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COVID has shown the power of science–industry collaboration

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COVID has shown the power of science–industry collaboration

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The pandemic has created a new kind of household name: AstraZeneca, BioNTech, Moderna and Pfizer are now as familiar as soap brands. But their life-saving vaccines would not have become a reality without remarkable and rapid collaboration with researchers at universities.

As part of this week's special issue on research collaborations, Nature spoke to industry scientists about their experiences of collaborating with academic colleagues on vaccine development. Collaboration between academia and industry is well established in many parts of the world. But the speed and scale of achievement during the pandemic - globally, 16 vaccines have been approved so far, with a further 9 in full phase III clinical trials - is rare, if not unprecedented, and interviewees praised the energy, enthusiasm and can-do attitude that they found in universities. Moreover, collaborating in the face of relentless media scrutiny as the world waited for a vaccine breakthrough has not been easy, interviewees added.

Unsurprisingly, respondents noted the limitations that virtual communication and lockdown restrictions have imposed on collaboration. They also urged more clarity on ownership of data and of intellectual property (IP) - areas where discussions with academic colleagues have been difficult.

This isn't new. Data ownership and intellectual property are sources of long-standing tensions in the academia-industry relationship. But there are ways these tensions can be eased.

The scientists Nature spoke to for this editorial say there have been robust exchanges with universities about how to apportion intellectual property when discussing collaborations. It's clear that some were not expecting that universities would also be thinking about monetizing their science; there remains a perception among some in industry that universities produce the science, and leave industry to commercialize it.

Universities do negotiate hard to maximize the returns on their science, effectively creating competition between universities and companies - something that did not exist in previous decades. And yet, there might be a silver lining. The campaign for time-limited IP relief on COVID-19 vaccines, backed by more than 100 countries, the World Health Organization and both China and, crucially, the United States, could help to reduce IP disputes with universities, at least when it comes to collaboration on COVID-19 vaccines. Industry is against the campaign, but if it drops its opposition, more knowledge will become public, and at least some barriers to collaboration will disappear.

Access to data is another area where collaboration could be improved. For example, there need to be better mechanisms for researchers to access industry data in emergencies. These were discussed ahead of last week's meeting of the G7 group of some of the world's biggest economies in Cornwall, UK, and might form part of a planned pandemic treaty. But solutions for data access also need to be found for collaborations to thrive outside of emergencies such as pandemics. Not all pharmaceutical-industry data that researchers can use is commercially sensitive. Other industries, such as finance and telecommunications, have similar challenges and experiences in data sharing, all of which need to be studied.

Dismantling barriers

Clearly, industry and academic colleagues have worked together at speed to deliver vaccines, underpinned by public and charitable investment; one analysis of the Oxford-AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine that has not yet been peer reviewed showed that 98% of identified funding came from these sources ( S. Cross et al. Preprint at medRxiv https://doi.org/ghwh; 2021).

Collaborations of this kind must continue beyond the pandemic. But, alongside goodwill, they will also require progress on ownership of data and IP.

The pandemic has boosted public awareness of science-industry partnerships. It has also led to greater public understanding of research, manufacturing and quality-assurance processes. "People are hearing scientists talk. Taking them out of the labs is a new and now-accepted thing," one industry representative told Nature.

Researchers need to study how this happened, in part to build on successes, and also to learn lessons for future pandemics, and to nurture the collaborations needed to tackle them. Researchers in academia and industry - and not only those who study infectious diseases - should now be looking to expand collaborations beyond the pandemic.

Success has also created expectations, in particular that academia and industry will deliver when called on. But future successes are not guaranteed, as both university- and industry-based researchers know. That is why every lesson from this pandemic must be learnt, and barriers to collaboration must be dismantled as much as possible.

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COVID has shown the power of science-industry collaboration

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But a thriving relationship needs clearer rules around data ownership and intellectual property - and public trust in the process. But a thriving relationship needs clearer rules around data ownership and intellectual property - and public trust in the process.

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Serbia Completes Successful IMF Program

Serbia exits a $1.32 billionthree-year program with the IMF on February 22 boasting outperformance on several of its goals. Concluding the program with flying colors is, however, only the first step in building a strong and vibrant economy able to compete globally, a recent IMF report observes.

"The program has done much better than expected, overperforming many of its macroeconomic goals," said James Roaf, head of the IMF's Serbia team. "Serbia managed to dig itself out of a hole: after stalling for years in the wake of the global financial crisis, growth has now returned, coupled with rising investment and employment. A lot of work has been started to transform the country into a full-fledged market economy; these reforms need to be deepened after the conclusion of the program for Serbia to reach its full potential."

In 2014 Serbia's economy was in serious trouble. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the country's economy stagnated, while weak public institutions, collapsing tax receipts, and overspending by government and state-owned enterprises resulted in a rapid buildup of public debt. Recognizing the unsustainable situation, the authorities adopted an ambitious program of fiscal adjustment, financial sector strengthening, and broad-based economic reforms. The IMF supported the program with economic advice and monitoring, along with precautionary financing.

After three years of effort under the program, the economy has turned around. The fiscal accounts, with the second-largest deficit in Europe in 2014, boasted a surplus in 2017. Economic confidence has improved with stronger investment both from foreign and domestic sources. Unemployment is near historic lows, and falling. Banks are solid, and nonperforming loans are now below their precrisis levels.

But it's vital to keep up the progress, the IMF says. The government should concentrate its efforts on helping the country catch up faster with its Western European peers. Reaching that goal is urgent to avoid the exodus of skilled Serbian workers in search of a better life. Here are the areas that need work.

Reform institutions and public services: Serbia must strengthen its institutions to support private-sector-led growth. Modernization should include tax administration and public services such as education and health. With more efficient management, public services could also mean better social protection. Financial market development must accompany broader use of the Serbian dinar instead of the euro. Labor market development must mean higher participation―especially of women―and less informality, and wide-ranging reforms to address the large gray economy.

Overhaul state-owned enterprises: Serbia restructured its inefficient railway company, introduced better debt collection in the main electricity and gas companies, and successfully privatized others, such as the Smederevo steelworks, but many state-owned enterprises still need work for successful resolution or unsubsidized free market viability. The sectors most in need of overhaul are mining and petrochemicals: companies such as the Resavicacoal mine, the RTB Borcopper complex, and petrochemical producers Petrohemija, MSK, and Azotara. Several state-owned financial institutions-for example, the BPSandKomercijalnabanks and Dunavinsurance company-are also in need of reform or privatization.

Improve the business climate: More investors are venturing into Serbia in the wake of better economic stability and a stronger regulation, but several problem areas still limit business investment and expansion. These include the tax and regulatory systems, multiple fees and charges, and delays and uncertainty in the judicial system.

Build better infrastructure: Better road, telecommunications, and energy networks will propel Serbia toward a standard of living that rivals that of Western Europe.

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Serbia exits a .32 billion three-year program with the IMF on February 22, after outperforming several of its goals. But this is only the first step in building a strong and vibrant economy able to compete globally, says the IMF.

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The number of Ukrainian refugees arriving in Ireland is expected to reach almost 60,000 by the end of the year.

So far, 48,700 people fleeing the conflict in Ukraine have come to this country.

RTÉ News understands that daily arrivals into the country dropped to around 90 per day in August, but have increased again, and as of last week stood at around 126 per day.

It's now anticipated that the total number here could reach 59,000 by the end of 2022, if an average of 100 arrive per day between now and then.

The number of Ukrainian people who have left the State to return home is not known.

Almost 38,000 Ukrainian people have so far required accommodation provided by the State.

More than 32,000 are being housed in "serviced accommodation", like hotels, hostels, B&Bs and commercial self-catering settings.

RTÉ News understands that around 165 contracts providing serviced accommodation will be due for renewal between now and December.

While a further 900 people are staying in emergency tented accommodation, and 4,500 people are staying in homes pledged by the public.

The tented accommodation that is currently housing 190 people at the Gormanston army camp in Co Meath is due to close from the first week in October, due to its unsuitability for winter weather.

It's understood that the Department of Children, which has responsibility for providing accommodation to Ukrainian refugees, is currently in discussions with the Defence Forces about whether it can assist in providing further, non-tented temporary accommodation.

Tented accommodation at Gormanston army camp (Pic:GIS)

Government departments are also working on providing more longer term housing solutions in response to the Ukrainian crisis, like modular housing and refurbished buildings.

It's understood that the OPW has secured a contractor to prepare certain sites for modular housing, the first of which will be in Cork city and in Co Cavan. It's expected these sites could be ready to house people by the end of this year, or early next year.

Discussions are also still under way to set up more "transit hubs" like the one in Citywest, and a number of options are still being considered, and could be up and running by the end of the year.

Separate to those Ukrainian arrivals, the number of international protection applicants coming here is also continuing to increase.

More than 15,000 applicants are currently being accommodated by the State, of which more than 10,000 only arrived this this year.

It's understood that agencies are experiencing persistent difficulties in securing accommodation for people seeking international protection and more resources will be dedicated to working with communities to promote integration.

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Up to 60,000 Ukrainians expected here by end of year

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The number of Ukrainian refugees arriving in Ireland is expected to reach almost 60,000 by the end of the year. So far, 48,700 people fleeing the conflict in Ukraine have come to this country. RTÉ News understands that daily arrivals into the country dropped to around 90 per day in August, but have increased again, and as of last week stood at around 126 per day.

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Some of the world's biggest central banks are unwittingly helping to finance agri-business giants engaged in the destruction of the Brazilian Amazon, according to a report published on Wednesday.

The Bank of England, the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are among the institutions that have bought millions of dollars in bonds issued by companies linked to deforestation and land-grabbing, according to the report Bankrolling Destruction, published by the rights group Global Witness.

"Because these programmes are guaranteed by the respective governments in the UK, the US and EU Member States, this means taxpayers throughout those territories are unwittingly underwriting companies engaged in the destruction of the Amazon and other rainforests," according to the report.

The banks buy corporate bonds issued by big companies in an attempt to inject liquidity into financial markets when the private sector is reluctant to lend. Known as "asset purchase programmes", these measures aim to reduce the cost of borrowing for companies and were used extensively during the pandemic as a way of bolstering economies.

Some of the companies that sold bonds are linked to environmental destruction, the report says, naming Cargill, Inc., the Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) and Bunge Ltd Financial Corp, three of the biggest agri-business conglomerates operating in Brazil.

Brazil is one of the world's biggest producers or exporters of grains, coffee, soy, fruit and other raw materials, and all three companies have faced previous allegations of wrongdoing. The Guardian reported on links between Cargill and Bunge and a Brazilian farm which has been connected to abuses of indigenous rights and land.

Addressing the allegations in the Global Witness report, Cargill said it was "committed to ending deforestation and conversion in our agricultural supply chains" and Bunge stated it was "committed to complying with all regulations either in local or global markets and to adhering to our own strict social-environmental policies". ADM did not respond to requests for comment.

But it was the central banks that bore the brunt of the criticism. "Since 2016, the Bank of England has also purchased an undisclosed share in a £150m corporate bond issued by Cargill, Inc., and the European Central Bank has bought an undisclosed amount of debt issued by Bunge Finance Europe B.V.," the report says.

And in just the last two years "the US Federal Reserve has bought a combined total of $16m of bonds issued by the Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) Bunge Ltd Financial Corp, and Cargill, Inc.

"All this comes despite the repeated public statements from all three central banks stressing the risks that climate change poses to financial stability and long-term economic growth."

Global Witness said the Federal Reserve had "wound down" its bond buying scheme and the Bank of England would start the same process this month.

The Fed said it had adopted the policy as a one-off measure in 2020 to save jobs during the global pandemic, and had no plans to do so again.

The Bank of England said it had taken measures to lower borrowing costs for all firms and to highlight the support given to Cargill was "an extremely narrow focus".

The European Central Bank, meanwhile, said it "aims to gradually decarbonise its corporate bond holdings, on a path aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. To that end, the Eurosystem will tilt these holdings towards issuers with better climate performance through the reinvestment of the sizeable redemptions expected over the coming years."

However, Global Witness said the refusal of UK and EU banks to publish the values of their holdings in the companies created "a lack of transparency".

"As supervisors of the private financial sector, central banks must lead by example and adopt an explicit zero-deforestation policy as part of their approach to climate change, including divestment from all deforestation-linked bonds and greater scrutiny of the threat to financial stability posed by deforestation and biodiversity loss," the report said.

The report comes amid ongoing destruction in the Amazon region, a vast area covering parts of nine different South American countries and a vital carbon sink to absorb the emissions driving the climate crisis.

Deforestation under far-right President Jair Bolsonaro hit a record high for the first seven months of the year, the latest shocking statistic under a president who has turned a blind eye to the illegal loggers, ranchers and miners active in the region.

Already, 26% of the Amazon has been cut down and some parts have passed the tipping point where previously lush forest have turned into dry savannah, according to a report issued early September by scientists and Indigenous organisations.

"I think this report is a very useful piece of analysis which highlights the need for central banks to look at their exposure to deforestation in their portfolios," said Nick Robins, a professor of sustainable financing at the LSE.

"2022 really is the year that central banks recognised nature risk as a threat to institutions. The focus up to now has been on the energy sector but this is another signal that deforestation and land use needs to be put at the heart of climate scenarios."

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World's central banks financing destruction of the rainforest

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Corporate bonds intended to inject liquidity into markets profited companies engaged in deforestation

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Far-right leader Giorgia Meloni has claimed victory in Italy's election, and is on course to become the country's first female prime minister.

Ms Meloni is widely expected to form Italy's most right-wing government since World War Two.

That will alarm much of Europe as Italy is the EU's third-biggest economy.

However, speaking after the vote, Ms Meloni said her Brothers of Italy party would "govern for everyone" and would not betray people's trust.

"Italians have sent a clear message in favour of a right-wing government led by Brothers of Italy," she told reporters in Rome, holding up a sign saying "Thank you Italy".

She is set to win around 26% of the vote, ahead of her closest rival Enrico Letta from the centre left. Mr Letta told reporters on Monday that the far-right victory was a "sad day for Italy and Europe" but his party would provide a "strong and intransigent opposition".

Ms Meloni's right-wing alliance - which also includes Matteo Salvini's far-right League and former PM Silvio Berlusconi's centre-right Forza Italia - will take control of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, with around 44% of the vote.

Four years ago, Brothers of Italy won little more than 4% of the vote but this time benefited from staying out of the national unity government that collapsed in July.

The party's dramatic success in the vote disguised the fact that her allies performed poorly, with the League slipping below 9%, and Forza Italia even lower.

Their big advantage, however, was that where they were able to put up one unified candidate in a constituency, their opponents in the left and centre could not agree a common position and stood separately.

Giorgia Meloni appears certain to become prime minister but it will be for the president, Sergio Mattarella, to nominate her and that is unlikely to happen before late October.

Although she has worked hard to soften her image, emphasising her support for Ukraine and diluting anti-EU rhetoric, she leads a party rooted in a post-war movement that rose out of dictator Benito Mussolini's fascists.

Earlier this year she outlined her priorities in a raucous speech to Spain's far-right Vox party: "Yes to the natural family, no to the LGBT lobby, yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology... no to Islamist violence, yes to secure borders, no to mass migration... no to big international finance... no to the bureaucrats of Brussels!"

The centre-left alliance was a long way behind the right with 26% of the vote and Democratic Party figure Debora Serracchiani argued that the right "has the majority in parliament, but not in the country".

In truth the left failed to form a viable challenge with other parties after Italy's 18-month unity government fell apart, and officials were downbeat even before the vote. The Five Star Movement under Giuseppe Conte won a convincing third place - but did not see eye to eye with Enrico Letta even though they have several policies in common on immigration and raising the minimum wage.

Turnout fell to a record low of 63.91% - nine points down on 2018. Voting levels were especially poor in southern regions including Sicily.

Italy is a founding father of the European Union and a member of Nato, and Ms Meloni's rhetoric on the EU places her close to Hungary's nationalist leader Viktor Orban.

Her allies have both had close ties with Russia. Mr Berlusconi, 85, claimed last week that Vladimir Putin was pushed into invading Ukraine while Mr Salvini has called into question Western sanctions on Moscow.

Ms Meloni wants to revisit Italian reforms agreed with the EU in return for almost €200bn (£178bn) in post-Covid recovery grants and loans, arguing that the energy crisis has changed the situation.

Italy is already the second most indebted country in the eurozone and Prof Leila Simona Talani of King's College London believes the next government will face a clutch of serious issues.

"They have no experience economically. Tax cuts will be a problem, so Italy will have less revenue and it's heading for a recession, so it'll face problems with the financial markets and with Europe. How will they find the money to tackle the rising energy prices?"

The Hungarian prime minister's long-serving political director, Balazs Orban, was quick to congratulate Italy's right-wing parties: "We need more than ever friends who share a common vision and approach to Europe's challenges."

In France, Jordan Bardella of the far-right National Rally said Italian voters had given European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen a lesson in humility. She had earlier said Europe had "the tools" to respond if Italy went in a "difficult direction".

However, Prof Gianluca Passarrelli of Rome's Sapienza University told the BBC he thought she would avoid rocking the boat on Europe and focus on other policies: "I think we will see more restrictions on civil rights and policies on LGBT and immigrants."

Ms Meloni wants a naval blockade to stop migrant boats leaving Libya, and Matteo Salvini is known to covet the job of interior minister which he held three years ago. However, he is currently on trial for barring a boat from docking as part of his policy to close ports to rescue boats.

This election marks a one-third reduction in the size of the two houses, and that appears to have benefited the winning parties.

The make-up of the Chamber and Senate is not yet clear but a YouTrend projection said the right-wing alliance would hold as many as 238 of the 400 seats in the lower house and 112 of the 200 seats in the upper house.

As for the centre left, they are projected to have 78 seats in the Chamber and 40 in the Senate.

More on Italy's election

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Giorgia Meloni: Italy's far-right wins election and vows to govern for all

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Far-right leader Giorgia Meloni has claimed victory in Italy's election, and is on course to become the country's first female prime minister. Ms Meloni is widely expected to form Italy's most right-wing government since World War Two. That will alarm much of Europe as Italy is the EU's third-biggest economy.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unNEYNzAbKw

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Citibank predicts 18.6% inflation for UK in January 2023 | UK's cost of living crisis worsens | WION

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Associate Professor of International Development Studies at Roskilde University

Masjid Umar Mosque in Leicester, England - a city that for decades has served as a model of coexistence, but in recent weeks has seen an eruption of tensions between Hindus and Muslims. Here, the mosque is seen in April 2020, after the British government extended COVID-19 lockdown restrictions. [Ross Kinnaird/Getty Images]

India's Hindu right wing has long advocated for its vision across the world. Overseas offshoots of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have helped in this, as have allied groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad or World Hindu Council.

Now, recent events in Leicester in the United Kingdom suggest that their dream of propagating Hindutva, their political philosophy, is coming true in new ways - violently, on the streets of cities far from India.

On September 17, young Hindu men marched through the streets of Leicester, chanting "Jai Sri Ram" - now a Hindu nationalist war cry - and attacking Muslims. This is the muscular brand of Hindu pride and chauvinism that Hindu nationalists have always aspired to.

These tensions have been in the offing. In May, a Muslim teenager in Leicester had to be hospitalised after an unprovoked attack by a Hindu crowd. In August after India's win against Pakistan in a cricket match, a Hindu group walked through the streets chanting "Death to Pakistan" before attacking a Sikh man. There were similar reports after a second cricket match between the two countries that India lost. In response, groups of Muslim men have also held protests - in one instance, a man pulled down a flag from outside a Hindu religious centre.

There is, of course, a long history of Hindu nationalist and Conservative Party collaboration in the UK. In the lead-up to the 2016 London mayoral elections, Conservative candidate Zac Goldsmith sent anti-Muslim campaign literature to Hindus and Sikhs to bring down his Muslim opponent, Sadiq Khan, of the Labour Party. On the eve of the 2019 UK general elections, there were reports that Hindu nationalist groups in the country were actively campaigning for Conservative candidates, since Labour's then-leader, Jeremy Corbyn, had criticised the Modi government's 2019 crackdown in Indian-administered Kashmir. Many of these groups have direct links to the BJP and their actions represented attempts at influencing an overseas election.

However, this is not just a UK problem. The scourge of Hindu nationalism has gone global.

'True friend in the White House'

Like in the UK, Hindu nationalists have actively campaigned for right-wing, Islamophobic candidates in the United States. This was apparent during the 2016 presidential elections when Hindu groups went all out in their efforts to mobilise Hindu Americans for Republican candidates.

In 2015 an Indian American lobby, the Republican Hindu Coalition (RHC), was launched by Chicago-based businessman Shalabh Kumar, who has had close ties to Modi. Its members donated to former US President Donald Trump's campaign and the RHC supported him as he ran for the presidency. At an event with the group ahead of the vote, Trump declared: "The Indian and Hindu community will have a true friend in the White House." He also praised Modi, calling him a "great man," and released a campaign video wooing Hindu Americans.

Ahead of the 2020 US presidential election, Modi acted almost as a campaigner for Trump, holding two joint rallies with the realtor-turned-politician - one in Ahmedabad, India, and the other in Houston, Texas. In the latter event, Modi seemed to give tacit backing to Trump's re-election campaign, even uttering the phrase "Ab ki baar, Trump sarkar (This time, it's going to be a Trump government)".

However, like in the UK, the Hindu right in the US has now moved from electoral influence to demonstrations of street might. In August this year, bulldozers adorned with posters of Modi and the BJP chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath, appeared at an Indian Independence Day parade in Edison, New Jersey, apparently celebrating the disturbing trend of local governments demolishing the homes of Muslim activists in India. Following criticism, the organiser - the Indian Business Association - apologised for the incident.

Open threats

In Canada too, Hindu nationalists have been making waves. In December last year anti-Sikh slogans and the Hindu swastika appeared outside a Sikh school. Canadian academics have been harassed and faced death and rape threats from diaspora Hindutva supporters for criticising the Modi government in India.

In June, Ron Banerjee, a Canadian Hindu nationalist openly called for the genocide of Muslims and Sikhs. "It is awesome what Modi is doing," Banerjee said, in an interview to a YouTube channel. "I support the killing of Muslims and Sikhs in the Republic of India because they deserve to die."

Australia too is witnessing an uptick in hate crimes committed by Hindus against Muslims and Sikhs. One such attacker, Vishal Sood, was eventually arrested for a series of attacks on Sikhs, and was convicted and deported since his visa had expired. When he got back to India, he received a hero's welcome.

Attempts have also been made by Indian authorities in Australia to silence critics of Modi and his Hindu nationalist policies. Thirteen academic fellows resigned from the Australia India Institute at the University of Melbourne citing interference from the Indian High Commission and attempts to censor research and writing that presented an "unflattering" image of India.

Why has Hindutva gone global?

Undoubtedly, the rise of Hindu nationalism globally has much to do with the rise of Modi.

Since becoming prime minister in 2014, he has overseen a highly controversial citizenship reform that discriminates against Muslim asylum seekers, scrapped the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir and built a temple at the location of a historic mosque demolished by Hindu hardliners in 1992. All while going after opposition leaders, activists and critics.

Modi's success in delivering on Hindutva's promises at home has inspired his supporters in the diaspora to exude a sense of chauvinistic pride abroad.

However, world leaders are guilty too, of legitimising Modi, giving this subsection of Hindu expatriates the conviction that their bigoted vision has some global cache. From Trump to former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and from former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, multiple right-wing politicians have presented themselves as "friends" of Modi.

Even those Western leaders who do not have a particularly pronounced right-wing agenda have been keen to establish and develop their economic and strategic ties with India while turning a blind eye to the Modi government's dismal human rights record.

What is next?

Islamophobia now appears to be a matter of public and foreign policy for India. The Indian High Commission in the UK responded to the events in Leicester by specifically referring only to the worries of the Hindu community there.

However, Leicester should serve as a wake-up call: Hindu nationalism cannot be ignored any more as a domestic, Indian issue. The movement has gone international - and is taking an increasingly violent form in other countries too. It is now a threat to democratic principles, equality and human rights everywhere. India under Modi will not address it. The world must.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.

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Hindu nationalists now pose a global problem

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Associate Professor of International Development Studies at Roskilde University India's Hindu right wing has long advocated for its vision across the world. Overseas offshoots of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have helped in this, as have allied groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad or World Hindu Council.

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The Russian autocrat's dark and violent vision of state power is not without precedent-but neither is the Lockean answer to it. The rise of authoritarian regimes, wars of aggression, the erosion of basic human rights, a bloody civil war, a refugee crisis in the heart of Europe-welcome to the 17th century.

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In the land that invented fascism, the far right is back in power. Italy's general election on Sunday yielded the result most saw coming - an emphatic victory for the nationalist Brothers of Italy Party, which secured about one-quarter of all votes and, along with a coalition of right-wing allies, a solid majority in both houses of the Italian Parliament. The party's leader, Giorgia Meloni, 45, is poised to become Italy's first female prime minister. She's also set to be her country's most ultra-nationalist premier since fascist dictator Benito Mussolini.

Meloni's success marks a significant moment not just for Europe but for all Western liberal democracies. In a major European country, a far-right party directly linked to its country's fascist past has not simply entered government or backed a ruling coalition but is set to take the lead. For years, as right-wing nationalists advanced electorally across the continent, more centrist politicians tried to erect "cordon sanitaires" that would freeze them out and cast them as politically beyond the pale.

But if there's one dominant story in Western politics over the past decade, it's that the far right is no longer beyond the pale. It has taken over the right-wing mainstream in many countries, including, arguably and most significantly, in the United States. In France, the far right has long been the leading force of the opposition; in Spain, it has also gained ground. In Sweden, a party originally founded by neo-Nazis and other right-wing extremists will now be the second-largest faction in parliament. In Hungary and Poland, the far right is already in power.

Meloni's Brothers of Italy can trace its origins to the Italian Social Movement, a small neo-fascist party founded out of the ashes of World War II by Giorgio Almirante, a former chief of staff to Mussolini. In the wake of Meloni's victory, Almirante's daughters were misty-eyed about what the election represented, describing to an Italian news agency that the vote was a "completion" of their father's journey.

The new Prime Minister of Italy.

Wow. pic.twitter.com/fkKTM8I9Fs
- Aaron Ginn (@aginnt) September 26, 2022

Meloni rages at being called "fascist," and many analysts don't view the "fascist" label as a useful frame through which to see her rise to power. There's little to differentiate her anti-establishment politics from that of other would-be populists elsewhere, as many in the West chafe against the perceived failings of an entrenched liberal establishment. She has disowned elements of Mussolini's dark legacy and has denounced antisemitism.

In an interview with my Washington Post colleagues, Meloni said she should be viewed as a mainstream conservative. "The issue of individual freedom, private enterprise in economy, educational freedom, the centrality of family and its role in our society, the protection of borders from unchecked immigration, the defense of the Italian national identity - these are the matters that we preoccupy ourselves with," she said.

Yet Meloni has a lengthy record of extremist rhetoric, has embraced the white supremacist narrative of the "great replacement" theory and has engaged in frequent dog whistling to a radical base. "Since 2017, she has tweeted repeatedly that Italian identity is being deliberately erased by globalists such as [Jewish American financier George] Soros and European Union officials, who have conspired to unleash 'uncontrolled mass immigration,'" wrote Ruth Ben-Ghiat, a professor of history and Italian studies at New York University. "The paranoid style in Italian politics translates into xenophobic proposals to deny citizenship to children born in Italy to foreign parents and to cut foreigners' access to welfare benefits."

Economic and demographic anxieties course through Italy - home to some of Europe's highest unemployment rates and lowest birth rates - and Meloni is only the latest politician to harness them. Anti-immigrant and nativist parties have been part of numerous ruling coalitions in recent years.

The Italian elections "were unique because Meloni will be the first female prime minister of Italy and the first far-right prime minister in today's western Europe," wrote Cas Mudde, a professor in the school of public and international affairs at the University of Georgia. "But they were usual in the sense that far-right parties (and ideas) have been part of the European political mainstream for at least two decades now."

The Italian far right won the elections. This is a first in a founding member of the EU.

But if Meloni is able to govern, it is only thanks to the alliance with the so-called "moderate" right. Berlusconi and the EPP are the stepping stone for the extremes.
- Stéphane Séjourné (@steph_sejourne) September 26, 2022

Meloni's own journey from angry neo-fascist youth politics to the halls of power in Rome would be impossible without the toleration of the establishment. "Meloni owes much to the more moderate forces in what Italians call the 'center-right' alliance," David Broder, author of "Mussolini's Grandchildren: Fascism in Contemporary Italy," wrote in Politico Europe. "They've allowed her the opportunity to present herself as part of the mainstream, not just because she's been softening her policies - at least in presentation - but also because center-right politicians jumping on her bandwagon have given her a veneer of respectability and credibility."

At the same time, attempts by her main center-left rivals to make the election about a spectral "fascist" threat proved unsuccessful. "The far right can succeed in Italy because the left has failed, exactly as in much of the world, to offer credible visions or strategies," wrote Italian essayist Roberto Saviano. "The left asks people to vote against the right, but it lacks a political vision or an economic alternative."

Similar arguments were made about the success of the far right in Sweden's recent election, where the Sweden Democrats became the second-largest party in the country and are now kingmakers in ongoing coalition talks. "Individuals leaning toward the Sweden Democrats for various reasons have felt stigmatized: Some haven't been invited to family gatherings, and in a few cases have even lost their jobs," noted Swedish author Elisabeth Asbrink. "This has not only fed the party's self-image as a martyr but also nurtured even more loyalty among its supporters."

Charles Kupchan, a European expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, told the New York Times that far-right parties have not only pushed centrists further to the right but are now "normalized" themselves.

"The direction of political momentum is changing - we had a wave of centrism before and during the pandemic, but now it feels like the political table is tilting back in the direction of the populists on the right," he said. "And that's a big deal."

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Analysis | The mainstreaming of the West's far right is complete

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SAN FRANCISCO, Sept 20 (Reuters) - Tesla (TSLA.O) Chief Executive Elon Musk blamed overreliance on factory robots for sending the electric carmaker to "production hell" four years ago, saying humans were better at certain jobs.

My, how times have changed.

Musk's Texas company now is floating ambitious plans to deploy thousands of humanoid robots, known as Tesla Bot or Optimus, within its factories, expanding eventually to millions around the world, according to job postings. Buzz is building within the company as Tesla is having more internal meetings on robots, a person familiar with the matter said.

Longer term, Musk said at a TED Talk robots could be used in homes, making dinner, mowing the lawn and caring for the elderly people, and even becoming a "buddy" or a "catgirl" sex partner.

The robot business eventually may be worth more than Tesla's car revenue, according to Musk, who is now touting a vision for the company that goes well beyond making self-driving electric vehicles.

At its "AI Day" on Sept. 30, Tesla will unveil a prototype from its project Optimus, an allusion to the powerful and benevolent leader of the Autobots in the Transformers series. Production could start next year, Musk said.

Tesla faces skepticism that it can show technological advances that would justify the expense of "general purpose" robots in factories, homes and elsewhere, according to robotics experts, investors and analysts interviewed by Reuters.

Tesla already employs hundreds of robots designed for specific jobs for production of its cars.

Humanoid robots have been in development for decades by Honda Motor Co (7267.T) and Hyundai Motor Co (005380.KS)'s Boston Dynamics unit. Like self-driving cars, the robots have trouble with unpredictable situations. read more

"Self-driving cars weren't really proved to be as easy as anyone thought. And it's the same way with humanoid robots to some extent," the lead of NASA's Dexterous Robotics Team, Shaun Azimi, told Reuters.

"If something unexpected happens, being flexible and robust to those kinds of changes is very difficult."

At an "Autonomy" event in 2019, Musk promised 1 million robotaxis by 2020 but has yet to deliver such a car.

Musk's robots may be able to demonstrate basic capabilities at the event, but it would be hard for them to impress public expectations of robots that are as capable as humans, experts say.

To succeed, Tesla will need to show robots doing multiple, unscripted actions, said Nancy Cooke, a professor in human systems engineering at Arizona State University. Such proof could provide a boost to Tesla stock, which is down 25% from its 2021 peak.

"If he just gets the robot to walk around, or he gets the robots to dance, that's already been done. That's not that impressive," she said.

Tesla did not respond to Reuters' request for comments, but Musk in the past proved skeptics wrong, jump-starting the electric car market and building a rocket company, SpaceX, although some product launches were behind schedule.

IN-HOUSE EXPERTISE

Initially, Optimus will perform boring or dangerous jobs, including moving parts around its factories, according to Musk.

Musk acknowledged that humanoid robots do not have enough intelligence to navigate the real world without being explicitly instructed.

But he said Tesla can leverage its expertise in AI and key components to develop and produce smart, yet less expensive, humanoid robots at scale.

He tweeted on Monday that its Autopilot team is also working on its Optimus robot, when asked about fixes of what it calls Full Self-Driving beta - a test version of its new automated driving software.

Tesla is on hiring spree for people to work on humanoid bi-pedal robots, with about 20 job postings on "Tesla Bot" including jobs for designing key robot parts like "actuators".

"The code you will write will at term run in millions of humanoid robots across the world, and will therefore be held to high quality standards," one of the job postings said.

Tesla has over 2 million vehicles on the road.

Jonathan Hurst, chief technology officer at Agility Robotics, a humanoid robot firm founded in 2015 said the technology "is right now starting to turn the corner."

"Certainly, an important measure of success is do they make money from it," he told Reuters, referring to Tesla's humanoid robot efforts.

HUMAN HELP?

Analysts see more pageant than product. "It's all part of distracting people and giving them the next shiny object to chase after," Guidehouse Insights analyst Sam Abuelsamid said.

"Investors are not excited about Optimus," said Gene Munster, managing partner at venture capital firm Loup Ventures, which holds Tesla stocks. "It's just such a low probability that it works at scale," he said, saying it is "infinitely harder than self-driving cars."

And then there is Musk's own experience with robots in the factory.

During the 2018 production hell, Musk specifically noted the problems of the "fluff bot," an assembly robot that failed to perform simple tasks that human hands can do - picking up pieces of "fluff" and placing them on batteries.

He said the cost of having technicians maintain the complicated robot far exceeded that of hiring someone to do the assembly.

The fluff bot is "a funny example but drives home the point that autonomy often doesn't generalize well, and so handling soft fluffy material that isn't as predictable as a rigid part was causing a huge problem," Aaron Johnson, a mechanical engineering professor at Carnegie Mellon University, said.

"Human hands are way better at doing that," Musk said.

Reporting by Hyunjoo Jin; Editing by Peter Henderson, Ben Klayman and Lisa Shumaker

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Elon Musk faces skeptics as Tesla gets ready to unveil 'Optimus' robot

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SAN FRANCISCO, Sept 20 (Reuters) - Tesla (TSLA.O) Chief Executive Elon Musk blamed overreliance on factory robots for sending the electric carmaker to "production hell" four years ago, saying humans were better at certain jobs. My, how times have changed.

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What is Hamas_ A simple guide to the armed Palestinian group _ Israel-Palestine conflict News _ Al Jazeera

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Back in Mesopotamian times ,Around the time the Atra-hasis was written, the global population is estimated to have been between 27 and 50 million people, equivalent to the number who currently inhabit Cameroon or South Korea - this was believed to be too much .

An Essay on the Principle of Population, published in 1798, by Thomas Malthus - said the population of 800m was too much.

"Malthus began with two important observations – that all people need to eat, and they like to copulate. When taken to their logical conclusion, he explained, these simple facts would eventually lead humanity's demands to outstrip the planet's supplies."

it is clear the boat is slowly and always being pushed out on the question 'How much is too much?'

"consumption is significantly higher in wealthier countries with lower birth rates. Reducing our individual demands on the planet could shrink humanity's footprint without stifling growth in poorer countries."

perhaps we could say that the west needs to consume less , while the 3rd world needs to dramatically lessen their birth rate.

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J R EXAM READY REALISTIC De-Globalization Essay

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Coining it: What currency shifts mean for Ireland

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The euro has been drifting against the dollar for some time now, but has been getting stronger against sterling for months. But what this means for consumers - and particularly businesses - can be hard to pin down. When it comes to currencies, there's always two sides to the coin.

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Taoiseach detects ‘genuine wish’ from Truss to resolve protocol dispute

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Micheal Martin said there was a need for the EU and UK to now enter a process to negotiate a settlement over the contentious post-Brexit trading arrangements.

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Another taboo in Europe is about to be broken. In Sweden, voters delivered a narrow mandate after elections on Sunday to a loose coalition of right-wing parties, including one with a neo-fascist past. On Wednesday evening, Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, a center-left Social Democrat allied to other left and green parties, conceded defeat. Her party had won 30 percent of the vote - making it still the single largest faction in parliament - but their coalition secured three fewer seats than their rivals to the right.

The kingmakers in Sweden are the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD), a party founded in 1988 by ultranationalist extremists and neo-Nazis. Over the past decade, they have moved from the fringes of their country's politics into the mainstream. This week, they secured some 20 percent of the Swedish vote, enough to make them the second-largest party in Sweden.

But they may not formally be in power. Such is the political stigma around them that they may remain technically outside a government led by the center-right Moderates and Liberals, yet crucially not in opposition. Coalition politics carry many complexities and wrangling over the new government may take weeks. Whatever the outcome, it seems the far-right SD believes it has a major seat at the table in a country long known for its progressive ethos and policies.

"Now we will get order in Sweden," SD leader Jimmie Akesson wrote Wednesday on Facebook. "It is time to start rebuilding security, prosperity and cohesion. It's time to put Sweden first."

Right-wing nationalists are marching into the future by rewriting the past

Sweden, national parliament election:

100% of districts counted

S-S&D: 30.3% (+2.0)
SD-ECR: 20.5% (+3.0)
M-EPP: 19.1% (-0.7)
V-LEFT: 6.7% (-1.3)
C-RE: 6.7% (-1.9)
KD-EPP: 5.3% (-1.0)
MP-G/EFA: 5.1% (+0.7)
L-RE: 4.6% (-0.9)

+/- vs. 2018 election

➤ https://t.co/rsoqcYChNY pic.twitter.com/WC0LMCR1Zk
- Europe Elects (@EuropeElects) September 15, 2022

Akesson's triumphalism has echoed across the continent. Marine Le Pen, leader of France's far-right National Rally Party, hailed the SD's success as a sign of nationalist resurgence. "Everywhere in Europe, people aspire to take their destiny back into their own hands!" she tweeted.

Le Pen, of course, knows her share of false dawns, having been repeatedly thwarted in elections no matter incremental gains in defeat. But far-right parties have in the past decade been the beneficiaries of the collapse of the so-called "cordon sanitaire" set up by more mainstream parties to block them from winning power, entering governing coalitions in Swedish neighbor Finland, Austria and Italy. And even when not in government, their agendas have made their way into governance - the center-left government in Denmark, for example, checked right-wing nativism by adopting the anti-immigration policies of their rivals.

Italian elections later this month are expected to deliver perhaps the most emphatic victory for a European far-right party: The Brothers of Italy, which draws its origins from Italy's neofascist movement, is currently leading in the polls and its leader, the charismatic Giorgia Meloni, is poised to be become prime minister with the backing of a number of other right-wing parties.

Akesson doesn't have the political alliances that Meloni does but shares an antipathy toward migration, Islam and the spectral "globalist" establishment that far-right campaigners across the West have harnessed in their bids for power. "They don't include Islam in Swedishness," said Andrej Kokkonen, a professor of politics at the University of Gothenburg, to my colleagues. "You don't get to be a Swede and a Muslim at the same time."

"They have few new solutions for today's destructive economic and environmental crises," wrote Pankaj Mishra for Bloomberg Opinion about the far right. "They can, however, channel social unrest to their advantage by reheating identities of race, religion and ethnicity, and retailing myths of national greatness."

A far-right politician is poised to become Italy's first female leader

Far-right Italian politician Alessio Di Giulio posted a video last week with a Roma woman, telling voters that if they cast their ballots for the party in the election later this month they'll "never see her again." https://t.co/lO4OFSe5eV
- Axios (@axios) September 15, 2022

Ahead of the election, Andersson pointed to the toxicity of the SD's legacy. "There are rightwing populist parties in many European countries, but the Sweden Democrats have deep roots in the Swedish neo-Nazis and other racist organizations in Sweden," she said last week on the campaign trail in an interview with the Guardian, highlighting an alleged incident where SD campaigners celebrated the Nazi invasion of Poland during World War II. "I mean, it's not like other parties."

But that has hardly dented their appeal. The SD emerged as a major political force in Sweden, siphoning off rural votes that once would have gone to parties on the other side of the political spectrum. "Treating nationalists as pariahs has not prevented their rise," observed the Economist. "On the contrary: elections in Europe now are often a case of loudly pitting the mainstream against the supposedly unpalatable and hoping that not too many voters pick the 'wrong' side. Simply hoping the nasties go away has not, in fact, made them go away."

For more mainstream parties on the right, finding accommodation with the far right has become, in some instances, the only path to power. "If you want a government that is not based on the Social Democrats you need to cooperate with the SD," said Anders Borg, a former finance minister for the Moderates, to my colleagues. "I cannot see any other viable election strategy."

"In Sweden," he added, "we isolated the SD and yet they grew to 20 percent as a lot of ordinary voters drifted toward them.At the same time, the SD has moved away from a fringe position toward being a more ordinary political party."

That is the narrative surrounding other ascendant far-right parties in Europe, including Meloni's Brothers of Italy. Meloni angrily rejects accusations of fascism and has cast herself as part of the political mainstream - cooling her Euroskepticism, supporting sanctions against Russia and prioritizing, at least for now, economic relief for Italians over a hysterical culture war.

If the Italian right wins power, Meloni will have to translate all the years of populist rabble-rousing into effective governance. That's no small matter given the thicket of problems facing her debt-ridden country. "I cannot say that, faced with such a responsibility, my hands aren't shaking," Meloni told my colleagues.

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Analysis | Sweden's election marks a new far-right surge in Europe

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Fear blamed for rise of the far-right in Europe

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Fear blamed for rise of the far-right in Europe

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People are getting more fearful of the world and all its events and are falling back to nationalism to "protect" them.

"In Italy, preelection polls suggest the Brothers of Italy is on course to get more than 20 percent of votes after only attracting 4 percent last time."

This would just go well aligned in the theory of human nature on how humans need a good structure of government and a clear leader to stop going back to brutality

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By EARLE GALE in London | China Daily Global | Updated: 2022-09-15 09:31

Giorgia Meloni, leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy party, speaks during a rally in Milan, Italy, on Sunday. FLAVIO LO SCALZO/REUTERS

Fear among Europe's voters has carried far-right parties to the fore in many countries, according to the leader of a center-left alliance in Italy.

Enrico Letta, leader of Italy's Democratic Party, told The Associated Press gains made by a populist party in Sweden is proof of that fear.

"Fears are today a big part of the way in which our societies are living," the former premier said, as a far-right alliance led by Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy looked poised to win Italian elections on Sept 25.

Letta, who leads a center-left alliance, said the fears stem from the novel coronavirus pandemic and resulting economic struggles, as well as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and soaring utility bills caused by the shortage of natural gas.

While the challenges are real, he believes collaborative solutions forged with the European Union are the way ahead; not isolationism and nationalism.

"It's easier for the right, for the extreme right, to push, to boost (itself), on these fears," he said, as he explained why they stoke fears instead of seeking solutions.

In Sweden on the weekend, the Sweden Democrats, a populist, anti-immigration party, surged in popularity to become the nation's second-largest party.

In Italy, preelection polls suggest the Brothers of Italy is on course to get more than 20 percent of votes after only attracting 4 percent last time.

Letta said fear helped the far-right get "a foothold in Europe", and he said nationalism in Italy could grow to the point where the nation elects a party that wants to leave the EU.

"You have just two possible solutions; the solution that the right is raising is a solution of nationalism," he said. "The other solution is on our side, and our solution means Europe."

Letta's warning came after Meloni told supporters this week Italy should change its relationship with the EU.

"If I win; for Europe, the fun is over," The Express newspaper quoted her as saying. "With me, we will return to make ourselves heard and to defend our interests."

Meloni, who has forged a right-wing coalition with Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini's League, said the EU should limit itself to dealing with "big matters "and let member nations manage their affairs.

"Don't let Brussels do what Rome can best take care of," she said.

The Cattaneo Institute think tank said after analyzing several opinion polls the right-wing alliance led by Meloni is on track to get 258 lawmakers elected to the 400-seat Chamber of Deputies while Letta's party will get 88.

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Fear blamed for rise of the far-right in Europe

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By EARLE GALE in London | China Daily Global | Updated: 2022-09-15 09:31 Fear among Europe's voters has carried far-right parties to the fore in many countries, according to the leader of a center-left alliance in Italy. Enrico Letta, leader of Italy's Democratic Party, told The Associated Press gains made by a populist party in Sweden is proof of that fear.

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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Western governments have not made a formal finding of responsibility for this week's sabotage attacks on two Russian underwater pipelines carrying natural gas to Europe. While all of the evidence is being carefully reviewed, it seems reasonable to expect that some of it will soon be declassified. In the meantime, NATO, the European Union, and key figures like International Energy Agency director Fatih Birol are not holding back about the identity of the culprit. "It is very obvious (...) who was behind this issue," the latter said on September 29. At the same time, Russian officials are unsurprisingly placing the blame on the West and have convened a UN Security Council session to discuss the matter.

There are aspects of this mystery that resemble an Agatha Christie novel, in which nearly everyone involved appears to have a motive or would benefit from the outcome. It's useful, therefore, even as a thought experiment, to look at what we know (and don't know) about what happened and the all-important question of who stands to benefit.

Pressure drops were reported at both the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines running underneath the Baltic Sea on September 26. Three separate leaks were recorded off the coasts of Denmark and Sweden, a few dozen kilometers apart. Both lines of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline were impacted, along with one line of Nord Stream 2. Reports from seismologists based in Denmark and Sweden suggest that sizeable explosions on the order of 100 kilograms of TNT occurred in both incidents.

Unlike an oil spill, gas leakage is relatively harmless for the surrounding area. At the same time, some climate experts are warning that the amount of methane-a powerful greenhouse gas-being released from the damaged pipelines could have a significant climate change impact. According to initial estimates, a total of 500 million cubic meters of gas was lost, which is the equivalent of 8 million tons of carbon dioxide, or 1/5000 of annual global CO2 emissions.

In a normal political and business environment, all three damaged sections could probably be repaired within a year by a single repair fleet. It is quite possible that the biggest problem would be not the subsea work itself, but pumping out the water from the three 1,200-kilometer stretches of the pipelines. Rock debris would also have to be cleared out lest it damage the inside of the pipelines once the flow is restored. Another concern would be the state of the inside polymer coating, which is not designed to withstand prolonged contact with seawater. The total bill might run into hundreds of million dollars, maybe even billions, but it is a small fraction of Gazprom's annual budget.

The work would require specialized equipment, and here the circumstances for Nord Stream 1 and 2 are quite different. Nоrd Stream AG is formally a Swiss company, not subject to any sanctions, and a member of the Pipeline Subsea and Repair Intervention Pool led by Norway's Equinor, which provides its members with access to specialist equipment and crews.

Nord Stream 2, however, was sanctioned by the United States, and the pipelaying was completed solely by Russian ships. The pipeline was completed last year but never launched: Germany put an end to the project in February, two days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The repairs would require a work permit from the Danish government, since it would be carried out in their territorial waters. Given the current political environment, it probably would be very difficult to obtain such permission. There are provisions within the existing sanctions for a waiver to be issued if work is needed to prevent damage to the environment or to navigational safety. Nord Stream 2 might apply on those grounds, but it is unlikely to be granted. Most likely, any repairs will have to wait until the end of the war in Ukraine, if not longer.

Given the reports of explosions and the statistical unlikelihood of three accidents occurring on the same day, sabotage seems certain. The charges could have been delivered in several ways: as depth charges dropped from a surface ship or even from a plane, or as explosives with a delayed charge installed by divers or delivered by a submarine, or even from inside the pipeline, the same way that a pipeline inspection gauge (a "pig") goes through Nord Stream 1 every year to inspect it and remove debris and sludge.

The scale of the operation-the multiple sites and amount of explosives involved-suggests the involvement of a state. Despite initial speculation that the attack could have been the work of non-state actors, that seems highly unlikely. Given reported drone sightings near oil and gas platforms in the North Sea in recent months, European and U.S. officials and energy companies have every reason to be worried about what Moscow is up to. Certainly, there will be very close inspection of global flight tracking services and MarineTraffic data by both professionals and amateurs looking for possible culprits. The Baltic Sea is a busy place, of course, but it can be assumed that governments, military units, and companies are already pooling their information.

Some commentators have already leaped to self-serving conclusions that simply raise eyebrows. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, for example, claimed that the attacks occurred in "countries that are completed controlled by the U.S. intelligence services." Fox News television personality Tucker Carlson also implied a U.S. role in the explosions. "If you are Vladimir Putin, you would have to be a suicidal moron to blow up your own energy pipeline," Carlson argued. "That's the one thing you would never do."

The explosions are clearly rattling Western governments that are already on edge following Putin's nuclear saber-rattling in a September 21 address to the nation. The current state of energy flows in Europe, however, was not directly impacted, nor is there any immediate economic effect. That is because Nord Stream stopped operating at the beginning of September following gradual supply reductions during the summer, whereas Nord Stream 2, despite containing gas, was never launched. Europe was not counting on the resumption of supplies by this route any time soon, and the pipelines were in any event doomed to lose their value in coming years as Europe moves to procure its gas from anywhere other than Russia. In strictly economic and commercial terms, this case might be the equivalent of the traditional potlatch ceremony held by Native Americans, a spectacular destruction of a dysfunctional piece of infrastructure with little residual value.

The attack may, however, have signaling value. If so, that does change the strategic landscape in the energy war. If perpetrated by Russia, the signaling value toward the West-which would certainly know Russia is behind the explosions-may be a threat to the rest of the marine energy infrastructure. Back in 2021, Putin told a gathering of military leaders: " If our Western colleagues continue the obviously aggressive stance, we will take appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures and react harshly to unfriendly steps. I want to emphasize that we have every right to do so." Was the Nord Stream attack a hint that similar mishaps might happen to some or all of the seven major pipelines delivering Norwegian gas to the UK and continental Europe? The explosions coincided with the inauguration of the Baltic Pipe taking Norwegian gas to Poland, so this is hardly an academic hypothesis.

One irony of the attack is that Russia's Gazprom potentially stands to benefit: it will no longer need to invent excuses not to supply Europe via Nord Stream 1. Now it can claim a force majeure, which will dramatically reduce the risk of compensation claims for non-delivered volumes. This logic, however, does not explain the damage caused to Nord Stream 2. On the other hand, the Nord Stream consortium companies and eventually Gazprom might even hope to collect some insurance for the damaged pipelines. Given that they already looked set to become a stranded asset, that would be far from the worst outcome for the giant company.

The elimination of Nord Stream's gas supply capacity from the European energy equation also strengthens the Ukrainian hand. Ukraine's fear ever since 2014 has been that if forced to choose between Russian gas and support for Ukraine, Europe might choose the former and abandon Ukraine, and as long as non-Ukrainian supply routes existed, Ukraine would not be able to stop Russia from supplying Europe. This was one of the reasons why Ukraine opposed the construction of Nord Stream 2.

The explosions have removed some optionality and thus changed the state of the board for some players. Russia has lost the opportunity to offer an easy restoration of gas supplies to Europe in exchange for concessions from the West. For the Europeans, there is no longer the risk that binding contracts to buy more expensive gas will become loss-making if Russia suddenly floods the market with cheap gas following some sort of de-escalation.

In theory, Russia still has the physical capacity to increase gas supplies to Europe. It could accomplish that by relying on another non-commissioned line of Nord Stream 2 that was spared the explosion (though there are reports that this last line might also have been damaged after all), or the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Together they have a capacity of 60 billion cubic meters per annum, or 40 percent of the pre-war supply volumes. However, with the Yamal-Europe pipeline controlled by Poland, a resolute ally of Ukraine, and Nord Stream 2 having yet to be launched, pulling any of this off would be a lot more difficult than simply switching back on the turbines on Nord Stream 1.

Neither Miss Marple nor Hercule Poirot will be turning up to solve the mystery of who was behind the pipeline explosions. But in today's increasingly transparent world, the truth might not stay buried for long.

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Shock and Awe: Who Attacked the Nord Stream Pipelines?

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Western governments have not made a formal finding of responsibility for this week's sabotage attacks on two Russian underwater pipelines carrying natural gas to Europe. While all of the evidence is being carefully reviewed, it seems reasonable to expect that some of it will soon be declassified.

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Fill in the doc below and paste it under the relevant article number

NAME:  Charlotte O’B

ARTICLE NAME PASTED HERE: “Giorgia Meloni: Italy's far-right wins election and vows to govern for all” - BBC News

Brief rundown of article: This article investigates the success of the ‘Brothers of Italy’ party in the recent Italian election. Points covered in the article include, the advantage they gained from staying out of the national unity government which collapsed in July earlier this year, their success in choosing a unified candidate for a constituency (something their competitors did not achieve) and a general outline of their position on current issues such as international finance, sexual identity and gender ideology.

Some stats relating to the article read: Despite the 22% of the vote they gained in this election (less than 4% in 2018 -> 26% in 2022), it is worth noting that this years voting turnout fell to a record low of 63.91%.

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The threat posed by Hindu Nationalism  (Article 1)

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The threat posed by Hindu Nationalism  (Article 1)

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The article details the sudden upswing of violent attacks committed against both Muslims and Sikhs by India's Hindu population at home and abroad. Such incidents are fueled by India's current prime minister as well as the support he gets from other world leaders and important global figures such as US presidential candidates who may hold Islamophobic views.

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Fate of Amazon rests on Brazil election, say experts

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Further destruction under Bolsonaro could push vital rainforest past irreversible tipping point

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This week the topic which had the high-powered fretting in Davos was the bold question: Is Globalisation Dead?

It's been asked before.

Go back to 2020's peak pandemic and the shutdown of the world's economy set serious brows a-furrow.

I've never been to Davos. But I have been to Switzerland several times. The Alps have created an incredible landscape of long valleys and indomitable peaks. The valleys have hemmed in disparate linguistic communities which, despite their differences, have maintained a federation which is itself a mini version of globalisation.

So, in the spirit of Swiss valley provincialism, let's look at this question of whether globalisation is over from the perspective of our own island economy.

Last week, the CSO published trade in goods figures for March. These are actual containers shipped into and out of the country with stuff being bought and sold. Not your funny money service exports (which we'll come to presently...).

The figures showed exports in March of €20.2 billion, the highest monthly figure ever recorded. Imports of €11 billion were shipped in, another record. On the export side, the biggest categories were the multinational dominated medical, pharmaceutical and chemical products. But the more traditional food and live animals category was also up 16%.

And there's been a Brexit-busting trend in our trade with the UK. Last year, trade with our nearest neighbour was disrupted in the wake of new Brexit customs procedures.

Supply lines switched to direct sailings from the continent and there was a big increase in cross-border trade. Imports from the UK declined by €2.4 billion or 13% in 2021.

In the first three months of this year, that trend changed again. Exports to the UK for the first quarter compared to the first quarter of 2021 are up 26%. Imports from the UK over the same period are up 78%. Part of the reason for this is we import most of our oil products via the UK and they've shot up in price. So, the euro value of imports from the UK is up but there's also more trade in other goods.

The CSO also published a special report this week on the ICT sector. It's a little more historical. The data is from 2019, but the sector has gone from strength to strength since. It details how 91,000 people are employed in the industry here: 50,000 in foreign owned multinationals and 41,000 in domestic firms.

It produced €128 billion worth of services in 2019, with €117 billion or 91% of those services exported. The sector paid out €8.5 billion in wages and €3.9 billion in tax.

So, our trading economy, whether that's goods or services, shows no sign of shrinking from the world.

But as one of the key publications of the World Economic Forum (a 'White Paper' no less...) this week made clear, "...the convergence of physical and virtual forms of economic globalisation is no longer a given."

It paints a number of scenarios.

One is entitled 'Autarkic World: Systemic Fragmentation'. It paints a dystopian future where "...the global pandemic and the geopolitical conflict at the beginning of the decade have had far-reaching consequences."

These include 'internet censorship and surveillance.' It gets much worse: "...living standards fall and safety nets are reduced...significant and prolonged price and supply shocks, rising political instability and increased defence spending."

Some of what's described in this report of course sounds familiar in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A separate publication at Davos this week highlights the negative implications of current levels of inflation on real wages across the economies of the world, not to mention the 'dire global consequences' for global food security as the war grinds on.

In the dialogues reported over the week in Davos, there was lots of talk about 'fragmentation' and 'restructuring of supply lines.' An example is the not-so-simple change Europe has been staring at since Russian invaded Ukraine: Where are we going to get our gas next winter?

Ireland's embrace of globalisation continues to serve the economy well. But the financial crisis taught us that globalisation can also deliver devastating damage when you're not prepared for the negative swings that do happen.

Globalisation is far from dead. But that doesn't mean the nature of the world with which we trade isn't changing and becoming much riskier. Because it is.

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The topic that rattled Davos - is globalisation dead?

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This week the topic which had the high-powered fretting in Davos was the bold question: Is Globalisation Dead? It's been asked before. Go back to 2020's peak pandemic and the shutdown of the world's economy set serious brows a-furrow. I've never been to Davos. But I have been to Switzerland several times.

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Elon Musk has unveiled a prototype of Tesla's humanoid robot Optimus, which the electric car maker aims to mass produce in the millions and sell for under £18,000.

The billionaire tycoon said he expected the company would be ready to take orders in three to five years.

said the venture could outstrip that of electric vehicle business.

The firm's push to design and build mass-market robots that would also be tested by doing jobs in its factories sets it apart from other manufacturers that have experimented with humanoid machines.

The debut of the prototype robots at Tesla's office in Palo Alto, California, forms part of Mr Musk's bid to position Tesla as a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence and not just a company that makes "cool cars".

An experimental test robot, with exposed wires and electronics, which Tesla said was developed in February, walked out slowly onto a stage, turned and waved to a cheering crowd at an event on Friday.

The company also showed a video of it doing simple tasks, such as watering plants, carrying boxes and lifting metal bars at a production station at the company's California plant.

But a more streamlined current model, which Mr Musk said was closer to what he hoped to put into production, had to be rolled out and did a slow wave to the audience.

Mr Musk, who cofounded the electronic-payment firm PayPal and formed the rocket manufacturer SpaceX, called the robot Optimus and said it would be able to walk "in a few weeks".

He added: "There's still a lot of work to be done to refine Optimus and prove it."

But he went on: "I think Optimus is going to be incredible in five or 10 years, like mind-blowing."

Musk said existing humanoid robots were "missing a brain" and the ability to solve problems on their own.

By contrast, he said, Optimus would be an "extremely capable robot".

While other carmakers, including Toyota and Honda have developed humanoid robot prototypes capable of doing complicated tasks, Tesla is alone in pursuing the opportunity for a mass-market robot that could also be used in factory work.

The next-generation Tesla bot will use Tesla-designed components, including a 2.3-kWh battery pack carried in its torso, and is designed to weigh 73kg.

Tesla engineers, who like Musk were all wearing black T-shirts with an image of metallic robotic hands making a heart shape, described how they developed the robot's features, including in areas like how the fingers move, with a focus on making the cost of production lower.

"We are trying to follow the goal of fastest path to a useful robot that can be made at volume," Musk said.
Read more:
Musk's Starlink broadband company will seek exemption to sanctions so it can cover Iran

Musk, who has spoken before about the risks of artificial intelligence, said the mass rollout of robots had the potential to "transform civilisation" and create "a future of abundance, a future of no poverty".

Many reactions on social media were positive, focusing on the speed of Tesla's development effort since August last year when Tesla announced its project with a stunt that had a person in a white suit simulate a humanoid robot.

Henri Ben Amor, a robotics professor at Arizona State University, said the price target of $20,000 (£17,937) was a "good proposition" since current costs are about $100,000 (£89,686) for humanoid robots.

But he said: "There's some discrepancy between sort of the ambition and what they have presented.

"When it comes to dexterity, speed, the ability to walk in a stable fashion and so on, there's still a lot of work to be done."

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Elon Musk debuts Tesla's first humanoid robot with eye on mass market

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Elon Musk has unveiled a prototype of Tesla's humanoid robot Optimus, which the electric car maker aims to mass produce in the millions and sell for under £18,000. The billionaire tycoon said he expected the company would be ready to take orders in three to five years.

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Elon Musk has got into a Twitter tussle with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy after the tech billionaire floated a divisive proposal to end Russia's invasion.

The Tesla chief executive, soon facing a court fight over his attempt to abandon a 44 billion US dollars offer to buy Twitter, argued in a tweet on Monday that to reach peace, Russia should be allowed to keep the Crimea Peninsula that it seized in 2014.

He also said Ukraine should adopt a neutral status, dropping a bid to join Nato following Russia's partial mobilisation of reservists.

Mr Musk also crossed red lines for Ukraine and its supporters by suggesting that four regions Russia is moving to annex following Kremlin-orchestrated "referendums" denounced by the West as a sham should hold repeat votes organised by the United Nations.

Mr Musk noted that Crimea was part of Russia until it was given to Ukraine under the Soviet Union in the 1950s and said a drawn-out war would not be likely to end in a resounding Ukrainian victory.

These positions are anathema for Mr Zelenskyy, who considers them pro-Kremlin.

The Ukrainian leader has pledged to recover all the terrain conquered in the war and considers Crimea as Ukraine's to reclaim as well.

Mr Musk also launched a Twitter poll asking whether "the will of the people" should decide if seized regions remained part of Ukraine or became part of Russia.

In a sarcastic response, Mr Zelenskyy posted a Twitter poll of his own asking "Which Elon Musk do you like more?" - "One who supports Ukraine" or "One who supports Russia".

Mr Musk replied to Mr Zelenskyy that "I still very much support Ukraine, but am convinced that massive escalation of the war will cause great harm to Ukraine and possibly the world".

"Russia is doing partial mobilisation. They go to full war mobilisation if Crimea is at risk. Death on both sides will be devastating,"
Mr Musk wrote in another tweet.

"Russia has (over) three times population of Ukraine, so victory for Ukraine is unlikely in total war. If you care about the people of Ukraine, seek peace."

The Kremlin itself chimed in, praising Mr Musk for his proposal but warning that Russia would not backtrack on its move to absorb the Ukrainian regions.

"It's very positive that such a person as Elon Musk is trying to look for a peaceful settlement," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Tuesday.

But he added "as for the referendums, people have voiced their opinion and there could be nothing else".

Ukraine and the West have said that the hastily organised votes in four occupied regions were clearly rigged to serve Mr Putin's purpose to try to cement his loosening grip on Ukrainian terrain.

Mr Musk's ideas seemed to get little support on Twitter, including from Russian chess great and anti-Putin political activist Garry Kasparov, who slammed the plan.

"This is moral idiocy, repetition of Kremlin propaganda, a betrayal of Ukrainian courage and sacrifice, and puts a few minutes browsing Crimea on Wikipedia over the current horrific reality of Putin's bloody war," Mr Kasparov tweeted.

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Elon Musk gets into Twitter tussle with Volodymyr Zelenskyy over plan to end Russian war

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Elon Musk has got into a Twitter tussle with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy after the tech billionaire floated a divisive proposal to end Russia's invasion. The Tesla chief executive, soon facing a court fight over his attempt to abandon a 44 billion US dollars offer to buy Twitter, argued in a tweet on Monday that to reach peace, Russia should be allowed to keep the Crimea Peninsula that it seized in 2014.

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Elon Musk is planning to buy social media company Twitter for his original offer price.

The world's richest man is proposing to go ahead with purchasing the platform for $54.20 per share, a total value of $44bn (£38.4bn), following months of legal battles.

Earlier, trading in Twitter shares was halted as the stock spiked following reports the deal was back on. The shares had been up by nearly 13% at $47.93 before trading was paused.

In a letter to Twitter from Musk's lawyers, he said: "Musk Parties intend to proceed to closing of the transaction... and adjourn the trial and all other proceedings."

Twitter and Mr Musk were due to be in court later this month as the company attempted to hold Mr Musk to his original offer, made in April.

"This is a clear sign that Musk recognised heading into Delaware Court that the chances of winning versus Twitter board was highly unlikely and this $44bn deal was going to be completed one way or another," said Dan Ives, analyst at investment firm Wedbush.

Mr Musk, the Tesla CEO, had wanted to back out of the deal over the number of bot accounts on the platform.

He said it was above Twitter's estimate of 5% of users and claimed in July that meant he could exit the deal.

Bots are automated accounts whose existence can lead to an overestimation of how many humans use the website. Knowing the number of genuine users is important for advertising sales and the overall value of the platform.

The takeover deal had received approval from Twitter shareholders last month.
Read more:
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Musk subpoenas Twitter whistleblower and ex-chief executive as he tries to get out of deal
Twitter sues Musk accusing him to 'trashing company'
More than $16bn worth of Tesla shares had been exchanged as of midday New York time on Tuesday resulting in a stock value plunge which rebounded in afternoon trading.

The proposal by Mr Musk may end months of turbulent litigation which was heading into a face-off in Delaware's Court of Chancery on 17 October.

In the past he has taken to Twitter to stir controversy, such as suggesting a peace plan for the Ukraine-Russia war that drew swift condemnation from Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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Mr Musk also said he would overturn former president Donald Trump's ban from the site.

According to text messages that came to light during the litigation, Mr Musk planned to change the platform by battling spam by verifying accounts; hosting money transfers, and wanted to create Twitter subscriptions instead of relying on advertising.

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Elon Musk agrees to buy Twitter for original offer price of $44bn - legal battle set to end

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Elon Musk is planning to buy social media company Twitter for his original offer price. The world's richest man is proposing to go ahead with purchasing the platform for $54.20 per share, a total value of $44bn (£38.4bn), following months of legal battles.

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GLOBALISATION ASSIGNEMENT WORKSHEET copy copy

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the article outlines how fear is the primary cause in staunch rises in radical nationalism and far right politics in european democracies
whether this fear is as a result of economic challenges, international conflicts or a shortage of resources, the right are blaming globalisation and immigration for these problems as a catalyst for radical nationalism.
countries such as Italy and Sweden are turning away from bodies such as the EU "dont let Brussels do what Rome can do best" and are preyeing on the scared, vulneraable and disenfranchised members of society by presenting nationalism as a source of pride, identity and a safer alternative to the globalised world.
Fukiya' theory of identities being set off against each other and Chomskys fifth filter of media vould be applicable

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Italy's Meloni_ The mainstreaming of the West’s far right is complete - The Washington Post

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GLOBALISATION ASSIGNEMENT WORKSHEET - Patrick 

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Paul Murphy ‘kicked by right-wing activist’ outside Leinster House

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TD Paul Murphy has said he was swarmed and assaulted by right-wing thugs as he was leaving Leinster House today.

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Press play to listen to this article

European far-right politicians just stormed to victory in Italy, after achieving historic results in France and Sweden.

"Everywhere in Europe, people aspire to take their destiny back into their own hands!" said Marine Le Pen, the leader of France's far-right National Rally Party.

But if you think there is a new wave of right-wing radicalism sweeping Europe, you'd be wrong. Something else is going on.

Analysis by POLITICO's Poll of Polls suggests far-right parties in the region on average did not increase their support by even one percentage point between the start of Russia's invasion in Ukraine in February and today.

POLITICO looked at the median and average increase of all parties organized in right-wing European Parliament groups of Identity and Democracy, the European Conservatives and Reformists or unaffiliated parties with political far-right positions.

Overall, the results indicate that if an increase in support occurred for far-right parties, it happened several years ago.

The Sweden Democrats' first surge happened after the 2014 election, when the party grew from around 10 percent to 20 percent, the same one-fifth share of the vote they received in this year's election. The far-right Alternative for Germany AfD in Germany grew fast in 2015 and 2016 reaching 14 percent in POLITICO's polling tracker. In Italy, the Northern League overtook Forza Italia for the first time in early 2015, and peaked in 2019 at 37 percent before starting a downward trend ending on 9 percent in last month's election. In the Italian election, voters mostly switched between rival right-wing camps.

The far-right has moved from the fringes of politics into the mainstream, not only influencing the political center but also entering the arena of power.

"There is a normalization of far-right parties as an integral part of the political landscape," said Cathrine Thorleifsson, who researches extremism at the University of Oslo. "They have been accepted by the electorate and also by other, conventional parties."

Cooperation between the center-right and the extreme-right has become less taboo.

"The rise of far-right parties is only part of the story. The facilitating and mainstreaming of far-right parties as well as the adoption of far-right frames and positions by other parties is at least as important," tweeted Cas Mudde, a leading scholar on the issue.

This may risk destabilizing Europe even more than winning a couple of percentage points in the polls.

Italy's far-right firebrand Giorgia Meloni is a clear-cut example. While her party draws its origin from groups founded by former fascists, she'll now lead the EU's third-largest economy.

Leader of Italian far-right party "Fratelli d'Italia" (Brothers of Italy), Giorgia Meloni | Pitro Cruciatti/AFP via Getty Images

In Sweden, the center-right party has started coalition talks for a minority government which would have to draw on opposition support, most likely from the far-right Swedish Democrats. Far-right parties have also entered governments in Austria, Finland, Estonia and Italy. Other countries are likely to follow.

George Simion, the leader of Romania's far-right party, Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), celebrated Meloni's win in Italy, saying his party is likely to follow in their footsteps.

Spain heads to the ballot box next year and socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez may have a tough time winning re-election. The conservative People's Party is between five and seven points ahead of the Spanish socialists in all the published polls, but it is unlikely to garner enough votes to secure a governing majority outright.

That means it may have to come to an agreement with far-right party Vox, whose leader, Santiago Abascal, is an ally of Meloni's. While the People's Party previously refused to govern with Vox, last spring its newly elected leader, Alberto Núnez-Feijóo, greenlit a coalition agreement with the ultranationalist group in Spain's central Castilla y León region.

Tom Van Grieken, the right-wing Belgian politician, also pointed to Spain as the next likely example, especially because of the possible cooperation with the PP. "All over Europe, we see conservative parties who are considering breaking the cordon sanitaire," he said, referring to the refusal of other parties to work with the far-right. "They are tired of compromising with their ideological counterparts, the parties at the left end of the spectrum."

Chairman of Vlaams Belang party Tom Van Grieken | Stephanie Le Coqc/EFE via EPA

This didn't happen overnight. The far-right worked hard to shrug off their extremist, neo-Nazi image.

"In some of the reporting on the Swedish Democrats, you'd think they'll deport people on trains as soon as they're in power. Come on, these parties have changed," said one EU official with right-wing affiliations.

The far-right invested in "image adjustment and trying to tread carefully with some issues, while unashamedly catering to others," said Nina Wiesehomeier, a political scientist at the IE University of Madrid. "This is particularly obvious in Italy right now, with Meloni sticking to the slogan of 'God, homeland, family,' as a continuation, while having tried to purge the party from more radical elements."

In Belgium's northern region of Flanders, the right-wing Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) explicitly dismisses the label "extreme-right." Just like his counterparts in Italy, Sweden and France, Van Grieken, the party's president, denounced the more extremist positions of his group's founding fathers and moderated his political message to make voting for the far-right socially acceptable.

Overt racism is taboo. Instead, the rhetoric changes to criticizing an open-door migration policy. By carefully catering to centrist voters, the far-right aims for a bigger slice of the cake, while still riding on the anti-establishment discontent.

"There is a clear fault line between the winners of globalization and the nationalists," Van Grieken told POLITICO. "This comes on top on the concerns about mass migration, whether it's in Malmö, Rome or other European cities."

Perfect storm

Now, the time is right to capitalize on that transformation.

As Europe is battling record inflation and Europeans fear exorbitant heating bills, governments warn about the political implications of a "winter of discontent."

"It's a massive drainage of European prosperity," Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo told POLITICO recently. "In the current situation, it's hard to believe in progress, it's very hard to make progress. So there's a very pessimistic feeling."

The current war in Ukraine is the latest in a succession of crises - in global finance, migration and the pandemic. Experts argue that this is key to understanding the rising support for the far-right.

"Such existential crises have a destabilizing effect and lead to fear," said Carl Devos, a professor in political science at Ghent University. "Fear is the breeding ground for the far-right. People tend to translate that fear and outrage into radical voting behaviour."

Migration and identity politics are less prominent in the media because of the Ukraine war and rising energy prices, but they're still key issues in right-wing debate.

In Austria, the coalition parties fought over whether or not asylum seekers should receive climate bonuses. In the Netherlands, the death of a baby at the asylum center Ter Apel led to a renewed debate over the overcrowded migration centers.

The combination of those issues is likely to feed into more right-wing wins across the continent. "The far-right offers nationalist, protectionist solutions to the globalized crises, said Thorleifsson. "We see how the migration issue was momentarily off the agenda during the pandemic, but now it's back."
Aitor Hernández-Morales, Camille Gijs and Ana Fota contributed reporting.

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How the far-right got out of the doghouse

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Press play to listen to this article European far-right politicians just stormed to victory in Italy, after achieving historic results in France and Sweden. "Everywhere in Europe, people aspire to take their destiny back into their own hands!" said Marine Le Pen, the leader of France's far-right National Rally Party.

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This past week, I met (in person!) with the students I teach at New York University Abu Dhabi; our subject was refugees. We began by discussing the shocking contrast between the brutality meted out to Syrian refuges who tried to enter Eastern Europe in 2015 and the willing, even eager, acts of self-sacrifice toward the 3 million and counting Ukrainians who have poured into Poland and neighboring countries. A New York Times article we read followed Albagir, a Sudanese asylum-seeker who was beaten up and left to die by border guards, and the Maslovas, a Ukrainian family who could not stop weeping as they were supplied with food, blankets, and tenderness.

My students hardly needed to be told that racism and xenophobia accounted for the difference in treatment. But then, we noticed something: After escaping the mass killings in Darfur, Albagir (the article only provided his first name) had gone to Moscow to study; only then had he tried to reach Western Europe. Of course, Albagir had been denied the decent and humane treatment every individual has a right to. But was he a legitimate refugee if he had already found refuge? Would it be cruel to deny asylum to someone who has suffered so much misfortune?

Then a harder question arose, at which my students balked. What are we to make of the deep sense of kinship that has led Poles to welcome desperate Ukrainians but spurn Syrians and Iraqis? Wasn't that related to the feeling of identification that made Europeans close ranks behind Ukraine in its war with Russia? Should we accord any legitimacy to "blood ties" when they are used to justify repudiation rather than passionate acceptance? "I don't understand," one of my scholars said. "You said that these are universal rights. How can it be okay for governments to say we'll accept you but not the others?"

This past week, I met (in person!) with the students I teach at New York University Abu Dhabi; our subject was refugees. We began by discussing the shocking contrast between the brutality meted out to Syrian refuges who tried to enter Eastern Europe in 2015 and the willing, even eager, acts of self-sacrifice toward the 3 million and counting Ukrainians who have poured into Poland and neighboring countries. A New York Times article we read followed Albagir, a Sudanese asylum-seeker who was beaten up and left to die by border guards, and the Maslovas, a Ukrainian family who could not stop weeping as they were supplied with food, blankets, and tenderness.

My students hardly needed to be told that racism and xenophobia accounted for the difference in treatment. But then, we noticed something: After escaping the mass killings in Darfur, Albagir (the article only provided his first name) had gone to Moscow to study; only then had he tried to reach Western Europe. Of course, Albagir had been denied the decent and humane treatment every individual has a right to. But was he a legitimate refugee if he had already found refuge? Would it be cruel to deny asylum to someone who has suffered so much misfortune?

Then a harder question arose, at which my students balked. What are we to make of the deep sense of kinship that has led Poles to welcome desperate Ukrainians but spurn Syrians and Iraqis? Wasn't that related to the feeling of identification that made Europeans close ranks behind Ukraine in its war with Russia? Should we accord any legitimacy to "blood ties" when they are used to justify repudiation rather than passionate acceptance? "I don't understand," one of my scholars said. "You said that these are universal rights. How can it be okay for governments to say we'll accept you but not the others?"

The extraordinarily generous treatment accorded to Ukrainian refugees across Europe forces a series of uncomfortable questions about our refugee regime. The right of refuge granted by the 1951 Refugee Convention is, of course, universal-as human rights are by their very nature. Signatories cannot decide who to accept. Yet that is just what happened when Arab Muslims, rather than remaining in other Arab or Muslim countries, crossed into Europe-the one region of the world, ironically, most deeply dedicated to the Enlightenment principle of universal rights.

Those refugees, as author Ivan Krastev writes in After Europe, exposed the hollowness of European professions of cosmopolitanism-and, indeed, the triumphalist narrative of post-1989, post-historical Europe. Even the most progressive states, like Sweden, found themselves divided between urban liberals, who welcomed the refugees, and nationalists, most from small towns and rural areas who regarded them as a threat to cultural cohesion. The divide was sharper still between Western and Eastern Europe, where-as I discovered in trips to Hungary and Poland-even the cosmopolites refused to accept a national obligation to accept refugees.

The Ukrainian experience has proved the point in reverse. In 2016, a European diplomat in Brussels told me it was unreasonable to expect, say, a French city suffering high unemployment to embrace refugees who might compete for scarce jobs. Yet much of eastern Poland, now taking the brunt of the refugee flight, is a wasteland of industrial abandonment.

When it's your brother or sister in distress, you don't think about whether there's enough to go around. The farmer who took in the Maslovas said he "couldn't stay indifferent." Yet I remember Poles telling me that if Syrians really loved their country, they would have stayed there and fought.

Krastev, borrowing nomenclature from British journalist David Goodhart, argues the world is increasingly divided between "nowheres"-the cosmopolites-and "somewheres"-the rooted. There are a lot more somewheres than the nowheres imagined, and their resentment of globalization's unintended consequences, including mass migration and refugee flight, is a political fact of the first order. (See former U.S. President Donald Trump's political rise.) At the outset of the refugee crisis in 2015, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel promised that Germany would accept every Syrian refugee who made it to Europe; only a few months later, she was working out a deal with Turkey to choke off the flow of refugees lest public support for her government collapse.

Refugee universalism is thus a recipe for disaster. Yet it is possible to design a humane and just system that takes account of political and human realities. Doing so requires less doctrinal purity and more attention to what refugees really need. For example, some migration experts insist that refugees enjoy not only the right of sanctuary but the right to choose their preferred sanctuary. Yet current law only recognizes a right to a first country of refuge. That would leave Agadir in Russia-at least so long as Russia is deemed safe for people like him. All refugees cannot live in Germany or Sweden. Similarly, the distinction between refugees and migrants looks very blurry at the margins. Do victims of gang violence rather than state violence count? But absent such a distinction, states would have to surrender their right to enforce borders.

Exclusive focus on the refugee problem's "who" and "where" obscures the all-important issue of "what." We hope Ukrainians will only need to stay briefly abroad until they can return in the aftermath of some kind of negotiated settlement. What they need is physical safety and temporary material support. That is not enough for most of the world's refugees, whether Syrians in Turkey or Afghans in Pakistan. The average length of a refugee's stay abroad is 10 years. As authors Paul Collier and Alexander Betts argue in their book Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (I'm revealing my reading list), what refugees do have a right to-beyond physical protection-is the "autonomy" enabled by work and access to education as well as a path back to their homes when it becomes safe to return. In other words, we need to confine some rights and expand others.

Refugees do not typically travel thousands of miles to find sanctuary; they flee to a neighboring state, just as Ukrainians did, and then stay there. Unlike migrants, refugees want to return home and so remain as close to home as possible. The terribly divisive argument over the obligation of European countries to accept Middle Eastern refugees was itself a sign of a failed response. Yet refugee flows place an impossible burden on countries with the misfortune of being located next to an exploding state. Collier and Betts suggest that if we are to, in effect, protect wealthy states from the great mass of refugees by keeping them in their respective regions, it is up to states farther away to provide development aid, trade, technical assistance, and the like to help create opportunities for work and schooling. That is a very tall order, but it's barely been tried.

Even for wealthy Europe, housing, feeding, educating, and supporting more than 3 million Ukrainians is going to be a staggering undertaking. But it will probably be done because Europeans feel so deeply that Ukrainians are them. But Europe has done too little for the millions of Middle Eastern refugees who remain in their own neighborhoods. Back in 2016, Frans Timmermans, then an European Union official responsible for migration issues, said, "I would be at peace with all this if the member states would allocate billions [of dollars] on a yearly basis to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to take care of the refugees." But they didn't. Since then, many European states have struck deals with migrant-exporting nations in Africa, which amount to bribes to police their borders.

I felt a little ashamed as I tried to persuade my idealistic and devoutly cosmopolitan students to accept the limits of universalism and the political reality of kinship and nationalism. Most were not persuaded. Yet I was arguing that when politics collides with morality, we have to find a way to adjust both our moral propositions and our politics. Principle without politics is every bit as dangerous as politics without principle.

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The Moral Realism of Europe's Refugee Hypocrisy

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This past week, I met (in person!) with the students I teach at New York University Abu Dhabi; our subject was refugees. We began by discussing the shocking contrast between the brutality meted out to Syrian refuges who tried to enter Eastern Europe in 2015 and the willing, even eager, acts of self-sacrifice toward the 3 million and counting Ukrainians who have poured into Poland and neighboring countries.

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In videos emerging from Bushehr, angry workers could be heard chanting "Death to the Dictator," “Death to Khamenei!” and “This year is the year of blood, Seyyed Ali Khamenei is done!”. “The proud workers of Asaluyeh blocked the roads and joined the strikes," a man is heard saying as hundreds of workers gathered outside the facility amid plumes of thick smoke. The refinery and associated petrochemical industries at Asaluyeh are considered one of the most important economic infrastructures in Iran and a main source of revenue for the government. But the Council of Oil Contract Workers had warned the government last week they would go on strike if security forces continued suppressing the protests.”We will stop working and join the people if you continue killing and arresting people in their protest against
compulsory hijab," the council said in a statement.

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In Michael Martins meeting with Truss at the funeral of the Queen, he said he felt a “genuine interest” when discussing the issue of Northern Irish trade between Britain and Ireland. Unionists found issue with the agreement (protesting in the streets of Belfast) as they only see it as a further separation between them and their British neighbours. The EU have stepped in to join the conversation between Ireland and Britain with them stating there would be serious issue and possible intervention if the process of negotiation took place without their say.

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https://hewittcollege-my.sharepoint.com/:w:/g/personal/ciara_lehane_hewittcollege_ie/EaWbPFh7xF1DvKZNXlY_QosBSogVDbt60IcrQGAHkKk7Kw?e=RI62W7

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Ireland is one of just two nations that have failed to apply for a key European Commission funding initiative aimed at ensuring continuity of energy supply in the wake of the Russia/Ukraine war.

It did so by applying emergency measures to boost the existing commission funds and by allowing member states to re-apply for substantial additional funding for their own energy programmes.

The initiative is expected to inject funding into the clean energy transition of €210bn by the year 2027.

The biomethane section of REPowerEU has a budget of €35bn alone. Ireland's potential funding from that budget is estimated at €800m in capital funding and a further €1.3bn in future supports.

The deadline for applications for phase one of the programme was early April.

Biomethane is a natural gas alternative made from agricultural and food waste via a process known as anaerobic digestion.

Its widespread use would be expected to reduce emissions across the economy, while also contributing to the decarbonisation of the agri-food sector.

Luxembourg is understood to be the only other country that has to date declined to apply for funding.

Energy consultant and former MEP Kieran Hartley described Ireland's failure to apply for REPowerEU as "costly missed opportunity".

"It would have given Ireland the opportunity to guarantee security of supply and guarantee a fixed price of energy from indigenous sources," Mr Hartley said.

Kieran Hartley said the failure was a 'costly missed opportunity' for Ireland. Picture: Denis Minihane

He added that it is "not just the case that Ireland can reapply".

"Countries which have already applied will be ahead of Ireland, will be producing energy at lower prices, and will be able to offer cheaper energy to their manufacturing industries," he said.

In response to a query as to why Ireland has not applied for the funding, a spokesperson for the Department of the Environment said it is "considering potential proposals for funding under this mechanism".

"This work is being carried out as part of the broader budget process," they said, adding that "any such funding would be in addition to what is already included in Ireland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan".

Last month, Italy was approved for a €4.5bn grant from REPowerEU towards increasing Italian biomethane production.

Speaking at the time the European Commission's Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager said the scheme will help the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition.

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Ireland failed to apply for European funding to secure energy continuity

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Ireland is one of just two nations that have failed to apply for a key European Commission funding initiative aimed at ensuring continuity of energy supply in the wake of the Russia/Ukraine war. It did so by applying emergency measures to boost the existing commission funds and by allowing member states to re-apply for substantial additional funding for their own energy programmes.

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GROUP MEMBERS NAMES: fionn, forget who else tbh

ARTICLE NAME PASTED HERE: ethnic/cultural global unrest

Brief rundown of article:

Right-wing party receives large support in sweden

Several other countries are electing right-wing parties

Some stats relating to the article read:

Received 30% of votes, failed to secure more than 3 seats however

Pick a Key thinker and use their theory to briefly respond/agree/disagree with article.

Erickson, in all his vagueness, would probably state that such a shift in election is the result of overheating due to identity politics. With the ever rapid expansion and cultural mixing of Sweden, many citizens can assume to feel as though their identity as being swedish is under attack. They turn to nationalists who put their country first, and aim to have them take control no matter their many, many other flawed policies.

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Ireland failed to apply for European funding to secure energy continuity

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Ireland failed to apply for European funding to secure energy continuity

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Recap ;
RePower EU program established March 2022
- funding explorations of renewable energy sources.
- bolstering the European Union’s energy supply chains following Ukraine invasion

They allowed member states to re-apply for substantial additional funding for their own energy programmes.. but Ireland failed to apply

Energy consultant and former MEP Kieran Hartley described Ireland’s failure to apply for REPowerEU as “costly missed opportunity”

The aim of this program is for the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition

Stats ;
- Ireland 1 of 2 nations that have failed to apply for key European Commission Funding Initiative (aimed continuing energy supply during wake of Russia Ukraine war)

- RePower EU create funding into the clean energy transition of €210bn by the year 2027

- biomethane section of REPowerEU has a budget of €35bn alone (Biomethane = is a natural gas alternative made from agricultural and food waste)

- Ireland’s *potential* funding from that budget is estimated at €800m in capital funding and a further €1.3bn in future supports.

- Luxembourg the only other country that hasn't applied for funding

- Italy was approved for a €4.5bn grant from REPowerEU towards increasing Italian biomethane production

- PB

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Protests exploded across Russia over the weekend, fueled largely by videos posted to social media, despite attempts by the Russian government to censor content across various platforms. The protesters braved extreme cold, police brutality and mass arrests, calling for the release of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who was detained last week shortly after returning to the country.

Social media helped spark and organize the protests, after Navalny called on his supporters to take to the streets on Saturday. Videos and posts promoting action quickly went viral, particularly on TikTok, YouTube and Instagram. TikTok videos with the hashtags involving "Free Navalny" and "23 January" garnered more than 200 million combined views by Thursday, according to the news site Open Media.

Young people in particular began filming themselves dressing for upcoming rallies, or as The Moscow Times noted, removing Russian President Vladimir Putin's portrait hanging in classrooms and often replacing it with Navalny's photo.

But the Russian media regulator Roskomnadzor quickly jumped to pressure social media platforms to remove videos that it said called for minors to participate in protests, warning that it was illegal for them to do so. On Friday, the government claimed that 38% of all offending videos on TikTok, 50% on YouTube and 17% on Instagram had been removed. By Saturday Roskomnadzor said more messages had been deleted on TikTok and Russian social media app Vkontakte. Facebook and Google, the owners of Instagram and YouTube respectively, expressed uncertainty about the accuracy of the numbers, Gizmodo reported.

The attempt at restricting social media communication didn't stop protesters from showing up in the tens of thousands in dozens of cities across Russia, from the island of Sakhalin, just north of Japan, all the way to Moscow, posting on social media along the way and begging for the world to watch.

In Irkutsk, near the Mongolian boarder, thousands chanted "We will not leave!"

In the northern area of Yakutia, protesters gathered in temperatures around minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit.

Even in areas that usually avoid opposition protests, large crowds came out in support of Navalny.

In Moscow, where protesters streamed through the streets in droves, demonstrators clashed with riot police in tense standoffs.

Пожалуйста, посмотрите это видео. На нем ОМОН провоцирует детей на драку сегодня на Пушкинской. Это день позора Российской полиции. Беспорядки устроили представители власти. pic.twitter.com/xpVufj67VS
- Дмитрий Петрович Алешковский (@aleshru) January 23, 2021

One video of a police officer grabbing a child while onlookers filmed on smartphones has been viewed hundreds of thousands of times.

And in some places, protesters threw snowballs at government officials and police.

By Sunday, over 3,500 demonstrators across the country had been detained, according to OVD-Info, an activist group that monitors arrests and protests. The group said it had never tracked so many arrests.

The U.S. State Department condemned the violence and arrests, citing the Russian government's attempt to control social media platforms and tighten restrictions on independent media.

"Continued efforts to suppress Russians' rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, the arrest of opposition figure Aleksey Navalny, and the crackdown on protests that followed are troubling indications of further restrictions on civil society and fundamental freedoms," said department spokesperson Ned Price in a statement. "We call on Russian authorities to release all those detained for exercising their universal rights and for the immediate and unconditional release of Aleksey Navalny."

Anton Svetushkov, a business student attending the protests on Saturday night, told NPR it was his first rally ever. Even as arrests were happening around him, he said he was ready to be there.

"There is a certain point where you say, OK, now I have to go beyond my own insecurities and just step up," Svetushkov said.

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Social Media Fueled Russian Protests Despite Government Attempts To Censor

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Protests exploded across Russia over the weekend, fueled largely by videos posted to social media, despite attempts by the Russian government to censor content across various platforms. The protesters braved extreme cold, police brutality and mass arrests, calling for the release of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who was detained last week shortly after returning to the country.

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Ukraine Joins European Power Grid, ending dependence on Russia 

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Ukraine Joins European Power Grid, ending dependence on Russia 

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Ukraine joins European power grid, ending its dependence on Russia - CBS News

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Engineers have linked Ukraine to an electricity grid spanning much of continental Europe, allowing the country to decouple its power system from hostile Russia, officials said Wednesday.

Belgium-based ENTSO-E, which represents dozens of transmission system operators in Europe, said the electricity grids of Ukraine and its smaller neighbor Moldova were successfully synchronized with the Continental European Power System on a trial basis.

"This is a significant milestone," the group said.

Grid operators had been preparing such a move after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, but the large-scale Russian military assault on Ukraine last month prompted an emergency request by Kyiv to speed up a process that was expected to take years more to complete.

ENTSO-E, whose 39 members operate the world's largest interconnected electrical grid, said the move means they will be able to help maintain the stability of the Ukrainian and Moldovan power systems.

The two countries were previously part of the Integrated Power System that also includes Russia and Belarus. This made Ukraine dependent on Russia's grid operator despite there having been no electricity trade between the two countries for years.

"This step will give Ukraine the opportunity to receive electricity if (Russia) continues to destroy our power infrastructure, and thus to save our power system," said Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, who chairs the management board of Ukraine's grid operator Ukrenergo. "We are sincerely grateful to our European partners for their great support and assistance during these difficult times."

Georg Zachmann, an expert with the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, said the switch will allow energy suppliers in the continental grid that stretches from Portugal to Poland to supply electricity to Ukraine if necessary.

This could allow Ukraine to turn off some of the coal-fired power plants it currently keeps running to ensure grid stability, saving precious fuel in wartime, he said.

In the long, term, Ukraine could export surplus electricity generated by its nuclear power plants to the rest of Europe.

"It's a nice win-win situation," said Zachmann. "It might even be good for the climate."
More

First published on March 16, 2022 / 6:49 PM EDT

© 2022 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

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Ukraine joins European power grid, ending its dependence on Russia

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Grid operators had been preparing such a move after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

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Globalization and Health 17, Article number: 57 (2021) Cite this article

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Abstract

Background

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of coronavirus across the world and has demonstrated the varied success of such approaches in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. While previous studies have demonstrated high predictive power of incorporating air travel data and governmental policy responses in global disease transmission modelling, factors influencing the decision to implement travel and border restriction policies have attracted relatively less attention. This paper examines the role of globalization on the pace of adoption of international travel-related non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during the coronavirus pandemic. This study aims to offer advice on how to improve the global planning, preparation, and coordination of actions and policy responses during future infectious disease outbreaks with empirical evidence.

Methods and data

We analyzed data on international travel restrictions in response to COVID-19 of 185 countries from January to October 2020. We applied time-to-event analysis to examine the relationship between globalization and the timing of travel restrictions implementation.

Results

The results of our survival analysis suggest that, in general, more globalized countries, accounting for the country-specific timing of the virus outbreak and other factors, are more likely to adopt international travel restrictions policies. However, countries with high government effectiveness and globalization were more cautious in implementing travel restrictions, particularly if through formal political and trade policy integration. This finding is supported by a placebo analysis of domestic NPIs, where such a relationship is absent. Additionally, we find that globalized countries with high state capacity are more likely to have higher numbers of confirmed cases by the time a first restriction policy measure was taken.

Conclusions

The findings highlight the dynamic relationship between globalization and protectionism when governments respond to significant global events such as a public health crisis. We suggest that the observed caution of policy implementation by countries with high government efficiency and globalization is a by-product of commitment to existing trade agreements, a greater desire to 'learn from others' and also perhaps of 'confidence' in a government's ability to deal with a pandemic through its health system and state capacity. Our results suggest further research is warranted to explore whether global infectious disease forecasting could be improved by including the globalization index and in particular, the de jure economic and political, and de facto social dimensions of globalization, while accounting for the mediating role of government effectiveness. By acting as proxies for a countries' likelihood and speed of implementation for international travel restriction policies, such measures may predict the likely time delays in disease emergence and transmission across national borders.

Background

The level of complexity around containing emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases has increased with the ease and increased incidence of global travel [ 1], along with greater global social, economic, and political integration [ 2]. In reference to influenza pandemics, but nonetheless applicable to many communicable and vector-borne diseases, the only certainty is in the growing unpredictability of pandemic-potential infectious disease emergence, origins, characteristics, and the biological pathways through which they propagate [ 3]. Globalization in trade, increased population mobility, and international travel are seen as some of the main human influences on the emergence, re-emergence, and transmission of infectious diseases in the twenty-first Century [ 4, 5].

Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases have presented major challenges for human health in ancient and modern societies alike [ 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The relative rise in infectious disease mortality and shifting patterns of disease emergence, re-emergence, and transmission in the current era has been attributed to increased global connectedness, among other factors [ 11]. More globalized countries - and, in particular, global cities - are at the heart of human influence on infectious diseases; these modern, densely populated urban centers are highly interconnected with the world economy in terms of social mobility, trade, and international travel [ 12, 13]. One might assume that given their high susceptibility to infectious diseases, globalized countries would be more willing than less globalized countries to adopt screening, quarantine, travel restriction, and border control measures during times of mass disease outbreaks. However, given their globalized nature, globalized countries are also likely to favor less protectionist policies in general, thus, contradicting the assumption above, perhaps suggesting that counteracting forces are at play: greater social globalization may require faster policy adoption to limit potential virus import and spread through more socially connected populations [ 14, 15]; greater economic globalization may indicate slower policy adoption due to legally binding travel and trade agreements/regulations, economic losses, and social issues due to family relations that cross borders [ 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Greater political globalization may indicate greater willingness to learn from others and/or maintain democratic processes of decision making in global coordination efforts, either way potentially delaying the implementation of travel restrictions. Travel restrictions may also have minimal impact in urban centers with dense populations and travel networks [ 22]. Moreover, the costs of closing are comparatively higher for open countries than for already protective nations. For example, more globalized countries are more likely to incur financial or economic penalties (e.g., see [ 23, 24]) when implementing health policies which aim to improve the health of local populations such as import restrictions or bans on certain food groups/products and product labelling. Globalization, after all, is known to promote growth and does so via a combination of three main globalization dimensions: economic integration (i.e., flow of goods, capital and services, economic information, and market perceptions), social integration (i.e., proliferation of ideas, information, culture, and people), and political integration (i.e., diffusion of governance and participation in international coordination efforts) [ 25, 26]. See Table 1 for examples of data used in the estimation of each (sub)dimension of the KOF globalization index we use in this study.

Table 1 Dimensions and sub-components of Globalizationa

Globalization appears to improve population health outcomes such as infant mortality rate (IMR) and life expectancy (LE) regardless of a country's level of development (i.e., developed, developing, or underdeveloped) [ 27, 28]. Links between the dimensions of globalization (i.e., social, political, and economic) and general population health are less clear cut [ 29]. For less developed countries, the economic dimension of globalization appears to provide the strongest determinant in IMR and LE, whereas for more developed countries, the social aspect of globalization is the strongest factor [ 27]. This suggests that as a country becomes more economically stable, it then moves towards greater social and political integration into global society; and for less developed countries, increased wealth creation through economic integration potentially delivers the greatest increases in population health. In contrast, for low- to middle-income countries, the social and political dimensions of globalization appear most strongly related to the propensity of women to be overweight [ 30, 31]. This suggests that for the least developed countries, the adoption of western culture, food habits and lifestyle may be detrimental to adult health if not backed up by social and political progress. Hence, it appears there is no definite relationship between the different aspects of globalization (i.e., social, political, and economic), a country's level of development, and health outcomes that hold across all health contexts. Regardless, trade policies and more generally, globalization, influence both a nation's determinants of health and the options and resources available to its health policymakers [ 32].

The influence of open trade agreements, policies favoring globalization and greater social connectedness on the (delayed) timing of travel restrictions during a pandemic would make logical sense. Globalized countries are more likely to incur financial, economic, and social penalties by implementing restrictive measures that aim to improve population health outcomes (e.g., see [ 23, 24]) and hence, will be less inclined to do so. Further, countries that rely on international students and tourism and have a high number of expatriates living and working abroad might be even less likely to close their borders or implement travel restrictions to avoid (1) increases in support payments or decreases in tax income during times of unforeseen economic upset, (2) negative backlash from media and in political polls, and (3) tit-for-tat behaviors from major trading partners. However, countries which are more socially connected may also act more quickly because they are inherently at higher risk of local outbreak and hence, to delay local emergence they may implement international travel restrictions earlier. Membership and commitments to international organizations [ 33], treaties, and binding trade agreements might also prevent or inhibit them from legally doing so [ 23, 34, 35], suggesting there are social, trade, and political motivators to maintain 'open' borders.

Domestic policies implemented in response to the coronavirus pandemic have ranged from school closures and public event cancellations to full-scale national lockdowns. Previous research has hinted that democratic countries, particularly those with competitive elections, were quicker to close schools. Interestingly, those with high government effectiveness (i.e., those with high-quality public and civil services, policy formulation, and policy implementation) were slower to implement such policies [ 36] as were the more right-leaning governments [ 37]. Further, more democratic countries have tended to be more sensitive to the domestic policy decisions of other countries [ 38]. In particular, government effectiveness - as a proxy of state capacity - can act as a mediator with evidence available that countries with higher effectiveness took longer to implement COVID-19 related responses [ 36, 39]. Countries with higher levels of health care confidence also exhibit slower mobility responses among its citizens [ 40]. Those results may indicate that there is a stronger perception that a well-functioning state is able to cope with such a crisis as a global pandemic like SARS-CoV-2. More globalized countries may therefore take advantage of a better functioning state; weighing advantages and disadvantages of policies and, consequently, slowing down the implementation of restrictive travel policies to benefit longer from international activities. Regardless, the need to understand the reasons (and potential confounding or mediating factors) behind the selection of some policy instruments and not others [ 36] and the associated timing of such decisions is warranted to enable the development and implementation of more appropriate policy interventions [ 41].

The literature seems to agree that greater globalization (and the trade agreements and openness which often come with it) make a country more susceptible to the emergence and spread of infectious and noncommunicable diseases [ 2, 42]. Greater connectedness and integration within a global society naturally increases the interactions between diverse populations and the pathways through which potential pathogens can travel and hence, emerge in a local population. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., social distancing, city lockdowns, travel restrictions) may serve as control measures when pharmaceutical options (e.g., vaccines) are not yet available [ 43]. However, such non-pharmaceutical measures are often viewed as restrictive in a social, political, and economic context. Our review of the literature did not detect clear indications of the likelihood that globalized cities will implement such measures, nor were we able to identify how quickly such cities will act to minimize community transmission of infectious diseases and the possible mediating effects of government effectiveness in the decision-making process. Furthermore, our review could not locate research on the relative influence of the social, political, and economic dimensions of globalization on the speed of implementing travel restriction policies. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of coronavirus across the world and has demonstrated the varied success of such approaches in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. Restrictive government policies formerly deemed impossible have been implemented within a matter of months across democratic and autocratic governments alike. This presents a unique opportunity to observe and investigate a plethora of human behavior and decision-making processes. We explore the relative weighting of risks and benefits in globalized countries who balance the economic, social, and political benefits of globalization with a higher risk of coronavirus emergence, spread, and extended exposure. Understanding which factors of globalization (i.e., social, economic, or political) have influenced government public health responses (in the form of travel/border restriction policies) during COVID-19 can help identify useful global coordination mechanisms for future pandemics, and also improve the accuracy of disease modelling and forecasting by incorporation into existing models.

Methods

Data

Key variables

The record for each country's international travel policy response to COVID-19 is obtained from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) database [ 44] (185 countries in total). The database records the level of strictness on international travel from 01 January 2020 to the present (continually updated), categorized into five levels: 0 - no restrictions; 1 - screening arrivals; 2 - quarantine arrivals from some or all regions; 3 - ban arrivals from some regions; and 4 - ban on all regions or total border closure. At various points in time from the beginning of 2020 to the time of writing (06 October 2020), 102 countries have introduced a policy of screening on arrival, 112 have introduced arrival quarantine, 152 have introduced travel bans, and 148 have introduced total border closures.1 A visual representation of these statistics in Fig. 1 shows the cumulative daily count of countries that have adopted a travel restriction, according to the level of stringency, between 01 January and 01 October 2020. Countries with a more restrictive policy (e.g., total border closure) and countries with less restrictive policies (e.g., ban on high-risk regions) are also counted. Figure 2 then shows the type of travel restriction and the date each country first implemented that policy. Together, we see that countries adopted the first three levels of travel restrictions in two clusters; first between late January to early February, and second during mid-March, around the time that COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the WHO. Total border closures, on the other hand, were mainly imposed after the pandemic declaration, except for two countries that went into lockdown at the beginning of March (i.e., State of Palestine, and San Marino). Country-specific timelines are shown in Fig. S 1 in the Appendix.

Timeline of international travel restriction policy adoption for 184 countries. Daily count shows the cumulative number of countries that have introduced an international travel policy that is 'at-least-as-strict'. Relaxation of international travel restriction is not shown in the figure

Restrictiveness of the first travel policy implemented over time. Each marker ( N  = 183) represents the type and date of the first travel restriction adopted, with the size of the marker representing the number of confirmed COVID cases at the time of policy implementation. Violin plot shows the kernel (Gaussian) density of timing of implementation

We obtained COVID-19 statistics from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University [ 45]. The dataset consists of records on the number of confirmed cases and deaths daily for 215 countries since January 2020.

Our measure of globalization is generated from the KOF Globalization Index (of more than 200 countries for the year 2017), published by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute2 [ 26]. The KOF Globalization Index is made up of 44 individual variables (24 de facto and 20 de jure components) relating to globalization across economic, social, and political factors3,4 (see also [ 25]). The complete index is calculated as the average of the de facto and the de jure globalization indices. We focus this analysis on the overall index, as well as the subdimensions of globalization (i.e., Economic (Trade and Financial), Social (Interpersonal, Informational, and Cultural), and Political globalization). Additionally, we also investigate the relative contributions of the de facto and de jure indices separately. Each index ranges from 1 to 100 (highest globalization). In the regression models, we standardize the variable to mean of zero with unit variance for effect size comparison.

Countries with no records of travel restriction adoption (not included in the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker) and globalization data from the KOF Globalization Index are listed in Tables S 1 and S 2, respectively.5

Control variables

When analyzing the timing of international travel restrictions, we take into account how such decisions can be affected by the policies of neighbors [ 37, 38]. Thus, to control for policy diffusion, we constructed a variable to reflect international travel policy adoption of neighboring countries by averaging the strictness of each country's neighbors weighted by the share of international tourism. Inbound tourism data of 197 countries were obtained from the Yearbook of Tourism Statistics of the World Tourism Organization [ 46]. The data consist of total arrivals of non-resident tourists or visitors at national borders, in hotels, or other types of accommodations; and the overnight stays of tourists, broken down by nationality or country of residence, from 1995 to 2018. Due to differences in statistical availability for each country, we take records from 2018 (or 2017 if 2018 is not available) of arrivals of non-resident tourists/visitors at national borders as the country weights for the computation of foreign international travel policy. If arrival records at national borders are not available for these years, we check for the 2018 or 2017 records on arrivals or overnight stays in hotels or other types of accommodation before relying on records from earlier years. To determine the weighted foreign international restriction policy for each country, we calculated the weighted sum using the share of arrivals of other countries multiplied by the corresponding policy value ranging from 0 to 4.6

Similarly, case severity amongst countries comprising the majority of inbound tourists should also increase the likelihood of a country adopting travel restrictions. We thus constructed a variable which takes the sum of the number of confirmed cases from neighboring countries weighted by their share of total arrivals in the focal country (log).

While [ 47] suggests that the diffusion of social policies is highly linked to economic interdependencies between countries, and is less based on cultural or geographical proximity, we test the sensitivity of our results using a variety of measures of country closeness (Fig. S 4 and S 5). Doing so also allows us to examine which factors are more likely to predict COVID-19 policy diffusion. In general, while our results are not sensitive to other dimensions of country proximity, decisions to adopt travel restrictions are best explained by models where neighbors are defined by tourism statistics (see SI Appendix).

Previous studies have found that countries with higher government effectiveness took longer to implement domestic COVID-19 related policy responses such as school closure (e.g., [ 36, 39], perhaps due to (mis)perception that a well-functioning state should be able to cope with such a crisis as the current coronavirus pandemic and therefore, has more time or propensity to learn from others and develop well-considered COVID-19 response plans. Therefore, we also control for governance capacity; the data for which is based on measures of state capacity in the Government Effectiveness dimension of the 2019 Worldwide Governance Indicators (the World Bank).

We check the robustness of our results using alternative measures such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Quality of Government and tax capacity (tax revenue as % of GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators) [ 38, 47]. The ICRG measure on the quality of government is computed as the average value of the "Corruption", "Law and Order", and "Bureaucracy Quality" indicators. We include additional control variables to account for each country's macroeconomic conditions, social, political, and geographical characteristics. For macroeconomic conditions, we obtained the latest record of GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and Gini coefficient from the WDI. We include population density, percentage urban population, and share of the population over 65, to control for the social structure of the country, which might affect the odds of implementing the policy due to a higher risk of rapid viral transmission and high mortality rates [ 38]. We also control for the number of hospital beds in the population [ 36, 38, 39, 40], which we used to proxy for a country's health system capacity, as countries with higher health capacity may be less likely to implement restrictive travel measures.7 We use the electoral democracy index from V-Dem Institute to control for the type of political regime [ 36, 38, 40]. Following previous studies, we include a dummy variable for countries with prior experience of managing SARS or MERS [ 38, 48, 49]; defined as those with more than 50 cases. Lastly, we include continent dummies which would absorb any unobserved regional heterogeneity [ 36]8 and country-specific weekend days, as policy changes might have occurred less often on days when politicians are not generally active or at their workplace.

Empirical strategy

We explore the following questions: how will more globalized countries respond to COVID-19? Do they have more confirmed cases before they first implement travel restrictions? Do they take longer to implement travel restriction policies in general? Which dimension of globalization (i.e., social, political, or economic) contributes most to these responses? To provide answers to these questions, we first report the correlations between the level of globalization and the time gap between the first confirmed domestic case and the implementation date of the first international travel restriction policy, calculated using records from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT [ 44];) on the timing of restrictions on international travel for each country and COVID-19 case statistics from the ECDC and CSSE [ 45]. We then examine the relationship using survival analysis through a multiple failure-event framework. This approach allows us to examine the underlying factors which affect the implementation of international travel restriction policies across country borders in an attempt to isolate the effect of globalization. It also allows us to use 'incomplete' datasets as certain countries may not have implemented any type of policy or may have implemented a strict policy without first implementing a less strict one (i.e., not sequentially implement policies of 'least strict' to 'most strict'). Furthermore, we conjecture that as a consequence from the above, countries with higher levels of globalization may have more confirmed cases by the time the first policy was introduced. Therefore, we also examine the relationship between globalization and the number of confirmed cases (in logs) at the time of policy implementation.

We employ the time-to-event analysis (survival analysis or event history analysis) to examine the role of globalization in the timing of international travel restriction policies. Similar to previous studies [ 37, 38, 50], we use the marginal risk set model [ 51] to estimate the expected duration of time (days) until each policy, with increasing strictness, was imposed by each country. Specifically, we model the hazard for implementing screening, quarantine, ban on high-risk regions, and total border closure separately; thus, allowing the possibility that a country may adopt a more restrictive policy early on, as countries are assumed to be simultaneously at risk for all failures (i.e., implementation of any level of policy strictness). Intuitively, as more stringent policies are less likely to be implemented or adopted early (especially if state capacity is high), we stratified the baseline hazards for the four restrictions to allow for differences in policy adoption rate. Yet, when a country adopts a more restrictive travel restriction policy (e.g., total border closure) before (or never) implementing the less restrictive ones (e.g., ban on high-risk regions), the latter is effectively imposed (at least from an outcome perspective). Thus, we code them as failure on the day the more restrictive policy was implemented.9 We also stratify countries by the month of the first confirmed COVID-19 case,10 as countries with early transmission of coronavirus have fewer other countries from which they can learn how best to respond to the pandemic [ 52]. This is important because disproportionally more countries with a higher globalization index contracted the virus early (Fig. S 2 in the SI Appendix). Additionally, we stratify time observations into before and after pandemic declaration (11 March 2020) [ 53] as it is likely to significantly increase the likelihood of countries adopting a travel restriction policy (particularly for border closures as seen in Fig. 2) as consensus on the potential severity of the pandemic solidified. Out of all 184 countries in our sample, 3 and 39 did not implement ban on high-risk regions and total border closure, respectively, before the end of the sample period, and are thus (right) censored (Fig. 1); i.e., nothing is observed or known about that subject and event after this particular time of observation.

We define the time-at-risk for all countries as the start of the sample period (i.e., 01 January 2020)11 and estimate the following stratified (semi-parametric) Cox proportional hazards model [ 37, 38, 50]:

$$ {h}_g\left(\mathrm{t},\mathbf{X}\right)={h}_{0g}\left(\mathrm{t}\right)\ast \exp \left(\boldsymbol{\beta} {\mathbf{X}}_{\mathrm{i}}\right) $$

where h g(t) is the hazard function of strata g, representing the four levels of international travel policy strictness: screening, quarantine and ban on high-risk regions, and total border closure, with h 0g as the respective baseline hazard. Because of the stratification approach, we cluster the standard errors at the country level. Tied failures are handled using the Efron method. The extended Cox model in (1) allows us to include static predictor variables - such as the KOF globalization index - and time-varying covariates on neighboring countries' international travel policy adoption or daily COVID-19 case statistics to examine their effects, relative to the baseline hazard, on the timing of policy implementation in the multiple-events data framework.

To study the relationship between COVID-19 case prevalence and the level of globalization at the time of travel restriction [ 39], we apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to estimate the following model:

$$ {Y}_{ij}=\alpha +\beta {Globalisation}_i+{\gamma}_j{\mathbf{X}}_{\boldsymbol{i}}+{\epsilon}_i $$

where Y ij is the number of cases (log) at the time of the restriction j (or a stricter restriction) was implemented. Globalisation i is the KOF globalization index of country i and X is a vector of country-specific controls.

Results

First, we examine whether the level of globalization of the country is correlated with the timing of international travel restrictions relative to the date of a country's first local confirmed case of coronavirus. With a simple correlation analysis, we find that the Pearson's correlation between the first policy implementation-first case gap and globalization index is significantly positive ρ = 0.35 ( p < 0.001; 95%CI = [0.210, 0.475]; n = 170),12 demonstrating that more globalized countries exhibited a delay in imposing travel restrictions compared with less globalized countries (Fig. 3a), relative to their first local confirmed case of COVID-19. Figure 3a also indicates that countries that reacted before the first local COVID-19 case tended to adopt screening on arrivals or quarantine rules as the first precautionary measures. We find that more globalized countries tend to have a higher number of confirmed local cases of COVID-19 at the time of implementing travel restrictions (Pearson's correlation between the log of confirmed cases and KOF index: ρ = 0.408; p < 0.001; 95%CI = [0.276, 0.525]; n = 173), Fig. 3b).13 One noteworthy case is the United Kingdom, which only enforced quarantine on travelers from high-risk regions on the 08 June 2020, 129 days after COVID-19 was first confirmed in the country.

Correlation between the globalization level of a country and a) the number of days between the first international travel restriction policy implemented and the first confirmed case; and b) the number of confirmed cases (log scale, with countries reporting 0 COVID-19 cases mapped below 1) at the time of the first policy being implemented. The colors represent the four international travel restrictions implemented first in each country. Size of the marker shows the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases on the date of the implementation of the first travel policy

These correlations persist and remain significant when each level of travel restriction is evaluated (see Fig. S 3 in SI Appendix). This shows that more globalized countries are more likely to impose international travel restrictions later, relative to the first confirmed case in the country, regardless of policy strictness. Interestingly, the two least strict policies (i.e., screening and quarantine) have slightly higher correlation coefficients meaning that it took more globalized countries longer to impose these policies relative to the first local COVID-19 case. One would think that the least strict policies would represent a lower barrier to continued globalization and hence, be the more likely route for a COVID-19 response measure for more globalized countries.

An intuitive narrative for these findings is that globalized countries are typically among the first to be hit by emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases and are naturally more susceptible to local community transmission [ 12, 13] (Fig. S 2). Hence, globalized countries may have less time to react, strategize, and learn from others in terms of suitable NPIs and how resources need to be mobilized for effective implementation. They may also underestimate the speed of transmission and contagiousness of the virus due to lack of clear evidence and knowledge of the virus at the early stage of the outbreak. Below, we present findings after accounting for the timing of the first COVID-19 wave appearing in the country.

Do more globalized countries take longer to implement travel restriction policies in general?

We present the results from the survival analysis in Table 2, which shows the hazard ratios (HRs) for each factor. For binary explanatory variables, HRs can be interpreted as the ratio of the likelihood of adopting travel restrictions between the two levels, while for continuous variables, it represents the same ratio for unit difference.

Table 2 Time-to-event analysis (marginal risk set model) predicting implementation of international travel restrictions

Despite the strong positive correlation observed in the bivariate analysis between globalization and the time difference between first local confirmed case and implementation of travel restriction, we did not find substantial evidence suggesting that more globalized countries are more reluctant to adopt travel restriction policies relative to their first local confirmed case. In fact, after adjusting for the date that COVID-19 was first locally contracted (through observation stratification), we find that, in general, more globalized countries are more likely to adopt travel restriction policies. Specifically, as the KOF globalization index increases by one standard deviation (e.g., from Paraguay to New Zealand), the likelihood of adopting travel restrictions increases by 80% ( p = 0.007; 95%CI = [1.163, 2.617], Table 2 model 3).

We also find strong evidence of travel restriction policy diffusion between countries that are heavily interdependent in the tourism sector; that is, a country is more likely to adopt a travel restriction if neighboring countries (in terms of share of non-resident visitor arrivals) have done so. As expected, an increase in COVID-19 prevalence in regions comprising the majority of inbound international tourist arrivals increases the likelihood of enforcing travel restrictions. Specifically, for every 1% increase in COVID-19 cases in neighboring countries, the chance of adopting a travel policy increases by about 15% ( p < 0.001, 95%CI = [1.075, 1.237]). On the other hand, increases in domestic COVID-19 cases do not appear to influence travel policy adoptions14 suggesting that travel restriction policy decisions may be driven more by 'keeping the disease out' than containing the disease locally for the greater global good. The likelihood of adopting a restrictive travel policy (e.g., arrivals ban) is about three times higher if the country has already implemented a less strict policy, suggesting there may be decreased difficulty in implementing more restrictive policies over time or an increased preference to do so. Moreover, policy change is 60% less likely to occur during weekends ( p  = 0.005, 95%CI = [0.199, 0.757]), perhaps because government officials are less likely to be working on weekends and hence, less active in the political decision-making process.

The effect of the electoral democracy index is not statistically significant, and our results are contrary to the findings of [ 38], where OECD countries with higher electoral democracy have lower rates of domestic policy adoption.15 Perhaps decisions to implement international travel restrictions are less controversial to voters than domestic policies as the former primarily aims at limiting mobility from outside country borders rather than restricting the freedom and mobility within country borders as the latter do. In addition, we find that countries with a higher unemployment rate are more likely to implement travel restrictions. Surprisingly, countries with a larger share of older population are less likely to implement travel restrictions, while no statistically significant effect was observed for the share of urban population and population density. Contrary to our expectation, countries with greater healthcare capacity tend to be more likely to adopt a travel restriction policy.16

Government capacity as a relevant mediator

When including the interaction term between the globalization index and measures of state capacity in the model, we find strong evidence suggesting that more globalized countries with higher government effectiveness are slower to adopt travel restrictions. On the other hand, the likelihood to adopt travel restrictions increases with the level of globalization for countries with lower state capacity. Perhaps these countries are more self-aware of their lack of preparedness and/or ability to execute effective COVID-19 response plans or accommodate large fluxes of hospital admissions owing to the coronavirus pandemic. Each regression includes the same set of control variables as those used in Table 2 model 4. As shown in Fig. 4, the hazard ratios of the interaction terms between KOF globalization index and WGI government effectiveness are statistically less than one ( p = 0.001), as well as the interaction term with an alternative measure of state capacity, namely ICRG quality of government ( p = 0.006) and tax capacity ( p = 0.018). For instance, computing the hazard ratios of globalization at different levels of government effectiveness reveals that the change in the likelihood to impose travel restrictions, with respect to a one standard deviation increase in KOF, is about 1.5 times higher (hazard ratio of 2.5) for a country with a WGI of 1.5 standard deviations below the world's average (e.g., Chad) while the risk a country with a WGI 1.5 standard deviations above the world's average (e.g., Austria) would fell by 12% (hazard ratio of 0.88). Moreover, we also find a similar effect with the interaction terms between globalization and health capacity (as measured by number of hospital beds ( p = 0.075), physicians ( p < 0.001), or nurses and midwives per 1000 ( p < 0.001), and current expenditure on heath (log) ( p  < 0.001)). This evidence supports the notion that countries with higher state or healthcare capacity and globalization were less likely to limit international travel, even when the stakes might be comparatively higher, i.e. when the country is more globalized and hence, more susceptible to infectious disease outbreaks.

Hazard ratios of interaction terms between globalization and state capacity or health care capacity. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Shaded area highlights the range of HRs

Which aspect of globalization can primarily account for these responses?

Next, we assess which aspects of globalization are more important when predicting travel restriction policy adoption by examining the influence of each (sub)dimension of the globalization index. We find the positive effect of globalization on the likelihood to adopt international travel restrictions is likely to be driven by the social dimension of globalization (Fig. S 6, HR is larger than 1 for both de jure and de facto dimensions), as the estimates of HR are statistically significant when we re-estimate model 4 in Table 2 with the three subdimensions of KOF. Only the subdimension of social globalization is statistically significant which shows that countries with higher social globalization are quicker to adopt travel restrictions, controlling for other factors. Moreover, we estimate and compare the hazard ratios of the interaction term of each globalization dimension with government effectiveness to assess mediator effects (Fig. 5).17 Overall, we find the likelihood of implementing travel restriction policies among countries with high state capacity is robustly estimated for all subcomponents (Fig. 5a), with HRs ranging from 0.70 (political globalization) to 0.76 (social globalization). A closer inspection distinguishing between de facto (actual flows and activities, Fig. 5b) and de jure (policies, resources, conditions and institutions, Fig. 5c) measures [ 26] leads to interesting insights.

HRs of the interaction terms between government effectiveness and different dimensions of the globalization index on adoption of travel restrictions. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals

First, we find that de jure political (number of treaties and memberships in international organizations) globalization, have the largest effect out of all other sub-dimensions of globalization.18 This is a highly surprising result given the call for international cooperation and coordination by many international organizations (e.g., WHO,19 World Economic Forum,20 United Nations21). We find that those countries with high government effectiveness and engagement in international political coordination efforts are less likely to implement travel restriction policies and hence, slower to do so. On the other hand, de facto economic globalization, which measures actual economic activities (such as exchange of and goods and services) over long distances, is not as strongly related to the timing of travel policy adoption for countries with high government effectiveness. De facto social globalization has the largest effect among other de facto globalization dimensions. These results suggest that a nation with high government effectiveness and more global social, interpersonal, and cultural flows is less likely to implement travel restriction policies in pandemic crises and hence, may delay doing so. Countries with higher government effectiveness and policies and conditions that tend to facilitate or favor globalization (e.g., trade policy, political connectedness and engagement in international political cooperation) are also less likely to implement travel restrictions.

Placebo analysis with domestic COVID-19 responses

To assess whether the observed delay in travel restriction adoption is better explained by globalization and its interplay with state capacity, we conduct a placebo analysis using COVID-19 policy responses that, at least in theory, cannot be explained by the same mechanism. Specifically, we employ the same event history analysis on domestic non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) imposed to mitigate COVID-19 transmission. While previous studies have argued for [ 48] and found a substantial negative effect of government effectiveness on the timeliness of enacting school closure policies [ 36] and other NPIs across Europe [ 39], there is no obvious reason why the delayed responses to implement domestic NPIs would be related to globalization. Thus, we would expect that the interaction term between globalization and government effectiveness to be zero. If our expectation is correct, then we are more comfortable interpreting our previous results as truly reflective of the effect of globalization on travel restrictions, rather than as the effect of globalization on the propensity to implement all types of NPIs.

Data on domestic NPIs adoption are derived from the same source we obtained records on international travel restriction (i.e., the OxCGRT database). Domestic containment and closure policies include closing of schools, workplace, and public transport, restriction on gatherings and internal movement, cancellation of public events, and shelter-in-place order. We follow the approach of [ 38], who focus only on mandatory nationwide policies adopted.22 We again utilize the marginal risk set model in analyzing the timing of adoption of the seven domestic policies, that is, we stratified the seven different policies and their variation in strictness. Similarly, adoption of a stricter version of the policy (e.g., restrictions on gatherings between 11 and 100 people or 10 people or less) implies the adoption of the less strict version.

The results of the placebo analysis are presented in Table S 3, showing the hazard ratios of each factor predicting the adoption of any COVID-19-related NPIs. Comparison of the estimates of several key variables to previous studies, while subject to a larger set of countries and more complete time frame, suggests that our modelling approach is reasonable.23 Similar to the adoption of international travel restrictions, more globalized countries are quicker to implement domestic NPIs than their less globalized counterparts.

Notably, the estimates of HRs are larger in magnitude and with higher statistical significance compared to the set in Table 2 for the case of international travel restrictions. This shows that the relative speed of more globalized countries in adopting travel restrictions is slower than domestic NPIs, compared to less globalized countries, suggesting the former takes relatively more time to impose international travel restrictions, where one would expect international travel policies to be adopted relatively earlier. Thus, this may show that globalized countries are more reluctant, at least relative to the implementation of domestic interventions, to impose international restrictions. This is perhaps due to that domestic NPIs are relatively easier to actualize in more globalized countries, as legally binding international travel and trade agreements and regulations and the potential for massive economic losses [ 23, 33, 34, 35] would also impede the introduction of international travel restriction policies, relative to domestic NPIs. Secondly, and more importantly, we did not find any statistical evidence suggesting the effect of state capacity varies across countries with different levels of globalization as the interaction effect between KOF and government effectiveness is not significant. This result holds for the alternative measures of state capacity as well as using measures of health system capacity. Finally, we also show that the results of the placebo analysis are not sensitive to the type of domestic policy adopted (see Table S 4) nor when different dimensions of globalization were considered, as none of the HRs of their interaction terms is statistically significantly smaller than one.24

Nevertheless, while the results from the placebo analysis suggest that the results we see in Table 2 are less likely to arise from, e.g., confounding effects due to other unobserved variables, given the difference in nature of domestic and international NPIs,25 we cannot conclusively claim that this is in fact the case. For example, an alternative explanation for why more globalized countries respond relatively faster with domestic policies than do less globalized countries might be found in the fact that most of the domestic policies were implemented at a later stage of the pandemic (compared to travel restrictions which were typically adopted early on). Hence, globalized countries may be better at learning how to coordinate resources and implement social distancing policies.

COVID-19 case severity at the introduction to international travel restriction policies

We conduct an analysis using the Ordinary Least Squares model predicting the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases when each travel restrictions were implemented.26 In each regression, we control for the date when the country has the first confirmed COVID-19 case. For countries with no confirmed cases when the travel restriction was implemented (i.e., date of the first confirmed is later than the date of the policy adoption), we recode this variable to the date when the policy was adopted.

In Fig. 6, we present the estimates of KOF globalization index on COVID-19 prevalence (total number of cases in log (6A) and case per capita in log (6B)) at the time the travel restriction was implemented. We report the estimates obtained from the models without controlling for other factors except for the date of the first confirmed case and models in which we include a full set of control variables (full regression results are presented in Table S 5 and Table S 6). This includes government effectiveness, electoral democracy, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, GINI coefficient, number of hospital bed per 1000 people, urban population, population density, whether the country experienced SARS or MERS, and region dummies. Additionally, we also control for containment policies implemented before the introduction of the travel restrictions of interest. We proxy this variable by the average value of the stringency index from the beginning of the time period to the day before the travel policy was adopted.27

Coefficients of globalization index predicting the number of COVID-19 cases at the time of travel restriction. Cap represents 95% confidence intervals. Full regression results are presented in Table S 5 and Table S 6

We find strong positive associations between the globalization index and the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases (and per capita cases) at the time the travel restriction policy was first introduced when we only account for when the country was first exposed to COVID-19. In particular, with a one standard deviation increase in globalization index, the predicted number of COVID-19 cases increases by about 1.9 times when screening (or more strict policies) was first adopted, while cases per capita are 7.7 times higher. The globalization multiplier in COVID-19 cases (or cases per capita) is higher when considering firmer travel restrictions (i.e., adoption of quarantine and banning entry from high-risk regions) except for total lockdown. However, the coefficient estimates for globalization predicting COVID-19 cases at the time of total border closure is likely to be underestimated, as a number of highly globalized countries, such as the USA, Japan, South Korea, and a large group of European countries (with the exception of Germany) did not totally close their borders at any point.

Except for the adoption of screening and quarantine, the effect of globalization became statistically insignificant when other control variables are added to the model. The reduction in the effect size is not unexpected as globalization index is highly correlated with several control variables, such as GDP per capita (ρ = 0.631), government effectiveness (ρ = 0.751), and share of the population over 65 (ρ = 0.775).

Additionally, we find further evidence supporting the mediating role of state capacity to the effect of globalization as suggested by the statistically significant interaction effect between globalization and government effectiveness (Table 3). That is, among globalized countries, those with higher state capacity are more likely to have more COVID-19 cases when the government first imposes travel restrictions. This echoes the findings from the time-to-event analysis.

Table 3 State capacity mediating effect on globalization

Discussion

Non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel restrictions may be seen an immediate means by which governments can delay infectious disease emergence and transmission [ 43], particularly during the early stages of a pandemic when pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines are not available [ 43]. To our knowledge, this study is the first to explore the influence of globalization on the timing of international travel restrictions implemented during the recent coronavirus pandemic and the mediating effect of government effectiveness. From a sample of more than 100 countries, we observe that in general, more globalized countries are more likely to implement international travel restrictions policies than their less globalized counterparts. However, we also find that more globalized countries tend to have a higher number of domestic COVID-19 cases before implementing their first travel restriction and also react slower to their first confirmed domestic case of COVID-19. Additionally, we find that countries with a higher level of globalization may be relatively more reluctant to impose international travel restrictions compared to domestic social isolation policies as the effect of globalization on the likelihood to implement the former is smaller than the latter.

Among globalized nations, those with high measures of government effectiveness are less likely to impose international travel restriction policies, suggesting some mediating effect. Perhaps their lower likelihood to implement travel restriction policies is due to (over)confidence in their capability and resources to deal with disease outbreaks, particularly true for some North American and European countries with substantial health system capacity but limited recent experiences with such pandemics [ 48]. It may also be that high government effectiveness is associated with mechanisms to better evaluate potential costs and benefits of implementing different measures or require approvals, coordination, and action across various levels of (sometimes conflicting) governance. In particular, the interaction variables between government effectiveness and de jure political and economic globalization metrics (i.e., representing policies, trade agreements, and pre-conditions which support greater global mobility and trade) have the largest influence on the likelihood to adopt travel restrictions out of all (sub)dimensions of globalization. Perhaps because the penalties from restrictive travel policies are not insignificant, countries with high government effectiveness and more formalized economic and political integration are more inclined to spend time considering the advantages (e.g., delayed domestic COVID-19 emergence) and disadvantages (e.g., reduced trade and potential conflicts with incumbent trade partners) of travel restrictions because the disadvantages affect them so disproportionately. Out of the interactions between government effectiveness and de facto measures, social measures of globalization have the greatest influence on likelihood to implement travel restrictions. Perhaps a nation with high government effectiveness and more global social, interpersonal, and cultural flows needs more time to consider the practicality of implementing travel restrictions or have their hands tied by commitments to international treaties and travel agreements (i.e., they must maintain 'open' borders to honor their incumbent commitments) [ 23, 33, 34, 35]. Given this evidence, we propose that interaction variables between government effectiveness and (sub)dimensions of globalization may be suitable proxies in infectious disease models for the likelihood of a country implementing travel and border restriction policies during a global health crisis such as COVID-19.

Countries often implement policies similar to those employed by their major economic partners, rather than those of close cultural or geographical proximity [ 55]. They also tend to emulate policy interventions of 'successful' foreign incumbents [ 56], suggesting some degree of knowledge or information transfer. However, during the early days of a pandemic, there may be limited 'successful' nations to learn from. Our study provides further support to the former proposition: countries are more likely to implement a travel restriction policy if their nearest neighbor (in terms of share of non-resident visitor arrivals) does. The implementation of travel restrictions is related more strongly to confirmed cases in neighbor countries than it is to domestic cases; perhaps this is due to the aim of the policy to keep the disease out rather than minimize spread between nations. Finally, we also find that the likelihood of adopting a more restrictive travel policy (e.g., arrivals ban) is about three times higher if the country has already implemented a less strict policy, suggesting reduced inertia in enacting more restrictive policies once the first measure has been taken.

The benefits of incorporating individual behavioral reactions and governmental policies when modelling the recent coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China has been demonstrated [ 57] and the usefulness of including air travel in the modelling of global infectious disease transmission has been shown [ 58, 59]. Some empirical evidence points to a small yet significant positive relationship between the implementation of international travel restrictions and the time delay in infectious disease emergence and transmission in the focal country [ 22, 60, 61]. Broader policy evaluations are still missing. Our results indicate it might be reasonable to assume that global infectious disease forecasting could be improved by including the globalization index while accounting for the mediating role of government effectiveness. In particular, the de jure economic and political dimensions and de facto social dimensions could serve as proxies for an effective government's likelihood and speed to implement travel restriction policies and hence, to predict the likely time delays in disease emergence and transmission across national borders [ 62]. include domestic, nationwide pandemic policies in their model with results to suggest that such policies are effective and promptly enforced to demonstrate the greatest benefits. While the results from this study might suggest that including international travel restriction policies could bolster additional support for the adoption of such policies in times of mass disease outbreak, it is important to remember that travel restrictions do not (typically) completely mitigate the emergence of infectious diseases, instead delaying the importation of infectious diseases and potentially minimizing the overall severity of outbreak [ 43, 60] and hence, reducing the associated demand for health system resources at the same time. Geographical regions known hotspots for the emergence and re-emergence of infectious agents [ 63, 64] could be considered as early candidates for inbound country-specific travel restrictions in the event of mass disease outbreaks.

Due to the ongoing state of COVID-19 transmission and continued enforcement of travel restriction policies, we are not yet able to fully explore the relationship between globalization and the easing of travel restrictions over time. As this data becomes available in the coming months, we will be able to explore various phenomena related to globalization and the easing of international travel restrictions; for example, where nations open up too early (i.e., are these nations overconfident in their health system capability?) or the sequence of easing travel restriction (i.e., do more globalized countries lift restrictions entirely in one go or do they go from strict to less strict?). To this end, further research is required to assess the drivers behind a nation's decision to (not) close its border in a timely fashion, despite their level of globalization.

In any analysis seeking insights based on government-based data sources, there is concern regarding the availability and quality of reporting as well as the difficulties in drawing robust policy recommendations using these data and the research design of the study. We control for this by incorporating into our analyses a wide and varied set of data sources and analytical tools. In doing so, we aim to strengthen our findings by demonstrating multiple routes/methods to reach similar conclusions. Nevertheless, care should be taken in interpreting the results of our analyses as correlation does not mean causation. However, our findings seem to provide strong support for the notion that, in general, more globalized countries are more likely to implement travel restriction policies. However, if they are also high in government effectiveness, they tend to be more hesitant to implement travel restriction policies (both domestic and international), particularly when high in de jure economic and political globalization and de facto social globalization. Thus, suggesting some non-insignificant mediating effect. Additionally, measurement errors stemming from states underreporting of outbreaks due to fear of financial losses or lack of testing capacities [ 18] could also contribute to the explanations of our results.

Conclusion

The recent COVID-19 pandemic highlights the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of infectious diseases across the world, and demonstrates their varying degrees of success in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. This paper examines the influence of globalization, its (sub)dimensions, and government efficiency on the likelihood and timeliness of government interventions in the form of international travel restrictions. We find that countries with higher government effectiveness and globalization are more cautious regarding the implementation of international travel restriction policies. We also find that the de jure economic and political dimensions and de facto social dimension of globalization have the strongest influence on the timeliness of policy implementation. We also find that countries are more likely to implement travel restrictions if their neighbor countries (in terms of share of non-resident visitor arrivals) do and that a country is over three times more likely to implement a more restrictive international travel policy measure if they have already adopted a less restrictive one first. These findings highlight the relationship between globalization and protectionist policies as governments respond to significant global events such as a public health crisis as in the case of the current COVID-19 pandemic. The findings suggest that the inclusion of such interaction variables in infectious disease models may improve the accuracy of predictions around likely time delays of disease emergence and transmission across national borders and as such, open the possibility for improved planning and coordination of transnational responses in the management of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases into the future.

Availability of data and materials

Data and materials used in the study are available online on Open Science Framework (Center for Open Science; see https://osf.io/qg6kc).

Notes

1. While we follow the definition in [ 44], we acknowledge that there could be potential measurement errors with how the variable is measured. For example, countries may have different criteria for screening and arrival ban policies, which may vary due to the relationship with the target countries, or border closure due to non-COVID 19 reasons (e.g., war). Within country difference in levels of enforcement and coverage (e.g., state varying or selected airport screening) of the travel restrictions may also contribute to the measurement error. In addition, the measure records policy for foreign travelers and not citizens (e.g., travelling to the target country). For detailed interpretation of the variable, see https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker/blob/master/documentation/interpretation_guide.md.

2. The average globalization index among countries (for those with KOF data, mean = 55) without OxCGRT records is slightly less than the global average (mean = 62, 95%CI = [60.1, 64]).

3. Specifically, the strength of travel restrictions, for a given country i, that is influenced by the country's neighbors indexed by j, can be written as: \( Restrictio{n}_{it}=\sum \limits_{j=1}^N{\gamma}_j Restrictio{n}_{jt} \), where 0 <  γ j < 1 is the share of country i's visitors that come from country j.

4. Additionally, we check the robustness of our results using the number of physicians per 1000 people and nurses and midwives per 1000 people; we present those results in the supplementary information.

5. Regions are defined as Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America.

6. While the marginal risk set model treats each failure event as an independent process, the hazards of implementing more restrictive travel policies may not be unconditional to the occurrence of less restrictive policy being implemented. We capture this uncertainty by incorporating a time-varying variable indicating whether the country has implemented a less restrictive policy in our model.

7. Cronert [ 36] stratified countries by the date of the first confirmed case, however, we believe this might cause over stratification. We also group together countries that did not record their first confirmed case before April ( n = 10).

8. This approach is also used by [ 36, 50] when examining the adoption rate of domestic NPI policies [ 38]. defines the beginning time-at-risk as the date of the first confirmed COVID-19 case of the country, thus treating countries which implemented a policy before having the first confirmed case as left censored observations. While this approach is more sensible when examining the adoption rate of domestic NPI policies (i.e., country is not yet at risk for the failure - policy implementation), it risks removing countries that engaged in precautionary strategy, i.e., implementing travel restrictions before domestic outbreaks of COVID-19.

9. Since the effect of travel restrictions might delay an outbreak of the virus, which itself might be more salient for more globalized countries, we check the correlation by censoring negative gaps (travel policy implementation before first confirmed COVID-19 case) to zero. The correlation is highly statistically significant, while the effect size is smaller ( ρ = 0.248; p = 0.0011; n = 170). Four countries were excluded from the calculation as they have zero COVID-19 cases during the entire sample period. The correlation increases to ρ = 0.366 ( p < 0.001) when the end of the sample period date is used to calculate the first policy implementation-first case gap for these countries.

10. We obtain very similar results when confirmed cases are adjusted for population size, i.e., log confirmed COVID-19 cases per million people ( ρ = 0.397; p < 0.001; n = 173).

11. In a separate model, we control for death rate instead of number of new confirmed cases in the last seven days; the effect of either variable is statistically insignificant when added separately in the model or together.

12. In addition, the effect is more pronounced if health capacity is measured with number of physicians per 1000 people. However, using the number of nurses and midwives per 1000 has no effect.

13. The HR estimates of each globalization dimension are also presented in Figure S6 (diamonds) for reference.

14. In a more sophisticated model where we include all interaction terms between each KOF subdimension (three de facto and three de jure dimensions) and government effectiveness, we find that the estimate of the interaction effect with de jure political dimension is most economically and statistically significant.

15. In unreported analysis, we included policy recommendation of closure and containment. This does not alter the findings.

16. For example, we find some evidence of policy diffusion beyond the OECD context [ 38], while timing of domestic NPIs adoption is not sensitive to foreign COVID-19 case. We also find robust evidence that countries with a large state capacity delay implementation of domestic COVID-19 policies [ 36, 39]. Interestingly, we also find that countries with relevant past experience (SARS and MERS) intervened relatively early [ 48].

17. Notably, the HRs for gathering and internal movement restrictions are statistically (at 10% level) larger than one.

18. Where the former are purposed to prevent and control mass transmission of the virus within the country and the latter aims to avoid the virus from coming in to the country. In particular, countries adopt travel restrictions at an earlier stage compared to domestic policies (between mid-March to April).

19. If the country did not adopt the travel restriction, we take the COVID-19 case statistics at the end of the sample period ( n = 4 for entry ban and n = 37 for total border closure). Since we use cumulative case statistics, the resulting coefficients are likely to be underestimated. This is because the sample of countries that did not implement travel bans has a higher level of globalisation than the mean, including the UK and the USA.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, 2 George St, Brisbane, QLD, 4000, Australia

Steve J. Bickley, Ho Fai Chan & Benno Torgler

2. Centre for Behavioural Economics, Society and Technology (BEST), 2 George St, Brisbane, QLD, 4000, Australia

Steve J. Bickley, Ho Fai Chan, David Stadelmann & Benno Torgler

3. Department of Global Economics & Management, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Ahmed Skali

4. University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany

David Stadelmann

5. CREMA - Centre for Research in Economics, Management, and the Arts, Südstrasse 11, CH-8008, Zürich, Switzerland

David Stadelmann & Benno Torgler

Contributions

SJB, HFC and BT designed the research; HFC extracted the data; SJB, HFC and BT analyzed the data and drafted the paper. AS and DS revised the manuscript and provided substantial inputs. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ho Fai Chan.

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Steve J. Bickley, Ho Fai Chan and Benno Torgler contributed equally to this work

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Bickley, S.J., Chan, H.F., Skali, A. et al. How does globalization affect COVID-19 responses?. Global Health 17, 57 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-021-00677-5
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Keywords

Coronavirus

COVID-19

SARS-CoV-2

Globalization

Travel restriction

Border closure

Health screening

Survival analysis

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
How does globalization affect COVID-19 responses? - Globalization and Health

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Background The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of coronavirus across the world and has demonstrated the varied success of such approaches in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus.

# data[].attributes.headline
Elon Musk's Twitter deal back on - and he says it's the path to creating 'everything app X'

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Elon Musk's Twitter deal back on - and he says it's the path to creating 'everything app X'

# data[].attributes.body
Elon Musk is proposing to purchase the for a total value of $44bn (£38.4bn). The idea behind his new app is an app, that combines messaging, social media, payments-and lack of reliance on ad revenue, similar to the Chinese WeChat. That already has more than one billion users, but no equivalent exists in the West. Musk has recently gone on Twitter to stir controversy, such as suggesting a 'peace plan' for the Ukraine-Russia war that drew provocation from Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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Euro has been strengthening against the pins in recent months, even after the pound started to recover slightly after its dramatic fall from the brexit elections in 2016 . Truss’s high borrowing & low taxing  budget has impacted greatly on this.
Euro is now 8% higher than sterling , essentially meaning British goods and services are 8% cheaper than before.
However, this may not be of benefit to Irish businesses. Ireland exported around 18 billion euro worth of good to the UK last year, but now if their prices become higher they are therefore less competitive and may suffer as a result. Conversely , within Ireland if it is cheaper for companies to source resources from the uk than from Irish producers they will suffer doubly as a result. Similarly, it may become marginally cheaper for Irish people to visit the UK, but with the decreased value of sterling it will likely result in British tourists spending less money in Ireland.

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the article explains how Bank of Ireland has lost over one Billion euro due to Liz Truss and her economic policies and the run off effect it has had because of Bank of Irelands relations with the British postal system.

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Musk acknowledged that humanoid robots do not have enough intelligence to navigate the real world without being explicitly instructed. But he said Tesla can leverage its expertise in AI and key components to develop and produce smart, yet less expensive, humanoid robots at scale. This article shows how the worlds technological evolution will inevitably leave to a loss in jobs as technology advances.
The technological global development will eventually lead to deglobalisation as jobs that were previously done by people will now be done by robots leaving people unemployed.

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Business reporter, BBC News

Three of the world's biggest Covid vaccine makers have seen off attempts to make them share the know-how to make their jabs.

A group of investors put proposals to the annual shareholders meetings of Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and Moderna but were voted down.

They argued sharing this intellectual property would speed up the rollout of vaccines by boosting manufacturing.

But the drug-makers say they are making doses faster than they can be used.

More than 11.4 billion doses of vaccine have now been distributed worldwide, although a third of the global population have not had a single dose, according the head of the World Health Organization Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus.

Taking the unprecedented step of addressing the Moderna annual general meeting (AGM), he said their help to boost vaccine production "would save lives, decrease the risk of variants and reduce the pandemic's economic toll".

But his argument that the "global inequity would lead to many more deaths" was not enough to convince shareholders. Only 24% backed the idea of the company undertaking a feasibility study into transferring intellectual property and technical know-how to manufacturers in low and middle-income countries.

Amongst Pfizer shareholders only 27.3% were in favour a similar motion. Johnson & Johnson has not yet released numbers but the proposal also failed there.

Netherlands-based Achmea Investment Management is leading a group of 65 firms who collectively control $3.5tn of assets, and support the idea.

"I think a significant amount of the investors have shown us support of these steps," Frank Wagemans, Achmea's senior engagement specialist told the BBC.

But he added: "We need more in the months and years ahead because we know the Covid pandemic is not over yet."

He said it was a "small win" that Moderna had at least introduced a link between executive bonuses and how well the firm meets demand for Covid vaccines from less well-off countries.

"The global economic recovery continues to be constrained by unequal access to tools to prevent and treat Covid-19," International Monetary Fund economist Ruchir Agarwal told the BBC.

The development body says an improved roll-out can help boost the global economy by $9tn by 2025.

Last year Moderna delivered 807 million doses of Covid vaccines, which made it a profit of $12.2bn. It says that more than a quarter of these went to low or middle-income countries.

Laying out the case against the shareholder proposal, its board of directors said it could have delivered more if it hadn't been for "last mile" difficulties and highlighted Africa as an example.

These problems include refrigeration capacity, the availability of health workers and vaccine hesitancy. The US based firm also says its working with its partners to increase production and is building a manufacturing facility in Kenya to increase future availability of vaccines.

Albert Bourla, chief executive of Pfizer, which developed its vaccine with BioNTech, told his shareholders that 3.4 billion vaccine doses have now been distributed in 179 countries.

Opposing the sharing of its intellectual property, the company's board argued that "vaccine manufacturing is a biological production that is extraordinarily complex", involving 280 ingredients from 86 suppliers in 19 countries. They added there was a risk to patients if other manufacturers were not able to meet all the requirements to make its vaccines properly.

It is expanding production to four billion does this year, with a quarter going to less well-off countries. Those with the lowest incomes will get the vaccines at cost price, Mr Bourla told shareholders.

Johnson & Johnson has had hundreds of millions of dollars of US taxpayers support to develop its vaccine. It says last year it worked with the African Union and Covax alliance to provide 900 million doses at a not-for-profit price and that it is working on a licencing agreement with an African company that would ensure safety standards are adhered to.

The proposals to share intellectual property were submitted by Oxfam USA, which owns shares in each of the pharmaceutical firms, allowing it to push for changes.

The arguments of all three against its motions "don't hold water", according to Robbie Silverman, from Oxfam USA.

"What the donation-based status quo has achieved is 74% vaccination rates in rich countries and 12% vaccination rates in poor countries," he said.

Vaccine hesitancy has been exaggerated by the drug makers, he told the BBC, adding that a system controlled by a few giant companies has caused distribution problems.

"It makes it very hard to plan on the ground when you don't know how many doses are coming," he said.

"Lower incomes countries are saying give us the tools that we need to manufacture our own doses for our own citizens, and that locally based manufacturing will solve many problems."

Achmea's Mr Wagemans is optimistic change will still come, saying it takes time to change corporate policies and the votes sent a "strong message towards management".

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Investors lose vote to share Covid vaccine know-how

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Business reporter, BBC News Three of the world's biggest Covid vaccine makers have seen off attempts to make them share the know-how to make their jabs. A group of investors put proposals to the annual shareholders meetings of Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and Moderna but were voted down.

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Two lines on Nord 1 were damaged and one line on Nord 2 was damaged. Seismologists based in Denmark and Sweden suggest that sizeable explosions on the order of 100 kilograms of TNT occurred in both incidents.

According to initial estimates, a total of 500 million cubic meters of gas was lost, which is the equivalent of 8 million tons of carbon dioxide, or 1/5000 of annual global CO2 emissions.

In a normal political and business environment, all three damaged sections could probably be repaired within a year by a single repair fleet.

Nоrd Stream AG is formally a Swiss company, not subject to any sanctions, and a member of the Pipeline Subsea and Repair Intervention Pool led by Norway’s Equinor, which provides its members with access to specialist equipment and crews.
Nord Stream 2, however, was sanctioned by the United States, and the pipelaying was completed solely by Russian ships.

Some commentators have already leaped to self-serving conclusions that simply raise eyebrows. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, for example, claimed that the attacks occurred in “countries that are completed controlled by the U.S. intelligence services.” Fox News television personality Tucker Carlson also implied a U.S. role in the explosions. “If you are Vladimir Putin, you would have to be a suicidal moron to blow up your own energy pipeline,” Carlson argued. “That’s the one thing you would never do.”

Russia has lost the opportunity to offer an easy restoration of gas supplies to Europe in exchange for concessions from the West. For the Europeans, there is no longer the risk that binding contracts to buy more expensive gas will become loss-making if Russia suddenly floods the market with cheap gas following some sort of deescalation.

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Elon Musk gets into Twitter tussle with Zelensky over plan to Russian war

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Elon Musk gets into Twitter tussle with Zelensky over plan to Russian war

# data[].attributes.body
Musk proposes that Ukraine give up the Crimea region in order to reach peace with Russia. He also created a twitter poll asking if the "will of the people" should decide whether certain regions should remain part of Ukraine or become part of Russia. He also said that since the population of Russia is triple the population of Ukraine, so he believes that it is unlikely that Ukraine will win the war. A Kremlin representative supports Musk's involvement in the war, meanwhile many people disagree with his views and believe he is not in a position to comment on the state of the war

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60,000 Ukranian Refugees Expected in Ireland by the End of the Year

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60,000 Ukranian Refugees Expected in Ireland by the End of the Year

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So far 48,700 people fleeing the conflict in Ukraine have come to Ireland that number is said to increase by almost 60,000 by the end of the year.
Almost 38,000 Ukranian people have so far required accommodation provided by the state. They are being housed in serviced accommodation eg. hostels, hotels and B&Bs.
Government departments are working on providing more long term housing solutions like modular housing and refurbished buildings.
The number of international applicants com ing here is also increasing. More than 15,000 applicants are currently being accommodated by the state.
Agencies are experiencing persistent difficulties in securing accommodation for people seeking international protection and more resources will be dedicated to working with communities to promote intergation.

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Protests in Iran regarding the Morality Police’s enforcement of the Iranian dress code have sparked once again after a 22-year-old woman named Mahsa Amini died in police custody after being detained for violating the country’s dress code, though the police deny that they mistreated her, claiming she died of a heart attack. Iranians have taken to the streets of the capital Tehran to protest her death.

Many protestors poured into Tehran, chanting “Death to the dictator”. They also chanted against the police and damaged a police vehicle, displaying the distrust of authorities present in the Iranian public.

A number of protestors in other areas got on motorbikes and overturned rubbish cans and chanted against the authorities before speeding off.

The hijab has been compulsory for women in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the morality police must enforce that rule. They have been criticized in recent years, especially for their treatment of young women.

This is not the first time this issue has been protested in Iran; dozens of women removed their headscarves in protest in 2017. This merely represents the latest protest from the Iranian people in regard to the dress code.

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Iranians have taken to the streets of the capital Tehran to protest the death of a young woman who had been detained for violating the country's conservative dress code.

The semiofficial Fars news agency said students in many Tehran universities gathered in protest on Monday, demanding an investigation into the death of Mahsa Amini and the dismantling of the morality police, who were holding her when she died.

Witnesses said demonstrators poured into Keshavarz Boulevard, a central thoroughfare, chanting "Death to the Dictator". They also chanted against the police and damaged a police vehicle. The witnesses spoke on condition of anonymity out of security concerns.

Late on Monday, Associated Press (AP) news agency reporters saw torched rubbish bins and rocks strewn across some downtown intersections as the smell of tear gas hovered in the air. Police closed roads leading to the central Vali-e Asr square. Plainclothes security forces and groups of riot police could be seen throughout the area, and mobile internet service was down in central Tehran.

Dozens of protesters on motorbikes briefly appeared at a couple of junctions, where they overturned rubbish cans and chanted against the authorities before speeding off.

Meanwhile, videos circulating on social media showed the third day of demonstrations in Kurdish-majority cities in western Iran as well as the northern city of Rasht and a university in the central city of Isfahan. AP could not independently verify the authenticity of the footage.

The morality police detained the 22-year-old Amini last Tuesday for not covering her hair with the Islamic headscarf, known as the hijab, which is mandatory for Iranian women.

Police say she died of a heart attack and deny that she was mistreated. They released closed-circuit video footage last week purportedly showing the moment she collapsed. Her family says she had no history of heart trouble.

Amini, who was Kurdish, was buried on Saturday in her home city of Saqez in western Iran. Protests erupted there after her funeral and police fired tear gas to disperse demonstrators on Saturday and Sunday. Several protesters were arrested.

Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi, who departed for New York on Monday to address the United Nations General Assembly, has ordered an investigation and pledged to pursue the case in a phone call with Amini's family. The judiciary has launched a probe, and a parliamentary committee is also looking into the incident.

The hijab has been compulsory for women in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the morality police are charged with enforcing that and other restrictions. The force has been criticised in recent years, especially over its treatment of young women.

Dozens of women removed their headscarves in protest in 2017. Iranians have also taken to the streets in recent years in response to an economic crisis exacerbated by Western sanctions linked to Iran's nuclear programme.

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Photos: Iranians protest over the death of Mahsa Amini

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Iranians have taken to the streets of the capital Tehran to protest the death of a young woman who had been detained for violating the country's conservative dress code. The semiofficial Fars news agency said students in many Tehran universities gathered in protest on Monday, demanding an investigation into the death of Mahsa Amini and the dismantling of the morality police, who were holding her when she died.

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60,000 Ukrainian coming to ireland, Department of children unsure of whether they can provide accommodation and so they are discussing whether they can with the Defence Forces in non-tented accomadation.

Almost 38,000 Ukrainian people have so far required accommodation provided by the State.

More than 32,000 are being housed in "serviced accommodation", like hotels, hostels, B&Bs and commercial self-catering settings.

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By Jan 2023- 18.6% predicted inflation rate
13% Oct 2022
2022- 11% contraction
Worse than world wars
estimated increase of of 1,700 per annum
But high profit for energy companies?
Average person hit hardest
However unemplayment low and housing price steady
UK very energy import dependent
Supply chain issues also adding to inflation
It may ease slightly after winter?

T.A.

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Elon Musk has said that he expects that he’ll be ready to take orders for his new humanoid robot in three to five years.
With this production Musk aims to make his company Tesla a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence and to stop being known as a company that just makes “cool cars”
He calls the project Optimus and Musk admits that “there’s still a lot of work to be done to refine” this product.
He says existing humanoid robots were missing a brain, but says that Optimus would be an “extremely capable robot”.
Many reactions were positive

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The IMF is a globalist organisation whose overall goal is to help economically suffering countries to avoid a recession. It has many success, notable remark above with Serbia

"The fiscal accounts, with the second-largest deficit in Europe in 2014, boasted a surplus in 2017"

It has produced a greater connection with surrounding economies and countries by removing protectionism policies and practically making them open up to the global market

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The Unavoidable Moral Hypocrisy of Ukraine’s Refugee Crisis (foreignpolicy

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Engineers have linked Ukraine to an electricity grid spanning continental Europe, allowing the country to decouple its power system from Russia, on Wednesday.
Ukraine and Moldova were successfully synchronized with the Continental European Power System.

Georg Zachmann said the switch will allow energy suppliers in the continental grid to supply electricity to Ukraine if needed. this will allow Ukraine to turn off coal-based power plant. which will benefit the environment.

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War in Europe – Putin mobilises 300,000 troops for war in Ukraine & warns he’s not bluffing with Nuclear treats.

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Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

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What is meant by deglobalization, what does it mean for efforts to address global challenges, and are there any benefits to having a less globalized world?

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M K Has Globalisation actually gone too far.docx

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https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20220905-is-the-world-overpopulated

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This year, the human population on Earth is expected to reach eight billion. To mark the occasion, BBC Future takes a look at one of the most controversial issues of our time.

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Hindu nationalists now pose a global problem

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Hindu nationalists now pose a global problem

# data[].attributes.body
India’s right wing party leader, Modi, leads a party whose political philosophy is based on islamophobia. This philosophy has manifested in violent demonstrations both in India and the Uk, US, Australia and Canada as well as several other countries. The narrative that this party sets is carried out by the Hindu population around the globe. This is encouraged by world leaders as both Trump and Biden have made friendly relationships with Modi. The violence has become extreme and unpredictable. It is case of Edward Said’s Orientalism, where there is an US and THEM. A case of this is seen when a hindu man murdered a sikh man after a Pakistan vs. India cricket match. He was heard to have said “Death to Pakistan” before he killed him.

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Turmoil for British financial markets continued to hit large Irish stock market companies, with Bank of Ireland having shed over €1bn of its value since the new UK government of Liz Truss unveiled a disastrous mini-budget last Friday.

The crisis unfolded for sterling and British bonds after international financial debt markets took fright at the unfunded economic plans by Ms Truss and her chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng, involving tax cuts and large borrowings.

Sterling slumped in recent days to a historic low against the dollar, and British yields or interest rates on British bonds or gilts jumped under the strain.

International fears spread that the loss of confidence could spark a meltdown. The IMF issued an unprecedented rebuke to the British government over its economic plans on Tuesday night. The Bank of England was forced to intervene on the debt markets to buy up billions worth of British bonds to stop British interest rates spiralling to levels that would have had punitive effects on the cost of borrowing for British companies and households.

By Thursday, the intervention had helped stabilise sterling at $1.095 against the dollar and at 88.8 pence against the euro, and to pull back the sharp rise in yields of British bond. The yield on British 10-year bond has nonetheless risen sharply over recent days, to 4.1%. That compares with implied lower cost of borrowing for the Irish State of 2.8%.

Many economists say the financial turmoil of recent weeks will likely make the looming recession in Britain even worse, by further undermining consumer confidence and rattling UK households over sharply-rising mortgage costs at a time when utility bills have already rocketed. Large Irish companies that generate significant revenues and profits from Britain face a double whammy from the fall in sterling when they translate revenues back to euro, as well as from the prospects of a deeper-than-expected downturn there.

Of the two main banks here, Bank of Ireland lends the most into Britian via a longstanding link with the British Post Office, through which it offers consumer loans and savings accounts in Britain.

Bank of Ireland shares fell 6.5% on Thursday and have now lost 17% since last Friday morning, before the unveiling of the UK's mini-budget.

Bank of Ireland shares fell 6.5% on Thursday and have now lost 17% since Friday morning, before the unveiling of the UK's mini-budget. That has taken out over €1bn from its stock market capitalisation since the onset of the British financial turmoil.

AIB shares have fallen by 8% since last Friday.

John Cronin, head of financials at broker Goodbody, said that Irish banks in Britain face a hit to loans growth and the effects of the fall in sterling when earnings are translated into euro.

Economist Jim Power said Britain is now less attractive for Irish businesses, with exporters such as agri-food firms facing more difficulties.

"Its financial markets are in turmoil, the economy is in turmoil, and the political system is in turmoil, and there is always the risk of contagion," Mr Power said, citing the concerns of the IMF and the White House of potential fallout from Britain for global markets.

Shares in other Irish companies with large operations in Britain have also been hit. Shares in building products firm Kingspan fell 8% on Thursday and Dalata, Ireland's largest hotels owner, fell by 5%.

Ryanair bosses will be looking out to see whether the financial turmoil of the past week weakens British consumer confidence.

The airline's shares fell over 4% on Thursday and have now fallen 10% since last Friday.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Bank of Ireland value falls €1bn since UK financial turmoil onset

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Turmoil for British financial markets continued to hit large Irish stock market companies, with Bank of Ireland having shed over €1bn of its value since the new UK government of Liz Truss unveiled a disastrous mini-budget last Friday.

# data[].attributes.body
Iranians protests:

Following the alleged mistreatment of a woman who went against the conservative values of her country, her death sparked a country wide protest. The cultural values upheld by the government are being viewed as oppressive, and so the citizens of the country are staging an uprising.

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Waving a Palestinian flag on British streets 'may not be legitimate', Suella Braverman warns _ UK News _ Sky News

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De-Globalisation Assignment H1 example 3

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De-Globalisation Assignment H1 example 2 

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Putin mobilizes 300,000 troops for war in Ukraine and warns he's not bluffing with nuclear threat

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Putin has put the Russian people and economy on a wartime footing as Moscow's invasion of Ukraine continues.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Turmoil for British financial markets continued to hit large Irish stock market companies, with Bank of Ireland having shed over €1bn of its value since the new UK government of Liz Truss unveiled a disastrous mini-budget last Friday.

The crisis unfolded for sterling and British bonds after international financial debt markets took fright at the unfunded economic plans by Ms Truss and her chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng, involving tax cuts and large borrowings.

Sterling slumped in recent days to a historic low against the dollar, and British yields or interest rates on British bonds or gilts jumped under the strain.

International fears spread that the loss of confidence could spark a meltdown. The IMF issued an unprecedented rebuke to the British government over its economic plans on Tuesday night. The Bank of England was forced to intervene on the debt markets to buy up billions worth of British bonds to stop British interest rates spiralling to levels that would have had punitive effects on the cost of borrowing for British companies and households.

By Thursday, the intervention had helped stabilise sterling at $1.095 against the dollar and at 88.8 pence against the euro, and to pull back the sharp rise in yields of British bond. The yield on British 10-year bond has nonetheless risen sharply over recent days, to 4.1%. That compares with implied lower cost of borrowing for the Irish State of 2.8%.

Many economists say the financial turmoil of recent weeks will likely make the looming recession in Britain even worse, by further undermining consumer confidence and rattling UK households over sharply-rising mortgage costs at a time when utility bills have already rocketed. Large Irish companies that generate significant revenues and profits from Britain face a double whammy from the fall in sterling when they translate revenues back to euro, as well as from the prospects of a deeper-than-expected downturn there.

Of the two main banks here, Bank of Ireland lends the most into Britian via a longstanding link with the British Post Office, through which it offers consumer loans and savings accounts in Britain.

Bank of Ireland shares fell 6.5% on Thursday and have now lost 17% since last Friday morning, before the unveiling of the UK's mini-budget.

Bank of Ireland shares fell 6.5% on Thursday and have now lost 17% since Friday morning, before the unveiling of the UK's mini-budget. That has taken out over €1bn from its stock market capitalisation since the onset of the British financial turmoil.

AIB shares have fallen by 8% since last Friday.

John Cronin, head of financials at broker Goodbody, said that Irish banks in Britain face a hit to loans growth and the effects of the fall in sterling when earnings are translated into euro.

Economist Jim Power said Britain is now less attractive for Irish businesses, with exporters such as agri-food firms facing more difficulties.

"Its financial markets are in turmoil, the economy is in turmoil, and the political system is in turmoil, and there is always the risk of contagion," Mr Power said, citing the concerns of the IMF and the White House of potential fallout from Britain for global markets.

Shares in other Irish companies with large operations in Britain have also been hit. Shares in building products firm Kingspan fell 8% on Thursday and Dalata, Ireland's largest hotels owner, fell by 5%.

Ryanair bosses will be looking out to see whether the financial turmoil of the past week weakens British consumer confidence.

The airline's shares fell over 4% on Thursday and have now fallen 10% since last Friday.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Bank of Ireland value falls €1bn since UK financial turmoil onset

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Turmoil for British financial markets continued to hit large Irish stock market companies, with Bank of Ireland having shed over €1bn of its value since the new UK government of Liz Truss unveiled a disastrous mini-budget last Friday.

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Ukraine war: Six key developments to know this weekend

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1. Voting at gunpoint: 'Referendums' continue in occupied areas

Moscow-installed officials in occupied east Ukraine are continuing with a referendum on whether to join Russia.

The voting process was described as "an opinion survey under the gun barrel" by a local Ukrainian official, adding that Moscow-backed local authorities sent armed escorts to accompany election officials and to take down the names of individuals who voted against joining Russia.

Election officials accompanied by police officers carried ballots to homes and set up mobile polling stations, citing safety reasons. The votes are set to wrap up Tuesday.

Ukraine and its Western allies say the referendums underway in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in the south and the eastern Luhansk and Donetsk regions have no legal force.

They alleged the votes were an illegitimate attempt by Moscow to seize Ukrainian territory stretching from the Russian border to the Crimean Peninsula.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged Ukrainians in occupied regions to undermine the referendums and to share information about the people conducting "this farce".
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2. Lavrov pledges Russia's 'full protection' of areas annexed by Moscow

Russia's top diplomat on Saturday said regions of Ukraine where widely-derided referendums are being held would be under Russia's "full protection" if they are annexed by Moscow, amid fears Russia could further escalate the conflict and even use nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing the UN General Assembly and the world's media in New York, attempted to justify Russia's February invasion of its neighbour, repeating Moscow's false claims that the elected government in Kyiv was illegitimately installed, filled with "neo-Nazis" and oppressed Russian speakers in the country's east.

Russia on Friday launched referendums in four eastern Ukrainian regions aimed at annexing territory it has taken by force.

Kyiv said residents were being coerced into voting and were not allowed to leave the regions during the four-day vote, which Western nations dismissed as a sham designed to justify an escalation of the seven-month-old war.

"Following those referendums, Russia of course will respect the expression of the will of those people who for many long years have been suffering from the abuses of the neo-Nazi regime," Lavrov said at a news conference after he addressed the assembly.

Asked if Russia would have grounds for using nuclear weapons to defend annexed regions of Ukraine, Lavrov said Russian territory, including territory "further enshrined" in Russia's constitution in the future, "is under the full protection of the state."

"All of the laws, doctrines, concepts and strategies of the Russian Federation apply to all of its territory," he said, also referring specifically to Russia's doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons.
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3. Biden promises more sanctions if Russia annexes eastern areas

Joe Biden said the United States and its allies would impose "swift and severe" new economic sanctions on Russia if it annexes territory in Ukraine in "referendums" that continue Saturday.

"Russia's referendums are a sham, a false pretext for trying to annex parts of Ukraine by force," the US president said on Friday evening.

Earlier, in a joint statement, the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) had called on "all countries to unequivocally reject these sham referendums", "shams" that "have neither legal effect nor legitimacy".

On Friday evening, in his daily address to the nation, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also denounced "pseudo-referendums".

4. Ukrainian army slowed down by onset of autumn, as winter threatens to freeze its progress

The onset of autumnal weather, with rains making fields too muddy for tanks, is beginning to cloud Ukraine's efforts to take back more Russian-held territory before winter freezes the battlefields, a Washington-based think tank said Sunday.

Russia, meanwhile, pressed on with its call-up of hundreds of thousands of men to throw into the seven-month war, seeking to reverse its recent losses.

It also deployed suicide drones on Sunday against the Ukrainian port city of Odesa, Ukrainian authorities said. No casualties were immediately reported.

For Ukrainian and Russian military planners, the clock is ticking, with the approach of winter expected to make fighting more complicated.

Already, rainy weather is bringing muddy conditions that are starting to limit the mobility of tanks and other heavy weaponry, according to the Institute for the Study of War.

But the think tank said Ukrainian forces are still gaining ground in their counteroffensive, launched in late August, that has spectacularly rolled back the Russian occupation across large areas of the northeast and which also prompted Russian President Vladimir Putin's new drive for reinforcements.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy earlier this week warned the assembly that he believes Moscow wants to spend the winter getting ready for a new offensive or at least preparing fortifications while mobilising more troops.

Regardless, he declared that his forces would ultimately oust Russian troops from all of Ukraine.

"We can do it with the force of arms. But we need time," said Zelenskyy, the only leader who was allowed to address the assembly by video this year.

5. New penalties for dodging Russian mobilisation calls

The Kremlin has toughened penalties for anyone who refuses orders to mobilise to the military.

On Saturday, President Putin signed amendments which include up to 10 years in prison for military personnel who desert or refuse to fight during mobilisation.

He also signed a law that facilitates access to Russian citizenship for foreigners who join the army for at least a year, at a time when Moscow is looking for all means to recruit more men to fight in Ukraine.

The Russian Defence Ministry shared videos on Saturday of reservists joining the mobilisation effort announced by President Vladimir Putin earlier this week.

The ministry released footage of men arriving at a recruitment office in Vladivostok in Russia's far east.

After their paperwork was taken care of, they received their uniforms, with some seen receiving rifles.

Around 300,000 reservists are expected to be called up in the partial mobilisation to join the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called on Russian recruits to sabotage and desert the military if they are called up under what Putin announced Wednesday.

"If you get into the Russian army, sabotage any activity of the enemy, hinder any Russian operations, provide us with any important information about the occupiers -- their bases, headquarters, warehouses with ammunition," Zelenskyy said.

6. Sri Lankans describe abuse as Russian captives in Ukraine

A group of Sri Lankans held captive by Russian forces in an agricultural factory in eastern Ukraine said Saturday that they were beaten and abused for months before escaping on foot as the Russians withdrew from the Kharkiv region this month.

Recounting their ordeal to reporters in Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city, one of the seven Sri Lankans said he was shot in the foot; another had his toenail ripped off and was slammed in the head with the butt of a rifle.

Ukrainian officials described their treatment as torture.

"Every day we were cleaning toilets and bathrooms," Dilukshan Robertclive, one of the former captives, said. "Some days Russians came and beat our people, our Sri Lanka people."

Four of the seven were medical students in the city of Kupiansk, and three were working there when Russian forces poured across the border in late February and occupied large swaths of eastern and southern Ukraine.

The group said they were captured at the first checkpoint out of Kupiansk and then taken to Vovchansk, near the border with Russia, where they were held in the factory with around 20 Ukrainians.

"They took our passports, other documents, phones, clothes, and locked us up in a room," said Sharujan Gianeswaran, speaking in Tamil to an AP journalist by phone.

"There were also Ukrainian people with us, and they were questioned and sent away in 10 days, 15 days or one month. With us they never spoke, because they could not understand our language."

Police said the factory housed a Russian "torture centre" - one of 18 in the Kharkiv region.

"They were bound and blindfolded. After that they were captured and then taken to the city of Vovchansk," said Serhiy Bolvinov, head of the investigative department of the National Police in Kharkiv.

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Ukraine war: Six key developments to know this weekend

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Moscow-installed officials in occupied east Ukraine are continuing with a referendum on whether to join Russia. The voting process was described as "an opinion survey under the gun barrel" by a local Ukrainian official, adding that Moscow-backed local authorities sent armed escorts to accompany election officials and to take down the names of individuals who voted against joining Russia.

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(Image: Cllr Liam Quaide)

A group of Native American people visited Cork's Kindred Spirits monument this week to celebrate the friendship with the Irish people that was formed after to acts of solidarity during each other's time of need.

Over covid a relief fund was started for the Navajo Nation and Hopi Reservation Native Americans and it received tends of thousands of donations from the Irish people.

Ireland's efforts towards that fund came as a mark to remember the famine, when the Choctaw donated $170 (around $5,000 in today's money) in 1847 to help feed people here despite it coming shortly after their own experience of the Trail of Tears.

Their generous act was later remembered with the Kindred Spirits sculpture in Midleton - which depicts identical feathers shaped into a bowl to represent the gift of food. It was created by Alex Pentek of the Sculpture factory in Cork and installed in Bailick Park in 2015.

Over the pandemic the monument's meaning was highlighted and it reminded everyone of what happened right as the Najavo Nation and Hopi Reservation Native Americans had a fund setup during their hour of need. There was then a massive drive to repay the favour and unlikely friendship made headlines across the globe at the time.

On Tuesday there was a lovely event, organised by Kindred Spirits Ireland, as people from different indigenous American backgrounds travelled here to visit the park.

Kindred Spirits Ireland is a collaboration among indigenous Irish hosts, and representatives of First Nations from the Americas and around the world.

Heads from different groups as well as a delegation of women leaders from the Navajo and Crow Creek Sioux Nations were there and thanked the people for their support.

Cllr Liam Quaide of the Green Party was among many local representatives who came out to mark the occasion and he said it was an "honour" to be part of the moment.

"I was delighted to meet a delegation of female leaders from the Navajo, Cherokee/Choctaw & Crow Creek Sioux Nations in Midleton yesterday.

"We celebrated the historic donation made by the Choctaw Nation to our famine-stricken people 167 years ago, and a more recent return of that favour by Irish people contributing to Native Americans in need during the Covid emergency.

"In our darkest days of suffering and injustice there are acts of fellowship and generosity that restore our sense of common humanity. The donation from the Choctaw Nation to our ancestors during the Great Famine was one such act, and it will always remain in our historical memory and it will always connect our peoples.

"It was an honour to be part of this celebration of our common humanity during a time of such tragedy. I hope we will see the delegation back in Midleton again over the coming years. Great to have Liam O'Maonlai along for spiritual vibes as well."
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Native American groups visit Cork monument as lovely acts of solidarity marked

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A group of Native American people visited Cork's Kindred Spirits monument this week to celebrate the friendship with the Irish people that was formed after to acts of solidarity during each other's time of need. Over covid a relief fund was started for the Navajo Nation and Hopi Reservation Native Americans and it received tends of thousands of donations from the Irish people.