# data[].attributes.body
Human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The broad and sustained offensive on human rights that started after President Xi Jinping took power five years ago showed no sign of abating in 2017. The death of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo in a hospital under heavy guard in July highlighted the Chinese government's deepening contempt for rights. The near future for human rights appears grim, especially as Xi is expected to remain in power at least until 2022. Foreign governments did little in 2017 to push back against China's worsening rights record at home and abroad.

The Chinese government, which already oversees one of the strictest online censorship regimes in the world, limited the provision of censorship circumvention tools and strengthened ideological control over education and mass media in 2017. Schools and state media incessantly tout the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and, increasingly, of President Xi Jinping as "core" leader.

Authorities subjected more human rights defenders-including foreigners-to show trials in 2017, airing excerpted forced confessions and court trials on state television and social media. Police ensured the detainees' compliance by torturing some of them, denying them access to lawyers of their choice, and holding them incommunicado for months.

In Xinjiang, a nominally autonomous region with 11 million Turkic Muslim Uyghurs, authorities stepped up mass surveillance and the security presence despite the lack of evidence demonstrating an organized threat. They also adopted new policies denying Uyghurs cultural and religious rights.

Hong Kong's human rights record took a dark turn. Hong Kong courts disqualified four pro-democracy lawmakers in July and jailed three prominent pro-democracy student leaders in August.

China's growing global influence means many of its rights violations now have international implications. In April, security officials at the United Nations headquarters in New York City ejected from the premises Dolkun Isa, an ethnic Uyghur rights activist, who was accredited as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) participant to a forum there; no explanation was provided.

In June, the European Union failed for the first time ever to deliver a statement under a standing agenda item at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) regarding country situations requiring the council's attention. This stemmed from Greece blocking the necessary EU consensus for such an intervention due to its unwillingness to criticize human rights violations in China, with which it has substantial trade ties. Chinese officials continued throughout the year to pressure governments around the world to forcibly return allegedly corrupt mainland officials despite a lack of legal protections in China or refugee status determination procedures outside China.

Despite the high costs, many in China continued to fight for rights and justice in 2017. Activists, including those working on women's, disability, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, continued to take cases to court to seek limited redress and raise awareness. In a small but significant step, in July a court in Henan province ruled against a public hospital for forcing a gay man to undergo discriminatory "conversion therapy." In its narrow ruling, the court found that admitting the plaintiff to the hospital against his will violated his rights.

Human Rights Defenders

The death of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo in 2017 laid bare authorities' ruthlessness towards peaceful proponents of human rights and democracy. In July, after serving nearly nine years of his 11-year prison sentence for "inciting subversion," Liu Xiaobo died from cancer in a Shenyang hospital, heavily guarded by state security. During his hospitalization, authorities isolated Liu and his wife, Liu Xia, from family and supporters, and denied Liu's request to seek treatment outside the country. Since Liu's death, authorities have forcibly disappeared Liu Xia. The government also harassed and detained a group of Liu's supporters for commemorating his death.

In 2017, authorities continued politically motivated prosecutions of human rights activists and lawyers who were rounded up in a nationwide crackdown that began in July 2015. Lawyer Wang Quanzhang and activist Wu Gan remained in police custody, awaiting trial or verdict on baseless charges. In November, lawyer Jiang Tianyong was sentenced to two years in prison on charges of "inciting subversion of state power."

Outside a Beijing courthouse, April 23, 2013: "I am not free. If they tell you I'm free, tell them I'm not free."...

Outside a Beijing courthouse, April 23, 2013: "I am not free. If they tell you I'm free, tell them I'm not free."

Liu Xia, 56, is a Beijing-based poet, artist, and photographer. She has published collections of poems, and her photographic works have been exhibited in France, Italy, the United States, and other countries. Liu Xia met Liu Xiaobo, an intellectual and activist, through Beijing literary circles and married him when he was imprisoned in a re-education through labor camp in 1996.

Since October 2010, when Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Liu Xia was held arbitrarily under house arrest and deprived of almost all human contact except with close family and a few friends. Throughout Liu Xiaobo's hospitalization, which began in June 2017, Liu Xia was prevented from speaking freely to family, friends, or the media. She is known to suffer from severe depression and a heart condition.

After announcing Liu Xiaobo's death on July 13, Shenyang authorities arranged a private funeral that only Liu Xia, a few of Liu Xiaobo's relatives, and some unidentified individuals, possibly state security officials, were allowed to attend. The funeral was followed by a sea burial. Although Liu Xia appeared in a video released by the authorities on August 19-the last time she was seen-saying she preferred such "simple" arrangements, there is no way to verify whether they were indeed her wishes since she remains in state custody. The couple's close friends believed that the burial arrangements were imposed on the family to prevent having a gravesite that could become a place of pilgrimage for Liu's supporters.

Chinese authorities continue to insist that Liu Xia is free.

A number of those caught in the "709 crackdown" were freed, but they continue to be closely monitored and isolated from friends and colleagues; some revealed that they were tortured and forced to confess while in detention. Authorities also continued to harass and intimidate the lawyers who represent the detainees, ordering them not to speak to media and disbarring several after giving them failing marks in China's annual lawyers' evaluation.

In March, a court in Guangdong province, in separate trials, convicted women's rights activist Su Changlan and online political commentator Chen Qitang on baseless charges of "inciting subversion" and sentenced them to prison terms of three years and four-and-a-half years, respectively. Su was released in October after serving her sentence. Her health deteriorated sharply while in detention due to inadequate medical care and poor conditions in detention. In March, a Sichuan court sentenced artist Chen Yunfei to four years in prison on charges of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" in connection with his activities commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre.

The government also tried to eliminate the country's few independent human rights news websites by jailing their founders. In August, a Yunnan court sentenced citizen journalist and protest chronicler Lu Yuyu to four years in prison on charges of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble." Also in August, authorities charged Liu Feiyue, founder of the website Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch (民生观察) with "leaking state secrets" and "inciting subversion of state power." Liu could face life imprisonment if convicted. Veteran activist and founder of the human rights website 64 Tianwang, Huang Qi, suffers from kidney disease and has been denied adequate medical care since his detention in November 2016.

In August, prominent rights lawyer and activist Gao Zhisheng disappeared from his home in Shaanxi province. Authorities subsequently informed Gao's family that he had been taken into police custody.

China continues to detain non-citizens for promoting human rights in China. In March, Guangdong authorities arbitrarily detained Taiwan democracy activist Lee Ming-che. After holding him incommunicado for six months, denying him access to family, a court in Hunan province sentenced Lee to five years in prison for "subverting state power." Mainland activist Peng Yuhua, who was tried alongside Lee, was given a seven-year sentence on the same charge.

Freedom of Expression

Authorities adopted new measures to limit access to circumvention tools that allow netizens to scale the Great Firewall to access the uncensored global internet. In January 2017, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued regulations making it unlawful to provide circumvention tools without the ministry's pre-approval.

In March, Chongqing authorities made public a regulation that bans unauthorized use of internet circumvention tools in the city. Anyone-from individuals to companies-who does so would be ordered to disconnect and receive a warning. The regulation was unprecedented in banning all use of these tools. The same month a Guangdong court sentenced Deng Jiewei to nine months in jail for illegally selling virtual private networks, or VPNs, which protect user privacy by shielding browsing activities from service providers or state surveillance.

In July, Apple removed dozens of VPNs from its App store in China, citing compliance with government regulations. In August, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) ordered five websites, including shopping giant Alibaba, to remove vendors that offered access to VPNs. In September, police detained Zhen Jianghua, activist and founder of a website that teaches people how to circumvent internet censorship, on suspicion of "inciting subversion." In November, in a letter to two US senators, Apple confirmed that it had removed 674 VPNs from its App store in China this year, citing compliance with government regulations.

Authorities further tightened screws on social media. In June, they shut down dozens of entertainment news and celebrity gossip social media accounts after calling on internet companies to "actively promote socialist core values" and stop the spread of "vulgar ... sentiments." In August, the CAC announced additional new regulations on the requirement of real-name registration. In September Weibo barred users who had not registered with their real names from posting messages on their own microblogs or comment on others.

In September, the CAC promulgated measures to make creators of online chat groups such as those on QQ and Wechat liable for information other users shared in the groups. The rules also require the service providers to establish credit rating systems for chat group users. Those who violate Chinese laws and regulations will have their credit scores lowered.

In September, Beijing police arrested Liu Pengfei, the creator of a WeChat group that had discussed political and social issues.

Authorities continued their assault on academic freedom. In January, Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou banned staff from criticizing the Communist Party. In June, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's disciplinary body, issued a report accusing 14 top universities of ideological infractions after a months-long investigation. Several professors were fired for speaking critically of the Chinese government on social media. In August, Shi Jiepeng, a professor of classical Chinese at Beijing Normal University, was sacked for "improper comments"; Shi had called Mao Zedong a "devil."

In August, Cambridge University Press admitted it had blocked access in China to more than 300 articles published in its journal China Quarterly, following orders from the Chinese government. The international backlash against the decision compelled the publishing house to restore the articles. In November, Springer Nature pulled access to over 1,000 articles in China. The publisher said the decision was to comply with Chinese regulations.

In March, authorities issued new measures to reduce the number of foreign children's titles published in Chinese. In August, the Ministry of Education issued new national editions of primary and middle school liberal arts textbooks, with added emphasis on traditional culture and "core socialist values."

Gui Minhai, a Swedish national and publisher of books critical of the Chinese leadership, was abducted in Thailand in October 2015. After holding Gui for two years in secret detention in China, the Chinese government in October told Swedish diplomats that Gui had been "released."

Hong Kong

Civil liberties in Hong Kong are increasingly being undermined by the growing interference of the central government, 20 years after the city returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

Opposition political parties and their supporters faced greater harassment from authorities. In April, the Companies Registry rejected the application of the Hong Kong National Party on grounds that the promotion of "Hong Kong independence is against the Basic Law." During President Xi's visit to Hong Kong, local and mainland police followed, harassed, and arrested some peaceful pro-democracy protesters.

In April, Hong Kong police arrested 11 pro-democracy advocates on charges including "unlawful assembly" and "obstructing police." The charges stem from the advocates' protest against a decision by China's top legislative body forcing Hong Kong courts to disqualify two pro-independence legislators. In July, a Hong Kong court disqualified four more pro-democracy lawmakers for modifying their oaths swearing allegiance to China in a 2016 ceremony.

In March, two mainland government advisers said the central government will rely more on "legal means"-suggesting manipulation of the territory's legal system-to strengthen central control. In April, the chief of legal affairs at the China Liaison Office in Hong Kong said the "one country, two systems" principle could be abolished altogether if the city "fails to actively defend the sovereignty" of China. In June mainland officials declared that the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which states that Hong Kong enjoys "a high degree of autonomy" except in foreign affairs and defense, "no longer has any realistic meaning."

In August, a Hong Kong appeals court sentenced pro-democracy student leaders Alex Chow, Nathan Law, and Joshua Wong to six to eight months in prison. The three had earlier been convicted of crimes related to "unlawful assembly" for peaceful protests at the time of the 2014 Umbrella Movement, and were given community sentences by a lower court. In a politically motivated move, the secretary of justice, a political appointee, sought a harsher prison sentence for the trio.

Also in August, the same court convicted 13 defendants of unlawful assembly for another anti-government protest in 2014. The 13, who had previously been sentenced to community service, were given prison terms of between 8 and 13 months after the Justice Department sought a review of their sentences. In October, the Court of Final Appeal released Chow, Law, and Wong on bail, pending appeal.

Xinjiang

The Chinese government has long conflated peaceful activism with violence in Xinjiang, and has treated many expressions of Uyghur identity, including language and religion, as threatening. Uyghur opposition to government policies has been expressed in peaceful protests but also through violent attacks. However, details about protests and violence are scant, as authorities severely curtail independent reporting in the region.

In 2017, the Chinese government continued its 2014 "strike-hard" campaign in Xinjiang, which vowed to adopt "unconventional tactics" in countering terrorism. After Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was transferred from Tibet to Xinjiang in August 2016, the Xinjiang regional government expanded its already pervasive security measures by hiring thousands more security personnel. In July, authorities forced residents in a district of Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, to install surveillance apps on their mobile phones. In 2017, the Xinjiang government also waged a campaign against "two faced" Uyghur cadres thought to oppose the party's stance on Uyghurs. In April, 97 officials in Hotan prefecture were reprimanded.

Authorities increasingly restricted and punished Uyghurs' foreign ties. Since October 2016, authorities have arbitrarily recalled passports from residents of Xinjiang. Since about April, 2017 authorities have arbitrarily detained thousands of Uyghurs and other Muslims in centers where they were forced to undergo "patriotic education."

Authorities also ordered Uyghur students studying abroad, including in Egypt, to return to Xinjiang; and in July, Egyptian authorities rounded up those who had failed to return, possibly at China's behest. By September, about 20 Uyghurs were forcibly repatriated to Xinjiang while 12 were released. Some of those who returned were detained; a Xinjiang court sentenced Islamic scholar Hebibulla Tohti to 10 years in prison after he returned with a doctorate degree from Egypt's Al-Azhar University.

In February, a video believed to be released by the extremist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) showed Uyghur fighters who pledged to return to China and "shed blood like rivers"-the first reported direct threat by the group against Chinese targets. A 2016 study reported that at least 114 Uyghurs had joined ISIS, but estimates vary widely and the level of participation remains unconfirmed.

In April, the Xinjiang Counter-Extremism Regulations, which prohibit the wearing of "abnormal" beards or veils in public places, became effective. Also in April, Xinjiang authorities issued a new rule banning parents from naming children with dozens of names with religious connotations, such as Saddam and Medina, on the basis that they could "exaggerate religious fervor."

Tibet

Authorities in Tibetan areas continue to severely restrict religious freedom, speech, movement, and assembly, and fail to redress popular concerns about mining and land grabs by local officials, which often involve intimidation and arbitrary violence by security forces. In 2017, officials intensified surveillance of online and phone communications.

Six UN special rapporteurs sent a communication to the government of China expressing concern about the late 2016 mass expulsion of monastics (monks and nuns) and demolition of living quarters at the Larung Gar monastery in Kandze, Sichuan. Similar expulsions and demolitions were reported at the Yachen Gar monastery in Kandze in August 2017.

Several thousand Tibetans traveling on Chinese passports to India for a January 2017 teaching by the Dalai Lama were forced to return early when officials in Tibetan areas attempted to confiscate passports, threatening retaliation against those travelling abroad and their family members back home.

In June, residents of Palyul county, Sichuan, demonstrated against land grabs; in July and August, Qinghai residents peacefully protested against several official policies. One solo protest in central Lhasa on June 23 ended in the protester's suicide. Between October 2016 and March 2017, there were at least six protests in Ngaba, Sichuan, alone, but details are scant due to extreme surveillance and intimidation.

Tibetans continue to self-immolate to protest Chinese policies. At time of writing, four had done so in 2017.

Freedom of Religion

The government restricts religious practice to five officially recognized religions in officially approved religious premises. Authorities retain control over religious bodies' personnel appointments, publications, finances, and seminary applications. The government classifies many religious groups outside its control as "evil cults," and subjects members to police harassment, torture, arbitrary detention, and imprisonment.

In February 2017, Beijing police detained Sun Qian, a businesswoman and Canadian citizen, on suspicion of "using cults to sabotage law enforcement." Sun is a follower of the Falun Gong, a meditation-focused spiritual group banned since 1999. Sun was reportedly pepper-sprayed, put in handcuffs attached to foot shackles, and deprived of sleep.

In May, authorities detained Shao Zhumin, a Catholic bishop of an underground church in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province. Shao's church had refused to join the state-affiliated Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association. Beijing and the Vatican have continued negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic ties, but the dialogue remains strained by disputes over who has authority to appoint bishops in the country.

In September, China passed revisions to the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs. The document, which comes into effect in February 2018, introduces new restrictions designed to "curb extremism" and "resist infiltration," including banning unauthorized teaching about religion and going abroad to take part in training or meetings. Donations from foreign groups or individuals that are over 100,000 RMB (US$15,000) are also prohibited. The new rules also expand the role of local authorities in controlling religious activities.

Authorities in Yunnan province charged more than a dozen Christians in 2017 with "using cults to sabotage law enforcement." In October, at least three of the charged were given prison sentences of four years. One of their lawyers said the arrests were due to the group not gathering at officially designated churches.

Women's and Girls' Rights

According to a report by World Economic Forum, China ranked 100th out of 144 countries for gender parity in 2017, falling for the ninth consecutive year since 2008, when it ranked 57th. The Party Congress, concluded in October, was marked by a striking absence of women in top political posts. Women and girls in China continue to confront sexual abuse and harassment, employment discrimination, and domestic violence.

The Chinese government remains hostile to women's rights activism. In February, internet company Sina suspended the microblog of Women's Voices, run by outspoken feminists, for 30 days. Between May and June, Guangzhou police forced five activists from their homes in retaliation for their campaign to raise awareness about sexual harassment on public transportation. In September, authorities finally lifted a 10-year travel ban on activist Wu Rongrong, enabling her to travel to Hong Kong for studies.

Disability Rights

China ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2008. However, persons with disabilities continue to face discrimination in areas including education and employment.

In February, authorities released long-awaited Regulations of Education of Persons with Disabilities to replace out-of-date 1994 regulations. While the new regulations have some positive aspects, they do not go far enough in removing discriminatory obstacles that prevent many children with disabilities from being placed in mainstream schools. They require that students with disabilities be evaluated by a quasi-governmental expert committee and placed according to their "physical conditions and ability to be educated and adapt to [mainstream] schools." Preventing children with disabilities from attending mainstream schools, or failing to provide them with support needed to attend such schools, is itself a violation of the CRPD.

In March, state press reported the death of a 15-year-old with autism in a Guangdong "care center" for the homeless, focusing attention on neglect in these facilities.

In a welcome move in April, the Ministry of Education issued a new rule to accommodate students with disabilities in college entrance exams, known as gaokao. While a 2014 decision already required schools to provide people with visual impairments access to braille or electronic paper in gaokao exams, the new rule provides more details on implementation and includes accommodation for people with other disabilities, including for deaf students.

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

While China de-criminalized homosexuality in 1997, it lacks laws protecting people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and same-sex partnership is not legal.

In May, Chinese authorities shut down a popular dating app for lesbians. In June, the government banned "abnormal sexual lifestyles," including homosexuality, from online video programs. In July, authorities forced the LGBT group Speak Out to cancel a conference in Chengdu. An earlier Speak Out event scheduled for May in Xi'an was also cancelled after police briefly detained the organizers and told them that LGBT events were "not welcome" in the city.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Beijing also appeared to step up its campaign to forcibly return North Korean refugees and asylum seekers in 2017: between July and August, 41 people were detained; 51 had been detained in all of 2016.

Key International Actors

While the European Parliament, United States Congress, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and individual members of governments and parliaments publicly expressed some concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in China in 2017, the response of "like-minded" governments to negative developments, such as jail sentences for peaceful protestors in Hong Kong, was even more muted than in previous years. Although the United States delivered a joint statement on behalf of a dozen countries at the March 2016 session of the UNHRC expressing concern at human rights violations in China, it did not present a follow-up joint statement at any of the council's 2017 sessions.

In January 2017, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres introduced President Xi at an event closed to civil society at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Guterres made no reference to China's deteriorating human rights environment or to human rights as a pillar of UN work.

At a summit in Brussels on June 1-2, the EU Council and Commission presidents publicly "expressed concern" about human rights abuses in China, but did not call for the release of political prisoners, including EU citizens, or the repeal of abusive laws. The EU did raise concerns about China at the UNHRC in September.

In June, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly challenged Chinese authorities to fulfill their commitments to register German NGOs under China's new Foreign NGO Management Law, which went into effect in 2017.

Also in June, Italian police briefly detained and later released Dolkun Isa, a prominent Uyghur activist and German citizen, as he tried to enter the Italian Senate, where he had been invited to speak. Italian authorities refused to clarify whether China had requested Isa's detention.

Australia failed to ratify an extradition treaty with China after protests from Australian politicians arguing Australia should not send people to China because the country's judicial system is plagued with human rights abuses.

Businessmen linked to China's government have made significant foreign donations to political parties in Australia, raising concerns about Chinese attempts to influence Australian policy. An Australian parliamentary inquiry in March called for a ban on political donations from foreign sources, and the government ordered a review of espionage laws.

In July, the United States issued several statements condemning China's failure to allow Liu Xiaobo the freedom to seek medical treatment wherever he chose. Yet within hours of Liu's death US President Donald Trump referred to President Xi as a "terrific guy" and "a great leader."

Foreign Policy

In May, China hosted its largest-ever gathering for the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative, a development program spanning 65 countries that China says will involve investments of more than $1 trillion. Many participating states have a history of countenancing serious human rights violations in major development and infrastructure projects.

Key international financial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the World Bank, have not taken adequate steps to ensure that they place strong human rights conditions on any participation in OBOR-related projects.

At the UN Security Council, China joined Russia in February in a double veto of a resolution that would have imposed sanctions related to use of chemical weapons in Syria. In September, the council held closed-door discussions on Burmese military atrocities against Burma's Rohingya Muslim minority; diplomats said China opposed language recognizing the right of return of the more than 630,000 Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh. While senior UN officials described the military campaign as "ethnic cleansing," Chinese state media endorsed it as a firm response to "Islamic terrorists."

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
Boats and boating--Equipment and supplies

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
World Report 2018: Rights Trends in China

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The broad and sustained offensive on human rights that started after President Xi Jinping took power five years ago showed no sign of abating in 2017. The death of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo in a hospital under heavy guard in July highlighted the Chinese government's deepening contempt for rights.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
China is facing growing criticism over its persecution of some Muslim minority groups, huge numbers of whom are allegedly being held in internment camps.

In August 2018, a UN committee heard that up to one million Uighur Muslims and other Muslim groups could be being detained in the western Xinjiang region, where they're said to be undergoing "re-education" programmes.

The claims were made by rights groups, but China denies the allegations. At the same time, there's growing evidence of oppressive surveillance against people living in Xinjiang.

We've developed this new format to try to explain the story to you better.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
China is facing growing criticism over its persecution of some Muslim minority groups, huge numbers of whom are allegedly being held in internment camps. In August 2018, a UN committee heard that up to one million Uighur Muslims and other Muslim groups could be being detained in the western Xinjiang region, where they're said to be undergoing "re-education" programmes.

# data[].attributes.headline
China's use of political power in Xinjiang. 

# data[].attributes.subject
China's use of political power in Xinjiang. 

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
And they pose the question: does the family know anyone abroad? As a test, it is suggested the Chinese guest offers their host family a beer, Byler wrote in the Asia Society's ChinaFile.

Uighurs have told Fairfax Media they are distressed at the intrusion into family privacy. One widow must allow a Han Chinese man into her house to spend the night several times a month, said an Australian Uighur. "Sending a man to a widow's home - this isn't even accepted in Han culture," she said.

Until a few weeks ago, the Chinese government denied any "re-education centres" existed. But the scale of the building program, and the disappearance of tens of thousands of Uighurs, made this approach untenable.

Breaking the official silence, Chinese state television broadcast a propaganda documentary on October 16 depicting the buildings as vocational training centres where Xinjiang's ethnic poor were being treated to free Mandarin language classes, instruction on national laws, and provided with work skills that would lead to a better life.

The "trainees" were paid a basic income, and shown a "colourful life" with dancing competitions and sport.

The next day, state newspapers carried thousands of words from Xinjiang's second-in-charge, chairman Shohrat Zakir, in which he said most "trainees" had reflected on their mistakes and seen the harm of religious extremism.

The first of the "trainees" were expected to have sufficient skills to finish their "course" and receive certificates by the end of the year, he said. The world is watching and waiting.

Although 90 per cent of the population in China is Han, almost half (46 per cent) of Xinjiang's population is Uighur.

Han comprised only 6 per cent of Xinjiang's population in 1949, when Mao's communist China absorbed the short-lived East Turkestan Republic into neighbouring lands conquered by the Qing Dynasty. But a surge in Chinese migration has resulted in Han now almost equalling the Uighur population at 41 per cent.

Over the past decade, Xinjiang has experienced a bitter cycle of government repression of Uighur culture - including a 2006 ban on children entering mosques - and eruptions of violence against Han Chinese.

In 2009, riots in the capital Urumqi saw almost 200 people, most of them Han Chinese, killed. In 2013, terrorists from Xinjiang exploded a car in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.

In 2014, the nation was shocked by a sword attack that killed 20 and injured 100 at a train station in Kunming in Yunnan province. As Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang in 2014, a train station was bombed. A month later, 31 people died in a market bombing in Urumqi.

The Syrian ambassador to China told media in 2016 that up to 5000 "Xinjiang jihadists" were fighting with Islamic State and militias in Syria. The Chinese government feared these fighters would bring their skills home.

A new Communist Party boss, Chen Quanguo, was appointed to Xinjiang later that year. He had been recruited from Tibet.

He appears to have ramped up the campaign against Islamic foreign influence to an unprecedented level.

The impact of that campaign reaches far beyond southern towns such as Kashgar and Hotan, which are near the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan and considered hotspots for separatism and ethnic violence.

Ordinary Uighur life has been disrupted across the entire province as the campaign reaches even "mild" eastern towns like Turpan, and Hami, which has had bilingual Chinese and Uighur education since Qing times.

The University of Sydney's David Brophy, an expert in Uighur political history, says: "Turpan and Hami have never been treated the same way as the south of the Tarim Basin. Going as far back as the Qing Dynasty these oases were regarded as more loyal, and better integrated into the empire, than regions to the south."

Brophy adds that Hami was the starting point of a major Uighur uprising in the 1930s that briefly led to the formation of the first East Turkestan Republic in Kashgar in 1933. Turpan was important "in the formation of a modern discourse of Uighur nationalism".

Asked why Beijing would extend its crackdown to Turpan and Hami, Brophy suggests another reason these towns are sensitive: "They're both in strategic geographic locations, along major routes into and across Xinjiang."

The Belt and Road Initiative, which links China to Europe via Xinjiang, could be a factor. Zakir, in his comments, emphasised that Xinjiang had been tasked with constructing "the core zone" of the new Silk Road.

And Turpan and Hami are the major stops on Xinjiang's new high-speed rail line.

The high-speed train glides through the desert at 300 kilometres an hour. The landscape is stunning - snow-dusted mountains rising up from a moon-crater surface. Wind carves the black desert soil like a sculptor.

At Hami, on the eastern edge of Xinjiang, passengers alight and push tickets into automatic gates. The door swiftly opens. A false dawn. Within minutes of stepping out of the station, the dragnet descends.

Half a dozen police in bulletproof vests stand at the bottom of the train station stairs. Behind them, a heavy metal fence and SWAT police shed.

They are looking for Uighurs and foreigners. An old Uighur man in a traditional cloth cap is picked out and asked for his identity card and papers that permit him to travel here. He is guided to a makeshift police station the size of a shipping container, where a flow chart on the wall clearly shows the process for ethnic profiling. Han Chinese will hasten through an X-ray scanner to enter Hami, while Uighurs must be checked and checked and checked.

The Uighur man says he is visiting his son. But he must prove it, and is told to call the son. It takes 45 minutes before the police are satisfied and he can enter the town.

The police routine is repeated over and over as high-speed trains pull into Hami. But they are mostly carrying Han Chinese, with less than a dozen Uighurs.

When Fairfax Media is spotted by police we are likewise taken into a police station. After three hours there, we are escorted into Hami by security and propaganda officials offering to show a neon-lit "model" Uighur culture street built two years earlier.

The officials have been assigned to stop the foreign journalist from seeing anything more. But this is impossible. There are police kiosks with flashing lights every few hundred metres along the main road, and a roadblock demanding identity cards from minorities or foreigners.

Petrol stations are enclosed by razor wire. To fill up, a car must first pull into a police checkpoint, open the boot, and all occupants leave the car as it is searched.

The rapidly expanded police presence has come at a massive cost. Local government tender documents show a 15,000-square-metre police skills training centre was built in Hami in December at a cost of 55 million yuan ($11.1 million). A special forces training base built in March cost 12 million yuan.

Xinjiang's total public security budget reached 57.9 billion yuan last year, soaring 93 per cent in 12 months, as thousands of roadside police kiosks were erected and auxillary police recruited.

The typical cost of building a "vocational education and training centre" is 40 million yuan, with each surveillance system an extra 3.8 million yuan.

A Hami town official said the only response he could give on the vocational training centres was to refer to what was published by state media.

This week, China's government-controlled newspapers published scores of interviews with smiling "trainees", including women who had reportedly escaped abusive marriages and Islamic extremism.

La Trobe University's James Leibold says the propaganda, including the video broadcast on state television, gives an "aspirational view of what 'vocational education'/ 'transformation through education' should look like".

The intent is clear: the rewiring of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities.
James Leibold

"There is likely a great variation of methods and conditions inside these camps, with some more benign and vocationally focused, and others more coercive and poorly run," he says.

"Regardless, the intent is clear: the rewiring of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in the image of the Han majority. Recent tours by senior Party leaders certainly signal a desire to normalise and standardise this thought and behaviour control process, and possibly transform it into a long-term strategy."

In the capital Urumqi on Friday, mosques are open for prayer, but it is mostly older Uighur men and women who arrive at 2pm and pass through security scanners and police checks to enter.

Within 100 metres of one mosque, but out of view, a dozen paramilitaries with machine guns stand at alert inside a police kiosk.

Police who force Fairfax Media to delete photographs outside the mosque scold that foreigners don't understand.

"There hasn't been a terrorist incident in 20 months."

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
'Ruined dreams': the people locked up in China's desert 're-education' centres

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Most have only seen them from the air, but China correspondent Kirsty Needham got on the ground in Xinjiang to explore China's vast network of gulags.

# data[].attributes.headline
Clear example of China's exertion of political power - for national security interests. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Clear example of China's exertion of political power - for national security interests. 

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
An ABC investigation has exposed China's vast network of secret ethnic gulags. Using high-resolution satellite imagery and Chinese government contract databases, it shows for the first time the scale and rapid expansion of China's controversial re-education camps.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
SAC Preparation – Unit 3 AOS 2 Power in the Asia Pacific.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Practice SAC Part B - Essay completed in class on Thursday 31st May

# data[].attributes.subject
Practice SAC Part B - Essay completed in class on Thursday 31st May

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Practice SAC Essay Unit 3 AOS 2 Power in the Asia Pacific.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Specific example of trade being used as a foreign policy instrument - Maritime Silk Road, China and Indonesia. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Specific example of trade being used as a foreign policy instrument - Maritime Silk Road, China and Indonesia. 

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Indonesia and China on April 13 in Beijing signed five cooperation contracts worth $23.3 billion under the latter's Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives.

The cooperation covers the construction of a $2-billion hydropower plant in Kayan in North Kalimantan, the development of a $700-million facility for converting coal into gas there, as well as the construction of a $17.8-billion hydropower plant on Kayan River. Other contracts cover the development of a $1.6.billion power plant in Bali and the construction of a $1.2- billion steel smelter, Antara news agency reported.

Both nations also signed two memoranda of understanding on the development of electric cars and motorcycles, as well as the construction of the Tanah Kuning Mangkupadi Industrial Park in North Kalimantan.

Indonesia's Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister Luhut Panjaitan highlighted the importance of encouraging business relations between both nations in line with the national interests.

"It is a matter of being smart to eye opportunities to derive more benefits," he pointed out, adding that the opportunities have to be seized to increase investment, create more jobs, raise the national gross domestic product and, generally, boost economic growth.

He said that Indonesia would seek further cooperation with China on some of Indonesia's economic corridors, including those in North Sumatra, North Kalimantan, North Sulawesi and Bali, with an investment value of $51.9 billion.

The Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives encompass investment for the development of infrastructure, railway tracks, toll roads, automotive products, real estate and power plants spanning over spanning dozens of countries across Asia, Africa and Europe.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
China to pump billions into Indonesia under New Silk Road initiative | Investvine

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Reading Time: 2 minutesIndonesia and China on April 13 in Beijing signed five cooperation contracts worth $23.3 billion under the latter's Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives. The cooperation covers the construction of a $2-billion hydropower plant in

# data[].attributes.headline
Practice SAC completed in class on Tuesday 29th May 

# data[].attributes.subject
Practice SAC completed in class on Tuesday 29th May 

# data[].attributes.body
Short answer responses only + marking guide.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Practice SAC Short Answer Response and Marking Guide.docx

# data[].attributes.body
Tibetan Interpretation of China's national interests

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Undercover In Tibet (Full Documentary) - Real Stories

# data[].attributes.body
Examiners feedback and Stefan's sample response.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
2017 Essay and Stefan Essay Example.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Marking Guide with Examiner's Advice for most practice questions. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Marking Guide with Examiner's Advice for most practice questions. 

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Marking Guide – Practice Questions Part 1.docx

# data[].attributes.body
View rubric when writing essay.

# data[].attributes.headline
Please refer to VCAA Glossary if you need help with key terms 

# data[].attributes.subject
Please refer to VCAA Glossary if you need help with key terms 

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
​​​​​​​​

Glossary

Aid

Refers to the provision of assistance, predominantly monetary, to global actors with the intention of influencing their decisions and actions in order to achieve a specific aim.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism reflects a desire among global actors to cooperate to reach common goals and outcomes to meet challenges that are presented to the global community.

Crisis diplomacy

Refers to negotiations between actors in the global political arena in response to an immediate crisis. This most commonly concerns conflicts and natural disasters, but also economic and health crises.

Cultural power

Refers to a desirable and transportable culture that states can use to achieve ends that might not be achieved through military and political means. It is often linked to soft power and may influence regional relationships and international standing.

Diplomacy

Refers to the ability to conduct effective negotiations between states without arousing hostility. As a foreign policy instrument of a state, it may be utilised through formal diplomatic channels, such as an ambassador, through its conduct in intergovernmental organisations and from meetings and speeches made by leaders of states.

Diplomatic power

Refers to the power accrued by states through their relationships with others in the form of alliances, alignments and international standing. Essentially, it is the ability of a state to influence other global actors by way of discussion and negotiation.

Economic power

A state's economic power is often determined by figures such as the gross domestic product (GDP), which indicate the wealth of a state and its economic activity. Economic power can also be assessed by the state's reliance on imports of goods and services. Crucially, economic power refers to a state's ability to influence the actions of another state through finance and trade.

Economic prosperity

The national interest of economic prosperity is important to a state as it indicates whether a state can weather international economic instability as well as protects and builds the wealth and welfare of its citizens. If a state is economically prosperous, it encourages other states to develop relationships with them and bolsters state sovereignty.

Ethics

This seeks to address questions of morality and extends to global politics, as global actors have underlying ideologies to their actions, such as realism or cosmopolitanism.

Global governance

Refers to institutions, rules, norms and legal arrangements that seek to facilitate cooperation, and manage relations, between states. Governance is carried out by both governmental organisations such as the United Nations and non-governmental organisations.​

Globalisation

Refers to acceleration and intensification of exchanges of goods, services, labour and capital, which promote global interdependence. These have been facilitated by rapid changes in communication and technology.

Hard power

Refers to power exercised through coercion, or threatened acts of coercion, to influence the actions of other global actors. This is most commonly exercised through military forms.

Idealism

Refers to a school of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by an ideological principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations.

Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO)

An intergovernmental organisation is an organisation composed primarily of states. They are established by a treaty, a founding charter for the organisation, and thus subject to international law. Examples include the United Nations and the European Union.

International cooperation

Refers to occasions when global actors work together to achieve common ideals and goals.

International law

Traditionally only relating to states, international law is a body of rules established by custom or written legal agreements that are accepted as binding upon the international community. Customary international law applies to all global actors. Written legal agreements, such as treaties, are only binding to those who consent to it through explicit ratification. Some international laws may apply only to states, such as the UN Convention against Torture, while others may apply directly to citizens, such as war crimes.

International standing

The international standing of a state is an important national interest as it influences the power a state has in global politics. Other national interests impact on international standing as well as a state's role and recognition in intergovernmental organisations and as a proponent of international law. If a state has a poor international standing it may threaten their sovereignty.

Justice

Refers to the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, law, fairness and equity that, importantly, also seeks punishment when these ethics are breached. Extends to global politics through international systems of justice, such as the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, which seek to uphold international law and deter future violations.

Military

Military as a foreign policy instrument refers to the military capacity of a state and how this is utilised to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The capacity will depend on the amount of money spent on the military, the type and calibre of weapons available, the number and expertise of servicemen and women in the armed forces, and the relationship between the military and the state. It may also refer to the placement of armed forces.

Military power

Refers to the use of a state's military to exert influence over the actions of other global actors. This may not need to be implemented through a use of force as placement and capacity of the military may be enough to influence other global actors.

Multilateralism

Refers to a system of coordinating relations between three or more states, usually in pursuit of objectives in particular areas.

Nation

Refers to groups of people claiming common bonds based on culture, language and history. Some nations have their own state, such as the Japanese, while others want their own state such as the Tibetans and Kurds.

National interests

The national interests of a state are pursued to ensure the survival and potential growth of that state. States implement policies and types of power to achieve their national interests and maintain state sovereignty.

National security

This is the national interest of a state to ensure it maintains sovereignty. Traditionally this term refers to the protection of a state's borders from intruders but has evolved to include other forms of security, such as resource and environmental security, that are necessary for a state to maintain sovereignty.

Nation-state

Political or social grouping in which people within territorial boundaries, with recognised sovereignty, have common bonds based on culture, language and history. For example, Japan.

Non-state actors

A non-state actor is a global actor that is not a state but still influences global politics. Often this refers to global actors that are not a direct part of global governance and international law, such as NGOs, global terrorist movements and/or organised religions.

Political power

Refers to the use of a state's internal political machinery to exert influence over the actions of others. For example, legislation, executive orders, white papers.

Power

Refers to the ability of one global actor to influence the actions of another global actor. Power can be exercised in a range of types.

Pragmatism

A school of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by practical considerations, as opposed to a particular ideology.

Realism

Realism involves states (and other global actors) prioritizing their specific interest and needs over those of the global community.

Regional relationships

Positive regional relationships are an important national interest to a state as they ensure its neighbours will not behave in a hostile manner and thus threaten state sovereignty. Alliances with other likeminded neighbours may help the success of other national interests. However, a state may consider other national interests more important than positive regional relationships if they better achieve the aims of a state.

Security

Traditionally this term refers to the protection of a state's borders from intruders and the maintenance of sovereignty, most commonly achieved through the use of military power. It has now evolved to include softer forms of security, such as access to resources and the protection of the environment.

Soft power

Refers to the ability of one global actor to shape the actions of other global actors through un-coercive yet persuasive means, so that they want the same outcome. This can be achieved in various ways, for example through diplomatic, cultural or historical ties. It is a term first coined by Joseph Nye.

Sovereignty

Legitimate or widely recognised ability to exercise effective control of a territory within recognised borders. This is the primary organising principle of global politics, providing states with the authority to represent their territorial entity within the international community. State sovereignty can be challenged internally (for example, secessionist groups) or externally (for example, one state invades another).

State

Traditionally this term refers to the central actor in global politics. States possess a permanent population, defined territory and recognised sovereignty. States are not necessarily culturally homogenous, for example Australia.

Trade

Refers to the manipulation of the exchange of goods, services, labour and capital to influence the actions of another state.

Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Refers to a company whose operations and investments extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which it is registered, and can also be referred to as a Multinational.

Unilateralism

Refers to the policy of a state acting alone, with little regard for the views or interests of other global actors, in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
​​​​​​​​ Refers to the provision of assistance, predominantly monetary, to global actors with the intention of influencing their decisions and actions in order to achieve a specific aim. Cosmopolitanism reflects a desire among global actors to cooperate to reach common goals and outcomes to meet challenges that are presented to the global community.

# data[].attributes.body
Additional resources online.

•  Why China cares about the South China Sea
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/07/china-cares-south-china-sea-160714105126859.html

• What Does China Actually Want in the South China Sea?http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-china-actually-want-the-south-china-sea-18211

• Chinese Waters? The South China Sea at the Heart of China’s National Interest
http://graduateinstitute.ch/fr/home/relations-publiques/news-at-the-institute/news-archives.html/_/news/corporate/2017/chinese-waters-the-south-china-s

• Why the world is wary of China’s ‘great wall of sand’ in the sea
https://theconversation.com/why-the-world-is-wary-of-chinas-great-wall-of-sand-in-the-sea-40070

• The Economist, 2010. “China’s Teritorial Claims” video (3 minutes)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JS4VZbCWj8

• The Economist, 2014. “What does China want?” video (4 minutes)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SscQBrJbiN0

• Vox, 2015. “Why China is building islands in the South China Sea” video (5
minutes) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luTPMHC7zHY

# data[].attributes.headline
South China Sea Case Study Blank Version 

# data[].attributes.subject
South China Sea Case Study Blank Version 

# data[].attributes.body
-National Interests (NI)
-Factors that shape NI's
-Differing interpretations
-Foreign Policy Instruments used by China
-Types of Power used by China
-Effectiveness?

# data[].attributes.headline
Unit 3 AOS 2 Practice Questions and Essay topics 

# data[].attributes.subject
Unit 3 AOS 2 Practice Questions and Essay topics 

# data[].attributes.body
Aim to complete all prior to the SAC :)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Unit 3 AOS 2 Practice SAR and Essay Questions.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Summarise - Factors and National Interests

# data[].attributes.subject
Summarise - Factors and National Interests

# data[].attributes.body
Read and respond.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
CHINA AS REGIONAL HEGEMON Reading Regional Relationships.docx

# data[].attributes.body
The Chinese Dream, Harmony and military expansion

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Xi Jinping May Be The World's Most Powerful Leader

# data[].attributes.headline
China's National Interests - General Overview 

# data[].attributes.subject
China's National Interests - General Overview 

# data[].attributes.body
Summarise key national interests and factors that influence

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Chinas National Interests Overview Summary Sheet.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
China's Drift away from Non-Interference 

# data[].attributes.subject
China's Drift away from Non-Interference 

# data[].attributes.body
Read and respond.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Reading Slow Drift Away from Non Interference Policy.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Factors that shape China's  national interests 

# data[].attributes.subject
Factors that shape China's  national interests 

# data[].attributes.body
A3 worksheet to complete.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Factors that shape China's NI Worksheet.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Piecing together China's NI and factors that shape them. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Piecing together China's NI and factors that shape them. 

# data[].attributes.body
Read to understand factors that shape China's NI.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Piecing Together China National Interests Reading Tasks.docx

# data[].attributes.body
Discussion Questions

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Questions and Discussion Martin Jacques Understanding the Rise of China.docx

# data[].attributes.headline
Concept 2 National Interests and factors that shape them

# data[].attributes.subject
Concept 2 National Interests and factors that shape them

# data[].attributes.body
Read and respond: What does the article suggest about key interests and priorities for the CPC going forward?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Key Themes Xi Jinping CCP Report National Innterests and Priorities.pdf

# data[].attributes.body
Overview of AOS 2, key skills and knowledge + SAC dates.

# data[].attributes.body
Please complete Level 1 and 2. Level 3 is optional.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Global Politics Holidays Homework Tasks Term 1.pdf

# data[].attributes.body
By Shae, Stefan and Bashir.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Political Power by Stefan Shae Bashir.docx

# data[].attributes.body
By Anthea and William

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Military Power by William and Anthea.docx

# data[].attributes.body
Cultural: https://docs.google.com/document/d/10f4cvf4pYQa31nCycM-HN-8ybL6bFQyhls1qiy4Ew9k/edit

Diplomatic:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W6SejnbDTOTGw1kS752TOg3bkBheeY16N1FIGD1lPpw/edit

Economic:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dcpY_9cirJ-OJ1nf4D8mr_fuWMVh8qFIpdtCZqnGN44/edit?usp=sharing

# data[].attributes.body
Exploration of soft and hard power.

# data[].attributes.body
a. Describe 'power transition' and 'power diffusion'.

b. Define 'power',  'hard power', 'soft power' and 'smart power'.

c. A.J.P stated that great power is a state's ability to prevail in war.
To what extent do you agree? Is this really 'great' power in 2018?

d. Nye draws on the quote 'the greatest thing we have to fear, is fear itself.' Do you agree? Why? How does this reflect the current global climate?

e. Nye describes the global stage as a three-dimensional chess board.
Outline each dimension.

f. Define 'zero-sum' and 'positive-sum'. Nye argues that a 'positive sum' approach coupled with 'smart power' will enable states to effectively address third-agenda issues. List factors you foresee that (currently) or will prevent states from exercising their power in this way.

# data[].attributes.headline
Nye - Why Military power is no longer enough, 2002  

# data[].attributes.subject
Nye - Why Military power is no longer enough, 2002  

# data[].attributes.body
Nye explains the rise of soft power and the role it will play in shaping the 21st century.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Today, the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force. A combination of factors - nuclear weapons that are too awesome to use, the difficulties of building empires in an age of nationalism, the unwillingness of western societies to send their troops into battle - have conspired to make war a last resort for most advanced countries. In the words of British diplomat Robert Cooper, 'A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer.' War remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was even half a century ago.

For most of today's great powers, the use of force would jeopardise their economic objectives. Even non-democratic countries that feel moral constraints on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives. As Thomas Friedman has put it, countries are disciplined by an "electronic herd" of investors who control their access to capital in a globalised economy.

Force remains important as we saw on September 11, 2000 and in Afghanistan. But it is also important to mobilise international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges. As I explain in my book The Paradox of American Power: Why the world's Superpower can't go it Alone, no country today is great enough to solve the problem of global terrorism alone.

There is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may secure the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. It is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power is "soft power" - getting people to want what you want.

Wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right values, their power will be greater than if they have relied only on cutting off allowances or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from determining the framework of a debate. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do.

Soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilised Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And countries like the Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight because of their support for international aid and peace-keeping.

The countries that are likely to gain soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe.

By the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration became convinced that 'America's security depended on its ability to speak to and to win the support of people in other countries.' With World War II and the Cold War, the government sponsored efforts including the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America and the Fulbright student exchange programme.

But much soft power arises from forces outside government control. Even before the Cold War, 'American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America's culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world.'

There are areas, such as the Middle East, where ambivalence about, or outright opposition to, American culture limits its soft power. All television in the Arab world used to be state-run until tiny Qatar allowed a new station, Al-Jazeera, to broadcast freely, and it proved wildly popular in the Middle East. Its uncensored images, ranging from Osama bin Laden to Tony Blair, have had a powerful political influence. Bin Laden's ability to project a Robin Hood image enhanced his soft power with some Muslims around the globe. As an Arab journalist described the situation earlier, 'Al-Jazeera has been for this intifada what CNN was to the Gulf War.' In the eyes of Islamic fundamentalists, the openness of Western culture is repulsive. But for much of the world, including many moderates and young people, our culture still attracts. To the extent that official policies at home and abroad are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for the opinions of others, the United States and Europe will benefit from the trends of this global information age, although pockets of fundamentalism will persist and react in some countries.

Power in the global information age is becoming less coercive among advanced countries. But most of the world does not consist of post-industrial societies, and that limits the transformation of power. Much of Africa and the Middle East remains locked in pre-industrial agricultural societies with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. Other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are industrial economies analogous to parts of the West in the mid-twentieth century. In such a variegated world, all three sources of power - military, economic, and soft - remain relevant. However, if current economic and social trends continue, leadership in the information revolution and soft power will become more important in the mix.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This is extracted from an essay in Re-ordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre ( http://www.fpc.org.uk).
You can contact the author via info@fpc.org.uk
Topics

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Joseph Nye: Why military power is no longer enough

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Today, the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force. A combination of factors - nuclear weapons that are too awesome to use, the difficulties of building empires in an age of nationalism, the unwillingness of western societies to send their troops into battle - have conspired to make war a last resort for most advanced countries.

# data[].attributes.body
Refer to for definitions of key terms and concepts.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
​​​​​​​​

Glossary

Aid

Refers to the provision of assistance, predominantly monetary, to global actors with the intention of influencing their decisions and actions in order to achieve a specific aim.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism reflects a desire among global actors to cooperate to reach common goals and outcomes to meet challenges that are presented to the global community.

Crisis diplomacy

Refers to negotiations between actors in the global political arena in response to an immediate crisis. This most commonly concerns conflicts and natural disasters, but also economic and health crises.

Cultural power

Refers to a desirable and transportable culture that states can use to achieve ends that might not be achieved through military and political means. It is often linked to soft power and may influence regional relationships and international standing.

Diplomacy

Refers to the ability to conduct effective negotiations between states without arousing hostility. As a foreign policy instrument of a state, it may be utilised through formal diplomatic channels, such as an ambassador, through its conduct in intergovernmental organisations and from meetings and speeches made by leaders of states.

Diplomatic power

Refers to the power accrued by states through their relationships with others in the form of alliances, alignments and international standing. Essentially, it is the ability of a state to influence other global actors by way of discussion and negotiation.

Economic power

A state's economic power is often determined by figures such as the gross domestic product (GDP), which indicate the wealth of a state and its economic activity. Economic power can also be assessed by the state's reliance on imports of goods and services. Crucially, economic power refers to a state's ability to influence the actions of another state through finance and trade.

Economic prosperity

The national interest of economic prosperity is important to a state as it indicates whether a state can weather international economic instability as well as protects and builds the wealth and welfare of its citizens. If a state is economically prosperous, it encourages other states to develop relationships with them and bolsters state sovereignty.

Ethics

This seeks to address questions of morality and extends to global politics, as global actors have underlying ideologies to their actions, such as realism or cosmopolitanism.

Global governance

Refers to institutions, rules, norms and legal arrangements that seek to facilitate cooperation, and manage relations, between states. Governance is carried out by both governmental organisations such as the United Nations and non-governmental organisations.​

Globalisation

Refers to acceleration and intensification of exchanges of goods, services, labour and capital, which promote global interdependence. These have been facilitated by rapid changes in communication and technology.

Hard power

Refers to power exercised through coercion, or threatened acts of coercion, to influence the actions of other global actors. This is most commonly exercised through military forms.

Idealism

Refers to a school of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by an ideological principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations.

Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO)

An intergovernmental organisation is an organisation composed primarily of states. They are established by a treaty, a founding charter for the organisation, and thus subject to international law. Examples include the United Nations and the European Union.

International cooperation

Refers to occasions when global actors work together to achieve common ideals and goals.

International law

Traditionally only relating to states, international law is a body of rules established by custom or written legal agreements that are accepted as binding upon the international community. Customary international law applies to all global actors. Written legal agreements, such as treaties, are only binding to those who consent to it through explicit ratification. Some international laws may apply only to states, such as the UN Convention against Torture, while others may apply directly to citizens, such as war crimes.

International standing

The international standing of a state is an important national interest as it influences the power a state has in global politics. Other national interests impact on international standing as well as a state's role and recognition in intergovernmental organisations and as a proponent of international law. If a state has a poor international standing it may threaten their sovereignty.

Justice

Refers to the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, law, fairness and equity that, importantly, also seeks punishment when these ethics are breached. Extends to global politics through international systems of justice, such as the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, which seek to uphold international law and deter future violations.

Military

Military as a foreign policy instrument refers to the military capacity of a state and how this is utilised to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The capacity will depend on the amount of money spent on the military, the type and calibre of weapons available, the number and expertise of servicemen and women in the armed forces, and the relationship between the military and the state. It may also refer to the placement of armed forces.

Military power

Refers to the use of a state's military to exert influence over the actions of other global actors. This may not need to be implemented through a use of force as placement and capacity of the military may be enough to influence other global actors.

Multilateralism

Refers to a system of coordinating relations between three or more states, usually in pursuit of objectives in particular areas.

Nation

Refers to groups of people claiming common bonds based on culture, language and history. Some nations have their own state, such as the Japanese, while others want their own state such as the Tibetans and Kurds.

National interests

The national interests of a state are pursued to ensure the survival and potential growth of that state. States implement policies and types of power to achieve their national interests and maintain state sovereignty.

National security

This is the national interest of a state to ensure it maintains sovereignty. Traditionally this term refers to the protection of a state's borders from intruders but has evolved to include other forms of security, such as resource and environmental security, that are necessary for a state to maintain sovereignty.

Nation-state

Political or social grouping in which people within territorial boundaries, with recognised sovereignty, have common bonds based on culture, language and history. For example, Japan.

Non-state actors

A non-state actor is a global actor that is not a state but still influences global politics. Often this refers to global actors that are not a direct part of global governance and international law, such as NGOs, global terrorist movements and/or organised religions.

Political power

Refers to the use of a state's internal political machinery to exert influence over the actions of others. For example, legislation, executive orders, white papers.

Power

Refers to the ability of one global actor to influence the actions of another global actor. Power can be exercised in a range of types.

Pragmatism

A school of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by practical considerations, as opposed to a particular ideology.

Realism

Realism involves states (and other global actors) prioritizing their specific interest and needs over those of the global community.

Regional relationships

Positive regional relationships are an important national interest to a state as they ensure its neighbours will not behave in a hostile manner and thus threaten state sovereignty. Alliances with other likeminded neighbours may help the success of other national interests. However, a state may consider other national interests more important than positive regional relationships if they better achieve the aims of a state.

Security

Traditionally this term refers to the protection of a state's borders from intruders and the maintenance of sovereignty, most commonly achieved through the use of military power. It has now evolved to include softer forms of security, such as access to resources and the protection of the environment.

Soft power

Refers to the ability of one global actor to shape the actions of other global actors through un-coercive yet persuasive means, so that they want the same outcome. This can be achieved in various ways, for example through diplomatic, cultural or historical ties. It is a term first coined by Joseph Nye.

Sovereignty

Legitimate or widely recognised ability to exercise effective control of a territory within recognised borders. This is the primary organising principle of global politics, providing states with the authority to represent their territorial entity within the international community. State sovereignty can be challenged internally (for example, secessionist groups) or externally (for example, one state invades another).

State

Traditionally this term refers to the central actor in global politics. States possess a permanent population, defined territory and recognised sovereignty. States are not necessarily culturally homogenous, for example Australia.

Trade

Refers to the manipulation of the exchange of goods, services, labour and capital to influence the actions of another state.

Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Refers to a company whose operations and investments extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which it is registered, and can also be referred to as a Multinational.

Unilateralism

Refers to the policy of a state acting alone, with little regard for the views or interests of other global actors, in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
​​​​​​​​ Refers to the provision of assistance, predominantly monetary, to global actors with the intention of influencing their decisions and actions in order to achieve a specific aim. Cosmopolitanism reflects a desire among global actors to cooperate to reach common goals and outcomes to meet challenges that are presented to the global community.

# data[].attributes.body
Document help used to form the end of year exam.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
FAQs Global Politics 2018 Examinable .docx