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Kids learn about the history of the Arms Race during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union building nuclear weapons stockpiles.

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Russian space scientist Roald Z. Sagdeev spent a large part of his career viewing NASA from the Soviet Union's side of the Cold War divide. Sagdeev, the former head of the Russian Space Research Institute, now is the director of the University of Maryland's East-West Space Science Center. He wrote this essay with his wife, Susan Eisenhower (President Dwight D. Eisenhower's granddaughter) that traces the long, hard path to space cooperation until the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991.

The Space Age spawned two outstanding space programs as a result of the hot competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries gave primary emphasis in their space efforts to a combination of national security and foreign policy objectives, turning space into an area of active competition for political and military advantage. At first, this charged political environment accommodated nothing more than symbolic gestures of collaboration. Only in the late 1980s, with warming political relations, did momentum for major space cooperation begin to build. As the Soviet Union neared collapse, with its ideological underpinnings evaporating, the impetus for the arms race and competition in space declined, allowing both countries to seriously pursue strategic partnerships in space.

The bumpy U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship in the years between 1957 and 1991 often was characterized by periods of mistrust and overt hostility (e.g., the U-2 incident, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and President Ronald Reagan's depiction of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire"). Periods of détente, in contrast, led to the Limited Test-Ban Treaty in 1963, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972, and an emerging U.S.-Soviet rapprochement during 1985-1991. Throughout this political roller-coaster period of history, both countries increased areas of coop-eration, including space, as a symbol of warmer relations while cutting cooperation off when ties worsened.

The birth of the Space Age following the Soviet launch of Sputnik came out of the confluence of two seemingly incompatible developments. From the end of World War II, the Soviets made rockets their most important military asset. By the mid-1950s, they were ready to test their first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In 1957, the International Geophysical Year was launched, a multinational effort to study Earth on a comprehensive, coordinated basis. To highlight the effort, organizers had urged the United States and the Soviet Union to consider launching a scientific satellite. On Oct. 4, 1957, a seemingly routine test launch of a Soviet ICBM (now known as the R-7 rocket) carried the first artificial satellite to orbit.

Sputnik's launch had dramatic repercussions for the Cold War rivals. After reaping the first political dividends from military rocket technology, the Soviets continued to pursue a highly classified military-industrial approach in developing its space program. Conversely, the U.S. government decided to make NASA a purely civilian enterprise, while focusing its military space efforts in the Pentagon and intelligence community.

Early on, President Dwight D. Eisenhower pursued U.S.-Soviet cooperative space initiatives through a series of letters he sent in 1957 and 1958 to the Soviet leadership, first to Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin and then to Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Eisenhower suggested creating a process to secure space for peaceful uses. Khrushchev, however, rejected the offer and demanded the United States eliminate its forward-based nuclear weapons in places like Turkey as a precondition for any space agreement. Feeling triumphant after Sputnik's launch, Khrushchev was certain his country was far ahead of the United States in terms of rocket technology and space launch capabilities, unlike the Soviet Union's more vulnerable geostrategic position in the nuclear arena. This would be the first of many times when space was linked with nuclear disarmament and other political issues.

Meanwhile, the United States energetically proceeded with its multinational initiative under the umbrella of the United Nations to develop a legal framework for peaceful space activities. This eventually led to the Outer Space Treaty and creation of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which a reluctant Soviet Union eventually joined.

In the scientific community, the role of an international space science union was assumed by the Committee on Space Research, with its unusual charter giving a mandate to both superpowers to appoint vice presidents. This arrangement opened an opportunity for dialogue and informal contacts between American and Soviet space officials. Academician Anatoli A. Blagonravov, the Soviet Union's representative for negotiating multilateral space science cooperation agreements, became the group's first appointed vice president. However, nothing could happen in the body without Kremlin approval.

I vividly remember a farewell conversation with Blagonravov, when he was preparing to retire from the Soviet space program. Blagonravov, an outstanding artillery engineer and general of the prerevolutionary Russian army who managed to survive during the Soviet regime, strongly advised me to keep the committee link alive. That would require a lot of domestic diplomacy, he thought. Indeed, my very first hurdle was to persuade the Kremlin not to kill Soviet participation in the 1977 conference in Tel Aviv, Israel.

The civilian nature of NASA, legislated in the 1958 Space Act, made it possible for the American researchers to collaborate on and disseminate scientific advances, an opportunity envied by many of us Soviet scientists. The actual work and industrial efforts for the Soviet space program were run under the classified umbrella of the Ministry of General Machine Building, with its enormous and rapidly expanding network of design bureaus and production facilities. The military was its principal client. The military also owned and operated every launch site and the network of ground control centers. The ministry had to report to the Communist Party's Central Committee and the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues of the Council of Ministers. Work beyond defense contracts was given secondary priority.

As a result of this critical dependence on the military, the Soviet aerospace industry relied entirely on domestic hardware, all the way down to the tiniest individual micro-components. This resulted in an internationally isolated technological culture that would have created enormous barriers of incompatibility for any joint endeavor.

In April 1960, in advance of a planned Eisenhower-Khrushchev sum-mit meeting, the leadership of Moscow's scientific community was anticipating a chance for major breakthroughs in bilateral cooperation, perhaps including the space area, following Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative. However, the much expected summit was cancelled in the aftermath of the May 1 downing of a U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union. I was beginning my scientific career at the heart of the Soviet nuclear establishment, now known as the Kurchatov Institute, and was very disappointed Eisenhower would not be visiting the institute as had been rumored.

Early in his presidency, John F. Kennedy made repeated attempts to engage the Soviet Union in space cooperation. In his inaugural address, Kennedy said, "Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars.'' Khrushchev, still persuaded of the eternal supremacy of Soviet rocketry, was not moved. Less than three months after Kennedy's inauguration, on April 12, 1961, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first human to escape Earth's gravity. In the aftermath of his brief flight, the piloted component of the Soviet space program rapidly grew to become indisputably dominant over any other type of space activity. Official Soviet propaganda was obsessed with everything that happened in orbit, including elaborate descriptions of the cosmonauts' menu at their last breakfast and all of the details of their physical exercise program. Every launch produced several more "Heroes of the Soviet Union," and more photographs of space superstars embraced by Khrushchev. At the same time, the Soviets were left far behind in other key areas of space technology. Their first geostationary telecommunication satellite was launched 11 years after its American counterpart. In the case of getting meteorological data from a geostationary location, the gap was even bigger.

Despite the continued space competition between the United States and U.S.S.R., Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter raising the possibility of space cooperation on a modest level after John Glenn became the first American to orbit Earth on Feb. 20, 1962. That led to two rounds of discussions between NASA's Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden and Soviet academician Blagonravov. An agreement led to the opening of cooperation in three areas: 1) the exchange of weather data from satellites and the eventual coordinated launching of meteorological satellites; 2) a joint effort to map the geomagnetic field of Earth; and 3) cooperation in the experimental relay of communications. This link became a primary forum for subsequent U.S.-U.S.S.R. interaction on space.

There were large differences between the two negotiating partners. The Soviet Academy of Sciences did not run the space program, but rather served as an official front for a vast network of secret enterprises controlled by the military and Communist Party apparatus. An asymmetry existed also in the fact that while the Russians knew about the American planning process, everything about the Soviet space program was a classified secret. In meetings among scientists, we often were approached by our colleagues at NASA asking us to disclose plans about what we were going to do next with Mars, Venus and other planets. It was difficult to persuade our Soviet authorities, including the president of the Academy of Sciences, academician Mstislav Keldysh, that we should reciprocate. The Soviet system had a different culture and mentality. Academician Keldysh himself was the subject of paranoid secrecy. For many years, Keldysh's name was a state secret. He was known only as the anonymous "chief theorist of cosmonautics." Sergei Korolev, the founder of the Soviet space and rocketry program, was less fortunate. His role as "chief designer of cosmonautics" became official only posthumously.

Following the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, the new Soviet leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues took even a harder line toward overall U.S.-Soviet relations. Brezhnev previously had served as the curator of the military industry on behalf of the Politburo. He knew well there was a "missile gap" in favor of the United States, and he was about to embark on an unprecedented build up of deterrent forces. The negative atmosphere at higher levels was reflected in the Soviet academy's dealings with NASA. Soviet opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam led to more bitterness.

In December 1968, only weeks after Richard Nixon's election, Apollo 8 orbited the moon, followed by the lunar landing of Apollo 11 in July 1969. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union experienced a series of failures in its manned lunar program. The opportunity for using dramatic space cooperation efforts as a means of reducing the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry had passed. As painful as it was for the Soviet leadership, the time of their country's dominance in heavy rocket launching technology was over. Cooperation in space now would have to come at more modest levels. The triumph of the Apollo program signified a crucial benchmark in the superpower space race by ending Soviet leadership in space exploration. The Soviet Union was simply unable to match such large-scale U.S. efforts. Nor did the Soviets have an institutional structure like NASA that was capable of running a program like Apollo in an open and transparent way. While not ready to publicly admit their defeat, the Soviets argued that scientific work on the moon could be better achieved robotically. Unmanned Soviet lunar missions, initially introduced as a shadow program with a much smaller budget than the manned version, occurred at the same time as the Apollo program. The Lunokhod moon rovers and sample return probes earned a great deal of admiration from international scientists. However, inside their close circle, the Soviet leaders, in a rude awakening, conceded that the era of Soviet dominance in space was gone forever. Cynics in the Soviet space community added an insult to the injury in the form of a "bad news, good news" joke drawing on a growing irritant for Kremlin - rapidly deteriorating relations with China. According to the joke, the bad news was, "The Chinese have landed on the moon. So what is the good news? It's all of them."

The challenge for both sides was determining where to go next. While the Americans eventually pursued the development of the space shuttle, the Soviets embarked on a program to place crews in space for extended periods of time by building the Salyut series of orbital space stations.

In reality, that space station program was not the result of major brainstorming or serious debates about a new national vision for space exploration. It came from the spontaneous process of internal competition between rivals within the Soviet aerospace industry. The Soviet military initially supported the approach, which was reminiscent of the U.S. Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory project, which was canceled in 1969 after a single, unmanned launch. Reflecting military priorities, the key instrument on early Salyut stations was a big optical Earth observation camera, the Soviet version of "open skies" technology. Of course, official propaganda said this mission had nothing to do with military interests. However, sharp tongues inside the space establishment jokingly asked, "Why do these brave men in orbit sleep when flying over our country, but stay alert over America?"

After this type of assignment was passed to unmanned spy satellites, the real motivation for expanding the Salyut program became the desire to undertake long-duration flight. Longevity records for humans in space became the benchmark for judging the success of these flights. In order to move in that direction, the Salyut program worked to excel in two important areas: achieving the safety of its manned flight hardware and developing a solid base in space medicine. Eventually, these would be two of the most important contributions the Russians would make to the International Space Station partnership.

In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration sought to reduce U.S.-Soviet tensions, and launched a major effort to reach a strategic arms limitation breakthrough, as well as new cooperation in space. In 1970, during a meeting with Keldysh, U.S. Academy of Sciences President Philip Handler mentioned an American movie starring Gregory Peck and Gene Hackman called Marooned, in which Soviet cosmonauts helped rescue three U.S. astronauts stranded in Earth orbit. Handler suggested the United States and U.S.S.R. develop a mutually com-patible docking system that would make possible such rescues, as well as non-emergency space dock-ings. This imaginary movie scenario touched a chord within space communities on both sides, which already had experienced emergency situations in real life. Talks led to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project docking mission of 1975, which developed compatible rendezvous and docking systems still in use today, and the establishment of a few topical working groups in different space science and applications disciplines.

Implementation of Apollo-Soyuz cooperation was dictated by the political will of the two countries' political leadership. The cooperation presented a serious management challenge for both sides, given the overall lack of compatibility between the two space programs. NASA had to work with a counterpart that could not even be clearly identified. The Ministry of General Machine Building was still shrouded in secrecy and Soviet authorities instructed the Academy of Sciences to act as a cover for all activities during Apollo-Soyuz. Soviet industry experts had to introduce themselves as employees of the Institute of Space Research and military officers from Soviet Space Command changed into civilian clothes while insisting that the Soviet academy administered the launch site in Baikonur, Kazakhstan.

The huge Soviet space military-industrial "iceberg" at that time could find only a tiny place at the tip of this colossus to deal with foreign visitors. Even if the Institute of Space Research was unable from a practical standpoint to serve as the sole counterpart to NASA's Apollo team, we were given instructions to at least pretend. We had to puff up our chests and represent the heart of the Soviet space program while it was clear to everyone that we were nothing but a bunch of scientists - the poor relatives of the rich space czars.

Well before the critical moments of the Apollo-Soyuz project when the crowds of American participants went to visit the manned flights control center in the Moscow suburb of Kaliningrad and the Soyuz launch pad at the Baikonur Cosmodrome, our authorities issued a long and detailed secret questionnaire. It suggested the appropriate answers to hundreds of questions that might be asked by the "nosy Americans." The reading of this questionnaire at a board of directors meeting brought great fun and pride to us. These were some of the questions:

"The imaginary American asks at the control center of Kaliningrad, 'Who is essentially running this installation?' Or a similar question at the Baikonur Cosmodrome, where military servicemen would have most probably just changed their uniforms for civilian clothes: 'Who is responsible for supervising and running this Cosmodrome?' We were very excited to respond to these queries. The recommended answer was always 'the Institute of Space Research and academician Sagdeev.'"

I felt like the Marquis de Carabas from Charles Perrault's fairy tale, Puss in Boots - the apparent "owner of all the territory the eye could see."

Despite this artifice, the docking in orbit in July 1975 was a rare and dramatic display of U.S.-Soviet friendliness during the depths of the Cold War. Leonid Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford exchanged messages of friendship and congratulations. This was to be the last dramatic international handshake in space for years to come. Soon after the flight, both sides met to discuss potential follow-on space projects and agreed to establish a special bilateral working group. I chaired the Soviet group and worked with NASA's Charles Kennel on a scenario in which a specialized science module, a blend of Russian and American station designs, could be delivered to orbit by the U.S. space shuttle. Unfortunately, politics intervened again. Incoming President Jimmy Carter was concerned by congressional charges that the Soviets had obtained valuable U.S. technology during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. By late 1978, the Carter administration had ended discussions on additional cooperation with the Soviets. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, any hope of significant cooperation in space was gone. The United States pursued cooperation with Europe through projects such as a Spacelab module that could ride aboard the space shuttle, while the Soviets maintained their focus on flying the manned Salyut space stations.

On the planetary exploration front, we were quite impressed by the successes of the Mars Viking missions and the Voyager missions to Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune and the outer limits of the solar system. At the same time the principal Soviet robotic missions were repeatedly directed toward Venus.

Every year as director of the Soviet Space Research Institute, I had to report on the completion of each important mission to a very large audience in Moscow at the Polytechnic Museum, which is a counterpart to the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. Each time, while learning about the new steps in a deeper penetration into the mysteries of Venus, my audience would ask, "While we keep sending spacecraft to Venus only, the American spacecraft visit Mars, Venus, Mercury, Jupiter, Saturn and so on. Why couldn't we have such projects?"

"You know," I responded, "we have a silent gentleman's agreement to share responsibilities in space. While the Americans are doing wide-range reconnaissance in the solar system, we are carrying on an intensive study of Venus, just as if that planet were declared the planetary test range of our space science." At another meeting, while reporting on the latest Venera spacecraft landing on the surface of Venus, I had to confront the same questions. This time, I was literally bewildered and without much thinking, immediately answered the question of why Americans do such and such:

"Because they are sons of bitches," I replied.

For several minutes, the audience gave a standing ovation. It was clear they were applauding the Americans and their space program, which had captured the imagination of the Soviets, despite the attempts of our official propaganda to undermine the achievements of those "sons of bitches."

Nevertheless, the Soviet robotic space program advanced by learning from and adapting to U.S. achievements. Anticipating the success of the U.S. Viking mission, the Soviet Academy of Sciences decided to abandon Mars as a priority and see how the American program would develop. The open and predictable nature of the U.S. space program gave Soviet scientists an opportunity to find their own niche with realistic projects that would have a scientific impact and avoid direct competition.

Our Venera program to Venus was quite successful. Following simplistic probes in the late 1960s, we managed to deliver sophisticated hardware to the planet's surface in 1975 and send back panoramic pictures. Because the United States and U.S.S.R. agreed to share the results of NASA's Pioneer Venus mission in 1978 and the Soviet Venera missions, scientists and space experts on both sides placed enormous symbolic and scientific value on the results of these joint efforts.

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in life sciences and biomedical research also took root in the 1970s. In 1977, seven U.S. biological experiments or medical devices flew aboard the Soviet Cosmos 936 mission, which also carried experiments from France and a number of Soviet bloc countries. This mission investigated the impact of long-duration spaceflight on the human body. A later Cosmos mission, Cosmos 1129 in 1979, carried 17 additional U.S. experiments and devices. And on May 6, 1979, the United States and U.S.S.R signed a treaty that provided for the deployment of an international system of emergency beacon receivers aboard satellites.

When Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency in 1981, Cold War tensions were rising. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, imposition of martial law in Poland and NATO's placement of Pershing rockets and cruise missiles in Europe - which was countered by hurried deployment of the Soviets' SS-20 medium-range nuclear missiles - characterized the tenor of the period. In the midst of the Poland martial law crisis, the Reagan administration announced on Dec. 29, 1981, that it would allow the U.S.-Soviet space cooperation agreement, due for renewal in May 1982, to lapse. Mutual suspicion grew to the point that the Soviets began attributing potentially aggressive intentions to the Space Shuttle Program. It would be another 10 years before the conditions finally were ripe again for cooperation.

Nevertheless, in the absence of a formal intergovernmental agreement, the White House authorized low-profile cooperation on a case-by-case basis. Among the activities that continued were the satellite-based search and rescue efforts, which was based on the coordinated use of the U.S.-Canadian-French SARSAT and the Soviet COSPAS satellites to locate airplanes or ships in distress. By the mid-1980s, the effort had helped save more than 400 people. NASA also was allowed to continue working with the Soviet Union in space biology and medicine. As part of that effort, four U.S. medical devices were used in experiments on the 1983 Cosmos 1514 mission, which was devoted to primate research. That tacit format of interaction led by Soviet academicians Oleg Gazenko and Anatoly Grigoriev and NASA's Dr. Arnauld Nicogossian, later would serve as an example for future cooperation between the Russian space station Mir and space shuttle programs and on the International Space Station. Meanwhile, exchanges of planetary data continued, but discussions of future cooperation in planetary exploration were cancelled.

The U.S. side was pragmatic about keeping up its contacts with Soviet scientists during these times times of political tensions. Regular consultations on space science-related issues, for example, were carried out through a channel between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Americans were keenly interested in learning about the effects of long-duration flights on the human body - an area where the Soviets enjoyed a monopoly during NASA's six-year hiatus in human spaceflight from 1975-1981.

In addition to these cooperative activities, Soviet and American space scientists regularly met at Committee on Space Research sessions. Aerospace engineers and officials from industry also maintained a similar engagement under the umbrella of the International Astronautical Federation.

During what many would consider the coldest period of bilateral relations in the early 1980s, these contacts produced a very special cooperative project that sought to explore Halley's comet. The United States and U.S.S.R. both participated in the Interagency Consultative Group, which was set up in 1981 to bring together space and ground-based studies of the comet during its 1986 passage through the inner solar system.

After deciding not to send a spacecraft to view the comet, the United States agreed to play a supporting role, which involved providing ground-based observation data on the comet. This data was used to support the parallel Soviet Vega 1, Vega 2 and European Space Agency Giotto missions. The success of the encounter with the comet was to be critically dependent on precise navigation. Scientists from NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, suggested a brilliant technical scenario for the Vega and Giotto spacecraft to use at the approach to the comet. This had to be done a few days prior to the arrival of Giotto in order to help it home in on the celestial whereabouts of the ultimate target: the comet's elusive nucleus. The whole procedure required close cooperation in real time. NASA's Deep Space Network was given all of the necessary parameters from the Soviet spacecraft communications systems, then both sides performed pre-flight calibration tests of the hardware. This helped Giotto navigate much closer to the comet's nucleus, providing scientists with outstanding data and producing some of the most awe-inspiring video footage ever taken in space. Several months before, when the Soviet Vega spacecraft had to release meteorological ballons in the atmosphere of Venus, the Deep Space Network played a crucial role in getting the first direct signals from these balloons and continued to track them as they were buffeted by Venus' unusual atmospheric circulation.

Ironically, such successes were achieved despite continued chilly relations between the two governments. Several private groups, however, worked to keep U.S.-Soviet space ties alive. Among them was the new Planetary Society, which was created in 1979 by well-known astronomer Carl Sagan, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Director Bruce Murray, and their associate, physicist Louis Friedman. After its founding in 1985, the Association of Space Explorers, composed of people who had flown in space, also became an important forum for discussions on the benefits of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in human spaceflight. These efforts would provide a powerful impetus for getting stalled U.S.-Soviet space cooperation back on track.

Not long after Ronald Reagan was elected president, NASA urged him to approve a space station to rival the Soviet station program. In his January 1984 State of the Union address, Reagan announced he was directing NASA to "develop a permanently manned space station ... within the decade" and "invite other countries to participate." Peggy Finarelli, a senior official in NASA's international office at the time, recalled that Reagan's approval of what became known as Space Station Freedom was "a leadership issue very much in the context of the Cold War. We were challenging the Soviets in the high ground of space. We had to say that Freedom would be bigger and better than the Soviet space station." The original estimate was that Freedom would cost about $8 billion. It was envisioned to be in orbit by 1992 in order to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' discovery of America.

While the Soviets were not invited to join the Freedom project, the Reagan administration indicated its willingness to resume space cooperation with the U.S.S.R. prior to the 1984 State of the Union address. Only days before the speech, the administration privately suggested to Moscow a simulated space rescue demonstration mission in which U.S. astronauts from the space shuttle would assist Soviet cosmonauts aboard a Salyut station. Both privately and publicly, the Soviet response was cool, because of the perceived asymmetry of a mission in which the Soviet crew was in trouble and the U.S. crew would act as rescuers.

The Soviet government also revived the notion from the Khrushchev era that space cooperation would be possible only if there were progress in space arms control. The primary point of contention was the Reagan administration's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative, which had been announced in March 1983. From the start of the Reagan administration, however, pressure for cooperation in space had been mounting. For example, Sen. "Spark" Matsunaga from Hawaii was among those warning of the dangers of weaponizing space and calling for an "internationally developed space station as an alternative."

The U.S. Senate issued a more formal call for renewal of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation with passage of Joint Resolution 236 on Oct. 10, 1984. President Reagan signed the resolution on Oct. 30, noting U.S. readiness "to work with the Soviets on cooperation in space in pro-grams which are mutually beneficial and productive."

When Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the Soviet leader in 1985, Reagan thought he had found a willing partner. Gorbachev was interested in reducing the Soviet defense budget, and with the so-called Euromissile issue still unresolved, his government quickly signaled its readiness for a new round of arms control negotiations with the United States. When Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva that November to discuss arms control, they also signed an agreement on scientific cooperation. Once again, cooperation was symbolic of a thaw in the Cold War. However, Gorbachev still expressed strong Soviet opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative and space was not included in the agreement. The Soviets had linked space cooperation to a demand that the United States abandon its plans for the initiative altogether.

Only three months after the Geneva summit, a tragedy occurred that would set the U.S. space program back several years - the space shuttle Challenger disaster. Little noticed at the time was a diplomatic breakthrough that occurred only a few weeks after the Challenger accident. On Feb. 20, 1986, the Soviets launched the first of six modules that eventually would comprise the Mir space station, and in the wake of the Challenger accident and the launch of Mir, the Kremlin finally agreed to decouple non-military space issues from the Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States and the Soviet Union subsequently signed a five-year agreement on space cooperation in April 1987. A number of joint scientific projects were agreed to, although there was no mention of cooperation in human spaceflight. More importantly, in an exchange of letters between Gorbachev and Reagan the previous summer, the link between arms control progress and renewed space cooperation was dropped. This paved the way for both sides to take meaningful steps toward actual cooperation.

During their last Moscow summit in May 1988, Gorbachev invited Reagan to walk inside the Kremlin yard. Passing by impressive historic artifacts like the "Czar Cannon" that never fired, and the "Czar Bell," that never tolled, the last Soviet president tried to lure his guest into agreeing to support a joint manned mission to Mars. Only time will tell if this project will come to pass or serve as another dead artifact of history.
Professor John Logsdon from George Washington University also contributed to this article.

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NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Russian space scientist Roald Z. Sagdeev spent a large part of his career viewing NASA from the Soviet Union's side of the Cold War divide. Sagdeev, the former head of the Russian Space Research Institute, now is the director of the University of Maryland's East-West Space Science Center.

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" Space Program - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum ". 2018. Jfklibrary.Org. Accessed May 22 2018. https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Space-Program.aspx.

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Space Program - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum

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Forty Years ago on July 20 the world stopped for a brief instant to witness a remarkable accomplishment, the first instance in which humanity set foot on another body in our solar system. It was a remarkable time.

When the Apollo 11 spacecraft lifted off on July 16, 1969, for the Moon, it signaled a climactic instance in human history. Reaching the Moon on July 20, its Lunar Module-with astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin aboard-landed on the lunar surface while Michael Collins orbited overhead in the Apollo 11 command module. Armstrong soon set foot on the surface, telling millions on Earth that it was "one small step for [a] man-one giant leap for mankind." Aldrin soon followed him out and the two planted an American flag but omitted claiming the land for the U.S. as had been routinely done during European exploration of the Americas, collected soil and rock samples, and set up scientific experiments. The next day they returned to the Apollo capsule overhead and returned to Earth, splashing down in the Pacific Ocean on July 24.

This flight to the Moon received great scrutiny. "This is the greatest week in the history of the world since Creation," President Richard M. Nixon enthused upon greeting the Apollo 11 crew when they returned from the Moon. Christopher Flournoy recalled that as a five-year-old when the mission occurred he may not have understood much of what took place but nonetheless was excited by the experience. He remembered his father saying that "he was never more proud of being an American than on the day our flag flew on the Moon."

One seven-year-old boy from San Juan, Puerto Rico, said of the first Moon landing: "I kept racing between the TV and the balcony and looking at the Moon to see if I could see them on the Moon." As a fifteen-year-old I sat with friends on the hood of a car looking at the Moon and listening to the astronauts on it. These experiences were typical. "One small step," hardly; Neil Armstrong nailed it with the second phrase of his famous statement, "one giant leap for mankind."

The flight of Apollo 11 met with an ecstatic reaction around the globe, as everyone shared in the success of the astronauts. The front pages of newspapers everywhere suggested how strong the enthusiasm was. NASA estimated that because of nearly worldwide radio and television coverage, more than half the population of the planet was aware of the events of Apollo 11. Although the Soviet Union tried to jam Voice of America radio broadcasts most living there and in other countries learned about the adventure and followed it carefully. Police reports noted that streets in many cities were eerily quiet during the Moon walk as residents watched television coverage in homes, bars, and other public places. Official congratulations poured in to the U.S. president from other heads of state, even as informal ones went to NASA and the astronauts. All nations having regular diplomatic relations with the United States sent their best wishes in recognition of the success of the mission.

Those without diplomatic relations with the U.S., such as the People's Republic of China, made no formal statement on the Apollo 11 flight to the U.S., and the mission was reported only sporadically by its news media because Mao Zedong refused to publicize successes by Cold War rivals. It was not until February 1972 when Nixon flew to China and met with Mao Zedong that the United States established formal diplomatic relations with the nation. China and other nations may soon return to the Moon, fully recognizing the success of the Apollo program. What might that portend for the future? Visit the 40th Anniversary of Apollo 11 web site to share your thoughts and see a list of commemorative events being held at the Museum.

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When the Apollo 11 spacecraft lifted off on July 16, 1969, for the Moon, it signaled a climactic instance in human history. Reaching the Moon on July 20, its Lunar Module-with astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin aboard-landed on the lunar surface while Michael Collins orbited overhead in the Apollo 11 command module.

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Editor's Note: This is the 29th in a series of essays on exploration by NASA's Chief Historian, Steven J. Dick.

It may well be argued that NASA has become the world's premier agent for exploration, carrying on in "the new ocean" of outer space a long tradition of expanding the physical and mental boundaries of humanity. Fifty years ago, however the agency that pushed the frontiers of aeronautics, took us to the moon, flew the space shuttle, built the International Space Station and revealed the secrets of the cosmos, was in its birth throes, and fundamental decisions were being made that profoundly shaped all that was to come.

The driving force, of course, was the launch of Sputnik on Oct. 4, 1957, followed by its even weightier successors. In the midst of the Cold War, a country that aspired to global preeminence could not let that challenge pass. Although the United States already had its own satellite plans in place as part of the International Geophysical Year, the Russian events spurred the Space Age, and in particular gave urgency to the founding of an American national space agency.

In the wake of the Sputniks, events moved quickly toward the development of NASA, especially considering the weighty issues that had to be resolved. Should there be a new agency, or one built on an already established institution, such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), or the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)? Or should it be part of a military agency - the Army and Air Force were both keen, based on their missile work. If it was military or civilian agency, then how to divide the tasks peculiar to each function? Should the new agency include aeronautical activities? Should it have the power to implement international agreements, how should those agreements be used as an instrument of foreign policy, and what should the new agency's relationship be with the State Department?

Already on Nov. 25, 1957 Senator Lyndon B. Johnson began hearings on American space and missile activities in the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This led on Feb. 6, 1958 to the establishment of a Senate Special Committee on Space and Aeronautics, with the goal of establishing a space agency, and Senator Johnson as its chairman. On the House side of Congress the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration was created on March 5, chaired by House majority leader John W. McCormack.

Meanwhile, in the Executive Branch President Eisenhower had asked his science advisor, James R. Killian, Jr., to convene the Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) for deliberations on the subject. By March 5 Eisenhower had approved a memorandum, dated the same day and signed by Nelson Rockefeller, chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, on which Killian also served. It proposed a civilian space agency built around the NACA, which by this time spent about half its total effort on space-related projects, including the Vanguard, X-15, and Defense Department missile programs. In the following weeks legislation was drafted by the Bureau of the Budget, NACA and Killian's office. One of those Bureau of Budget drafters, Willis H. Shapley (son of the famous Harvard astronomer Harlow Shapley), later became a Deputy Associate Administrator of NASA. Another drafter, Paul G. Dembling - general counsel for the NACA during the crucial 1957-58 period and later the NASA general counsel - recalled that it was a high pressure situation "because other agencies [than NACA] were seeking the mantle, and we didn't know exactly where we all stood." Dembling, who is still alive and well today, recalls there was no one source for drafting such legislation, and he relied on past decisions by the General Accounting Office. The legislation that emerged called for a new agency rather than a strengthened NACA, responding to the criticism of some that NACA had become too lethargic to deal with the onrush of events, and that a new start was needed.

On April 2, Eisenhower sent the draft legislation to Congress establishing the "National Aeronautics and Space Agency." At the behest of Eilene Galloway, who worked for the Congressional Research Service and served as a consultant to both Senator Johnson and Congressman McCormack during the drafting of the final Space Act, the name was changed to "National Aeronautics and Space Administration." It was her belief that an "Administration" with an "Administrator" would be vested with more power than a mere "agency" with a "director," and in fact that the new institution would need that power to coordinate with many other agencies. Galloway, too, is alive and well today, still offering her reminiscences at age 101.

After Congressional hearings during spring 1958, Congress passed the legislation and President Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act into law on July 29, 1958. Although it had generally been assumed that Hugh Dryden, the head of the NACA, would be appointed administrator, three weeks later, on Aug. 19, T. Keith Glennan - the President of Case Institute of Technology since 1947 and a former member of the Atomic Energy Commission - was sworn in at the White House as NASA's first Administrator, with Dryden as his Deputy Administrator. NASA formally opened for business on Oct. 1, 1958.

It is instructive to recall the objectives for NASA that emerged in section 102 of the final Space Act:

1. The expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space;

2. The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles;

3. The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms through space;

4. The establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes;

5. The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere;

6. The making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or significance, and the furnishing by such agencies, to the civilian agency established to direct and control nonmilitary aeronautical and space activities, of information as to discoveries which have value or significance to that agency;

7. Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof;

8. The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering resources of the United States, with close cooperation among all interested agencies of the United States in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities and equipment

The Space Act has been amended many times since 1958 (see online reference below for details), but these goals have been little changed. In NASA's Authorization Act for 1985 the expansion of human knowledge "of the Earth" was added to goal 1, reflecting increased concern about Earth resources and global climate change. And in the Authorization Act for 1989 a ninth goal was added: "The preservation of the United States preeminent position in aeronautics and space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes." Other sections of the Space Act dealt with the civilian-military coordination, international cooperation, the demise of the NACA, the transfer of functions from other government agencies, and intellectual property rights.
Beyond the logistical questions in the founding of a new space agency were larger issues not fully grasped at the time. In creating NASA, Pulitzer-Prize historian Walter McDougall argued, Congress was creating a technocratic institution, where technocracy is defined as "the institutionalization of technological change for state purposes, that is, the state-funded and-managed R&D explosion of our time." He saw Sputnik as a saltation that sparked this technological revolution. McDougall later revised this point in light of the events of the Space Age. Historian Robert MacGregor has also recently challenged the view of Sputnik as a technological saltation, arguing that technocratic ideas of the relation of science to the state were already well established by this time. In particular he points to the parallels between the Atomic Energy Commission and NASA, and further argued that "NASA's rise in the 1960's as an engine of American international prestige was rooted in atomic diplomacy, and that certain debates in Congress about the new agency were largely approached from within a framework of atomic energy, thereby limiting the range of discourse and influencing the shape of the new agency." MacGregor finds of special importance the sections of the National Aeronautics and Space Act that were inspired by the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, especially the relation of the Department of Defense to the new agency, the role of international cooperation, and the apportionment of intellectual property. Issues great and small were involved in the founding of NASA. It may truly be said that NASA has achieved the goals laid out in section 102, sometimes in spectacular fashion, with the possible exception of objective 4, involving studies of the long-range benefits and problems related to spaceflight.

That objective is now being undertaken in the NASA History Division, as witnessed in the recent publication of Societal Impact of Spaceflight (see http://history.nasa.gov/sp4801-part1.pdf.) and other planned publications. Perhaps no goal is more important for sustaining a robust space program than ensuring that society has a vested interest in the aeronautics and space activities of NASA and the other space agencies that have sprouted up around the world over the last 50 years.

Further Reading

Galloway, Eilene, "Sputnik and the Creation of NASA: A Personal Perspective," in NASA: 50 Years of Exploration and Discovery (Faircount, 2008), pp. 48-49.

Goldstein, Edward S., David S. Schuman and Gregory C. La Rosa. "Present at the Creation: Paul G. Dembling, Author of NASA's Founding Legislation," in NASA: 50 Years of Exploration and Discovery (Faircount, 2008), pp. 50-51.

Griffith, Alison. The National Aeronautics and Space Act: A Study of the Development of Public Policy (Washington, D.C., 1962)

Hall, Cargill, "Origins of U. S. Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies and Freedom of Space," in Exploring the Unknown, Vol. 1, John M. Logsdon, editor, pp. 213. ff.

Hunley, J. D., editor. The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan (NASA SP-4105, 1993). Online at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4105/sp4105.htm (Glennan was NASA's first Administrator.)

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Legislative Origins of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Proceedings of an Oral History Workshop, conducted April 3, 1992. Monographs in Aerospace History # 8, (NASA History Office, 1998). Online at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/40thann/legislat.pdf , or a larger file with graphics at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/40thann/legorgns.pdf

MacDougall, Walter. ... The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985)

MacGregor, Robert R. "Imagining an Aerospace Agency in the Atomic Age," in Remembering the Space Age, Steven J. Dick, ed. (NASA History series, forthcoming)

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, with legislative history showing changes over time, online at http://history.nasa.gov/spaceact-legishistory.pdf

Portree, David S. F. NASA's Origins and the Dawn of the Space Age, Monographs in Aerospace History #10 (NASA History Division, September, 1998). Online at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/monograph10/

Rosholt, Robert L. An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963 (NASA SP-4101, 1966).

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NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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Editor's Note: This is the 29th in a series of essays on exploration by NASA's Chief Historian, Steven J. Dick. It may well be argued that NASA has become the world's premier agent for exploration, carrying on in "the new ocean" of outer space a long tradition of expanding the physical and mental boundaries of humanity.

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Background History

Bibliography

Biographies

Chronology

Documents

Explorer

The International Geophysical Year

Photo Gallery

Vanguard

NASA Main Page Multimedia Interactive Feature on 50th Anniversary of the Space Age

Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age

History changed on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik I. The world's first artificial satellite was about the size of a beach ball (58 cm.or 22.8 inches in diameter), weighed only 83.6 kg. or 183.9 pounds, and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its elliptical path. That launch ushered in new political, military, technological, and scientific developments. While the Sputnik launch was a single event, it marked the start of the space age and the U.S.-U.S.S.R space race.
The story begins in 1952, when the International Council of Scientific Unions decided to establish July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, as the International Geophysical Year (IGY) because the scientists knew that the cycles of solar activity would be at a high point then. In October 1954, the council adopted a resolution calling for artificial satellites to be launched during the IGY to map the Earth's surface.

In July 1955, the White House announced plans to launch an Earth-orbiting satellite for the IGY and solicited proposals from various Government research agencies to undertake development. In September 1955, the Naval Research Laboratory's Vanguard proposal was chosen to represent the U.S. during the IGY.

The Sputnik launch changed everything. As a technical achievement, Sputnik caught the world's attention and the American public off-guard. Its size was more impressive than Vanguard's intended 3.5-pound payload. In addition, the public feared that the Soviets' ability to launch satellites also translated into the capability to launch ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear weapons from Europe to the U.S. Then the Soviets struck again; on November 3, Sputnik II was launched, carrying a much heavier payload, including a dog named Laika.

Immediately after the Sputnik I launch in October, the U.S. Defense Department responded to the political furor by approving funding for another U.S. satellite project. As a simultaneous alternative to Vanguard, Wernher von Braun and his Army Redstone Arsenal team began work on the Explorer project.

On January 31, 1958, the tide changed, when the United States successfully launched Explorer I. This satellite carried a small scientific payload that eventually discovered the magnetic radiation belts around the Earth, named after principal investigator James Van Allen. The Explorer program continued as a successful ongoing series of lightweight, scientifically useful spacecraft.

The Sputnik launch also led directly to the creation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In July 1958, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act (commonly called the "Space Act"), which created NASA as of October 1, 1958 from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and other government agencies.

Updated October 10, 2007
Steve Garber, NASA History Web Curator
For further information E-mail histinfo@hq.nasa.gov

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Background History Bibliography Biographies Chronology Documents Explorer The International Geophysical Year Photo Gallery Vanguard NASA Main Page Multimedia Interactive Feature on 50th Anniversary of the Space Age History changed on October 4, 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik I.

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the US hid the missile technology intend for war as a race to space

The technology being made in the time of the space race was not driven for space exploration but for power in nuclear advancements over the soviets

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Intro - Thesis

Paragraph 1 - Overview of Space Race

Paragraph 2 - Nucular Technology

Paragraph 3 - How the US hid the Space Race as compotition with the Soviets

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Both US and Soviets start producing nuclear bombs, Soviets use spies to get original idea for first bombs.
M.A.D - Mutually Assured Destruction

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Era of rocket technology - travel to space starts to be possible - post WW2

spy planes - revealed Soviet weakness

Soviet's start having rocket technology

Soviet Union launched Sputnik I - new propaganda for Soviet's

US - Explorer 1

"one of NASA’s goals was to research and develop ways to apply space technology to civilian life, Americans saw enjoyed benefits such as improved communications, weather forecasting, medicine, and energy research and applications." DOSE NOT AGREE WITH THESES"

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Space race: Discovery Service for Cambridge School of Weston
Eds.b.ebscohost.com
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=cf3aa2e4-e2b3-40fb-af69-516600cf9e16@pdc-v-sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmU=#AN=89183508&db=ers

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During the launch of Sputnik, the United States decided to no longer compete with the Soviet Union via military means, but instead, have a race to see who could put man on the moon first. The transition between the Cold War and the Space Race was mostly focused on how missiles and satellites were used. From being used as nuclear warheads to being used for advancing technology, satellites played a key role in the space race. These were key because they were the trial and error "test runs", and the more test runs a country had, the more progress was made, the more progress that has made meant being closer to putting a man on the moon. Sputnik was launched into orbit on October 4th, 1957. It was visible all around the world, and its radio pulses were detectable.This sent fear throughout the United States as they believed a device of Sputnik's capabilities was capable of weapon based operations. Today both the United States and Russia have focused much less on space exploration, though it is evident there are still tensions between the two. Relating to that rivalry between the two countries, Russia has started funding their space program again, while the United States has cut their funding towards NASA. Recently Russia has been doing things against other country's requests. This has reignited a competition between the United States and Russia as global superpowers, who aren't enemies, but surely are not "allies". This is important because it means two superpowers may be in a competition by non-military means again, leaving another space race as a definite possibility. The great thing about space exploration is it doesn't just better a single country, but every country, most Russian and American scientists studying space travel don't care what country they are researching for, as long as they make progress. The questions left to answer are how will Russia react to the United States if another Space Race is to come, and how technology will continue to advance.
The launching of the Sputnik satellite during the Cold War caused tensions to rise between the Soviet Union and the United States through policy changes, as the Sputnik launch caused paranoia and this caused the United States to create policies such as the Limited Test Ban and containment policy, which then led to the Space Race, and even though the Space Race has ended, the tensions from that era are still present today in the form of Russia ignoring the United States requests to not invade Ukraine.Through the examination of the Sputnik launch, context of the containment policy, comparison of the Soviet Union then and Russia now, and the care the United States government has for NASA, one can see the effects of the Space Race and how they are still present in todays world.

In the wake of the sputnik launch of '57 many political thinkers were trying to understand the broader implications of Soviet space supremacy. One such political scientist was Klaus Knorr who writes an article to address the fears generated by this Soviet advance. In his 1960 publication in World Politics he makes accurate predictions about the future of the cold war that both hold true and indicate the problems that these changes outline (Knorr, 568). His first prediction is the effort on the part of the U.S government to increase the amount of, "special resources (e.g., scientists)... with a competitive vigor similar to that shaping recent defense programs"(Knorr, 570). Not only was this prediction completely accurate to the U.S policies that were later implemented but this also shows the lack of U.S. prioritization of nonmilitary scientific programs until this point. Another prediction that Knorr makes is in relation to the greater implications of a "space race". He asserts that it will be, "difficult... to separate outer space research and development from military research and development", thus exemplifying the concern of how space and rocket technologies reflect the military technology of a specific country. Essentially, the more advanced the technological achievements are of one country, the more military achievements could be made in secret.
In the beginning of his presidency at the end of WWII President Truman advocated his doctrine of the containment of the soviet communist threat. Containment showed itself in a significant amount of U.S foreign policy from the Korean War to the war in Vietnam. Specifically, containment influenced and fueled the policies of the space race. The U.S would have been more ambivalent to soviet advances like Sputnik if it did not have to adhere to this policy of stopping the expansion of the Soviet Union at all costs(Roberts, 38). This was to act as a fail safe. If the United States were not able to beat the Soviet Union to the moon, at least they were already working on getting communism out of other countries before more would join the communist side, because of their superiority of reaching the moon first. The publication Foreign Policy addressed the policy of Containment in a more retrospective way in the summer of 1972. It speaks to the enormous ability of the U.S to impede Soviet expansion and essentially goes into depth on how effective this policy was at what it set out to do. Another policy implemented from these events was the "Test Ban Treaty" (Roberts, 43). The TBT was a treaty developed when long range rockets were being tested for space flight. Aware that the other country could arm one of these rockets with nuclear weapons developed from WW2, they agreed on a treaty to focus on a non-weaponized competition. Though a lot of the focus of containment was on geo-political relationships, the idea still significantly influenced America to put its space program in the forefront.
A writer for CNN, Laura Spark, wrote an article describing current events regarding NASA and Russia's relationship with the United States. Spark says in the article that the United States may as well stop funding NASA from the support they have been showing for space exploration (Spark, 4). Over the years, as NASA has slowly but surely continued towards space exploration, the United States has been giving less and less support to NASA. Recently the United States has been shipping money to Russia to continue space exploration in the name of NASA. Instead of creating jobs in the United States, they give money to Russia, which the united states is against right now due to the Crimea crisis.

Roger Launius is a writer who took an in depth look at the United States spending for NASA compared to previous years, and where they would be now had they gotten the appropriate funding. Launius describes how NASA has become underfunded since it's high point of the moon landing back in 1969. Back when the United States was in a Space Race with the Soviet Union, roughly $25.4 billion (about $125 billion in 2009 dollars) was spent, with the only rival in terms of project size being the building of the Panama Canal. Launius mentions how the launch control centers are now used for storage, and old launch sites have since been taken apart for parts, and abandoned. When the space race was first initiated, the first 15 years were the strongest ones. The United States even emphasized a "civil space program with several major components"(Launius, 19). Because of all this space race focused work, the "space agency's annual budget increased from $500 million in1960 to a high point of %5.2 billion in 1965." As Launius says, "NASA's budget declined from 1966 to 1975. Then, in 1976, NASA's budget took a hit that forced the cancellation of Apollo missions 18-20". If the budget had stayed about the same as it did in 1965, then in 2008 the $2 trillion federal budget would have meant NASA was funded with more than $75 billion, instead of the $18.4 billion they were actually given.
Because of the constant decline in government funding, NASA (As mentioned before) as closed down many branches and started taking apart old projects for resources to use on current projects. NASA was even put in the position of having to decide whether or not to dismantle the Apollo 1 space craft. In the end NASA decided to leave the Apollo 1 in the Langley research center. Eventually the research center shut down, and Apollo 1 remains there to this day, not on display, and not in any means of being preserved (Launius, 22). Launius also talks about how because of the continuation of losing many NASA related artifacts, there should be a public awareness of how much NASA is being funded and how space related research is at an all time low.
Many technological advances were because of the space race. The "space race" was a competition between the Soviet Union and the United States to see who could be more successful in terms of space exploration. Vladimir Putkov talked about the space race and what Russia's plans are for space exploration at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in 2007. He mentions that "[in]1969, development of the first Soviet meteorological system began with the Meteor series of satellites." (Putkov, 38). The Meteor series of satellites were the beginning of "common satellites" which we use today to forecast weather, broadcast tv, etc. (Putkov, 39). Putkov goes on to explain how, because of the space race, and developments made during that time, we now live in a world where technology(telecommunications, navigation, and other things regarding information provided by remote sensing) is necessary in everyday life.
Another member who spoke at the conference was Sergey Basanov. Sergey talks about the Outer Space Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty was a treaty made in 1967, but still remains as an outstanding and very progressive treaty (Basanov, 51). The OST laid legal foundations for a wide range of activities in a new, limitless environment, and at a time when comparatively little was known about it. The OST was concluded four decades ago, when the political, military and scientific landscape was very much different from what we see today (Basanov, 52). Another important thing Sergey talked about was how the Space Race was compared to the Cold War, in the sense of it was a fierce competition for supremacy between the two superpowers. When he talks about two superpowers competing (like Russia and the United States) he says "[after the Cuban Missile Crisis] such a competition could not be allowed to get out of control" in reference to another space race like competition.
This is how the United States reacted to the Sputnik launch, and how the action's consequences are still around today. From the implementation of both Containment and the Test Ban Treaty to Russia's lack of interest of the United States requests, both events are related to the Moon landing. All in all, the one last thing to hope for is another competition with Russia by a non weaponized agreement and letting the scientific community flourish once again.

Works Cited:
Knorr, Klaus. "On the International Implications of Outer Space." World Politics Vol. 12, No. 4 (1960): 564-68.

Launius, Roger D. "Abandoned in Place: Interpreting the U.S. Material Culture of the Moon Race." The Public Historian Vol. 31, No. 3 (2009): 9-38.

Roberts, Chalmers M. "How Containment Worked." Foreign Policy No. 7 (1972): 41-53.

Smith-Spark, Laura. "US to End Most Activities with Russia." CNN. Last modified April 4th, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/us/us-russia-relations-nasa/

"Sputnik." n.d. http://www.vibrationdata.com/Sputnik.htm

United Nations, Celebrating the Space Age: 50 Years of Space Technology, 40 Years of Outer Space Treaty ( Geneva: United Nations, 2007), 37-57.

Illustrations:
Be Proud Soviet Man, for you discovered the way to the stars, 1962,
http://www.flickriver.com/photos/apple_min/5564205223/

Replica of Sputnik, 2003, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Race#mediaviewer/File:Sputnik_asm.jpg

Space Race, n.d., http://davidsspacerace.weebly.com/uploads/2/0/5/9/20592902/header_images/1369939418.jpg

We were born to make the fairy tale come true!, 1960, http://i.kinja-img.com/gawker-media/image/upload/s-VRDvHa0l-/c_fit,fl_progressive,q_80,w_636/18yebx4d6bxsgjpg.jpg

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Soviet Union Vs. United States: Space Race of Technology

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During the launch of Sputnik, the United States decided to no longer compete with the Soviet Union via military means, but instead, have a race to see who could put man on the moon first. The transition between the Cold War and the Space Race was mostly focused on how missiles and satellites were used.

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How the US tricked people into thinking it was a race?

What were the advancements?

What gave the US the advantage in these missile advancements?

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The Space Race was an opportunity for the US to work on nuclear technology behind the cover of racing to space.

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The Space Race was about technological advancements.

The Space Race showed the US to be one step ahead the USSR in missile technology.

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WHITE [stuff]

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Kids learn the history of the Space Race during the Cold War. A race between the United States and the Soviet Union to put a man on the Moon.

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The Cold War: Crash Course US History #37

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USA vs USSR Fight! The Cold War: Crash Course World History #39

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The competitive war like challenge to get to the moon first - nuclear and atomic power was being discovered - science was being developed. Was it all a set up for scientific advancements. What did the US actually gain from getting to the moon first.

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Sign in with your credentials to access the EBSCOhost premium information resources provided by your subscribing institution.

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Persuasive
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Universal thesis

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Was the Space Race a plan to gain nuclear power?
What advancements did the US make through the rocket technology in the Space Race?
Was the Space Race more about war or science?