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Ethical standards I will uphold as a future professional school counselor (PSC):

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Ethical standards I will uphold as a future professional school counselor (PSC):

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The role of a school counselor is to expand personal multicultural and social justice advocacy, awareness, knowledge, and skills to become an effective, culturally competent leader.

In order to provide culturally sustaining school counseling, school counselors work toward cultural competence and cultural humility.

Educators demonstrate responsiveness when they collaborate with students and community members to promote a school and community climate that embraces cultural diversity and encourages academic, career, and social development for ALL students.

​(The School Counselor and Cultural Diversity - American School Counselor Association [ASCA], n.d.)

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(Adopted 1988; revised 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2015, 2021)

ASCA Position

School counselors have a professional and ethical responsibility to expand personal multicultural and social justice advocacy, awareness, knowledge and skills to be an effective, culturally competent school counselor. School counselors work toward cultural competence and cultural humility to provide culturally sustaining school counseling. School counselors demonstrate responsiveness by collaborating with students and stakeholders in support of a school and community climate that embraces cultural diversity and helps to promote all students' academic, career and social/emotional development.

The Rationale

Diversity is a "range of cultures and subcultures that represent attitudes, beliefs, values, rituals, symbols, norms and conventions, customs, behaviors and ideologies" (Stone & Dahir, 2016, p. 294). Culture is a powerful and pervasive influence on the attitudes and behaviors of students, stakeholders and school counselors. In response to cultural diversification in schools and communities, school counselors must be more globally responsive and culturally sustaining in the educational and social environment than ever before.

As a part of this charge, school counselors need to continue to enhance knowledge and awareness of prejudice, power and various forms of oppression and utilize culturally responsive skills to support ever-changing student needs (ASCA Ethical Standards, 2022). In support of students, school counselors implement "equitable academic, career and social/emotional developmental opportunities for all students" (ASCA Ethical Standards, 2022). It is an "expectation, not the exception" for school counselors to integrate multiculturalism and social justice perspectives into their work as advocates and leaders (Ratts and Greenleaf, 2017, p.8).

The School Counselor's Role

The ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors (2022) and a "host of voices in school counseling literature point to school counselor advocacy as a key factor in making progress toward this vision of equitable schools and communities. Our vision for equitable, inclusive and culturally sustaining schools can inform our advocacy goals as people and as professionals" (Grothaus, et al., 2020, p. 26).

School counselors can provide culturally responsive counseling by:

exploring their personal knowledge, attitudes and beliefs about working with diverse student populations

ensuring each student has access to a school counseling program that advocates for all students in diverse cultural groups

addressing the impact poverty and social class have on student achievement

identifying the impact of family culture upon student performance

delivering culturally sensitive instruction, appraisal and advisement, and counseling

ensuring all students' rights are respected and all students' needs are met

consulting and collaborating with stakeholders to create a school climate that welcomes and appreciates the strengths and gifts of culturally diverse students

using data to measure access to programs and to close disproportionate gaps in opportunity, information and resources that affect achievement among diverse student populations (Henfield et al., 2014)

enhancing their own cultural competence and facilitating the cultural awareness, knowledge and skills of all school personnel (Ratts & Greenleaf, 2017; Ratts, et al., 2015)

A culturally sustaining school counseling program includes a school counseling program advisory council that incorporates diverse perspectives and has representation reflecting the school's cultural census. Advisory councils can support the school counseling program in the development of goals, culturally relevant curriculum and pedagogy. and strategic planning, as well as community bridging, awareness and advocacy (Grothaus, et al., 2020).

Summary

School counselors implement a culturally sustaining school counseling program that creates systematic change through growth, self-awareness, humility, knowledge of worldviews and cultural identities (Grothaus, et al., 2020). School counselors collaborate with all stakeholders to provide relevant interventions and strategies that advocate for and promote social justice for all students (Ratts, 2015, as cited in Grothaus, et al., 2020). Through their school counseling programs, school counselors are positioned to actively become a part of the solution where cultural diversity is fully embraced in schools (ASCA, 2020).

References

American School Counselor Association. (2022). ASCA ethical standards for school counselors. Alexandria, VA: Author.

American School Counselor Association. (2020) Standards in practice: Eliminating racism and bias in schools: The school counselor's role. Alexandria, VA: Author.

Grothaus, T., Johnson, K. F., & Edirmanasinghe, N. (2020). Culturally sustaining school counseling. Alexandria: VA: American School Counseling Association.

​*Note this position statement includes minor updates to reflect the revisions to the 2022 ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors.

Henfield, M. S., Washington, A. R., & Byrd, J. A. (2014). Addressing academic and opportunity gaps impacting gifted Black males: Implications for school counselors. Gifted Child Today, 37(3), 147-154. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1076217514530118

Lekas, H. M., Pahl, K., & Fuller Lewis, C. (2020). Rethinking cultural competence: Shifting to cultural humility. Health Services Insights, 13, 1178632920970580. https://doi.org/10.1177/1178632920970580

Ratts, M. J., & Greenleaf, A. T. (2017). Multicultural and social justice counseling competencies: A leadership framework for professional school counselors. Professional School Counseling. https://doi.org/10.1177/2156759X18773582

Ratts, M., Singh, A., Nassar-McMillian, S., Butler, S. & McCullough, J. (2016). Multicultural and social justice counseling competencies: Guidelines for the counseling profession. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development. 44. 28-48. 10.1002/jmcd.12035.

Stone, C.B., & Dahir, C.A. (2016). The transformed school counselor (3 rd ed.). Cengage Learning.

Resources

American School Counselor Association (2019). ASCA national model: A framework for school counseling programs. Alexandria, VA.

American School Counselor Association (2019). ASCA Standards for School Counselor Preparation Programs. Alexandria, VA.

Atkins, R., & Oglesby, A. (2019). Interrupting racism: Equity and social justice in school counseling. Routledge.

Chu-Lien Chao, R. (2013). Race/ethnicity and multicultural competence among school counselors: Multicultural training, racial/ethnic identity, and color-blind racial attitudes. Journal of Counseling and Development, 91, 140-151.

Council for Accreditation of Counseling & Related Educational Programs (CACREP; 2016). Social and cultural diversity professional counseling identity. Alexandria, VA: Author.

Frances, D. (2020). Multicultural counseling: Understanding bias and practicing humility [Webinar]. American School Counseling Association. https://videos.schoolcounselor.org/cross-cultural-counseling-understand-bias-and-practice-humility.

Guzman, M. R., Calfa, N. A., Kerne, V., McCarthy, C. (2013). Examination of multicultural counseling competencies in school counselors. Journal of School Counseling, 11(7), 1-27.

Howard, T. (2020). Why race and culture matter in schools: Closing the achievement gap in America's classrooms. New York: Teachers College Press.

Merlin, C. (2016). Build multiculturally aware students [Webinar]. American School Counseling Association. https://videos.schoolcounselor.org/build-multiculturally-aware-students.

Merlin-Knoblich, C., Moss, L., Cholewa, B., & Sringer, S. I. (2019). A consensual qualitative research exploration of school counselor multicultural education behaviors. Professional School Counseling. https://doi.org/10.1177/2156759X20940637

Nieto, S & Bode, P. (2018). Affirming diversity: The sociopolitical context of multicultural education. Pearson.

Owens, D., Bodenhorn, N., Bryant, R. M. (2010). Self-efficacy and multicultural competence of school counselors. Journal of School Counseling, 8(17), 1-20.

Studer, J. R. (2015). The essential school counselor in a changing society. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Shure, L., West-Oltunji, C., & Cholewa, B. (2019). Investigating the relationship between school counselor recommendations and student cultural behavioral styles. Journal of Negro Education, 88(4), 454-466.

​*Note this position statement includes minor updates to reflect the revisions to the 2022 ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors.

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The School Counselor and Cultural Diversity

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(Adopted 1988; revised 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2015, 2021) School counselors have a professional and ethical responsibility to expand personal multicultural and social justice advocacy, awareness, knowledge and skills to be an effective, culturally competent school counselor. School counselors work toward cultural competence and cultural humility to provide culturally sustaining school counseling.

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Personal Connections as a future professional school counselor (PSC):

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Personal Connections as a future professional school counselor (PSC):

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Underrepresented populations have historically had difficulty accessing rigorous curriculums and higher-level courses. It is possible for school counselors, teachers, administrators, and other staff members to act as involuntary gatekeepers in these classrooms. School counselors can play a considerable role in empowering students when they are able to connect with them. Students who feel biased or negatively treated often exhibit self-destructive behaviors, such as truancy, withdrawal, acting out, and non-participation in class. In contrast, students who believe that they are treated fairly are more likely to be engaged in school, speak out about pressing topics and participate in class activities (The School Counselor and Equity for All Students - American School Counselor Association [ASCA], n.d.).

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The majority of United States school counselors are white, while the country is becoming more and more diverse. Racial sensitivity and bias in our school systems can cause increased strife, a lack of services, and a lack of overall understanding when it comes to caring for our young learners (ACA: C.5).

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American Counseling Association. (2014). 2014 ACA Code of Ethics. https://www.counseling.org/resources/aca-code-of-ethics.pdf

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About TEA | Texas Education Agency. (n.d.). https://tea.texas.gov/about-tea

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The Texas Education Agency is the state agency that oversees primary and secondary public education. It is headed by the commissioner of education. The Texas Education Agency improves outcomes for all public school students in the state by providing leadership, guidance, and support to school systems.

Overview

Learn more about TEA's roles and responsibilities and organization in this brief overview.

Agency Finances

Public education is a big business in Texas. Billions of dollars flow through the agency and are distributed to our more than 1,200 school districts and charters. The agency's finances from our legislative appropriations request to our check book register are all available for public review.

Come Visit or Drop Us a Line

Would you like to come to TEA or contact us by email or phone? You'll find all our contact information on one-page.

Laws and Rules

The work of TEA and the entire public school system is driven by laws created by the Texas Legislature and the U.S. Congress and administrative rules adopted by the commissioner of education, the State Board of Education, and the State Board for Educator Certification. Public input is critical in crafting laws and rules.

Leadership

The commissioner of education, the State Board of Education and the State Board for Educator Certification provide statewide leadership for the Texas public schools.

Legal Services

TEA's Legal Services Division provides information and resources about legal issues that affect public education in Texas.

Other Services

TEA coordinates with 20 Regional Education Service Centers (ESCs) that provide support to school districts and charters. They provide a wide array of training, services such as handling payrolls for districts, meeting space and much more to Texas schools. The agency also has programs supporting military families and homeless students and provides up-to-date information on weather and other disasters affecting Texas school districts.

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The Texas Education Agency is the state agency that oversees primary and secondary public education. It is headed by the commissioner of education. The Texas Education Agency improves outcomes for all public school students in the state by providing leadership, guidance, and support to school systems. Learn more about TEA's roles and responsibilities and organization in this brief overview.

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American Civil Liberties Union. (n.d.). Your Right to Equality in Education. https://www.aclu.org/other/your-right-equality-education

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Corporate Finance Institute. (2022, November 26). Risk Management. 

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Corporate Finance Institute. (2022, November 26). Risk Management. 

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Corporate Finance Institute. (2022, November 26). Risk Management. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/risk-management/risk-management/

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Risk management encompasses the identification, analysis, and response to risk factors that form part of the life of a business. It is usually done with

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Equal Educational Opportunity | Texas Education Agency

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Equal Educational Opportunity | Texas Education Agency

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Equal Educational Opportunity | Texas Education Agency. (n.d.). https://tea.texas.gov/about-tea/contact-us/general-inquiry/equal-educational-opportunity

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Equal Educational Opportunity | Texas Education Agency

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Complaints that allege that a public school discriminates on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or disability in admission or access to, or treatment or employment in, a school district’s programs or activities are under the jurisdiction and authority of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR…

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Federal Protections Against National Origin Discrimination

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Federal Protections Against National Origin Discrimination

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Federal Protections Against National Origin Discrimination. (2015, August 6). https://www.justice.gov/crt/federal-protections-against-national-origin-discrimination-1

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Issued October 2000 INTRODUCTION

Federal laws prohibit discrimination based on a person's national origin, race, color, religion, disability, sex, and familial status. Laws prohibiting national origin discrimination make it illegal to discriminate because of a person's birthplace, ancestry, culture or language. This means people cannot be denied equal opportunity because they or their family are from another country, because they have a name or accent associated with a national origin group, because they participate in certain customs associated with a national origin group, or because they are married to or associate with people of a certain national origin.

The Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division is concerned that national origin discrimination may go unreported in the United States because victims of discrimination do not know their legal rights, or may be afraid to complain to the government. To address this problem, the Civil Rights Division has established a National Origin Working Group to help citizens and immigrants better understand and exercise their legal rights. If you think you, or someone you know, has been discriminated against because of national origin and want to learn more about exercising your legal rights, you should read this brochure.

This brochure explains the laws prohibiting national origin discrimination and provides some examples. You may find additional information about the Civil Rights Division and its Sections on the internet at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt. You may contact the Division to report complaints of discrimination as explained below.

KNOWING YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS

The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice enforces federal laws that prohibit discrimination in:

The Division also enforces laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, protects the civil rights of persons who are institutionalized in certain state or local facilities, and prosecutes crimes that are motivated by a crime victim's race, color, or national origin.

In some cases, the Division may only become involved if there is a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. A "pattern or practice" generally means that there is more than a single incident of discrimination, and that there is a policy or repeated conduct that is discriminatory.

CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

* A young man of South Asian descent is assaulted as he leaves a concert at a nightclub. The assailant, a member of a skinhead group, yells racial epithets as he beats the victim unconscious in the club's parking lot with fists and a pipe.

* At Ku Klux Klan meetings, a Klansman tells other members that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans should go "back where they came from." They burn a cross in the front yard of a young Hispanic couple in order to frighten them and force them to leave the neighborhood. Before burning the cross, the defendant displays a gun and gives one of his friends another gun in case the victims try to stop them.

* An American company recruits workers in a small Mexican town, promising them good work at high pay. The company smuggles the Mexicans to the United States in an empty tanker truck. When they finally arrive in the U.S., the workers are threatened, told that if they attempt to leave their factory they will be killed.

The Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division prosecutes people who are accused of using force or violence to interfere with a person's federally protected rights because of that person's national origin. These rights include areas such as housing, employment, education, or use of public facilities. You can reach the Criminal Section at (202) 514-3204 or write to:

DISABILITY RIGHTS

* An HMO that enrolls Medicaid patients tells a Mexican American woman with cerebral palsy to come back another day for an appointment while it provides immediate assistance to others.

This example may be a violation of federal laws that prohibit discrimination because of disability as well as laws that prohibit discrimination because of national origin. If you believe you have been discriminated against because you have a disability you may contact the Disability Rights Section at (800) 514-0301 (voice) or 800-514-0383 (TTY). You may also write to:

* A child has difficulty speaking English, but her school does not provide her with the necessary assistance to help her learn English and other subjects.

* A majority Haitian school does not offer honors classes. Other schools in the district that do not have many Haitian students offer both honors and advanced placement courses.

These examples may be violations of federal law, which prohibits discrimination in education because of a person's national origin. The Division's Educational Opportunities Section enforces these laws in elementary and secondary schools as well as public colleges and universities. The Education Section's work addresses discrimination in all aspects of education, including assignment of students to schools and classes, transportation of students, hiring and placement of faculty and administrators, distribution of school resources, and provision of educational programs that assist limited English speaking students in learning English.

To file a complaint or for more information, contact the Education Section at (202) 514-4092, or write to:

EMPLOYMENT

* A transit worker's supervisor makes frequent racial epithets against the worker because his family is from Iran. Last week, the boss put up a fake sign on the bulletin board telling everyone not to trust the worker because he is a terrorist.

* A woman who immigrated from Russia applies for a job as an accountant. The employer turns her down because she speaks with an accent even though she is able to perform the job requirements.

* A food processing company requires applicants who appear or sound foreign to show work authorization documents before allowing them to complete an employment application while native born Caucasian applicants are not required to show any documents before completing employment applications. Moreover, the documents of the ethnic employees are more closely scrutinized and more often rejected than the same types of documents shown by native born Caucasian employees.

These examples may be violations of the law that prohibits discrimination against an employee or job applicant because of his or her national origin. This means an employer cannot discipline, harass, fire, refuse to hire or promote a person because of his or her national origin.

If you believe an employer, labor organization or employment agency has discriminated against you because of your national origin, contact:

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(800) 669-4000
(Employers with 15 or more employees)
Office of Special Counsel
(800) 255-7688
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, 1425
Washington, D.C. 20530
(Employers with 4 to 14 employees)
Employment Litigation Section
(202) 514-3831
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Employment Litigation Section, PHB
Washington, D.C. 20530
(State or local government employer with a pattern or practice of illegal discrimination)

In addition, an employer may violate federal law by requiring specific work authorization documents, such as a green card, or rejecting such documents only from applicants of certain national origins. For more information or to file a charge, contact the Division's Office of Special Counsel at the above address or toll-free number.

* A Native Hawaiian family is looking for an apartment. They are told by the rental agent that no apartments are available, even though apartments are available and are shown to white applicants.

* A realtor shows a Latino family houses only in Latino neighborhoods and refuses to show the family houses in white neighborhoods.

These examples may be violations of the federal Fair Housing Act. That law prohibits discrimination because of national origin, race, color, sex, religion, disability, or familial status (presence of children under 18) in housing. Individual complaints of discrimination may be reported to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) at (800) 669-9777. If you believe there is a pattern or practice of discrimination, contact the Division's Housing and Civil Enforcement Section at (202) 514-4713.

* A Latina woman is charged a higher interest rate and fees than white male customers who have similar financial histories and apply for the same type of loan.

This example may be a violation of federal laws that prohibit discrimination in lending because of national origin, race, color, sex, religion, disability and marital status or because any of a person's income comes from public assistance. If you believe you have been denied a loan because of your national origin or other protected reason, you may ask the lender for an explanation in writing of why your application was denied.

If the loan is for a home mortgage, home improvement, or other housing-related reasons, you may file a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development at (800) 669-9777. If the loan is for purposes other than housing (such as a car loan), you may file a complaint either with the Division's Housing and Civil Enforcement Section or with the lender's regulatory agency. If your experience was part of a pattern or practice of discrimination you may also call the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section at (202) 514-4713, to obtain more information about your rights or to file a complaint.

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

* In a restaurant, a group of Asian Americans waits for over an hour to be served, while white and Latino customers receive prompt service.

* Haitian American visitors to a hotel are told they must pay in cash rather than by credit card, are charged higher rates than other customers, and are not provided with the same amenities, such as towels and soap.

These examples may be violations of federal laws that prohibit discrimination because of national origin, race, color, or religion in places of public accommodation. Public accommodations include hotels, restaurants, and places of entertainment. If you believe you have been denied access to or equal enjoyment of a public accommodation where there is a pattern or practice of discrimination, contact the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section at (202) 514-4713. You may also write to:

POLICE MISCONDUCT

* Police officers constantly pull over cars driven by Latinos, for certain traffic violations, but rarely pull over white drivers for the same violations.

* A police officer questioning a man of Vietnamese origin on the street gets angry when the man is unable to answer his questions because he does not speak English. The Officer arrests the man for disorderly conduct.

These examples may be violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. They may also be violations of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That law prohibits discrimination because of national origin, race, color, religion, or sex by a police department that gets federal funds through the U.S. Department of Justice. They may also violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination by law enforcement agencies that receive any federal financial assistance, including asset forfeiture property.

Complaints of individual discrimination can be filed with the Coordination and Review Section at

or contact the Coordination and Review Section at 1-888-848-5306.

Complaints of individual discrimination may also be filed with the Office of Justice Programs at Office for Civil Rights, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20531, or contact Office of Justice Programs at (202) 307-0690.

The Special Litigation Section investigates and litigates complaints that a police department has a pattern or practice of discriminating on the basis of national origin. To file a complaint, contact the Special Litigation Section at (202) 514-6255 or write to:

CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS

* A jail will not translate disciplinary hearings for detainees who do not speak English.

* A state's psychiatric hospital has no means of providing treatment for people who do not speak English.

These examples may be violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Special Litigation Section enforces the constitutional rights of people held in state or local government institutions, such as prisons, jails, juvenile correctional facilities, mental health facilities, developmental disability or mental retardation facilities, and nursing homes. If you are a resident of any such facility and you believe there is a pattern or practice of discrimination based on your national origin, contact the Special Litigation Section at (202) 514-6255. You may also write to:

FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS

* A local social services agency does not provide information or job training in Korean even though one quarter of local residents speak only Korean.

* A hospital near the Texas/Mexico border dresses its security officers in clothes that look like INS uniforms to scare Latinos away from the emergency room. Latino patients are told to bring their own translators before they can see a doctor.

These examples may be violations of federal laws that prohibit discrimination because of national origin, race or color by recipients of federal funds. If you believe you have been discriminated against by a state or local government agency or an organization that receives funds from the federal government, you may file a complaint with the Division's Coordination and Review Section at (888) 848-5306. You may also write to:

The Coordination and Review Section will refer the complaint to the federal funding agency that is primarily responsible for enforcing nondiscrimination prohibitions applicable to its recipients.

* Despite requests from voters in a large Spanish-speaking community, election officials refuse to provide election materials, including registration forms and sample ballots, in Spanish or to allow Spanish speakers to bring translators into the voting booth.

* A polling official requires a dark-skinned voter, who speaks with a foreign accent and has an unfamiliar last name, to provide proof of American citizenship, but does not require proof of citizenship from white voters.

The election officials' conduct may violate the federal laws prohibiting voting discrimination. The Voting Rights Acts do not specifically prohibit national origin discrimination. However, provisions of the Acts make it illegal to limit or deny the right to vote of any citizen not only because of race or color, but also because of membership in a language minority group. In addition, the Acts also require in certain jurisdictions that election materials and assistance be provided in languages other than English.

Additionally, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, allows voters, who need help because of blindness, disability or because they cannot read or write, to bring someone (other than an employer or union representative) to help. This means that a voter who needs help reading the ballot in English can bring a friend or family member to translate. In some places, election officials must provide information, such as voter registration and the ballot, in certain language(s) other than English. This can include interpreters to help voters vote.

If you believe that you have been discriminated against in voting or denied assistance in casting your ballot, you may contact the Division's Voting Section at (800) 253-3931. You may also write to:

Note: For persons with disabilities, this document will be available in large print, audio tape, computer disc, and braille.

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Federal Protections Against National Origin Discrimination

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Issued October 2000 INTRODUCTION Federal laws prohibit discrimination based on a person's national origin, race, color, religion, disability, sex, and familial status. Laws prohibiting national origin discrimination make it illegal to discriminate because of a person's birthplace, ancestry, culture or language.

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School counselors recognize and distinguish individual and group differences and strive to equally value all students and groups. School counselors are advocates for the equitable treatment of all students in school and in the community (The School Counselor and Equity for All Students - American School Counselor Association (ASCA), n.d.).

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The School Counselor and Equity for All Students

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(Adopted 2006, revised 2012, 2018) School counselors recognize and distinguish individual and group differences and strive to equally value all students and groups. School counselors are advocates for the equitable treatment of all students in school and in the community. According to the U.S.

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American Counseling Association Code of Ethics

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American Counseling Association Code of Ethics

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ACA: C.5. Nondiscrimination Counselors do not condone or engage in discrimination against prospective or current clients, students, employees, supervisees, or research participants based on age, culture, disability, ethnicity, race, religion/spirituality, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, marital/ partnership status, language preference, socioeconomic status, immigration status, or any basis proscribed by law.

ACA:D.1.h. Negative Conditions Counselors alert their employers of inappropriate policies and practices. They attempt to effect changes in such policies or procedures through constructive action within the organization. When such policies are potentially disruptive or damaging to clients or may limit the effectiveness of services provided and change cannot be affected, counselors take appropriate further action. Such action may include referral to appropriate certification, accreditation, or state licensure organizations, or voluntary termination of employment.

ACA:I.2.f. Unfair Discrimination Against Complainants and Respondents Counselors do not deny individuals employment, advancement, admission to academic or other programs, tenure, or promotion based solely on their having made or their being the subject of an ethics complaint. This does not preclude taking action based on the outcome of such proceedings or considering other appropriate information.
(American Counseling Association, 2014)

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The Role and Procedures for Risk Management:

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The Role and Procedures for Risk Management:

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The role of risk management is to empower a school with the necessary tools to identify and deal with potential risks. It is easy to mitigate risk once it has been identified.

School staff begin risk management by understanding

1. Who might face discrimination

2. How to minimize discrimination

3. How to support students at risk

Start by assessing the school's current situation and identifying its strengths, as well as its needs and priorities. Stakeholder consultation is vital, especially with students and, where possible, parents. Tools such as surveys, questionnaires, focus groups, etc., can be used. Because discrimination experiences are sensitive, anonymously collecting the information would be ideal. The assessment of the current situation provides a basis for identifying immediate policy priorities. Priorities will vary with the school, but might include, for example:

language development

gender equality

accessibility of the physical environment

intercultural competences

If a school wishes to mitigate identified risks and prevent their recurrence, it must ask the following questions:

1. What can be done to prevent the occurrence of the identified risk?

2. Furthermore, what should be done if the problem recurs?

A number of the ideas that have been found to be useful for mitigating risks are developed into tasks and contingency plans. The plans can be implemented if risks arise (Corporate Finance Institute, 2022).

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Risk management encompasses the identification, analysis, and response to risk factors that form part of the life of a business. It is usually done with

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Why are local administrative laws, policies, rules important?

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Why are local administrative laws, policies, rules important?

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Agencies with subject-matter expertise and frontline experience can promote and communicate detailed standards and requirements in their designated issue areas using administrative rules, which fill the gaps left open by lawmakers, allow them to exercise legislative grants of authority and discretion, and allow them to exercise legislative grants of authority and discretion (Adams, n.d.).

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Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure

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Administrative law is critical to the modern practice of governance. Administrative rules fill the gaps in statutes left open by lawmakers, allow agencies to exercise legislative grants of authority and discretion, and give agencies with subject-matter expertise and frontline experience the opportun…

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Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure.

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Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure.

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Adams, C. (n.d.). Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure. FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss2/5/

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FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History

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Keywords

Administrative law; agencies; APA; policy; cities; states

Abstract

Administrative law is critical to the modern practice of governance. Administrative rules fill the gaps in statutes left open by lawmakers, allow agencies to exercise legislative grants of authority and discretion, and give agencies with subject-matter expertise and frontline experience the opportunity to promulgate detailed standards and requirements in their designated issue areas. Adjudication allows an agency to dispose of matters and disputes formally before it, whether under its rules or another source of law. While agencies at every level of government-federal, state, and local- engage in administrative action, legal scholarship on administrative law is almost exclusively focused on the federal realm, which is shaped by the Administrative Procedure Act. States can look to a Model State Administrative Procedure Act drafted by experts at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, a document that was originally promulgated around the same time as the federal Administrative Procedure Act, for guidance on ordering the activities of their agencies. Local governments, however, have far fewer resources to draw upon. This Note argues that the time has come for localities to embrace the codification of administrative procedures. The governments and agencies of localities have always played a prominent role in the everyday lives of residents, as well as regional and national economic structures, and their work will benefit from procedural statutes. Cities, in particular, have taken on an increasingly central role as political agents and policy entrepreneurs and this shift underscores the need for greater procedural guidance. To make the case, this Note briefly examines the purposes and history of modern administrative law, analyzes approaches taken by exemplar cities, lays out and probes some of arguments for and against more rigorous procedures at the local level, and proposes three methods to help localities and states undertake this project.

Recommended Citation

Casey Adams, Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 629 (2018).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss2/5

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administrative law; agencies; apa; policy; cities; states

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Home Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure

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Administrative law is critical to the modern practice of governance. Administrative rules fill the gaps in statutes left open by lawmakers, allow agencies to exercise legislative grants of authority and discretion, and give agencies with subject-matter expertise and frontline experience the opportunity to promulgate detailed standards and requirements in their designated issue areas.

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City and state governments created regulations and mandates to ensure all laws are followed and reinforced. 

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City and state governments created regulations and mandates to ensure all laws are followed and reinforced. 

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Federal government agencies issue regulations as a means of implementing laws passed by Congress (The Fed - What Is a Regulation and How Is It Made?, n.d.)

Laws and mandates are equally enforceable. It only differs in how it came to be. The governor can issue a mandate with the authority granted by the legislature. Laws and mandates have the same effect in general.

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Pub. L. 93-380, title VIII, §801, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 597

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WSISD: Equal Educational Opportunities Policies FB, FFH 

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WSISD: Equal Educational Opportunities Policies FB, FFH 

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Equal Educational Opportunities Policies FB, FFH

In an effort to promote nondiscrimination and as required by law, White Settlement ISD does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, or disability in providing education services, activities, and programs, including Career and Technical Education (CTE) programs, in accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended.

Standard 1.10 The educator shall be of good moral character and be worthy to instruct or supervise the youth of this state

(White Settlement ISD 2022–2023 Employee Handbook, 2015).

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al. (n.d.). LII / Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/411/1

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411 U.S. 1

93 S.Ct. 1278

36 L.Ed.2d 16

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants,
v.
Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al.

No. 71-1332.

See 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919.

Syllabus

The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program designed to provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each district supplements state aid through an ad valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class action on behalf of schoolchildren said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The District Court, finding that wealth is a 'suspect' classification and that education is a 'fundamental' right, concluded that the system could be upheld only upon a showing, which appellants failed to make, that there was a compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded that appellants failed even to demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's system. Held:

1. This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. Pp. 18-44.

(a) The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. It has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class of 'poor' people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. Pp. 18-28.

(b) Nor does the Texas school-financing system impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a 'fundamental' right or liberty. Though education is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited category of rights recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if some identifiable quantum of education is arguably entitled to constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise of other constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that purpose. Pp. 29-39.

(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke strict scrutiny since it involves the most delicate and difficult questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of review. Pp. 40-44.

2. The Texas system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly imperfect, the system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages participation in and significant control of each district's schools at the local level. Pp. 44-53.

D.C., 337 F.Supp. 280, reversed.

Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., for appellants.

Arthur Gochman, San Antonio, Tex., for appellees.

[Amicus Curiae Information from pages 3-5 intentionally omitted]

Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

II

We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect-classification not the fundamental-interest analysis persuasive.

A.

The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and its progeny, 52 the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment requirements in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were totally unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case emphasized that no constitutional violation would have been shown if the State had provided some 'adequate substitute' for a full stenographic transcript. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228, 92 S.Ct. 431, 434, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prisons, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269 (1958).

As suggested above, appellees and the District Court may have embraced a second or third approach, the second of which might be characterized as a theory of relative or comparative discrimination based on family income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each district and the expenditures therein for education. That is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower the dollar amount of education received by the family's children.

The principal evidence adduced in support of this comparative-discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, noted, first, a positive correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. Second, the court found a similar correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.Supp., at 282 n. 3.

B

'Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.' Ibid.

'The Court today does not 'pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection . . ..' To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.' Id., at 642, 89 S.Ct., at 1335. (Emphasis in original.)

Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained:

'We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease, without the payment of rent . . .. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.' Id., at 74, 92 S.Ct., at 874. (Emphasis supplied.)

Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expendi tures in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.

We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which 'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, supra, 316 U.S. at 536, 62 S.Ct. at 1111; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at 338- 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1001-1004. A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), expresses well the salient point: 81

'This is not a complaint that Congress . . . has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected (to others similarly situated) . . ..

'(The federal law in question) does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law. . . . We need only decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected . .. was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,' . . . that a legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' . . . and that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind . . .." Id., at 656-657, 86 S.Ct., at 1727. (Emphasis in original.)

C

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.

The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These same considerations are relevant to the determination whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, nevertheles bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next turn our attention.

III

The basic contours of the Texas school finance system have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will now describe in more detail that system and how it operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.

This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas school financing structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The District Court found that the State had failed even 'to establish a reasonable basis' for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil expenditure. 337 F.Supp., at 284. We disagree.

Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, they attack the school-financing system precisely because, in their view, it does not provide the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in more equality in education expenditures. While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 107 the existence of 'some inequality' in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the State's interest, which occasion 'less drastic' disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S., at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). It is also well to remember that even those districts that have reduced ability to make free decisions with respect to how much they spend on education still retain under the present system a large measure of authority as to how available funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous other decisions with respect to the operation of the schools. 108 The people of Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of school financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along with increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go increased control over local policies. 109

Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live.

IV

In light of the considerable attention that has focused on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the District Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education. Some commentators have concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs that might be devised and approved, the result could not avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of public education. Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of these cases have found no clear or dependable answers and their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the desirability of completely uprooting the existing system.

These practical considerations, of course, play no role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democractic pressures of those who elect them.

Mr. Justice STEWART, concurring.

This doctrine is no more than a specific application of one of the first principles of constitutional adjudication-the basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv.L.Rev. 129 (1893).

Under the Equal Protection Clause, this presumption of constitutional validity disappears when a State has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently 'suspect.' Because of the historic purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prime example of such a 'suspect' classification is one that is based upon race. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222. But there are other classifications that, at least in some settings, are also 'suspect'-for example, those based upon national origin, 4 alienage, 5 indigency, 6 or illegitimacy. 7

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Although I agree with my Brother WHITE that the Texas statutory scheme is devoid of any rational basis, and for that reason is violative of the Equal Protection Clause, I also record my disagreement with the Court's rather distressing assertion that a right may be deemed 'fundamental' for the purposes of equal protection analysis only if it is 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' Ante, at 33-34. As my Brother MARSHALL convincingly demonstrates, our prior cases stand for the proposition that 'fundamentality' is, in large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, '(a)s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.' Post, at 102 103.

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting.

The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use of the real estate property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is the only revenue-raising mechanism extended to school districts, is practically and legally unavailable. That this is the situation may be readily demonstrated.

Local school districts in Texas raise their portion of the Foundation School Program-the Local Fund Assignment-by levying ad valorem taxes on the property located within their boundaries. In addition, the districts are authorized, by the state constitution and by statute, to levy ad valorem property taxes in order to raise revenues to support educational spending over and above the expenditure of Foundation School Program funds.

Both the Edgewood and Alamo Heights districts are located in Bexar County, Texas. Student enrollment in Alamo Heights is 5,432, in Edgewood 22,862. The per-pupil market value of the taxable property in Alamo Heights is $49,078, in Edgewood $5,960. In a typical relevant year, Alamo Heights had a maintenance tax rate of $1.20 and a debt service (bond) tax rate of 20¢ per $100 assessed evaluation, while Edgewood had a maintenance rate of 52¢ and a bond rate of 67¢. These rates, when applied to the respective tax bases, yielded Alamo Heights $1,433,473 in maintenance dollars and $236,074 in bond dollars, and Edgewood $223,034 in maintenance dollars and $279,023 in bond dollars. As is readily apparent, because of the variance in tax bases between the districts, results, in terms of revenues, do not correlate with effort, in terms of tax rate. Thus, Alamo Heights, with a tax base approximately twice the size of Edgewood's base, realized approximately six times as many maintenance dollars as Edgewood by using a tax rate only approximately two and one-half times larger. Similarly, Alamo Heights realized slightly fewer bond dollars by using a bond tax rate less than one-third of that used by Edgewood.

Nor is Edgewood's revenue-raising potential only deficient when compared with Alamo Heights. North East District has taxable property with a per-pupil market value of approximately $31,000, but total taxable property approximately four and one-half times that of Edgewood. Applying a maintenance rate of $1, North East yielded $2,818,148. Thus, because of its superior tax base, North East was able to apply a tax rate slightly less than twice that applied by Edgewood and yield more than 10 times the maintenance dollars. Similarly, North East, with a bond rate of 45¢, yielded $1,249,159-more than four times Edgewood's yield with two-thirds the rate.

In order to equal the highest yield in any other Bexar County district, Alamo Heights would be required to tax at the rate of 68 per $100 of assessed valuation. Edgewood would be required to tax at the prohibitive rate of $5.76 per $100. But state law places a $1.50 per $100 ceiling on the maintenance tax rate, a limit that would surely be reached long before Edgewood attained an equal yield. Edgewood is thus precluded in law, as well as in fact, from achieving a yield even close to that of some other districts.

'The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).' Neither Taxas nor the majority heeds this rule. If the State aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice, by permitting school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to do so, it utterly fails in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax bases so low that there is little if any opportunity for interested parents, rich or poor, to augment school district revenues. Requiring the State to establish only that unequal treatment is in furtherance of a permissible goal, without also requiring the State to show that the means chosen to effectuate that goal are rationally related to its achievement, makes equal protection analysis no more than an empty gesture. 6 In my view, the parents and children in Edgewood, and in like districts, suffer from an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause.

Perhaps the majority believes that the major disparity in revenues provided and permitted by the Texas system is inconsequential. I cannot agree, however, that the difference of the magnitude appearing in this case can sensibly be ignored, particularly since the State itself considers it so important to provide opportunities to exceed the minimum state educational expenditures.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting.

A.

B

The appellants do not deny the disparities in educational funding caused by variations in taxable district property wealth. They do contend, however, that whatever the differences in per-pupil spending among Texas districts, there are no discriminatory consequences for the children of the disadvantaged districts. They recognize that what is at stake in this case is the quality of the public education provided Texas children in the districts in which they live. But appellants reject the suggestion that the quality of education in any particular district is determined by money beyond some minimal level of funding which they believe to be assured every Texas district by the Minimum Foundation School Program. In their view, there is simply no denial of equal educational opportunity to any Texas school children as a result of the widely varying per-pupil spending power provided districts under the current financing scheme.

At the very least, in view of the substantial interdistrict disparities in funding and in resulting educational inputs shown by appellees to exist under the Texas financing scheme, the burden of proving that these disparities do not in fact affect the quality of children's education must fall upon the appellants. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F.Supp. 844, 860-861 (D.C.D.C.1971). Yet appellants made no effort in the District Court to demonstrate that educational quality is not affected by variations in funding and in resulting inputs. And, in this Court, they have argued no more than that the relationship is ambiguous. This is hardly sufficient to overcome appellees' prima facie showing of state-created discrimination between the schoolchildren of Texas with respect to objective educational opportunity.

C

Despite the evident discriminatory effect of the Texas financing scheme, both the appellants and the majority raise substantial questions concerning the precise character of the disadvantaged class in this case. The District Court concluded that the Texas financing scheme draws 'distinction betwen groups of citizens depending upon the wealth of the district in which they live' and thus creates a disadvantaged class composed of persons living in property-poor districts. See 337 F.Supp., at 282. See also id., at 281. In light of the data introduced before the District Court, the conclusion that the schoolchildren of property-poor districts constitute a sufficient class for our purposes seems indisputablet to me.

It may be, though, that my Brother STEWART is not in fact demanding precise identification of the membership of the disadvantaged class for purposes of equal protection analysis, but is merely unable to discern with sufficient clarity the nature of the discrimination charged in this case. Indeed, the Court itself displays some uncertainty as to the exact nature of the discrimination and the resulting disadvantaged class alleged to exist in this case. See ante, at 19-20. It is, of course, essential to equal protection analysis to have a firm grasp upon the nature of the discrimination at issue. In fact, the absence of such a clear, articulable understanding of the nature of alleged discrimination in a particular instance may well suggest the absence of any real discrimination. But such is hardly the case here.

II

To avoid having the Texas financing scheme struck down because of the interdistrict variations in taxable property wealth, the District Court determined that it was insufficient for appellants to show merely that the State's scheme was rationally related to some legitimate state purpose; rather, the discrimination inherent in the scheme had to be shown necessary to promote a 'compelling state interest' in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The basis for this determination was twofold: first, the financing scheme divides citizens on a wealth basis, a classification which the District Court viewed as highly suspect; and second, the discriminatory scheme directly affects what it considered to be a 'fundamental interest,' namely, education.

A.

A similar process of analysis with respect to the invidiousness of the basis on which a particular classification is drawn has also influenced the Court as to the appropriate degree of scrutiny to to accorded any particular case. The highly suspect character of classifications based on race, 63 nationality, 64 or alienage 65 is well established. The reasons why such classifications call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recognized as 'discrete and insular minorities' who are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at 372, 91 S.Ct., at 1852; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). Moreover, race, nationality, or alienage is "in most circumstances irrelevant' to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 192, 85 S.Ct., at 288. Instead, lines drawn on such bases are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices rather than legislative rationality. It may be that all of these considerations, which make for particular judicial solicitude in the face of discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, or alienage, do not coalesce-or at least not to the same degree-in other forms of discrimination. Nevertheless, these considerations have undoubtedly influenced the care with which the Court has scrutinized other forms of discrimination.

'these interests are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment of indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors to whom the statute itself repeatedly makes reference. State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state interests they may serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self sufficiency and self respect.' Id., at 141-142, 92 S.Ct., at 2034.

The Court, in short, clearly did not consider the problems of fraud and collection that the state legislature might have concluded were peculiar to indigent criminal defendants to be either sufficiently important or at least sufficiently substantiated to justify denial of the protective exemptions afforded to all civil judgment debtors, to a class composed exclusively of indigent criminal debtors.

'(I)mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth . . ..' Id., at 175-176, 92 S.Ct., at 1407 (footnote omitted).

Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something which the individual cannot control, and should generally be irrelevant in legislative considerations. Yet illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence, discrimination on the basis of birth-particularly when it affects innocent children warrants special judicial consideration.

Opinions such as those in Reed and James seem drawn more as efforts to shield rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's decisions. Such obfuscated action may be appropriate to a political body such as a legislature, but it is not appropriate to this Court. Open debate of the bases for the Court's action is essential to the rationality and consistency of our decisionmaking process. Only in this way can we avoid the label of legislature and ensure the integrity of the judicial process.

Nevertheless, the majority today attempts to force this case into the same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as decisions involving discrimination affecting commercial interests. By so doing, the majority singles this case out for analytic treatment at odds with what seems to me to be the clear trend of recent decisions in this Court, and thereby ignores the constitutional importance of the interest at stake and the invidiousness of the particular classification, factors that call for far more than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing scheme which the majority pursues. Yet if the discrimination inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with the care demanded by the interest and classification present in this case, the unconstitutionality of that scheme is unmistakable.

B

'Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. . . .'

C

In the final anaylsis, then The invidious characteristics of the group wealth classification present in this case merely serve to emphasize the need for careful judicial scrutiny of the State's justifications for the resulting interdistrict discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded to the schoolchildren of Texas.

D

The only justification offered by appellants to sustain the discrimination in educational opportunity caused by the Texas financing scheme is local educational control. Presented with this justification, the District Court concluded that '(n)ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests for their classifications based upon wealth, they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.' 337 F.Supp., at 284. I must agree with this conclusion.

'As a result of the acts of the Legislature our school system is not of mere local concern but it is statewide. While a school district is local in territorial limits, it is an integral part of the vast school system which is coextensive with the confines of the State of Texas.' Treadaway v. Whitney Independent School District, 205 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex.Civ.App.1947).

See also El Dorado Independent School District v. Tisdale, 3 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.Com.App. 1928).

Moreover, even if we accept Texas' general dedication to local control in educational matters, it is difficult to find any evidence of such dedication with respect to fiscal matters. It ignores reality to suggest-as the Court does, ante, at 49-50-that the local property tax element of the Texas financing scheme reflects a conscious legislative effort to provide school districts with local fiscal control. If Texas had a system truly dedicated to local fiscal control, one would expect the quality of the educational opportunity provided in each district to vary with the decision of the voters in that district as to the level of sacrifice they wish to make for public education. In fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the opposite result. Local school districts cannot choose to have the best education in the State by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the educational opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined by the amount of taxable property located in the district-a factor over which local voters can exercise no control.

III

In conclusion, it is essential to recognize that an end to the wide variations in taxable district property wealth inherent in the Texas financing scheme would entail none of the untoward consequences suggested by the Court or by the appellants.

First, affirmance of the District Court's decisions would hardly sound the death knell for local control of education. It would mean neither centralized decisionmaking nor federal court intervention in the operation of public schools. Clearly, this suit has nothing to do with local decisionmaking with respect to educational policy or even educational spending. It involves only a narrow aspect of local control-namely, local control over the raising of educational funds. In fact, in striking down interdistrict disparities in taxable local wealth, the District Court took the course which is most likely to make true local control over educational decision-making a reality for all Texas school districts.

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Page 134

                                    TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

                                     REVENUES OF TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS
                        CATEGORIZED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS
                                             CATEGORIES

                                                                                                    Total Revenues
                                                               State and Local                        Per Pupil
 Market Value of                                                Revenues Per      Federal           (State-Local-
 Taxable Property         Local Revenues  State Revenues        Pupil (Columns    Revenues          Federal, Columns
  Per Pupil                 Per Pupil       Per Pupil             1 and 2)        Per Pupil           1, 2 and 4)


 Above $100,000                $610            $205                 $815             $41                $856
  (10 districts)
 $100,000-$50,000               287             257                  544              66                 610
  (26 districts)
 $50,000-$30,000                224             260                  484              45                 529
  (30 districts)
 $30,000-$10,000                166             295                  461              85                 546
  (40 districts)
 Below $10,000                   63             243                  306             135                 441
 (4 districts)

Page 135

      APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

                         TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY
                          EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES, EQUALIZED
                            TAX RATES, AND YIELD OF RATES

   CATEGORIES                       EQUALIZED                  YIELD PER PUPIL
  Market Value of                      TAX                     (Equalized Rate
  Taxable Property                    RATES                   Applied to District
    Per Pupil                        ON $100                     Market Value)

  Above $100,000                      $.31                            $585
   (10 districts)
  $100,000-$50,000                     .38                             262
  (26 districts)
  $50,000-$30,000                      .55                             213
  (30 districts)
  $30,000-$10,000                      .72                             162
  (40 districts)
  Below $10,000                        .70                              60
  (4 districts)

Page 136

                              APPENDIX III TO
                   OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

         SELECTED BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY
             EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATION AND SELECTED INDICATORS
                          OF EDUCATIONAL QUALITY

  Selected Districts                Per Cent of   Per Cent of
  From High to Low by Professional  Teachers With          Total Staff   Student-
  Professional
  Market Valuation   Salaries   Per College     Masters   With Emerg- Counselor   Professional
  Per Pupil             Pupil       Degrees     Degrees   ency Permits Ratios    Per 100 Pupils

 ALAMO HIEIGHTS          $372          100%         40%         11%       645         4.80
 NORTH EAST               288           99          24           7      1,516         4.50
 SAN ANTONIO              251           98          29          17      2,320         4.00
 NORTH SIDE               258           99          20          17      1,493         4.30
 HARLANDALE               243           94          21          22      1,800         4.00
 EDGEWOOD                 209           96          15          47      3,098         4.06

Page 137

                APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

                      BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS
                       RANKED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUE
                       AND TAX RATE REQUIRED TO GENERATE
                        HIGHEST YIELD IN ALL DISTRICTS

    Districts Ranked from                                   Tax Rate Per $100
     High to Low Market                                      Needed to Equal
    Valuation Per Pupil                                       Highest Yield

       ALAMO HEIGHTS                                              $0.68
       JUDSON                                                      1.04
       EAST CENTRAL                                                1.17
       NORTH EAST                                                  1.21
       SOMERSET                                                    1.32
       SAN ANTONIO                                                 1.56
       NORTH SIDE                                                  1.65
       SOUTH WEST                                                  2.10
       SOUTH SIDE                                                  3.03
       HARLANDALE                                                  3.20
       SOUTH SAN ANTONIO                                           5.77
       EDGEWOOD                                                    5.76

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al.

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411 U.S. 1 93 S.Ct. 1278 36 L.Ed.2d 16 SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants,v.Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al. No. 71-1332. See 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919. Syllabus The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation.

# data[].attributes.headline
School Counselors Applying the ASCA 2016 Ethical Standards

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School Counselors Applying the ASCA 2016 Ethical Standards

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Johnson, G., & Carrico, J. (2020). School Counselors Applying the ASCA 2016 Ethical Standards. Journal of Counseling Research and Practice, 6(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.56702/uckx8598/jcrp0601.1

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School Counselors Applying the ASCA 2016 Ethical Standards

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As the student population becomes more diverse in the United States (Human Rights Campaign, 2018; National Center for Education Statistics, 2018), school counselors (SCs) are also called upon to provide comprehensive school counseling programs to meet the needs of all students (ASCA, 2019). In addit…

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Taylor, J. (2020, October 2). Mandate vs. law, what is the difference? 

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Taylor, J. (2020, October 2). Mandate vs. law, what is the difference? 

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Taylor, J. (2020, October 2). Mandate vs. law, what is the difference? NonStopLOCALnews. https://www.kulr8.com/great-falls/mandate-vs-law-what-is-the-difference/article_016da119-a33f-56b8-8027-3ce8dcce3813.html

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Mandate vs. law, what is the difference?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In July, Governor Steve Bullock issued a mask mandate in counties with four or more active COVID-19 cases.

# data[].attributes.headline
Texas Students Took Their School District to Court for Discrimination

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Texas Students Took Their School District to Court for Discrimination

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Texas Students Took Their School District to Court for Discrimination. (2021, December 15). ACLU of Texas. https://www.aclutx.org/en/news/texas-students-took-their-school-district-court-discrimination-and-won

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Texas Students Took Their School District to Court for Discrimination — and Won

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Students and parents in Magnolia Independent School District can breathe a sigh of relief that the district’s archaic, discriminatory dress code is a thing of the past.

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The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX.

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The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX.

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The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX. (n.d.). United States Courts. https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/14th-amendment-and-evolution-title-ix

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Ratified in 1868, Congress and the courts have applied the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to many aspects of public life over the past 150 years. Title IX is an example of how the 14th Amendment has been interpreted over time. Title IX, which is of particular interest to young people, prohibits institutions that receive federal funding from excluding students from participating in educational and athletic programs on the basis of sex.

Specifically, Title IX states that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

Title IX of the Civil Rights Act was signed into law on June 23, 1972 by President Richard M. Nixon. However, Title IX began its journey through all three branches of government when Representative Patsy T. Mink, of Hawaii, who is recognized as the major author and sponsor of the legislation, introduced it in Congress. When she died in 2002, Title IX was renamed the Patsy Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act. She was given the Medal of Freedom after her death.

One way to track the evolution of Title IX is to examine the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell. As the high court's first Title IX case, the issues that arose from the Act, demonstrate how each of the three branches exercises its authority. The case makes Title IX a study not only of the 14th Amendment but also of the impact of the push and pull of the separation of powers on law-abiding citizens.

In a Nutshell

The Legislative Branch. Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which requires that no person be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex under "any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." It authorizes any federal agency that provides such assistance to issue regulations to enforce the prohibition of sex discrimination. It also allows termination of financial assistance when an institution does not voluntarily comply.

The Executive Branch. In 1975, the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (which became the Department of Education and is referred to here as the Department) issued implementing regulations requiring every educational institution that receives federal financial assistance to file a document assuring its compliance with Title IX.

The Judicial Branch. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1984 that Title IX's non-discrimination and compliance requirements apply to any educational institution that receives federal financial assistance through grants provided directly to its students. At that time, the requirement applied only to the specific program or activity receiving federal assistance. In this instance the program was student financial aid.

The Legislative Branch. In early 1988, the Senate and House of Representatives each responded to the Supreme Court decision by passing legislation (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987) which clarifies that a "program or activity," for purposes of Title IX and other civil rights laws, refers to "all operations" of an institution whenever federal financial assistance is extended to "any part" of the institution.

The Executive Branch. On March 16, 1988, President Reagan vetoed the legislation on grounds that it "vastly and unjustifiably expand[s] the power of the [f]ederal government over the decisions and affairs of private organizations."

The Legislative Branch. On March 22, 1988, Congress overrode the President's veto by passing again the legislation with the support of a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate. As a result, the Civil Rights Restoration Act became law.

How to Use These Resources

1. To get started, review the glossary and prepare students to use it with the case materials to underline terms and concept they find in the readings.

2. Have students read the Grove City College v. Bell facts and case summary and make a list of their questions and arguments.

3. Use the Title IX discussion questions to dive more deeply into the issues raised in Grove City College v. Bell.

4. Have students use the Title IX timeline as a reference for drawing a Venn Diagram or double bubble map to list the impacts of each branch of government on the evolution of Title IX.

5. Use the separation of powers discussion questions to illuminate how the push and pull of the three branches of government shaped Title IX. Guide students' understanding of how the separation of powers has an impact on the their daily life and the issues that matter to them.

6. Have students view the Ahead of the Majority video on Representative Patsy Mink, often called the Mother of Title IX. Next, have students select a Pathways to the Bench video profile of a federal judge whose story also deals with personal adversities that motivated them to be of service.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Ratified in 1868, Congress and the courts have applied the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to many aspects of public life over the past 150 years. Title IX is an example of how the 14th Amendment has been interpreted over time.

# data[].attributes.headline
The Fed - What is a regulation and how is it made?

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The Fed - What is a regulation and how is it made?

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The Fed - What is a regulation and how is it made? (n.d.). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-is-a-regulation.htm

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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

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The Fed - What is a regulation and how is it made?

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The Federal Reserve Board of Governors in Washington DC.

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The School Counselor and Cultural Diversity - American School Counselor Association (ASCA):

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The School Counselor and Cultural Diversity - American School Counselor Association (ASCA):

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The School Counselor and Cultural Diversity - American School Counselor Association (ASCA). (n.d.). https://www.schoolcounselor.org/Standards-Positions/Position-Statements/ASCA-Position-Statements/The-School-Counselor-and-Cultural-Diversity

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(Adopted 1988; revised 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2015, 2021)

ASCA Position

School counselors have a professional and ethical responsibility to expand personal multicultural and social justice advocacy, awareness, knowledge and skills to be an effective, culturally competent school counselor. School counselors work toward cultural competence and cultural humility to provide culturally sustaining school counseling. School counselors demonstrate responsiveness by collaborating with students and stakeholders in support of a school and community climate that embraces cultural diversity and helps to promote all students' academic, career and social/emotional development.

The Rationale

Diversity is a "range of cultures and subcultures that represent attitudes, beliefs, values, rituals, symbols, norms and conventions, customs, behaviors and ideologies" (Stone & Dahir, 2016, p. 294). Culture is a powerful and pervasive influence on the attitudes and behaviors of students, stakeholders and school counselors. In response to cultural diversification in schools and communities, school counselors must be more globally responsive and culturally sustaining in the educational and social environment than ever before.

As a part of this charge, school counselors need to continue to enhance knowledge and awareness of prejudice, power and various forms of oppression and utilize culturally responsive skills to support ever-changing student needs (ASCA Ethical Standards, 2022). In support of students, school counselors implement "equitable academic, career and social/emotional developmental opportunities for all students" (ASCA Ethical Standards, 2022). It is an "expectation, not the exception" for school counselors to integrate multiculturalism and social justice perspectives into their work as advocates and leaders (Ratts and Greenleaf, 2017, p.8).

The School Counselor's Role

The ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors (2022) and a "host of voices in school counseling literature point to school counselor advocacy as a key factor in making progress toward this vision of equitable schools and communities. Our vision for equitable, inclusive and culturally sustaining schools can inform our advocacy goals as people and as professionals" (Grothaus, et al., 2020, p. 26).

School counselors can provide culturally responsive counseling by:

exploring their personal knowledge, attitudes and beliefs about working with diverse student populations

ensuring each student has access to a school counseling program that advocates for all students in diverse cultural groups

addressing the impact poverty and social class have on student achievement

identifying the impact of family culture upon student performance

delivering culturally sensitive instruction, appraisal and advisement, and counseling

ensuring all students' rights are respected and all students' needs are met

consulting and collaborating with stakeholders to create a school climate that welcomes and appreciates the strengths and gifts of culturally diverse students

using data to measure access to programs and to close disproportionate gaps in opportunity, information and resources that affect achievement among diverse student populations (Henfield et al., 2014)

enhancing their own cultural competence and facilitating the cultural awareness, knowledge and skills of all school personnel (Ratts & Greenleaf, 2017; Ratts, et al., 2015)

A culturally sustaining school counseling program includes a school counseling program advisory council that incorporates diverse perspectives and has representation reflecting the school's cultural census. Advisory councils can support the school counseling program in the development of goals, culturally relevant curriculum and pedagogy. and strategic planning, as well as community bridging, awareness and advocacy (Grothaus, et al., 2020).

Summary

School counselors implement a culturally sustaining school counseling program that creates systematic change through growth, self-awareness, humility, knowledge of worldviews and cultural identities (Grothaus, et al., 2020). School counselors collaborate with all stakeholders to provide relevant interventions and strategies that advocate for and promote social justice for all students (Ratts, 2015, as cited in Grothaus, et al., 2020). Through their school counseling programs, school counselors are positioned to actively become a part of the solution where cultural diversity is fully embraced in schools (ASCA, 2020).

References

American School Counselor Association. (2022). ASCA ethical standards for school counselors. Alexandria, VA: Author.

American School Counselor Association. (2020) Standards in practice: Eliminating racism and bias in schools: The school counselor's role. Alexandria, VA: Author.

Grothaus, T., Johnson, K. F., & Edirmanasinghe, N. (2020). Culturally sustaining school counseling. Alexandria: VA: American School Counseling Association.

​*Note this position statement includes minor updates to reflect the revisions to the 2022 ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors.

Henfield, M. S., Washington, A. R., & Byrd, J. A. (2014). Addressing academic and opportunity gaps impacting gifted Black males: Implications for school counselors. Gifted Child Today, 37(3), 147-154. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1076217514530118

Lekas, H. M., Pahl, K., & Fuller Lewis, C. (2020). Rethinking cultural competence: Shifting to cultural humility. Health Services Insights, 13, 1178632920970580. https://doi.org/10.1177/1178632920970580

Ratts, M. J., & Greenleaf, A. T. (2017). Multicultural and social justice counseling competencies: A leadership framework for professional school counselors. Professional School Counseling. https://doi.org/10.1177/2156759X18773582

Ratts, M., Singh, A., Nassar-McMillian, S., Butler, S. & McCullough, J. (2016). Multicultural and social justice counseling competencies: Guidelines for the counseling profession. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development. 44. 28-48. 10.1002/jmcd.12035.

Stone, C.B., & Dahir, C.A. (2016). The transformed school counselor (3 rd ed.). Cengage Learning.

Resources

American School Counselor Association (2019). ASCA national model: A framework for school counseling programs. Alexandria, VA.

American School Counselor Association (2019). ASCA Standards for School Counselor Preparation Programs. Alexandria, VA.

Atkins, R., & Oglesby, A. (2019). Interrupting racism: Equity and social justice in school counseling. Routledge.

Chu-Lien Chao, R. (2013). Race/ethnicity and multicultural competence among school counselors: Multicultural training, racial/ethnic identity, and color-blind racial attitudes. Journal of Counseling and Development, 91, 140-151.

Council for Accreditation of Counseling & Related Educational Programs (CACREP; 2016). Social and cultural diversity professional counseling identity. Alexandria, VA: Author.

Frances, D. (2020). Multicultural counseling: Understanding bias and practicing humility [Webinar]. American School Counseling Association. https://videos.schoolcounselor.org/cross-cultural-counseling-understand-bias-and-practice-humility.

Guzman, M. R., Calfa, N. A., Kerne, V., McCarthy, C. (2013). Examination of multicultural counseling competencies in school counselors. Journal of School Counseling, 11(7), 1-27.

Howard, T. (2020). Why race and culture matter in schools: Closing the achievement gap in America's classrooms. New York: Teachers College Press.

Merlin, C. (2016). Build multiculturally aware students [Webinar]. American School Counseling Association. https://videos.schoolcounselor.org/build-multiculturally-aware-students.

Merlin-Knoblich, C., Moss, L., Cholewa, B., & Sringer, S. I. (2019). A consensual qualitative research exploration of school counselor multicultural education behaviors. Professional School Counseling. https://doi.org/10.1177/2156759X20940637

Nieto, S & Bode, P. (2018). Affirming diversity: The sociopolitical context of multicultural education. Pearson.

Owens, D., Bodenhorn, N., Bryant, R. M. (2010). Self-efficacy and multicultural competence of school counselors. Journal of School Counseling, 8(17), 1-20.

Studer, J. R. (2015). The essential school counselor in a changing society. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Shure, L., West-Oltunji, C., & Cholewa, B. (2019). Investigating the relationship between school counselor recommendations and student cultural behavioral styles. Journal of Negro Education, 88(4), 454-466.

​*Note this position statement includes minor updates to reflect the revisions to the 2022 ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The School Counselor and Cultural Diversity

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
(Adopted 1988; revised 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2015, 2021) School counselors have a professional and ethical responsibility to expand personal multicultural and social justice advocacy, awareness, knowledge and skills to be an effective, culturally competent school counselor. School counselors work toward cultural competence and cultural humility to provide culturally sustaining school counseling.

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The School Counselor and Equity for All Students - American School Counselor Association (ASCA)

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The School Counselor and Equity for All Students - American School Counselor Association (ASCA)

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The School Counselor and Equity for All Students - American School Counselor Association (ASCA). (n.d.). https://www.schoolcounselor.org/Standards-Positions/Position-Statements/ASCA-Position-Statements/The-School-Counselor-and-Equity-for-All-Students

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The School Counselor and Equity for All Students

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(Adopted 2006, revised 2012, 2018) School counselors recognize and distinguish individual and group differences and strive to equally value all students and groups. School counselors are advocates for the equitable treatment of all students in school and in the community. According to the U.S.

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H.R. 6687 (IH) - Combating Implicit Bias in Education Act (20 U.S.C. 7801)

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H.R. 6687 (IH) - Combating Implicit Bias in Education Act (20 U.S.C. 7801)

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The Secretary of Education shall award grants, on a competitive basis, to local educational agencies to provide training to educators, principals, and other staff of elementary schools and secondary schools on implicit bias, for the purposes of— ending discrimination based on such bias, including in the administration of exclusionary discipline (including suspensions and expulsions); in access to gifted and talented programs; and in the apportionment of academic resources

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Official Publications from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

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20 U.S.C. 1221-1 - National policy with respect to equal educational opportunity 

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20 U.S.C. 1221-1 - National policy with respect to equal educational opportunity 

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No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by— (a) the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within schools; (Pub. L. 93-380, title VIII, §801, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 597).

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§1221-1. National policy with respect to equal educational opportunity

Recognizing that the Nation's economic, political, and social security require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reaffirms, as a matter of high priority, the Nation's goal of equal educational opportunity, and (2) declares it to be the policy of the United States of America that every citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or her full potential without financial barriers.

( Pub. L. 93-380, title VIII, §801, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 597.)

Editorial Notes

Codification

Section was enacted as part of Education Amendments of 1974, and not as part of General Education Provisions Act which comprises this chapter.

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Effective Date

Pub. L. 93-380, §2(c), Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 488, provided that:

"(1) Unless otherwise specified, each provision of this Act [see Tables for classification] and each amendment made by this Act shall be effective on and after the sixtieth day after the enactment of this Act [Aug. 21, 1974].

"(2) In any case where the effective date for an amendment made by this Act is expressly stated to be effective after June 30, 1973, or on July 1, 1973, such amendment shall be deemed to have been enacted on June 30, 1973."

Study of Civilian Aviation Training Programs

Pub. L. 102-325, title XIV, §1410, July 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 821, directed Secretary of Education to enter into appropriate arrangements with National Academy of Sciences Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education to study civilian aviation training programs needed to satisfy workforce requirements of commercial aviation industry in year 2000 and beyond, directed Secretary to request that National Academy of Sciences Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education submit an interim report to Secretary and Congress within 1 year after July 23, 1992, and directed that the study be completed within 2 years of July 23, 1992, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 105-332, §6(b)(2), Oct. 31, 1998, 112 Stat. 3128.

National Commission on Independent Higher Education

National Commission on Cost of Higher Education

Education Council Act of 1991

Pub. L. 102-62, June 27, 1991, 105 Stat. 305, as amended by Pub. L. 102-359, §1, Aug. 26, 1992, 106 Stat. 962; Pub. L. 103-290, §1, Aug. 1, 1994, 108 Stat. 1456; Pub. L. 103-382, title III, §362, Oct. 20, 1994, 108 Stat. 3975, provided for establishment, membership, etc., of National Education Commission on Time and Learning, which Commission was to examine the quality and adequacy of the study and learning time of elementary and secondary students in the United States, including issues regarding the length of the school day and year, the extent and role of homework, how time is being used for academic subjects, year-round professional opportunities for teachers, and use of school facilities for extended learning programs, report to Congress and the Secretary on the results of the study not later than 2 years after the Commission concludes its first meeting, and terminate Sept. 30, 1994, and provided for establishment, membership, etc., of National Council on Education Standards and Testing, which Council was to advise the American people whether suitable specific education standards should be established for the knowledge and skills that students should possess and that schools should impart in order that American student leave grades 4, 8, and 12 demonstrating competency in challenging subject matters and whether an appropriate system of voluntary national tests or examinations should be established to provide prompt and accurate information on the progress made towards specific education standards by individual students, schools, school systems, States, and the Nation as a whole, submit a final report, as soon as possible, but not later than Dec. 31, 1991, to Congress, Secretary of Education, and National Education Goals Panel, and cease to exist 90 days after submitting its final report.

National Commission on Responsibilities for Financing Postsecondary Education

Pub. L. 99-498, title XIII, §1321, Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1584, as amended by Pub. L. 101-324, July 6, 1990, 104 Stat. 300; Pub. L. 102-170, title III, §306, Nov. 26, 1991, 105 Stat. 1136, established as an independent agency in executive branch a commission to be known as National Commission on Responsibilities for Financing Postsecondary Education, directed Commission to study and investigate extent to which (1) there is a consistent and coherent Federal policy regarding the appropriate family role in financing costs of postsecondary education for family members, (2) current Federal laws and regulations promote stated Federal policy, and (3) extent to which State laws which remove parental responsibilities for children over 18 years of age conflict with Federal policy in this area, directed Commission to (A) summarize appropriate findings of National Commission on Student Financial Assistance, (B) recommend to Congress a comprehensive analysis on extent to which consensus exists regarding appropriate role of family in financing postsecondary education, and (C) recommend changes in current law required to achieve desired Federal policy, and provided that Commission would terminate 2 years after first meeting of its member, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 105-332, §6(a), Oct. 31, 1998, 112 Stat. 3127.

Study of Classroom Use of Volunteers

Native Hawaiian Education Study

Pub. L. 96-374, title XIII, §1331, Oct. 3, 1980, 94 Stat. 1499, established an Advisory Council on Native Hawaiian Education consisting of seven members appointed by Secretary of Education, after consultation with Governor of Hawaii, from among individuals who were professionals in various fields relating to human development, and who were familiar with educational problems of Native Hawaiians, to conduct a study to (A) evaluate effectiveness of State and federally assisted educational programs in serving Native Hawaiian children and extent to which such programs achieve their purposes with respect to such children, and (B) take into account special health, social, and psychological needs of Native Hawaiian children, and to submit a report to Secretary and to Congress not later than Jan. 31, 1983, containing findings and recommendations of the Council, with the Council to terminate 60 days after submission of its report.

Appropriations Not Authorized for Native Hawaiian Education Study for Fiscal Year 1982, 1983, or 1984

Pub. L. 97-35, title V, §512(a), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 444, provided that: "No funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out part D of title XIII of the Education Amendments of 1980 [section 1331 of Pub. L. 96-374, set out as a note above] for fiscal year 1982, 1983, or 1984."

Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education; Studies and Surveys; Advisory Panel; Reports

Pub. L. 95-561, title XII, §1203, Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2335, as amended by Pub. L. 96-46, §2(a)(4), Aug. 6, 1979, 93 Stat. 340; Pub. L. 96-88, title III, §301(a)(2), (b)(1), title V, §501(a), 507, Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 677, 678, 689, 692, established a 15-member Advisory Panel on Financing Elementary and Secondary Education within Department of Education to provide for (1) availability of reliable and comparative data on status and trends in financing elementary and secondary education, (2) conduct of studies necessary to understand and analyze the trends and problems affecting financing of elementary and secondary education, both public and non-public, including prospects for adequate financing during the next ten years, and development of recommendations for Federal policies to assist in improving equity and efficiency of Federal and State systems for raising and distributing revenues to support elementary and secondary education, with views and recommendations of the Panel to be presented to 1980 White House Conference on Education.

White House Conference on Education: Report of Findings and Recommendations; National Conference Committee: Establishment, Membership, Report to President and Congress, Travel Expenses; Apportionment of Funds; Authorization of Appropriations

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Recognizing that the Nation’s economic, political, and social security require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reaffirms, as a matter of high priority, the Nation’s goal of equal educational opportunity, and (2) declares it to be the policy of the United States of America that every citi…

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The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX

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The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX

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Specifically, Title IX states that “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX, n.d.).

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Ratified in 1868, Congress and the courts have applied the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to many aspects of public life over the past 150 years. Title IX is an example of how the 14th Amendment has been interpreted over time. Title IX, which is of particular interest to young people, prohibits institutions that receive federal funding from excluding students from participating in educational and athletic programs on the basis of sex.

Specifically, Title IX states that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

Title IX of the Civil Rights Act was signed into law on June 23, 1972 by President Richard M. Nixon. However, Title IX began its journey through all three branches of government when Representative Patsy T. Mink, of Hawaii, who is recognized as the major author and sponsor of the legislation, introduced it in Congress. When she died in 2002, Title IX was renamed the Patsy Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act. She was given the Medal of Freedom after her death.

One way to track the evolution of Title IX is to examine the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell. As the high court's first Title IX case, the issues that arose from the Act, demonstrate how each of the three branches exercises its authority. The case makes Title IX a study not only of the 14th Amendment but also of the impact of the push and pull of the separation of powers on law-abiding citizens.

In a Nutshell

The Legislative Branch. Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which requires that no person be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex under "any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." It authorizes any federal agency that provides such assistance to issue regulations to enforce the prohibition of sex discrimination. It also allows termination of financial assistance when an institution does not voluntarily comply.

The Executive Branch. In 1975, the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (which became the Department of Education and is referred to here as the Department) issued implementing regulations requiring every educational institution that receives federal financial assistance to file a document assuring its compliance with Title IX.

The Judicial Branch. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1984 that Title IX's non-discrimination and compliance requirements apply to any educational institution that receives federal financial assistance through grants provided directly to its students. At that time, the requirement applied only to the specific program or activity receiving federal assistance. In this instance the program was student financial aid.

The Legislative Branch. In early 1988, the Senate and House of Representatives each responded to the Supreme Court decision by passing legislation (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987) which clarifies that a "program or activity," for purposes of Title IX and other civil rights laws, refers to "all operations" of an institution whenever federal financial assistance is extended to "any part" of the institution.

The Executive Branch. On March 16, 1988, President Reagan vetoed the legislation on grounds that it "vastly and unjustifiably expand[s] the power of the [f]ederal government over the decisions and affairs of private organizations."

The Legislative Branch. On March 22, 1988, Congress overrode the President's veto by passing again the legislation with the support of a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate. As a result, the Civil Rights Restoration Act became law.

How to Use These Resources

1. To get started, review the glossary and prepare students to use it with the case materials to underline terms and concept they find in the readings.

2. Have students read the Grove City College v. Bell facts and case summary and make a list of their questions and arguments.

3. Use the Title IX discussion questions to dive more deeply into the issues raised in Grove City College v. Bell.

4. Have students use the Title IX timeline as a reference for drawing a Venn Diagram or double bubble map to list the impacts of each branch of government on the evolution of Title IX.

5. Use the separation of powers discussion questions to illuminate how the push and pull of the three branches of government shaped Title IX. Guide students' understanding of how the separation of powers has an impact on the their daily life and the issues that matter to them.

6. Have students view the Ahead of the Majority video on Representative Patsy Mink, often called the Mother of Title IX. Next, have students select a Pathways to the Bench video profile of a federal judge whose story also deals with personal adversities that motivated them to be of service.

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The 14th Amendment and the Evolution of Title IX

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Ratified in 1868, Congress and the courts have applied the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to many aspects of public life over the past 150 years. Title IX is an example of how the 14th Amendment has been interpreted over time.

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al.

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al.

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In this class action, appellants claim that schoolchildren living in low-tax school districts are members of poor families. Due to substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting from differences in the value of the assessable property, the Texas system's local property taxation favors the more affluent and violates equal protection requirements because it relies heavily on local property taxes (411 U.S. 959, 93)

(SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT Et Al., Appellants, V. Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ Et Al., n.d.)

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411 U.S. 1

93 S.Ct. 1278

36 L.Ed.2d 16

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants,
v.
Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al.

No. 71-1332.

See 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919.

Syllabus

The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program designed to provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each district supplements state aid through an ad valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class action on behalf of schoolchildren said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The District Court, finding that wealth is a 'suspect' classification and that education is a 'fundamental' right, concluded that the system could be upheld only upon a showing, which appellants failed to make, that there was a compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded that appellants failed even to demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's system. Held:

1. This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. Pp. 18-44.

(a) The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. It has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class of 'poor' people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. Pp. 18-28.

(b) Nor does the Texas school-financing system impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a 'fundamental' right or liberty. Though education is one of the most important services performed by the State, it is not within the limited category of rights recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if some identifiable quantum of education is arguably entitled to constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise of other constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that purpose. Pp. 29-39.

(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke strict scrutiny since it involves the most delicate and difficult questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of review. Pp. 40-44.

2. The Texas system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly imperfect, the system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages participation in and significant control of each district's schools at the local level. Pp. 44-53.

D.C., 337 F.Supp. 280, reversed.

Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., for appellants.

Arthur Gochman, San Antonio, Tex., for appellees.

[Amicus Curiae Information from pages 3-5 intentionally omitted]

Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

II

We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect-classification not the fundamental-interest analysis persuasive.

A.

The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and its progeny, 52 the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment requirements in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were totally unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case emphasized that no constitutional violation would have been shown if the State had provided some 'adequate substitute' for a full stenographic transcript. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228, 92 S.Ct. 431, 434, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prisons, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269 (1958).

As suggested above, appellees and the District Court may have embraced a second or third approach, the second of which might be characterized as a theory of relative or comparative discrimination based on family income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correlation exists between the wealth of families within each district and the expenditures therein for education. That is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower the dollar amount of education received by the family's children.

The principal evidence adduced in support of this comparative-discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, noted, first, a positive correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. Second, the court found a similar correlation between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median family income. 337 F.Supp., at 282 n. 3.

B

'Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.' Ibid.

'The Court today does not 'pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection . . ..' To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.' Id., at 642, 89 S.Ct., at 1335. (Emphasis in original.)

Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained:

'We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease, without the payment of rent . . .. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.' Id., at 74, 92 S.Ct., at 874. (Emphasis supplied.)

Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expendi tures in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.

We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which 'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or liberty. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, supra, 316 U.S. at 536, 62 S.Ct. at 1111; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at 338- 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1001-1004. A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), expresses well the salient point: 81

'This is not a complaint that Congress . . . has unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to vote but rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the relief effected (to others similarly situated) . . ..

'(The federal law in question) does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state law. . . . We need only decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected . .. was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,' . . . that a legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' . . . and that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind . . .." Id., at 656-657, 86 S.Ct., at 1727. (Emphasis in original.)

C

It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights.

The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas' system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These same considerations are relevant to the determination whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, nevertheles bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next turn our attention.

III

The basic contours of the Texas school finance system have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will now describe in more detail that system and how it operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.

This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas school financing structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The District Court found that the State had failed even 'to establish a reasonable basis' for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil expenditure. 337 F.Supp., at 284. We disagree.

Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, they attack the school-financing system precisely because, in their view, it does not provide the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted in more equality in education expenditures. While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 107 the existence of 'some inequality' in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 485, 90 S.Ct. at 1161. Nor must the financing system fail because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the State's interest, which occasion 'less drastic' disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S., at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). It is also well to remember that even those districts that have reduced ability to make free decisions with respect to how much they spend on education still retain under the present system a large measure of authority as to how available funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous other decisions with respect to the operation of the schools. 108 The people of Texas may be justified in believing that other systems of school financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along with increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go increased control over local policies. 109

Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and control as would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live.

IV

In light of the considerable attention that has focused on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the District Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in public education. Some commentators have concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs that might be devised and approved, the result could not avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of public education. Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of these cases have found no clear or dependable answers and their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the desirability of completely uprooting the existing system.

These practical considerations, of course, play no role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democractic pressures of those who elect them.

Mr. Justice STEWART, concurring.

This doctrine is no more than a specific application of one of the first principles of constitutional adjudication-the basic presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv.L.Rev. 129 (1893).

Under the Equal Protection Clause, this presumption of constitutional validity disappears when a State has enacted legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently 'suspect.' Because of the historic purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prime example of such a 'suspect' classification is one that is based upon race. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222. But there are other classifications that, at least in some settings, are also 'suspect'-for example, those based upon national origin, 4 alienage, 5 indigency, 6 or illegitimacy. 7

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Although I agree with my Brother WHITE that the Texas statutory scheme is devoid of any rational basis, and for that reason is violative of the Equal Protection Clause, I also record my disagreement with the Court's rather distressing assertion that a right may be deemed 'fundamental' for the purposes of equal protection analysis only if it is 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' Ante, at 33-34. As my Brother MARSHALL convincingly demonstrates, our prior cases stand for the proposition that 'fundamentality' is, in large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, '(a)s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.' Post, at 102 103.

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice BRENNAN join, dissenting.

The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these latter districts, no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use of the real estate property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is the only revenue-raising mechanism extended to school districts, is practically and legally unavailable. That this is the situation may be readily demonstrated.

Local school districts in Texas raise their portion of the Foundation School Program-the Local Fund Assignment-by levying ad valorem taxes on the property located within their boundaries. In addition, the districts are authorized, by the state constitution and by statute, to levy ad valorem property taxes in order to raise revenues to support educational spending over and above the expenditure of Foundation School Program funds.

Both the Edgewood and Alamo Heights districts are located in Bexar County, Texas. Student enrollment in Alamo Heights is 5,432, in Edgewood 22,862. The per-pupil market value of the taxable property in Alamo Heights is $49,078, in Edgewood $5,960. In a typical relevant year, Alamo Heights had a maintenance tax rate of $1.20 and a debt service (bond) tax rate of 20¢ per $100 assessed evaluation, while Edgewood had a maintenance rate of 52¢ and a bond rate of 67¢. These rates, when applied to the respective tax bases, yielded Alamo Heights $1,433,473 in maintenance dollars and $236,074 in bond dollars, and Edgewood $223,034 in maintenance dollars and $279,023 in bond dollars. As is readily apparent, because of the variance in tax bases between the districts, results, in terms of revenues, do not correlate with effort, in terms of tax rate. Thus, Alamo Heights, with a tax base approximately twice the size of Edgewood's base, realized approximately six times as many maintenance dollars as Edgewood by using a tax rate only approximately two and one-half times larger. Similarly, Alamo Heights realized slightly fewer bond dollars by using a bond tax rate less than one-third of that used by Edgewood.

Nor is Edgewood's revenue-raising potential only deficient when compared with Alamo Heights. North East District has taxable property with a per-pupil market value of approximately $31,000, but total taxable property approximately four and one-half times that of Edgewood. Applying a maintenance rate of $1, North East yielded $2,818,148. Thus, because of its superior tax base, North East was able to apply a tax rate slightly less than twice that applied by Edgewood and yield more than 10 times the maintenance dollars. Similarly, North East, with a bond rate of 45¢, yielded $1,249,159-more than four times Edgewood's yield with two-thirds the rate.

In order to equal the highest yield in any other Bexar County district, Alamo Heights would be required to tax at the rate of 68 per $100 of assessed valuation. Edgewood would be required to tax at the prohibitive rate of $5.76 per $100. But state law places a $1.50 per $100 ceiling on the maintenance tax rate, a limit that would surely be reached long before Edgewood attained an equal yield. Edgewood is thus precluded in law, as well as in fact, from achieving a yield even close to that of some other districts.

'The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).' Neither Taxas nor the majority heeds this rule. If the State aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice, by permitting school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose to do so, it utterly fails in achieving its purpose in districts with property tax bases so low that there is little if any opportunity for interested parents, rich or poor, to augment school district revenues. Requiring the State to establish only that unequal treatment is in furtherance of a permissible goal, without also requiring the State to show that the means chosen to effectuate that goal are rationally related to its achievement, makes equal protection analysis no more than an empty gesture. 6 In my view, the parents and children in Edgewood, and in like districts, suffer from an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause.

Perhaps the majority believes that the major disparity in revenues provided and permitted by the Texas system is inconsequential. I cannot agree, however, that the difference of the magnitude appearing in this case can sensibly be ignored, particularly since the State itself considers it so important to provide opportunities to exceed the minimum state educational expenditures.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting.

A.

B

The appellants do not deny the disparities in educational funding caused by variations in taxable district property wealth. They do contend, however, that whatever the differences in per-pupil spending among Texas districts, there are no discriminatory consequences for the children of the disadvantaged districts. They recognize that what is at stake in this case is the quality of the public education provided Texas children in the districts in which they live. But appellants reject the suggestion that the quality of education in any particular district is determined by money beyond some minimal level of funding which they believe to be assured every Texas district by the Minimum Foundation School Program. In their view, there is simply no denial of equal educational opportunity to any Texas school children as a result of the widely varying per-pupil spending power provided districts under the current financing scheme.

At the very least, in view of the substantial interdistrict disparities in funding and in resulting educational inputs shown by appellees to exist under the Texas financing scheme, the burden of proving that these disparities do not in fact affect the quality of children's education must fall upon the appellants. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F.Supp. 844, 860-861 (D.C.D.C.1971). Yet appellants made no effort in the District Court to demonstrate that educational quality is not affected by variations in funding and in resulting inputs. And, in this Court, they have argued no more than that the relationship is ambiguous. This is hardly sufficient to overcome appellees' prima facie showing of state-created discrimination between the schoolchildren of Texas with respect to objective educational opportunity.

C

Despite the evident discriminatory effect of the Texas financing scheme, both the appellants and the majority raise substantial questions concerning the precise character of the disadvantaged class in this case. The District Court concluded that the Texas financing scheme draws 'distinction betwen groups of citizens depending upon the wealth of the district in which they live' and thus creates a disadvantaged class composed of persons living in property-poor districts. See 337 F.Supp., at 282. See also id., at 281. In light of the data introduced before the District Court, the conclusion that the schoolchildren of property-poor districts constitute a sufficient class for our purposes seems indisputablet to me.

It may be, though, that my Brother STEWART is not in fact demanding precise identification of the membership of the disadvantaged class for purposes of equal protection analysis, but is merely unable to discern with sufficient clarity the nature of the discrimination charged in this case. Indeed, the Court itself displays some uncertainty as to the exact nature of the discrimination and the resulting disadvantaged class alleged to exist in this case. See ante, at 19-20. It is, of course, essential to equal protection analysis to have a firm grasp upon the nature of the discrimination at issue. In fact, the absence of such a clear, articulable understanding of the nature of alleged discrimination in a particular instance may well suggest the absence of any real discrimination. But such is hardly the case here.

II

To avoid having the Texas financing scheme struck down because of the interdistrict variations in taxable property wealth, the District Court determined that it was insufficient for appellants to show merely that the State's scheme was rationally related to some legitimate state purpose; rather, the discrimination inherent in the scheme had to be shown necessary to promote a 'compelling state interest' in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The basis for this determination was twofold: first, the financing scheme divides citizens on a wealth basis, a classification which the District Court viewed as highly suspect; and second, the discriminatory scheme directly affects what it considered to be a 'fundamental interest,' namely, education.

A.

A similar process of analysis with respect to the invidiousness of the basis on which a particular classification is drawn has also influenced the Court as to the appropriate degree of scrutiny to to accorded any particular case. The highly suspect character of classifications based on race, 63 nationality, 64 or alienage 65 is well established. The reasons why such classifications call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recognized as 'discrete and insular minorities' who are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at 372, 91 S.Ct., at 1852; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783-784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). Moreover, race, nationality, or alienage is "in most circumstances irrelevant' to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 192, 85 S.Ct., at 288. Instead, lines drawn on such bases are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices rather than legislative rationality. It may be that all of these considerations, which make for particular judicial solicitude in the face of discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, or alienage, do not coalesce-or at least not to the same degree-in other forms of discrimination. Nevertheless, these considerations have undoubtedly influenced the care with which the Court has scrutinized other forms of discrimination.

'these interests are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment of indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors to whom the statute itself repeatedly makes reference. State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state interests they may serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self sufficiency and self respect.' Id., at 141-142, 92 S.Ct., at 2034.

The Court, in short, clearly did not consider the problems of fraud and collection that the state legislature might have concluded were peculiar to indigent criminal defendants to be either sufficiently important or at least sufficiently substantiated to justify denial of the protective exemptions afforded to all civil judgment debtors, to a class composed exclusively of indigent criminal debtors.

'(I)mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth . . ..' Id., at 175-176, 92 S.Ct., at 1407 (footnote omitted).

Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something which the individual cannot control, and should generally be irrelevant in legislative considerations. Yet illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence, discrimination on the basis of birth-particularly when it affects innocent children warrants special judicial consideration.

Opinions such as those in Reed and James seem drawn more as efforts to shield rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's decisions. Such obfuscated action may be appropriate to a political body such as a legislature, but it is not appropriate to this Court. Open debate of the bases for the Court's action is essential to the rationality and consistency of our decisionmaking process. Only in this way can we avoid the label of legislature and ensure the integrity of the judicial process.

Nevertheless, the majority today attempts to force this case into the same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as decisions involving discrimination affecting commercial interests. By so doing, the majority singles this case out for analytic treatment at odds with what seems to me to be the clear trend of recent decisions in this Court, and thereby ignores the constitutional importance of the interest at stake and the invidiousness of the particular classification, factors that call for far more than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing scheme which the majority pursues. Yet if the discrimination inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with the care demanded by the interest and classification present in this case, the unconstitutionality of that scheme is unmistakable.

B

'Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. . . .'

C

In the final anaylsis, then The invidious characteristics of the group wealth classification present in this case merely serve to emphasize the need for careful judicial scrutiny of the State's justifications for the resulting interdistrict discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded to the schoolchildren of Texas.

D

The only justification offered by appellants to sustain the discrimination in educational opportunity caused by the Texas financing scheme is local educational control. Presented with this justification, the District Court concluded that '(n)ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state interests for their classifications based upon wealth, they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.' 337 F.Supp., at 284. I must agree with this conclusion.

'As a result of the acts of the Legislature our school system is not of mere local concern but it is statewide. While a school district is local in territorial limits, it is an integral part of the vast school system which is coextensive with the confines of the State of Texas.' Treadaway v. Whitney Independent School District, 205 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex.Civ.App.1947).

See also El Dorado Independent School District v. Tisdale, 3 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.Com.App. 1928).

Moreover, even if we accept Texas' general dedication to local control in educational matters, it is difficult to find any evidence of such dedication with respect to fiscal matters. It ignores reality to suggest-as the Court does, ante, at 49-50-that the local property tax element of the Texas financing scheme reflects a conscious legislative effort to provide school districts with local fiscal control. If Texas had a system truly dedicated to local fiscal control, one would expect the quality of the educational opportunity provided in each district to vary with the decision of the voters in that district as to the level of sacrifice they wish to make for public education. In fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the opposite result. Local school districts cannot choose to have the best education in the State by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the educational opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined by the amount of taxable property located in the district-a factor over which local voters can exercise no control.

III

In conclusion, it is essential to recognize that an end to the wide variations in taxable district property wealth inherent in the Texas financing scheme would entail none of the untoward consequences suggested by the Court or by the appellants.

First, affirmance of the District Court's decisions would hardly sound the death knell for local control of education. It would mean neither centralized decisionmaking nor federal court intervention in the operation of public schools. Clearly, this suit has nothing to do with local decisionmaking with respect to educational policy or even educational spending. It involves only a narrow aspect of local control-namely, local control over the raising of educational funds. In fact, in striking down interdistrict disparities in taxable local wealth, the District Court took the course which is most likely to make true local control over educational decision-making a reality for all Texas school districts.

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Page 134

                                    TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

                                     REVENUES OF TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS
                        CATEGORIZED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS
                                             CATEGORIES

                                                                                                    Total Revenues
                                                               State and Local                        Per Pupil
 Market Value of                                                Revenues Per      Federal           (State-Local-
 Taxable Property         Local Revenues  State Revenues        Pupil (Columns    Revenues          Federal, Columns
  Per Pupil                 Per Pupil       Per Pupil             1 and 2)        Per Pupil           1, 2 and 4)


 Above $100,000                $610            $205                 $815             $41                $856
  (10 districts)
 $100,000-$50,000               287             257                  544              66                 610
  (26 districts)
 $50,000-$30,000                224             260                  484              45                 529
  (30 districts)
 $30,000-$10,000                166             295                  461              85                 546
  (40 districts)
 Below $10,000                   63             243                  306             135                 441
 (4 districts)

Page 135

      APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

                         TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY
                          EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES, EQUALIZED
                            TAX RATES, AND YIELD OF RATES

   CATEGORIES                       EQUALIZED                  YIELD PER PUPIL
  Market Value of                      TAX                     (Equalized Rate
  Taxable Property                    RATES                   Applied to District
    Per Pupil                        ON $100                     Market Value)

  Above $100,000                      $.31                            $585
   (10 districts)
  $100,000-$50,000                     .38                             262
  (26 districts)
  $50,000-$30,000                      .55                             213
  (30 districts)
  $30,000-$10,000                      .72                             162
  (40 districts)
  Below $10,000                        .70                              60
  (4 districts)

Page 136

                              APPENDIX III TO
                   OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

         SELECTED BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY
             EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATION AND SELECTED INDICATORS
                          OF EDUCATIONAL QUALITY

  Selected Districts                Per Cent of   Per Cent of
  From High to Low by Professional  Teachers With          Total Staff   Student-
  Professional
  Market Valuation   Salaries   Per College     Masters   With Emerg- Counselor   Professional
  Per Pupil             Pupil       Degrees     Degrees   ency Permits Ratios    Per 100 Pupils

 ALAMO HIEIGHTS          $372          100%         40%         11%       645         4.80
 NORTH EAST               288           99          24           7      1,516         4.50
 SAN ANTONIO              251           98          29          17      2,320         4.00
 NORTH SIDE               258           99          20          17      1,493         4.30
 HARLANDALE               243           94          21          22      1,800         4.00
 EDGEWOOD                 209           96          15          47      3,098         4.06

Page 137

                APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

                      BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS
                       RANKED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUE
                       AND TAX RATE REQUIRED TO GENERATE
                        HIGHEST YIELD IN ALL DISTRICTS

    Districts Ranked from                                   Tax Rate Per $100
     High to Low Market                                      Needed to Equal
    Valuation Per Pupil                                       Highest Yield

       ALAMO HEIGHTS                                              $0.68
       JUDSON                                                      1.04
       EAST CENTRAL                                                1.17
       NORTH EAST                                                  1.21
       SOMERSET                                                    1.32
       SAN ANTONIO                                                 1.56
       NORTH SIDE                                                  1.65
       SOUTH WEST                                                  2.10
       SOUTH SIDE                                                  3.03
       HARLANDALE                                                  3.20
       SOUTH SAN ANTONIO                                           5.77
       EDGEWOOD                                                    5.76

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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al.

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411 U.S. 1 93 S.Ct. 1278 36 L.Ed.2d 16 SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants,v.Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al. No. 71-1332. See 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919. Syllabus The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation.

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The Human Rights Law: The HRL prohibits educational institutions from denying the use of its facilities to any person otherwise qualified and allowing discrimination based on protected classes of persons. These classes are: Race, Color, Religion, Military Status, Disability, Sex, National Orientation, Age, Sexual Orientation, Marital Status, Gender Identity or Expression

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AUSTIN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
206 E. 9th Street, Room 14.138, 14th Floor
Austin, TX 78701

Marco Salinas, Administrator
Tel: (512) 499-3251
Fax: (512) 499-3278
TDD: (512) 499-2445

The Commission investigates allegations of discrimination in employment, under contract with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. It also investigates housing and public accommodations complaints.

Geographic area(s) served: City of Austin
Type(s) of publications: None

TEXAS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
P.O. Box 13493
Austin, TX 78711

William M. Hale, Executive Director
Tel: (512) 437-3450
Fax: (512) 437-3478
TDD: None

The Texas Commission on Human Rights enforces State laws prohibiting employment and housing discrimination. Both laws are substantially equivalent to their Federal counterparts.These laws are: employment, Texas Commission on Human Rights Act; and housing, Texas Fair Housing Act.

Geographic area(s) served: State of Texas
Type(s) of publications: Annual report and various brochures

DALLAS FAIR HOUSING OFFICE
City Hall, 1-B North
1500 Marilla Street
Dallas, TX 76201

Rosie Norris, Administrator
Tel: (214) 670-5677
Fax: (214) 670-0665
TDD: None

The office is mandated to further and promote fair housing choice through enforcement of local and Federal laws and regulations, outreach, and education, so that individuals of similar incomes have similar opportunities for housing and services without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, or familial status.

Geographic area(s) served: City of Dallas
Type(s) of publications: None

FORT WORTH HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION
1000 Throckmorton
Fort Worth, TX 76102

Michael D. Ivey, Director
Tel: (817) 871-7525
Fax: (817) 871-7529
TDD: None

The Commission serves as an enforcement agency for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the City of Fort Worth's Fair Employment Ordinance No. 7278, as amended. It also serves as a deferral agency for the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Texas Commission on Human Rights and an investigative agency for housing, employment, and public accommodations charges of discrimination.

Geographic area(s) served: City of Fort Worth and Tarrant County
Type(s) of publications: Annual report

HOUSTON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CONTRACT COMPLIANCE DIVISION
500 Jefferson, Suite 1400
Houston, TX 77002-7333

Lenoria Y. Walker, Director
Tel: (713) 658-3800
Fax: (713) 658-3824
TTY: (713) 247-1001

The office is composed of three enforcement sections: Employee Relations, Minority/Women/Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (MWDBE), and Contract Compliance. The Employee Relations Section enforces equal employment laws internally as they apply to the city as an employer. MWDBE certifies minority and women ownership of businesses. Contract Compliance enforces the prevailing wage rate.

Geographic area(s) served: City of Houston
Type(s) of publications: Bimonthly newsletter

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AUSTIN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 206 E. 9th Street, Room 14.138, 14th Floor Austin, TX 78701 Marco Salinas, Administrator Tel: (512) 499-3251 Fax: (512) 499-3278 TDD: (512) 499-2445 The Commission investigates allegations of discrimination in employment, under contract with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. It also investigates housing and public accommodations complaints.

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The Dignity for All Students Act (DASA): state law that prohibits bullying, harassment, and discrimination. DASA, like the HRL, includes a list of protected classes: Race, Color, Weight, National origin, Ethnic group, Religion, Religious practice, Disability, Sexual orientation, Gender, Sex

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Civil Rights Act of 1964-Title VII: prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, etc.

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it unlawful to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity) or religion. The Act also makes it unlawful to retaliate against a person because the person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.

Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including:

Hiring and firing;

Compensation, assignment, or classification of employees;

Transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall;

Job advertisements and recruitment;

Testing;

Use of company facilities;

Training and apprenticeship programs;

Retirement plans, leave and benefits; or

Other terms and conditions of employment.

Discriminatory practices under Title VII also include:

Harassment on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity) or religion;

Refusal or failure to reasonably accommodate an individual's sincerely held religious observances or practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business;

Employment decisions based on stereotypes or assumptions about the abilities, traits, or performance of individuals of a certain race, color, national origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity), or religion;

Denial of employment opportunities to an individual because of marriage to, or association with, an individual of a particular race, color, national origin, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity) or religion; and

Other employment decisions based on race, color, national origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity) or religion.

Complaints under Title VII are filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Under Title VII, the Department of Justice has authority to prosecute enforcement actions against state and local government employers upon referral by the EEOC of complaints arising under the Act. The Department of Justice also has authority to initiate investigations and prosecute enforcement actions against state and local government employers where it has reason to believe that a "pattern or practice" of employment discrimination exists.

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) seeks to ensure that servicemembers are entitled to return to their civilian employment upon completion of their military service. Servicemembers should be reinstated with the seniority, status, and rate of pay that they would have obtained had they remained continuously employed by their civilian employer. To qualify for USERRA's reemployment rights, a servicemember must meet the following eligibility criteria:

The servicemember must have left a civilian job;

The servicemember must have given notice to the employer that he/she was leaving to perform military service;

The military service must not exceed five years (although there are a few exceptions);

The servicemember must have had an honorable discharge; and

The servicemember must have reported back to work within the appropriate time constraints.

Reasonable efforts must be made to enable returning employees to refresh or upgrade their skills to enable them to qualify for reemployment. Additionally, servicemembers are entitled to immediate reinstatement of health insurance for the member and previously covered dependents with no waiting period and no exclusion of preexisting conditions other than those that are military service-related. Employers must reemploy servicemembers who are disabled because of their military service in a position most nearly approximating their former position if they can no longer perform that job.

USERRA also protects servicemembers from discrimination in hiring, promotion, and retention on the basis of past, present and future membership in the armed services, or military obligations.

USERRA applies to voluntary as well as involuntary military service, in peacetime as well as wartime, and the law applies to virtually all civilian employers, including the federal government, state and local governments, and private employers, regardless of size. Complaints under USERRA are filed with the Veterans' Employment and Training Service of the Department of Labor. Under USERRA, the Department of Justice may appear on behalf of a servicemember if the Department of Justice is reasonably satisfied that the servicemember is entitled to the rights or benefits being sought.

Executive Order 11246

Executive Order 11246, signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965, prohibits federal government contractors and federal government-assisted construction contractors and subcontractors, who do over $10,000 in federal government business in one year from discriminating in employment decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or national origin.

The Executive Order also requires federal government contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that equal opportunity is provided in all aspects of their employment. Affirmative action, or positive measures, must be taken by covered employers to recruit and advance qualified minorities and women for jobs in which they are underutilized relative to their availability. Affirmative actions include training programs, outreach efforts, and other positive steps. These procedures should be incorporated into the federal government contractor's written personnel policies. Federal government contractors with written affirmative action programs must implement them, keep them on file, and update them annually.

Federal government contractors also are required to take all necessary actions to ensure that no one attempts to intimidate or discriminate against an individual for filing a complaint or participating in a proceeding under the Executive Order. Executive Order 11246 is administered by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs at the Department of Labor. The Department of Justice has authority to prosecute enforcement actions in federal court upon referral by the Department of Labor of complaints arising under the Executive Order.

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Laws Enforced By The Employment Litigation Section

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it unlawful to discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity) or religion.

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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: prohibits sex discrimination

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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

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Public schools that are accused of discriminating against students due to race, color, nationality, sex, or disability in admissions, access to programs or activities, or treatment or employment in such programs or activities are under the jurisdiction of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Programs or activities receiving federal funds are prohibited from discriminating under several federal civil rights laws enforced by OCR and TEA (Equal Educational Opportunity | Texas Education Agency, n.d.).

As stated in the Preamble, professional school counselors (PSC) are responsible for ensuring students' inherent rights are protected. Students should be treated with respect, dignity, and equal access to comprehensive school counseling programs (CSCP) regardless of their cultural differences (ASCA, 2016). The  American School Counseling Association’s Ethical Standards (ASCA) 2016 Ethical Standards also address PSCs' responsibilities to students, parents/guardians, schools, and themselves (G. Johnson & Carrico, 2020)

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20 U.S. Code § 6301

The United States guarantees free public education to all school-age children. As a result, all kids have the right to an equal education regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, wealth, or citizenship status (American Civil Liberties Union, n.d.).

05-071 C.M.R. ch. 4, § 03 - GENERAL REQUIREMENT OF NONDISCRIMINATION

Title IX protects students from unlawful discrimination in all academic, educational, extracurricular, athletic, and other programs or activities offered by school districts.

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Tex. Educ. Code § 4.001 et seq.

Sec. 4.001.  PUBLIC EDUCATION MISSION AND OBJECTIVES.  (a)  The mission of the public education system of this state is to ensure that all Texas children have access to a quality education that enables them to achieve their potential and fully participate now and in the future in the social, economic, and educational opportunities of our state and nation.  That mission is grounded on the conviction that a general diffusion of knowledge is essential for the welfare of this state and for the preservation of the liberties and rights of citizens.  It is further grounded on the conviction that a successful public education system is directly related to a strong, dedicated, and supportive family and that parental involvement in the school is essential for the maximum educational achievement of a child.

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US Department of Education (ED). (n.d.-a). About OCR. https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/aboutocr.html

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An overview of the role and functions of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).

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White Settlement ISD 2022–2023 Employee Handbook

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White Settlement ISD 2022–2023 Employee Handbook

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White Settlement ISD 2022–2023 Employee Handbook. (2015). wsisd.com. https://wsisd.edliotest.com/ourpages/users/jsears/Employee%20Handbook/2022%20Employeee%20Handbook%20-%20Final.pdf

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Governing Agency regarding Discrimination in Schools

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Governing Agency regarding Discrimination in Schools

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Public schools that are accused of discriminating against students due to race, color, nationality, sex, or disability in admissions, access to programs or activities, or treatment or employment in such programs or activities are under the jurisdiction of the Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Programs or activities receiving federal funds are prohibited from discriminating under several federal civil rights laws enforced by OCR and TEA (Equal Educational Opportunity | Texas Education Agency, n.d.).

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Department of Justice ~ Educational Opportunities Section 

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Department of Justice ~ Educational Opportunities Section 

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The law prohibits discrimination in education based on national origin. This law is enforced by the Educational Opportunities Section of the Division, which oversees elementary, secondary, and public colleges and universities. The Education Section's work addresses discrimination in all aspects of education, including the assignment of students to schools and classes, transportation of students, hiring and locating faculty members and administrators, distributing school resources, and providing educational programs to assist limited English-speaking students in learning English (Federal Protections Against National Origin Discrimination, 2015).

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SummaryThe Texas Education Agency oversees both primary and secondary public education in the state. It is led by the commissioner of education. By providing leadership, guidance, and support to school systems, the Texas Education Agency improves outcomes for all public school students (About TEA | Texas Education Agency, n.d.).

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The Federal Office for Civil Rights enforces several federal civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in federally funded education programs or activities (US Department of Education (ED), n.d.-a).

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Best Practices of Professional School Counselors (PSC):

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Best Practices of Professional School Counselors (PSC):

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School counselors can use various strategies to address cultural competence when providing services to students from minority races/ethnic identities.  As a first step toward interventions, school counselors (SC) should recognize and put aside their own biases, stereotypes, and personal beliefs that could interfere with their duties. In addition, they can stay current on relevant information regarding state policies and legislation concerning anti-bullying and nondiscrimination. By providing staff with professional development in relevant topics, like addressing discrimination, harassment, and bullying when it occurs, SCs can improve school climate (Johnson, G., & Carrico, J., 2020).

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A.C. ET AL V. MAGNOLIA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

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A.C. ET AL V. MAGNOLIA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

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Magnolia Independent School District is being sued for severely punishing students and, in some cases, for excluding them from school for their gender and long hair. As a result of gender stereotypes, Magnolia ISD enforces a mandatory short hair policy for boys, but not for girls.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are violated by this discriminatory, gender-based hair policy (Texas Students Took Their School District to Court for Discrimination, 2021).

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Texas Students Took Their School District to Court for Discrimination — and Won

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Students and parents in Magnolia Independent School District can breathe a sigh of relief that the district’s archaic, discriminatory dress code is a thing of the past.

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School counselors promote equitable treatment of all students by:

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School counselors promote equitable treatment of all students by:

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Using data to identify gaps in achievement, opportunity, and attainment

Advocating for rigorous courses and higher education for underrepresented groups.

Maintaining professional knowledge of the ever-changing and complex world of students’ culture

Maintaining knowledge and skills for working in a diverse and multicultural work setting

Promoting the development of school policies leading to equitable treatment of all students and opposing school policies hindering equitable treatment of any student

Promoting access to rigorous standards-based curriculum, academic courses, and learning paths for college and career for all students

Developing plans to address over- or underrepresentation of specific groups in programs such as special education, honors, Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate

Creating an environment that encourages any student or group to feel comfortable to come forward with problems

Collaborating with families in seeking assistance services for financial literacy, job skills and placement, and free services (such as childcare assistance) as well as providing parents educational opportunities to assist them in supporting their student's education

Acting as a liaison between home and school promoting an understanding and encouraging creative solutions for students handling multiple responsibilities beyond a typical load (The School Counselor and Equity for All Students - American School Counselor Association [ASCA], n.d.).

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The School Counselor and Equity for All Students

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(Adopted 2006, revised 2012, 2018) School counselors recognize and distinguish individual and group differences and strive to equally value all students and groups. School counselors are advocates for the equitable treatment of all students in school and in the community. According to the U.S.

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The student population is increasingly diverse (African American, Hispanic, Low-Socioeconomic, Disabled). Underrepresented populations have historically had difficulty accessing rigorous curriculums and higher-level courses. Professional school counselors (PSC) are typically middle-class, Caucasian women. This discrepancy can inadvertently cause bias and/or discrimination.

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The purpose of this legal guide is to bring attention to these important ethical topics in our schools today and to provide information to parents, school board members and the community to improve the school environment for our students.

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Sutton, my future school counseling dog. He & I just passed our state comfort dog exams. He will be attending school w/me a few days a week beginning Jan 2023!

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As a future professional school counselor, I will serve a diverse population of students and staff. As a white, middle-class woman, I realize that racial and socio-economic sensitivity will play a crucial role in how I effectively serve my campus. As an educated adult, I acknowledge that most individuals are unknowingly biased regarding many things, despite best efforts to avoid prejudice. Though I consider myself to be an unbiased and racially sensitive woman, I understand that my own experiences affect how I perceive others, and to truly comprehend those that I serve I must have a robust understanding of those in my care. The purpose of this legal guide is to bring attention to these important ethical topics in our schools today and to provide information to parents, school board members, and the community to improve the school environment for our students.