerable public and governmental anxiety. There is no yet proven connection between consumption of and networking around violent extremist online content and adoption of extremist ideology and/or engagement in violent extremism and terrorism however. Some scholars and others remain skeptical of a significant role for the Internet in processes of violent radicalization. There is increasing concern on the part of other scholars, and increasingly also policymakers and publics, that high and increasing levels of always-on Internet access and the production and wide dissemination-and thence easy availability-of large amounts of violent extremist content online may have violent radicalizing effects, which certainly appears to be one of the main purposes of its producers. Determining the significance of the role of the Internet in contemporary extremism and terrorism is not the goal of this article, however, and, indeed, is unlikely to be able to be adequately addressed in any single journal article given the scope of the issues necessary to be addressed. This article has a narrower remit: it contextualizes research and discussion in this area to date and proffers six suggestions for progressing research on the role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism so that we may be better placed to make a determination as to the significance of the Internet's role in the latter going forward. The article is composed of three sections. The first section provides context via summary of the nature of the research produced to date on the role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism. Section two composes a brief re-cap of a variety of arguments for and against the Internet having a significant role in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism. Section three, the article's longest, identifies two core questions regarding the interaction of violent extremism and terrorism and the Internet, particularly social media, which have yet to be adequately addressed and supplies a series of six follow-up suggestions, flowing from these questions, for progressing research on violent online extremism and terrorism. These suggestions are with respect to the necessity for researchers in this area to widen our research beyond violent online jihadism, engage in more comparative analysis, consider virtual ethnography as a viable approach while at the same time not dismissing upscaling techniques, draw from Internet studies and engage in interdisciplinary research, and consider gender as an important category. The conclusion reiterates that while ours is a burgeoning research field, it lacks a sound theoretical and evidential base.

Research to Date

A useful distinction may be drawn between descriptive research and explanatory research. Broadly, descriptive research asks " What is going on?" while explanatory approaches ask " Why is it going on?" Much descriptive research is scene-setting; it involves providing historical and/or contemporary overviews of some research topic or issue area by drawing together and synthesizing the available data. Abstract questions are not ruled out however. "Is the role of the Internet in contemporary terrorism increasing?" is a descriptive research question, for example. Explanatory research, on the other hand, largely develops causal explanations. Instead of asking whether the Internet has an increased role in contemporary terrorism, explanatory research might ask "Why is the Internet playing an increased role in contemporary terrorism?" It is one thing to show that the Internet is of greater significance in contemporary terrorism, in other words, but another thing altogether to explain why this is so. Research of both sorts is "fundamental to the research enterprise," unfortunately adequate amounts of neither have been undertaken on the role of the Internet in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism. It is impossible to adequately answer the question of why the Internet is playing a greater role in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism absent prior knowledge of what role, if any, the Internet is playing in the latter. Unfortunately, basic descriptive research is largely missing from this field, along with more complex theory-informed approaches seeking to show causal connections.

This is pretty astounding given the treasure trove of data now available online. It allowed William McCants, in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence in December 2011, to raise the following in relation to what questions:

There is little research to go on, which is striking given how data-rich the Internet is. In hard numbers, how widely distributed was Zawahiri's last message? Did it resonate more in one U.S. city than another? Who were its main distributors on Facebook and YouTube? How are they connected with one another? This sort of baseline quantitative research barely exists at the moment.

Aaron Zelin observed as recently as 2013 that:

More than 11 years after the attacks of 9/11 and nearly a decade since the rise of popular online jihadi Internet forums, there is strikingly little empirical research on the manner in which jihadi activists use the Web to propagate their cause. Whereas researchers and policy analysts have systematically collected and analyzed the primary source material produced by al-Qaeda and its allies, very little work has been done on the conduits through which that information is distributed-and even to what extent anyone is accessing that propaganda other than counterterrorism analysts.

Missing, in other words, are analyses of individual Internet users' online activity and experiences in extremist cyberspaces, in addition to research on the online structures within which the latter are operating-even constrained-and the different workings and therefore functions of these. Neither what or why questions are being addressed, in other words.

Given these and other difficulties with the available research, it's unsurprising that there is ongoing debate among scholars about the significance of the Internet in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism, particularly its role in processes of violent radicalization.

Arguments for and Against a Significant Role for the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Skepticism that the Internet might have a role to play in violent extremism and terrorism is not new. Walter Laqueur, an early and influential figure in Terrorism Studies, made the following observation in 1999: "No amount of email sent from the Baka Valley to Tel Aviv, from Kurdistan to Turkey, from the Jaffna peninsula to Colombo, or from India to Pakistan will have the slightest political effect. Nor can one envisage how in these conditions virtual power will translate into real power." This is an interesting statement from a number of perspectives, chief among them being that just a few lines previously, on the very same page in fact, Laqueur says that audio-cassettes of Khomeini smuggled into Iran during his exile in Najaf and subsequently Paris significantly impacted the Iranian revolution. So Laqueur readily admits the fact that audio-cassettes changed the course of Iranian history, but cannot see how Internet technologies could fundamentally change anything in relation to terrorism. His initial impetus, to assign a role to information and communication technologies in political violence movements, is in keeping with David Rapoport's wave theory of terrorism, an often overlooked aspect of which is the way technology, especially communications technology, can influence the types, timing, and spread of terrorism.

Laqueur's skeptical view nonetheless persists. Over a decade later, in 2011, Jason Burke, journalist and author of an excellent early book about Al Qaeda, made the following observation about social media and its effects in terms of contemporary terrorism:

Twitter will never be a substitute for grassroots activism. In much of the Islamic world, social media is only for super-connected local elites or supporters in far-off countries. Neither are much use on the ground, where it counts. Social media can bring in donations or some foreign recruits. It can aid communication with some logistics and facilitate propaganda operations, but it is not much use in a firefight. ... Twitter won't help al-Shabaab retake Mogadishu or the Taliban reach Kabul in any meaningful way.

Startlingly, Burke seems to think social media activity cannot be a substantive form of "grassroots activism," which he seems to imply must be "real world" activism. Second, he appears to think that not a great many people in the Arab and Muslim world(s) are social media users, which was untrue, even in 2011; five Arab countries (i.e., United Arab Emirates [UAE], Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and Tunisia) had greater than 25 percent Facebook penetration at the end of 2011, for example. Third, Burke says that Twitter is "not much use on the, ground, where it counts," while at the same time admitting that it can bring in donations, so it has a financing aspect; can attract so-called foreign fighters, so it has a recruitment function; and can also aid in communication, logistics, and propaganda. A single free online platform that can be employed for fund-raising, recruitment, information dissemination, and intra-group communications seems likely to be quite an important tool in arriving at, ultimately, the "firefight."

This privileging of "real world" activity is shared by a diversity of commentators. Assertions that "most jihadists need to actually meet recruiters offline to be convinced to make the trip overseas" or "Physical contact, in addition to online communication and propaganda, is essential" are quite commonplace. An implicit privileging of the "real world" may also explain the contention contained in the U.K. House of Commons's Home Affairs Committee's counterterrorism report that:

The process of radicalisation will continue: the ideology which has come to be associated with al-Qa'ida will be more resilient than al-Qa'ida itself. Extremist material on the Internet will continue to motivate some people to engage in terrorism but will rarely be a substitute for the social process of radicalisation " [italics mine].

Thence, in 2014, there were-likely still are-those in the U.K. government who think that the Internet is not social. They are either unaware of or have misunderstood the "social" aspects of "social media." Today's Internet does not simply allow for the dissemination and consumption of "extremist material" in a one-way broadcast from producer to consumer, but also high levels of online social interaction around this material. It is precisely the functionalities of the social Web that causes many scholars, policymakers, and others to believe that the Internet is playing a significant role in contemporary radicalization processes.

This is not to say that there are not more convincing arguments for the role of the Internet in contemporary violent radicalization having been oversold; these arguments take two main forms. One position holds that most, although not all, contemporary violent online extremists are dilettantes, in the sense that they restrict themselves to using the Internet to support and encourage violent extremism, but pose no "real world" threat. Put another way, there is the possibility that extremists' virtual "venting" or "purging" satisfies their desire to act. Their online activity, on this analysis, rather than becoming an avenue for violent radicalization and potentially ultimately "real world" action including, in the most extreme instances, terrorism, instead becomes for many a mechanism to dissipate the desire for violent action. An associated argument is that many of those using the Internet to profess a dedication to or desire for violent action are engaged in a type of grandstanding common to the Internet, without ever having had any real commitment and/or intention to engage in violence at all. Even the United Kingdom's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has acceded that true intent can be very difficult to discern from online communications and activity. The "online dis-inhibition effect," in its "toxic" form, means that discussion of violent action and even direct threats of violence are so prevalent online that were all social media companies to share all postings of a violent extremist nature with authorities, the latter would be deluged with information and potentially rendered unable to function; the ultimately benign-or at least not directly resulting in "real world" violence-nature of most such vitriolic trolling is seen to make this unnecessary, however.

A second skeptical approach is to argue that claiming violent extremist online content violently radicalizes individuals is senseless given that other consumers of the same content are not similarly affected. In fact, large and growing numbers of researchers, journalists, and others are regularly exposed to substantial amounts of violent extremist content over long periods of time, but are not radicalized, never mind caused to engage in terrorism. On the contrary, the latter experience may even increase these consumers' abhorrence of violent extremism and terrorism, which may be supposed to be the opposite effect than intended by its producers. There's no reason to expect that this is not the experience of large segments of the general public also. This is not the same thing, on the other hand, as saying consumption of violent extremist content has negligible effects on all those who consume it. MI5 asserts that Inspire magazine was "read by those involved in at last seven out of the ten attacks planned within the UK since its first issue [in 2010]." The direction of causation remains unknown however: did reading Inspire cause the attack planners to plan the attacks? Did they begin attack planning and were then exposed to the magazine? Or did Inspire have different roles for different (groups of) attackers? Overall, the issue of the ratio of downloads/views to attacks causes some to argue that while violent extremist content can buttress an already sympathetic individual's resolve to engage in violence, it is not generally the originating cause of such a commitment. This may make intuitive sense, but is it borne out by the evidence?

It is estimated that Internet penetration in North America is c. 88 percent, in Europe is c. 70.5 percent, and in the Middle East is c. 48 percent. Most scholars are inclined to agree, in this context, that along with all the other changes that it has wrought, the Internet is also affecting the conduct of contemporary violent extremism and terrorism. "Terrorism cases in the UK without a 'digital footprint' are increasingly rare," for example. The former chief constable of West Yorkshire and U.K. Association of Chief of Police Officers (ACPO) head of Prevent, Norman Bettison, observed in 2012 that "the Internet features in most, but not all, terrorism cases." This is a far cry, however, from Marc Sageman's assertion that "face-to-face radicalisation has been replaced by online radicalisation." The vast majority of researchers grappling with the role of the Internet in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism-whether sceptics for a significant role, convinced of same, or located somewhere in between-now agree that the question is no longer if the Internet has a role to play in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism, but the more pertinent issue is determining its level of significance in contemporary violent radicalization processes. How do we know that most jihadis still need to meet recruiters offline to be convinced to travel overseas? This is no more likely, in the absence of sound data and analysis, than young women being "Brainwashed in their Bedrooms" via Twitter. Both could be true, in fact; perhaps gender is a determining factor. We just do not know enough at this stage as this whole research area is bereft of established empirical findings.

Where Do We Go From Here? Six Suggestions for Progressing Research

It is suggested that at least two foundational questions regarding the role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism are yet to be adequately addressed, never mind answered. These are:

1. Is it possible for persons to be radicalized online? In particular, can online interactions and/or consumption of violent and/or nonviolent online content cause some individuals to become violently radicalized?

2. If violent online radicalization can be shown to occur, what are the contours of these processes? In particular, does the significance of the Internet in violent radicalization processes differ according to users' ideology, location, proximity to a given conflict, gender, types of online activity, preferred online platforms, and/or other factors?

There is little difficulty in finding appropriate cases or anecdotes to illustrate the array of arguments both for and against a decisive role for the Internet in contemporary radicalization processes. The reality however is that insufficient substantive empirically grounded social science research has been undertaken to date in order to allow us to convincingly answer these questions. The work that has been done is largely focused on analyzing digital content and not its producers or consumers (i.e., the audience), distribution mechanisms, or its functioning and effects.

Even if one accepts, in the absence of sound research-and many people do including, importantly, policymakers-but on the basis of common sense, anecdote, and the like that violent online radicalization is actually occurring, how can effective counter strategies be developed, if we do not know how it's occurring? This has not stopped a chorus of national leaders, government ministers, and intelligence chiefs from calling on social media companies to do more to rid their platforms of violent extremist and terrorist content. This raises a host of potential difficulties, not least what exactly constitutes "terrorist content" and others around freedom of speech. Instead of wholesale removals of "terrorist content," it could be possible if better analysis was available to do quite targeted deletion of content shown to be directly implicated in violent radicalization and terrorism. Content control and/or deletion measures are often advocated in conjunction with online CVE (countering violent extremism), in which more resources are promised to be invested by governments. But how can we develop and deploy effective online CVE projects absent knowing who precisely these should be targeted at, what types of content are attractive to them, and what platforms are trafficked by these users? These are the kinds of answers that nobody appears to have at the present time.

How can we begin to remedy this? Below are six suggestions-there are surely a great many others; this is certainly not an exhaustive accounting, merely a first attempt-for progressing research and knowledge on the role of the Internet, especially social media, in violent extremism and terrorism.

Widen

Academics, media, policymakers, and others have a tendency to lose perspective when it comes to violent jihadi online activity, particularly that of IS. The amount of violent political extremist online content is increasing all the time and is not limited to purveyors of any one political ideology. Research on the role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism therefore needs to be widened beyond the present narrow focus on violent jihadi online content and interactions. In order to determine whether violent online radicalization is occurring, academic research needs to extend to inquire into the whole range of contemporary violent extremists and terrorists and their online activities. This includes so-called old terrorist organizations that still maintain online presences, all variants of the violent extreme right, and a range of others. This widening is necessary, if for no other reason, than to allow for comparative research (of which more below); to ask how what the jihadis do is different from, but also how it may share similarities with, what other violent extremists are doing online and to come up with explanations for these, especially as pertaining to the alleged effectiveness of violent jihadis' online radicalization strategies.

The extreme right is particularly worth consideration as, along with a history of violence, it has a very long online history, dating to the earliest days of the public Internet in the mid-1980s. The Stormfront online forum, which has proudly described itself as "the first White Nationalist site on the Web," has well over 11 million posts. As early as 1996, Stormfront's Don Black asserted that "Organizations have recruited through Stormfront, and through their Web pages that we've linked to" while a report by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) alleges that in the period 2010-2014, almost 100 murders could be attributed to registered Stormfront users. Stormfront recorded an average of some 5,800 threads per month between August 2012 and February 2015, which amounts to some 70,000 new threads per year. By way of comparison, the top-tier jihadi forum al-Shumukh al-Islam, showed some 150 new threads per day in Spring 2012 for an average of circa 55,000 new threads per year.

Stormfront's longevity, size, and notoriety means that it has attracted a certain amount of scholarly attention. In fact, researchers' attention to the extreme right's online presences, while not vast, dwarves the analysis conducted on the "new" media activity of "old" terrorist groups. According to the European Union's police agency, Europol, nationalist-separatist activity remains commonplace. "Old" terrorist groups are still therefore very much in existence and maintain presences on "new" media, which have received very little attention from researchers in recent years. "The IRA [Irish Republican Army] is unquestionably the most heavily studied terrorist organisation of the past forty years" and yet there are only a handful of analyses addressing (dissident) Irish Republican online activity, despite these being considered a real and ongoing threat and having a plethora of websites, forums, and social media accounts associated with them. This dearth of attention extends to other "old" groups with very lengthy and active online presences including, for example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and even Hamas and Hizbollah, both of which have proved themselves profoundly media-savvy and have highly resourced and extensive online presences.

Compare

Widening our present narrow focus on violent online jihadism to encompass a variety of other contemporary violent online extremisms will allow us to engage in much-needed cross-ideological analysis. This is the minimum necessary level of comparative research however; comparison within and across a number of other categories is also vital. These categories are: (1) groups, (2) countries, (3) languages, and (4) platforms.

Violent jihadism is an ideology to which a large number of widely dispersed groups subscribe. Today, most journalists, policy analysts, and researchers are focused on the online activity of just one group that subscribes to this ideology: IS; a host of other violent jihadi groups are active online, however, and thus also warrant attention. Research on the role of the Internet in the Syria and Iraq conflicts largely omits analysis of the online activity of violent Shi'a groups, which are definitely not absent from the Internet, for example. Africa-based jihadi groups, including al-Shabab and Boko Haram, are also under-researched. Boko Haram's online presence was, until quite recently, fairly low-level and amateurish, but this appears to be changing. What influence will the latter's pledge of Bay'ah to IS have on the former's online activity and what, if any, will be the "real world" impact of these?

Some types of violent extremism and terrorism are strongly linked with specific regions, countries, or locales-varieties of nationalist-separatism or ethnic-separatism (e.g., Irish Republicanism, Ulster Loyalism)-whereas others are more diffuse in character (e.g., violent jihadism, neo-Nazism) having both national and transnational components and links. Consider the European Union: different Member States face different levels of threat from these different types of violent extremists and terrorists, with some states facing significant difficulties from just one or a small number of types of extremism and others routinely dealing with violence perpetrated in the name of a wide variety of different extremisms. Germany, for example, has experienced violence on the part of violent jihadists, the extreme right, and the extreme left; Ireland, on the other hand, has a long history of terrorism associated with the Northern Ireland conflict, but has suffered no terrorism on the part of violent jihadists, the extreme right, or the extreme left. Interesting questions arise regarding the role of the Internet in more local extremisms versus those of a more transnational or even global character: Is the Internet more effective in one setting than the other? Do social media have different functions for extremists with a specific geographic affiliation versus those subscribing to more diffuse ideologies? How do the specific dynamics of local conflicts play out online? The significance of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism in specific locales has received scant scholarly attention to date, much less comparison across these.

Should an emphasis on geography be avoided when researching the Internet? The Internet is oftentimes portrayed as inherently global in character; rather than geography playing a determining role therefore, might language be a more important factor? In some cases, language and geography map onto each other, but in many instances they do not. Clearly many people beyond those in Arab countries are consumers of Arabic language jihadi online content; not enough research into this content and activity surrounding it has yet been produced and this needs to change. Studying violent online political extremism within the European Union context without considering Arabic language content would be redundant therefore as would studying IS's online activity only in the context of its Arabic language content and not the host of content produced in or translated into other languages. The French language "jihadisphere," for example, is composed of contributors from France, Belgium, and other francophone countries, particularly those in North Africa. The issue of translation is also relevant; questions that have not yet even been raised in this domain include: What types of extremist online content is produced by extremist and terrorist groups in multiple languages simultaneously and why? What type of extremist content is routinely translated by fans, into what languages, and why? This translation work might prove to be of particular import if an analysis of interactions within and between extreme right communities on Twitter that found that linguistic and geographical proximity were highly influential factors were to play out similarly in the jihadi "Twittersphere" and more widely.

Finally, in terms of top-level comparison, a lot more comparative research needs to get underway within and across online platforms, particularly social media platforms. Violent extremists and terrorists are active on not just one online platform but, like the rest of us, increasingly operate across multiple platforms. The Pew Research Centre has found that multi-platform use was on the rise in 2014, with 52 percent of online American adults now using two or more social media sites, an increase of 10 percent from 2013. Violent extremist and terrorist groups and individual extremists and fans may be expected, likewise, to maintain multiple official online presences, including dedicated websites, blogs, forums, and assorted social media accounts. Researchers need to be cognizant of this and to inquire into specific violent extremist groups/ideologies and how they operate across different social media platforms, websites, and forums, on the one hand, and also consider how a diversity of violent extremist groups/ideologies operate on specific platforms. Different social media platforms have different functionalities; how are these different functions exploited by violent extremists? What are the affordances of Twitter that make it so attractive to jihadis, for example, and how does their Twitter activity differ from, but also integrate with, their YouTube activity? What, on the other hand, does the broad violent extremist landscape on Facebook look like? What does the violent extremist landscape of YouTube look like? And so on. It's worth noting here too that it's not just high profile social media platforms that are integral to violent extremist online networks, but a host of other file, text, and video upload sites are also crucial nodes as are a diversity of other platforms such as, for example, lower profile social media, Telegram, and the Internet Archive. Analyses of the latter are worthwhile not just in themselves, but also because "[t]he dominance of Twitter as the 'model organism' for social media big data analyses ... skews analyses of mechanisms," particularly with respect to violent online jihadism.

Deepen

In addition to casting a wider ideological net and engaging in more comparative research, drilling downward is also necessary. A great deal of the research that has been done in this area to-date is focused on (mainly jihadi) online content, whether drawn from websites, forums, or social media. Von Behr et al. are therefore correct to underline that:

Von Behr and colleagues liaised with British police for the purposes of their study and this may be a route open to other U.K. researchers and those in other jurisdictions also. For those unable or unwilling to adopt this approach, collection of primary data will require some old-fashioned social science research, including interviewing, probably especially online interviewing given that some of the currently ongoing conflicts that have significant terrorism and online components are not conducive to on-the-ground research.

Interviewing could allow us to gain a deeper and more contextualized understanding of who is behind varieties of violent extremist online content, what they believe their purposes are, and why they are so invested in this particular pursuit. We need to ask users producing and disseminating this content: What are the content's production processes (i.e., how is it produced)? Why it is they are producing and disseminating the content? Who are they targeting? Who do they believe they are influencing and to what end? And the consumers: How and where do they locate violent extremist content online? Why are they consuming it or what causes them to do so? What, precisely, is its attractiveness? How do they feel it has affected them? A particularly salient question would be whether a majority or minority of those encountered by interviewers are so-called prosumers, that is at the same time both producers and consumers of violent extremist online content. Given that the Internet is no longer a "new media," there are also increasing numbers of former extremists able to speak to the role (or not) of the Internet in their (de-)radicalization.

At the group as opposed to the individual level, virtual, online, or digital ethnography is an under-utilized approach for digging deeper. "The objective of ethnography is to describe the lives of people other than ourselves, with an accuracy and sensitivity honed by detailed observation and prolonged first-hand experience." Rather than individual lives, however, ethnographers are concerned with the systematic exploration of particular cultures, including particularly sub-cultures and countercultures. "Virtual ethnography" or "netnography" simply refers to the conduct of ethnographic research in online spaces. Employing the latter in research into violent online extremist spaces is doubly attractive because not only would it allow researchers to develop embedded understandings of the "real" and "online" day-to-day lives of particular countercultural groups, but in fact is being undertaken by many of us albeit largely unknowingly already: "It took me a long time to even notice these things ... but it didn't really register-it was background noise to me, stuff I needed to shove aside to get to the hard information about people and events." Hegghammer is referring here to the way in which cultural products (i.e., music, poetry, etc.) and practices (i.e., clothing, beard styles, gestures) are largely overlooked by those studying extremism and terrorism because they are not immediately and obviously instrumental. Hegghammer's interest is in jihadi culture generally and so he laments that "It was not possible to do participant observation with groups this radical. Fortunately, though, the internet has made available a large amount of high-granularity primary sources that allow for a form of 'ethnography by proxy.'"

For those of us whose primary interest is in violent extremist online cultures, however, the Internet is the "field" and online participant observation is a staple of our daily lives; we just need to make this work for us to a greater extent than presently. Why? Because the successfulness of IS's (online) strategy is probably at least partially predicated on a steady stream of attack footage, including beheading videos, but what if an additional important ingredient of its online "successfulness" is precisely the selfies, cat pictures, and food "porn" so prevalent across IS "fighters'" social media accounts? What virtual ethnographic approaches allow us to tap into is the soft power of the latter and thereby a potential explanation for why some violent extremists' online strategies are more effective than others. Certainly, for youthful online jihadi "fanboys" and "fangirls" Al Qaeda's online content was (and is) probably apprehended as remote, undirected, and boring, while IS's is familiar, interactive, and "cool," displaying as it does many of the signs of everyday youth online culture albeit with a violent jihadi twist. This is not to say, of course, that virtual ethnographic approaches are inclined to take online pronouncements and portrayals at face value; much of what happens online is, following Irving Goffman, "frontstage": "normative, conventional, and expected behavior meant for public viewing." A key advantage of deep and prolonged participant observation however, including in the online "field," is that it provides access to the "backstage" of groups' social lives: "Backstage behavior is meant to be hidden from the public eye, it occurs behind the scenes, and only intimates can participate in or witness it." A clash of "frontstage" and "backstage" becomes fairly quickly apparent to observers of female involvement and portrayals in the violent jihadi online milieu, for example, of which more below.

Upscale

At the same time that the above-suggested deepening is taking place, some large-scale data-I hesitate to use the term "big data"-collection and analysis also needs to be ongoing. There is a huge amount of "born digital" data now publicly available online; this data along with available tools for its analysis and visualization ought to be harnessed by violent online extremism researchers. Much of this data has a high level of ephemerality associated with it however and thus needs to be subject to continuous collection, formatting, and archiving, so that it may be readied for immediate quantitative and qualitative research and retained for future comparative analyses. Such analyses would provide, at a minimum, a big picture view of the contemporary violent online extremist scene and its various corners and allow us to identify areas in which to excavate further. What explains the lack of studies employing large datasets culled from violent extremist online spaces? I suggest it's because most researchers in this area are social scientists and thus do not have the necessary skills to easily collect, store, and analyze truly large quantities of online data. There are at least four ways to seek to hurdle this obstacle however: (1) work with computer scientists, (2) learn how to undertake basic online data collection and analysis ourselves, (3) build data archives and develop bespoke tools, (4) use commercial data brokers. Collaborating with colleagues from other disciplines, including computer science, is addressed in the next section, so let me briefly address points 2-4 here.

It's not impossible for social scientists to learn how to use basic online data collection and analysis tools, especially freely available open source software accompanied by clear "How To" documentation and online tutorials; Gephi data visualization software is one such accessible tool. This option is made more attractive when researchers have the opportunity to learn how to use these tools in dedicated "real world" tutorials and workshops, preferably tailored for social scientists. Another option is to build, maintain, and make accessible archives of violent extremist online content for use by researchers. An example of this is the University of Arizona's Dark Web Forum Portal, which collected and makes available to researchers the content of 28 jihadi forums that together comprise nearly 13,000,000 messages. This is an excellent resource, which has not been widely drawn on; one reason for this may be social scientists inability, as already mentioned, to handle not just collection, but also analysis of such "big data" (another reason may be the shift of focus from forums to social media in recent years). The relatively low level of Dark Web take-up could be altered, it is suggested, by making available easy-to-use analysis tools alongside data on a single platform, which is a planned outcome of the EU-funded VOX-Pol project. The final option is to employ the services of commercial social media data brokers, such as Gnip or DataSift, which allow researchers to buy data from a multiplicity of social media platforms from a single supplier. Some downsides of this are the cost and the inability to freely share the data for replication and other purposes post-publication.

The difficulties of upscaling are not just of a practical sort, however. One of the most obvious difficulties is the issue of representativeness. Analyses drawing on large or even huge amounts of violent extremist content from the Internet and using it to explain violent online extremism have the propensity to be treated as "true" precisely because of the "hugeness" of the data and thereby its alleged representativeness. Selecting data on the basis of meeting a criteria and then using that data as evidence for the criteria (i.e., selecting on the dependent variable) is problematic, however. In the case of violent online extremism research, this is exacerbated by a recent further narrowing of focus to Twitter because of its particular affordances (e.g., ease of data collection due to its publicness) and thus introducing further sample selection bias. Layered atop all of this must be the further realization that "[s]ocial media data almost solely captures 'node-to-node' interactions, while 'field' effects-events that affect a society or a group in a wholesale fashion either through shared experience or through broadcast media-may often account for observed phenomena." Put another way, there needs to be greater awareness among violent online extremism researchers that IS's Twitter activity, for example, while unlikely to be having no impact in terms of, say, attracting "foreign fighters," may be less impactful than IS's (and other violent jihadis) overall Internet-based campaign(s) that may, in turn, be much less impactful than other factors, such as IS's declaration of the caliphate, as an attraction factor. One of the only ways of determining this, to revert to an earlier point, would be to interview (former) "foreign fighters" and ask them about what influenced their decision making because "[s]ometimes, the only way to study people is to study people."

Outreach

The original interest of most of those currently researching the intersection of violent extremism and terrorism and the Internet is violent extremism and/or terrorism rather than the Internet. This is easily remediable by, for example, exposing ourselves to new literatures beyond terrorism studies and/or direct outreach to colleagues in other disciplines. A literature that researchers in our field could usefully familiarize themselves with is Internet Studies while disciplines that we could perhaps most usefully collaborate with colleagues from include computational linguistics, computer science, information systems, and statistics.

It is pertinent to ask about media and communication studies in general and Internet Studies, in particular what Richard Jackson asked about conflict analysis and peace research and its relationship to terrorism studies. "How is it," Jackson inquired:

Reformulating Jackson's question then: "How is it that knowledge of the intersections of media and conflict (including conflicts where terrorism was present), which has accumulated from decades of media and communication research, among others, remains largely 'unknown' within the terrorism studies field? Why is it that within terrorism studies research there has been a surge of research on questions related to terrorism and the Internet, especially social media, without reference to the key scholars and existing studies of media and communication research generally and Internet studies particularly?" A ready answer to this question, which basically queries our lack of knowledge of other social scientists research, is much more difficult to supply than, say, a convincing answer to the question of why collaboration between social scientists and computer scientists or statisticians is not more prevalent.

Christina Archetti has contributed a book detailing the merits of a communication studies approach to Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media; I want to emphasize here the necessity of drawing from Internet studies to enrich research on violent online extremism and terrorism. There is a large and increasing body of work done by Internet researchers that is germane to this particular sphere. Internet researchers have, for example, generated a significant amount of work on credibility and trust online, none of which deals directly with violent extremism or terrorism, but is nonetheless straightforwardly relevant in that it engages deeply with questions like how credibility is built online, how credibility is lost online, and so on. Hegghammer's analysis of jihadi online forums is clearly enriched by his drawing from this literature; few other terrorism researchers have followed his lead, however. Take another area of Internet research in which there are strongly consistent findings: the way in which discussion forums and other online spaces are generally dominated by a few "super contributors." Berger and Morgan made a similar finding in their recent work on IS-related Twitter activity (i.e., of the network of 40,000+ user accounts analyzed, c. 1,500-3,000 were prolific tweeters), but omitted discussion of the way in which this is at least partially explainable by previous research on non-extremist online environments and thus is not unique to IS, albeit the latter have also been known to "game the system." Having said this, The ISIS Twitter Census is an excellent example of a beneficial collaborative relationship between an extremism researcher and a technologist/data scientist, which does the important job of answering some of the what questions regarding IS's Twitter presence.

Truly interdisciplinary research is easier said than done; collaborating with colleagues from other disciplines, including computational linguistics and computer science, among others, is distinctly different than drawing from other social science fields like Communication Studies or Internet Studies. Research into the role of the Internet in violent extremism and terrorism is an area that would benefit hugely from the latter, however. It was suggested above that social scientists educate ourselves in the use of basic online data collection and analysis tools; for more sophisticated analyses, we need to work with those who not only have knowledge of the available tools and their deployment, but can tailor these further. This is not a one-way relationship with computer scientists benefiting their social science colleagues in the absence of benefit to themselves; the best outcomes are obtained by computer scientists collaborating with domain experts, in this case those with knowledge of the ideologies prevalent within and day-to-day workings of online extremism. Increased collaboration between social scientists, especially terrorism studies scholars, and computer scientists is the most pressing, but there are a host of other colleagues we could doubtless also benefit from collaborating with (e.g., law, criminology, psychology).

Gender

The preceding five sub-sections dealt largely with broad brush methodological or "how to" issues, this sub-section is somewhat different. In it I want to emphasize both how some of my earlier points apply, but also how the study of gender is particularly pertinent in violent online extremism.

Al-Khansa, the first online jihadi magazine targeted specifically at women, appeared in 2004. Stormfront's "Ladies Only" sub-forum was established in 2007 and has 1,156 threads and 48,789 posts at time of writing. Astoundingly, given their relative visibility and after more than a decade of research, the online activity of jihadi and extreme right females is the subject of less than a handful of studies. Women featured fairly prominently on the websites of the FARC, New People's Army, and Tamil Tigers in the 1990s and early 2000s; the role of ethnic-nationalist or nationalist-separatists women online has been the subject of no research at all however. The role and influence of women in violent extremist cyberspaces is therefore largely unknown. A number have clearly played powerful roles online that may not have been afforded them in more conventional settings including, for example, Malika El-Aroud's central role in the establishment of the French-language "jihadisphere." When addressed, it is generally female extremists' power as online motivators of their male counterparts that is highlighted albeit the role of so-called jihadi brides resident in Syria in persuading other young women to follow in their footsteps has received considerable recent global media attention. In terms of widening therefore, an additional step omitted earlier is to include women as a category of violent online extremists.

Study of the gender dimensions of violent extremist and terrorist online activity does not, indeed should not, be restricted to female users, however. Not all, probably not even most, portrayals of women and their roles in violent extremism and terrorism are by women, but are instead depictions of women's roles as assigned by men. Interesting comparison would be between the depiction of jihadi women and their roles in official online publications, such as al-Khansa, Inspire, and Dabiq, versus the desired roles expressed by women in their social media activity and in other online spaces or the portrayal of women in violent jihadi cyberspaces versus in extreme right cyberspaces. How has the portrayal of women changed over time? If we ascertain an increased role for and influence of women in extremist cyberspaces in the last decade, can we link this to changes in the volume and types of depictions of women over the same period or are there other factors at play?

A number of images of violent jihadi women "training" with guns and posing with weapons around a luxury car have become well-known via social media and their reproduction in the Western press. It is suggested that these images go to distinctions between "frontstage" and "backstage" portrayals of the role of women in violent jihadism alluded to earlier, because they are carefully constructed "frontstage" portrayals of "romance" and adventure almost wholly outside of "normal" female jihadi activity in Syria. The vast majority of violent jihadi videos and other online content are striking, in fact, for their almost complete absence of female bodies. An Arabic language text that was circulated widely in Arab jihadi online networks, but not available in English until translated by a U.K. researcher, is probably more indicative of the " jihadi bride" experience than the "girls with guns" images. The Arabic document entitled "Women in the Islamic State" is unequivocal regarding female roles: "the greatness of her position, the purpose of her existence is the Divine duty of motherhood." It goes on to extol the virtues of being a dutiful wife-a role that may appropriately be fulfilled from the age of nine-and the necessity of women remaining within the walls of their homes at almost all times. The document is an interesting item of content in itself, but is also a noteworthy instance both of how online audiences may continue to be separated quite effectively by language and, relatedly, an awareness on the part of IS of the desire of some young women to play a more central role than that of simply muhājirāt or "migrants" and thus IS's attempts at constructing a more attractive online narrative for these. The competing online constructions are drawn together in a tweet by one young woman: "I wonder if I can pull a Mulan and enter the battle field."

"Pulling a Mulan" refers to the Disney film in which a young woman impersonates a man to join the military. While the likelihood of successfully carrying off such an impersonation in "real life" is improbable, gender-switching is commonplace online. From its earliest days the Internet was viewed by some as the ideal realm in which to "play" with their gender. Online gender-switching has been extensively studied in online gaming. What is the likelihood of high levels of gender-switching in, say, jihadi online spaces? Early research on radicalization via YouTube found that that the higher one's status within the online group studied, on several different measures, the less likely one was to provide information about one's gender. Of the top ten users who frequently ranked in the top three of various social network measures in the study, five were of unknown gender and five identified themselves as female. It was thus surmised that at least some of the five users of unknown gender were probably in fact female. This is not without precedent; in the past jihadi online forums were often segregated on the basis of gender. Anecdotal evidence collected by the author suggests that female researchers accessing extremist forums of various sorts are wont to adopt male personae, including screen names and avatar images, in those settings, but that male researchers retain male identities in the same circumstances. This is a potentially interesting phenomenon facilitated by the Internet that could mean that female users are more influential in extremist cyberspaces than previously thought. (Switching in the other direction is a possibility too, of course, and also has the potential for interesting findings.)

Conclusion

In closing, and by way of full disclosure, I am somebody who believes the Internet is playing significant and diverse roles in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism. Rapoport argues that structural factors are very important in terms of influencing the various waves of terrorism identified by him. Historically, new communication technologies (e.g., mass circulation newspapers, radio, audio cassettes, TV) have been shown to be particularly influential and have a history of transforming terrorism; the Internet is unlikely to be any different. Given the resources, in terms of both time and money, they are inputting to online campaigns, a diversity of contemporary violent extremists certainly thinks it's having an impact too. Some of the anecdotal evidence is also compelling. Taking just IS: online outreach to young women has resulted in an influx of " jihadi brides" to Syria, similar online calls for families to migrate to the "caliphate" have seen an uptick in family groups departing various countries, and a spate of previously uncommon types of terrorist attacks (e.g., running down people with cars, knifings) appear to correlate with online calls for these types of attacks to be undertaken. None of this is sufficient of course; what needs to be supplied is theoretically sound, empirically verifiable, social science research detailing-I hesitate to use the word "proving" in a social science context, especially this social science context-the role of the Internet in contemporary radicalization processes.

The earliest piece of analysis on violent extremism and the Internet appeared in 1985, but the vast bulk only began to be produced in the 2000s, with a significant uptick since c.2010 and a particular spike in the past twelve months. Research in this area is thus not long underway and so, of course, there are many what and why questions still to be asked and answered. The nature of the Internet means that it changes very fast; it is thus quite difficult to effectively research the Internet and its workings over time. Direct audience research is also problematic because of the nature of violent extremist and terrorist online content, which presents problems for undertaking the kinds of experiments that are standard in other areas of Internet audience research as it would require introducing subjects to online content with allegedly radicalizing effects and, in fact, almost certainly necessitate exposing youth and young adults to distressing levels of violence. Progressing research in this area is thus not easy; it is not impossible either however. There are, of course, a whole host of issues that it was not possible to address in this article (e.g., Internet research ethics, the role of Internet companies as political intermediaries), but what it seeks to do is to make six major practical suggestions for progressing research on the role of the Internet in contemporary violent extremism and terrorism with, perhaps, the side-effect of also kick-starting discussion of colleagues' additional or preferred steps in this regard.

Funding

This work was supported by the European Union's Framework Programme 7 [Grant number 312827: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence].

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9. As borne out in, for example, and , Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

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13. Arab Social Media Report, "Dynamic Dashboard: Facebook Penetration, 31 December 2011." Available at http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/Facebook/LineChart.aspx?&PriMenuID=18&CatID=24&mnu=Cat (accessed 27 March 2015).

16. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Counter-Terrorism: Seventeenth Report of Session 2013-14 (London: The Stationery Office, 2014), pp. 6 - 7.

17. Awan et al., Radicalisation and Media, pp. 58-59 and 64-65; , "Relocating the Virtual War," Defence Against Terrorism Review 2(1) (2009), p. 35.

18. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby (UK: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2014), p. 131.

19. , "The Online Disinhibition Effect," International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies 2(2) (2005). See also , The Dark Net (London: Windmill Books, 2015), pp. 41-42.

21. As quoted in Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, p. 60; see also Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad (King's College London: ICSR, 2011), p. 56.

22. Jonathan Githens-Mazer , "Radicalisation Via YouTube?"; Ghaffar Hussain and Erin Marie Saltman, Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter It (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014); Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2004), 163; Tim Stevens and Peter Neumann, Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action (King's College London: ICSR, 2009), ch. 2.

23. "Internet World Stats." Available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed 27 March 2015).

25. As quoted in ibid., p. 5.

26. , "The Next Generation of Terror," Foreign Policy (March/April 2008), p. 41. Sageman argued in previous work that the Internet was an important facilitator, but unlikely to transcend the necessity for face-to-face connections for development of deep interpersonal ties: Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 157 and 163.

28. Violent online radicalization is conceived herein as "a process whereby individuals, through their online interactions and exposure to various types of Internet content, come to view violence as a legitimate method of solving social and political conflicts" per Adam Bermingham et al., "Combining Social Network Analysis and Sentiment Analysis to Explore the Potential for Online Radicalisation," in ASONAM 2009: Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (IEEE Computer Society: Digital Library, 2009), p. 1.

29. See, for example, , "Sanction Tech Firms Over Hate Speech' says Hollande," BBC News, 28 January 2015; and , "Facebook and Twitter have 'Social Responsibility' to Help Fight Terrorism, says David Cameron," The Guardian, 16 January 2015.

30. See, for example, the Joint Statement of EU Ministers of the Interior and/or Justice condemning the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Paris, 11 January 2015. Available at https://eu2015.lv/images/news/2015_01_11_Joint_statement_of_ministers_for_interrior.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015).

31. See, for example, Robert Hannigan (the director of the UK's Government Communications Headquarters, GCHQ), "The Web is a Terrorist's Command-and-Control Network of Choice," Financial Times, 3 November 2014; remarks by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director John O. Brennan at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 13 March 2015. Available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2015-speeches-testimony/director-brennan-speaks-at-the-council-on-foreign-relations.html (accessed 27 March 2015).

32. The Australian government announced the Combating Terrorist Propaganda in Australia initiative at the February 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, which commits AUS$17.9 million "to combat the lies and propaganda terrorist groups are promulgating online." Media release available at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2015/FirstQuarter/20-February-2015-Combating-terrorist-propaganda-online.aspx (accessed 27 March 2015).

33. Anti-Defamation League (ADL), Computerized Networks of Hate: An ADL Fact Finding Report (New York: ADL, 1985). Available at https://archive.org/details/ComputerizedNetworksOfHate (accessed 27 March 2015).

36. , "White Homicide Worldwide," SPLC Intelligence Report, Summer 2014. Available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/white-homicide-worldwide.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015), pp. 2-6.

37. Unpublished research by the author recorded 680,000 threads on Stormfront in August 2012; at time of writing, in February 2015, Stormfront was showing 861,972 threads. The figure for average new threads monthly reported here were arrived at by calculating the number of threads initiated between August 2012 and February 2015 (i.e., 181,972) and dividing this by the number of months elapsed (i.e., 31).

38. , The State of Global Jihad Online, p. 8; see also Thomas Hegghammer, "Interpersonal Trust on Jihadi Internet Forums," in , ed., Fight, Flight, Mimic: Identity Signalling in Armed Conflicts (forthcoming). Available at http://hegghammer.com/_files/Interpersonal_trust.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015), p. 5.

39. See, for example, Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, "Exploring Stormfront: A Virtual Community of the Radical Right," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32(11) (2009); Willem De Kostera and Dick Houtman, "Stormfront is like a Second Home to Me: On Virtual Community Formation by Right-Wing Extremists," Information, Communication, and Society 11(8) (2008); Priscilla M. Meddaugh and Jack Kay, "Hate Speech or 'Reasonable Racism'? The Other in Stormfront," Journal of Mass Media Ethics 24(4) (2009).

40. See, for example, Josh Adams Vincent J. Roscigno, "White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture and the World Wide Web," Social Forces 84(2) (2005), pp. 759-778; , "The Internet Rhetoric of the Ku Klux Klan: A Case Study in Web Site Community Building Run Amok," Communication Studies 55(2) (2004); Val Burris, Emery Smith, and Ann Strahm, "White Supremacist Networks on the Internet," Sociological Focus 33(2) (2000); Manuela Caiani and Linda Parenti, European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet (London: Ashgate, 2013); Manuela Caiani and Claudius Wagemann, "Online Networks of the Italian and German Extreme Right," Information, Communication & Society 12(1) (2009); Bart Cammaerts, "Radical Pluralism and Free Speech in Online Public Spaces: The Case of North Belgian Extreme Right Discourses," International Journal of Cultural Studies 12(6) (2009); Michael Chau and Jennifer Xu, "Mining Communities and Their Relationships in Blogs: A Study of Online Hate Groups," International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65(1) (2007); Peter Chroust, "Neo‐Nazis and Taliban On-line: Anti-modern Political Movements and Modern Media," Democratization 7(1) (2000), pp. 102-118; Phyllis Gerstenfeld, Diana Grant, and Chau-Pu Chiang, "Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites," Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 3(1) (2003); Luca Tateo, "The Italian Extreme Right On-line Network: An Exploratory Study Using an Integrated Social Network Analysis and Content Analysis Approach," Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 10(2) (2005); Georgie Weatherby and Brian Scoggins, "A Content Analysis of Persuasion Techniques Used on White Supremacist Websites," Journal of Hate Studies 4(9) (2005/6).

41. Europol, TE-Sat 2015: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015 (The Hague: Europol, 2015); Europol, TE-Sat 2014: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014 (The Hague: Europol, 2014).

42. , "The Impact of 9/11 on Research on Terrorism," in , ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 84.

43. Lorraine Bowman-Grieve , "Irish Republicanism and the Internet: Support for New Wave Dissidents," Perspectives on Terrorism 4(2) (2010), pp. 22-34; Lorraine Bowman-Grieve and , "Exploring the Form and Function of Dissident Irish Republican Online Discourses," Media, War & Conflict 5(1) (2012), pp. 71-85; , "The Electronic Starry Plough: The E-nationalism of the Irish Republican Socialist Movement (IRSM)," 2001); Ross Frenett and M. L. R. Smith, "IRA 2.0: Continuing the Long War-Analyzing the Factors Behind Anti-GFA Violence," First Monday 6(12) ( Terrorism and Political Violence 24(3) (2012), pp. 375-395; John Nalton, Gilbert Ramsey and Max Taylor, "Radicalization and Internet Propaganda by Dissident Republican Groups in Northern Ireland Since 2008," in P. M. Currie and Max Taylor, eds., Dissident Irish Republicanism (New York: Continuum, 2011), pp. 119-14; Paul Reilly, Framing the Troubles Online: Northern Irish Groups and Website Strategy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011).

44. The FARC's lengthy online presence does not appear to have a single article or chapter dedicated to it, while the PKK's online presence appears to be the subject of just two chapters: Erdoğan Çelebi, "Analysis of PKK/KONGRA-GEL Websites to Identify Points of Vulnerability," in NATO Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism, eds., Responses to Cyberterrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008); Erdoğan Çelebi, "Female Separatism: The Role of Women in the PKK/Kongra-Gel Terrorist Organization," in Hans-Liudger Dienel, Y. Sharan, Christian Rapp, and Niv Ahituv, eds., Terrorism and the Internet: Threats, Target Groups, Deradicalisation Strategies (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010). I analyze the FARC and PKK websites, along with others, in Maura Conway, "Terrorist Web Sites: Their Contents, Functioning, and Effectiveness," in Philip Seib, ed., Media and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

45. In-depth studies of Hamas's online activity-as opposed to mention of their websites in analytical overviews of a diversity of violent extremist groups' virtual activity-are also astoundingly few: Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weimann, "The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33(3) (2010). See also Conway, "Terrorist Websites."

46. Again, given Hizbollah's acknowledged media-savvy, analyses of their Internet acumen are scant: Maura Conway, "Terrorism and the Making of the 'New Middle East': New Media Strategies of Hizbollah and al Qaeda," in , ed., New Media in the New Middle East (London: Palgrave, 2007); Maura Conway, "Cybercortical Warfare: Hizbollah's Internet Strategy," in Sarah Oates, Diana Owen, and Rachel Gibson, eds., The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists (London: Routledge, 2005); Rune Friberg Lyme, Hizb'allah's Communication Strategy: Making Friends and Intimidating Enemies (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009). See also Conway, "Terrorist Web Sites."

47. The only scholarly analysis that I am aware of that treats this issue in any depth is Philip Smyth's "The Shiite Jihad in Syria and It's Regional Effects," Policy Focus No. 138. Available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138_Smyth-2.pdf (accessed 26 April 2015). It's worth noting here too that Syrian government forces, Free Syrian Army units, the PKK and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and other parties to the Syria conflict also maintain online presences and engage via the Internet, another issue that has not received sufficient scholarly attention to date.

48. Stewart Bertram and Keith Ellison, "Sub-Saharan African Terrorist Groups' Use of the Internet," Journal of Terrorism Research 5(1) (2014); Fredrick Romanus Ishengoma, "Online Social Networks and Terrorism 2.0 in Developing Countries," International Journal of Computer Science & Network Solutions 1(4) (2013); Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher, and James Sheehan, Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab's Western Media Strategy (King's College London: ICSR, 2012); Lindsay Pearlman, "Tweeting to Win: Al-Shabaab's Strategic Use of Microblogging," Yale Review of International Studies Nov. 2012. Available at http://yris.yira.org/essays/837 (accessed 27 March 2015); Rachel Sullivan, "Live-Tweeting Terror: A Rhetorical Analysis of @HSMPress_ Twitter Updates During the 2013 Nairobi Hostage Crisis," Critical Studies on Terrorism 7(3) (2014).

49. "Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?" BBC Monitoring, 4 March 2015 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31522469 (accessed 27 March 2015).

50. Aurélie Campana and Benjamin Ducol, "Voices of the 'Caucasus Emirate': Mapping and Analyzing North Caucasus Insurgency Websites," Terrorism and Political Violence 27(4) (2015), pp. 679-700.

51. An exception is Charlie Winter, Documenting the Virtual Caliphate (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015).

54. , "Social Media Update 2014," Pew Research Centre: Internet Science and Tech Report, 9 January 2015. Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014/ (accessed 27 March 2015).

55. Justpaste.it is a particularly important node in the contemporary violent jihadi online scene; Pastebin and Paste.ee are also used as repositories. In terms of video-hosting, Dailymotion, MediaFire, Vid.me, Vimeo, and a host of other more obscure sites (e.g., Hugefiles.net, Uploadhero.com, Uptobox.com) are also employed.

56. These include Ask.fm, Diaspora, Flickr, Instagram, SoundCloud, Tumblr, VKontakte, and others.

57. , "Big Questions for Social Media Big Data: Representativeness, Validity and Other Methodological Pitfalls." Available at http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1403/1403.7400.pdf (accessed 30 November 2015), p. 2.

58. von Behr et al., Radicalisation in the Digital Era, p. 8.

63. , "Why Terrorists Weep: The Socio-Cultural Practices of Jihadi Militants" (Paul Wilkinson Memorial Lecture, University of St. Andrews, April 16, 2015), p. 2. Available at http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_-_Wilkinson_Memorial_Lecture.pdf (accessed 21 April 2015).

65. , "Participant Observation: A Thick Explanation of Conflict in a Sri Lankan Village," in and , eds., Using Methods in the Field: A Practical Introduction and Casebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 43.

67. See, for example, the University of Amsterdam's Digital Methods Initiative at https://www.digitalmethods.net (accessed 21 April 2015), particularly their Summer and Winter Schools.

68. See http://ai.arizona.edu/research/terror (accessed 21 April 2015).

69. For more information, see http://www.voxpol.eu (accessed 21 April 2015).

70. See https://gnip.com and http://datasift.com (accessed 21 April 2015). Datasift supplied access to the Twitter "firehose" up until mid-April 2015, when this was retracted by Twitter from all partners excepting Gnip, which Twitter now owns.

71. Tufekci, "Big Questions for Social Media Big Data," p. 1.

72. Ibid., p. 6.

74. Archetti, Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media.

75. See, for example, Gordon Bowen and Richard Bowen, "Brand Trust in Offline and Online Environments: Lessons for Social Media," in and , eds., Computer-Mediated Marketing Strategies: Social Media and Online Brand Communities (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2015); Jo Bryce and James Fraser, "The Role of Disclosure of Personal Information in the Evaluation of Risk and Trust in Young Peoples' Online Interactions," Computers in Human Behavior 30 (2014); Charles E. Naquin, and Gaylen D. Paulson, "Online Bargaining and Interpersonal Trust," Journal of Applied Psychology 88(1) (2003); Helen Nissenbaum, "Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron," Boston University Law Review 81(3) (2001); Ye Diana Wang and Henry H. Emurian, "An Overview of Online Trust: Concepts, Elements, and Implications," Computers in Human Behavior 21(1) (2005).

76. Hegghammer, "Interpersonal Trust on Jihadi Internet Forums."

77. , "Uncovering the French-speaking Jihadisphere," pp. 58-59; and , "Acceptance and Utility of a Systematically Designed Virtual Community for Cancer Patients," in Peter Van Den Besselaar , , , and , eds., Communities and Technologies 2005: Proceedings of the Second Communities and Technologies Conference (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 140-141; , Media, Technology and Everyday Life in Europe: From Information to Communication (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 66-70.

78. The ISIS Twitter Census, p. 29.

80. , "In Defense of Honor: Women and Terrorist Recruitment on the Internet," Journal of Postcolonial Cultures and Societies 4(1) (2013); Carolyn Boyle, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett, Becoming Mulan: Female Western Migrants to ISIS (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015); Tammy Castle and Meagan Chevalier, "The Women of Stormfront: An Examination of White Nationalist Discussion Threads on the Internet," 2011). Available at Internet Journal of Criminology ( http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Castle_Chevalier_The_Women_of_Stormfront_An_Examination_of_White_Nationalist_Discussion_Threads.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015); Anita Perešin, "Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS," Perspectives on Terrorism 9(3) (2015); Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part": Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015); Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-al-Qaeda Generation (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), ch. 5.

81. Ducol, "Uncovering the French-Speaking Jihadisphere," pp. 54-55.

83. Charlie Winter's translation of "Women in the Islamic State" is available at https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/women-of-the-islamic-state3.pdf (accessed 30 November 2015). See also Charlie Winter, "Women of The Islamic State: Beyond the Rumor Mill," Jihadology.net 31 March 2015. Available at http://jihadology.net/2015/03/31/guest-post-women-of-the-islamic-state-beyond-the-rumor-mill/ (accessed 26 April 2015).

85. See, for example, Amy S. Bruckman, "Gender Swapping on the Internet," in , ed., High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Susan C. Herring, "Gender and Power in Online Communication," Center for Social Informatics (CSI) Working Paper No. WP-01-05 (2001). Available at https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2022/1024/WP01-05B.html (accessed 26 April 2015); Zaheer Hussain and Mark D. Griffiths, "Gender Swapping and Socializing in Cyberspace: An Exploratory Study," CyberPsychology and Behavior 11(1) (2008); Rosa Mikeal Martey et al., "The Strategic Female: Gender-switching and Player Behavior in Online Games," Information, Communication & Society 17(3) (2014); Lynne D. Roberts and Malcolm R. Parks, "The Social Geography of Gender-Switching in Virtual Environments on the Internet," Information, Communication & Society 2(4) (1999).

86. , "Combining Social Network Analysis and Sentiment Analysis to Explore the Potential for Online Radicalisation," pp. 234-235.

87. Martey et al., "The Strategic Female."

88. ADL, Computerized Networks of Hate.

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Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research

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ABSTRACT Some scholars and others are skeptical of a significant role for the Internet in processes of violent radicalization. There is increasing concern on the part of other scholars, and increasingly also policymakers and publics, that easy availability of violent extremist content online may have violent radicalizing effects.

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ISIS-Linked Digital Activism and Sympathy-Raising on Behalf of ISIS Women Held in SDF Camps

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Anne Speckhard and Mona Thakker As published in Homeland Security Today: As the ISIS foreign women languish in the overcrowded Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF] administered camps of Al Roj and Al Hol housing without adequate and regular access to health care, food and potable water, their endurance to

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(New York, N.Y.) - The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) reports weekly on the methods used by extremists to exploit the Internet and social media platforms to recruit followers and incite violence. Last week, CEP researchers located five pro- ISIS accounts on Meta-owned Facebook that posted a variety of violent propaganda, including modified videos, and 10 accounts on Meta-owned Instagram that posted white supremacist, neo-Nazi, and antisemitic images and videos.

In addition, a white supremacist imageboard containing downloadable manifestos, including of the Christchurch attacker, Holocaust denial literature, and neo-Nazi accelerationist propaganda books that encourage acts of terrorism was found.

Further, the pro-ISIS tech group Qimam Electronic Foundation (QEF) published a guide for detecting and removing malware on Mac computers on a bulletin board-style website. Lastly, CEP located an online store operated by a neo-Nazi group on the print-on-demand platform Spring and a neo-Nazi online bookstore was found using PayPal services to accept payments.

Pro-ISIS Propaganda Located on Facebook

CEP researchers located five pro- ISIS accounts on Meta-owned Facebook in a sample of content located on March 2. The accounts posted clips from ISIS propaganda videos, including those modified to evade detection, pro-ISIS videos, ISIS Amaq propaganda photos with text blurred to avoid detection, and text-based propaganda. Four accounts had their number of friends or followers listed, ranging between 167 and 4,217 and an average of 1,274.

One account posted a clip on October 24, 2022, that contained footage of ISIS snipers shooting unknown security forces members. The video "Arrows of the Monotheists #2" was originally released in August 2017. The clip uploaded to Facebook in October contained an emoji on the top right of the screen to cover an ISIS logo. The clip had 47 likes/reactions, 10 shares, and over 750 views when it was located on March 2. Facebook identified the video as "violent or graphic content" and required an additional click to watch the video.

The five accounts were reported to Facebook on March 2. One account was removed by March 6.

Original footage from the ISIS video "Arrows of the Monotheists #2" (the victim's face has been blurred by the researcher).

Modified ISIS video of "Arrows of the Monotheists #2" on Facebook, located on March 2. (The victim's face has been blurred by the researcher). The video was still online on March 6.

White Supremacist, Neo-Nazi, and Antisemitic Content Located on Instagram

In a sample of content located on March 1, CEP researchers found 10 accounts on Meta-owned Instagram that posted white supremacist, neo-Nazi, and antisemitic images and videos. Content included videos from a rally held in Springfield, Ohio, on February 25, 2023, posted by a regional chapter of a white supremacist group, a montage of Atomwaffen Division (AWD) propaganda photos, various neo-Nazi symbols, antisemitic posts, and posts glorifying the leader of the neo-Nazi group The Order.

CEP also located uploaded images supporting Patriot Front and the French active club chapter. One account, with over 1,300 followers, was for a clothing brand that offered t-shirts and slogans associated with the white supremacist movement. A Telegram page for the clothing brand has shared propaganda and photos from the Canadian branch of the active club movement.

The 10 accounts had between 12 and 1,346 followers, averaging 438. CEP reported all 10 accounts to Instagram on March 1. Six accounts were still online on March 6. Instagram removed four accounts, including those that posted active club, AWD, and Patriot Front propaganda.

Video of a white supremacist demonstration posted on Instagram on February 27, 2023. Screenshot taken on March 1. (The flags have been edited by the researcher)

Multiple Manifestos of White Supremacist Terrorists and Neo-Nazi Texts and Propaganda Located on Imageboard

CEP researchers located a section of a white supremacist imageboard containing over 200 white supremacist and neo-Nazi texts available for viewing and download. The website included the manifestos of the Christchurch terrorist and the 2011 Norway attacker, James Mason's book Siege, William Luther Pierce's The Turner Diaries, content from the Atomwaffen Division, and the Iron March Forum. Notorious accelerationist propaganda books that encourage acts of terrorism were also found, including one guide that contained bomb-making information and helpful information for committing individual attacks. Two publications from Blood & Honour were also found, as well as a large quantity of Holocaust denial literature.

The imageboard uses Cloudflare as its name server and Tucows as its registrar. The website also has a mirror onion site, accessible with Tor. The website accepts donations in the cryptocurrencies Bitcoin, LiteCoin, Monero, Ethereum, and Solana. The last publicly available transaction for Ethereum occurred in November 2022 for approximately $40.

Pro-ISIS Tech Group Publishes Guide For Detecting Malware on a Mac

On February 27, the pro-ISIS tech group Qimam Electronic Foundation (QEF) published a guide for detecting and removing malware on Mac computers on a bulletin board-style website. The post included examples of the most common malware on Mac devices and offered advice on determining if a computer is infected. The guide also included a short list of anti-virus programs. QEF has previously shared information on encrypted communications, online security, and cryptocurrency.

Qimam Electronic Foundation logo

Spring Removes Clothing Store for Neo-Nazi Group

On February 28, CEP researchers located a web store on the print-on-demand platform Spring (formerly Teespring) selling clothing with the logo of a Scottish neo-Nazi group previously identified by CEP as the beneficiary of a crowdfunding campaign on GiveSendGo. The group stated that merchandise sales would benefit propaganda campaigns and legal and court costs. Spring quickly removed the web store after CEP reported it.

Spring also responded quickly to remove neo-Nazi clothing shops from its platform in April 2022 and again in June 2022. According to Spring's Acceptable Use Policy, the platform does not "allow campaigns that promote or glorify hatred toward people based on their age, race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability and religion, including people, organizations or symbols dedicated to hatred against these groups."

Neo-Nazi Bookstore Accepts PayPal

On March 1, CEP contacted PayPal regarding a neo-Nazi bookstore that uses the service to accept payments. The web store sells various white supremacist and neo-Nazi books, including The Turner Diaries and Holocaust denial literature and an improvised explosives manual. The store also sells hats and flags featuring swastikas and black sun/sonnenrad symbols that benefit a known neo-Nazi propagandist.

PayPal's Acceptable Use Policy prohibits the sale of items that promote "hate, violence, racial or other forms of intolerance that is discriminatory." The web store still appeared to accept PayPal on March 6.

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Extremist Content Online: Accounts Spreading Pro-ISIS And White Supremacist Propaganda Located On Meta-Owned Platforms

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The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) reports weekly on the methods used by extremists to exploit the Internet and social media platforms to recruit followers and incite violence. Last week, CEP researchers located five pro-ISIS accounts on Meta-owned Facebook that posted a variety of violent propaganda, including modified videos, and 10 accounts on Meta-owned Instagram that posted white supremacist, neo-Nazi, and antisemitic images and videos.

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While the Benefits Go Up, So do the Scams

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While the Benefits Go Up, So do the Scams

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It is important to understand that there are people who are out to obtain people's money through nefarious means. The elderly are a huge target when it comes to financial resources due to their lack of understanding with technology and their lack of impairment as they get older.

Backman, M. (2023, April 25). Social Security benefits increased a lot in 2023. so have scams. Retrieved April 30, 2023, from https://www.fool.com/retirement/2023/04/25/social-security-benefits-increased-a-lot-in-2023-s/

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For pretty much all of 2022, seniors on Social Security were forced to grapple with rampant inflation, and so were consumers across the board, for that matter.

The only positive thing to come out of that was a very generous cost-of-living adjustment, or COLA, in 2023. Social Security recipients saw their benefits rise 8.7% at the start of the year. That's the largest COLA to come down the pike in decades.

But while those higher Social Security paychecks are no doubt giving millions of seniors more financial breathing room, the unfortunate reality is that higher benefits have tempted criminals to make more of an effort to go after that money. And it's important that current Social Security recipients know how to spot a scam so they don't end up losing their benefits.

Scammers are out in full force

Recently, the Social Security Administration's Office of the Inspector General said that 2023's record COLA has led to an uptick in scams. And that's something seniors need to be aware of.

A Social Security scam can take on different forms. It might be that someone calls you out of the blue, telling you there's a problem with your benefits and you need to verify your banking details to make sure those payments aren't held up.

A Social Security scam might also involve a criminal emailing you and offering a chance to boost your benefits if you send a wire transfer to a specified account. Or, you might be contacted by a criminal who threatens to throw you in jail for Social Security fraud if you don't verify your Social Security number and bank account details right away.

All of these scams could make it possible for a criminal to access your personal financial data. Once they have that, they might attempt to steal not just your Social Security benefits, but other funds you have. So it's important to be able to identify the red flags that indicate a scammer has reached out.

As a general rule, the Social Security Administration will not call, text, or email you out of the blue. The agency also will not ask you to send money, whether by wire transfer, gift card, or another source, to "unlock" your benefits or set you up for a higher monthly check.

If you receive a text or email with a link to click on for more information about your Social Security benefits or account, that, too, is apt to be a scam. So you'll want to ignore any sort of suspicious message along those lines.

Also, if a scammer does try to contact you, it's a good idea to report it using this link. That way, the Social Security Administration can investigate the matter and, ideally, stop a criminal from causing additional harm.

Remember, you might know how to spot a Social Security scam and avoid getting hurt. But other seniors may not be as savvy. If you report criminal activity as you come across it, you might spare someone in a similar boat a world of upheaval.

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Social Security Benefits Increased a Lot in 2023. So Have Scams | The Motley Fool

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For pretty much all of 2022, seniors on Social Security were forced to grapple with rampant inflation, and so were consumers across the board, for that matter. The only positive thing to come out of that was a very generous cost-of-living adjustment, or COLA, in 2023.

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The Best US Cities to retire on Social Security Alone

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The Best US Cities to retire on Social Security Alone

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Finding a place to retire is important for individuals looking to settle down. Not every city is fit for retirement due to its population and living conditions.

Barrera, D. (2023, April 28). The best US cities to retire on Social Security alone. Retrieved April 30, 2023, from https://en.as.com/latest_news/the-best-us-cities-to-retire-on-social-security-alone-n/

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When it comes to retiring on Social Security alone, finding a city with a lower cost of living is crucial. Taking into account the monthly income of a retiree in the US, here are four of the best cities in the country to live solely on the Social Security check, according to figures from the financial blog Insider Monkey.

The affordability of a city can vary based on individual circumstances and lifestyle choices. It's always a good idea to do your own research and consider your own budget when deciding when and where to retire.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Pittsburgh is the place to be for retirees. According to Insider Monkey, rents in this city are 61.4% cheaper than in New York, while the overall cost of living is 19.1% cheaper. In addition, the average cost of assisted living care for seniors is $3,250, which is below the national average of $4,100.

Another plus for retirees is that the state does not tax Social Security income or retirement account payments.

Cleveland, Ohio

Cleveland has costs of living 6% lower than the national average. Median rent ranges between $959 and $2,075, which means that housing is 17% more affordable than the national average. Plus, groceries and clothing are also 4% cheaper overall.

Lincoln, Nebraska

The cost of living in Lincoln is 8%lower than the national average. However, retirees should note that the state does not provide any deductions or exemptions on income from retirement, except military retirement income.

Madison, Wisconsin

According to Insider Monkey, this city is home to more than 38 retirement communities, making it a favorite for seniors as it has many attractions and recreational activities for the elderly. Overall, Madison offers a good quality of life and medical care; however, housing costs have been increasing in recent months.

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The best US cities to retire on Social Security alone

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When it comes to retiring on Social Security alone, finding a city with a lower cost of living is crucial. Taking into account the monthly income of a retiree in the US, here are four of the best cities in the country to live solely on the Social Security check, according to figures from the financial blog Insider Monkey .

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Here's Exactly How to Boost Your Monthly Social Security Payout 

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Here's Exactly How to Boost Your Monthly Social Security Payout 

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This article outlines how someone can maximize their social security benefits. These benefits are a privilege and getting the most out of this privilege is a must because adults need to be able to save as much money as possible for their families.

Maranjian, S. (2023, April 30). Here's exactly how to boost your monthly social security payout. Retrieved April 30, 2023, from https://www.fool.com/retirement/2023/04/30/heres-how-to-boost-your-social-security-benefits/

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Here’s Exactly How to Boost Your Monthly Social Security Payout | The Motley Fool

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Don’t settle for average benefits -- because they’re quite modest. Take some steps to increase your future income.

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A way we can protect children is by teaching them online safety

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A way we can protect children is by teaching them online safety

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Outlines things parents can do to prepare their child for the dangers of the social media. Some simple start out with screen time, letting them know what is appropriate to post on social media, also the value in schools teaching their teenage students about social media.
Z., M. (2023, January 18). Teaching social media responsibility to teenagers - safes. Screentime Monitoring | Safes Parental Control App. Retrieved April 25, 2023, from https://www.safes.so/blogs/teaching-social-media-responsibility/

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Screentime Monitoring | Safes Parental Control App

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Where I went to school, cellphones were banned since it was believed that no good came out of them. According to Pew Research Center , in 2022, approximately 20% of teenagers are constantly on YouTube. And that's just one of the many popular social media platforms that exist nowadays. Platforms like YouTube, have a lot of benefits for teenagers. For example, they can watch educational videos for free. A big problem is that banning phones, tablets, and computers that let teenagers gain access to social media doesn't work. You need to start teaching social media responsibility to teenagers as soon as possible.

Is There a Proper Use of Social Media for Youth?

The reason teenagers have to learn to be responsible for their social media use is that you can't be there to check their social media constantly. You can't be there to tell them how much time they should spend on social media, what sort of people they should interact with, etc.

Younger people tend to have more trouble trying to understand long-term risks and rewards. This isn't specific to social media. This culture of instant gratification leads to many teenagers not being able to see the bad in social media. That's the bad news.

The good news is that social media can be used responsibly. Teenagers just need to get used to it. If used responsibly, social media can be a valuable learning tool. Think of it as eating chocolate; there's a huge gap between the first sweet bite and diabetes. But it's easy to start chewing and forget the need to stop before it's too late.

How to Use Social Media Responsibly

The first thing you have to do is to talk to your teenage child and explain what constitutes responsible use of social media. For example, posting an inappropriate photo or video is certainly not a responsible act. But the funny thing about responsibilities is that the person responsible has to first know about them. You have to make sure that your teenager understands what the rules of the house are; both in the real world and the digital one.

One great way of doing this is by weighing rights and responsibilities. For example, you can make a list of the social media rights your child has, ranging from access to social media to posting photos, to screen time limits. Normally, these are rights that are taken for granted and that's all right. Your child doesn't need to earn these rights. Instead, they start with these rights. Bad behavior limits their rights, or in extreme cases takes those rights away from them, and good behavior increases their rights. So, you both have a negative and positive feedback loop at your disposal.

Now make a list of social media responsibilities. These responsibilities will dictate the rules your child has to play by to earn a reward. The rules and responsibilities can also be written in one table, as the example below shows, but it doesn't mean there's a one-to-one correlation between each rule and reward. The point is for your teenager to know what the rules of the game are because it doesn't make sense to be punished or rewarded when they don't have a clue what they're risking.

Access to information and entertainment

Being sensitive when making comments

Keeping safe (not giving out personal information about themselves or others)

Not bullying or abusing

Gamifying this process can help get your teenager on the same page as you. But you still have to make the reasons behind this process clear. Explain the pros and cons of using social media. And then explain how using it responsibly can counter the cons. Maybe talk about the dangers of posting children's pictures on social media or the negative effects of social media on physical health . These can help your teenager understand why learning social media responsibility is a must.

Should Schools Be Responsible for Teaching Safe Social Media Education?

In general, teaching social media Etiquette should be part of a teenager's education in the digital age. Like all education, it can happen both at school and at home. The advantage that schools have over parents is that they can teach a whole group of teenagers at once. Teenagers are much more likely to welcome the idea of responsible use when they see their peers doing it as well.

Rules for Using Social Media Responsibly

Rules might differ in every household, depending on your values, and your child. But in general, there are a few rules you should keep in mind when teaching social media responsibility to your child.

Limiting Screen Time

Screen time is a right that children have, but you can limit the amount of screen time you allow your child. Determining the amount of screen time can be based on how responsible your teenager is. For example, not having a limit is a good idea if they do their homework, but if they're prone to be distracted it might be a good idea to determine a screen time limit.

Not Sharing Private Information

Social issues among teenagers in the age of the internet sometimes make sharing information with their peers easier than with their families. But teenagers might not always be aware of the dangers of sharing personal information with others on the internet.

This personal information might be shared directly, like giving out their full name to strangers, or indirectly like posting a picture of where they live on Instagram. The things your kid should not post on Instagram or other social media platforms should be made clear to them. It's not a bad idea to also have a chat about how much privacy should a teenager have on the internet .

Not Bullying

It's not impossible for your child to bully others. This can sometimes happen accidentally. Teenagers are growing up in a digital environment and are getting used to being anonymous. They might hurt others' feelings unintentionally. Or worse, they might comment mean things because they don't fully understand how much it will influence their peer. Try to see what their answer is to how social media affects teenagers' self-esteem .

Install a Parental Control App

Parental control apps can make enforcing rules much easier than normal. Usually, you'll have to keep checking on your child to see if they're using social media. By using , you can:

Limit your child's screen time

Set a schedule for each app

Instantly block your child's apps

The best thing is that you enforce all these rules without the need to be in the vicinity of your child. So even when they go to school or to a friend's house "to do homework," you can control your child's social media usage. Since Safes's schedules and screen time limits can be changed whenever you want, you can use the app as a tool for the positive and negative feedback loops mentioned above.

To learn more about Safes's features and , feel free to the app or contact us with your questions in the comments below.

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Teaching Social Media Responsibility to Teenagers - Safes

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Where I went to school, cellphones were banned since it was believed that no good came out of them. According to Pew Research Center , in 2022, approximately 20% of teenagers are constantly on YouTube. And that's just one of the many popular social media platforms that exist nowadays.

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FBI Evaluates the threat of Networking Cites to Children

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FBI Evaluates the threat of Networking Cites to Children

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Nelson, P. (2021, June 2). Deep Dive: FBI estimates 500,000 online predators are a daily threat to kids going online. KOAA News 5. Retrieved April 24, 2023, from https://www.koaa.com/news/deep-dive/fbi-estimates-500-000-online-predators-are-a-daily-threat-to-kids-going-online

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Federal investigators want parents to ask themselves an important question, do you know what your kids are up to online right now? News 5 takes a deep dive into the terrifying world of online predators and the trouble that could be waiting if our families aren't careful.

Online gaming, social media, and online dating, these are all mainstream online platforms, but federal investigators say they're also providing cover for online predators targeting our kids.

One of the online schemes being carried out by online predators that's concerning FBI agents the most is called sextortion. The predator convinces the child to send them an explicit image of themselves and then uses that image as blackmail to get the victim to continue to produce more inappropriate photos and videos.

"Individuals who are conducting this kind of activity have multiple online profiles. They can pretend to be a 16-year-old boy or girl, they can pretend to be anyone, especially in the online gaming environments where they're offering cheat codes, they're offering access to coupons or to get further advanced in a game," said FBI Special Agent Herrick "So it's really important to have your guard up to know that if someone was contacting you saying that there's something, there's a good chance they might not be."

The FBI has been tracking statistics about online predators and targets of their actions. Federal investigators believe there are more than 500,000 online predators active each day and they all have multiple online profiles. More than 50% of victims are ages 12 to 15 and 89% of victims are contacted by online predators through chat rooms and instant messaging.

At 14 years old, Evan McDaniel was doing well in school and his parents saw no signs of any trouble until it was too late.

At the start of 2021, Evan visited a website where he made contact with who he thought was a teenage girl, but turned out to be a criminal enterprise that the investigators later determined to be based in the Philippines.

Whoever was on the other end of the line with Evan appears to have recorded a compromising video of him. They threatened to expose Evan if he didn't pay and when he didn't pay and stopped responding, they sent a screen grab to his sister and cousin and moved the conversation to Instagram.

The pressure got so great that Evan took his own life.

"The force behind the threats kept escalating," said Evan's father David McDaniel.

"We never told him, if you do mess up and something happens come to us," said Evan's mother Jennifer McDaniel.

In addition to warning them about these online dangers, remind your kids there is no problem too big that you can't work it out together.

Ashley Reynolds was also targeted by the sextortion scheme when she was 14, but says talking to her parents saved her.

"Just knowing that someone else knows, that someone else is aware, that I am not the only one who knows what I have been doing. It is just bricks off of your back," said Reynolds.

Advice from FBI agents on preparing your family for online threats:
- Learn about websites software, games, and apps your child uses.

- Talk about what is appropriate to say or share online.

- Stress that images and comments never truly disappear online.

- Utilize privacy settings

- Remind them they can report any suspicious activity to 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324).

To help protect your family and to guide you in these serious conversations about online dangers...
Here are some additional resources:
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/protecting-your-kids
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/sextortion

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Deep Dive: FBI estimates 500,000 online predators are a daily threat to kids going online

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Federal investigators want parents to ask themselves an important question, do you know what your kids are up to online right now? News 5 takes a deep dive into the terrifying world of online predators and the trouble that could be waiting if our families aren't careful.

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A study on cyberstalking: Understanding investigative hurdles

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A study on cyberstalking: Understanding investigative hurdles

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D'Ovidio, R., & Doyle, J. (2003). A study on cyberstalking: Understanding investigative hurdles. FBI L. Enforcement Bull., 72, 10.

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The Internet provides the opportunity for stalkers to harass their targets under the assumption of anonymity. Cyberstalking is defined as "the repeated use of the Internet, e-mail, or related digital electronic communication devices to annoy, alarm, or threaten a specific individual or group of individuals." This crime has become so widespread that all 50 States and the Federal Government have enacted legislation designed to protect victims of cyberstalking. In the current study, the authors examined all 201 closed cases of aggravated harassment between January 1996 and August 2000 that were investigated by the New York Police Department's Computer Investigation and Technology Unit (CITU). The offenders in these cases were mainly males (80 percent), 74 percent were White, 13 percent were Asian, 8 percent were Hispanic, and 5 percent were Black. The average age of the cyberstalkers was 24, although 26 percent of these offenders were juveniles. The victims of the cyberstalkers were mainly females (52 percent), but many of the targets were institutions such as educational institutions, private corporations, and public-sector agencies. Eighty-five percent of the victims were White, 6 percent were Asian, 5 percent were Black, and 4 percent were Hispanic. The average age of the victims was 32. In terms of technology used, most cases (92 percent) used only one method of technology. E-mail was used in 79 percent of the cases and instant messenger was used in 13 percent of the cases. The authors also discuss the challenges faced by law enforcement when dealing with cases of cyberstalking. The most glaring challenges are described as jurisdictional issues and issues of privacy when trying to obtain account records and user information from Internet service providers. The continued widespread use of technology and the anonymous nature of cyberstalking will likely contribute to the continued increase in this type of crime. 8 Endnotes

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Study on Cyberstalking: Understanding Investigative Hurdles

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The Internet provides the opportunity for stalkers to harass their targets under the assumption of anonymity. Cyberstalking is defined as "the repeated use of the Internet, e-mail, or related digital electronic communication devices to annoy, alarm, or threaten a specific individual or group of individuals."

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How children are groomed on social media

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How children are groomed on social media

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Cano, A.E., Fernandez, M., Alani, H. (2014). Detecting Child Grooming Behaviour Patterns on Social Media. In: Aiello, L.M., McFarland, D. (eds) Social Informatics. SocInfo 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8851. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13734-6_30

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Abstract

Online paedophile activity in social media has become a major concern in society as Internet access is easily available to a broader younger population. One common form of online child exploitation is child grooming, where adults and minors exchange sexual text and media via social media platforms. Such behaviour involves a number of stages performed by a predator (adult) with the final goal of approaching a victim (minor) in person. This paper presents a study of such online grooming stages from a machine learning perspective. We propose to characterise such stages by a series of features covering sentiment polarity, content, and psycho-linguistic and discourse patterns. Our experiments with online chatroom conversations show good results in automatically classifying chatlines into various grooming stages. Such a deeper understanding and tracking of predatory behaviour is vital for building robust systems for detecting grooming conversations and potential predators on social media.

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Authors and Affiliations

Knowledge Media Institute, Open University, UK

Amparo Elizabeth Cano, Miriam Fernandez & Harith Alani

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

1. Yahoo! Research, Barcelona, Spain

Luca Maria Aiello

2. Stanford Graduate School of Education, 485 Lasuen Mall, 94305-3096, Stanford, CA, USA

Daniel McFarland

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Cano, A.E., Fernandez, M., Alani, H. (2014). Detecting Child Grooming Behaviour Patterns on Social Media. In: Aiello, L.M., McFarland, D. (eds) Social Informatics. SocInfo 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8851. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13734-6_30

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Detecting Child Grooming Behaviour Patterns on Social Media

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Online paedophile activity in social media has become a major concern in society as Internet access is easily available to a broader younger population. One common form of online child exploitation is child grooming, where adults and minors exchange sexual text and...

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How predators groom children on the internet

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How predators groom children on the internet

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Evidence handling in proactive cyberstalking investigations: the PAPA approach

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Evidence handling in proactive cyberstalking investigations: the PAPA approach

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Aggarwal, S., Henry, P., Kermes, L., & Mulholland, J. (2005, November). Evidence handling in proactive cyberstalking investigations: the PAPA approach. In First International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE'05) (pp. 165-176). IEEE.

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Stalking is the malicious, unsolicited intrusion on another's personal space, and cyberstalking extends this to cyberspace via Internet technology. All fifty U.S. states criminalized stalking in the...

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Evidence handling in proactive cyberstalking investigations: the PAPA approach | Semantic Scholar

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The PAPA system is a comprehensive toolkit that captures all relevant cyberstalking data with the potential for admissibility in a court of law, and as far as possible under existing federal, state, and international statutes. Stalking is the malicious, unsolicited intrusion on another's personal space, and cyber-stalking extends this to cyberspace via Internet technology.

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Cyberstalking: An Analysis of Online Harassment and Intimidation 

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Cyberstalking: An Analysis of Online Harassment and Intimidation 

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Visual of the drastic increase of child predators online

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Visual of the drastic increase of child predators online

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Ladchartabi, A. (2023, February 8). The stats that show the alarming reality of online predators - safes. Screentime Monitoring | Safes Parental Control App. Retrieved April 25, 2023, from https://www.safes.so/blogs/online-predator-statistics/