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It seems like Boeing has dominated media headlines lately, and the news doesn't look good. After a seemingly endless spate of accidents involving the company's once-beloved 737 aircraft, Boeing now faces lawsuits, economic woes, and consumer distrust. Two major crashes claimed the lives of 346 people within five months of each other. A door plug blew off an Alaska Airlines flight in January 2024. An engine cover flew off a Southwest Airlines flight in early April. These are just a few reasons to be wary of boarding what Simple Flying called "one of the most successful aircraft in history."

Are you wondering why so many Boeing 737 airplanes have experienced accidents and whether you should steer clear of flying in one? You're not alone! That's why we've spent countless hours digging deep into the research to determine what's causing these catastrophic events. Armed with the knowledge we gained from international news agencies, aviation experts, and the FAA, we've determined the main reasons behind the many incidents involving Boeing 737s. Buckle your seat belt and get ready for a turbulent ride through Boeing's rocky and often deceitful history and the truth behind its aircraft's most tragic accidents.

The most recent Boeing 737 accidents

Two of Boeing's most catastrophic plane crashes have occurred on the same type of aircraft, a 737 Max 8. In October 2018, an Indonesian Lion Air flight plummeted into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people on board. The second crash, operated by Ethiopian Airlines, happened six minutes after take off in March 2019, causing 157 fatalities. These weren't the first crashes involving a 737 plane. In 1991, a United Airlines flight crashed in Colorado, killing 25 people, and a USAir plane carrying 131 people crashed near Pittsburgh in 1994.

More recently, an engine cover blew off a 737-800 operated by Southwest Airlines in April 2024. According to the Wall Street Journal, this accident occurred upon takeoff, and no injuries were reported despite the cover hitting a wing flap upon its descent. Earlier in the year, a 737-800 operated by United Airlines landed at an Oregon airport without one of its external panels. No injuries were reported, and the airline claimed that "there was no indication of any damage to the plane during the flight," per The New York Times. Another incident occurred in February on a 737 Max 8 operated by United Airlines. The plane's rudder pedals became stuck upon landing. And in January, an Alaska Airlines flight lost its door plug mid-air.

Software failure

Both the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes resulted from a flight-control software called MCAS. A new addition to the original 737 models, pilots of the newer planes weren't familiar with this software, and many were never told it existed. The Associated Press said MCAS wasn't listed in the aircraft or training manuals. Boeing did not initially tell pilots or airlines of the existence of this software, which it designed to lower the plane's nose in emergencies where the nose tilted up.

Due to the 737 Max's design, its nose tended to tilt up at times, hence the addition of MCAS. According to CNN, Boeing kept this system "almost secret" because it believed it would only need to be used in "extreme flying circumstances." During both crashes, the system activated unintentionally because of a faulty sensor. The pilots were unable to correct the situation.

In an interview with NPR, reporter and author of "Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and The Fall of Boeing," Peter Robinson claimed there was poor communication during the development of the MCAS system. Upper management reportedly ignored engineers with valid questions. When one employee asked what would happen if a sensor malfunctioned, Robinson said, "He was told, 'If that happens, the system shuts down immediately.' And that was completely not true."

Cost-cutting measures compromise safety

A Bloomberg article claims the safety concerns with the Boeing 737 Max resulted from the company's "relentless cost-cutting." According to the news agency's interviews with former Boeing engineers, Boeing staff focused more on aspects like low costs than on important issues like passenger safety. Bloomberg reporter and author of "Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing" Peter Robinson has discussed Boeing's downward spiral from an engineering- and quality-driven company to one focused more on saving money and outsourcing work to increase profits.

To cut costs, Boeing reportedly moved sections of the company (like the pilot training simulators) to different states to avoid working with unions. It gained "$60 million in state and local tax credits over 20 years" by moving its headquarters from Seattle to Chicago, claimed former Medtronic CEO Bill George in an op-ed for Harvard Business School. This moved engineers further away from management, making communication difficult.

The MCAS system, too, was allegedly developed to save the company money. According to Robinson's interview with NPR, when Boeing realized the 737 Max could stall when its nose moved upwards, it implemented MCAS instead of redesigning it. Recreating the plane would have slowed the aircraft's production and increased expenses. Unfortunately, Boeing chose not to properly train pilots on MCAS because flight simulators are expensive (about $10 million each), Robinson stated.

Turning a blind eye to safety

The Associated Press reported that Michael Whitaker, FAA Administrator, implied that Boeing has put safety on the backburner in favor of turning out more aircraft. In a hearing about aviation safety, Whitaker told the House Transportation subcommittee," The current system is not working because it is not delivering safe aircraft." The New York Times reported that engineers flagged the Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 Max 9 plane the day before the door plug accident.

According to research conducted by the newspaper, the staff "were so concerned about the mounting evidence of a problem" that they wanted to pull the aircraft from flight rotation and have it serviced. About a week before the accident, the same plane was sent to maintenance for issues with a front passenger entry and an exit door. After returning to service, the aircraft's pressurization warning light illuminated twice, the last time just two days before the incident.

Shifts in leadership

According to multiple sources, including Bill George (former Medtronic CEO), who penned an op-ed for Harvard Business School, Boeing's main issues can be traced back to Philip Condit, the company's CEO, during its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas. In 2003, Condit was "forced to resign" due to ethical issues (he allegedly had affairs with employees and demonstrated questionable business practices), reported The New York Times. Harry C. Stonecipher replaced Condit, lasting just 15 months on the job before also being ousted for having an affair with an employee. He was succeeded by Jim McNerney, who remained in the role for 10 years before leaving in 2015.

With Boeing in the hot seat for its role in the fatal 2018 and 2019 crashes, the company fired Dennis Muilenburg, the CEO who took over for McNerney, claiming it did so to "restore confidence," reported PBS. David Calhoun took over the position in January 2020. He was at the helm when the door plug blew off that Alaska Airlines flight and when the engine cover flew off the Southwest Airlines flight in April. The company will have to find yet another CEO following Calhoun's 2024 departure.

A history of safety issues

Boeing endured repeated safety issues years before the 2018 and 2019 crashes. The Washington Post reported that the FAA caught a Boeing subcontractor manipulating cargo door certifications on the company's 777 aircraft. This had reportedly been going on for years before government regulators found out. The Washington Post said the FAA clamped down on the company's many perceived infractions in 2015, ordering it to address its "broader corporate culture and governance issues."

The FAA demanded that Boeing be more honest and forthcoming about its practices and fix issues to ensure that its planes meet federal safety requirements. Common complaints included tools abandoned in the aircraft wings and wire bundles that weren't installed properly, resulting in chafing, which could cause pilots to lose control of the plane as it entered a roll. Despite its 2015 agreement with the FAA, Boeing continued to miss deadlines for fixing safety problems.

It keeps redesigning the same model

CNN labeled Boeing's 737 aircraft "the most successful airliner ever made and one whose future is more uncertain than ever." The 737 experienced its first official wheels up in 1967 and was sold to 17 airlines. At the time, this efficient aircraft was deemed smaller and more cost-efficient than the company's predecessors. Boeing was "the undisputed dominator of the industry," reported New York Magazine." Fast forward almost 50 years, and that same plane is still found on runways (and falling from the skies) in various reiterations across the globe.

Instead of starting from scratch and investing in the research and engineering necessary to develop a new aircraft, Boeing executives repeatedly tweaked its original model. The 737-300 was released in 1984, a redesign that lengthened and widened the fuselage to carry more passengers and included a bigger engine. As CNN stated, "The success of this upgrade set aside initial plans to design an entirely new, more modern aircraft."

The company realized it could simply build upon the aircraft's original frame, soon launching the 737 Next Generation versions that were even longer and had greater fuel capacity. In 2011, Boeing released its fourth generation 737, the Max. The New York Times states this aircraft "was the company's best selling jet ever, with hundreds of billions of dollars in advance orders from airlines around the world." Then, it began to crash and fall apart, changing everything.

Allegedly untruthful employees

Before approving the Boeing 737 Max for commercial use, the FAA conducted extensive evaluations of the aircraft. During this time, two Boeing technical pilots allegedly deceived FAA investigators about MCAS changes, supposedly concealing system information. By keeping this information from the FAA, the U.S. Department of Justice claimed that Boeing conspired to "defraud the Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft Evaluation Group." Despite these claims, a federal jury later acquitted one of the technical pilots of felony charges of deceiving the Federal Aviation Administration.

During the company's deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice, David P. Burns, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Department's Criminal Division, said, "Boeing's employees chose the path of profit over candor by concealing material information from the FAA concerning the operation of its 737 Max airplane and engaging in an effort to cover up their deception." The company agreed to pay more than $2.5 billion in penalties for its perceived infractions.

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Why So Many Boeing 737 Airplanes Are Having Accidents - Islands

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The Boeing 737 and the company behind it have been associated with a growing number of safety concerns. What's really going on with this notorious aircraft?

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Islands.com covers everything you want to do and anywhere you want to travel with expert info, in-depth guides, local tips, and more.

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Boeing plane incidents timeline: Full list of 9 issues in 3 months

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Issues with Boeing crafts have received renewed scrutiny following a viral incident in January.

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The Long-Forgotten Flight That Sent Boeing Off Course

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A company once driven by engineers became driven by finance.

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Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More Than 25 Years Ago | Working Knowledge

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Once again, Boeing’s 737 MAX is back in the headlines. After two crashes that killed 346 people in 2018 and 2019 and five years of ensuing design changes and regulatory scrutiny, the 737 MAX is grounded again after a mid-air blowout of a fuselage panel on January 5. After loose bolts were discovered on other MAX 9s, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded the planes and opened an investigation into whether MAX is safe to fly, accompanied by a stern warning, saying, “This incident should have never happened, and it cannot happen again.” Boeing has also experienced repeated problems in design and production with its newest jumbo jet, the 787 Dreamliner. Such frequent, repeated crises point to a deeper issue than isolated engineering mishaps. The underlying cause of these issues is a leadership failure that has allowed cultural drift away from Boeing’s once-vaunted engineering quality. William Boeing created the commercial aviation industry. For the next century, Boeing was the leading producer, based on its excellence in aircraft design and safety. Boeing’s problems today date back to former CEO Philip Condit, who made two ill-fated decisions that dramatically changed Boeing’s culture. The first was acquiring archrival McDonnell Douglas in 1997, a leader in military aviation with its fighter jets and Boeing’s major competitor in commercial aviation. In contrast to Boeing’s culture of engineering excellence, McDonnell Douglas focused on cost-cutting and upgrading older airplane models at the expense of all-new aircraft. Secondly, in 2001 Condit moved Boeing’s headquarters from its original home in Seattle to Chicago—all to gain $60 million in state and local tax credits over 20 years. With none of its businesses based in Chicago, the move separated Boeing’s corporate executives from its engineering and product decisions and alienated its Seattle-based engineers. Leader turnover, ethical lapses, and buybacks After Condit resigned in 2003 following an ethics scandal, Boeing’s board convinced former McDonnell Douglas executive Harry Stonecipher to come out of retirement to replace Condit. Stonecipher, a General Electric (GE) alum, immediately set out to change Boeing’s culture, proclaiming, “When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so that it is run like a business rather than a great engineering firm.” One of Stonecipher’s fated decisions was to turn down the proposal from Boeing’s head of commercial aviation to design an all-new single-aisle aircraft to replace the Boeing 727 (FAA-certified in 1964), 737 (1968 certification) and 757 (1972). Instead of designing a new airplane incorporating all the advances in aviation technology from the past 30-40 years, Stonecipher elected to maximize profits from older models and use the cash to buy back Boeing stock. Just two years after taking over, Stonecipher resigned after violating the company’s code of conduct. Rather than promoting the internal candidate, Alan Mulally, who headed up commercial aviation and led the development of the highly successful Boeing 777, the board recruited ex-GE executive Jim McNerney to succeed Stonecipher. At the time, McNerney was CEO of 3M, a tenure that lasted just four years. Meanwhile, Mulally became CEO of Ford, where he led one of the most important business turnarounds in history. Maximizing earnings, but at what cost? By 2011, Boeing found its 737 losing out to rival Airbus’s A320neo with major customers like American Airlines. Rather than designing a new aircraft to replace the 737, McNerney opted for a five-year program to upgrade to the 737 MAX. This decision required the redesign to stay within FAA’s original type-certification with the same flying characteristics. Boeing also agreed with customers like Southwest Airlines to avoid retraining pilots and upgrading its training manuals. These decisions minimized short-term cost to maximize short-term earnings. In my experience with advanced technology products, quick fixes often lead to design compromises that create more problems. This happened with the 737 MAX in 2015 when it encountered stall problems. Rather than further design changes that would have risked the 737’s original type-certification, Boeing opted for a major software change that was not disclosed to the FAA or described in its pilot’s manual. The flaws in the software design that took flight control away from the pilots without their knowledge based on data from a single sensor, ultimately led to the two 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019, causing the deaths of 346 people. After the first crash, Boeing issued a statement that offered pilots and passengers “our assurance that the 737 MAX is as safe as any airplane that has ever flown the skies.” That assurance came back to haunt Boeing four months later when the second MAX crashed. When Boeing leadership failed to ground its fleet of 737 MAX planes, the FAA forced them to do so, pushing Boeing into a lengthy set of regulatory inspections, tests, and design changes lasting 20 months. During that time, its customers waited for aircraft they desperately needed in service. Then Congress held a damaging hearing that eventually forced Boeing’s board to relieve then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg. Today, ex-GE executive David Calhoun, a Boeing board member since 2009, has the onerous task of restoring Boeing’s business and its quality standards. The cost of reputational damage When we discuss the Boeing cases in my classes at Harvard Business School, I ask participants, “Are Boeing’s problems caused by individual leadership failures or a flawed culture?” The answer “both” eventually emerges. It was the actions of Condit and Stonecipher that turned Boeing’s culture from excellence in aviation design, quality, and safety into emphasizing short-term profit and distributing cash to shareholders via stock buybacks. McNerney compounded the problem through his decision to launch a quick fix to the 737 rather than design a new airplane. Muilenburg was left with the flawed aircraft, but failed to ground the planes after the first crash and pinpoint the root cause of the failure. The Boeing board, which is composed of exceptional individuals, failed to preserve Boeing’s culture and reputation. Ironically, decisions made in the name of shareholder value over the past two decades have cost its investors $87 billion since 2018. The long-term damage to Boeing’s reputation and market position is even greater as Airbus has outsold Boeing in new aircraft orders each of the last five years. Now CEO Calhoun faces immediate pressure to fix the MAX fuselage panel and win back market share. However, his real task must be to restore Boeing’s culture of aviation excellence—a long-term project that is the only real solution to restore this once iconic company to aviation leadership. Bill George is an Executive Fellow at Harvard Business School, and former Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Medtronic. He doesn’t hold a financial stake in Boeing, its competitors, or any airlines. You Might Also Like: What Went Wrong with the Boeing 737 Max? Courage: The Defining Characteristic of Great Leaders Why Leaders Lose Their Way Feedback or ideas to share? Email the Working Knowledge team at hbswk@hbs.edu. Image note: Illustration was created with artwork from AdobeStock/John Vlahidis.