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Most of the peasants in Russia in the nineteenth century were forced to confront poverty, young Joseph Stalin was no exception. However, he battled against this hollow factor and rose to become one of the greatest communist revolutionaries and powerful ruler of the former Soviet Union.

Joseph Stalin was born as Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili on the 21 st of December 1879 in Gori, Georgia (which was, at the time, a part of the Russian empire) to an alcoholic cobbler and a maid. As a young boy he earned the nickname 'Pocky' due to the scars he acquired to his face when he contracted smallpox. It was in his youth that Joseph realised just how he wanted the Soviet Union to be ruled and that he himself must take action to help this. He had received a scholarship to a fine theological seminary in the Georgian capital but he had no interest whatsoever in such studies. Joseph devoted himself to the revolutionary movement against the Russian monarchy and even joined a secret revolutionary organisation called 'Messame Dassy'. This group persevered for the release of Georgia from the claws of the Russian Monarch so it could become independent. Naturally, when Joseph's allegiance was discovered, he was expelled from the seminary.

Stalin set to work immediately after his expulsion, teaching middle class children. With a lot of spare time on his hands, Joseph effectively motivated workers and peasants to organise strikes and shut-downs. His enthusiasm and persuasiveness gained him much popularity among the people. However, he soon had to go into hiding once the Monarch's secret police learned of his revolutionary activities. But Joseph persisted, which subsequently lead to his arrest and his exile to Siberia.

Eventually, with the assistance of other activists, the communist party came into power with Joseph in the high ranks. With sheer cunning and desperation to be leader, Joseph had the other men who were competing for leadership turn against each other and eventually they were exiled. Stalin had now become the supreme authority of the Soviet.

Joseph was arguably the Soviet Union's most powerful and ruthless leader. With his socialist-economic policies he attained the favour of the poor and working class people and with the power endowed by this popularity he trounced the prominent party leaders of his oposition. The concept of a 'Five-Year-Plan' was adopted by the Soviet Union as they sought escalated industrialisation and a collectively controlled economy where peasantry was directly in political control. However, it was through these programs that the true brutality of his nature shone. Stalin was cruel and merciless and the lives of all those who he ruled were at his expense. Stalin was at the top, and he enjoyed his absolute power and authority.

In fear of any corruption in his rule or plots against him, Stalin took action to ensure his safety and supremacy. He launched the great terror of the 1930's; a vicious campaign entitled 'The Purge' which constituted of the execution of the party members and other sectors of the Soviet Union who he deemed suspicious and disloyal to him and also the exile of millions to slave labour camps. Joining with the ally forces against the Nazi's, Stalin assailed Germany due to its breach of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union despite the fact that they once collaborated. This powerful force strongly aided in the defeat of Germany despite the huge death toll in the Soviet Union - but this did not faze him in the least. He even extended his savagery to those who had committed either political or criminal offences. The Russian archives record that, under Joseph's ruling, around 800,000 prisoners were executed.

Joseph Stalin remained supreme ruler until his death on March 5, 1953, at the age of 74. Joseph's supremacy acted as a drug in his system and he was continually hungry for more. The obsessive measures he took to ensure that his position was secured exceeded the necessary force of a ruler. He knew how he wanted the Soviet Union to be ruled and he took the steps that he saw fit in a desperate effort to achieve that goal. Under this monster's treacherous rule, death and suffering was cast upon tens of millions of people.
- by Kristina Macula, 10ENG

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Most of the peasants in Russia in the nineteenth century were forced to confront poverty, young Joseph Stalin was no exception. However, he battled against this hollow factor and rose to become one of the greatest communist revolutionaries and powerful ruler of the former Soviet Union.

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Diana was a charming woman, yet she was also able to describe Adolf Hitler in almost wholly terms.

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The key, inescapable difference between Diana Mosley and the scores of other pre-war pro-Nazis who had changed their political allegiance once the concentration camps yielded up their incontrovertible evidence of the profound evil of Hitlerism was that she was hooked for life.

As the writer Michael Shelden has diagnosed it: "There was no going back; Diana Mosley's stubbornness and aristocratic pride made her reluctant to admit that she had made a profound mistake.'' Indeed, even that puts it too mildly.

Lady Mosley fully appreciated the frisson that would shoot through a lunch table when she made some fond reference to a Nazi leader. Nor did it end there.

She helped to finance the British Union of Fascists until the death of its organiser, Jeffrey Hamm, in 1994, often attending their annual dinners. In letters I received from her in 1992, she took particular pleasure in the way that Czechoslovakia, which she wrote "couldn't last in its 1938 form'', was splitting in two, just as Hitler had succeeded in forcing it to do at Munich. She even recently wrote to The Spectator to argue that her late husband "was not an extremist''.

The problem of how to deal socially with Lady Mosley was not made that much harder after her release from Holloway in 1943, especially once she went to live in France after the war.

British ambassadors were instructed, as if they really needed to be, not to invite the Mosleys to the embassy, and, other than the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, they made few new friends. But old friendships and ties of blood, especially through the children of Diana's first husband, Bryan Guinness, meant that they were never short of visitors to their beautiful house outside Paris, Temple de la Gloire, which was originally built for General Moreau in 1800 to commemorate the battle of Hohenlinden.

When I visited the Temple to interview Diana Mosley for a book I was writing about Churchill's contemporaries, I was subjected to the full force of her superb Mitfordesque charm, and I am ashamed to say that I loved it. There was not a trace of pomposity to her - "How snooty I looked in those days'', she said of a photograph of herself - nor of the boorishness one expects (and rather hopes for) from fascists. Yet she never failed to appreciate the effect of occasionally flashing a view of the cloven hoof.

"Hitler was attractive,'' she told me, "though not handsome, with great inner dynamism and charm. Charm can mean so mean so many things; I don't suppose I've met anyone quite so charming. It might be just that he was powerful, I suppose, but it seemed more than that.''

I asked about the Holocaust, of course, expecting a David Irving-style refutation, but was astounded not to get one. "I'm sure he was to blame for the extermination of the Jews,'' she answered. "He was to blame for everything, and I say that as someone who approved of him.''

Was that use of the past tense an admission? Had she in fact changed her mind about the Führer? So I asked her again, hoping that I would not have to think this beautiful aristocrat a monster because of her disgraceful views.

When she married Mosley in a civil ceremony in Joseph Goebbels's "ordinary, middle-class drawing room'' in Berlin in 1936, the only guests (besides the witnesses) were Hitler and Goebbels himself. Fifty-two years and a world war later, I wondered, what she would do if the Führer walked into the room? "I should have to be pleased,'' she replied, "and ask him how it had been in Hell, or Heaven, or wherever he'd been.''

There it was; the same disdain for equivocation that later led her to talk to Sue Lawley about Hitler's lovely blue eyes, the same inability to admit that the central fact about her life had been disastrous, that fascism was evil and that the man she had worshipped - Oswald Mosley, "Tom'' to his friends, "Kit'' to her - had wasted his undeniable talents upon a foul lie.

There were several people who told me in the course of my researches - including another of Oswald Mosley's lovers, Lady Alexandra "Baba'' Metcalfe - that Diana was the more dangerous of the couple, because she was more fanatical than her husband back in the 1930s. Her own sister, the novelist Nancy Mitford, told the Home Office as much in 1940.

I like to think that she stuck to her repulsive views out of love for her husband and because her beloved sister Unity had attempted to commit suicide for them on the outbreak of war, and that to denounce them would have been a betrayal of her.

Whatever the reason, Diana Mosley took her disgusting, unchanged views to her grave, and now she can ask the Führer herself how he has fared "in Heaven, or Hell, or wherever he'd been''.

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Diana Mosley, unrepentantly Nazi and effortlessly charming

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The key, inescapable difference between Diana Mosley and the scores of other pre-war pro-Nazis who had changed their political allegiance once the concentration camps yielded up their incontrovertible evidence of the profound evil of Hitlerism was that she was hooked for life.

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18b: It was one of the Defence Regulations. It allowed the interment (when someone is imprisoned without a trial) of suspected Nazi followers/ sympathisers.

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Defence Regulation 18B, often referred to as simply 18B, was one of the Defence Regulations used by the British Government during the Second World War. The complete name for the rule was Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939. It allowed the internment without trial of people suspected of being actively opposed to the ongoing war with Germany during the Second World War, pacifist and separatist elements (for example Irish republicans suspected of involvement in the Sabotage Campaign) or were otherwise suspected of ideological Nazi-alligned sympathy (this included members of the British Union of Fascists and similar groups). The effect of 18B was to suspend the right of affected individuals to habeas corpus.

The Defence Regulations existed in draft form, constantly revised, throughout the years between the world wars. In early 1939 it was decided that since a war might break out without warning or without time to pass an Act of Parliament to bring in emergency regulations, the Regulations should be split into two codes. Code A would be needed immediately if war broke out and could be passed in peacetime, while Code B, containing more severe restrictions on civil liberties, would be brought in later. In order not to alert the public to the existence of Code B, Code A was simply numbered consecutively. Defence Regulation 18 concerned restrictions on movement of aircraft. It was originally intended that Code B would be imposed by an Order in Council, with retrospective indemnity being granted by an Act of Parliament should anyone dispute the actions of the authorities.

On 24 August 1939, after tensions rose over Poland, the House of Commons was recalled from its summer recess to pass the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, which gave authority to implement the Defence Regulations. Code A was brought into effect that day and Code B followed on 1 September. Enemy aliens were detained using powers under the Royal Prerogative, while 18B was used mainly for British nationals.

(1) If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained.

(1A) If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to have been or to be a member of, or to have been or "to be active in the furtherance of the objects of, any such organisation as is hereinafter mentioned, and that it is necessary to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained. The organisations hereinbefore referred to are any organisation as respects which the Secretary of State is satisfied that either- (a) the organisation is subject to foreign influence or control, or (b) the persons in control of the organisation have or have had associations with persons concerned in the government of, or sympathies with the system of government of, any Power with which His Majesty is at war. and in either case that there is danger of the utilisation of the organisation for purposes prejudicial to the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public order, the efficient " prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged or the maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community.

(2) At any time after an order has been made against any person under this Regulation, the Secretary of State may direct that the operation of the order be suspended subject to such conditions- (a) prohibiting or restricting the possession or use by that person of any specified articles; (b) imposing upon him such restrictions as may be specified in the direction in respect of his employment or business, in respect of the place of his residence, and in respect of his association or communication with other persons; (c) requiring him to notify his movements in such manner, at such times, and to such authority or person as may be so specified; (d) prohibiting him from travelling except in accordance with permission given to him by such authority or person as may be so specified; as the Secretary of State thinks fit; and the Secretary of State may revoke any such direction if he is satisfied that the person against whom the order was made has failed to observe any condition so imposed, or that the operation of the order can no longer remain suspended without detriment to the public safety or the defence of the realm.

(3) For the purposes of this Regulation, there shall be one or more advisory committees consisting of persons appointed by the Secretary of State; and any person aggrieved by the making of an order against him, by a refusal of the Secretary of State to suspend the operation of such an order, by any condition attached to a direction given by the Secretary of State or by the revocation of any such direction, under the powers conferred by this Regulation, may make his objections to such a committee.

(4) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to secure that any person against whom an order is made under this Regulation shall be afforded the earliest practicable opportunity of making to the Secretary of State representations in writing with respect thereto and that he shall be informed of his right, whether or not such representations are made, to make his objections to such an advisory committee as aforesaid.

(5) Any meeting of an advisory committee held to consider such objections as aforesaid shall be presided over by a chairman nominated by the Secretary of State and it shall be the duty of the chairman to inform the objector of the grounds on which the order has been made against him and to furnish him with such particulars as are in the opinion of the chairman sufficient to enable him to present his case.

(6) The Secretary of State shall make a report to Parliament at least once in every month as to the action taken under this Regulation (including the number of persons detained under orders made thereunder) and as to the number of cases, if any, in which he has declined to follow the advice of any such advisory committee as aforesaid.

(7) If any person fails to comply with a condition attached to a direction given by the Secretary of State under paragraph (2) of this Regulation that person shall, whether or not the direction is revoked in consequence of the failure, be guilty of an offence against this Regulation.

(8) Any person detained in pursuance of this Regulation shall be deemed to be in lawful custody and shall be detained in such place as may be authorised by the Secretary of State and in accordance with instructions issued by him.

The initial arrests were few and confined to those believed to be hard-core Nazis. By 14 September 1939 there were only 14 people interned under 18B. Several of these were German or Austrian by birth but had been naturalised as British subjects. The total would have been higher if William Joyce had not been tipped off by an MI5 officer, who appears to have been Maxwell Knight, about his impending internment, allowing him to flee to Germany.

In the Commons a group of Labour and Liberal MPs attempted to have Code B annulled on 31 October 1939, but were persuaded to withdraw their motion in favour of consultation that produced slightly amended wording.

The authorities dramatically revised their approach to the British far right in the late spring of 1940. The recent rapid seizure of power in Norway by Vidkun Quisling raised the possibility of a fifth column deposing the British government. The fall of the Low Countries and the invasion of France led to fear of invasion. Then on 20 May 1940 a raid on the home of Tyler Kent, a cypher clerk at the U.S. Embassy, revealed that Kent had stolen copies of thousands of telegrams, including those between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. Kent was an associate of Archibald Maule Ramsay, an openly anti-semitic MP. This opened the possibility that Ramsay might use parliamentary privilege to reveal the telegrams, which Churchill had not told the Cabinet about. It would also reveal Roosevelt was trying to help Churchill while proclaiming his support for neutrality in public. The Cabinet decided in favour of widespread detentions of the far right on 22 May. This required an amended version of the Regulation, known as 18B (1A).

One of the first to be arrested, in the early morning of 23 May, was Sir Oswald Mosley. Others arrested later included Admiral Sir Barry Domvile and Sir Reginald Goodall. Popular reaction was strongly in favour,[citation needed ] and one reader wrote to to note with satisfaction that news of Mosley's arrest had been carried in the fifth column of the page. By December 1940 there were more than a thousand detainees in custody.

A person subject to 18B would be arrested without warning. Some were in the forces and were arrested while on parade. They would be taken first to police cells and then to prison. The first detainees were sent to HM Prison Wandsworth for men and HM Prison Holloway for women, but the men were later moved to HM Prison Brixton. With the expansion in numbers in 1940 came a shortage of prison accommodation, so some derelict wings of prisons (including Stafford and Liverpool women's prison) were brought back into use to house internees.

Eventually it was decided to hold the internees in camps. The winter quarters of Bertram Mills's circus provided one camp at Ascot Racecourse, and uncompleted council housing at Huyton near Liverpool was used from March 1941. Finally the authorities solved the accommodation problem, both for 18B internees and for interned enemy aliens by setting up camps on the Isle of Man. A new Act of Parliament, the Isle of Man (Detention) Act 1941, was needed to authorise the transfer. The men stayed at Peveril Camp, Peel, and the women at Rushen Camp, Port Erin. A small number of designated leaders remained in Wandsworth Prison throughout, for greater security. In a few cases husbands and wives who had both been interned were later allowed to live together.

The regime in the camps was relatively liberal. Free association was permitted and there were some entertainments, even including trips to cinemas.

There were two justifications for an order to intern: "acts prejudicial to the public safety" and "hostile origin or associations". A detainee could challenge their detention by way of an appeal to an Advisory Committee headed by Norman Birkett. The committee would be presented with a statement of the reasons why detention had been proposed, drawn up by MI5, which the detainee was not permitted to see. The committee could recommend continued detention, release under conditions or unconditional release. The committee's recommendations went to the Home Secretary, who was not bound to accept them, and MI5 often lobbied him not to accept a recommendation to release.

Some detainees attempted to take further action through the courts. Challenges were brought on the basis of habeas corpus, but refused on the grounds that the Home Secretary had taken his decision to intern on the basis of reports that had to be kept secret, and that he had reasonable cause to sign the internment orders. The most significant case was Liversidge v. Anderson, brought by Robert W. Liversidge who was a successful Jewish businessman and therefore a highly atypical 18B internee. He brought a civil action for damages for false imprisonment, but did not apply for habeas corpus. It was ultimately decided that where it is required in law that a minister "has reasonable cause to believe" something before acting, a court can inquire into whether he really did believe it, but not into whether the things causing this belief were true. Lord Atkin wrote a dissent from this judgment.

Archibald Maule Ramsay, the only MP detained, had the matter referred to the House of Commons Committee on Privileges for a ruling as to whether the detention of an MP was a breach of the Privilege of Parliament. The committee decided that it was not.

Fear of immediate invasion subsided after the Battle of Britain and the number of 18B internees slowly decreased as those of least concern were released. From a peak of about 1,000 in 1940, by summer 1943 there were fewer than 500. Oswald Mosley, who was said to be suffering from phlebitis, was released on 23 November 1943, to a great deal of public criticism. The Council for Civil Liberties demanded his continued imprisonment.

The invasion of France on D-Day again lifted pressure and by the end of 1944 only 65 18B internees remained, most of whom were naturalised German-born citizens.[citation needed ] By the time Adolf Hitler killed himself there were 11 and by V-E Day there was only one. 18B ceased to have effect a few days later.[citation needed ]

Simpson, A. W. Brian (1992). In the Highest Degree Odious. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-825775-9.

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Defence Regulation 18B, often referred to as simply 18B, was one of the Defence Regulations used by the British Government during the Second World War. The complete name for the rule was Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939.

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Did not understand most of it, but it helped.

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Description:

The official publication of the North American Conference on British Studies (NACBS), the Journal of British Studies, has positioned itself as the critical resource for scholars of British culture from the Middle Ages through the present. Drawing on both established and emerging approaches, JBS presents scholarly articles and books reviews from renowned international authors who share their ideas on British society, politics, law, economics, and the arts. In 2005 (Vol. 44), the journal merged with the NACBS publication Albion, creating one journal for NACBS membership.

The NACBS also sponsors an annual conference, as well as several academic prizes, graduate fellowships, and undergraduate essay contests. While the largest single group of its members teaches British history in colleges and universities in the United States and Canada, the NACBS has significant representation among specialists in literature, art history, politics, law, sociology, and economics. Its membership also includes many teachers at universities in countries outside North America, secondary school teachers, and independent scholars.

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Defence Regulation 18B: Emergency Internment of Aliens and Political Dissenters in Great Britain during World War II

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Description: The official publication of the North American Conference on British Studies (NACBS), the Journal of British Studies, has positioned itself as the critical resource for scholars of British culture from the Middle Ages through the present.

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Trying to understand what I was reading. Not that much luck, though.

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And were the means used by the Allies, the terror bombing of Japanese and German cities, killing hundreds of thousands of women and children, perhaps millions, the marks of a "good war"?
Cohen contends that the evil of the Holocaust makes it a "good war." But the destruction of the Jews of Europe was a consequence of this war, not a cause. As for the Japanese atrocities like the Rape of Nanking, they were indeed horrific.
Is a war that replaces Hitler's domination of Europe with Stalin's and Japan's rule in China with Mao's a "good war"? We had to stop the killers, says Cohen. But who were the greater killers: Hitler or Stalin, Tojo or Mao Zedong?
Can a war in which 50 million perished and the Christian continent was destroyed, half of it enslaved, a war that has advanced the death of Western civilization, be truly celebrated as a "good war"?

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Was WWII Really 'The Good War'? - by Pat Buchanan

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Was it a good war for Hungarians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Romanians and Albanians who ended up behind the Iron Curtain? In Hungary, it was hard to find a women or girl over 10 who had not been raped by the "liberators" of the Red Army.

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FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

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IN THE UNITED STATES, World War II is generally known as "the good war." In contrast to some of America's admittedly bad wars, such as the near-genocidal Indian Wars and the vicious conflict in Vietnam, World War II is widely celebrated as a "crusade" in which the US fought unreservedly on the side of democracy, freedom, and justice against dictatorship. No wonder President George W. Bush likes to compare his ongoing "war against terrorism" with World War II, suggesting that America is once again involved on the right side in an apocalyptic conflict between good and evil. Wars, however, are never quite as black-and-white as Mr. Bush would have us believe, and this also applies to World War II. America certainly deserves credit for its important contribution to the hard-fought victory that was ultimately achieved by the Allies. But the role of corporate America in the war is hardly synthesized by President Roosevelt's claim that the US was the "arsenal of democracy." When Americans landed in Normandy in June 1944 and captured their first German trucks, they discovered that these vehicles were powered by engines produced by American firms such as Ford and General Motors. ¹ Corporate America, it turned out, had also been serving as the arsenal of Nazism.

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World War II is generally known as "the good war."

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Comprehensive research has shown not only that Washington knew in advance of the attack, but that it deliberately withheld its foreknowledge from our commanders in Hawaii in the hope that the "surprise" attack would catapult the U.S. into World War II. Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, stated in 1944: "Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war."

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On Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japan launched a sneak attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, shattering the peace of a beautiful Hawaiian morning and leaving much of the fleet broken and burning. The destruction and death that the Japanese military visited upon Pearl Harbor that day - 18 naval vessels (including eight battleships) sunk or heavily damaged, 188 planes destroyed, over 2,000 servicemen killed - were exacerbated by the fact that American commanders in Hawaii were caught by surprise. But that was not the case in Washington.

Comprehensive research has shown not only that Washington knew in advance of the attack, but that it deliberately withheld its foreknowledge from our commanders in Hawaii in the hope that the "surprise" attack would catapult the U.S. into World War II. Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, stated in 1944: "Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war."

Although FDR desired to directly involve the United States in the Second World War, his intentions sharply contradicted his public pronouncements. A pre-war Gallup poll showed 88 percent of Americans opposed U.S. involvement in the European war. Citizens realized that U.S. participation in World War I had not made a better world, and in a 1940 (election-year) speech, Roosevelt typically stated: "I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

But privately, the president planned the opposite. Roosevelt dispatched his closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, to meet British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in January 1941. Hopkins told Churchill: "The President is determined that we [the United States and England] shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him - there is nothing he will not do so far as he has human power." William Stevenson noted in A Man Called Intrepid that American-British military staff talks began that same month under "utmost secrecy," which, he clarified, "meant preventing disclosure to the American public." Even Robert Sherwood, the president's friendly biographer, said: "If the isolationists had known the full extent of the secret alliance between the United States and Britain, their demands for impeachment would have rumbled like thunder throughout the land."
Background to Betrayal
Roosevelt's intentions were nearly exposed in 1940 when Tyler Kent, a code clerk at the U.S. embassy in London, discovered secret dispatches between Roosevelt and Churchill. These revealed that FDR - despite contrary campaign promises - was determined to engage America in the war. Kent smuggled some of the documents out of the embassy, hoping to alert the American public - but was caught. With U.S. government approval, he was tried in a secret British court and confined to a British prison until the war's end.

During World War II's early days, the president offered numerous provocations to Germany: freezing its assets; shipping 50 destroyers to Britain; and depth-charging U-boats. The Germans did not retaliate, however. They knew America's entry into World War I had shifted the balance of power against them, and they shunned a repeat of that scenario. FDR therefore switched his focus to Japan. Japan had signed a mutual defense pact with Germany and Italy (the Tripartite Treaty). Roosevelt knew that if Japan went to war with the United States, Germany and Italy would be compelled to declare war on America - thus entangling us in the European conflict by the back door. As Harold Ickes, secretary of the Interior, said in October 1941: "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."

Much new light has been shed on Pearl Harbor through the recent work of Robert B. Stinnett, a World War II Navy veteran. Stinnett has obtained numerous relevant documents through the Freedom of Information Act. In Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (2000), the book so brusquely dismissed by director Bruckheimer, Stinnett reveals that Roosevelt's plan to provoke Japan began with a memorandum from Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The memorandum advocated eight actions predicted to lead Japan into attacking the United States. McCollum wrote: "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." FDR enacted all eight of McCollum's provocative steps - and more.

While no one can excuse Japan's belligerence in those days, it is also true that our government provoked that country in various ways - freezing her assets in America; closing the Panama Canal to her shipping; progressively halting vital exports to Japan until we finally joined Britain in an all-out embargo; sending a hostile note to the Japanese ambassador implying military threats if Tokyo did not alter its Pacific policies; and on November 26th - just 11 days before the Japanese attack - delivering an ultimatum that demanded, as prerequisites to resumed trade, that Japan withdraw all troops from China and Indochina, and in effect abrogate her Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy.

After meeting with President Roosevelt on October 16, 1941, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: "We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move - overt move." On November 25, the day before the ultimatum was sent to Japan's ambassadors, Stimson wrote in his diary: "The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot...."

The bait offered Japan was our Pacific Fleet. In 1940, Admiral J.O. Richardson, the fleet's commander, flew to Washington to protest FDR's decision to permanently base the fleet in Hawaii instead of its normal berthing on the U.S. West Coast. The admiral had sound reasons: Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to attack, being approachable from any direction; it could not be effectively rigged with nets and baffles to defend against torpedo planes; and in Hawaii it would be hard to supply and train crews for his undermanned vessels. Pearl Harbor also lacked adequate fuel supplies and dry docks, and keeping men far from their families would create morale problems. The argument became heated. Said Richardson: "I came away with the impression that, despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined to put the United States into the war if Great Britain could hold out until he was reelected."

Richardson was quickly relieved of command. Replacing him was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also informed Roosevelt of Pearl Harbor's deficiencies, but accepted placement there, trusting that Washington would notify him of any intelligence pointing to attack. This proved to be misplaced trust. As Washington watched Japan preparing to assault Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel, as well as his Army counterpart in Hawaii, General Walter C. Short, were completely sealed off from the information pipeline.
Prior Knowledge
One of the most important elements in America's foreknowledge of Japan's intentions was our government's success in cracking Japan's secret diplomatic code known as "Purple." Tokyo used it to communicate to its embassies and consulates, including those in Washington and Hawaii. The code was so complex that it was enciphered and deciphered by machine. A talented group of American cryptoanalysts broke the code in 1940 and devised a facsimile of the Japanese machine. These, utilized by the intelligence sections of both the War and Navy departments, swiftly revealed Japan's diplomatic messages. The deciphered texts were nicknamed "Magic."

Copies of Magic were always promptly delivered in locked pouches to President Roosevelt, and the secretaries of State, War, and Navy. They also went to Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. However, although three Purple decoding machines were allotted to Britain, none was sent to Pearl Harbor. Intercepts of ciphered messages radioed between Tokyo and its Honolulu consulate had to be forwarded to Washington for decrypting. Thus Kimmel and Short, the Hawaiian commanders, were at the mercy of Washington for feedback. A request for their own decoding machine was rebuffed on the grounds that diplomatic traffic was of insufficient interest to soldiers.

How untrue that was! On October 9, 1941, the War Department decoded a Tokyo-to-Honolulu dispatch instructing the Consul General to divide Pearl Harbor into five specified areas and to report the exact locations of American ships therein.

There is nothing unusual about spies watching ship movements - but reporting precise whereabouts of ships in dock has only one implication. Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief of intelligence, later wrote that the "reports were on a grid system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war ... coordinate grid is the classical method for pinpoint target designation; our battleships had suddenly become targets." This information was never sent to Kimmel or Short.

Additional intercepts were decoded by Washington, all within one day of their original transmission:

* November 5th: Tokyo notified its Washington ambassadors that November 25th was the deadline for an agreement with the U.S.

* November 11th: They were warned, "The situation is nearing a climax, and the time is getting short."

* November 16th: The deadline was pushed up to November 29th. "The deadline absolutely cannot be changed," the dispatch said. "After that, things are automatically going to happen."

* November 29th (the U.S. ultimatum had now been received): The ambassadors were told a rupture in negotiations was "inevitable," but that Japan's leaders "do not wish you to give the impression that negotiations are broken off."

* November 30th: Tokyo ordered its Berlin embassy to inform the Germans that "the breaking out of war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

* December 1st: The deadline was again moved ahead. "[T]o prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been advising the press and others that ... the negotiations are continuing."

* December 1st-2nd: The Japanese embassies in non-Axis nations around the world were directed to dispose of their secret documents and all but one copy of their codes. (This was for a reason easy to fathom - when war breaks out, the diplomatic offices of a hostile state lose their immunity and are normally overtaken. One copy of code was retained so that final instructions could be received, after which the last code copy would be destroyed.)

An additional warning came via the so-called "winds" message. A November 18th intercept indicated that, if a break in U.S. relations were forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. This would not be in the Purple code, as it was intended to reach consulates and lesser agencies of Japan not equipped with the code or one of its machines. The message, to be repeated three times during a weather report, was "Higashi no kaze ame," meaning "East wind, rain." "East wind" signified the United States; "rain" signified diplomatic split - in effect, war.

This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio monitors were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department typed it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, "Higashi no kaze ame" was indeed broadcast and picked up by Washington intelligence.

On three different occasions since 1894, Japan had made surprise attacks coinciding with breaks in diplomatic relations. This history was not lost on President Roosevelt. Secretary Stimson, describing FDR's White House conference of November 25th, noted: "The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might be attacked, say next Monday, for example." Nor was it lost on Washington's senior military officers, all of them War College graduates.

As Robert Stinnett has revealed, Washington was not only deciphering Japanese diplomatic messages, but naval dispatches as well. President Roosevelt had access to these intercepts via his routing officer, Lieutenant Commander McCollum, who had authored the original eight-point plan of provocation to Japan. So much secrecy has surrounded these naval dispatches that their existence was not revealed during any of the ten Pearl Harbor investigations, even the mini-probe Congress conducted in 1995. Most of Stinnett's requests for documents concerning Pearl Harbor have been denied as still classified, even under the Freedom of Information Act.

It was long presumed that as the Japanese fleet approached Pearl Harbor, it maintained complete radio silence. This is untrue. The fleet barely observed discretion, let alone silence. Naval intelligence intercepted and translated numerous dispatches, some clearly revealing that Pearl Harbor had been targeted. The most significant was the following, sent by Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese First Air Fleet on November 26, 1941:

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for the dawn of x-day. Exact date to be given by later order.

So much official secrecy continues to surround the translations of the intercepted Japanese naval dispatches that it is not known if the foregoing message was sent to McCollum or seen by FDR. It is not even known who originally translated the intercept. One thing, however, is certain: The message's significance could not have been lost on the translator.

1941 also witnessed the following:

On January 27th, our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a message to Washington stating: "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all their strength...."

On November 3rd, still relying on informants, Grew notified Secretary of State Cordell Hull: "War with the United States may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness." He sent an even stronger warning on November 17th.

Congressman Martin Dies would write:

Early in 1941 the Dies Committee came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department. As soon as I received the document I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him what I had. Secretary Hull directed me not to let anyone know about the map and stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map reached the news services.... I told him it was a grave responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense.

Dusko Popov was a Yugoslav who worked as a double agent for both Germany and Britain. His true allegiance was to the Allies. In the summer of 1941, the Nazis ordered Popov to Hawaii to make a detailed study of Pearl Harbor and its nearby airfields. The agent deduced that the mission betokened a surprise attack by the Japanese. In August, he fully reported this to the FBI in New York. J. Edgar Hoover later bitterly recalled that he had provided warnings to FDR about Pearl Harbor, but that Roosevelt told him not to pass the information any further and to just leave it in his (the president's) hands.

Kilsoo Haan, of the Sino-Korean People's League, received definite word from the Korean underground that the Japanese were planning to assault Hawaii "before Christmas." In November, after getting nowhere with the State Department, Haan convinced Iowa Senator Guy Gillette of his claim's merit. Gillette briefed the president, who laconically thanked him and said it would be looked into.

In Java, in early December, the Dutch Army decoded a dispatch from Tokyo to its Bangkok embassy, forecasting attacks on four sites including Hawaii. The Dutch passed the information to Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, the U.S. military observer. Thorpe sent Washington a total of four warnings. The last went to General Marshall's intelligence chief. Thorpe was ordered to send no further messages concerning the matter. The Dutch also had their Washington military attaché, Colonel Weijerman, personally warn General Marshall.

Captain Johann Ranneft, the Dutch naval attaché in Washington, who was awarded the Legion of Merit for his services to America, recorded revealing details in his diary. On December 2nd, he visited the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Ranneft inquired about the Pacific. An American officer, pointing to a wall map, said, "This is the Japanese Task Force proceeding East." It was a spot midway between Japan and Hawaii. On December 6th, Ranneft returned and asked where the Japanese carriers were. He was shown a position on the map about 300-400 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor. Ranneft wrote: "I ask what is the meaning of these carriers at this location; whereupon I receive the answer that it is probably in connection with Japanese reports of eventual American action.... I myself do not think about it because I believe that everyone in Honolulu is 100 percent on the alert, just like everyone here at O.N.I."

On November 29th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull secretly met with freelance newspaper writer Joseph Leib. Leib had formerly held several posts in the Roosevelt administration. Hull knew him and felt he was one newsman he could trust. The secretary of state handed him copies of some of the Tokyo intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor. He said the Japanese were planning to strike the base and that FDR planned to let it happen. Hull made Leib pledge to keep his name out of it, but hoped he could blow the story sky-high in the newspapers.

Leib ran to the office of his friend Lyle Wilson, the Washington bureau chief of United Press. While keeping his pledge to Hull, he told Wilson the details and showed him the intercepts. Wilson replied that the story was ludicrous and refused to run it. Through connections, Leib managed to get a hurried version onto UP's foreign cable, but only one newspaper carried any part of it.

After Pearl Harbor, Lyle Wilson called Leib to his office. He handed him a copy of FDR's just-released "day of infamy" speech. The two men wept. Leib recounted his story in the History Channel documentary, "Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor."

The foregoing represents just a sampling of evidence that Washington knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack. For additional evidences, see Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by Pulitzer Prize-winning historian John Toland, and Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett.* So certain was the data that, at a private press briefing in November 1941, General George Marshall confidently predicted that a Japanese-American war would break out during the "first ten days of December."

However, none of this information was passed to our commanders in Hawaii, Kimmel and Short, with the exception of Ambassador Grew's January warning, a copy of which reached Kimmel on February 1st. To allay any concerns, Lieutenant Commander McCollum - who originated the plan to incite Japan to war - wrote Kimmel: "Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and deployment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future."
Sitting Ducks
To ensure a successful Japanese attack - one that would enrage America into joining the war - it was vital to keep Kimmel and Short out of the intelligence loop. However, Washington did far more than this to facilitate the Japanese assault.

On November 25th, approximately one hour after the Japanese attack force left port for Hawaii, the U.S. Navy issued an order forbidding U.S. and Allied shipping to travel via the North Pacific. All transpacific shipping was rerouted through the South Pacific. This order was even applied to Russian ships docked on the American west coast. The purpose is easy to fathom. If any commercial ship accidentally stumbled on the Japanese task force, it might alert Pearl Harbor. As Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the Navy's War Plans officer in 1941, frankly stated: "We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via the Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic."

The Hawaiian commanders have traditionally been censured for failing to detect the approaching Japanese carriers. What goes unsaid is that Washington denied them the means to do so. An army marching overland toward a target is easily spotted. But Hawaii is in the middle of the ocean. Its approaches are limitless and uninhabited. During the week before December 7th, naval aircraft searched more than two million square miles of the Pacific - but never saw the Japanese force. This is because Kimmel and Short had only enough planes to survey one-third of the 360-degree arc around them, and intelligence had advised (incorrectly) that they should concentrate on the Southwest.

Radar, too, was insufficient. There were not enough trained surveillance pilots. Many of the reconnaissance craft were old and suffered from a lack of spare parts. The commanders' repeated requests to Washington for additional patrol planes were turned down. Rear Admiral Edward T. Layton, who served at Pearl Harbor, summed it up in his book And I Was There: "There was never any hint in any intelligence received by the local command of any Japanese threat to Hawaii. Our air defenses were stripped on orders from the army chief himself. Of the twelve B-17s on the island, only six could be kept in the air by cannibalizing the others for spare parts."

The Navy has traditionally followed the rule that, when international relations are critical, the fleet puts to sea. That is exactly what Admiral Kimmel did. Aware that U.S.-Japanese relations were deteriorating, he sent 46 warships safely into the North Pacific in late November 1941 - without notifying Washington. He even ordered the fleet to conduct a mock air raid on Pearl Harbor, clairvoyantly selecting the same launch site Admiral Yamamoto chose two weeks later.

When the White House learned of Kimmel's move it countermanded his orders and ordered all ships returned to dock, using the dubious excuse that Kimmel's action might provoke the Japanese. Washington knew that if the two fleets met at sea, and engaged each other, there might be questions about who fired the first shot.

Kimmel did not give up, however. With the exercise canceled, his carrier chief, Vice Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, issued plans for a 25-ship task force to guard against an "enemy air and submarine attack" on Pearl Harbor. The plan never went into effect. On November 26th, Admiral Stark, Washington's Chief of Naval Operations, ordered Halsey to use his carriers to transport fighter planes to Wake and Midway islands - further depleting Pearl Harbor's air defenses.

It was clear, of course, that once disaster struck Pearl Harbor, there would be demands for accountability. Washington seemed to artfully take this into account by sending an ambiguous "war warning" to Kimmel, and a similar one to Short, on November 27th. This has been used for years by Washington apologists to allege that the commanders should have been ready for the Japanese.

Indeed, the message began conspicuously: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." But it went on to state: "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organizations of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." None of these areas was closer than 5,000 miles to Hawaii! No threat to Pearl Harbor was hinted at. It ended with the words: "Continental districts, Guam, Samoa take measures against sabotage." The message further stated that "measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population." Both commanders reported the actions taken to Washington. Short followed through with sabotage precautions, bunching his planes together (which hinders saboteurs but makes ideal targets for bombers), and Kimmel stepped up air surveillance and sub searches. If their response to the "war warning" was insufficient, Washington said nothing. The next day, a follow-up message from Marshall's adjutant general to Short warned only: "Initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage."

Thus things stood as Japan prepared to strike. Using the Purple code, Tokyo sent a formal statement to its Washington ambassadors. It was to be conveyed to the American Secretary of State on Sunday, December 7th. The statement terminated relations and was tantamount to a declaration of war. On December 6th, in Washington, the War and Navy departments had already decrypted the first 13 parts of this 14-part message. Although the final passage officially severing ties had not yet come through, the fiery wording made its meaning obvious. Later that day, when Lieutenant Lester Schulz delivered to President Roosevelt his copy of the intercept, Schulz heard FDR say to his advisor, Harry Hopkins, "This means war."

During subsequent Pearl Harbor investigations, both General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, denied any recollection of where they had been on the evening of December 6th - despite Marshall's reputation for a photographic memory. But James G. Stahlman, a close friend of Navy Secretary Frank Knox, said Knox told him FDR convened a high-level meeting at the White House that evening. Knox, Marshall, Stark, and War Secretary Stimson attended. Indeed, with the nation on war's threshold, such a conference only made sense. That same evening, the Navy Department received a request from Stimson for a list of the whereabouts of all ships in the Pacific.

On the morning of December 7th, the final portion of Japan's lengthy message to the U.S. government was decoded. Tokyo added two special directives to its ambassadors. The first directive, which the message called "very important," was to deliver the statement at 1 p.m. The second directive ordered that the last copy of code, and the machine that went with it, be destroyed. The gravity of this was immediately recognized in the Navy Department: Japan had a long history of synchronizing attacks with breaks in relations; Sunday was an abnormal day to deliver diplomatic messages - but the best for trying to catch U.S. armed forces at low vigilance; and 1 p.m. in Washington was shortly after dawn in Hawaii!

Admiral Stark arrived at his office at 9:25 a.m. He was shown the message and the important delivery time. One junior officer pointed out the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; another urged that Kimmel be notified. But Stark refused; he did nothing all morning. Years later, he told the press that his conscience was clear concerning Pearl Harbor because all his actions had been dictated by a "higher authority." As Chief of Naval Operations, Stark had only one higher authority: Roosevelt.

In the War Department, where the 14-part statement had also been decoded, Colonel Rufus Bratton, head of the Army's Far Eastern section, discerned the message's significance. But the chief of intelligence told him nothing could be done until Marshall arrived. Bratton tried reaching Marshall at home, but was repeatedly told the general was out horseback riding. The horseback ride turned out to be a long one. When Bratton finally reached Marshall by phone and told him of the emergency, Marshall said he would come to the War Department. Marshall took 75 minutes to make the 10-minute drive. He didn't come to his office until 11:25 a.m. - an extremely late hour with the nation on the brink of war. He perused the Japanese message and was shown the delivery time. Every officer in Marshall's office agreed these indicated an attack in the Pacific at about 1 p.m. EST. The general finally agreed that Hawaii should be alerted, but time was running out.

Marshall had only to pick up his desk phone to reach Pearl Harbor on the transpacific line. Doing so would not have averted the attack, but at least our men would have been at their battle stations. Instead, the general wrote a dispatch. After it was encoded it went to the Washington office of Western Union. From there it was relayed to San Francisco. From San Francisco it was transmitted via RCA commercial radio to Honolulu. General Short received it six hours after the attack. Two hours later it reached Kimmel. One can imagine their exasperation on reading it.

Despite all the evidence accrued through Magic and other sources during the previous months, Marshall had never warned Hawaii. To historians - ignorant of that classified evidence - it would appear the general had tried to save Pearl Harbor, "but alas, too late." Similarly, FDR sent a last-minute plea for peace to Emperor Hirohito. Although written a week earlier, he did not send it until the evening of December 6th. It was to be delivered by Ambassador Grew, who would be unable to receive an audience with the emperor before December 8th. Thus the message could not conceivably have forestalled the attack - but posterity would think that FDR, too, had made "a valiant, last effort."

The Roberts Commission, assigned to investigate the Japanese attack, consisted of personal cronies of Roosevelt and Marshall. The Commission fully absolved Washington and declared that America was caught off guard due to "dereliction of duty" by Kimmel and Short. The wrath of America for these two was exceeded only by its wrath for Tokyo. To this day, many believe it was negligence by the Hawaii commanders that made the Pearl Harbor disaster possible.
* Though a major exposer of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy, Robert Stinnett is sympathetic regarding FDR's motives. He writes in his book: "As a veteran of the Pacific War, I felt a sense of outrage as I uncovered secrets that had been hidden from Americans for more than fifty years. But I understood the agonizing dilemma faced by President Roosevelt. He was forced to find circuitous means to persuade an isolationist America to join in a fight for freedom." In our view, a government that is allowed to operate in such fashion is a government that has embarked on a dangerous, slippery slope toward dictatorship. Nonetheless, Stinnett's position on FDR's motives makes his exposé of FDR's actions all the more compelling.
This article, slightly revised, originally appeared under the title "Pearl Harbor: The Facts Behind the Fiction" in the June 4, 2001 issue of The New American.
Related articles: Pearl Harbor: Motives Behind the Betrayal Pearl Harbor: Scapegoating Kimmel and Short

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Pearl Harbor: Hawaii Was Surprised; FDR Was Not

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Comprehensive research has shown not only that Washington knew in advance of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but that it deliberately withheld its foreknowledge from our commanders in Hawaii in the hope that the "surprise" attack would catapult the U.S. into World War II. By James Perloff

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WW2 is now known by many people (Americans and the English mostly) to have been a good war.

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The IHR, an independent, public interest history research and publishing center, seeks to promote peace and freedom through greater awareness of the past.

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I was thinking about this today while playing BF1. WW1 seems to be more terrible because it was so complex, and there is no easy way to frame it as "the bad guys vs the good guys". WW2 on the other hand is often portrayed as just "Nazi's needed to be stopped, Fascism was terrible".

I'd like to emphasize that I'm not a Nazi sympathizer or a Holocaust denier and I'm not trying to discount or downplay what they did.

Thanks a lot guys

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WW2 seems almost comically "Good vs Evil" in modern times. Is there a way to paint the war, its belligerents, and the axis leaders, so it seems more neutral/gray?

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I was thinking about this today while playing BF1. WW1 seems to be more terrible because it was so complex, and there is no easy way to frame it as "the bad guys vs the good guys". WW2 on the other hand is often portrayed as just "Nazi's needed to be stopped, Fascism was terrible".

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World War 2 debate about if it was evil vs evil

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World War 2 debate about if it was evil vs evil

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-USA dropped the Atom Bomb on Japan and invented Weapons of Mass destruction

-France and Britain allowed Germany to invade half of Europe before doing anything to stop Hitler and even then they did little, not to mention they refused to recognise Tito as leader of Yugoslavia even though he led Yogoslavia to Independence.

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World War 2, was it a War between Good versus Evil or Evil Versus Evil?

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I look back at WW2 and i think to myself. Which side really was the good side in that war. I mean in my opinion there was no good side, it was just a co...

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-Had Germany won the war, Hitler would probably announced to the world that he had defeated evil forces which were us!
-Russia killed and imprisoned most of its own country.
-The British and Americans bombed places such as Dresden, Hamburg, Berlin e.t.c.
-I believe there are no true 'good' and 'evil' sides in any war. Only losers all round.
-I do agree with the Japanese being some of the most callous and brutal peoples in WW2, however the decision to use the Atomic Bombs at the wars end still wrangles me somewhat.
-I don't know that there is ever anything truly "good" about war. In the end what it boils down to is man killing man, and that is never a good thing.
-Did Hitler view himself as Evil the way most of the rest of the world did? I don't believe so. There is an old saying that the "greatest harm often comes from the best intentions." Hitler rationalized his actions against the presumption that communism was a world wide threat that had to be dealt with, and that there was a world wide conspiracy of Jews to dominate, undermine and corrupt all the governments of the world. Throw into the mix that he was convinced that there was a clear scientific case for racial superiority, and you have a recipe for disaster.
-Now clearly many of these ideas are flawed or completely false, but that's not the point. Hitler rationalized that his actions, however violent they may have been, were necessarry for the common good. This is often the case with tyrants and that's why people have such a difficult time understanding and dealing with them. They don't view the world the way most of the rest of us do, and that makes them unpredictable.
-Had the Axis won the war, would we (the proceeding generations) really think that the Allied cause was 'good'? After all, the history books are written by the victors.

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Was WWII about good vs. evil? - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History

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Was WWII about good vs. evil? World War II