# data[].attributes.body
1. Germany's strongest case is that the Weimar Republic was weak.

The argument was convincing and connected to Germany's ascent, and the examples used were excellent.

2. The most persuasive argument was Japan's economic problems. They could effectively illustrate how their mistrust of the government contributed to the emergence of militarism by detailing the impact of the earthquake and the Great Depression.

3. They may have used the significance notion to describe the importance of western values in Japan, how the Japanese were forced to rebel against them, and how the military took advantage of this.

# data[].attributes.body
1. proportional representation was the most convincing argument for Germany. coalitions often disagreed on laws and policies which discredited the Weimar government allowing the nazi party to present themselves as a stronger alternative.

2. economic crisis was the most convincing argument for japan. it caused the public to lose faith in the government for not being able to contain the economic crisis, and being inefficient. the public thought that the government was weak and could not solve their own economic problems, thus leading to the rise of militirants in japan

3. the group doesn't have an answer as to which factor was the most important.

# data[].attributes.body
1. economic woes was the most convincing argument for Germany. this group masterfully explained how hyperinflation and great depression led to the Nazi Party exploiting the citizen's discontent and offered attractive solutions to the problems turning the public's frustrations into support for their party.

2. the weakness of the civilian government was the most convincing argument for japan. the frequent changes in leadership due to political division and ineffective governance allowed authoritarian parties to gain more control of Japan, thus leading to the ultimate rise of militarists to power in Japan.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued that economic woes was the most important factor for Germany as it revealed the fact that due to the financial difficulties, the Nazi Party could then exploit this state of unrest and use it to rise to power.

# data[].attributes.body
1. the most convincing argument for germany is the propaganda and manipulation argument. the group talked about how the nazi party used different ways to promote their own propaganda, and also selected relevant examples to display the use of this. the group evaluated well on this factor.

2. the most convincing argument for japan is the military's distrust of party government which played a crucial role in propelling japan towards militarism. the group talked about how the militarists desired dominance and hence leveraged these aspirations. the group evaluated this factor concisely

3. the group could have selected more specific examples overall especially for economic instability in japan to evaluate better and further improve their arguments

# data[].attributes.body
1. the weakness of the weimar government as the group selected relevant examples which clearly represented how it caused the german population to lose faith in the government which ultimately caused the rise of the authoritarian regimes and also the german population seeked stronger alternatives besides the weimar

2. social developments because the group showed how certain examples like the rich-poor socioeconomic divide caused the wealth to be concentrated in the hands of large capital owners

3. the appeal of hitler and the nazi party can be improved by providing more specific examples and also evaluating them which can show that hitler is a charismatic and powerful character

# data[].attributes.body
1. the Weimar Republic was a very convincing argument. they provided two specific evidence and clearly explained how these evidence led to the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany. for example, article 48 proved that democratic government was not working, weak, and useless. This caused public dissatisfaction to continue fostering, as people believed democracy was useless, thus turning to a more stronger alternative, which was what the Nazi Party presented itself to be.

2. the military influence was the most convincing factor as there were alot of specific evidence backing up the claim that this was the most impt factor

3. Perhaps they can do better by saying which factor is THE most important factor not by stating 4 factors

# data[].attributes.body
1. Economic instability in Germany. They used concise and significant examples and explanations, showing how each event supported their main factor which is economic instability which led to the rise of the Nazi party.

2. Nationalism in Japan. They used accurate and justified examples to give coherent explanations, leading to the rise of authoritarian regimes in Japan.

3. They should have more concise and clearer points such that it will make their points more convincing and showing clear understanding on each points.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument for germany was economic downturn of the weimar republic. They explained how the inflation (price of basic commodities skyrocketed) after the reich was unable to pay off its war reperations led to economic despair in germany. They wer very specific when evaluating this factor which made it one of the more well-spoken one

2. weak constituion of the civilian government -> they provided specific examples and also re enacted relevant scenes. they also mentioned that the prime minister resigned in 1931 following the mukden incident which was a staged event used as a pretext for the invasion of manchuria. this point was especially siginificant because it served as an event that exacerbated the factor itself and other groups did not talk about it.

3. they can improve their arguments by being more concise about it.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The weakness of the weimar government was the most convincing argument for Germany, because they evaluated the relevant events well and showed that the weimar government failed to address the problems and hardships at that time, which ultimately led to their downfall

2. The social developments factor because the japanese became unhappy with the government for not protecting their traditional japanese values, and this also led to the rise of other authoritarian powers in japan

3. I think the group could have been more concise about their arguments (eg. national humiliation -> part of the weakness of civilian gov. how does national humiliation link to this argument?)

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing arguement this group made was the weakness of the Weimar republic which led to the rise of the Nazi party as they explained how the image of the Weimar Republic was tarnished and how they were seen as weak in the eyes of the public, this greatly encouraged the rise of the nazi authoritarian party as they were clearly the more stronger and confident party, whilst the weimar republic was weak and did not show that they could lead the country out of the darkness they put their citizens in.

2. The most convincing argument that the group made about the militarists to rise to power in japan was the rise of ultranationalism in japan, they used specific evidence and also acted out how the militarists will kill and kidnap the civilian government who does not support what they do showing how the teachers in school spreaded propaganda and influenced the young to be loyal to the imperial family and how they are supreme.

3. They gave too much factual evidence which may be too much to handle, which is not a conducive explanation to look at or absorb

# data[].attributes.body
1. Economic instability in Germany. They provided sufficient and significant examples and explanations to show how it led to the rise of the Nazi party in Germany.

2. Nationalism in Japan. They gave accurate examples and specific explanations, allowing for an increased amount of influence on the military. p

3. They should infer more in order to accurately present their views and explanation such that it would be convincing and specific.

# data[].attributes.body
1. economic crisis. potrayal of how the citizens felt after losing all their jobs and not being able to provide that led to discontent towards weimar and turning towards alternatives

2. economic crisis and banks collapsing leading to public dissatisfaction. the video clearly showed how the government favouring the zaibatsu and neglecting the poor citizens led to people hating the civilian gov

# data[].attributes.body
1. Political instability in Germany. They gave specific and clear evidences and explanations on how the use of Article 48 led to the rise of the Nazi party in Germany.

2. Rise of ultranationalism in Japan. They used specific evidences to explain how it led to the rise of authoritarian regimes and they acted out a scene showing how the use of education led to the influence of military.

3. They can have more concise explanations and points such that it would be more convincing and accurate.

# data[].attributes.body
1. They provided a significant amount of detail and facts about economic woes, which put a lot of emphasis on it's significance

2. The most convincing factor that the group stated was economic woes, as they emphasised it a lot throughout their podcast about how the Nazis capitalised off of it to gain traction and support.

3. They could have expanded more about the impacts of each of the events to let the audience get a better understanding on how these events have contributed and to what extent

# data[].attributes.body
1. It is the economic turmoil in Germany. They gave clear explanations on how the different evidence led to the economic turmoil in Germany, allowing the Nazi party to take advantage of it and rose to power.

2. It is the military influence in Japan. They gave sufficient and specific evidences to prove that the military had a great impact on the government.

3. They could have chosen one specific factor that they feel is the most important that led to the rise of authoritarian regimes in both countries such that the explanations would be clearer and more convincing.

# data[].attributes.body
1. Economic woes, they gave a lot of details for the relevant events and evaluated + weighed the importance of this factor

2. Nationalism. Sino-japan and russo-japan war also served as the glorification of the japanese military

3. The group could have argued that it was because of the stuctural flaws of the weimar government. This would improve the argument becasue it more specific

# data[].attributes.body
1. It would be political instability within the Weimar government. It was clearly explained how they used Article 48 which lead to the rise of the Nazi Party. Strong evidences was provided, showing how the Nazi party rose to power.

2. It is the economic tensions in Japan. By acting out a scene of the poor and rich, they show how the economic tensions led to the rise of authoritarian regimes in Japan.

3. The group could have gone into greater detail on the most important reason that led to rise of authoritarian regimes in both countries, showing how the different parties in both countries used similar methods to rose to power. This can help improved their presentation as it gives the audience a clearer overview of their thoughts and opinions on the most important factor.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
HistoryAA, Shakthi, Myint Myat, Ren Xiang, Cailyn.mp3

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
RISE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

by charlotte, dayenus, gabbie, xenia

GERMANY
.3 most important factors.
FACTOR 1 : Political Instability
FACTOR 2 : Economic Turmoil
FACTOR 3 : Appeal of Hitler and the Nazi Party

Overall, the Weimar Republic was weak and unstable and could not solve their problems, which fostered public dissatisfaction, causing them to look for stronger and more stable alternatives that could solve their problems: the Nazi Party.

Article 48: proportional representation:
As there were 29 different political parties and 9 different coalition governments, it was very difficult to make decisions as the politicians often disagreed. This meant decision making was slow and ineffective, discrediting and making the Weimar Republic look weak.
This caused the German population to lose faith in the government to effectively handle the instability and started to seek other stronger political alternatives, like the Nazi Party.
allowed the chancellor to bypass democracy to pass laws straightaway. Due to political representation leading to slow and ineffective decision making, it led to frequent reliance by 1930, which proved that democratic government was not working, weak, and useless. This caused public dissatisfaction to continue fostering, as people believed democracy was useless, thus turning to a more stronger alternative, which was what the Nazi Party presented itself to be.

Appeal Of Hitler and the Nazi Party

Hitler was a charismatic and powerful speaker who could effectively convey the party's ideology and persuade the public into supporting them. At the time, he seemed to be the answer to Germany's problems as the Party spread a lot of propaganda and political campaigns, which were clever, persuasive, convincing, and effective, essentially turning the public's votes towards them.
Besides that, the Party's protection forces such as the SS and SA gives Germans an impression that they are organised, disciplined and powerful and orderly, which was what Germans were looking for in a government. They removed many opposition while their popularity surged, allowing them to easily win elections, and thus gain more power constitutionally over Germany.

These events further worsened the public's view of the Weimar Republic, as workers felt unjustified due to the crisis not being handled properly. They lost trust in the government and turned to alternatives that could solve their problems. The Nazi party took advantage of this situation, making promises that they would bring back economic stability and provide for the people's livelihoods. This resonated well with the citizens, thus they gave their support to the Nazi Party.

Economic Turmoil

Due to the Treaty of Versailles' War Guilt Clause, Germany had to pay a lot of money back to the war victims. The government tried to print more money in an attempt to afford goods and the pay of the workers, resulting in hyperinflation. It destabilized Germany's economy, making it hard for Germans to afford basic necessities.
Germany's already weak economy completely crashed due to this. By 19 October 1930, 4 million Germans were unemployed, losing trust in the Weimar Republic. They became desperate for a change as they did not want to suffer anymore.

JAPAN
.3 most important factors.
FACTOR 1 : Economic Challenges
FACTOR 2 : Social Development
FACTOR 3 : Military Influence

The Japanese blamed all these economic problems on civilian government as they believed it was corrupt due to its close relations with zaibatsu. They thought the civilian government only cared about the wealthy and neglected the poor, and they couldn't blame anyone else such as the emperor and military due to the emperor being seen as divine and the military's war accomplishments. The public perception of the civilian government had declined as they increasingly lost trust in the integrity and capability of the civilian government.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
OneDrive photos, enjoy, share & organize your photos

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Rise of authoritarian regimes in Germany and Japan in the 1930s

# data[].attributes.body
Students will view the resources of the other groups and as a group, post responses to the following questions for each group’s resource:

1. What is the most convincing argument that the group makes about why the Nazi Party rose to power? Why?

2. What is the most convincing argument that the group makes about why the militarists rose to power in Japan? Why?

3. Revisit the “Be a Young Historian” components in SLS on Significance. Provide a concrete suggestion on how using either concept can improve any one argument that the group has made in its resource (e.g., Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued that... This would improve the argument because,...)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Login to access and create your next design.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Check out this Presentation designed by danzel_joshua_mariaraja.

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.canva.com/design/DAGByyC53bo/O3-bjCsMTHUfW-I3Pu8vpg/edit?utm_content=DAGByyC53bo&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link2&utm_source=sharebutton

# data[].attributes.body
1. ﻿﻿﻿Weakness of the Weimar Republic is the most convincing argument for Germany.
The examples chosen was good and the explanation was well justified and linked to the rise of Germany.

2. ﻿﻿﻿For Japan, economic woes was the most convincing. They could explain the effects of the earthquake and great depression, also linking it to the distrust they had in thegovernment, effectively explaining on how it led to the rise of militarism

3. Using the concept of significance, they could have explained the significance of the western values in japan and how it made the Japanese go against it and the military to take advantage of that.

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.canva.com/design/DAGByyiJnTo/W1wzyuio6Jy1Kb5tviTFQA/view?utm_content=DAGByyiJnTo&utm_campaign=designshare&utm_medium=link&utm_source=editor

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Login to access and create your next design.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Brown Vintage Scrapbook Cover Project History Document (A4)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Check out this Document (A4) designed by Ryan Chen Zi Xi (Temasekjc).

# data[].attributes.body
Using what you have learned from the SLS activities, create a short presentation (8 minutes maximum) to argue for what you believe are the three most important factors for the rise of authoritarian regimes in Germany and Japan respectively (three for Germany, three for Japan). Each proposed factor must be supported by evidence.

# data[].attributes.body
we’ll be doing a 6-8 min podcast

# data[].attributes.body
we will be making a 6-8 min podcast

# data[].attributes.body
We will be creating a website. We aim to help the audience understand our project better by giving a website with well-consolidated information.

# data[].attributes.body
we will be making a poster

# data[].attributes.body
we will be creating a podcast with a duration of minimum 5 minutes that will be focusing on the rise of the Nazi Party and the militalism in Japan

# data[].attributes.body
Video

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
2024 IP3H2  Term 2 AA - The Rise of Authoritarian Regimes (Germany and Japan)

# data[].attributes.body
We will be creating an 8-minute video that focuses on... We aim to help use this medium to answer the overarching inquiry question and sub-questions because...

# data[].attributes.body
By the end of the lesson on Wednesday, 20 March, create a post in this column with your group number and members in the Title. In the post-it, indicate what resource you will be creating. An example is provided for you.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
How did Hitler rise to power? - Alex Gendler and Anthony Hazard

# data[].attributes.headline
History Brief: The Rise of Imperial Japan (YouTube - Reading Through History)

# data[].attributes.subject
History Brief: The Rise of Imperial Japan (YouTube - Reading Through History)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
History Brief: The Rise of Imperial Japan

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
(See Handout no.7)

Showa Depression 1930-1932

Japan experienced the deepest economic downturn in modern history during 1930-32. This should not be confused with the banking crisis of 1927 (previous lecture).

There were two causes of this depression.

(1) Internally, the Minsei Party government (July 1929-April 1931, with prime minister Osachi Hamaguchi, finance minister Junnosuke Inoue, and foreign minister Kijuro Shidehara) deliberately adopted a deflationary policy in order to eliminate weak banks and firms and to prepare the nation for the return to the prewar gold parity (fixed exchange rate with real appreciation). The policy of deflation and return to gold was strongly advocated and implemented by finance minister Inoue.
(2) Externally, Black Thursday (Wall Street crash) of October 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression in the world economy had a severe negative impact on the Japanese economy.

Its main consequences on the Japanese economy and society were as follows:

--As before, macroeconomic downturn was felt primarily in falling prices and not so much in output contraction (estimated real growth was positive during this period). As prices fell, manufacturers produced even more to maintain earning and keep factories running. But clearly, this behavior would collectively accelerate the oversupply and the deflation. From 1929 to 1931, WPI fell about 30%, agricultural prices fell 40%, and textile prices fell nearly 50%.

The famous photo of hungry children eating white radish [however, they do not appear on the verge of starvation to me. I think there were worse situations than this in the world].

--Around 1931, rural impoverishment became severe. Moreover in 1934, rural communities were hit by famine. Especially in Tohoku (northeastern) Region of Japan, rural poverty generated many undernourished children and some farmers were forced to sell their daughters for prostitution. This rural disaster caused much anger and popular criticism against the government and big businesses.

--Cartelization and rationalization were promoted under government guidance. Free market seemed to worsen the depression, so agreements on output restriction were adopted. This practice spread to virtually all material industries including cotton yarn, rayon, carbide, paper, cement, sugar, steel, beer, coal and so on.

--Military and right-wing movements emerged. In economic despair, much blame was placed on party governments and their policies. Even ordinary people, who normally hated militarism, were disappointed with the performance of party governments and became more sympathetic to the military and nationalists.

In the 1930s, political and intellectual thinking gradually shifted from economic liberalism toward more economic control under state management. There were many reasons for this, including: (i) influence of Marxism; (ii) apparent success of USSR; (iii) Showa Depression; (iv) the idea that deflation was worsened by excess competition; and (v) disappointment with politicians and political parties. Many considered that the days of the US-style free market economy were over and from now on, state control and industrial monopoly would strengthen the competitiveness of the national economy.

Another aim of the military and right-wing groups was active military expansion. They criticized "Shidehara Diplomacy" which to them seemed too soft on China. Their primary goal was to "defend Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia [more precisely, eastern part of "Inner" Mongolia]).

Seiyukai versus Minsei Party

Seiyukai (full name: Rikken Seiyukai) was established in 1900 by the union of a leading politician (Hirobumi Ito) and a former opposition party who decided to cooperate with the government. Its main policies were (i) fiscal activism with an emphasis on public investment in rural and industrial infrastructure; (ii) acceptance of military buildup and expansion; and (iii) pleasing a narrow voter base (rural landlords and urban rich). It was a party supportive of a big government allocating public money and subsidies. Seiyukai literally means "political friend society."

Minsei Party (full name: Rikken Minsei To) was originally called Kenseikai (1916-), later merged with another party to become Minsei Party in 1927. Its main policies were (i) economic austerity and industrial streamlining (free economy and small government); (ii) return to prewar gold parity; and (iii) international cooperation and peaceful diplomacy especially with the US. Its support base consisted of intellectuals and urban population. Minsei means "people's politics."

Minsei Party Seiyukai

Main supporters

Intellectuals, urban workers

Big businesses, rural landlords

Economic policy

Small government, free market principle, eliminate inefficient units through macroeconomic austerity

Big government, fiscal activism, public investment for industry and rural development

Foreign policy

Cooperate with US, oppose military invasion of China (protect Japanese interests through diplomacy)

Supporting military expansion, cooperate with military, if necessary, to undermine Minsei Party

Finance minister & economic policy in the 1930s

<Junnosuke Inoue, until Dec. 1931>
Intentionally generate deflation
Return to prewar gold parity

<Korekiyo Takahashi, Dec. 1931-Feb. 1936>
End gold parity and depreciate yen
Fiscal expansion (later, tight budget)
Easy money

Japanese voters did not always vote for the same party but often switched their support from one party to another depending on the issue and situation. Smaller "proletariat parties" also emerged with farmers and workers as the support base.

As noted earlier, Junnosuke Inoue of Minsei Party (finance minister 1929-31) was deeply committed to the policy of deflation and returning to gold. This policy caused severe depression but he never relented or regretted. People became greatly frustrated with his policy. Finally, the government (second Wakatsuki Cabinet) was removed and succeeded by a Seiyukai government (Inukai Cabinet) in December 13, 1931.

As soon as the new Seiyukai government was sworn in, finance minister Korekiyo Takahashi completely reversed Inoue's policies:

--On the very first day of the new government, Takahashi ended the gold standard and the fixed exchange rate, and floated the yen. It immediately depreciated.
--Fiscal expansion financed by government bond issues (called "Spending Policy"). Monetization of fiscal deficit was tried for the first time in Japanese history (BOJ buys up newly-issued government bonds).

--Monetary expansion and low interest rates.

Thanks to this policy turnaround, the Japanese economy began to recover in 1932 and expanded relatively strongly until 1936 (the last year of non-wartime economy). Among major countries, Japan was the first to overcome the global depression of the 1930s. Fiscal and monetary expansion seemed appropriate. But the yen's large depreciation might be considered as the "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy (i.e., a cheaper yen was beneficial to Japanese industries but it imposed costs on other countries through real appreciation of their currencies).

For these achievements, Korekiyo Takahashi is called "Japanese Keynes." He adopted Keynesian policies even before John Maynard Keynes wrote the famous General Theory in 1936 ! Even today, Takahashi's policy is admired while Inoue's policy is generally criticized as stubborn and misguided. But this view is sometimes challenged and continues to be debated. As recently as in 2001, Prof. Junji Banno (Chiba University) wrote that Inoue's deflation policy was pre-requisite for economic expansion of the mid 1930s, because without it efficiency improvement could not have been achieved. His article indirectly criticizes the current Koizumi government's policy of supporting weak firms and banks without painful restructuring (see the box at the end of lecture 8).

Around 1934 when the Japanese economy was firmly on a path to recovery, Takahashi shifted to a tighter budget (which seemed an appropriate decision). But the army and navy demanded more military spending despite fiscal pressure. Takahashi resisted and was assassinated by a military group in the February 26 Incident in 1936 (next section).

Both Inoue and Takahashi previously served as a Bank of Japan governor before becoming a finance minister, but their personalities differed significantly. Inoue was a slim, intellectual graduate from Tokyo University. Takahashi was fat and extremely popular among people (his nickname was "Daruma," a round doll). He did not have much education and had a rough life when he was young.

Political terrorism and invasion of China

From 1931 to 1937, Japanese politics was gradually overtaken by the military. Many incidents occurred, each undermining the basis of party government. Within the army and navy (especially the army), a few ultra-nationalist groups formed with the purposes of rejecting a party-based political system, uniting the nation under the emperor, introducing economic planning, saving the rural poor, and so on. They staged many coups and assassinations. Below is the brief history of this dismal period. Underlined incidents were particularly significant.

1931
March Incident (failed military coup attempt).

Manchurian Incident (Sept. 18 Incident)--a few officers of Kantogun (Japanese army stationed in China), including Kanji Ishihara and Seishiro Itagaki, started military invasion by exploding a railroad track and blaming it on Chinese. Ishihara's idea was that Japan had to take Manchuria (Northeastern China) in order to prepare for a full war against the US. They started the incident without informing the Tokyo government or army headquarters. Foreign minister Shidehara told Kantogun to refrain from further military action but Ishihara's group ignored the order. The Chinese side adopted non-resistance strategy, and Manchuria was soon occupied by the Japanese troops. This incident clearly showed that the party government could no longer restrain the behavior of the military.

October Incident (failed military coup attempt).

1932
Blood Society Incident--Junnosuke Inoue (former finance minister) and Takuma Dan (Mitsui Group) were assassinated.

Establishment of the state of Manchuria (Japanese puppet state).

May 15 Incident--navy officers assassinated prime minister Tsuyoshi Inukai (Seiyukai).

1933
Japan was criticized by the League of Nations over the occupation of Manchuria. In protest, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations.

The period 1933-35 was relatively "quiet" thanks to economic recovery and fewer domestic and international incidents. But this proved to be a temporary calm before the big storm.

1936

February 26 Incident--nationalistic army officers led their troops to stage a military coup on a snowy morning in Tokyo. They wanted to get rid of the current government and start a new regime. Korekiyo Takahashi (finance minister), Makoto Saito (interior minister) and Jotaro Watanabe (education minister) were assassinated. The coup group occupied central Tokyo for four days. The army headquarters first approved their action but later disowned them, because Emperor Showa angrily told the military to put down the rebellion. The coup thus failed, but after this incident the party government was marginalized and the military controlled Japanese politics.

During all these incidents, Seiyukai behaved opportunistically, often supporting the military in order to politically attack its rival, Minsei Party. It was a risky tactic since the goal of the military was to remove all political parties including Seiyukai ! (By contrast, Minsei Party more consistently opposed the military.) Political parties were seriously discredited in the eyes of the public due to (i) inability to oppose the military, (ii) money politics and corruption, and (iii) Seiyukai's self-destructive move to cooperate with the military.

1937

Japan-China War began--on July 7, Japanese and Chinese troops had a skirmish at Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing (Beiping). The incident was minor but Tokyo (Konoe Cabinet) decided to send more troops to China. Thus began a full-scale war with China (until 1945).

After the Japan-China war erupted, political parties were emasculated and later disbanded, the military completely took over Japanese politics, and the entire nation was mobilized to execute the war.

In my view, Japan crossed the point of no return with the Manchurian invasion in 1931. With this incident, Shidehara Diplomacy ended and the military's influence surged. International isolation became unavoidable. Party governments were too weak to stop this trend. While some factions within Seiyukai and Minsei Party tried a few times to merge the two parties to oppose militarism, their attempt did not materialize. Starting with the Manchurian Incident, the period 1931-1945 is sometimes called the "Fifteen-Year War."

War economy, 1937-1945

The military leaders thought (hoped) the war with China would be short. But in reality, it lasted for eight years. Without realistic vision or planning, the war front expanded and fighting escalated. Within China, the nationalists and the communists were fighting each other at first but later joined forces to fight the Japanese.

While there were earlier calls for economic planning before the war, the Japanese economy basically remained market-oriented until 1936. But with the outbreak of the Japan-China War in 1937, the economy was completely transformed for war execution. One by one, new measures were introduced to control and mobilize people, enterprises and resources. Most Japanese firms remained privately-owned but were heavily regulated to contribute to the war effort.

Key measures for establishing the war economy included the following:

1937--The Planning Board (kikakuin) was created. This board, directly under the prime minister, was responsible for comprehensive policy design for wartime national resource mobilization. The brightest bureaucrats from various ministries were gathered for this purpose. It basically played the same role as the state planning committee in socialist countries.
1938--The Planning Board issued the Resource Mobilization Plan (first economic plan). Separately, the National Mobilization Law was approved.

1940--Konoe Cabinet's New Regime Movement. This movement was started in response to Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and German victories in Europe. A strong one-party system was advocated and adopted. Existing political parties were dismantled.

1943--The Military Needs Company Act was adopted. Designated companies were placed under official control (top management, production plan, penalty for non-compliance, etc) but at the same time they were provided with necessary inputs on a priority basis.

In addition, rationing, forced enterprise mergers, and forced factory labor were adopted in increasing intensity.

For economic planners, the primary objective was to maximize military production under limited domestic resources and availability of imports. Key military products were ships and warplanes. Toward the end of the war, airplane production became the only priority. In order to boost heavy industries, consumption was greatly squeezed and light industries were suppressed. The textile industry (previously the leading industry of Japan) was virtually eliminated. The people were forced to live without a new supply of clothes and footwear. Steel products in structures and households were stripped as the metal source for building more airplanes and ships.

RED (Dec.1941): Japan's occupied areas immediately after the Pacific War started. YELLOW (Aug.1942): Japan's maximum military expansion. After this, Japan began to retreat.

In wartime planning, two variables were crucial: (i) foreign exchange reserves; and (ii) energy and raw materials (and the capability to transport them by sea). Until around 1940, the question was how to maximize military output subject to these two constraints. But after 1940, Japan could no longer trade with other countries and the problem shifted to the physical transportation of natural resources from the Japanese colonies and occupied areas to mainland Japan.

Japan considered that resources from the "Yen Bloc" (Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and the rest of occupied China) were not enough. In July 1941, in order to secure more resources, Japan began to invade Southeast Asia, starting with French Indochina (Vietnam). This angered the US, which imposed oil embargo and asset freeze on Japan. If oil imports from the US were cut off, Japan's oil reserve would last only two years. At this point, Japan began to prepare a war with the US. Diplomatic efforts to maintain peace were tried but failed. With the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, Japan started the Pacific War against the US and its allies.

Japanese leaders did not have any clear idea regarding how to fight a war against the US, let alone how to win it. However, they were encouraged by the brilliant victories of Nazi Germany in Europe. To them, totalitarianism of Japan, Germany and the USSR seemed superior to American capitalism and individualism.

Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan invaded a wide area of Southeast Asia but soon began to retreat under allied counter-attacks. Japanese ships and planes were quickly lost while Americans built more and more of them. From late 1944, US aerial bombing (mainly incendiary bombs) destroyed virtually all cities in Japan (except Kyoto). In 1945, the US troops landed in Okinawa, two atomic bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the USSR entered a war against Japan. A few days later, Japan surrendered.

Economically, the main reason for Japan's defeat was that its war economy collapsed due to the lack of inputs and energy. Japan lost virtually all ships and could not transport materials from abroad (including colonies).

Neighborhood groups were organized to put off fire from US bombing. Actually, the bombing was so fierce that this kind of exercise was virtually of no use.

As young males were sent to war fronts, women were trained to defend the homeland. Due to the lack of weapons, they were provided with bamboo swords. Women and high school students were also mobilized to work in military factories.

The origin of the Japanese system

Many of the characteristics of the post-WW2 Japanese economy originated during the war period (1937-1945). They feature long-term relationship and official intervention such as:

Heavy and chemical industrialization drive
Administrative guidance (gyosei shido)
Subcontracting system
Separation of ownership and management
Lifetime employment system and seniority wage
Enterprise-based trade unions
Financialkeiretsu and mainbank system
The Bank of Japan's "window guidance" and "convoy system"
Food control system
Foreign exchange budget and surrender requirement

All of these policies and systems were deliberately adopted by the government in the late 1930s through the early 1940s in order to effectively execute the war. Before that, the Japanese economy was more neoclassical-- characterized by freer entry, short-term contracts and high labor mobility.

These wartime features were largely retained even after WW2 and worked relatively well in the 1950s and 60s when Japan was growing rapidly. However, they are now considered obsolete and to have become barriers to change in the age of IT and globalization. Among the list above, the last one was abolished long ago but most others still remain in the Japanese economy even today in various degrees.

There is a debate among economists regarding the interpretation of the Japanese system.

The majority of Japanese economists argue that Japan should go back to the free market model, because the relational and interventionist system was originally alien to Japan. These may have played a historical role before, but we do not need them any more (some aspects, like priority on job security, could be partially retained, however). Prof. Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Prof. Tetsuji Okazaki (both at Tokyo University) are leading advocates of this view.

But a minority voice says that Japan needed a system based on long-term relations, with or without war. When an economy graduates from the light industry stage (textile, food processing, etc) and moves to heavy industrialization and machinery production, free markets may not be the best choice. Official support and long-term relationship become indispensable for industries with large initial investments, high technology and intra-firm labor market. As Japan began heavy industrialization in the 1920s and 1930s, the free economic system inherited from Meiji was inappropriate and had to change. The war provided a good excuse for this change. But even without the war, Japan had to adopt a new system anyway. Prof. Yonosuke Hara (Tokyo University) presents such a view. He says that the free economy of Meiji was foreign, and the relational and interventionist system is more normal to Japan, dating back to the Edo period.

According to the latter view, implications for today's developing countries are as follows. Light industries and electronics assembly can be promoted by free trade and FDI, but if the country hopes to absorb technology vigorously and have advanced manufacturing capability, certain industrial promotion measures become necessary; Japan, Taiwan and Korea all adopted this method in the past. By contrast, no ASEAN countries seem to have broken through this "glass ceiling" and internalized the industrial power. If latecomer countries are now banned from taking these measures because of WTO, FTAs, World Bank policy matrix and so on, they may remain at a low level of industrialization (contract manufacturing, simple processing, etc) and not get to a higher level of technology.

<References>

Banno, Junji, Nihon Seijishi: Meiji, Taisho, Senzen Showa (History of Japanese Politics: Meiji, Taisho and Prewar Showa), University of the Air Press, revised 1993.

Iwanami Shoten, Nijukozo, Nihon Keizaishi 6 (The Dual Structure, Japanese Economic History vol. 6), T. Nakamura and K. Odaka, eds, 1989.

Iwanami Shoten, Keikakuka to Minshuka, Nihon Keizaishi 7 (Planning and Democratization, Japanese Economic History vol. 7), T. Nakamura ed, 1989.

Noguchi, Yukio, 1940 Nen Taisei: Saraba Senji Keizai (The 1940 Regime: Goodbye to the War Economy), Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1995.

Okazaki, Tetsuji, and Masahiro Okuno, eds, Gendai Nihon Keizai System no Genryu (The Source of the Modern Japanese Economic System), Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1993.

Takafusa Nakamura, Showa Kyoko to Keizai Seisaku (Showa Depression and Economic Policy), Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1994.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
(See Handout no.7) Showa Depression 1930-1932 Japan experienced the deepest economic downturn in modern history during 1930-32. This should not be confused with the banking crisis of 1927 (previous lecture). There were two causes of this depression.

# data[].attributes.body
Note: The resources in this section feature China as well; for the purposes of your research, focus on Japan.

How are nations' identities affected by their contacts and conflicts with others?

How did nineteenth-century Western imperialism influence Japan and China’s modern nation-building efforts? How did the two countries’ responses to Western imperialism differ?

# data[].attributes.headline
Notes on the Growth of Nazi Germany, 1933-1939

# data[].attributes.subject
Notes on the Growth of Nazi Germany, 1933-1939

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Imperial Japan: 1894-1945

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was originally written for Japan Society's previous site for educators, "Journey Through Japan," in 2003.

Between the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the mid-20th century, Japan created an enormous empire stretching from Alaska to Singapore, controlling as much territory and as many people as any of the great powers of Europe. Why did Japan's leaders choose to develop an industrial economy and a powerful military machine in the late 19th century? How could they succeed, given that no one could have predicted such achievement from a non-Euro-American island nation at the edge of East Asia? Why did they decide to overpower their neighbors and gradually to take their territory, beginning with the island of Taiwan, then Korea, then part of mainland China, the Philippines, most of the Pacific Islands, and more? What led Japan into its ill-fated war with the United States?

Answering questions like these requires not only "facts" such as industrial production statistics or treaty texts or numbers of aircraft carriers, but also an understanding of Japanese views of their position in Asia, and of Japanese culture itself. As non-Japanese readers, we must humanize the Japanese, even in a period when they were becoming our avowed enemies, and see people from this most "other" of places as unique individuals rather than as a racially defined, homogeneous enemy. This approach will produce a very different narrative of modern Japan from that of motion pictures, comic books, government propaganda, and textbook summaries. Their stories, with clear good guys (us) and bad guys (them), with black-and-white portrayals of Japan as an agent of evil, cannot stand up to historical inquiry if we consider Japanese to be human beings. Our purpose lies not in justifying the behavior of any historical actor-Japanese or American-but in learning how people in the past made choices and decisions, understood their worlds, and created the cultures and events of human history. This essay will present a basic timeline of Japanese imperial history as a first step in that process.

Japan's Early Motivation for Empire

After 1868, the new leaders of Meiji Japan worked hard to improve their country's status in the world and to abolish the unequal treaties and racial discrimination imposed on them by the European powers and the United States. They watched nervously as Southeast Asia came under French rule, Russia moved rapidly into Manchuria (northeast China), the United States pushed westward from California to Hawai'i, and Britain fought two wars to advance its interests in China. What strategies could Japan use to preserve its independence? What models of international behavior should it follow?

Historians have advanced many reasons why Japan took the great northern island of Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Islands (including Okinawa) as part of its territory, industrialized its economy, built up its military, and expanded its interests and its territory outside its "home islands." Certainly the need for national security haunted the leaders of Meiji Japan. They had begun their program of Euro-American industrialization largely in order to defend against the foreigners-to jõi, "expel the barbarians." Looking outward from their islands they saw Korea and China overwhelmed by enemies, unwilling or unable to defend themselves and offering to Britain and Russia the opportunity to set their sights on Japan. They worried especially about Korea, which (in strategic terms) they saw as a 'dagger pointing at the heart of Japan." (A look at the map will confirm this!) In the very first years of the Meiji period, many of Japan's new leaders advocated a quick invasion of Korea for two reasons-to combat a Russian, Chinese, or European takeover, and to give their own impatient samurai warriors a noble mission. But calmer heads won the debate, and the invasion was postponed until Japan was more independent in modern weaponry and well trained in military strategy. The war party had to be content with forcing the Choson king to sign an unequal treaty giving Japan the kinds of privileges in Korea that Euro-Americans had in Japan.

By 1894, the army and navy had met that goal by purchasing and manufacturing high-quality European-style weapons and by reorganizing the military along European lines. Meanwhile, the Qing government in China and the Choson government in Korea had weakened further still. Claiming to be aiding a pro-Japanese group in the Choson court, Japan sent troops to attack both Korea's national army and the Qing troops that came to their aid. Japan's victory was rapid and total, on land and sea, demonstrating the effectiveness of Euro-American technology in East Asian hands. Through a peace treaty, Japan took as colonies the island of Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula, both parts of the Qing empire, as well as a huge sum of money. Japan also ended Qing power in Korea. By looking at a map, however, we can see that Japan's victory directly threatened one of the expanding European empires, Czarist Russia. With help from Germany and France, Russia pressured Japan to return Liaodong to China in exchange for more cash. Much of the Japanese public, delighted by Japan's easy victory, rioted against the government for caving in to the foreigners' demands.

Japan had its chance for revenge a decade later. After careful planning, an alliance with England (1902), and a very costly military build-up, Japan went to war with Russia in 1904, effectively eliminating the Russian fleet in southern Liaodong in the initial battle. Land campaigns in northeast China resulted in gradual success, but with thousands of lives lost. The navy then provided the crucial difference. Under Admiral Togo, Japanese ships intercepted and destroyed the Russian Baltic Fleet, which had steamed all the way around Africa to reach the Pacific. Both sides, tired of the war, sought the assistance of United States President Theodore Roosevelt, who helped them work out a treaty. Japan obtained control over Korea and southern Manchuria and possession of the southern half of Sakhalin Island but received no cash payments, despite Japanese victories. Again, the Japanese public felt that Japan had not received its due, and rioting broke out in the major cities.

Some scholars believe that the leaders of Japan intended from the beginning to establish an empire outside the home islands, while others contend that Japan's overseas expansion was unplanned. However it may have originated, the idea of Japan as the powerful center of a revived Asia found fertile soil among the Japanese people. As the nation won these initial wars, Japan's business and strategic interests in Korea, China, and Southeast Asia expanded, and so did their security perimeter. Korea was the first area of concern, followed by Taiwan, Manchuria, Shandong, the entire China coast, and finally the Philippines (recently colonized by the USA) and the Dutch East Indies. Anxious about supplies of raw materials necessary for industrial and military development, especially coal, iron, rubber, and oil; afraid of European involvement, especially Anglo-American naval strength; and inspired by military success, Japanese corporations and the Japanese military moved rapidly to secure zones of influence all over East Asia. Colonists went abroad in large numbers, taking their wealth and labor with them and establishing communities which demanded and received protection from the Japanese government. More and more Japanese troops went overseas to secure the safety of civilians and industrial installations.

Mobilizing the Nation for Empire Building

The engagement of government, private business, schools, and ordinary citizens in Japan's overseas empire, as well as the riots which occurred when Japan's honor was not respected, reveal a deep patriotism and nationalism among ordinary Japanese, a feeling very important to the Meiji government. Using a variety of tools-public education, well-controlled media, veterans' associations, local religious institutions, among others-the government planted in many (some say most) Japanese a deep emotional tie to the Emperor (Tennõ), the government, and the idea of Japan itself, which was called the kokutai, the uniquely Japanese nation. This provided an effective motivation for people to sacrifice, to be patriotic, and to lay down their lives or their work for their country. Though not entirely different from nationalism in other countries, this public-spirited emotion sank deep roots in Japan in part because of the timing of its genesis-it came when Japan could easily be perceived to be in dire straits, its very existence at risk.

Portrait of the Meiji Emperor (r. 1868-1912) in military attire.
Credit: Donated by Corbis-Bettmann
Many people did manage to resist the government's well-planned campaign for national loyalty, but it convinced the majority that their country was superior to others, the "land of the gods," a notion which could be found in some very old texts. Westerners could be admired for their technology and knowledge, but many Japanese believed that only they possessed the special warrior spirit of an unconquered people, with its single and uninterrupted family line of rulers descended from Amaterasu, the goddess of the sun (Tennõ means "heavenly sovereign"). Some Japanese, however, noticed that powerful people in Japan became wealthy through corruption or political influence, and that workers and farmers received only a tiny wage for their patriotic, backbreaking labor. Convinced that this inequality had to be corrected before Japan could be a great nation, they tried to make their voices heard. But without a free press or academic freedom, and in the face of consistent government repression, they could not reach most of the people. The Meiji state and its successors feared domestic dissidents to the point that even groups of a dozen socialists or fewer could be subjected to police raids, confiscations, and prison terms.

When the Meiji Emperor died in 1912, many Japanese felt a terrible sense of loss, for the figure of the Tenno, however little real power he may have had, represented Japan's new international success and stature to them. Ordinary people lined up outside the Imperial Palace in Tokyo to pay their respects. General Nogi, a hero of the war against Russia, committed suicide with his wife, "following their lord" in death, an act widely admired by the public.

Famous writers found themselves drawn back into Japanese traditions after decades of fascination with the United States and Europe. Japanese literature after 1912 reflects a deepening sense of the value of an idealized vision of Japan's past and the nation's importance in the writers' sense of who they were as individuals. Using this nationalism to their advantage, Japan's leaders usually could rely on their people's loyalty to the government, though they constantly worried about subversion. (A small group of leftists was arrested, and their leaders executed, for plotting to kill the Emperor in 1910.) These leaders continued Japan's quest for wealth and power under the Taishõ Emperor (reigned 1912-1926), a weak and unstable character. Inspired by European parliamentary systems, some Japanese politicians formed parties to participate in elections to the national assembly (called the Diet); while others opposed the government because they thought it was corrupt.

World War I, the "war to end all wars" in Europe, gave Japan a new opportunity to gain wealth. With all the European powers needing military supplies and consumer goods, the Japanese moved rapidly into the world's markets for weapons and light industrial products, providing both goods and shipping. Japanese exports almost tripled in only four years. Taking advantage of Europe's internal conflicts, Japan moved into an East Asian power vacuum and demanded that the Chinese government, weak and decentralized after the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912, turn over much of its economic and political power to Japan. Yuan Shikai, the military leader who had taken charge of the embryonic Republic of China, had no choice but to submit to Japan's superior strength. At the same time, however, Japan's arrogance and aggression caused many Chinese to join nationalist movements of their own. In colonized Korea, too, resistance to Japanese occupation took many forms, so Japanese forces fought back by killing and jailing many civilians.

These overseas conflicts coincided with growing social movements in Japan itself. Many sectors of society-workers, farmers, intellectuals, suffragists, and others-disagreed with the government's call for obedience and national unity. Young people in the cities (called "modern boys" and "modern girls") saw American movies, wore the latest fashions, and bought products advertised in fashionable magazines. Inspired by Russian socialism and anarchism, and by the success of the 1917 Revolution, radical Japanese intellectuals and workers tried to form unions for factory employees, to obtain better wages or working conditions or to influence the government. Some women became authors, leaders of social groups, even politicians, despite great social pressure to conform to the ideal role of "good wife and wise mother." Intellectuals and professors taught a wide range of topics, including Marxism, Darwin's theory of evolution, Woodrow Wilson's internationalism, and even Freudian psychology. All these developments gave rise both to cultural excitement and to political unease, as disunity threatened the seemingly fragile post-Meiji state and society. As social and cultural diversity spread in Japan, great corporations such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo organized industry for their own profit and for production of weapons for the military. Businesses made sure they could benefit from government contracts by bribing politicians, and citizens on both the left and the right came to mistrust both the industrialists and the political parties. To whom could they turn for security and a stable reference in a confusing world?

All societies going through rapid change face problems. The world seems very unstable, and people may not know what to believe or who is right? Who should they trust when "old-fashioned values" no longer seem to be effective? Faced with all of this apparent chaos, many Japanese worried that the special "Japanese spirit" in which they had been taught to believe would disappear under the influence of Euro-American ideas and fashions. Many Japanese believed that the most important value in Japan should be unity and willingness to sacrifice for their country in order to face foreign enemies such as Britain, the United States, and especially the new Soviet Union. It is no surprise that they turned to the Tennõ as their nation's symbolic leader and to the military as their ideal of discipline and self-sacrifice. In this view, electoral politics were inherently corrupt, for civilian leaders acted only for selfish interests, but the Emperor and the military could be trusted. However, the new Shõwa Emperor, known to foreigners by his personal name of Hirohito, was enthroned in 1926 but inherited little real power, and the leaders of Japan's military, despite their reputation, did not necessarily have the people's best interests in mind.

Domestic Political and Social Trends: Dissent and Response

By the 1920s, the Meiji politicians had mostly passed away, and their political heirs tried to create widespread, single-minded devotion to the country in a climate of political party division and factional rivalry. Originally based on a late 19th century German ideal of direct service to the ruler, Japan's government now resembled a British style of rule by one of two centralized parties. Run by a tiny elite of pro-business, mostly pro-Western politicians, these parties used both policy and corruption to promote their own leadership. They did liberalize some aspects of society, allowing labor unions, giving all Japanese males the right to vote, and joining the League of Nations to participate in the international community. As a "great power"-the only one not ruled by Euro-Americans-Japan participated in naval limitation conferences, maintained its colonies by a combination of administrative bureaucracy and military-police violence in the same way Britain, France, and the United States did, and forced China to expand Japan's treaty rights. Despite continued discrimination against the Japanese by Europeans and Americans-who continued to affirm that Japanese were not "white" people, despite their successes-Japan became a member of the "imperial club." But Japanese internationalism, personified in Shidehara Kijurõ, Foreign Minister in the early 1920s, also posed a challenge to Japanese nationalists, who saw the politics of international diplomacy, parliamentary democracy, and compromise as weakness, in contrast to the military's desire for further conquest.

Under the surface, economic inequality threatened the unity of the Japanese people even more in the 1920s than it had sixty years before, for industrialization had created the same tensions between workers and employers as it had in Euro-American societies. Conflicts over wages and working conditions led to unions and strikes, actions which seemed like treason to people committed to the almost religious unity of the kokutai. To combat this potential disorder, the Japanese government as early as 1900 had passed strict laws to punish anyone who promoted social conflict. Even in the relatively liberal 1920s, those laws were strengthened to give the government greater power over the press, virtually eliminating the public's rights of free speech and assembly, rights which had never been strongly proclaimed in Japan's constitution or law codes.

Labor Day demonstration in Tokyo in 1925.
Credit: Donated by Corbis-Bettmann

Japanese companies, especially the very large ones, learned from the government and took measures to prevent expression of worker discontent. Skilled laborers were hired for life and encouraged to link their own destinies with that of their company. Local company-based unions negotiated limited benefits for their members, while both law and custom prevented the formation of many effective national unions. Government regulation did not hamper the growth of huge manufacturing monopolies. Rather the Japanese state encouraged a dual economy of a few giant companies supplied by thousands of small operations, employing only a few people each. In periods of economic growth, these strategies proved quite effective. But tougher methods were necessary in bad times, which arrived with the crash and depression in 1929.

The Japanese economy was badly damaged by the great stock market crash because so much of its wealth came from foreign trade, which declined drastically after 1929. As the American and European economies staggered, their cash supplies low and millions of their people unemployed, they could no longer afford to buy foreign goods. During this period, the Japanese lost 50% of their overseas sales, domestic prices crashed, and Japanese incomes fell 30% on average. Ordinarily, such difficulties might produce public support for antigovernment groups like communists and socialists, whose demands included support for the poor and unemployed. But Japan's government had discouraged even the mildest dissent, so many citizens turned instead to right-wing organizations, both civilian and military, to express their dissatisfaction with politics as practiced by the ruling parties.

These right-wing, ultranationalist groups claimed a special purity for their own ideas-the centrality of the Tennõ and opposition to international diplomacy which, they claimed, kept Japan weak by limiting its military options. They encouraged citizens to support and love the army and navy abroad, and they praised the virtues of self-sacrifice and nationalism. They also used Shintõ, part of Japan's religious tradition, to idealize the Japanese spirit and its samurai virtues. Through local shrines and priests, who preached Japan's superiority over other peoples and practiced rituals of "uniquely Japanese" purity and love for nature, many Japanese people became convinced of Japan's sacred task to drive the Euro-Americans out of Asia. They also believed that making war was a central part of that mission. The beauty of nature, especially of cherry blossoms falling (constant reminders of the brevity of human life), of sacred mountains, and of the sea, came to be equated with heroic death in the national cause.

Young men, both military officers and their colleagues in civilian organizations such as the Kokuryukai (Amur River Society), expressed their nationalist passions through assassinations of politicians, industrialists, intellectuals, and others who did not conform to their rigid standards of "pure Japanese" behavior and beliefs. Prime Minister Hamaguchi was murdered at Tokyo Station in 1930, and Prime Minister Inukai was killed in 1932. Both assassinations were perpetrated by ultranationalists impatient with the corruption of party politics and eager for Japan to be driven by their own heroic values, which were expressed most obviously in the military and the drive to dominate Japan's neighbors, especially China.

The military, meanwhile, had conflicts and troubles of its own. The army and navy fought one another over budgets, weapons systems, political influence in Tokyo, and Japan's international policies. The navy, more concerned with technology than the army, had been limited in construction of large warships by the Washington (1922) and London (1930) Naval Treaties. Still, it had managed to build a strong fleet including aircraft carriers and submarines, a navy larger than any foreign fleet they might face in the western Pacific. The U.S. naval presence in Hawai'i made the United States the main target of naval war planning, and their main anxiety lay in securing the supplies of oil needed to run the ships of both the navy and the merchant marine, since most oceangoing vessels had converted from coal to diesel fuel. Japan imported most of its oil from the USA and American-controlled oil fields in Mexico, so the Japanese military found itself dependent on its most likely enemy for a crucial material resource. The nearest developed oil field to Japan lay in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia and especially Brunei), at the end of a long north-south sea lane that the Japanese navy had to secure.

The army, on the other hand, found itself bogged down occupying Taiwan, Korea (taken as a colony in 1910), and especially Manchuria, where the army protected Japanese mines, factories, railroads, and large communities of settlers. Eager to demonstrate their power, unwilling to wait for diplomacy, and convinced that their allies in Tokyo would back them, Japanese army officers planned an incident which would force the Japanese government to seize Manchuria. Despite advance warning of the plot, the High command in Tokyo was unwilling to take action against its own men until it was too late. On September 18, 1931, a bomb blast on a Japanese railroad triggered a well-prepared attack in which all of northeast China was seized. By spring, large parts of Mongolia also lay in Japanese hands, and for the next six years, by treaty and by aggressive action on the ground, Japan took over piece after piece of northern China.

In the face of this direct disobedience to orders, Tokyo did nothing, accepting this huge new territory as part of the empire. They declared Manchuria to be an independent state, Manshukoku in Japanese (usually called Manchukuo in English), under a Chinese emperor. But the real governor of Manchukuo was always the commander-in-chief of the Japanese army stationed there in overwhelming numbers. The international community reacted angrily to the "Manchurian Incident," and, after lengthy investigation, the League of Nations condemned Japanese aggression. The Japanese delegation walked out, never to return. US influence in this matter was very limited, for the United States had never joined the League in the first place, but American public opinion ran strongly in China's favor and against Japan.

From 1932 to 1936, domestic political conflict escalated in Japan, as war in China required more and more troops and money to control the rising armed power of Chinese nationalism. The civilian government had to bow to the demands of the military, for no government could be formed or sustained without military participation. Admiration of the military, and faith in its spirit, led many Japanese to ultranationalism, the belief that Japan was inherently superior, that the Japanese military could never be defeated, and that Japanese culture and morality were uniquely pure and true. But some Japanese people did not fall into the ultranationalist camp. Resistance came from civilian politicians fearful for their own power, intellectuals unwilling to accept the simple-minded ideals of kokutai and military virtue, from socialists, Christians, and others committed to self-determination of peoples (including Chinese and Koreans) and to the unity of human kind. The voters continued to choose the conservative and moderate political parties in parliamentary elections. In a February 1936 election, one of the mainstream parties won a majority with slogans such as, "What shall it be, parliamentary government or fascism?" Even the small socialist party made modest gains at the polls during the 1930s, in the face of a high tide of ultranationalist propaganda.

But only a week after those elections, on February 26, 1936, the Army First Division, stationed in downtown Tokyo, attacked the heart of the civilian government. After killing a number of high officials, they held several blocks of the central city for three days. Though still supporting their junior officers, the High Command finally called in reinforcements-many of them, not surprisingly, from the navy-and forced the rebels to surrender. The leaders and a few key civilian allies (including the right-wing intellectual Kita Ikki) were executed and generals who had been involved in the plot were fired, but the army remained deeply involved in politics, and the incident may even have strengthened the military's hand-high officers could throw up their hands and say, "We'd love to help, but we're afraid the young hotheads might rebel again!" Though civilian ultranationalists lost a measure of influence after the "Young Officers' Coup" failed, politicians eager to demonstrate their patriotism put intense pressure on all dissidents, including not only communists and socialists but also liberal intellectuals. Party politics revived briefly in the late 1930s, but the military and the professional bureaucrats in Tokyo combined to make the Diet's job impossible. The chaotic operations of representative government, with their public contesting of elections and open debates over policy disagreements, reinforced the view that politics consisted only of mean-spirited self-interest, not of high-minded patriotism and loyalty to the Tennõ.

In China, events conspired against moderate forces in Japan. In December 1936, President of the Republic and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by two of his own generals and forced into an all-China alliance against Japan. This United Front, including Chiang Kai-shek's deadly rivals, the Chinese Communist Party, posed a direct threat to Japanese military power in China, and the Japanese army could not allow it to gain national strength. Their mainland strategy required them to protect Japanese economic interests and defend against the Soviet Union, so the army chose full-scale war rather than endless local conflicts against armed Chinese nationalism. Only July 7, 1937, a local clash between Chinese and Japanese troops near Beijing gave them their chance. Unprepared for war-the army had just drawn up a five-year plan to produce sufficient supplies of arms and material-Japan's generals decided to attack China before it could become a strong, unified nation. Many Japanese hoped that the war would establish a new order in East Asia, one based on all peoples' common identity and common opposition to European and American imperialism and colonialism.

Japanese soldiers climb the Great Wall of China during their southern advance on November 5, 1937.

From the outset, the war did not go well for the Japanese military. Persuaded by their officers that the cowardly Chinese would not fight, Japanese troops stormed ashore at Shanghai and met stiff, protracted resistance from Chiang Kai-shek's crack divisions. Finally victorious after weeks of battle, the Japanese army had lost tens of thousands of men and gained desire for revenge and an appetite for killing Chinese people, an emotion fed both by their losses and by the racialist propaganda of their leaders. The next city to be assaulted, Chiang Kai-shek's capital of Nanjing, suffered the consequence. After driving out the Chinese troops, the Japanese army undertook a horrific massacre of the civilian population, with victims numbering from 80,000 to 300,000, depending on whose statistics one believes. This crime, and smaller-scale atrocities elsewhere, aided both Chiang Kai-shek's government and its Communist rivals in stimulating ordinary Chinese to join in resistance to Japanese conquest. A Japanese-sponsored "government of China" was set up, but everyone knew it was Tokyo's puppet. Many patriotic Chinese followed their political leaders westward-Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party and Mao Zedong's Communist Party both set up governments in remote areas and tried to fight the invaders.

Having signed an anti-Soviet alliance with Hitler's Germany in 1936, Japanese diplomats saw their best advantage in squeezing the Soviet Union, still the main enemy in many policy planners' eyes, between their powerful military forces. The Axis Alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan had been designed to prevent British, American, or Soviet meddling in East and Southeast Asia, which Japan claimed as its sphere of influence. The army tried to take the measure of the Soviet Red Army in a border clash in northern Manchuria in 1939 and took a terrible beating. Never had the Japanese faced an enemy who possessed modern armor and artillery, nor an opponent as skillful as General Zhukov. After this defeat, even the army conceded that Japan's interests lay more in the south, and a mutual non-aggression pact was signed with the Soviet Union (one that lasted until August 1945). The rich oil fields and rubber plantations of the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China constituted tempting targets, and the navy tried to consolidate the strategic sea routes from the home islands to all of these crucial resource bases. By the summer of 1941, with the Soviet Union hard-pressed by German invasion and Britain utterly incapable of overseas intervention, only one enemy remained to prevent Japan from ruling the entire western Pacific-the United States.

Why did Japan abandon its diplomatic relationship with the United States, which had worked fairly well, to initiate a new phase in the Pacific War, one which many Japanese knew could be disastrous? As early as 1915, American policy makers had noted the possible Japanese threat to American interests in China, and in the late 1930s President Roosevelt began to flex American muscle, especially economic power, to force Japan off the Chinese mainland. The USA (under Theodore Roosevelt) had covertly traded Japanese control over Korea for American control in the Philippines, but China was far too important a political, military, and sentimental ally for the USA to allow Japan a free hand there. After 1939, President Roosevelt refused to allow Japan to purchase American scrap metal. In early 1941, FDR threatened to cut off exports of oil. Without US oil, Japan could not operate its fleet or move its armored vehicles, could not fuel the huge merchant marine, which moved raw materials and goods throughout the Japanese empire, from northern Korea to the south seas. The only alternative supply lay in the Dutch East Indies. If Japan attacked the Dutch, the USA would certainly respond by declaring war, but how else could Japan ensure its supply of this vital resource? Japanese planners found themselves in an impossible bind. Economic interests as well as nationalism prevented Japan from withdrawing from China, as Roosevelt demanded, for they had invested blood, treasure, and national prestige in their mainland empire. But if the Japanese continued in China, Roosevelt would turn off the oil tap, and Japan could not obtain sufficient fuel without risking war with the USA.

At this point, naval planners in Tokyo ordered their finest strategist, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, to draw up a plan for destroying US power in the Pacific and rendering the western Pacific sea lanes, including those to the oil fields, safe for Japanese shipping. Yamamoto tried to persuade his superiors that attacking the USA would be catastrophic for Japan and that Japan would never be able to match US industrial might-he argued from first-hand experience, for he had studied and worked in the USA in the 1920s and was familiar with American military and industrial technology. But they disagreed with him, and as a good soldier and a patriot, he went ahead with his job.

The USA had military forces, mostly army, in the Philippines, but its Pacific Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, on the island of Oahu. Yamamoto made a careful study of the harbor and its defenses and decided that it could be destroyed from the air, if the attack could be a complete surprise. Japan had the right weapons-Japanese aircraft carriers, torpedo planes, torpedoes, and fighter-bombers were the most advanced in the world at that time. After a year of diplomatic wrestling with the USA over their entirely incompatible demands-Roosevelt urging the Japanese to get out of China and the Japanese asserting their right to colonize in East Asia-Japan's leaders, headed by Prime Minister and Army General Tõjõ Hideki, decided that they had no choice. They could not survive a continued embargo of oil, so they had to attack southward and take the rich Brunei oilfields from the Dutch. But first, they had to eliminate the US threat. So on December 7, 1941, Japanese carrier-based aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor and destroyed much of the US fleet anchored there. Unfortunately for the Japanese navy, and for Japan, the American aircraft carriers that should have been in harbor were on maneuvers at sea that day and escaped damage.

We cannot answer the question, "Why did they do it?" with any single answer. Certainly the need to ensure supplies of oil and other raw materials played a large part in the decision to go to war with the USA despite the continuing conflict in China and an industrial complex considerably smaller than that of their chosen enemy. Other factors also played their parts-a pan-Asianist ideology that claimed all of East and Southeast Asia to be Japan's natural sphere of influence; an (ironic) anticolonialism that took "white" domination of Asians as its target; long-term Japanese antipathy for what they perceived to be American arrogance in foreign policy; and, perhaps most telling, many decades of humiliation by American racism, best symbolized by a 1924 Act of Congress which specifically excluded all Japanese from immigration to the USA, the only people singled out in this way. Whatever complex motivations led the Japanese into these multiple wars-in China, in southeast Asia, in the Pacific-they never achieved the military and industrial superiority which they required in order to win, and the years after 1937 saw Japan spiral downward into a Dark Valley of war, privation, and suffering which was to last for over eight years.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
About Japan: A Teacher's Resource | Imperial Japan: 1894-1945 | Japan Society

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was originally written for Japan Society's previous site for educators, "Journey Through Japan," in 2003. Between the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the mid-20th century, Japan created an enormous empire stretching from Alaska to Singapore, controlling as much territory and as many people as any of the great powers of Europe.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
READ: Authoritarianism in Japan (article) | Khan Academy

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Learn for free about math, art, computer programming, economics, physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, finance, history, and more. Khan Academy is a nonprofit with the mission of providing a free, world-class education for anyone, anywhere.

# data[].attributes.headline
Kurt Klein, who emigrated from Walldorf, Germany, to the United States in 1937, recalls how Nazi policies and propaganda affected his life at school.

# data[].attributes.subject
Kurt Klein, who emigrated from Walldorf, Germany, to the United States in 1937, recalls how Nazi policies and propaganda affected his life at school.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Kurt Klein, who emigrated from Walldorf, Germany, to the United States in 1937, recalls how Nazi policies and propaganda affected his life at school.

Using the strategies from Facing History is almost like an awakening.

- Claudia Bautista, Santa Monica, Calif

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Kurt Klein, who emigrated from Walldorf, Germany, to the United States in 1937, recalls how Nazi policies and propaganda affected his life at school. Using the strategies from Facing History is almost like an awakening. - Claudia Bautista, Santa Monica, Calif

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The Nazis were not the only fascists in Europe. But Nazism's racist ideology and persecution of Jews distinguished it from other varieties of fascism.

Fascism in Germany

The Nazis were not the only fascists in Europe. But Nazism's racist ideology and persecution of Jews distinguished it from other varieties of fascism.

Introduction

Nazi Germany is often held up as the model of a fascist government, and for good reason. Robert O. Paxton has said that "[o]nly in Nazi Germany did a fascist regime approach the outer horizons of radicalization." Beginning in 1933, the Nazis tried to build a powerful state with the intent of controlling most aspects of life. They were defeated in 1945, but not before using this state to drag Germany and the world into a catastrophic war. It cost tens of millions of lives, including more than six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust. In this article, we look at how Nazism rose to power in Germany, the way it used the state to advance its agenda, and how persecution of the Jews was a defining feature of the Nazi regime.

Nazis take power

Between the founding of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in February 1920 to the rise of its leader, Adolf Hitler, who gained the office of chancellor in January 1933, the Nazis never held an elected majority in Germany and therefore had limited political power. But those limits began to change after a fire nearly destroyed the Reichstag building in Berlin on February 28, 1933. As news of the incident spread, Hitler claimed that the fire was a terrorist act by communists trying to overthrow the government. Using a combination of political tactics, violence, and intimidation, Hitler and the Nazis gathered enough parliamentary support to pass the Enabling Act (March 24, 1933), which transferred broad lawmaking powers to Hitler. It's significant that this was done by parliamentary vote. By confirming this law with a two-thirds majority, the German parliament ended Germany's democracy. They gave Hitler the powers needed to create a dictatorship. Within weeks, Hitler had dissolved all other political parties to eliminate any opposition as he assumed the powers of an autocrat.

While the Enabling Act allowed the Nazis to take power, it also illustrated Hitler's desire to look like he was playing by the rules. In fact, the Nazi state was in many ways a regime of laws administered through institutions already in place. Hitler and the Nazi Party used the legal system to enact sweeping changes and take control of more and more aspects of German life. This is a key trait of totalitarianism. The Nazis wanted to bring about social, political, and economic transformations, but with as little disruption as possible. On the surface, it seemed to at least some people that institutional continuity was steady. Thus, Hitler and the Nazis were able to make big shifts in policy as if this were all business as usual.

Antisemitism and the Nazi state

Because the Nazis used familiar institutions to take over the government, it may have felt like nothing extraordinary was taking place. In truth, a revolution was under way. The regime's laws allowed for policies that dramatically altered the relationship of German people to the state and how they related to each other. The Nazi Party made use of, and encouraged, existing antisemitism in Germany. Legal attacks on Jews started right away in 1933, but perhaps the most significant act of Nazi legislation was the passage of the Nuremberg Laws on September 15, 1935. These statutes allowed the persecution of German Jews on two important fronts. One, Jews were stripped of their citizenship because they did not have "German blood," and, two, intermarriage between Jews and ethnic Germans was prohibited. With the loss of citizenship came the loss of basic rights. Oppressive antisemitism had been common in Germany before 1935, but the Nuremberg Laws gave it the state's official stamp of approval. After 1935, wave after wave of laws made things even worse for Germany's Jewish population. They were denied employment in certain trades and industries, and many Jewish businesses were boycotted or forced to close. Access to public education was restricted. Civil service careers were forbidden to anyone considered non-Aryan by birth. The state often seized the property of Jewish families. These measures took a huge toll on German Jews. In just a few short years a once thriving community, some of whose families had lived in Germany for centuries, was reduced to a population living at the complete mercy of the Nazis and their fellow Germans.

The purpose of the Nuremberg Laws was to terrorize Jews and remove them, first from legally participating in German society, and then from being physically there at all. German fascists believed that Jews posed a threat to the well-being of the nation. But in addition to wanting Jews out of Germany, there was another goal behind Nazi racist ideology. German fascists portrayed Jews and communists-and Jewish communists above all-as the greatest danger to the German nation and its people. The Nazi leadership exploited the fear this generated to convince everyday people to support their terrible policies. They told German citizens that the displacement of the Jews from Germany, and eventually all of Europe, would bring racial and national renewal to Germany and, eventually, all Europe. Thus they used their racist ideology to create a powerful, centralized state that gave them total power.

Defining the nation

The Nuremberg Laws and other laws didn't stop there. Excluding and demeaning Jews contrasted what it was to be German with what it was to be Jewish. It meant that part of being German was not being Jewish, and vice versa. German citizens had rights, access to national resources, and economic privileges; Jews did not. Germans formed one racial group, the Jews another, and the two were not meant to coexist. By "othering" Jews in these ways, anti-Jewish laws made German ethnic and political identity more uniform. Religious identity was used the same way. Some Protestants and Catholics used the Nazis' antisemitic policies and language to reaffirm Christianity's place as the foundation of German and European culture. Jews, instead of just not being Christian, came to be seen as enemies of Christianity. According to this logic, the Nazis were making sure Europe remained Christian by eliminating the Jews. Anti-Jewish laws also revealed just how far into everyday life the tentacles of the Nazi state could reach. After watching the Nazis systematically ban Jews from German society and seize their property, other Germans could be certain of one thing: Hitler's regime had enormous power over the lives of ordinary people. And it was not only the persecution of Jews that made this clear. Nazi policy shaped everything from the military and the economy to the health-care system and elementary education. Even the film and radio industries became tools of Nazi propaganda under the guidance of Joseph Goebbels. This kind of pervasive control, or hegemony, was meant to bring people into compliance with the regime in every aspect of their lives. The efforts of Nazi leaders to insert the power of state into the most remote corners of society is a typical feature of totalitarianism.

Conclusion

It is important to remember that the Nazis took over in Germany because of a vote. Anxious about security concerns raised by the Reichstag fire, parliament granted Hitler the sole authority to make laws. Using his new powers, Hitler obtained one-party rule. He and his party destroyed the liberal notions of equality before the law and individual rights. They built a totalitarian state to reshape German society in accordance with Nazi ideology. These are the basic elements of Nazi authoritarianism. From 1933 onward this state terrorized Jews and other minorities in an effort to remove them entirely from German society and, ultimately, from all of Europe. Antisemitism was central to German fascism, and German fascism was central to Nazism. Still, the Nazis' enforcement of measures like the Nuremberg Laws wasn't just because they hated Jews. It also reinforced a sense of German ethnic identity and showed how far-reaching the arm of state really was.

David Eacker is a Ph.D. student in History at Indiana University-Bloomington. His research focuses on modern Europe with an emphasis on Germany and Britain from 1789 to 1918. He is currently working on a dissertation about missionaries, theology, and empire in the 18th and 19th centuries. David has worked for two academic journals, Theory and Society and The American Historical Review.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
READ: Fascism in Germany (article) | Khan Academy

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The Nazis were not the only fascists in Europe. But Nazism's racist ideology and persecution of Jews distinguished it from other varieties of fascism. Fascism in Germany The Nazis were not the only fascists in Europe. But Nazism's racist ideology and persecution of Jews distinguished it from other varieties of fascism.

# data[].attributes.headline
The Rise of Fascism in Japan before WWII

# data[].attributes.subject
The Rise of Fascism in Japan before WWII

# data[].attributes.body
What do you think are the most significant events that occurred in your assigned country (Japan or China) during this period?

How would you summarize the impact of Western imperialism on your assigned country during this period?

# data[].attributes.headline
Japanese Expansion Before and During WWII

# data[].attributes.subject
Japanese Expansion Before and During WWII

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Japanese Expansionism Before and During World War Two (WWII) - Part 1

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Japan, nevertheless, fears the possibility of American competition, particularly in Manchuria, where she has been pursuing a policy by which foreign, including American, goods must be subordinated in that market to Japanese goods, and must be sold through Japanese firms. Potentially this policy is meaningless because, if China and Manchuria are to be modernized, no one country, surely not Japan, can supply either the quantity or the variety of goods and services required.

# data[].attributes.headline
Facing History and Ourselves, "The Jewish Ghettos: Separated from the World," last updated May 2, 2022.

# data[].attributes.subject
Facing History and Ourselves, "The Jewish Ghettos: Separated from the World," last updated May 2, 2022.

# data[].attributes.headline
Facing History and Ourselves, "National Socialist German Workers’ Party Platform," last updated April 4, 2019.

# data[].attributes.subject
Facing History and Ourselves, "National Socialist German Workers’ Party Platform," last updated April 4, 2019.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The following list contains some of the provisions that Hitler proposed at the National Socialist German Workers' Party's first large party gathering in February 1920.

El Programa del Partido Nacionalsocialista Obrero Alemán

La siguiente lista contiene algunas de las disposiciones que Hitler propuso en la primera gran reunión del Partido Nacionalsocialista Obrero Alemán en febrero de 1920.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
National Socialist German Workers' Party Platform

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The following list contains some of the provisions that Hitler proposed at the National Socialist German Workers' Party's first large party gathering in February 1920. La siguiente lista contiene algunas de las disposiciones que Hitler propuso en la primera gran reunión del Partido Nacionalsocialista Obrero Alemán en febrero de 1920.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Report Outline
Dominance of Military in Sino-Japanese Crisis
Foundations of the Japanese Military Tradition
Limitations to Liberalism Under Constitution of 1889
Rise of Political Parties to Position of Influence
Militarism Vs. Liberalism in Japan Since the War

Dominance of Military in Sino-Japanese Crisis

Japanese voters are expected to give the party of Prime Minister Inukai a plurality, if not an outright majority, of the seats in the House of Representatives at the general election to be held February 20, 1932. While the positive military policy now being followed by Japan in China is not an issue in the election campaign, being generally supported by the public, it is recognized that the government now in office is more sympathetic to that adventure than the cabinet which resigned December 11, 1931.

Baron Shidehara, foreign minister in the late government of Prime Minister Wakatsuki, in a letter published in a Tokyo newspaper February 2, warned the government of "irreparable consequences" that might ensue if it should be carried away by the Shanghai excitement. "Japan," he said, "should set aside her face-saving and settle the trouble at Shanghai in concert with the other powers." His views seemed to be shared only by a few liberals, mostly educators and professional men. Newspaper approval of the government's course has been almost unanimous.

Dominance of Militarists in Sino-Japanese Crisis

While the Inukai cabinet apparently hesitated to send army units to Shanghai, it seems to have been forced to do so in order to avert the threatened resignation of its war and navy ministers. To explain its action in dispatching a new expeditionary force, the government issued a declaration February 6 that it was prompted by "no other motive than that of discharging its international duty and of safeguarding the large number of Japanese nationals and property worth hundreds of millions," and that "unless the Chinese, by continuing hostilities or by obstructing our army in attaining these ends, compel it to take necessary action, there is no intention whatever that it should enter upon an aggressive campaign."

Militarism Vs. Liberalism in Japan

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Report Outline Dominance of Military in Sino-Japanese Crisis Foundations of the Japanese Military Tradition Limitations to Liberalism Under Constitution of 1889 Rise of Political Parties to Position of Influence Militarism Vs.

# data[].attributes.headline
Facing History and Ourselves, “The Era of Modernization in Japan,” video, last updated April 18, 2022.

# data[].attributes.subject
Facing History and Ourselves, “The Era of Modernization in Japan,” video, last updated April 18, 2022.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
[MUSIC PLAYING]

When the world was just China and Japan with Korea in there to a certain extent, things were culturally, relatively simple. But when the West comes into the picture-- new languages, new cultures, completely alien religions and peoples-- it gets much more complicated.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

In 1853, American Naval Commander Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Edo Bay with a squadron of powerful vessels. His goal was to secure a trade treaty with Japan, thereby opening more of East Asia to the West. Surprised by their demands and outgunned by their military, within one year, the Japanese agreed to Perry's terms.

And on March 31, 1854, the Convention of Kanagawa was signed. What followed was a period of Western influence that would forever change Japan. Many Japanese cast aside ancient traditions in favor of more modern ideas, while others were more resistant to new ways.

Until 1868, which is a very important year in Japanese history, the basic structure of the feudal government-- it was the shogunate, is the term we use, meaning the government of a shōgun-- the military government-- and it was placed in the city of Edo. In 1868, that city changes its name to Tokyo, which is modern-day Japan. The emperor, which is another seat of power, is in the city of Kyoto, which was the capitol, until 1868, of Japan.

The emperor is said to reign, not rule. The emperor sits there, and basically writes poetry, and plays with his butterflies, and does other things. The military government runs the show. And it's a feudal government. So there are domains all over the country, big and small. And they are categorized in different ways. And that goes on for 267, 268 years. And then under pressure from the West, and under pressure from within Japan, it collapses.

In order to become up to speed on the world as it is, both countries realize they need to get their acts together. They need to modernize in a way that is similar to the West, because they realize the West is very strong. They may not have any respect, as many of them don't, for Western culture, or Western religion, even Western society. But they realize that politically and militarily, the West is more powerful than they are.

So both countries put into effect modernization programs in the late 19th century.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

In Japan, there's a more serious national effort to reach this level of modernization and military capacity. Wealth and strength, that's what it's all about, wealth and strength. And they lead one to another. National wealth can lead to national strength. And then national strength can increase national wealth. This happy circle.

But there are a lot of other things that go along with modernization. The case of Japan is really interesting because until roughly the early 1870s-- late 1860s, 1870s-- Japan was a hierarchical feudal society, in which only the tiniest fraction of people would be considered part of the elite, the so-called samurai class.

And everyone else-- merchants, farmers, the great majority of people-- had no role in government. Their opinions were not solicited. Their views were irrelevant. And they were not welcomed. But that all changed when Japan decided to join the modern world of nation-states.

Then it needed a modern army. Now modern armies, again, don't drop out of the sky. You can't just conscript people all of a sudden and tell them, you know, it wasn't OK for you to have a weapon, because you were not a samurai. But now, you not only can serve, now I'll give you a weapon. Moreover, you have to be willing to die for this entity, Japan.

What's that? I mean, they didn't know what-- Japan was a vague notion to most people. So they have to give people a stake in it, which means education becomes available to many people. So that's this social contract that the Japanese government develops. And of course, it works.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

When Japan entered the modern world and quickly learned that to be a player in the big game meant you had a couple of colonies, maybe more than a couple. And so that meant that Japan needed a colony. And then there were all rationales that were built into having a colony, which is an area for exports and free or really cheap labor.

And by the time Japan got into the game, there were slim pickings out there. By the end of the 19th century, most of Southeast Asia was either in the hands of the British or the French. And the British were in India. And all these European countries have little areas carved out of China. The US was about to make the Philippines a colony.

Korea, though, was still available and close. And so they compelled the Koreans to sign certain kinds of unequal arrangements with them.

And then that got the Chinese very upset, because the Chinese didn't look at Korea as a colony, but they looked at them, in the Empire's view of the world, as kind of a younger brother. Part of a larger-- not necessarily part of the Qing dynasty's empire, but at least part of the Chinese sphere of influence.

And the Japanese were not playing by those rules any longer. They were playing by the new set of rules. And that led to war in 1894 with China, which the Japanese won in 1895. And they got their first colony.

Ten years later, Japan went to war again and was victorious in 1905 against a much larger and more powerful imperial country, Czarist Russia. Strengthened by this victory, Japan continued its empire-building, occupying Manchuria in 1931.

By the summer of 1937, Japanese Imperial Forces had invaded China once more, eventually winning the Battle of Shanghai. Japanese forces then turned their sights on the then-capital city of China, Nanjing. On December 13, 1937, the siege of the city began.

What they aspired to is to become part of the game-- to join it rather than to fight it. There was no fighting it. Learning how to build a strong, powerful nation, the Japanese just do it really well. The sad thing is when you start victimizing other populations. And that comes with empire.

In the 19th century, and before, people really didn't care, in the Western world, about what those people thought. Then the Japanese, in many ways, just followed suit. They felt you need an empire to survive. This was the ideology.

You need an empire as a place for your excess population, for your excess well-trained graduates from your universities and whatever, who don't have jobs, for people who need more land to spread out and to farm on. And so you take the closest place that's available that you can succeed in colonizing. And so they did.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
MUSIC PLAYING] When the world was just China and Japan with Korea in there to a certain extent, things were culturally, relatively simple. But when the West comes into the picture-- new languages, new cultures, completely alien religions and peoples-- it gets much more complicated.

# data[].attributes.headline
Facing History and Ourselves, “Japanese Pan-Asianism: An Introduction,” video, last updated April 12, 2022.

# data[].attributes.subject
Facing History and Ourselves, “Japanese Pan-Asianism: An Introduction,” video, last updated April 12, 2022.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Professor Rana Mitter explains the origins of the Japanese Pan-Asianism.

Using the strategies from Facing History is almost like an awakening.

- Claudia Bautista, Santa Monica, Calif

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Professor Rana Mitter explains the origins of the Japanese Pan-Asianism. Using the strategies from Facing History is almost like an awakening. - Claudia Bautista, Santa Monica, Calif

# data[].attributes.headline
Facing History and Ourselves, "Visual Essay: The Impact of Propaganda," last updated April 29, 2022.

# data[].attributes.subject
Facing History and Ourselves, "Visual Essay: The Impact of Propaganda," last updated April 29, 2022.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Explore a curated selection of primary source propaganda images from Nazi Germany.

# data[].attributes.headline
Facing History and Ourselves, "Hitler in Power" last updated January 27, 2021.

# data[].attributes.subject
Facing History and Ourselves, "Hitler in Power" last updated January 27, 2021.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In April 1932, Paul von Hindenburg, at the age of 84, remained president by defeating Hitler and his other challengers. He began his new term in office that spring by naming a new chancellor-Franz von Papen, a close friend and member of the Center Party. Papen ran the country for the rest of the year. When he failed to end the depression, another of Hindenburg's friends, General Kurt von Schleicher, who belonged to no party, took over in December. He was also unable to bring about a recovery and was forced to resign.

Hindenburg and his advisors were all conservatives who represented wealthy landowners, industrialists, and other powerful people. As the depression persisted, their popular support was shrinking. So in January of 1933, they decided to make a deal with Hitler. He had the popularity they lacked, and they had the power he needed. They also agreed on a number of points, including a fierce opposition to communism, hostility to democracy, and eagerness for Lebensraum-additional land for the German Volk.

Hindenburg's advisors believed that the responsibility of being in power would make Hitler moderate his views. They convinced themselves that they were wise enough and powerful enough to "control" Hitler. Also, they were certain that he, too, would fail to end the depression. And when he failed, they would step in to save the nation. Hitler fooled them all.

On January 30, 1933, Hitler was sworn in as chancellor of Germany. Because the Nazi Party did not control a majority of the Reichstag, they joined with the German National People's Party to form a coalition government-that is, one run by multiple political parties, usually with different but overlapping agendas. Nevertheless, Hitler accepted the appointment as if he had been named emperor of Germany and ignored the wishes of the other party. He and his fellow Nazis boasted that they would soon restore the nation and the "Aryan race" to greatness by ending so-called "Jewish racial domination" and eliminating the Communist threat. The result would be a "third Reich" ( Reich is the German word for "empire"). The Nazis considered the Holy Roman Empire (952-1806) the "first Reich" and the empire established after the unification of the German states in 1871 the "second." Hitler was confident that his Third Reich would be the greatest of all, and it would last a thousand years.

Connection Questions

1. Why did Hindenburg appoint Hitler chancellor? What advantages and disadvantages did he consider?

2. What kind of chancellor did Germany's political leaders expect Hitler to be? What reasons did they have for those expectations?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In April 1932, Paul von Hindenburg, at the age of 84, remained president by defeating Hitler and his other challengers. He began his new term in office that spring by naming a new chancellor-Franz von Papen, a close friend and member of the Center Party. Papen ran the country for the rest of the year.

# data[].attributes.headline
Cambridge AS History: Japanese Militarism

# data[].attributes.subject
Cambridge AS History: Japanese Militarism

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
World War I changed everything. From new countries to literature, from tanks to treaties and from flamethrowers to fashion, the conflict is still writ large on our lives 100 years on.

It gave birth to violent dictators and their ideologies but extended the electoral franchise to millions. It ushered in the era of mechanised warfare whilst laying the foundations for modern medicine. Empires crumbled, borders were redrawn, art movements flowered and women won the vote (even if you still had to be over 30 in some countries). Poets committed some of the most memorable imagery in modern verse to paper while a generation of writers would descend on Europe's war-torn cities and fashion a new style of literature.

After millions of men gave their lives on the battlefields of Europe, it was doubly tragic that a deadly influenza would claim up to 50 million more deaths in the conflict's immediate aftermath. World War I has given us daylight saving time, Dada, triage, chemical weapons, plastic surgery, fascism and, of course, another war. It invented new forms of killing and unearthed miraculous ways to save lives.

Wall Street Journal editors from around the world have selected 100 legacies that still shape our lives today. History is always open to interpretation, but as the war to end all wars retreats from living history, it feels more important than ever to remember its impact. It is everywhere you look.

Writers

Nathan Hodge, Art Patnaude, Tommy Stubbington, Andrew Peaple, Tom Mudd, Peter Evans, Sarah Sloat, Rory Jones, Alexis Flynn, Fiona Matthias, Harriet Torry, Alen Mattich, Chase Gummer, Laurence Eyton, Peter Stiff, Paul Hannon, Laurence Witherington, Gautam Naik, Christopher Lawton, Michael Wright, Neetha Mahadevan, Laurence Norman, Caitlan Reeg, Jovi Juan, Liza Hearon, Inti Landauro, Thomas Varela, Marcus Walker, Jake Lee, Shirley Wang, Stephen Fidler, Juhana Rossi, Will Lyons, Monica Houston-Waesch, Francesca Freeman, Peter Nurse, James Leigh, Max Colchester, Todd Buell, Frances Robinson, Adam Najberg, Matthew Walls, Yuka Hayashi, Jose DeCordoba, Selina Williams, Naftali Bendavid, David Winning, Geoffrey T. Smith, Charles Hutzler, Matina Stevis, Ayla Albayrak, Charles Forelle, Perry Cleveland-Peck

Editors

Tom Mudd, Laurence Eyton, Sheila Courter, Margaret de Streel, Matthew Walls, Adrian Kerr, Peter Stiff, Perry Cleveland-Peck, Sofia McFarland, Tina Fuhr, Lydia Serota, Ese Erheriene, Jon Sindreu, Yvonne Dennis, John Crowley

Multimedia Producers

Dipti Kapadia, Mark Kelly, Parminder Bahra, Miho Inada, Menglin Huang, Ayla Albayrak, Monika Vosough, Billy Higgins, Beckey Bright, Tom DiFonzo, George Downs, Pat Minczeski, Michael Ovaska

Designers & Developers

Jovi Juan, Renee Lightner, Elliot Bentley

Consultant

David Tattersfield from the Western Front Association

Published June 28, 2014 | Updated October 31, 2018

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
World War I Centenary: Japanese Militarism

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
World War I changed everything. From new countries to literature, from tanks to treaties and from flamethrowers to fashion, the conflict is still writ large on our lives 100 years on. It gave birth to violent dictators and their ideologies but extended the electoral franchise to millions.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
World War II really began when the Japanese army seized Manchuria in 1931. But that was not the starting point of Japanese aggression. Japan started in business as a land-grabbing power in a small way. Moving cautiously, while its modern navy and army were still in the infant stage, Japan took over several groups of small islands not far from its homeland without having to fight for them.

By 1894 it was strong enough to challenge the weak and aging Chinese Empire. In July of that year Japanese naval guns fired on Chinese ships without warning. For the next fifty years Japan's conquest and absorption of Asia and the Pacific islands has continued, step by step, with time out to consolidate the gains and gather strength for the next move.

The successful war with China in 1894-95 added Formosa and the nearby Pescadores islands to the Japanese Empire. After defeating Russia in 1904-05, Japan took the south half of Sakhalin and the southern tip of Manchuria known as the LiaotungPeninsula. In 1910 Korea was annexed. At the end of World War I, the victorious powers handed the Japanese a mandate over the former German islands north of the equator, one of the most important strategic areas in the Pacific. Twelve years later the Japanese began carving out sections of China, starting with Manchuria in 1931. On the eve of the present war, Japan seized control of Indo-China from defenseless France and reduced Thailand (Siam) to the status of a puppet.

By a combination of bluff and bloodshed Japan's warlords, in less than half a century, had increased their holdings from 147,669 square miles to more than 1,000,000.

It's our problem now.

Only a few Americans seem to have realized that the peace and security of the United States were being endangered every time Japan seized a slice of its neighbors' territory. There is nothing to be gained by reproaching ourselves for not having read the future correctly. But we can plan and act now to keep the sons of the men who are fighting Japan from having to do the job all over again.

We know that the Japanese will be defeated. But though our victory will remove the immediate danger that threatened us in 1941, it will not of itself make us secure against a repetition of that danger. That will depend mainly upon our firmness and wisdom in handling Japan after the victory is won.

A day will come when Japan will lie stricken and harmless. Then will be the time to employ the treatment that will cure the Japanese once and for all of the disease of creeping aggression.

To understand what has to be done to prevent another Pearl Harbor we need to know something of the motives which led the Japanese to stake everything on this greatest gamble in their history. Americans have never before gone to war with a nation about which they knew so little. Since 1941 the people of this country have been too busy fighting Japan and the other Axis partners to spend much time investigating their history and politics.

What were the causes of aggression?

For the purposes of this pamphlet the principal causes of Japanese aggression may be summarized as follows:

1. The Japanese believe that their nation is superior to all others and that it has a special mission to dominate and rule the rest of mankind.

2. The Japanese armed forces enjoy a special position that gives them practical control of the government.

3. Japan is located at the center of the rich Asiatic-Pacific area and had the strongest and most successful army and navy in Asia.

4. The Japanese were dissatisfied with their economic condition. The working classes had a low standard of living, and big business demanded more raw materials and more markets which could be exploited without meeting European and American competition. Japan was less rich in resources than the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. Also, high tariffs in the United States and other countries barred Japanese goods from some of the world markets.

Japan's "divine mission"

The Japanese actually believe that they are descendants of the gods, that their emperor is divine, and that they have a heaven-inspired mission to rule the world. These fantastic ideas are based on what they call "history," in reality a patchwork of fact, legend, and wishful thinking. We can pass over the business of descent from the gods and the emperor's divinity. To us the very ideas are absurd. But we must never forget that all Japanese children are instructed in these beliefs from the cradle and that many of the strongest of Japanese emotions are centered in them.

In recent years Japanese education and propaganda have featured a phrase supposed to have been used by the first emperor-eight corners of the world under one roof. This has been interpreted to mean, in plain English, that Japan must dominate about a billion people in Asia and the Pacific area, and eventually rule the world. This is no new idea to the Japanese mind. Three hundred and fifty years ago their combination Julius Caesar and Napoleon, Hideyoshi, wrote: "All military leaders who shall render successful vanguard service in the coming campaign in China will be liberally rewarded with grants of extensive states near India, with the privilege of conquering India and extending their domains in that vast empire."

This could have been written yesterday. The speeches and writings of Japanese statesmen and superpatriots in modern times reveal dozens of similar warnings of their intentions. Yet, in the summer of 1941, when their plan for conquest was officially published in The Way of the Subjects, the so-called "bible" of the Japanese people, many foreigners still did not take it very seriously. Six months later they did.

Why are the Japanese easily led?

It has been pointed out that highly organized worship of the state and its symbol, the emperor, is a comparatively recent development. The official Shinto religion has been called an instrument to bring the people into line for an all-out war effort. The truth of the matter seems to be that the government did not create a new faith or loyalty. It merely made use of beliefs that the Japanese have held in a rather passive way for centuries. The all too human desire to possess their neighbors' property was thus elevated to a patriotic and religious duty. Universal schooling and cheap printing made the task easier, as did also the docility of the people and their ingrained respect for authority.

The keynote of the Japanese character is loyalty rather than freedom and individuality. A citizen's duties and obligations to the nation are emphasized, but almost no recognition is given to his rights. To argue the merits and demerits of this philosophy is outside the scope of this pamphlet. But these beliefs and ideals of the Japanese people have made it easy for them to be led into war.

How did the war lords get control?

In Japan the armed forces have won almost complete control of the government and the nation. Every department of the national life-industry, commerce, agriculture, education, the press, even religion-is subject to their will.

Japan was not always an out-and-out military dictatorship. For a brief period after the first World War there were indications that it was on the road to establishing representative government and was following the lead of Western nations in carrying out some badly needed social and political reforms.

The Japanese constitution of 1889 provided the framework of a nineteenth-century monarchy modeled on Prussia. At the head of the state is the emperor, assisted by his privy council. There is a cabinet, headed by the prime minister, and a parliament consisting of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives, the latter elected by the people. Actually, the emperor is a figurehead. He is worshiped, but he does not originate either policy or action. For centuries the imperial power has been in the hands of a few nobles, soldiers, or statesmen who had the strength to use it.

The makers of this system did not plan for or want popular government. But from about 1921 to 1931 the Japanese political parties gained in power, and it seemed to many observers that the cabinet and the House of Representatives might in time become the controlling elements in the government. Critics have claimed, however, that even during this brief period there was no true republican system in Japan. If Japan is ever to have democracy in the future there must be fundamental reforms in the system by which the country is governed.

The so-called "liberals" of Japan who came to the fore after 1920 were not liberal in our sense of the word. For the most part they represented big business. But they did, advocate a moderate foreign policy to further the expansion of international trade and they realized the value of remaining on friendly terms with the United States. Their period of influence reached its high point with the signing of the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Military fascism raises its ugly head

A movement was on foot, however, which in the end swept away the weak machinery of representative government and launched Japan on its biggest gamble for empire. The army and navy die-hards opposed bitterly any limiting of Japan's fighting power. In November 1930 the "liberal" Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot by an assassin.

Who were the men behind this drive? The usual answer is "the army." To be more specific, it was a group of extremists within the army, backed by powerful "superpatriot" influences outside. The extremists are sometimes referred to as the "younger officers," because many of them were below the rank of colonel.

To follow the rise of military-fascist dictatorship in Japan it is necessary to understand the unique position which the armed forces occupy in the government and in, the minds and hearts of the people. Before the rise of modem Japan, the nobles and their fighting men (samurai) formed the ruling class. After 1868 the old system of warrior clans was abolished and universal conscription was introduced.

The honor of bearing arms, which had always been regarded as a mark of the superior man, was extended to the entire nation. The mingling of emperor worship with the glorification of war, plus continued victories over half a century, have given the army and navy a popular prestige that will be hard to destroy.

Tradition and the constitution

An unusual feature of the Japanese government which the militarists have used in their rise to power is the make-up of the cabinet. The posts of war and navy minister can be held only by a general and an admiral on the active list. So the army or the navy can prevent the formation of any cabinet that is not acceptable to them merely by refusing to fill these positions.

Another dangerous feature is the division of control over civil and military affairs. The emperor is nominal commander in chief of the armed forces, and on military matters he receives advice only from high-ranking officers. The ministers of war and the navy have direct access to the emperor and do not have to approach him through the prime minister.

The modern Japanese army admired and imitated the German. Its officers regard themselves as heirs of the old samurai. The majority of them are poor, proud of their service, and fanatically devoted to the emperor. Dangerously ignorant of the world outside Japan, they dislike foreigners and regard prosperous Japanese businessmen and politicians who have absorbed Western culture with a mixture of envy and suspicion.

Discontented militarists

By 1930 there was serious discontent in the armed forces. The world-wide depression hit Japan hard, causing much privation among the poor farmers from whose ranks the army was largely recruited. There were many failures of small businesses and serious unemployment among industrial and white-collar workers.

Army officers were alarmed at the spread of Western political ideas, especially communism. Their own rather vague political philosophy was not unlike Hitler's National Socialism. Their faith in the government was shaken by the evidence of bribery, graft, and corruption in the chief political parties, and by deals between politicians and big business to the disadvantage of the mass of the people. Like the Nazis, the Japanese military fascists claimed to be friends of the common man.

To pull Japan out of the depths of the depression a vigorous program of social, economic, and political reform was needed. But the big landowners and industrialists were not prepared to accept changes which threatened their interests. The army had another sort of program in mind-expansion by force in China to overcome Japan's dependence on foreign trade, plus a military dictatorship with the emperor as figurehead, and a wartime "controlled economy" on the home front.

The army moves in

"Soldiers have always saved Japan," said fire-eating General Araki. "To our soldiers will fall the grave responsibility for quieting unrest in our agrarian communities-both material and spiritual unrest." To gain their ends the army extremists developed two characteristically Japanese methods: first, resorting to direct military action in China without authorization by the government; and second, terrorism against their political opponents at home.

For support among the civilian population the militarists depended upon the ex-servicemen's association, with its three million members, and the so-called "patriotic societies." Membership in these powerful organizations ranged from college professors, government officials, and prosperous merchants to half-starved students, poor peasants, and hired killers.

The worst of these superpatriots worked with the army fanatics to organize numerous assassinations, after 1930. The victims were leading statesmen, bankers, industrialists, and even generals and admirals who advocated a moderate policy. Most of the killers were given light sentences when brought to trial and were regarded as heroes by millions of Japanese because of the "purity" and "sincerity" of their motives. The government of Japan during the ten years before Pearl Harbor has been aptly described as "government by assassination."

The first blow

Discontent and revolutionary unrest were seething within the army like a volcano preparing to erupt. On September 18, 1931 the top blew off in Manchuria. Commanders of troops guarding the South Manchurian Railway faked a piece of railway sabotage as an excuse to occupy the chief Manchurian cities. This was done without the consent of the cabinet then in office, which resigned as a result. In 1932 a government headed by Admiral Saito approved the seizure of Manchuria by formally recognizing Manchukuo, a dummy empire set up by the army. The militarists followed up their gains by the occupation of a large slice of north China in 1933, forcing the Chinese government to sign a humiliating truce.

In February 1933, Japan quit the League of Nations, burning its most important bridge with the outside world. In the words of former Ambassador Grew this step meant "a fundamental defeat for the moderate elements in the country and the complete supremacy of the military."

Military mutiny

In February 1936, after two years of deceptive quiet, the army volcano erupted again, this time in a mutiny almost within the shadow of the imperial palace. Only about 1,400 troops, led by their captains and lieutenants, were involved. But there is good reason to suspect that some of the highest ranking generals were in sympathy with the mutineers. The fascist-minded young officers were not in rebellion against their military superiors, but against the government. They had prepared a long death list of prominent men whose principles and actions they disapproved. Actually they succeeded in assassinating only three high officials. The chief result was greater power for the supreme command.

The army's consolidation of the home front proceeded during the years 1937-41. The outbreak of a large-scale war, in China rallied the people to the support of the militarists. All opposition to the war was suppressed. The army took over the conduct of affairs in China, allowing the politicians little or no say. The state, which had always exercised strong controls over industry, trade, education, religion, and the press, tightened its grip.

Step by step, the Japanese people were prepared for a "unified," that is, a military-fascist government. In the summer of 1940 all political parties "voluntarily" disbanded. On September 27, 1940, Japan concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy. The "New Order in Greater East Asia," to include not only China but the rich territories in southern Asiatic waters, became the official foreign policy.

By the beginning of 1941, for all practical purposes the army and the state were one. Even big business, since 1937 an uneasy partner in the wartime economy, could no longer offer effective opposition to the fascists in uniform.

The chance of a century

It is unlikely that any nation will risk its very existence in a war if it lacks a gambler's chance of winning. On the other hand, a powerful army and navy tuned to a high pitch of enthusiasm and efficiency are a strong temptation to a war-minded government in time of crisis. Japan had the best army, navy, and air force in the Far East. In addition to trained manpower and modern weapons, Japan had in the mandated islands a string of naval and air bases ideally located for an advance to the south.

From 1937 to 1941 the Chinese war had cost Japan many billions of dollars and at least a million casualties. In return for this heavy investment, the Japanese expected great gains. Economic resources were at a low ebb; this was the chief weakness. Nonetheless, in the fall of 1941 Japan was at the peak of its military and naval strength. Britain and Russia faced victorious Axis armies in Europe and Africa, and the British navy was fighting the Battle of the Atlantic. France and Holland were in no position to come to the rescue of their Eastern possessions. Only the United States Navy was a formidable threat, and Japan's plans included a sneak attack to cripple our Pacific fleet.

This challenging opportunity, the equal of which might not occur again in centuries, was the final temptation which led Japan's war lords to make their fatal choice. They knew that they must strike soon, or give up forever their dream of conquest. Certain events of the years between 1932 and Pearl Harbor had convinced even the arrogant descendants of the gods that the United States was not going to be pushed around much longer.
From EM 15: What Shall Be Done about Japan after Victory? (1945)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
World War II really began when the Japanese army seized Manchuria in 1931. But that was not the starting point of Japanese aggression. Japan started in business as a land-grabbing power in a small way.

# data[].attributes.headline
This 1938 poster advertises a popular antisemitic traveling exhibit called Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew).

# data[].attributes.subject
This 1938 poster advertises a popular antisemitic traveling exhibit called Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew).

# data[].attributes.body
This is a poster representing a museum exhibit in Germany in 1937 and 1938 that was titled The Eternal Jew.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
This 1938 poster advertises a popular antisemitic traveling exhibit called Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew). Most teachers are willing to tackle the difficult topics, but we need the tools. - Gabriela Calderon-Espinal, Bay Shore, NY

# data[].attributes.body
Guiding Questions

How many parties were on the ballot in 1932? How many parties are typically represented in the legislature of your country?

What might be the benefit of having so many political parties competing in an election? What might be the drawbacks?

In a democracy, is it important for election winners to receive a majority of the vote? Why or why not?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The 1932 German election ballot featured 36 parties, many of which existed only on paper. The number of different groups made it difficult for any single party to gain a majority in parliament in the Weimar Republic.

# data[].attributes.headline
Identity and the Rise of Prewar Nationalism in Japan

# data[].attributes.subject
Identity and the Rise of Prewar Nationalism in Japan

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Identity and the Rise of Nationalism in Prewar Japan

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
This module is designed for an AP world history course, although it could also be used in a standard high school world history course.

# data[].attributes.headline
The Outbreak of World War II in East Asia Documents

# data[].attributes.subject
The Outbreak of World War II in East Asia Documents

# data[].attributes.body
1.economic woes for Germany. relevance to how it was linked to its rise and specific examples of significance like hyperinflation and great depression was used to show and link to its rise 2.only one was provided which was rise of authoritarian regimes. they segmented it into the many minor problems which made it easier to understand and provided good explanations and links 3. Using the concept of significance, the group could have compared how the economic woes are more important as compared to the other factors. This would have highlighted the factor as it would've shown the significance of that specific factor

3.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument the group provided that led to the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany was the economic crisis. The Nazis promised economic recovery during the Depression, which appealed to many Germans, leading to their rise to power.

2. [WIP]

3. .

# data[].attributes.body
1. I feel that the most convincing factor that the group explained was the propaganda used by the Nazi Party as they made use of Nuremburg rallies to prove their point

2. I feel that the most convincing factor was the rise of nationalism. Thier explanation was concise which made their pont clear

3. Using the concept of significance, the group could have further explained the significance of their main points as compared to other less important factors to make their ponts seem more important

# data[].attributes.body
We will be creating a 6-8 minute video. We think that this will be entertaining yet educational and encompasses the objectives of this project.

# data[].attributes.headline
Group 4 (Javier Tan, Pak Yu, Hong Wei, Ryan)

# data[].attributes.subject
Group 4 (Javier Tan, Pak Yu, Hong Wei, Ryan)

# data[].attributes.body
We will be making a website

# data[].attributes.body
1. Economic Instability. They provided examples with proper reasoning and statistics to back up their claims, such as the amount of unemployed citizens and the devaluation of currency.

2. The economic downfall of Japan, similar to the one they used in Germany, they provided concrete evidence to support their point. 3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued using the less example driven point, Manchuria. This would improve the argument because it would make the example more explanation based including the examples they provided.

# data[].attributes.body
1. It would be their economic woes. They supported their views with strong evidence and explanation on how it led to the rise of the Nazi party.

2. weakness of the civilian government. clearly linked government's inability to assert control to dissatisfaction of public and appeal of military. external research examples of hakko ichiu ideology also made it convincing

# data[].attributes.body
1. The weakness of Weimar republic was the most convincing argument as they used the most accurate information and the most well justified examples.

2. The weakness of the civilian government was the most convincing argument as they clearly explained how this factor led to the rise of the militarists in Japan with unique examples too.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued by explaining why the other factors were not as important as the weakness of the governments in both countries instead of just simply stating that the weakness of the governments were the most important.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument the group has made is the fact that economic downturn's of the Weimer republic that led to the rise of the Nazi power. Because during the Great Depression in Germany, the nazi party gained momentum by exploiting widespread economic hardship and national humiliation after World War I. Along with Adolf Hitler's charismatic leadership and promises of economic revival and national restoration resonated with the disillusioned populace, this propelled the Nazis to power.

2. The most convincing argument the group made for the rise of militarism in Japan is the deeply rooted nationalism prevalent in Japanese society during the early 20th century. Japan's imperialistic ambitions and desire for expansion were fueled by a strong sense of national identity and pride. The militarists capitalized on this sentiment, promoting the idea of Japan's superiority and the need to assert dominance in East Asia.

3. The group could have argued that the rise of militarism in Japan was a pivotal turning point in its history, shaping both domestic politics and international relations. This would enhance the argument by providing a deeper understanding of the profound impact of militarism on Japan's trajectory as a nation and its ongoing legacy in contemporary perceptions of the country.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the Nazi party rose to power is the economic woes of Germany at the time, as they had properly explained how the Nazi strategically capitalised on the existing issues, paving the way for Authoriatian Regimes.

2. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the militarists rose to power in Japan is the nationalism sentiments, they explained how fostering a sense of pride led to the rise of enlistment in the military, hene strengthening the military.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued better on how a weak constitution posed an issue for the respective countries, and also how the authoriarian regimes came into power through this issue.

# data[].attributes.body
1. Political factors like article 48. They gave specific evidence and clear explanations on how the nazi managed to exploit their weaknesses and consolidate power in order to

be more appealing to the German citizens

2. Ultranationalism. Played out the classroom setting of japan at the time so it is very clear how the teachers and education board spread the military propaganda to the students

3. They should've shortened down their points to ones more specific and relevant instead of including all the points.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the Nazi Party rose to power is the instituitional instability as they clearly showed how proportional representation led to political fragmentation.

2. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the militarists rose to power in Japan is the economic woes as they showed clearly how that erodes the trust in the government and thus leads to the rise of militarists.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued which factor was the most important.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The appeal of the Nazi Party. They displayed how the citizens were unhappy with the Weimar Government and wanted a authoritarian government like the Nazi Party. They showed how the citizens were attracted to Hitler's plans on bringing back Germany's former glory. Thus, I felt that that was the most convincing argument

2. The attack on Manchuria. They recreated the scene on Manchuria and showed why and how the army took over Manchuria. They made a point on how the army now held a strong territory, increasing the strength of the military.

3. The group did not really expand on the most important reason and they could use the examples of Nazi and Japan to back up their stand.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the Nazi party rose to power is the political instability as they distinctively stated and explained how each event supported the main point of political instability and thus led to the rise of power for the Nazi party.

2. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the militarists rose to power in Japan is the economic challenges as they have proper explanations and elaborations that thus explain why the militarist rose to power.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued how charismatic leadership leads to authoritarian regimes as they lack evidence of such.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the Nazi party rose to power is the instituitional instability as they clearly explained it.

2. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the militarists rose to power in Japan is the deep-seated nationalism as they explained that the militarists stirred the hearts of the people, painting themselves as the guardians of the nation's destiny. Hence it led to the greater militarism in Japan.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued better on why they decided nationalism to be the most important factor as they didn't justify it well enough.

# data[].attributes.body
1. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the Nazi party rose to power is the economic instability as they successfully explained how the events led to the support of the Nazi party.

2. The most convincing argument that the group made about why the militarists rose to power in Japan is the political instability as they managed to link the events to the rise of militarism by explaining it well.

3. Using the concept of Significance, the group could have argued better why the other factors weren't as important compared to the weakness of the constitutions in their own respective countries.