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Use alternative energy to avoid nuclear power plant use

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Use alternative energy to avoid nuclear power plant use

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This waste is poisoning the oceans and therefore the seafood we eat.

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We need to stop making nuclear weapons AND stop threatening to use them

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April 4, 2002

Press Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107 Paul Kerr, Research Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

In 1995 and 2000, when the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was under review, the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states recognized that to preserve the objective of global nuclear nonproliferation, the nuclear-weapon states needed to reiterate and update their NPT Article VI disarmament commitments. On the basis of their May 1995 agreement to strengthen the treaty review process and pursue specific principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, the nuclear and non-nuclear NPT states-parties reached consensus to indefinitely extend the NPT. In May 2000, the nuclear-weapon states reaffirmed this approach by agreeing to a 13-point program of action on disarmament steps related to Article VI. This month, as delegates from over 100 states gather in New York for the first meeting on the NPT since the 2000 review conference, they will find that very little progress has been achieved toward these and other nuclear security objectives.

For an overview of the NPT, see www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact.asp. For the full text of the 2000 NPT review conference final document, see www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/docjun.asp.

The following are the 13 "practical steps" outlined in the 2000 NPT review conference final document (shown in italics) and a brief analysis of progress made toward their implementation.

1. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Opened for signature in 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear weapon test explosions. For the treaty to enter into force, 44 countries designated as "nuclear-capable states" must ratify the agreement. Of those 44, three-India, Pakistan, and North Korea-have not signed the treaty and another ten, including the United States and China, have signed, but not ratified, the accord. Although 34 countries-including Russia and Ukraine, two of the 44 nuclear-capable states-completed treaty ratification since the 2000 NPT review conference, the treaty is unlikely to enter into force soon, particularly since the Bush administration has said it does not plan to ask the Senate to reconsider its October 1999 rejection of U.S. ratification of the treaty.
2. Nuclear Test Moratorium A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

No country has tested a nuclear weapon since India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in May 1998. While the Bush administration claims it does not foresee a need to conduct a nuclear test in the near term, it has also not ruled out future U.S. nuclear testing. A congressionally established panel recommended in March 2002 that the United States reduce to between three months and one year the amount of time needed to prepare for and conduct a nuclear test after a decision to do so. Current U.S. test readiness is a two to three year period. The Bush administration has asked Congress to fund work to study modifying existing U.S. nuclear weapons for new military missions, which the administration claims would not require nuclear testing. And the administration has also expressed interest in developing new types of nuclear weapons, which would likely require nuclear tests.
3. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

A 66-member body that works by consensus, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not started negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, which would ban production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. Member countries, including the United States and Russia, are considering a work program proposal that would include establishing a CD ad hoc committee to negotiate such a treaty, but China does not support the proposal because it does not include parallel negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The United States opposes negotiations on outer space, although it would be willing to discuss, not negotiate on, the subject. This standoff has stalemated the conference, which has not held any treaty negotiations except for a couple of weeks in August 1998, since the CD completed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
4. Nuclear Disarmament Discussions The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

The current work program proposal under consideration by the CD to negotiate a treaty banning production of fissile material also includes setting up a CD subsidiary body to "exchange information and views" on practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. While many conference members favor negotiations on the issue, it is clear that they would be willing to accept the current offer to hold talks on the subject. This proposal, if eventually approved, would satisfy the NPT review conference's call "to deal with," not negotiate on, the issue of nuclear disarmament. However, beginning such talks hinges on the conference finding an acceptable approach to addressing the outer space issue.
5. Irreversibility of Nuclear Reductions The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

In its latest proposal on a "legally binding agreement" to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arms to 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads each by 2012, the Bush administration has rejected the principle of irreversibility in favor of flexibility. Briefing reporters in Geneva on March 22, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said the United States wants the final U.S.-Russian agreement to include a mechanism that would permit either country to exceed agreed limits on the number of deployed strategic warheads if they notified the other. In addition, the Bush administration is now planning to store rather than destroy most of the warheads removed from delivery vehicles. In keeping with this plan, the Bush administration will keep enough warheads in a "responsive force" to enable the United States to deploy an additional 2,400 strategic nuclear weapons within a three-year period after completing the reductions called for by the proposed U.S.-Russian agreement. While past strategic reduction agreements between the two countries did not require the destruction of actual warheads, the agreements did call for destruction of delivery vehicles. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed in March 1997 to pursue "measures relating to...the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads," as part of a START III framework. The Bush administration does not support such an approach in the current talks with Russia.

6. Elimination of Nuclear Arsenals
An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

At the 2000 NPT review conference, the nuclear-weapon states pledged themselves unequivocally to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Under Article VI of the NPT, nuclear-weapon states are legally bound "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Mexican Ambassador Antonio de Icaza heralded the 2000 NPT statement, declaring, "What has always been implicit has now become explicit."

Bush administration officials contend that the United States supports the NPT and that "it understands its special responsibility under Article VI." At the upcoming meeting, U.S. officials will likely highlight President Bush's effort to secure an agreement to reduce U.S. and Russian strategic deployed nuclear arsenals to no more than 2,200 by 2012. However, the administration plans to store most of the warheads rather than destroy them in future strategic reductions that are currently being discussed with Russia, moving Washington away from the weapons-elimination pledge. In addition, the recently completed U.S. nuclear posture review projects that the United States will retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. China also reportedly has a strategic modernization effort underway to expand the size of its current nuclear arsenal.
7. The START II, START III, and ABM Treaties The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

The Bush administration has taken actions that are in direction opposition to the above-stated goals. By pursuing an agreement with Russia to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700-2,200 apiece, the United States has signaled it will not seek entry into force of the START II treaty or to negotiate a START III treaty as outlined by then-Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in March 1997. In setting the START process aside, the United States and Russia will not be obligated to give up multiple warheads (MIRVs) on missiles, as called for by START II, and the United States is not seeking actual destruction of warheads as proposed under the START III framework.

After pledging to offer Russia amendments to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty during the 2000 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush did not do so, and he announced on December 13, 2001 his intention to withdraw from the treaty, which prohibits Washington and Moscow from building nationwide strategic missile defense systems. Unless President Bush decides to reverse his decision, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will occur on June 13 and the treaty will no longer be in force.
8. Securing Excess Nuclear Material The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Started in 1996 between the United States, Russia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Trilateral Initiative seeks to develop methods for the IAEA to secure and verify the peaceful status of excess weapons-grade nuclear material in the United States and Russia. Progress has been made in developing technical criteria and other arrangements for a model verification system, and both Washington and Moscow have already identified at which storage facilities the IAEA will monitor their respective excess plutonium, ensuring it is not returned to military use. Still unresolved are issues over the scope of the verification system, exact specifications for material subject to verification, and the duration of the verification measures.
9. Other Nuclear-Weapon States' Actions Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally

The Bush administration originally proposed that U.S.-Russian deployed strategic warhead reductions be undertaken unilaterally, but Russia has insisted they be accomplished through a legally binding, bilateral agreement. On February 5, 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell endorsed this general approach, which President Bush later affirmed. Since the 2000 NPT review conference, no nuclear-weapon state has reduced its arsenal, and China is actually pursuing a strategic modernization program that the U.S. intelligence community recently said could result in an increase in the number of warheads China deploys on long-range ballistic missiles, from approximately 20 today to 75 to 100 by 2015.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament

The United States and Russia have pledged that their planned deployed strategic nuclear reductions will be done in a transparent and verifiable way, although they have not yet reached agreement on the details.
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process

On September 27, 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States would eliminate all of its ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear weapons and withdraw all of its tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. naval ships and submarines, as well as all nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft. He also asked Soviet leaders to reciprocate, which the Kremlin pledged to do on October 5, 1991. While it is believed that Moscow followed through on withdrawing its deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, these actions have not been verified. Currently, the United States deploys approximately 1,700 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, while Russia deploys an estimated 3,600 and retains several thousand more nondeployed tactical nuclear weapons.

Russia dismissed allegations in early 2001 that it had deployed tactical nuclear weapons in its Kaliningrad Oblast, which sits on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania. The United States still deploys some 200-600 tactical nuclear gravity bombs in seven European countries as part of its NATO obligations. In its April 1999 strategic concept, NATO described the nuclear forces based in Europe as "an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance."

While the proposed 1997 START III framework called for Moscow and Washington to explore measures on tactical nuclear weapons, neither the United States nor Russia has made the issue a priority.

- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems

While campaigning for president in May 2000, Bush said the United States "should remove as many weapons as possible from high alert, hair-trigger status." Bush's stated goal of reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 will effectively reduce the alert status of a large portion of the U.S. arsenal, although the administration has indicated that many of the warheads scheduled for retirement could be redeployed within "weeks" or "months." The U.S. military is considered capable of launching thousands of nuclear warheads within minutes of being informed of a decision to do so by the president. Russia is believed to have a similar capability.
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination

The Bush administration claims that its January 2002 nuclear posture review seeks to reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons, but the posture review asserts that nuclear weapons are needed to assure U.S. allies of U.S. security commitments; to dissuade hostile countries from pursuing weapons of mass destruction capabilities; to deter enemies from attacking U.S. territory, forces, or friends and allies; and to defeat adversaries decisively. The nuclear posture review also calls for new nuclear weapon capabilities to attack hard and deeply-buried targets, to attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical and biological weapons agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. With its emphasis on preserving flexibility in sizing its nuclear forces and refurbishing and revitalizing the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, the Bush administration is signaling that nuclear weapons are considered essential and that the United States intends to keep them long into the future.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterated past U.S. negative security assurance pledges in a statement made on February 22, 2002, in which he said, "The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state."

The credibility of this pledge was undermined, however, by subsequent statements by administration officials responding to reports about the nuclear posture review. On March 22, Secretary of State Powell said, "For those nations that are developing these kinds of weapons of mass destruction, it does not seem to us to be a bad thing for them to look out from their little countries and their little capitals and see a United States that has a full range of options...to defend the United States of America, the American people, our way of life, and our friends and allies."

In recent years, Russia has also underscored an increasing reliance on its nuclear forces as compensation for its declining conventional force capabilities, and China has a strategic modernization plan underway.
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons

The United States and Russia have thus far confined their negotiations on nuclear weapons reductions to themselves. Other nuclear-weapon states have indicated that they will not enter into such talks until the U.S. and Russian arsenals drop to a level comparable with theirs, which each remain in the low hundreds.
10. Excess Fissile Material Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

The United States, Russia, and the IAEA are working on developing a model verification regime for the storage of fissile material declared in excess to security needs. This agreement, called the Trilateral Initiative, would safeguard fissile material to ensure that it is not used for military purposes. Additionally, Washington and Moscow are continuing their "HEU Deal," under which a private company in the United States purchases Russian fissile material for use in U.S. power reactors. Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States is also helping Moscow safely secure fissile material located in Russia. Additionally, the Bush administration announced on January 23 that it would continue implementing a U.S.-Russian agreement that would make 34 metric tons of military plutonium in each country unusable for weapons purposes.

Although France and Britain have committed not to produce additional fissile material, they have not come to agreement on the disposition of their stockpiles and have not engaged the IAEA in securing their respective excess material. China, which has a strategic modernization program under way that U.S. intelligence estimates say could substantially increase the number of deployed Chinese warheads, may actually be increasing its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material.
11. General and Complete Disarmament Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

While progress in nuclear disarmament has been slow, efforts to eliminate chemical, biological, and conventional weapons have also been dragging. The United States in July 2001 rejected a draft verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and five months later called for the international community to abandon the existing process to strengthen the accord. A number of countries are believed to have or are pursuing chemical and biological weapons programs. And the total value of the global conventional arms trade has increased over the past three years to total $36 billion in new arms agreements in 2000, according to an August 2001 Congressional Research Service report.
12. Regular Reports on Disarmament Progress Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

This statement at the NPT review conference marked the first time that the nuclear-weapon states committed to regular reporting on their implementation of Article VI. Since 1995, all five nuclear-weapon states have voluntarily provided reports on their progress toward implementing nuclear disarmament obligations. The 2002 meeting is expected to yield an agreement on how official reporting should be carried out.
13. Verification The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Verification is one of the most crucial aspects of international arms control and disarmament treaties. In recent years, NPT states-parties have sought to strengthen safeguards through a proposal called the "93+2 Program." Created in response to the IAEA's inability to detect Iraqi and North Korean clandestine nuclear weapons programs, the proposal seeks to increase transparency among member states and employ newly developed verification techniques, such as environmental sampling, while substantially shortening the time period required before an inspection could take place. These provisions were intended to be in place by 1995, but many were delayed, causing them to be divided into two parts. With regard to the first part, the IAEA has adopted no-notice inspections and environmental sampling as part of its verification measures. The second part requires countries to approve the Additional Safeguards Protocol, which calls for increased IAEA inspection authority, greater transparency, and exchanges of information among member-states. To date, 61 countries, including all of the nuclear-weapon states, have either signed the additional protocol or come to agreement with the IAEA over the protocol.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is effectively verifiable through a treaty-sanctioned global monitoring and verification system as well as national intelligence means and civilian seismic detection networks. However, the treaty has not yet entered into force, and the preparatory commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) is working to establish an international monitoring system (IMS) to detect any nuclear tests and explosions. Despite the United States' lack of support for the CTBT, the United States continues to pay 95 percent of its annual dues to the CTBTO to support the establishment of the IMS. However, the United States declared in August 2001 that it would not provide financial or technical support for on-site inspections related to the treaty.

U.S. and Russian reductions under the START I treaty have been recently completed and fully verified under a system of intrusive inspections and information exchanges. The United States and Russia have said that they would like to use START I verification provisions to verify compliance with the strategic arms agreement currently under negotiation, although a senior U.S. official recently said the United States has offered suggestions to reduce the "burdensomeness of some of the inspections." START I is due to expire in 2009 unless extended by the treaty parties.

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U.S. Implementation of the "13 Practical Steps on Nonproliferation and Disarmament" Agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference | Arms Control Association

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In 1995 and 2000, when the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was under review, the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states recognized that to preserve the objective of global nuclear nonproliferation, the nuclear-weapon states needed to reiterate and update their NPT Article VI disarmament commitments.

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World leaders must all join together in this as humans 

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World leaders must all join together in this as humans 

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World Leaders Urge Universal Accession, as They Sign Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons at Headquarters Ceremony | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases

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Leaders of the United Nations, national Governments and civil society urged universal accession to the new international agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons, as dozens of Heads of State and Government became the first signatories to the landmark treaty during the annual event to promote international instruments for peace and development.

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Ride a bike to work, recycle...

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Alternative energy sources
Powering and heating your home with clean energy sources sounds like a no-brainer when it comes to going green, but deciding which kind of fuel is right for you isn't as simple. Solar power? Wind power? Hydropower? Geothermal power?--active or passive? It's overwhelming--and it's enough to stop you before you even get started.

Green energy alternatives
We've taken the guesswork out: the following pages offer comprehensive breakdowns of the different types of energy and notes on what you should consider before investing in one, so it's easy to figure out which best fits your needs and lifestyle. Change the energy source in your home, or--if you're buying or building--learn what to look for during the planning and construction process. Not in a position to green your whole house? You can start with smaller changes, like powering just one room.

Alternative energy in the home
But the first thing you should do before switching to green power sources is simple: cut back on the electricity you use now by increasing your energy efficiency. In addition to trimming your electric bills and carbon output, needing less energy will make providing your own that much easier. Since most of us are already connected to the traditional power grid, the logical (and easiest) first step is to make the energy we're using go as far as possible. That way, when you start incorporating the use of more alternative energy into your home, you'll need less of it.

Top Green Alternative Energy Tips

1. Start by switching to green power
The easiest way to switch to green energy is to call your current provider and see if they offer an alternative. An increasing number of companies do, harnessing renewable sources like wind and solar power to offer electric service in their markets. This costs more for the consumer, since you'll pay a premium to offset the money involved in tapping the alternative source, but the price varies: in Sacramento, you'll pay 5 cents per kilowatt hour or $30 a month for solar, and in Oregon you'll shell out only .8 cents per kilowatt hour for wind, geothermal, or hydropower. Curious about the options in your state? Check this chart of Green Power Networks to see your local providers.

2. Plug in to solar power
There are two kinds of solar power you can use in your home: active and passive. Active solar power is captured through solar cells (also known as photovoltaics), and can be stored for later or used immediately to provide heat or electricity-or to supplement a traditional heating or electrical system. You can use a grid tie to go off-grid entirely, or you can stay on the regular power grid even if you have solar panels, so that the grid acts as your backup and provides power at night or on cloudy days. The good news is prices have fallen a lot over the past few years and solar power is now very affordable in many regions, often cutting your monthly power bill. But before you buy a solar system for your house, keep a few points in mind: many towns have restrictions on the size and type of collectors they'll allow; the annual number of sunny days in your climate will affect how much power you can collect (the Southwest usually has the best luck with solar collection); and the system's cost efficiency varies based on its size, your location, and the amount of power you plan to get from it.

3. Get passive solar to work for you
The second kind of solar power, passive solar, doesn't involve the (expensive) photovoltaic cells and mechanical systems of active solar, but still takes advantage of the sun to heat your home in one of three ways: direct gain, which collects light through the windows; indirect gain, which stores thermal energy within the walls; and isolated gain, more commonly put to use in a solarium or sun room setup. By thinking about window placement, insulation, and even landscaping-trees can be the ultimate passive solar helpers, since they soak up solar in the hot summer, and let the sun through in the winter--it's possible to help keep your home warm in the winter and cool in the summer.

4. Opt for solar hot water
You can also use solar power to heat the water for your showers, dishwasher, and laundry (though why aren't you using cold water for that?) by installing a solar hot water system. If you live in a place where freezing temps aren't a concern, look for a direct circulation system-this cycles water through the solar heater and into the home; otherwise, go for an indirect circulation system, which runs a freeze-proof fluid through the system to prevent icing. Both those active systems are generally more efficient than passive solar heaters, which don't have the same pumps and controls but can be more dependable.

5. Tap into the earth's natural geo-energy
The terms "geothermal" and "ground source heat pump" are nearly interchangeable in casual conversation-but they shouldn't be, since they're not the same. Geothermal energy comes right from the ground-think hot springs, geysers, and volcanic areas--while ground source heat pumps use the relatively steady temperature of the Earth (as compared to the air) to heat and cool buildings. Ground source heat pumps are a way to reduce electricity use for heating and cooling, so that it's easier to go 100% renewable. These heat pumps use as little as a quarter to a half as much electricity as traditional systems, and generally last between 25 and 50 years; you can expect the system to pay for itself in energy savings in less than 10 years.

6. Replace fossil fuels with biomass/biofuels
You can also heat your home using biofuels--nontoxic, biodegradable, and renewable power sources, like those made from animal and vegetable fats and oils or wood. If you're using oil heat, have a technician take a look at your furnace and get the okay to switch to a blend of 20%-99% biodiesel; in most cases, you won't need any additional parts or service to make the switch. Using a woodstove to heat your home is an age-old solution, but the more modern version is the pellet stove: The pellets of compressed sawdust take up less storage space than a wood pile, and burn with so few emissions that they aren't required to get EPA certification. (One tip: if you're going this route, find a local source for inexpensive pellets first.)

7. Harness the power of the wind
Wind energy is one of the cleanest forms of alternative energy available. Once you make sure your area is zoned to allow wind turbines, you'll want to make sure you have enough space--the Department of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy suggests at least one acre of rural land--and a climate that affords a steady breeze. Run an energy audit on your home to determine what size turbine you'll need; most houses require between 5 and 15 kilowatts to produce an average of 780 kilowatt hours every each month. And wind turbine systems aren't cheap, so run the numbers to figure out if you'll save enough to make the 20-year investment worth it.

8. Capture small-scale hydropower
If you're looking for a bigger clean energy project and if you are lucky enough to have a creek, stream, or river in your backyard, then a micro hydropower system may be a good alternative energy solution. By diverting a portion of the water through a wheel or turbine, you allow a shaft to spin; the spinning allows immediate results, like pumping water, or more indirect usage, like powering a generator. These calculations from the Department of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy can help you figure out if your water source will provide enough energy to significantly offset your electric bill.

9. Make a smart start
If you're in the process of buying a home, it's easier to make alternative energy work for you by selecting a well insulated and energy-efficient home that makes good use of passive solar, because that means you need less electricity to be clean, for example. It also means you need fewer solar panels and that your bills will be smaller. If you're designing from the ground up, choose a roof that's specially fitted for solar panels; place your house on the lot so it takes advantage of the sun; build with passive solar materials; and use daylighting technology by installing windows and doors in places that allow you to get the most out of natural light sources.

600 percent: The highest average efficiency of a ground source heat pump in the winter, compared to 250 percent for air-source pumps.

12: Percentage of the average household electricity bill that goes toward lighting alone.

7: Lowest wind speed (in miles per hour) from which it's efficient to harness wind power.

280,475: Number of photovoltaic cells shipped domestically in 2007.

Solar power: use has increased by 53x in the last 9 years.

Wind power: use has increased by 6.6x in the last 9 years

21 percent: Energy Information Administration's estimate of how much world electricity was generated by renewable energy. They project that it will rise to 25 percent by 2040.

Interesting Facts & Numbers about Alternative Energy

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy, American Wind Energy Association, Energy Information Administration.

Alternative Energy Tech: Net Metering, Biofuels & More

Net metering
Renewable energy sources are often a great alternative to traditional power, but cloudy days, droughts, and still air can all get in the way of even the best-laid plans for solar, water, or wind power. If you're worried about relying entirely on the power you can capture from Mother Nature, there's another option: hook your system into the established energy grid (with the permission of your town's electricity provider) and use it as a backup. Often, they'll put you on a net-metering plan, which means the company keeps track of the energy you make and subtracts it from what they provide, so you only pay the difference. In months where you make more than you use, they'll send you a check for the balance.

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Alternative energy sources Powering and heating your home with clean energy sources sounds like a no-brainer when it comes to going green, but deciding which kind of fuel is right for you isn't as simple. Solar power? Wind power? Hydropower? Geothermal power?--active or passive? It's overwhelming--and it's enough to stop you before you even get started.

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Sign a petition or donate to organizations fighting end nuclear weapons' use 

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Sign a petition or donate to organizations fighting end nuclear weapons' use 

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The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winner for our efforts to achieve a nuclear ban treaty. Join our movement

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Fund research into studies about nuclear waste-eating bacteria

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Fund research into studies about nuclear waste-eating bacteria

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Tiny single-cell organisms discovered living underground could help with the problem of nuclear waste disposal, say researchers involved in a study at The University of Manchester.

Although bacteria with waste-eating properties have been discovered in relatively pristine soils before, this is the first time that microbes that can survive in the very harsh conditions expected in radioactive waste disposal sites have been found. The findings are published in the ISME (Multidisciplinary Journal of Microbial Ecology) journal.

The disposal of our nuclear waste is very challenging, with very large volumes destined for burial deep underground. The largest volume of radioactive waste, termed 'intermediate level' and comprising of 364,000m ³ (enough to fill four Albert Halls), will be encased in concrete prior to disposal into underground vaults. When ground waters eventually reach these waste materials, they will react with the cement and become highly alkaline. This change drives a series of chemical reactions, triggering the breakdown of the various 'cellulose' based materials that are present in these complex wastes.

One such product linked to these activities, isosaccharinic acid (ISA), causes much concern as it can react with a wide range of radionuclides -- unstable and toxic elements that are formed during the production of nuclear power and make up the radioactive component of nuclear waste. If the ISA binds to radionuclides, such as uranium, then the radionuclides will become far more soluble and more likely to flow out of the underground vaults to surface environments, where they could enter drinking water or the food chain. However, the researchers' new findings indicate that microorganisms may prevent this becoming a problem.

Working on soil samples from a highly alkaline industrial site in the Peak District, which is not radioactive but does suffer from severe contamination with highly alkaline lime kiln wastes, they discovered specialist "extremophile" bacteria that thrive under the alkaline conditions expected in cement-based radioactive waste. The organisms are not only superbly adapted to live in the highly alkaline lime wastes, but they can use the ISA as a source of food and energy under conditions that mimic those expected in and around intermediate level radwaste disposal sites. For example, when there is no oxygen (a likely scenario in underground disposal vaults) to help these bacteria "breath" and break down the ISA, these simple single-cell microorganisms are able to switch their metabolism to breath using other chemicals in the water, such as nitrate or iron.

The fascinating biological processes that they use to support life under such extreme conditions are being studied by the Manchester group, as well as the stabilizing effects of these humble bacteria on radioactive waste. The ultimate aim of this work is to improve our understanding of the safe disposal of radioactive waste underground by studying the unusual diet of these hazardous waste eating microbes.

One of the researchers, Professor Jonathan Lloyd, from the University's School of Earth, Atmospheric and Environmental Sciences, said: "We are very interested in these Peak District microorganisms. Given that they must have evolved to thrive at the highly alkaline lime-kiln site in only a few decades, it is highly likely that similar bacteria will behave in the same way and adapt to living off ISA in and around buried cement-based nuclear waste quite quickly.

"Nuclear waste will remain buried deep underground for many thousands of years so there is plenty of time for the bacteria to become adapted. Our next step will be to see what impact they have on radioactive materials. We expect them to help keep radioactive materials fixed underground through their unusual dietary habits, and their ability to naturally degrade ISA."

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extreme survival; bacteria; microbiology; weapons technology; nuclear energy; consumer electronics; hazardous waste; recycling and waste; environmental science

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Nuclear waste eaters: Scientists discover hazardous waste-eating bacteria

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Tiny single-cell organisms discovered living underground could help with the problem of nuclear waste disposal, say researchers. Although bacteria with waste-eating properties have been discovered in relatively pristine soils before, this is the first time that microbes that can survive in the very harsh conditions expected in radioactive waste disposal sites have been found.