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As a high school counselor at a school of all at-risk students in Arlington, Texas, I have the opportunity to work each day with students who belong to the LGBTQ community.  Working with this population requires me to be knowledgeable about issues these students face to best support their academic and emotional well-being. To ensure I provide for these students, it is critical to address all legal and ethical issues surrounding their rights.

The resources included in this legal guide are designed to guide other school counselors and administrators in their work with the LGBTQ population.

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The American School Counselor Association (2020) Position Statement on LGBTQ Youth:

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The American School Counselor Association (2020) Position Statement on LGBTQ Youth:

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School counselors must help foster a respectful educational environment for all students, regardless of their gender identity or sexual expression, to combat the negative experiences that can impact students from these marginalized groups.

LGBTQ students report an increased risk of challenges in schools, including bullying and harassment, negatively impacting their educational experiences. School counselors must recognize these issues to help promote a healthy self-image and a safer school environment.

School counselors should advocate for LGBTQ students as they express their gender identity and help create an affirming environment in schools.

Schools and counselors should identify LGBTQ students experiencing higher absenteeism rates and lower academic achievement by addressing issues that impact the student’s mental health.

To support LGBTQ students, a counselor should foster a non-judgmental counseling environment and provide safe spaces for students.

School counselors should also ensure that the school provides the necessary training for staff and students to reduce incidences of harassment and bullying and introduce a more inclusive curriculum. Training should include information on the risk factors for LGBTQ youth.

Counselors should advocate for LGBTQ rights regarding their education, including ensuring that they are offered the same opportunities as other students and are protected in all school facilities while also supporting students in the event of possible discrimination.

To support families, counselors should identify resources community-wide and work with families of students who are coming out.

(American School Counselor Association, 2020)

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According to the U.S. Department of Education’s interpretation, LGBTQ student rights are protected under Title IX regulations.

This announcement aligns with President Biden’s January 2021 executive order addressing gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination. This decision is a departure from interpretations during Trump’s administration which claimed that Title IX protections did not apply to LGBTQ students.

While the Supreme Court had previously found that LGBTQ discrimination is unlawful in the workplace, applying this ruling to schools was unclear before the new Title IX interpretations.

However, reversals are possible unless the Supreme Court applies it in future cases.

Feedback from the Department of Education hearing will seek to address additional Title IX concerns, specifically those related to amendments drafted by Betsy DeVos, former U.S. Secretary of Education.

(Modan, 2021)

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Adams, a Florida transgender teen, challenged a policy that kept him from using the boys’ bathrooms in high school on the grounds of the Equal Protection Clause in the 14th amendment and Title IX regulations in Adams v. St. Johns County School Board.

While his school district had implemented policies of using preferred pronouns, they had not adopted a transgender-inclusive restroom policy.

The student had used the boys’ restroom for the first nine weeks of school before being told he had to revert to the girls’ bathroom.

The courts inititially found in favor of Adams, highlighting discrepancies in both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause; however, the school district appealed the ruling.

After hearing the appeal, the court found that the district’s policy was inconsistent and unjust as they failed to recognize the validity of Adams’s updated birth certificate, which lists him as male.

The dissenting opinion argued for the legality of sex-determined bathrooms against the policy of removing privacy through allowing transgender bathroom usage and argued against the need to update gender in official documents.

While the decision on appeal only addressed conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause, other cases have found that transgender student rights are protected by Title IX.

(Walsh, 2021)

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In 1992, Colorado voters passed Amendment 2, which stated that homosexuals and bisexuals could not be considered a protected class in the state.

Romer v. Evans (1996) found that this Amendment violated 14th Amendment protections.

The courts also found that Amendment 2 did not further legitimate state interests.

The findings in this case clarify the position of protections for sexual minorities.

(Romer v. Evans, 1996)

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Jackie Parsons is the Assistant Principal at a high school for at-risk students, including a large population of LGBTQ students (personal communication, July 12, 2021). She shares that her students identifying as a sexual minority come to her school as a way to find a place of acceptance and receive an education with less discrimination from staff and students. Her experience shows that school counselors and administrators must understand the laws that affect how they educate students, regardless of gender or sexual identity. More recent interpretations of Title IX regulations expand those protected by the law to include LGBTQ students. These students who identify outside of the traditional gender norms need the same protections as all other students. It is the job of a school counselor and administrators to help guide a school to establish a safe learning space for all students.

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This Texas Administrative Code establishes that higher education establishments must have a Title IX coordinator.

The role of the coordinator is to ensure compliance with Title IX regulations, which can protect LGBTQ student rights.

(19 TAC § 3.14, 2020)

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1) Schools should establish a culture of inclusivity, ensuring that all students are given equal opportunities regardless of gender or sexual identity. To ensure schools meet their goals in this area, they should frequently solicit feedback from stakeholders and address any known issues immediately.

2) Faculty and staff should all receive LGBTQ sensitivity training to understand better the issues revolving around gender equity.

3) Administration should uphold all rules and laws regarding harassment and discrimination to ensure that the school is seen as a safe space for students and staff.

(J. Parsons, personal communication, July 12, 2021)

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Addressing gender equity to include all gender identities is a current issue at the forefront of educational improvement (J. Parsons, personal communication, June 12, 2021). In schools where students identify as non-traditional gender and sexual minorities, schools must be prepared to serve and protect them while also providing them with a high-quality education. School counselors must establish a protocol for working with students, regardless of sexual identity, to meet their emotional needs. Additionally, schools must evaluate their policies for transgender students in the current climate, addressing bathroom, locker room, and sports team assignments while remaining respectful to all involved.

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Jackie Parsons
Assistant Principal
Venture High School

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Welcome to the Venture School website! I am so proud to be the Assistant Principal of Venture School. I am blessed to work with some of the best educators and amazing students that Arlington has to offer. Our campus is unique in the fact that we can meet students where they are and move them toward graduation in an alternative setting. Our teachers identify the individual needs of students and assist them in achieving success. We work diligently to develop a safe and engaging environment for all students. We believe that all students can learn and become productive, responsible.
Duties
Assistant Principal
Education
Bachelor of Science in Interdisciplinary Studies, Texas A&M University

Masters in School Counseling, Amberton

Principal Certification, Lamar University
Career
Began teaching in 2000

Held role as a school counselor from 2000-2016

Member of Venture faculty since 2016
Email jparson1@aisd.net

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Welcome to the Venture School website! I am so proud to be the Assistant Principal of Venture School. I am blessed to work with some of the best educators and amazing students that Arlington has to offer. Our campus is unique in the fact that we can meet students where they are and move them...

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Patsy Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act (Title IX) 

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Patsy Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act (Title IX) 

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President Nixon signed Title IX into law in 1972.

The law was meant to expand the interpretation of the equal rights protections included in the 14th Amendment by stating that a person can not be discriminated against based upon their sex.

This includes not limiting participation in or benefits of an event or program in schools and other institutions which benefit from funding on the basis of sex.

Recent interpretations have extended these protections to include LGBTQ students.

(Patsy Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 1972)

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(a) Each postsecondary educational institution shall: (1) designate: (A) one or more employees to act as responsible employees for purposes of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq.); and (B) one or more employees as persons to whom students enrolled at the institution may speak confidentially concerning sexual harassment, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking; and (2) inform each student enrolled at the institution of the responsible and confidential employees designated under Paragraph (1). (b) A confidential employee designated under Subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section may not disclose any communication made by a student to the employee unless the student consents to the disclosure or the employee is required to make the disclosure under Section 3.5(c), state law, or federal law.

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(a) Each postsecondary educational institution shall: (1) designate: (A) one or more employees to act as responsible employees for purposes of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C.

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Patsy Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1972). https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix-

education-amendments-1972

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19 TAC § 3.14 (2020).

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This amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes that states are not allowed to make or enforce any laws that will deny any citizen equal protections that will deny them life or liberty.

The 14th Amendment can be applied to addressing LGBTQ Youth in schools as they are entitled to the protections outlined in this portion of the Constitution.

(U.S. Const. amend XIV)

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Arlington ISD (AISD) Code of Conduct Policy on Discrimination

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Arlington ISD (AISD) Code of Conduct Policy on Discrimination

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AISD policy establishes discrimination based on sexual or gender identity as a Group III misbehavior.

This distinction is based upon the discrimination's potential disruption to learning and danger to a student's health or safety.

Potential corrective actions for students who exhibit discrimination include parent conferences, mediation, suspension, referral to law enforcement, and restorative practices.

(Arlington ISD Student Code of Conduct, 2020)

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Arlington ISD. (2020). 2020-2021 Student Code of Conduct. https://www.aisd.net/wp-content/files/Student-Code-of- Conduct-English.pdf

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Amendment XIV

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2.

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.

Section 3.

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5.

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

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U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

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ASCA Ethical Standards: E.2. Multicultural and Social Justice Advocacy and Leadership

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ASCA Ethical Standards: E.2. Multicultural and Social Justice Advocacy and Leadership

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The American School Counselor Association (2010) establishes the responsibility of professional school counselors and addresses the appropriate ethical response to LGBTQ issues under the umbrella of social justice initiatives.

While counselors should work to expand their knowledge of issues facing LGBTQ students, they should not impose their personal beliefs or values on student or stakeholders.

(American School Counselor Association, 2010)

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American School Counselor Association. (2010). Ethical standards for school counselors. https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/sspw/pdf/scethicalstandards.pdf

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The School Counselor and LGBTQ+ Youth - American School Counselor Association (ASCA)

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American School Counselor Association (ASCA) (2019). The ASCA National Model: A framework for school counseling programs (4th ed.). Author.

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American School Counselor Association. (2020). The school counselor and LGBTQ youth. Schoolcounselor.org. https://www.schoolcounselor.org/Standards-Positions/Position-Statements/ASCA-Position-Statements/The-School-Counselor-and-LGBTQ-Youth

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A federal appeals court panel issued a revised opinion Wednesday that again rules for a Florida transgender student but on narrower grounds than a decision released last year.

The new opinion suggests some behind-the-scenes wrangling on whether the full appeals court would reconsider the case and reveals a deep rift over the issue of legal protections for transgender students.

Last August, the panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta, ruled 2-1 for student Drew Adams on the grounds of both the 14th Amendment equal-protection clause and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which bars sex discrimination in federally funded schools.

The new opinion in Adams v. St. Johns County School Board rules only on equal-protection grounds for Adams, who challenged a school board policy that barred him from the boys' restroom after he began presenting as a boy when he entered Nease High School in Ponte Vedra, Fla., in 2015.

Chief Judge Beverly B. Martin said that just after the panel had issued its original ruling last August, one member of the full 11th Circuit court took a procedural step that delayed the issuance of a final judgment in the case. That was evidently to give the full court time to consider whether to rehear the case.

"In an effort to get broader support among our colleagues, we vacate the opinion issued on August 7, 2020, ... and replace it with this one," Martin wrote. "This revised opinion does not reach the Title IX question and reaches only one ground under the Equal Protection Clause instead of the three Equal Protection rulings we made in the August 7 opinion."

Meanwhile, the majority and the dissent in the revised panel opinion traded some sharp barbs.

"The majority of the pages in the dissent are directed at an opinion no longer in existence," Martin wrote. "Indeed much of the dissent continues to shadowbox with an opinion we never wrote. We view the dissent's recycling of outdated arguments as an apt metaphor for its analytical approach."

Judge William H. Pryor Jr., who slightly revised the dissent he wrote last August but stood by his views in support of the school district, said "the new majority opinion is shorter, but it is no less wrong."

"By failing to address head-on the lawfulness of sex-separated bathrooms in schools, the majority recasts the school policy as classifying students on the basis of transgender status," Pryor said. "And based on this recasting, it reached the remarkable conclusion that schoolchildren have no sex-specific privacy interests when using the bathroom."

The new opinion in the Florida case comes as transgender student rights continue to be hotly debated in courtrooms and state legislatures. At least one other federal appeals court has ruled that Title IX protects transgender students as they seek to use school restrooms and locker rooms consistent with their gender identity.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently declined to hear the appeal of a Virginia school board in the case of transgender student Gavin Grimm. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, in Richmond, Va., in 2020 had ruled for Grimm on Title IX and equal protection grounds. On Title IX, the 4th Circuit held that the analysis was similar to that made by the Supreme Court when it interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity in employment.

The Supreme Court's refusal to hear the appeal of the 4th Circuit decision was not a ruling on the merits, and the high court may have wanted to allow transgender student rights to continue to percolate in lower courts.

The majority and dissent in the revised 11th Circuit panel opinion in the Adams case continued to squabble over factual and legal matters.

Adams used the boys' restroom for his first nine weeks of 9th grade, court papers say, but after a complaint administrators informed him he could use only the girls' restroom or a gender-neutral, single-stall restroom in the school office. The St. Johns district had adopted a "best practices" policy for LGBTQ students that included using transgender students' preferred pronouns. But it declined to allow transgender students to use restrooms or locker rooms consistent with their gender identity.

In the revised opinion, the majority said the St. Johns school board's policy was arbitrary and the district failed to accept Adams's amended Florida birth certificate, which lists him as male, and instead relied on Adams's birth certificate from the time of his enrollment, which listed Adams as female.

The school district's policy "requires that a student's enrollment package prevail over current government records, even though those government-issued documents constitute controlling identification for any other purpose," Martin said for the majority.

The majority concluded by saying that because it was ruling for Adams based on the equal-protection clause, it did not need to address his Title IX claim.

Pryor, in dissent, continued to argue that the majority's reasoning threatens sex-separate restroom policies in schools. And he said the school district was under no obligation to "accept updates" about a student's gender identity as expressed on state documents.

"A student's sex does not come with an expiration date, and it does not require periodic updates to confirm its continuing accuracy," Pryor said. "The object of the schools' practice with respect to the enrollment documents is to determine students' sex, not their gender identity."

Lambda Legal, a New York City-based LGBTQ civil rights organization that represents Adams, issued a statement that praised the revised ruling, without addressing its more narrow scope or any potential behind-the-scenes drama.

Adams is now a college student in Florida.

Lawyers for the St. Johns district, which asked the full 11th Circuit to rehear the case, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

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Appeals Court Again Backs Transgender Student, But on Narrower Grounds Amid Signs of Rift

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A federal appeals court panel issued a revised opinion Wednesday that again rules for a Florida transgender student but on narrower grounds than a decision released last year. The new opinion suggests some behind-the-scenes wrangling on whether the full appeals court would reconsider the case and reveals a deep rift over the issue of legal protections for transgender students.

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Walsh, M. (2021, July 14). Appeals  court again backs transgender student, but on narrower grounds amid signs of rift. Education Week. https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/appeals-court-again-backs-transgender-student-but-on-narrower-grounds-amid-signs-of-rift/2021/07

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Dive Brief:

The U.S. Department of Education on Wednesday issued a notice of interpretation, announcing Title IX, the civil rights law preventing sex-based discrimination in federally funded schools, also protects the rights of LGBTQ students. In a press release, the U.S. Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona said all students "deserve the opportunity to learn and thrive in schools that are free from discrimination."

The change follows President Joe Biden's executive orders in January and March meant to curb discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. The interpretation, not yet codified and able to be challenged by future administrations, signals that the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights will crack down on Title IX violations of LGBTQ students.

Interpreting Title IX to protect students from discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity walks back the department's previous decision under former President Donald Trump, whose administration said Title IX did not protect students from such discrimination and used an OCR case brought against six Connecticut school districts and the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference to formalize its interpretation in 2020.

Dive Insight:

The decision comes on the heels of the one-year anniversary of Bostock v. Clayton County, a landmark Supreme Court case that found LGBTQ discrimination counts as unlawful sex discrimination in the workplace. In that decision, justices did not weigh in on whether or how the decision applies to schools, leaving those questions up for interpretation and for the justices to take on in a future case.

This round of Title IX ping-pong by the Biden administration builds on that case, pleasing both civil rights advocates and education leaders, who now have clear guidance for what was previously a gray area between the Supreme Court and the Department of Education.

However, since the interpretation is not codified, it leaves the door open for future reversals unless taken on by the Supreme Court in a separate case specific to schools. One such case, Gavin Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, brought against a Virginia school board after a transgender student was denied entry into a boys' bathroom, has been in the court's sights for years. However, it was on its way to the federal bench when Trump rescinded Obama-era guidance protecting LGBTQ students under Title IX, which was the basis for the case's appeal, making moot the Supreme Court's decision to hear oral arguments.

The Supreme Court is set to once again consider hearing the case on June 24.

Meanwhile, additional Title IX concerns remain. Last week, the Department of Education conducted hearings for five days, during which students, lawyers, Title IX coordinators and others provided feedback on the law's regulations, including amendments put in place by former U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos that were later challenged by several attorneys general. Formal changes to the regulations are in the pipeline.

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Ed Dept: Title IX protects LGBTQ students

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The U.S. Department of Education on Wednesday issued a notice of interpretation, announcing Title IX, the civil rights law preventing sex-based discrimination in federally funded schools, also protects the rights of LGBTQ students. In a press release, the U.S. Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona said all students "deserve the opportunity to learn and thrive in schools that are free from discrimination."

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Modan, N. (2021, June 17). Ed Dept: Title IX protects LGBTQ students. K-12 Dive. https://www.k12dive.com/news/ed-dept-title-ix-protects-lgbtq-students/601933/

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ROY ROMER, GOVERNOR OF COLORADO, et al., PETITIONERS v. RICHARD G. EVANS et al.

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of Colorado

[]

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado's Constitution.

The enactment challenged in this case is an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Colorado, adopted in a 1992 statewide referendum. The parties and the state courts refer to it as "Amendment 2," its designation when submitted to the voters. The impetus for the amendment and the contentious campaign that preceded its adoption came in large part from ordinances that had been passed in various Colorado municipalities. For example, the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the City and County of Denver each had enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions and activities, including housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare services. Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV §§28-91 to 28-116 (1991); Aspen Municipal Code §13-98 (1977); Boulder Rev. Code §§12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987). What gave rise to the statewide controversy was the protection the ordinances afforded to persons discriminated against by reason of their sexual orientation. See Boulder Rev. Code §12-1-1 (defining "sexual orientation" as "the choice of sexual partners, i.e., bisexual, homosexual or heterosexual"); Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV §28-92 (defining "sexual orientation" as "[t]he status of an individual as to his or her heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality"). Amendment 2 repeals these ordinances to the extent they prohibit discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Colo. Const., Art. II, §30b.

Yet Amendment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provisions. It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians. The amendment reads:

"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self executing." Ibid.

Soon after Amendment 2 was adopted, this litigation to declare its invalidity and enjoin its enforcement was commenced in the District Court for the City and County of Denver. Among the plaintiffs (respondents here) were homosexual persons, some of them government employees. They alleged that enforcement of Amendment 2 would subject them to immediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation. Other plaintiffs (also respondents here) included the three municipalities whose ordinances we have cited and certain other governmental entities which had acted earlier to protect homosexuals from discrimination but would be prevented by Amendment 2 from continuing to do so. Although Governor Romer had been on record opposing the adoption of Amendment 2, he was named in his official capacity as a defendant, together with the Colorado Attorney General and the State of Colorado.

The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of Amendment 2, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Colorado. Sustaining the interim injunction and remanding the case for further proceedings, the State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process. Evans v. Romer, 854 P. 2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)(Evans I). To reach this conclusion, the state court relied on our voting rights cases, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), and on our precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of governmental decisionmaking, see, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1(1971). On remand, the State advanced various arguments in an effort to show that Amendment 2 was narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests, but the trial court found none sufficient. It enjoined enforcement of Amendment 2, and the Supreme Court of Colorado, in a second opinion, affirmed the ruling. Evans v. Romer, 882 P. 2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) ( Evans II). We granted certiorari and now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court.

The State's principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that it puts gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons. So, the State says, the measure does no more than deny homosexuals special rights. This reading of the amendment's language is implausible. We rely not upon our own interpretation of the amendment but upon the authoritative construction of Colorado's Supreme Court. The state court, deeming it unnecessary to determine the full extent of the amendment's reach, found it invalid even on a modest reading of its implications. The critical discussion of the amendment, set out in Evans I, is as follows:

"The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is, at a minimum, to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that barred discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Aspen, Colo., Mun. Code §13-98 (1977) (prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation); Boulder, Colo., Rev. Code §§12-1-2 to "4 (1987) (same); Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code art. IV, §§28-91 to "116 (1991) (same); Executive Order No. D0035 (December 10, 1990) (prohibiting employment discrimination for `all state employees, classified and exempt' on the basis of sexual orientation); Colorado Insurance Code, §10-3-1104, 4A C. R. S. (1992 Supp.) (forbidding health insurance providers from determining insurability and premiums based on an applicant's, a beneficiary's, or an insured's sexual orientation); and various provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation at state colleges. ²⁶

" ²⁶ Metropolitan State College of Denver prohibits college sponsored social clubs from discriminating in membership on the basis of sexual orientation and Colorado State University has an antidiscrimination policy which encompasses sexual orientation.

"The `ultimate effect' of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes, regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is first amended to permit such measures." 854 P. 2d, at 1284-1285, and n. 26.

Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status effected by this law. So much is evident from the ordinances that the Colorado Supreme Court declared would be void by operation of Amendment 2. Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.

The change that Amendment 2 works in the legal status of gays and lesbians in the private sphere is far reaching, both on its own terms and when considered in light of the structure and operation of modern anti discrimination laws. That structure is well illustrated by contemporary statutes and ordinances prohibiting discrimination by providers of public accommodations. "At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who `made profession of a public employment,' were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer." Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 13). The duty was a general one and did not specify protection for particular groups. The common law rules, however, proved insufficient in many instances, and it was settled early that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). In consequence, most States have chosen to counter discrimination by enacting detailed statutory schemes. See, e.g., S. D. Codified Laws §§20-13-10, 20-13-22, 20-13-23 (1995); Iowa Code §§216.6-216.8 (1994); Okla. Stat., Tit. 25, §§1302, 1402 (1987); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§953, 955 (Supp. 1995); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§10:5-3, 10:5-4 (West Supp. 1995); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §354-A:7, 354-A:10, 354-A:17 (1995); Minn. Stat. §363.03 (1991 and Supp. 1995).

Colorado's state and municipal laws typify this emerging tradition of statutory protection and follow a consistent pattern. The laws first enumerate the persons or entities subject to a duty not to discriminate. The list goes well beyond the entities covered by the common law. The Boulder ordinance, for example, has a comprehensive definition of entities deemed places of "public accommodation." They include "any place of business engaged in any sales to the general public and any place that offers services, facilities, privileges, or advantages to the general public or that receives financial support through solicitation of the general public or through governmental subsidy of any kind." Boulder Rev. Code §12-1-1(j) (1987). The Denver ordinance is of similar breadth, applying, for example, to hotels, restaurants, hospitals, dental clinics, theaters, banks, common carriers, travel and insurance agencies, and "shops and stores dealing with goods or services of any kind," Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV, §28-92.

These statutes and ordinances also depart from the common law by enumerating the groups or persons within their ambit of protection. Enumeration is the essential device used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those who must comply. In following this approach, Colorado's state and local governments have not limited anti discrimination laws to groups that have so far been given the protection of heightened equal protection scrutiny under our cases. See, e.g.,J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. __, __ (1994) (slip op., at 8) (sex); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (illegitimacy); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-192 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry). Rather, they set forth an extensive catalogue of traits which cannot be the basis for discrimination, including age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability of an individual or of his or her associates-- and, in recent times, sexual orientation. Aspen Municipal Code §13-98(a)(1) (1977); Boulder Rev. Code §§12-1-1 to 12-1-4 (1987); Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV, §§28-92 to 28-119 (1991); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§24-34-401 to 24-34-707 (1988 and Supp. 1995).

Amendment 2 bars homosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that these public accommodations laws address. That in itself is a severe consequence, but there is more. Amendment 2, in addition, nullifies specific legal protections for this targeted class in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and employment. See, e.g., Aspen Municipal Code §§13-98(b), (c) (1977); Boulder Rev. Code §§12-1-2,12-1-3 (1987); Denver Rev. Municipal Code, Art. IV §§28-93 to 28-95, §28-97 (1991).

Not confined to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and forbid all laws or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado government. The State Supreme Court cited two examples of protections in the governmental sphere that are now rescinded and may not be reintroduced. The first is Colorado Executive Order D0035 (1990), which forbids employment discrimination against " `all state employees, classified and exempt' on the basis of sexual orientation." 854 P. 2d, at 1284. Also repealed, and now forbidden, are "various provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation at state colleges." Id., at 1284, 1285. The repeal of these measures and the prohibition against their future reenactment demonstrates that Amendment 2 has the same force and effect in Colorado's governmental sector as it does elsewhere and that it applies to policies as well as ordinary legislation.

Amendment 2's reach may not be limited to specific laws passed for the benefit of gays and lesbians. It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-4-106(7) (1988) (agency action subject to judicial review under arbitrary and capricious standard); §18-8-405 (making it a criminal offense for a public servant knowingly, arbitrarily or capriciously to refrain from performing a duty imposed on him by law); §10-3-1104(1)(f) (prohibiting "unfair discrimination" in insurance); 4 Colo. Code of Regulations 801-1, Policy 11-1 (1983) (prohibiting discrimination in state employment on grounds of specified traits or "other non merit factor"). At some point in the systematic administration of these laws, an official must determine whether homosexuality is an arbitrary and thus forbidden basis for decision. Yet a decision to that effect would itself amount to a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexuality, and so would appear to be no more valid under Amendment 2 than the specific prohibitions against discrimination the state court held invalid.

If this consequence follows from Amendment 2, as its broad language suggests, it would compound the constitutional difficulties the law creates. The state court did not decide whether the amendment has this effect, however, and neither need we. In the course of rejecting the argument that Amendment 2 is intended to conserve resources to fight discrimination against suspect classes, the Colorado Supreme Court made the limited observation that the amendment is not intended to affect many anti discrimination laws protecting non suspect classes, Romer II, 882 P. 2d at 1346, n. 9. In our view that does not resolve the issue. In any event, even if, as we doubt, homosexuals could find some safe harbor in laws of general application, we cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the State's view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability. This is so no matter how local or discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the injury. We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.

The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must co exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271" 272 (1979); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. See, e.g.,Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 6).

Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.

Taking the first point, even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained. The search for the link between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limits of our own authority. In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (tourism benefits justified classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (assumed health concerns justified law favoring optometrists over opticians); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (potential traffic hazards justified exemption of vehicles advertising the owner's products from general advertising ban); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs for Port of New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (licensing scheme that disfavored persons unrelated to current river boat pilots justified by possible efficiency and safety benefits of a closely knit pilotage system). The laws challenged in the cases just cited were narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for us to ascertain that there existed some relation between the classification and the purpose it served. By requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. See United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect .").

Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instructive; "[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision." Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928).

It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. "`Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.'" Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). Respect for this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense. "The guaranty of `equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.' " Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), not cited by the parties but relied upon by the dissent, is not evidence that Amendment 2 is within our constitutional tradition, and any reliance upon it as authority for sustaining the amendment is misplaced. In Davis, the Court approved an Idaho territorial statute denying Mormons, polygamists, and advocates of polygamy the right to vote and to hold office because, as the Court construed the statute, it "simply excludes from the privilege of voting, or of holding any office of honor, trust or profit, those who have been convicted of certain offences, and those who advocate a practical resistance to the laws of the Territory and justify and approve the commission of crimes forbidden by it." Id., at 347. To the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer good law. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). To the extent it held that the groups designated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote because of their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of `equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes often can be explained by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons. Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. We conclude that, in addition to the far reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted, the principles it offends, in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988), and Amendment 2 does not.

The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. "[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., at 24.

We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

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Romer, Governor of Colorado, et al. v. Evans et al., 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)

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Treat all students, regardless of sexual or gender identity, with respect.

Adopt inclusive language and model its usage with faculty and staff.

Commit to learning more about issues facing the LGBTQ population.

Institute inclusivity and risk identification training for faculty and staff.

Encourage staff to integrate inclusive curriculum.

Create safe spaces for LGBTQ students through organizations like the Gay-Straight Alliance.

Hold students and staff accountable for any instances of discrimination as outlined in the Code of Conduct.

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Based upon my time working with LGBTQ students, I have seen the impact of discrimination based upon gender and sexual identity that has led to educational and mental hardships. As a school counselor, I will strive to ensure that all students have a sense of inclusivity by applying legal and ethical principles and seeking opportunities to bring awareness of these issues among faculty and staff. With interpretations of laws and ethics regarding LGBTQ rights expanding, counselors and administrators must implement policies and practices that will guarantee the rights of this marginalized population of students.

# data[].attributes.body
As I explored the legal and ethical standards related to equity in LGBTQ education, I discovered the responsibilities of a school counselor to ensure a safe environment for this marginalized population. These standards helped me to identify practical ways to serve students in gender and sexual minorities. By considering the expanded interpretations of the 14th Amendment and Title IX requirements, it is evident that educators must make strides to eliminating discrimination on our campuses.

# data[].attributes.body
Upon reviewing current events, laws, and regulations, I first felt compelled to begin doing more to protect the LGBTQ students on my campus.

Understanding the current controversies surrounding this issue has inspired me to integrate more training and awareness activities to ensure that all faculty members are on board with the mindset and policy changes that need to happen to protect LGBTQ students.

Evaluating this issue has reinforced my goal of creating an inclusive counseling program on my campus and utilizing my influence to ensure that the campus is a safe space for all students.