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NGO development in China since the Wenchuan earthquake 

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NGO development in China since the Wenchuan earthquake 

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Written on . Posted in Article, Focus.

In an essay published in this journal in 2018, I commented that in the decade that followed the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008 I had witnessed the transformation of civil society development in the quake-struck areas from a grassroots-driven, wild process to a rather fluid and dynamic situation and then to a top-down and managed process. My research largely focuses on those nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that are registered with state authorities and are mainly service-oriented; some NGOs that stay unregistered for various reasons or pursue advocacy missions face a far more antagonistic environment than the organisations in my analysis (Franceschini and Lin 2019). The changes that have occurred in this realm since I penned those words have reinforced this view: while the NGO sector is on the rise in China, the Party-State has managed to direct and dominate its development. But what are those changes? How do Chinese NGOs adapt in this evolving environment? Have the government and NGOs arrived at a certain understanding about how to deal with each other? And, finally, what research agenda can we pursue to move forward the study of NGO development in China?

The Role of External Actors

Various overseas actors have played a significant role in fostering NGO development and changing the relationship between state and society in China. Through their endeavours to inject new ideas into local governance, they have inspired and engaged both state agents and social actors, creating platforms for constructive state-in-society interactions. My study of a group of Hong Kong social workers building a social work profession in mainland China has enabled me to explore how those external actors, through their efforts to promote professional knowledge across borders, have helped build internal and external networks for Chinese NGOs to bridge their locally embedded practices with global norms and standards (Kang 2020c). The Hong Kong social workers were largely cooperative with the local state and made compromises in their attempt at 'indigenisation', but they also carried out prosaic yet constant struggles to incrementally expand NGO turf within the political boundaries of mainland China.

At the same time, local cadres make strenuous efforts to reshape the practices of external actors to ensure their actions conform to the government's existing objectives and agenda. Stephen Noakes and Jessica Teets (2020) have found that international NGOs and foundations working inside China must comply with domestic rules, norms, and practices, facing difficult trade-offs in engaging with the country's strong authoritarian government. Thus, they make a series of strategic adaptations as a pragmatic response to operating within China. Echoing their work, my research also finds that the Chinese Government has engaged Hong Kong social workers in the neoliberal management of indigenous social work organisations, which promotes apolitical pragmatism while suppressing advocacy and discouraging cultivation of expertise (Kang 2020b). Being vulnerable to the government's political clout, these overseas professionals have become increasingly frustrated by the various gaps in mentality and substantial power asymmetry between themselves and the agents of the Chinese State. Frictions accumulating over time, along with the growing hostility of the Chinese Government towards external civil society actors, have driven many of them away from mainland China in recent years. Such dynamics have resulted in shrinking external funding and support for Chinese NGOs, which have forced many NGOs that were previously supported by overseas organisations to turn to domestic funding sources (Gåsemyr 2017).

The NGO Funding Game

Although it should be noted that there are regional differences in terms of the funding game and its implications for state-NGO relationships in China (Hsu et al. 2017), my fieldwork in Beijing, Shanghai, and Sichuan between 2016 and 2017 has allowed me to gain some insight into the current dynamics (Kang 2019). The government is increasingly using purchase-of-service contracting to incentivise and manage NGOs (Jing 2018; Yuen 2020). Private foundations are growing rapidly, and some have actively supported the development of grassroots NGOs although funding remains relatively limited (Shieh 2017). At the same time, funding to Chinese NGOs from international foundations and organisations has gradually shrunk in recent years due to tighter government restrictions, especially after the enactment of the Foreign NGO Management Law of 2017 (Teets 2017). In this context, both existing NGOs that were previously supported by overseas organisations and newly established NGOs have turned to government funding and the various grant schemes of domestic private foundations, which have become the two dominant funding sources for China's civil society (Yu 2016; Gåsemyr 2017). In this situation-which I previously described as a 'twin-pillared NGO funding game' (Kang 2019)-Chinese NGOs simultaneously feel two opposing effects. On the one hand, the coexistence of government funds and private foundations' grants-which differ in their focus, selection/evaluation criteria, and scaling strategies-has offered alternatives to NGOs' practices and growth paths and thus widened the space for diversity. On the other hand, the two funding pillars similarly adopt commercial logics and drive NGOs to eschew challenging the status quo and fit into fields and roles supported by the government, hence repressing NGOs' unique organisational missions and characteristics. While NGOs pursue dynamic and multifacete resource strategies to exploit the space created by alternative funding sources, they eventually find their options extremely limited.

NGOs elsewhere also face isomorphic pressures as they voluntarily conform to donor expectations of appropriate and acceptable practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The pressures Chinese NGOs face, however, are unique in their relative novelty and irresistibility. Since Chinese NGOs have long experienced coercive and mimetic pressures from an intimidating Party-State (Hasmath and Hsu 2014; Gåsemyr 2017), isomorphic pressures generated by friendlier funding mechanisms are unfamiliar to them, and they therefore remain wary yet experiment with flexible and versatile approaches. Some adopt mundane survival strategies, such as testing alternative opportunities to understand their differences and crafting development paths accordingly (Kang 2019); others pursue strategic advocacy, such as engagement in 'service activism' and 'resistance through accommodation' (Yuen 2018; Jakimów 2017). Chinese NGOs' resource strategies are moving beyond the dichotomy between 'state alliance' and 'state avoidance' (Hsu and Jiang 2015) towards more multifaceted and interactive approaches, with 'navigation, circumvention and brokerage' being a more accurate description of the current situation (Gåsemyr 2017).

However, Gåsemyr's (2017: 99) prediction of Chinese NGOs' prospects of being 'proactive and innovative and less donor-driven' was too optimistic. The twin-pillared funding game has made Chinese NGOs passively accept donor dominance (unless they bravely exit the game) and has ultimately restrained their imagination and creativity. Moreover, unlike their counterparts elsewhere, who form mutually dependent partnerships with donors, Chinese NGOs face severe power imbalances and thus possess extremely limited bargaining power when interacting with government and private foundation donors. Newly established NGOs, in particular, face a vicious cycle: being weak and less well-developed, they lack the resources and space in which to accrue proficiency and demonstrate their unique value in areas where the public and private sectors lack competence, thus they are at the mercy of donors' whims, which makes them even more vulnerable and likely to become government-like or business-like organisations (Kang 2019).

The Evolution of the Local State-NGO Relationship

Much work has been done to understand the relationships between local governments and NGOs in China. Researchers have observed that, with the practice of neoliberal governmentality, the Chinese Government has increasingly retreated from the provision of social welfare, leaving social services that the government supports but is unable to fully provide to NGOs and privately funded philanthropy programs (McCabe and Deng 2018; Zhan 2020). On the other hand, the local state is not retreating from control. Local officials at different levels and in different departments interact with NGOs in different ways and form various microlevel relationships. Accordingly, NGOs strategically cope with the multilevel, multifaceted institutions of the state (Newland 2018; Yuen 2020).

After closely following the evolution of local state-NGO relationships in six cities in Sichuan for a decade after the Wenchuan earthquake, I have found that the state resources that could have been used to advance the NGO sector's overall capacity have been gradually channelled along patron-client lines (Kang 2020a). Local officials-especially those at the frontlines of governance-increasingly understand that it is counterproductive to simply employ some general policy frameworks to control NGOs. Rather, creating consensus and authority through their individual interactions with NGOs can be more effective for establishing stable working partnerships and reciprocity. Controlling manifold resources and possessing management authority in purchase-of-service contracting, local officials thus have progressively pursued clientelist strategies towards NGOs, actively seeking and nurturing NGO clients-the NGO working partners whom they consider to be loyal and reliable-to appropriate their resources and personnel for purposes such as policy implementation, service provision, stability maintenance, and so on. The NGO clients can receive favourable treatment and protection but need to continuously invest resources and efforts to strengthen the ties with their patrons instead of striving to enhance their expertise. Such clientelism is sustained by the marked power imbalance and resource inequality between state agents and NGOs, as well as the absence of security, space, and alternatives for NGO advancement in contemporary China. Its effect is to prevent NGOs from moving towards more competitive and pluralistic forms.

Officials' clientelist approach enables the local state to coopt NGOs in a deep and extensive way-a form of control I have defined as 'dispersed domination' (Kang 2020a). Domination is achieved through unbalanced reciprocity as NGOs are more dependent on state agents; it is dispersed as local officials and NGOs interact in a scattered and atomised manner. Such 'dispersed domination' shows the diversity within both the local state and the NGO sector and the increasing fragmentation in local state-NGO relations in China. On the one hand, the development of cohesive civil society is unlikely, while on the other, the state can hardly achieve integrated control over the rising NGO sector as encounters between government authorities and NGOs remain highly scattered and atomised, with officials each groping for their own personal way to cope with uncertainty. Furthermore, as disparate parts of the state and the NGO sector form self-perpetuating coalitions, changing the status quo becomes difficult.

Contrary to the expectation that a growing, vibrant NGO sector could somehow 'limit' state power, in recent years, the Chinese local state has become increasingly capable of 'moulding' NGOs to fit its governing rationalities. Possessing the power to selectively allocate resources and opportunities, local officials have made highly conscious efforts to proactively shape the patterns of NGO development, with the aim of reasserting their dominance over new social actors and maximising personal gains from such relationships. The engineering of compliance and consensus is no longer the result of top-down authoritarian coercion alone. Rather, the local state has progressively intermingled with NGOs and coopted them into a structure of interests (Kang 2020a). Thus, Toepler et al. (2020) asked the question: '[C]an civil society actively undercut democratization efforts by directly or indirectly supporting non-democratic regimes?'

Opportunities for NGOs to regain initiative and bargaining power lie in their ability to solve new problems and produce new knowledge that can create fresh learning experiences for the government. Such an ability may depend on, but at the same time enable, NGOs' endeavours to establish meaningful new connections with domestic and overseas actors in the public and private sectors.

Research Agenda: Attending to NGOs' Knowledge Production

In the era of a 'risk society' (Beck 1992) and digitisation, when crises occur more frequently and technologies bring greater uncertainties, NGOs' unique role and capacity in fighting social vulnerabilities demand greater attention. Interdisciplinary knowledge accumulation has contributed to an ever-expanding understanding and imagining of vulnerability. Nonetheless, the actors noted for knowledge generation predominantly consist of research institutes, think tanks, and industrial research and development units. NGOs' roles in knowledge (co-)production or as 'boundary organisations' (Guston 2001) remain understudied. This might be explained by the fact that NGOs' tan gible services and support for vulnerable communities always attract more attention. However, in coping with social vulnerability during crises or on a daily basis, NGOs continuously engage in knowledge production that can inform vulnerability reduction in the long run. Information and knowledge as crucial types of resources and weapons may bestow on NGOs their unique power. Moreover, activities related to knowledge production, such as archiving and fact-checking, which are so mundane in routine work and hence often go unnoticed, have become increasingly important in this information age and especially in crisis situations like the COVID-19 pandemic. Knowledge production processes also have relational characteristics (Plotkin 1994). They not only reveal the multiple, dynamic interactions between NGOs and a wide range of actors, but also open space for NGOs' horizontal network-building, both inside and beyond regional borders.

A focus on knowledge production will enable us to tell the stories of NGOs that go beyond the conventional dichotomies of their service-delivery versus value-advocacy missions or cooperative versus conflictual relationships with state agencies/commercial sectors. How can NGOs be empowered by their knowledge possession and production despite their weaker economic and institutional status vis-a-vis state or private-sector actors in contemporary China? What explains different NGOs' uneven capabilities and heterogeneous approaches of generating, accumulating, and communicating knowledge? How do the processes of knowledge generation and transmission bridge NGOs with diverse participants from government, business, external civil society actors, and local communities? These are the questions that lack systematic examination in the extant literature, and they deserve careful examination in future study. ■

Cover Photo: Yingxiu Middle School Memorial. PC: David and Jessie Cowhig (CC).

References:

Kang, Yi. 2020c. 'Social Empowerment Through Knowledge Transfer: Transborder Actions of Hong Kong Social Workers in Mainland China.' China Information , 18 August. Online first at: http://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X20946570 .

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NGO Development in China Since the Wenchuan Earthquake: A Critical Overview - Made in China Journal

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In an essay published in this journal in 2018, I commented that in the decade that followed the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008 I had witnessed the transformation of civil society development in the quake-struck areas from a grassroots-driven, wild process to a rather fluid and dynamic situation and then to a top-down and managed process.

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The uncertain future of civil society in China

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The uncertain future of civil society in China

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As a developing country with one-fifth of the world's population, China presents enormous opportunities for the world's non-governmental organizations (NGOs). But a new law passed by the National People's Congress Standing Committee in April 2016 has imposed new regulations that define and, in some cases, restrict what organizations can do. These limitations dovetail with broader controls implemented by Xi Jinping, China's president, who has emerged as a forceful nationalist during his five years in power.

To get a better sense of how the law, which took effect last January, affects foreign NGOs in China, Asia Blog spoke with Jessica Batke, a senior editor at ChinaFile and the head of the China NGO Project at the Center on U.S.-China Relations. The conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity.
First things first - how does civil society work in China?
It's hard to define. Typically, people think of civil society as completely separate from the government but in China, it's difficult to have a fully formed and vibrant civil society completely outside the auspices of the Communist Party.

That's why you have GONGOS: government organized non-governmental organizations. For some organizations, it can be good to be a GONGO if the government is on board with what you want to do. And in that way, GONGOs are an important part of civil society because they're doing work that people on the grassroots wanted to do anyway.

But for other groups, it can be hard to work completely free from government affiliation, since the government may want to shape what you're doing or stop you from doing things they don't appreciate. It's a matter of time before what you do gets clipped, shortened, or shaped in certain ways.
When did civil society and NGOs emerge in China?
Many of them started to spring up in the '90s, when you saw the fruits of China's reform period and, also, problems when the government steps back from service provision and oversight. [The China NGO Project] is about to publish an article with someone who started an NGO in 2003 after seeing villages in Henan where people had given blood and contracted AIDS because the blood wasn't processed properly.

What Reform and Opening did was give people the social space to be able to solve problems on their own. It overcame this idea that the government had to solve everything, like under Mao.

Right now, there's a tension between citizens wanting to solve their own problems and the government wanting to define what kinds of problem-solving is permissible. The problem is that the government still feels like it should be able to obtain permission for anything to be solved.
What have been the consequences of the new NGO law?
It's a highly uncertain time for foreign NGOs. People may feel like it's inherently riskier to get involved with one. And it isn't limited to NGOs, either: There's been a clear and concerted effort by the Communist Party to heighten awareness and fear of foreigners and foreign governments in particular. For example, there have been posters popping up instructing Chinese people how to tell if a foreigner is a spy.

The National People's Congress considers the NGO law as part of the national security legislation, whereas in the U.S. civil society and national security are considered separately. Foreign NGOs are not treated as a social issue in China as domestic ones are.
What is worrisome about restricting foreign NGOs?
In some ways, the new law could actually have some positive effects. It could allow domestic NGOs to free themselves from externally imposed goals, values, and judgments that funders may have levied on them. If you're a domestic NGO and you want to work on a certain issue that's at odds with your funders, maybe you won't have to work on that anymore. Pathways for funding have opened up in China, and groups can focus on work that's more relevant to them.

But from a more global perspective, it's inherently problematic anytime a government tries to cut off grassroots citizen engagement across countries. I don't think it's a good idea to restrict people from other countries from coming and engaging with your citizens.

Chinese civil society has grown by leaps and bounds but there's a lot of knowledge transmission that could be happening, and a lot of foreign expertise and certainly foreign money that could be relayed.
Is the subject of NGOs a useful lens for examining the changes happening in China as a whole?
Yes. You can see this in a conversation people are having about sharp power, which is a phrase introduced but is now all over the place. In terms of China's engagement with the world, writ large, this is definitely a symptom of something larger and is not an outlier.

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The Uncertain Future of Civil Society in China

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As a developing country with one-fifth of the world's population, China presents enormous opportunities for the world's non-governmental organizations (NGOs). But a new law passed by the National People's Congress Standing Committee in April 2016 has imposed new regulations that define and, in some cases, restrict what organizations can do.

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1. Why do some people say that there is 'no civil society in China'? 

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1. Why do some people say that there is 'no civil society in China'? 

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Theoretical poverty in the research on Chinese civil society

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Theoretical poverty in the research on Chinese civil society

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Re-making China's civil society in the Xi Jinping era

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Re-making China's civil society in the Xi Jinping era

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Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. Xi Jinping seems to have embraced this aphorism with gusto. At the 19th Party Congress in October of last year, and the 13th National People's Congress in March, held in the midst of tumultuous changes in the U.S.-China relationship, Xi took extraordinary measures to concentrate power in himself and the Party in a herculean effort to catapult China into a "new era of socialism." He had his ideas enshrined in the Constitution, removed term limits on the Presidency, and carried out an unprecedented reorganization of the government. Given his past animosity towards civil society, Xi's actions have been seen by some as moving China towards a new form of totalitarianism and a closing of the space for civil society. I would argue instead that we should see Xi's ascendancy, together with previous policies carried out during his last five years as General Secretary, as advancing an ambitious effort to remake civil society in the Party-state's image. Whether he succeeds will depend to a large measure on civil society's response to this transformed political landscape.

The Takeaways from the 19th Party Congress and 13th National People's Congress

The general consensus coming out of the 19th Party Congress and the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) is that Xi got what he wanted, emerging as the undisputed and most powerful leader of China since Deng Xiaoping (even if the full political cost of this remains to be seen). His second five-year term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) and President of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) was rubber-stamped. He shored up his power base through personnel changes in the Central Committee and Politburo, engineered the inclusion into the Party constitution of "Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era of Socialism With Chinese Special Characteristics," and easily received the NPC's overwhelming approval for abolishing the two-term limit for president in the Chinese constitution. Commentators, casting around for superlatives to describe Xi's new position, quickly anointed him " president for life."

During the 13th N.P.C. session, Xi pushed through one of the biggest reorganizations of the Party-state bureaucracy in the reform era, to make the government, in the words of China's Xinhua News Agency, "more efficient and service-oriented." Organizational changes relevant to civil society included the elevation and revamping of ministries and commissions working on environmental protection, health, and justice. These agencies work on and regulate areas that are the focus of many NGOs in China. A new Ministry of Ecology and Environment will take on a larger range of oversight responsibilities than its predecessor, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Responsibilities for healthcare and coordinating national health reform will be consolidated under a new National Health Commission, which will replace the National Health and Family Planning Commission. The Ministry of Justice will absorb the State Council Legal Affairs Office, and play a primary role in advancing law-based governance, one of Xi's main initiatives. In addition, a new International Development Cooperation Agency was established, taking over coordination of foreign aid responsibilities previously shared by the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agency will play an important role in supporting China's global diplomacy initiatives such as Belt and Road. While NGOs currently have no clear role in the delivery of Chinese foreign aid, Chinese NGOs have begun internationalizing their work, and government outsourcing of foreign aid to NGOs, as happens in other countries, is very much a possibility in the near future.

The objectives behind these momentous changes are, in typical Xi fashion, grandiose. As laid out in the 19th Party Congress report, they include returning China to its proper role as a great power, or what the report refers to as "national rejuvenation," consolidating the power of the Communist Party, and raising living standards for the Chinese people by moving beyond basic economic security to improving their quality of life. This requires tackling the principal contradiction or problem in Chinese society, which in the words of the report is "the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life" so that China can achieve a "moderately prosperous society" by 2020 (the centenary of the C.C.P.'s founding), "socialist modernization" by 2035, and become a "socialist modernized great power" by 2049 (the centenary of the P.R.C.'s founding).

These are heady aims, and Xi has made a big wager on a strong, centralized, law-based, people-centered Party apparatus monitoring bureaucrats, businesses, and society as the solution. If Xi is able to achieve those aims, he will truly have taken China into a "new era of socialism" and be worthy of standing on the same platform as Mao and Deng.

Xi's initiatives raise some serious concerns. Among them is whether they contain their own principal contradiction: Even as Xi seeks to strengthen the Party, he has also sought to concentrate power in his own hands, and in the process undermined norms of collective leadership and succession that were seen as hallmarks of the Party's authoritarian resilience. Xi's answer to this contradiction seems to be that a strong leader is needed in order to reshape the Party into a resilient, accountable, innovative governing institution staffed with loyal, honest bureaucrats who believe in the Party's mission and are engaged with the masses.

It is a top-down logic in a top-down system that inspires numerous questions. How does a strong leader ensure that his institutional reforms survive his tenure? Can Party-state resiliency, accountability, and social engagement be achieved through command-and-control systems? Or will Xi's policies leave civil society in a place where it will be able to have a consultative and participatory role in securing the Party-state's reforms?

Whither Civil Society?

Outside of the private business sector, civil society has been an important source of bottom-up ideas and models that have developed independently of the Party-state since the early 1980s. Given Xi's revolution from above, which seemingly seeks to bring everything under the Party-state's umbrella, does civil society still have a role? For Carl Minzner, the answer is clear and dramatic. In his new book, End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival is Undermining Its Rise, he argues that Xi's "counter-reforms" have "systematically undercut [the regime's] own bottom-up reforms," robbing "social activists of the gradual evolutionary path toward becoming a moderate, institutionalized political force."

Minzner is right that Xi's strategy has been to undercut bottom-up reforms, seeing them as inviting official corruption and social instability. But it is also true that Xi has not reabsorbed civil society back into the Party-state, nor could he even if he wanted to. Chinese civil society has shown substantial growth over the last four decades (despite the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989, Falun Gong in 1999, and Charter 08 in 2008, along with episodic repression against ethnic minorities, underground churches, labor activists, and independent NGOs). Over the last two decades, environmental activists helped stop dam construction on the Nu River in Yunnan and raised awareness about air pollution. Women's rights activists helped shape the Anti-Domestic Violence Law passed in 2015 and fought gender-based discrimination. Labor activists helped organize workers to bargain collectively in factories. Over the past decade-and-a-half, private foundations, started by entrepreneurs, have jump-started a culture of philanthropy that has only continued to grow since a new law regulating charities was implemented in 2016. After the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, NGOs, foundations, and volunteers came together in a rare public display of bottom-up assistance to a major disaster. By 2012, when Xi became the General Secretary, Chinese scholars estimated there might be more than a million civil society organizations, many of them unregistered.

Faced with this burgeoning and increasingly vocal civil society, the Xi administration has decided to respond by reshaping and taming it using a mix of carrots and sticks. Some say a similar process is going on with China's lawyers. The sticks have rightly attracted more attention. Since Xi came to power in 2012, there has been a sustained and brutal repression of activists and lawyers engaged in rights protection and advocacy. This includes smear campaigns; forced confessions; stronger ideological controls over universities, media, and the Internet; and the passage of national security laws such as the National Security Law, Law of the People's Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China (hereafter the Foreign NGO Law), and Cybersecurity Law. The human cost of this repression is enormous, and there is no sign it is likely to ease. For human rights activists such as Sharon Hom, these actions have shown the Chinese regime's true colors: "the leadership has not only torn off the thin veil of its claim to 'rule the country according to law,' but also exposed its naked use of the law as a tool to ensure ideological compliance and unquestioned loyalty to the Party."

What have received less attention are the carrots being offered to civil society. These come in the form of high-level recognition and support for civil society as redefined by the Party. In his analysis of the 19th Party Congress report, Wang Zhenyao, Dean of the China Philanthropy Research Institute at Beijing Normal University and a former Ministry of Civil Affairs official, was heartened that the report recognized the role of "social organizations" (the Party's term for civil society organizations) and their role in building "social governance" and "socialist consultative democracy." These concepts call for civil society to play a consultative role in strengthening community self-governance and mechanisms for resolving social tensions-with the precondition that this consultation happens under the Party's leadership.

In addition, the 2016 Charity Law and other regulations, which opened up opportunities for public fundraising, charitable trusts, and government contracting, are providing a large infusion of domestic financing to qualified civil society organizations. This is particularly true for those organizations working on government priorities. Those priorities include poverty alleviation domestically and Belt and Road internationally. Prime Minister Li Keqiang's work report at the 13th NPC also expressed support for child welfare protection, the elimination of discrimination, and environmental protection as other priority areas for civil society.

To some analysts, the objective of this combination of carrots and sticks is clear: the co-optation of civil society. By privileging certain types of NGOs, the spate of NGO laws and regulations that came out in 2016 all point in this direction. The recent drafts of registration and management regulations for social organizations, for example, promise to do away with the dual management system that requires social organizations to get a government sponsor before they can register. But this preferential treatment is limited to organizations working in certain areas, such as commerce, science and technology, public welfare and charity, and urban and rural community services. Similarly, the Charity Law allows social organizations to apply for charitable and public fundraising status as long as their work falls in the recommended "public welfare" or "charitable" fields. These fields are explicitly defined as: poverty alleviation, eldercare, aid for orphans, aid for the ill, assistance for the disabled, disaster relief, education, science, culture, health, sports, environmental protection, and "other public interest activities compliant with the provisions of this law." Of course, the last item leaves open the possibility that work in other fields will be permitted, but the government's preferred role for civil society is reflected in what is explicitly stated.

Conversely, the more independent and vocal grassroots NGOs-those that worked on the wild side in rights protection and advocacy, and were denied the ability to register as social organizations and therefore had to register either as businesses or remain unregistered-face a challenging environment. In the past, these NGOs relied heavily on overseas funding for their activities, but the Foreign NGO Law makes it very difficult for overseas NGOs to fund or partner with local NGOs that are not registered as social organizations. Foreign NGOs that have successfully registered a representative office in China report that authorities will not allow them to continue to fund for-profit domestic enterprises, a restriction aimed directly at cutting off funding for domestic NGOs registered as companies. In the same vein, foreign NGOs that wish to file for "temporary activities" need to work through a Chinese partner, which can be almost any kind of organization except a for-profit enterprise. Domestic NGOs can still accept funds from foreign governments and embassies, but those funds are getting scarcer as foreign governments reduce their aid to an increasingly prosperous China. Starved of funds or partnerships with foreign NGOs, grassroots Chinese organizations face difficult choices. They must modify their activities in order to get registered, accept funding sources that do not comply with the law, or downsize, otherwise they may even have to make the decision to close down.

These laws and regulations, meant to keep NGOs in line, will be supplemented by the new social credit system currently being established to monitor and regulate the behavior of individuals, companies, and organizations in China. The Ministry of Civil Affairs announced in January the adoption of the Regulation on Social Organization Credit Information Management, which will set up a management system to deal with social organizations that do not fulfill their obligations or engage in illegal conduct. The regulation mandates the creation of two blacklists, one for social organizations with "irregular activities" (such as not submitting annual work reports to the Civil Affairs bureau in a timely fashion, or not establishing internal Party cells according to the regulations), and another for social organizations that have committed "serious illegal and dishonest acts" (such as falsifying registration materials). The social organizations on these lists will not be able to bid on government contracts or receive financial aid from the government. In contrast, social organisations with good credit will be given priority when bidding on government contracts, or requesting financial and policy support.

An open question is whether NGOs can remain independent and thrive once they are integrated into the system. Proponents like Wang Zhenyao argue that integration into the system is an opportunity for NGOs to professionalize their operations, reach a mainstream audience, and cultivate channels to consult with policymakers in improving governance. Critics point out that integration into an authoritarian system leaves NGOs-particularly those working in areas not aligned with government priorities-vulnerable to pressure to conform and be compliant with government dictates. In the words of Renmin University Professor Kang Xiaoguang, "some grassroots organizations, after gaining legal status and being incorporated into the system, soon afterwards face real pressures to compromise or even abandon their own values, reduce their advocacy function and orient themselves towards social service activities in order to ensure their survival." Others note that there are no specific regulations governing NGO consultation with policymakers, and few resources or opportunities for strengthening their consultative capacity.

Co-opted or not, Chinese civil society groups have not been standing still. Small-scale demonstrations of activism continue to take place both on the ground and online. Grassroots NGOs such as Friends of Nature have been filing environmental public lawsuits, which are now allowed by the revised Environmental Protection Law. Workers in Walmart China, Lala van drivers, and Chinese truckers have coordinated online to organize strikes in multiple provinces. Labor activists continue to help workers organize and negotiate collective agreements and are carrying out initiatives to hold the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (China's official union) accountable. Feminists and LGBT activists are making their voices heard on sexual violence and discrimination. Public interest lawyers continue to defend the growing number of activists being detained. Foreign NGOs have been meeting to monitor the implementation of the Foreign NGO Law and communicating on a regular basis with PSBs and their Chinese partners about registering representative offices and filing temporary activities.

Furthermore, a number of new institutions and initiatives have emerged in the wake of the Charity Law to promote philanthropy more widely. Most notably, online fundraising platforms are thriving. One prominent example is Tencent's September 9 Day of Giving, which raised 1.3 billion renminbi in 2017 from 12.68 million donors to support more than 6,000 charitable projects. As sources of foreign funding dry up and local funding becomes more important, the traditional NGO business model-registering an NGO and applying for funding from foundations and governments-may become less relevant, particularly for those interested in innovating outside of government priorities and the official system. NGOs and activists are looking into resources from less conventional sources, tapping into crowdsourcing, volunteers, and individual donations, or establishing social enterprises that earn income from selling goods and services to support a social mission. Loose networks of like-minded citizens from the middle- and upper-class are supporting activists and artists championing social causes.

Civil society is adapting, growing, and thriving in some areas, and under threat and dormant in others. But civil society and its capacity to contribute to bottom-up reforms is not dead. We are witnessing an extraordinary period in which civil society is having to remake itself in a very different ecosystem, explore new ways to adapt, grow, and move forward, and strengthen its capacity to collaborate with government and the private sector while remaining independent. The civil society space is not unlike a forest that has experienced a major fire. Some areas were unaffected and continue to grow, but other areas damaged by the fire will need to regenerate new plants and trees. This will require time, ingenuity, luck, and, above all, persistence.

In the long run, there really is no good alternative to a robust, vibrant civil society if China wants to develop into a prosperous and stable modern power. Chinese civil society's responsibility is thus a heavy one and its supporters should recognize this moment as a critical opportunity to rethink how civil society can adapt and move forward. Despite what its propaganda might have one believe, the Party-state cannot do it all. China desperately needs bottom-up ideas and models to govern an increasingly complex and wealthy society, and when it comes time for the Party-state to relinquish power, it will need, in Minzer's words, a "moderate, institutionalized political force" with roots in civil society ready to assist in ensuring a peaceful transition.

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Remaking China's Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era

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Given his past animosity towards civil society, Xi's actions have been seen by some as moving China towards a new form of totalitarianism and a closing of the space for civil society.

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Changing spaces for civil society organisations in China

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Changing spaces for civil society organisations in China

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Made in China is a quarterly on Chinese labour, civil society, and rights.  In this issue of Made in China a series of perspectives is offered on the changes to civil society in China, including an article  'Conceptual Confusion in the Research on Chinese Civil Society' by Taru Salmenkari which highlights the biases and lack of clarity that undermines much of the discussion of Chinese civil society.

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【文2】中国公民社会：概念、分类与制度环境_俞可平

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Chinese Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society: A Review of the Literature

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Chinese Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society: A Review of the Literature

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2. Do you feel it is useful or dangerous to use the term 'civil society' when referring to China?

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2. Do you feel it is useful or dangerous to use the term 'civil society' when referring to China?

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3. Who is the term 'civil society most helpful to? Scholars, policy makers, NGOs, others?

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3. Who is the term 'civil society most helpful to? Scholars, policy makers, NGOs, others?

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4. Outline some of the different ways in which civil society has been conceptualised in China and differentiate between the various Chinese terms which are currently used when referring to civil society

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4. Outline some of the different ways in which civil society has been conceptualised in China and differentiate between the various Chinese terms which are currently used when referring to civil society

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5. How have any differences in Chinese terminology evolved? 

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5. How have any differences in Chinese terminology evolved? 

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6. How do these conceptualisations differ from the ways in which civil society is understood elsewhere in the world? 

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6. How do these conceptualisations differ from the ways in which civil society is understood elsewhere in the world? 

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八十年代的中国同样出现了巨变，正是这种巨变构成了八九民众运动的历史背景。不少西方学者运用"公民社会"和"公共空间"这两个概念，来描述当代中国出现的独立于国家的自主性的社会领域，并视之为社会政治改革的一个重要方面。然而，对这种正在出现的自主性社会领域的强度和性质，出现了越来越多的争辩。本文旨在对这场所谓"公民社会与公共空间争论"[1] 中出现的有关论点进行评述。

"公民社会"的概念在西方社会和政治思想史上已经有了很长的历史。在不同的思想传统中，这一概念有着不同的内涵。近年来，这一概念主要在一些西方左派的政治和社会论述中重新兴起，并且有望在一个新的政治和社会潮流中占据中心位置。然而，这一思想努力迄今为止还没有取得众所公认的成果。对此，本文因题旨所限，无法详述。在这里，我们仅简单地引征加拿大政治思想家、著名的社区主义者（communiatarian）泰勒（Charles Taylor）的定义。他区分了"公民社会"的强定义和弱定义。在弱的定义中，公民社会是指那些不受国家力量支配的民间团体的存在; 在强的意义下，当透过不受国家支配的民间团体，社会可以自我建设及协调起来时，这才是公民社会。泰勒同时提出了一个更强的定义，作为上述强定义的替代或补充，即当这群民间团体能够有效地影响国家政策的方向时，这才是公民社会。[2]

"公共空间"这个概念是德国思想家哈贝马斯（Jurgen Habermas）发展起来的，他的定义如下：

"公共空间"首先意指我们社会生活中能够形成舆论的一个领域。"公共空间".原则上对所有公民开放。它的一部份是在日常对话中建构起来的，其中"私"人们走到一起组成一个"公"。之后，他们不再作为商人或专业人员从事他们的私务，也不像法律专业人员那样受制于国家官僚机器的法律管理并且被迫服从。当公民有了保障，能够自由地集会，自由地组织起来，自由地表达其意见并使之公开化时，他们的行动才是在一个"公共空间"里的行动。[3]

依照哈贝马斯的解释，这种自由的、资产阶级式的公共空间，乃是在十七和十八世纪的西方伴随着公民社会的兴起而发展起来的，而公民社会则是在资本主义的市场经济的基础上得到发展的。早期的资产阶级公共空间仅有一小部份受过教育的、富有的人组成。哈贝马斯认为，公共空间不仅使一系列特殊的利益以及国家与社会之间的对立制度化，而且还使一种对政治事务进行公开、理性和批判性讨论的实践制度化，后来他在一种更为宽泛的意义上称这种讨论为"沟通行动"。在他看来，公共空间的重要性就在于它作为一种社会整合模式的潜在功能。[4]
公民社会正形成于八十年代的中国吗？
第一个引入"公民社会"的概念来解释中国八九民众运动的，是丹麦学者奥斯特咖德（Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard）。六四事件后仅四五个月，他在一篇文章中反对把学生示威仅仅放在中共权力斗争的背景中来理解，强调应该把更多的注意力放在社会的重要变化上。在他看来，"我们正在民众中目睹着一个独立的政治化过程，一个新兴组织的萌芽"。他声称： 作为经济改革的结果，国家的影响力已经受到削弱，公民社会已经得到发展。公民社会的兴起，部份地反映了创建一个新市场体系的需要，部份地反映了新兴的、独立社会群体的力量。奥斯特咖德认为，公民社会在中国的出现是八九民众运动社会背景的重要因素。[5]

同时，卡尔洪（Craig Calhoun）首次把八九民众运动作为一次建立"公共空间"的努力加以讨论。卡尔洪把"公共空间"的兴起追溯到1978年的"北京之春"运动，并区分了其中的三个层面： 第一，人们通过朋友之间的小群体对广泛的政治议题进行讨论。第二是国际性媒体在建构这一公共空间中所扮演的重要角色。第三是文化的国际化过程，知识分子和大学生们努力追赶着西方社会理论和文学批评的最新潮流，而中国传统的思想和符号象征受到抨击。卡尔洪指出，中国的"公共空间"仍然只是初生的。在他看来，要进一步发展"公共空间"，关键在于要创建一系列在国家控制之外的制度和组织，以支持一种有生气的批判性文化，从而使那些具有政治重要意义的论题能够得到讨论。换言之，制度化是发展一个羽翼丰满的公共空间的关键。[6]

高棣民（Thomas B. Gold）以不同的方式提出了一个类似的观点。他认为，我们所目睹的不只是公民社会在中国的兴起，而且是其复活。在中华人民共和国刚刚建立的随后几年中，中国共产党"以一系列摧毁所有的自主性活动领域并消除其再生之可能性的努力"重建了中国的社会。在毛泽东时代极权主义统治下，"收"与"放"的辩证虽然为公民社会提供了一个喘息的机会，但是却没有导致公民社会的再生。然而，自1978年的改革开始以来，党与国家放松了控制，并且实质性地促进了制度变革，特别是城市私有部门的合法化。邓小平的"放"也为知识分子的独立活动创造了空间。结果，一种同党和国家相对立的气氛开始浓厚起来，从而引致了1989年的抗议。在高棣民看来，一方面，"1989年四五月间的奇异事件揭示了公民社会在中国再生的深度"，另一方面，六四的流血亦揭示了中国共产党依然不愿并不能接受公民社会正在再生这个现实。[7]

史特兰（David Strand）走得更远。他提出： 在中国的城市中，一个强定义下的公民社会正在出现，其中民间社团与组织使一个"公共空间"的出现成为可能，社会自主性正在经济、政治和知识领域中成为现实。作为证据，他指出1989年初的人权请愿签名运动，大学生们建立的各种"沙龙"，各种激进政治观点（包括"民主"的要求）的公开表达，知识分子精英充当国家与示威学生之间的调解者或作为"理性的声音"的代表，以及像四通公司这样的准私有企业卷入到学生示威中去。

在八九民众运动中，许多人，包括工人、教师、公务人员、知识分子，甚至党的干部，举着标示其单位的标语，乘着汽车游行到天安门广场。史特兰特别强调这个事实，并由此得出结论： "如今，原属国家的一些要素，即一些国家控制的机构，包括大学、新闻机关、工厂等等，已经发展出一种独立的社会认同。通过一种中国版的东欧式"社会自我捍卫"的战略，这些机构能够对国家进行攻击。在过去，国家与社会之间的这种模糊性有助于政权进行政治和社会控制。但现在，国家在控制自身方面所碰到的越来越多的困难，一下子触发了社会的突然扩大。正如国家媒体的记者、国家企业中的工人以及国家机构中的研究人员和工作人员在1989年的背叛所显示的那样，国家，或其部份机构，或许会构成针对政权本身的抗议的社会基础。"[8]

另一位得出同样结论的是美国学者苏立万（Lawrence R.　Sullivan）。他相信公民社会的出现在八九年春天的中国是一件显而易见的事情。其中的两个引人注目的特徵给他留下深刻印象，即来自各种职业的民众的广泛参与，以及一百多万示威者所表现出来的异乎寻常的自律。这些因素对他来说证明了"中国城市中的社会，特别是在北京，已经从一盘散沙转变成一个有凝聚力的公民社会，它有能力维护社会秩序，甚至在没有"中央"控制之下维系政府的日常功能。"[9] 在苏立万看来，另一个具有重要意义的现象是学生、工人以及其他城市居民之间阶级紧张的打破。这导致了他所谓的"社会一体"或"民众一体"的出现，这一点被他认为是公民社会自主性和团结性的证明。此外，他亦强调，公民社会的其他基本要素在1989年的中国民众运动也是存在的： 如个人与国家命运的认同、对社会的成员有一种父亲式的关怀以及"广泛地运用理性"。[10] 他显然没有注意到这一事实，即在八九民众运动中，学生竭力维护其纯洁性，避免同知识分子之外的社会群体，尤其是工人，有实质性的接触。

怀特（Martin K. Whyte）也同意公民社会正在中国出现的观点，并把其发展追溯到毛时代的结束期。他提出，首先，这一时期的反官僚主义冲动以及对党的官员滥用权力和腐败的暴露，对民众产生了极大的影响，促使新一代年轻人敢于"反潮流"、"怀疑一切"。第二，这种意识形态上的变化同中国社会组织上的变化相伴随，尤其是除军队以外的大多数官方机构的非动员化。人们比以前有更大的空间进行自主性的活动，例如红卫兵到全国自由旅行，组织各种群体和派系，同敌对派系打派仗。第三，许多人在文化大革命中所经历的审讯之苦，导致他们抛弃了自己以前对政府的信任，希望有独立于国家控制的新形式的社团。对毛统治的反应是如此强烈，以致许多不满的迹象，甚至是表达各种不满的组织行动，也在毛统治的最后几年中变得清晰可见了。所有这些，促使了公民社会的再生。[11]依照怀特的见解，公民社会的再生因邓小平的改革而加强。邓的改革最初旨在放松毛主义时期的紧张状态，并解决权威危机的问题，但是它却有利于公民社会的因素在城市中国进一步产生和巩固。

政治精英之间的不断增长的冲突是另一个关键性的因素。1978年以后复苏的许多自主性的社团活动，多采取了一种非政治甚至反政治的形式。在这些活动中，人们提出了一些具有高度批判性的、激进的、多元化的观点，包括提倡经济的私有化、取消党对知识生活的控制，甚至开始讨论允许利益群体存在的好处。另一个显著的主题是主张法治和司法独立，以保护个人及新出现的自主性社团。怀特进一步提出，到八十年代末，官方对多元观点的接受，再加上各种形式的草根性自主社会活动的大量涌现，为一种健全的舆论的发展提供了基础。他断言：一个初生的公民社会已经出现，并且正处在发展和巩固自身的过程之中。[12]

怀特承认这个正在兴起的公民社会依然是脆弱的，因为它严重依赖当局的容忍，其制度化的程度很低，缺乏法律以及来自国家的其他保障。过份关注道德和政治一致性的中国文化传统对公民社会也有负面的影响。虽然如此，他依然坚持认为，在八十年代后期城市中国正在出现的公民社会，可以同出现在东欧（至少在捷克）的自主性社团活动的水平相媲美。[13]

相反，也有不少人，例如沃德（Andrew Walder），认为八九民众运动并不一定是公民社会出现的证据。沃德的观点基于他的所谓"共产主义的新传统主义"理论。该理论强调那些在某种程度上独立于党的控制的社会网络的存在，而远非独立的社会群体的存在。[14] 沃德怀疑中国的普通公民（尤其是工人）会有意把自己组织起来，以便在政治生活中发挥某种作用。在他看来，他们只不过利用了最先由学生创造、随后有知识分子卷入、接着有某些重要的政府机构和媒体参与而提供的机会，来表达他们的不满。沃德认为，以公民社会与国家之间的对抗来刻画北京抗议的特徵，是"有诱惑力的，但却是误导的"。[15]
中国的过去是否存在"公民社会"？
那些谈论八十年代的中国公民社会之"再生"或"复活"的学者，例如高棣民、史特兰和怀特，认为公民社会存在于过去的中国。很长一段时间以来，近代中国史家们都在关注着晚清及民国初年国家与社会之关系的变迁。其中，罗（William T.　Roew）、兰京（Mary Backus Rankin）和史特兰三人认为，在近代中国的确出现过公民社会和公共空间。

罗的结论基于他对十八和十九世纪汉口的经验性研究。[16] 他的目的是提出一个非韦伯式和非费正清式的模式，强调中国社会在受到西方影响之前的动态性（而非停滞性）特徵，以及中国现代化的内部动力。他认为，在汉口，某种实质性程度的自主性已经得到发展。那里，政府对市政事务很少甚至没有干预，大量的城市行政掌握在士绅的手中。由于这种走向社会和经济多元化的总趋势，太平天国之后的汉口商业界看起来非常像西方工业化之前的城市商业资本主义社会。[17] 这些相似之处主要体现在：有组织的、合作型的市民行动的稳步发展，范围广泛的慈善和公共服务机构的激增，以解决处在现代化早期阶段城市所面临的特殊的社会问题。[18]

罗在近期的文章中重申了这些看法，强调中华帝国晚期社会变迁的六个方面。第一，作为一个拥有庞大的、具有自我意识的城市商人阶级的高度商业化社会，清朝的中国具有近代欧洲早期的某些显著的社会经济特徵。虽然罗不同意把这些新出现的特徵称为"资本主义萌芽"，但他却认为它们至少在某些方面同欧洲模式"公民社会"的出现的前提条件相吻和。第二，罗认为，一个制度化的公共管理已经得到了发展。十八世纪二十年代引入的财政改革，是这一发展中的一个重要事件，为地方的基础设施建设提供了"公共"预算。第三，在很大程度上，当时的中国具有一种独特的"民法"传统。同时，受到法律保障的"硬"财产权也初具雏形。第四，出版业及其日益增长的消费市场的出现，对晚清城市精英分子有着越来越大的影响。在二十世纪初，出版界对于政治事务更多地发表争论性的意见。第五，一种特殊的市民文化出现并得到扩展。第六，各种自愿性组织开始获得能够同欧洲近代早期同类组织相媲美的自主性。[19] 罗进一步认为，公民社会的智识和文化要素，例如，社会契约和自然权利的观念、所有权的理论、个人主义、公民的观念、舆论，在近代中国也并不是"完全阙如"。[20]

兰京1986年出版的《中国的精英行动主义与政治转变》一书，是关于十九世纪中国的公共空间的先驱性研究。她使用"中国的公共空间"这一说法来描述太平天国之后由于地方精英在控制和管理地方事务发挥重要、有时甚至是支配性的作用而引致的国家与地方精英之平衡的重大变化。这种地方士绅作为管理者而兴起的现象，被她称为"精英行动主义"。[21]在后来发表的三篇论文中，兰京把这种所谓的"中国公共空间"的起源追溯到十六世纪末和十七世纪初。[22] 她的目的是从公共空间兴衰的角度对中国近代史进行一番新的解释。这一兴衰过程被划分为三个阶段。第一个阶段始自十六世纪末，亦即中国马克思主义史学家称之为"资本主义萌芽"的那个时期。兰京认为，正在兴起的公共空间的中心在于地方性事务的诸方面由官僚体系之外的地方精英来管理。这种类型的公共管理在晚明只是在一些区域得到发展，尤其是长江下游和珠江三角洲。虽然大清王朝控制中国之后官方的管制增加了，但是，在十八世纪后半叶，精英管理的组织和活动在质量和范围两方面都有所扩展。这些变化的积累，足以使我们谈论"公共空间"的出现。[23]

然而，正如兰京自己指出的那样，这种具有中国特色的所谓"管理型公共空间"同哈贝马斯的模式并不相同，它仅仅停留在地方层面，对国家政策的影响很小。中国的公共空间只是同一种商业经济，而不是像在西方那样同资本主义联系起来："管理，而不是（对政治问题的）公开讨论，是其核心特徵。官员和那些在地方性事务上活跃的精英保持着总体来说是和谐而非对抗性的关系，精英并不试图定出他们同国家对抗的权利，也没有对国家的权力进行正式的限制。"[24]

但是，随着大背景的变化，中国公共空间的潜在政治重要性在十九世纪中叶发生了改变。这是兰京第二阶段的起点。太平天国极大地震撼了国家与社会之间已存的平衡关系。地方精英突然有了更大的自主性，开始行使以前由政府行使的职能。中国的公共空间还保留着地方化和管理型的特徵，但是对全国性事务的舆论开始具有雏形。自甲午战争以还，尤其是义和团运动之后，新政的实行导致了一系列基本的结构性变革，使公共空间极大地拓宽。[25]

兰京的第三个阶段为民国时期，其特徵是出现了弱的公民社会，其政治意义在辛亥革命之夜得到了展现。公民社会之所以弱，主要是由于缺乏一个全国性的政府，因而使得民间机构发展所必须的环境条件十分贫乏。1927年南京政府的建立，并未有助于民间组织的发展;相反，它挖空了在江苏由地方精英主掌的政府，并把在上海的地方自治政府置于中央的控制之下。而且，民国时期不断增加的大众示威对公民社会的发展也有负面影响，因为大众政治不能产生持久性的制度变革。[26]

史特兰1989年出版的《人力车北京》一书，也涉及到民国时期的公民社会和公共空间问题。他相信，在二十年代公共空间有很大的扩展，显示在各种市场生活领域（如戏院、茶馆、饭店）中发生的公共活动。他强调，天安门广场已经不再仅有建筑的意义，而是一个可进行各种公共活动（甚至像五四运动那样的反政府活动）的场所。随着一个活跃的公共空间的日益发展，至少自1903年以降，一个初生的公民社会开始在北京出现，其中包括知识分子的社团、同乡会以及更为重要的职业性法团，例如商会、律师协会和银行家社团。[27]

然而，这些群体究竟有多大独立性和自主性呢？ 史特兰承认，"北京的商人倾向于同官方势力结合，甚至向官方谄媚。......在近十年的时光中，北京商会对政治权威一直保持着一种被动的、依附的关系。......商会和其他法团所能做的只是听命于新老政治掮客"。[28] 他指出，"公共空间在欧洲的存在，假定国家与社会在公共和私人领域之外的极端两极化"，而西方式的"社会"概念，即独立于国家的个人的组合，在传统中国思想中也是缺乏的。虽然如此，他依然坚持说，他所描绘的"公共活动"支持了他的命题，即一个有限的、软的公共空间的确存在于民国时期。[29] 史特兰还作了一番初步的尝试，把这一分析扩展到八十年代。

这些关于中国近代历史的看法具有很大的争议性。黄宗智认为，用"公民社会"和"公共空间"这样一些术语来刻画明清和民国初年的社会发展，而不对中国和欧洲的差别严加注意，就意味着同样的发展既在欧洲也在中国发生。[30] 在他看来，这样的研究路子，会导致化约主义和目的论： 即沿着中国马克思主义史学家的"资本主义萌芽"话语，研究所谓"民主萌芽"。这种操练的意义在于认为在西方发生的事件的因果序列，会或应该在中国出现。其根基是认为只有一种可能的模式，即十八世纪的英法民主化模式。[31] 同时，黄宗智还认为，许多学者夸大了市场性活动和民间社团在八十年代的扩大所具有的民主意义，也扩大了一九八九之春天安门广场示威者所拥有的民间性权力基础。

黄宗智主要从理论和方法的角度提出批评，而魏裴德的批评则是从经验研究的角度提出。他从罗的书中发现，被罗认定为代表了中国城市自主性和民间性认同的汉口的两大工商协会，有一个实际上是由在上海督办监管下的商人发起的，这些商人只是汉口的暂居者。由此，他讽刺罗的所谓"自主性"像一只风筝。[32] 魏裴德指出，罗的书中有许多自相矛盾的陈述。例如，罗一方面坚持认为汉口拥有"早期'城市自主性'"，另一方面他又提到"在十九世纪初，一个阻止这一自主性成为现实的重要因素在于，官僚组织关注的是把汉口置于它的控制之下。在这个城市，政府官员的数量多得异乎寻常"。而且，"只要清政府打算独占汉口的政治权威，它总是能够做到这一点"。[33] 这不啻在说： 汉口的自主性实际上是虚的。至于舆论的问题，魏裴德认为，罗的结论也是误导性的。罗把《申报》在汉口发行同一个正在建构中国新公共空间的城市改革派精英的崛起扯在一起。但这份报纸是由一位英国人在上海而不是汉口创办并出版的。[34]

私有化和城市企业家的作用

前述史特兰关于八十年代中国经济改革中出现所谓"经济自主性"的议论，主要是依据杨美惠（Mayfair Mei-hui Yang）对北京的一家小型集体所有制印刷厂进行的案例研究。杨的论文提出，随着经济改革的进行，一个公民社会正在中国重新出现; 它同波兰的团结工会有所不同，是建立在非国营的集体合作组织中。在中国，国家与社会都依靠单位来行使其社会功能。这造成了集体合作组织的内在紧张，以发展其自身的利益，即使这种利益同国家的利益并不一致。当它们从国家那里获得更多的自主性时，集体合作组织之间的经济交流愈来愈倾向于发生在官僚等级体系管道的纵向介入之外。"因此，公民社会的横向一体化在经济领域中得到加强，公民社会开始超脱于国家之外"。[35]

杨的论证具有很大的跳跃性。中国社会主义的工厂单位在听命于国家之外还有自己的利益，这种利益常常与国家的利益相冲突，因而这些单位会显示杨所描述的双重性格。也就是中国人常常说的"上有政策、下有对策"。但是，问题在于这是否构成公民社会在中国重新出现的证据。实际上，杨美惠描述的不过是一个常识。不仅是中国的集体性小型企业，而且所有的单位，甚至包括官僚机构部门，都具有她所谓的"双重性格"。这一现象用比较共产主义研究中的"制度内多元论"来刻画更为贴切。这理论依据政治社会学中关于官僚组织的理论，把共产主义国家中庞大的官僚等级体系，包括各级国营和集体企业以及各种事业单位，看成是由具有多元化利益冲突的各种利益单元所组成的体系，进而分析制度内利益冲突的模式。[36]

我们看到，人们广泛认为经济改革、尤其是私有部门的兴起，为公民社会的发展创造了社会和经济的基础。然而，索琳格并不同意这一点。她认为："中国的城市经济改革并没有在商业领域导致现在人们热衷于谈论的'公民社会'。在这一特定领域，国家与社会之间也没有任何清楚的划分"。[37] 相应地，城市经济改革已经产生了一个商人企业家阶层。然而，这并不是一个具有个人主义色彩的资产阶级，能够在推动一场资产阶级民主革命中扮演历史性的领导角色。正如索琳格所指出的，"旧的党与国家体系对经济资源的基本上独占，在今天既造就了官员也造就了商人;两者形成了相互依附、相互渗透的准阶级，他们甚至共同具有一种新形式的对国家的依附"。[38] 索琳格根据自己的经验性研究指出，在官僚商人的关系上，一项有趣的发展是所谓"戴红帽"的活动，即那些实际上私有的企业，在某些官员的支持下，总是把自己注册为"集体的"甚至是同国家有关系的企业。经济成长现在已经变成了中国共产党统治的一个主要的合法性来源，官方高度评价商人-企业家，赞扬他们生产资本的能力，并且设法保护他们免受那些反对私有部门的意识形态举措的损害。[39]

与此同时，在八十年代中国出现的一些新机构也鼓励官僚与企业家的各种形式的共生。这种机构有各种类型。第一类是各种旨在管理和控制私人部门的机构，包括私营企业家协会及各种新的商业协会。第二类机构由商人自己建立，但受到国家支持，包括各种挂上民办头衔的技术发展公司或中心。其中最著名的一例是四通公司。第三种则是直接由官僚设立的各种经贸"公司"。依照索琳格的观点，所有这些机构的功能，是"把官僚和商人们同时拉进向市场经济的转型之中，并创造出新的既得利益，从而延长这一转型"。新的机构为官僚们创造了大量的机会运用他们对国家资源的控制和获取的权力（关系、信息、信用、资助等等）来为自己建立经济实力。[40] 因此，索琳格对中国经济改革的政治意涵有着不同的认识。她认为，在改革时期，正在出现的并不是如公民社会论者想象的那种国家与社会的分开，而是合并。"新鲜的事物是官僚与商人之间出现了紧密的相互依赖关系，他们竞相竞取国家的资金和补贴以及市场，但他们之间有时也出现交易和串通在一起。"[41]

索琳格的分析得到了罗森邦（Arthue Lewis Rosenbaum）的支持。就中国的经济改革而言，罗森邦中肯地指出："虽然在中国，国家的权力在组织上和运作上都发生了一些基本性的变化，而且有助于更大的社会自主性的产生，但是这并不必定意味着公民社会的被接受及制度化"。[42]
知识分子生活的变化及其影响
那些相信公民社会正在中国出现或重新出现的学者，都认为知识分子在这一过程中扮演了主要的角色。他们建立沙龙、研究所、编辑委员会、出版机构及其他商业或研究设施，以从事自主性的活动。

澳洲学者戴凯利和何包钢（David Kelly and Baogang He）认为，在中国的改革过程中，实际上存在一个"事实上的自主性社会组织"的领域。这一领域作为经济改革的一种后果有了极大的扩展。各种民办的研究机构诞生，有些机构甚至出版立场独立的报纸，有些机构同准私营机构挂钩。[43] 法国学者包凝和热维利叶（Michel Bonnin and Yves Chevier）则强调知识分子自主性已经在中国出现。他们把这一过程追溯到1976年以前。当时，许多知识青年基于他们在上山下乡中建立起来的私人关系组织了不少沙龙，而八十年代的大多数知识分子组织都是围绕着这些沙龙建立起来的。开始这些沙龙具有很强的私人性，但越来越关心公共事务。它们的重要性在1978年的民主运动中有所显示。

包凝和热维利叶把八十年代出现的知识分子组织分为三个类型。第一种由非官方的、但需要在官方机构"挂靠"的各种协会组成。第二种是那些同行政机构、研究组织、国营或大的集体性企业有组织联系的机构，但并不直接受到政治的监管。第三类是一些行使咨询顾问功能的研究小组或研究所，他们是在党或高级政府官员的关怀下建立起来的。这些组织的自主性不仅依赖于大的政治气候，而且依赖于其支持者和保护者的政治命运。尽管如此，包凝和热维利叶确信，这些知识分子组织的自主性有了显著的增加。首先，大多数知识分子都采取同样的战略，使自己对国家的忠诚转变为对社会的忠诚，并且以社会的名义发言。第二，也是更为重要的，他们近乎拥有财政的独立，这些财政收入主要来自他们从事的商业性活动，如出版书籍、从事职业培训、或从各种政府机构或企业获得合同资助。第三，一小部份知识分子走得更远，他们在非国家部门寻找工作，因而开辟了"社会个人化"的道路。[44]

在八九民众运动中出现的自治组织被广泛认为是公民社会在中国得到发展的一个重大标志。戴凯利和何包钢称之为"一个不可否认的分水岭"。[45] 依照包凝和热维利叶的看法，创建一个公共空间以自由地表达政治意见，是知识分子自主性发展的一个逻辑结果。知识分子群体与其他社会群体（尤其是企业家）的日益增多的接触，也是关键的因素。在八九年的危机中，知识分子的沙龙和团体变成了实际上的政治群体，在这场运动中扮演了积极的角色。他们把天安门广场上出现自治性组织的时刻，称为"走向公民社会的制度化"。[46]

然而，了解一些天安门广场情况的人都知道，当时的一些所谓自治性组织，有的陷入内部的严重混乱，有的极其短命，有的毫无影响力。所有这些在在都是中国的公民社会（如果有的话）缺乏制度化的表现。这些为包凝和热维利叶所忽略的事实在戴凯利和何包钢的论文中得到承认。戴和何强调指出，1989年北京的情形同波兰的团结工会是大不相同的。北京的自治性组织过于强调其自主性，在确认彼此的合法性上做得甚少，因而没有联接起来形成一个强定义下的公民社会。[47] 虽然这些学者都认为公民社会的出现已经是一个事实，但戴凯利和何包钢对此有一定的保留。"这一空间的扩展"，他们写道，"发生在脆弱的社会基础上。支撑着这一空间的公民社会仅具雏形，而且对本身已成为公民社会缺乏一种自我意识"。最关键的问题在于中国的公民社会在建立长久的机构和组织方面十分薄弱。[48]

在此，应该补充一点，八十年代的中国知识分子对"公民社会"的理念还很不熟悉。几乎没有援引这方面的思想作为推进中国民主化的意识形态策略。人们对东欧知识分子关于公民社会的论述也近乎完全不知晓。这一事实不能以难以接触西方论著来解释。事实上，黑格尔、葛兰西、托克维尔等人的著作在中国已有译本，而八十年代西方关于公民社会的论著在中国的公共图书馆中也能找到。此外，中国改革派的东欧问题专家也不少。戴凯利和何说，他们不清楚在1989年以前"波兰民主运动中关于公民社会的意识形态是否为中国知识分子所注意"。[49] 事实上，这种意识形态没有获得应有的注意。哈维尔的思想是在1991年之后经《二十一世纪》中有关文章才为大陆知识分子所知，而当时他们感到十分新鲜。

这其中的问题在于，中国的民主精英们始终持一种国家主义的进路，他们的关注点近乎压倒一切地在国家制度、机构和组织的改革上，例如关于修宪问题的讨论就是如此，而并不关注社会的变化。这一国家主义的思想进路本身并没有什么可质疑之处，但对国家与社会关系的不平衡关注至少显示一点，社会在精英的心目中几乎不占地位，社会的变化对民主化的影响也未引起他们的注意。

史特兰和怀特都援引曲指可数的使用了"公民社会"一词的中文文献来支持他们所谓中国已存在公民社会之因素的论点。最常引用的是王志光和刘素莉在《政治学研究》上发表的"从群众社会到公民社会"一文。[50] 然而，这篇文章的主题是在卢梭"人民主权论"的框架下，力图使中国官方的"群众"概念公民化。这涉及到当时人们广泛讨论的实现中国政治文化从"群众意识"到"公民意识"之转变的问题。显然，这种建立"公民社会"的方案同我们现在讨论的"公民社会"不是一回事。[51]

对"公共空间"这个概念的使用也是如此。首先，中国知识分子从来没有使用过"公"这个字眼来描述他们在所谓"公共空间"中的活动。他们宁愿认为他们的活动是属于"私"的。其次，这个所谓的"事实上存在的中国公共空间"同哈贝马斯描述的"公共空间"有着近乎本质性的差别，因为前者并没有向全体知识分子开放，惶论向全体公民开放。事实上，在这一领域，知识分子的活动一直是相互分裂的、小圈子的活动。如果称之为"扩大的私人空间"更为贴切。至于这一"扩大的私人空间"能否发展为"公共空间"，那又是另一个问题了。

几乎所有宣称在中国目睹了公民社会的出现或再生的学者，都是在一个弱的定义下来使用"公民社会"一词，即指那些不在国家管辖之下的社会群体的活动领域。这甚至比泰勒的最小定义，即不在国家管辖之下的自由的公民社团的存在，还要宽泛。泰勒倾向于认为他的最小定义与我们的讨论不相干，因为在这种弱的定义下，"公民社会"可说存在于许多地方，似乎只有纳粹德国和史达林的苏联例外。[52] 如果是这样，使用比泰勒的弱定义还要宽泛的"公民社会"概念，也就更没有解释力了。

许多中国问题专家对"公民社会"一词的滥用正说明了这一点。他们，如怀特，甚至把文化大革命时期的无政府状态也同公民社会扯在一起。这种滥用导致了循环论证： 他们一方面把所有国家放松控制后出现的事物都称之为"公民社会的要素"，然后又用其存在来解释社会和政治的变化。每当发现经验的证据不足以支持他们的论点的话，他们就使用各种各样的形容词，例如"脆弱的"、"初生的"、"软的"、"萌芽状态中的"等等，来修饰其"公民社会"的概念。史特兰和怀特关于公民社会在八十年代的中国再生的说法，同样基于那种对公民社会（或民间社会）的疏松理解以及由此而进行的对中国近代社会史的漏洞百出的研究。

最后，必须指出，现有的各种"公民社会"理论是一种规范性、而不是经验性的理论。它们旨在为全世界的民主化指出新的出路。在西方，这些理论尤其为那些对西方民主持有不满的左派知识分子所津津乐道，从而具有强烈的批判性。不加改造地把这种"应该怎样"的理论用于谈论"是什么"的问题，是社会科学方法论上的大忌，这样的讨论难免意识形态化。这一问题在苏东研究甚至西方领域中也同样存在。近来，西方有些学者开始怀疑近来热门的"公民社会"概念是否可以成为一个社会科学的分析范畴，怀疑"公民社会"这一概念是否可以用来指称某种现实。如果仅仅用它来指公民社团（civil associations）的集合，那么是否有必要使用这样一个含义不清的辞藻。因此，有人认为，只能把"公民社会"看成一个意识形态的话语体系，其中亦有许多不相一致的地方，对它只能进行阐释学的研究，即看各家各派如何利用这一概念的含混性发展各自的意识形态。[53]

究竟如何从"公民社会"和"公共空间"的角度来看待中国近代和当代社会与政治的变化，至今尚没有比较令人满意的解答。这一点，正如黄宗智所评论的，乃是"中国研究领域当前存在的'范式危机'的一种反映"。[54]

【注 释】
(1) 这个说法出自Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture", Modern China, Vol.19, No. 2 (April 1993)。
(2) Charles Tayloe, "Modes of Civle Society", Public Culture, Vol.3, No.1 (Fall 1990), p.98.此文中译载《两间》(创刊号,1991年11月),页6-15,题为"原民间社会"。
(3) Jurgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere", in Steven Seidman (ed.), Jurgen Habermas on Society and Politics:　A Reader (Boston:　Beacon Press, 1989), p.231.
(4) See Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere，(Trans. Thomas Burger, Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1989]
(5) Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Citizens, Groups and a Nascent Civil Society in China", China Information, Vol.4, No.2 (Autumn 1989), pp.28-41
(6) See Craig Calhoun, "Tiananmen, Television and the Public Sphere: Internationalization of Culture and the Beijing Spring of 1989", Public Culture, Vol.2, No.1 (Fall 1989), pp.54-71
(7) Thomas B.　Gold, "The Resurgence of Civil Society in China", Journal of Democracy, Vol.1, No.1 (Winter 1990), pp.18-31。此文的中译本,题为"中国的党与公民社会",载《知识分子》(纽约),第五卷,第一期(1989年秋]
(8) David Strand, "Protest in Beijing:　Civil Society and Public Sphere in China", Problems of Communism, Vol.39, No.3 (May-June 1990), pp.1-19
(9) See Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Emergence of Civil Society in China, Spring 1989", in Tony Saich (ed.),The Chinese People's Movement:　Perspectives on Spring 1989 (New York and London: M.E.Sharpe, 1990), p.127
(10)同上,p.126-44
(11)See Martin K.　Whyte, "Urban China:　A Civil Society in the Making？", in Arther Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.), State and Society in China:　The Consequences of Reform (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.85-87
(12)同上,p.87-94.
(13)同上,p.94.
(14)See Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism:　Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986]
(15)See Andrew G. Walder, "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheval of 1989", Problems of Communism, Vol.38, No.5 (September-October 1989), pp.30-40
(16)William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford:　Stanford University Press, 1984); and Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1885 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989]
(17)See Rowe (1984), pp.10, 339, 36, 119-21
(18)See Rowe (1989), pp.3-5
(19)See Rowe, "The Problem of 'Civil Society' in Late Imperial China", Modern　China, Vol.19, No.2 (April 1993), pp.143-8
(20)同上,pp.149-53
(21)See Mary B. Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Trasformation in China:　Zhejiang Province 1865-1911 (Stanford:　Stanford University Press, 1986]
(22)这三篇文章分别是:"The Origins of a Chinese Public Sphere: Local Elites and Community Affairs in the Late Imperial Period", Etudes Chinoises, Vol.2, No.2 (Autumn 1990), pp.13-60; "The Local Managerial Public Sphere:　Refashioning State-Society Relations in Late Imperial China", paper prepared for the European-American Symposium on "Society versus State in Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese Traditions", Paris, 29-31 May 1991; and "Some observations on a Chinese Public Sphere", Modern China, Vol.19, No.2 (April 1993), pp.158-82
(23)See Rankin　(1993), pp.160-2.
(24)同上,pp.162-3.
(25)同上,pp.169-70.这段关于晚清历史的描述并没有任何新内容,只是多了"公共空间"这个新名词而已。可参见刘广京在《剑桥中国晚清史》中的有关章节。
(26)See Rankin (1993), pp.170-1
(27)See David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing:　City People and Politics in 1920s China (Berkeley:　University of California Press, 1989
(28)同上, pp.100-2.
(29)同注释(8), pp.3-9.
(30)See Philip C.C.Huang, "The Paradigmatic Crisis in Chinese Studies", Modern China, Vol.17, No.3 (July 1991), pp.299-341
(31)See Philip C.C.Huang, "'Public Sphere'/'Civil Society' in China？", Modern China, Vol.19, No.2 (April 1993), pp.216-40
(32)同注释(1),pp.117-8.
(33)同注释(1),p.121.引文出自罗(1984),p.38.
(34)同注释(1),p.128.
(35)See Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, "Between State and Society: The Construction of Corporation in a Chinese Socialist Factory", Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.22 (July 1989), pp.31-60
(36)关于这一理论,参见Robert V.　Daniels, "Soviet Politics since Khrushchev", in John W.　Strong (ed.), The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin (New York:　Van Norstrand-Reinhold Co., 1971), pp.22-23; Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System:　Petrification or Pluralism？", Problems of Communism (March-April 1972), pp.325-45; and Jerry F.　Hough, The Soviet Union and the Social Science Theory (Cambridge, MA.:　Harvard University Press, 1958), pp.22-25
(37)See Dorothy J. Solinger, "Urban Entrepreneurs and the State:　The Merger of State and Society", in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.), op.cit., p.121
(38)同上,p.121.
(39)同上,pp.127-9.
(40)同上,p.130-6.
(41)同上,p.136.
(42)参见其导言, Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.), op.cit., p.3.
(43)See David Kelly and He Baogang, "Emergent Civil Society and the Intellectuals in China", in Robert F. Miller (ed.), The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems (Sydney:　Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp.28-30
(44)See Michel Bonnin and Yves Chevrier, "The Intellectual and the State:　Social Dynamics of Intellectual Autonomy during the Post-Mao Era", The China Quarterly, No.127 (September 1991), pp.569-93
(45)See Kelly and He, op.cit., p.32.
(46)See Bonnin and Chevrier, op.cit., pp.587-9.
(47)See Kelly and He, op.cit., p.32.
(48)同上,pp.37-38.
(49)同上,p.32.
(50)王志光和刘素莉,"从群众社会到公民社会",《政治学研究》,1988年第5期,第1-5页。See Strand (1990), p.4; Whyte, op.cit., p.91
(51)戴凯利和何包钢非常小心地使用这一史料,没有像史特兰和怀特那样掉进词语的陷阱。但是,戴和何也没有清楚地指出王和刘的文章同关于公民社会的争论不相干这一点。
(52)参见Taylor, Op.cit., p.98.
(53)See Keith Tester, Civil Society (London: Routledge, 1992).
(54)See Huang (1991).

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当代中国有无公民社会与公共空间？ ──评西方学者有关论述

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八十年代的中国同样出现了巨变，正是这种巨变构成了八九民众运动的历史背景。不少西方学者运用"公民社会"和"公共空间"这两个概念，来描述当代中国出现的独立于国家的自主性的社会领域，并视之为社会政治改革的一个重要方面。然而，对这种正在出现的自主性社会领域的强度和性质，出现了越来越多的争辩。本文旨在对这场所谓"公民社会与公共空间争论"[1] 中出现的有关论点进行评述。 ...

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7. Does any of that matter? Why/Why not?

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7. Does any of that matter? Why/Why not?

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Bryan Greetham has suggested that we play ‘devil’s advocate’ when we read. He argues that when we read critically it can be helpful to analyse arguments from different perspectives. He suggests that arguments in texts can be weak or fallacious for three reasons: that the authors may have mis-stated the facts (material fallacies); that they have wrongly used words (verbal fallacies); or that they have drawn the wrong inferences (logical fallacies). Play devil's advocate as you read through this article.

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China's human rights situation further deteriorated last year as police systematically tortured activists and forcibly disappeared government critics while state TV continued to broadcast forced confessions, a new report shows.

A creeping security state also attempted to codify much of its existing behaviour on paper, giving the police legal authority to criminalise a host of NGOs deemed politically sensitive by the authorities, according to the report by the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD).

"The Chinese government seems intent on eliminating civil society through a combination of new legislation restricting the funding and operations of NGOs, and the criminalisation of human rights activities as a so-called threat to national security," Frances Eve, a researcher at CHRD, told the Guardian.

"What stands out is the almost institutionalised use of torture to force defenders to confess that their legitimate and peaceful human rights work is somehow a 'crime'."

Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has overseen a sweeping crackdown on civil society. In 2015, police targeted almost 250 rights lawyers and activists in what some have dubbed a "war on law", and the effects of that campaign continued to be felt throughout last year.

Reports of torture while in detention in 2016 were rampant, with methods including beatings, attacks by fellow inmates on the orders of prison guards, stress positions, deprivation of food, water and sleep, inhumane conditions and deprivation of medical treatment.

In some cases, human rights activists were prevented from receiving medical care even once they were released.

Huang Yan, who was detained in November 2015, was suffering from ovarian cancer and diabetes. Police confiscated her diabetes medication, and despite an exam done at a detention facility in April 2016 showing the cancer had spread, she was not treated and was denied medical bail.

When she was finally released, Huang was scheduled to undergo surgery last November to treat her cancer, but the authorities pressured the hospital and the team of surgeons declined to treat her.

Torture also took more overt forms. Last year reports also emerged that rights lawyer Xie Yang was subject to beatings and stress positions in detention, with interrogators warning him: "We'll torture you to death just like an ant".

In November 2016, Jiang Tianyong, a respected Christian attorney, disappeared while about to board a train and police waited weeks to confirm he had been detained. Jiang's whereabouts are still a mystery nearly three months later.

In a rare strongly-worded statement, the European Union called for his immediate release along with several other lawyers.

China also continued the practice of airing confessions on state television, a move that is reminiscent of internal Communist party political purges.

In one of the most prominent cases, Swedish NGO worker Peter Dahlin was paraded on the national broadcaster after three weeks in detention, declaring: "I have violated Chinese law through my activities here. I have caused harm to the Chinese government. I have hurt the feelings of the Chinese people."

The confessions air before detainees ever see the inside of a courtroom, and in Dahlin's case he was promptly deported.

For those activists that do go to trial, in at least 15 cases last year police attempted to pressure activists into accepting government-appointed lawyers. In cases where state-appointed lawyers represented human rights activists, little defence was mounted and the accused pleaded guilty and promised not to appeal their cases.

The report also outlined two laws passed in 2016 that are likely to curb civil society: legislation regulating charitable giving and a law on foreign NGOs. The charity law, while not explicitly requiring all NGOs to register with the government, makes it difficult for unregistered organisations to raise funds domestically.

The foreign NGO regulations require overseas groups that give money to Chinese organisations to be registered with the police.

"Together, these laws will hamper the development of Chinese civil society by restricting their funding," the CHRD report said.

"There are no more 'grey areas'," an unnamed human rights activist said in the report. "To advocate for human rights in China today, you must be willing to accept the reality that the government views your work as 'illegal'."

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China 'eliminating civil society' by targeting human rights activists - report

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China's human rights situation further deteriorated last year as police systematically tortured activists and forcibly disappeared government critics while state TV continued to broadcast forced confessions, a new report shows.

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中国政府终于在本周公布了《境外非政府组织（NGO）管理法》 第二次审议稿。消息不好：尽管相较于 第一稿 有些枝微末节的改进，政府大幅强化控制公民社会的主要目的仍昭然若揭。

新版草案仍旧禁止境外NGO在华成立"分支机构"，仅增列获国务院─中国最高行政机关─许可的例外条款。何种NGO可获得许可，以及做出许可决定的程序，均无明文规定。但可想而知，中国政府只会允许它认为不具威胁性的组织，而排除那些它不喜欢的。

该法草案规定，对涉及"颠覆国家政权"或"煽动抗拒国家法律、行政法规"等情形的组织可予以处罚。同时亦禁止"破坏民族团结、分裂国家"和"从事或资助政治活动，非法从事[或]非法资助宗教活动"─这些都是常被用来检控和平维权人士和批评政府人士的罪名。

这项法律若通过，将使外国资助者遭遇更大阻力，难以持续其支持中国独立民间组织的工作。境外NGO的登记和管理将由公安部而非民政部负责，实质就是让警察机关对国际组织及其决策拥有否决权。

由于中国当局，尤其在国家主席习近平掌权后，毫不掩饰地敌视公民社会，该法律显然是旨在限制而非便利民间组织工作的整体政策的一部分。

各种迹象皆不利于那些敢于仗义执言的NGO。2014年10月，北京警方拘捕了知名政策研究机构"传知行"的负责人 郭玉闪。今年3月，警方又拘押与反歧视NGO"益仁平"有关的 五名女权 活动人士。这五位女士于4月中旬获释后，益仁平仍持续受到警方骚扰。

外国资助机构若不立刻采取行动，想出办法继续为这些组织提供支持，它们将很难再找到具有独立精神而非服膺政府意志的合作伙伴。凡是支持中国独立公民社会发展的人士，都应该要求北京放弃这项立法。

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时评：中国收紧对公民社会控制

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中国政府终于在本周公布了《境外非政府组织（NGO）管理法》 第二次审议稿。消息不好：尽管相较于 第一稿 有些枝微末节的改进，政府大幅强化控制公民社会的主要目的仍昭然若揭。 ...

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李友梅：党的人民观

百年来党带领人民进行社会建设的实践，极大地重构了中国的国家与社会关系，呈现出超越西方"国家与社会"范式的社会构型与实践路径。相较于西方社会基于个人主义之上的权利共同体，中国的人民共同体是以人民集体利益优先的价值共同体。历史也反复证明，党和国家的每一次重大胜利都离不开党和国家与人民群众的相互支持，正是这种共同体的相濡以沫，意味着党领导的百年社会建设不可能走向西方的"公民社会"。可以说，人民共同体的思考路径，是我们从中国共产党百年社会建设实践的历史进程中进行经验总结、思想提炼得来的，也是我们从历史文化和文明价值的角度，对社会主义文明的肌理与运作逻辑及其如何应对"现代化"考验作出的一些新的思考。因而，中国特色社会主义所构筑的人民共同体的文明形态，也在更深的层次上提供了可以为不同国家、不同民族所理解和认同的文化价值观。

原文链接：党的人民观：破解"中国之治"的社会密码

赵天淼："饭圈"文化的引导与规约

"饭圈"文化所带来的网络乱象和社会乱象需要引起各方重视，既要治其"标"又要规其"本"。首先，要正视市场经济中资本这一主角的弊端，通过经济管制、制度规约来破除"饭圈"文化背后的以"流量"为核心的经济逻辑。其二，要继续加强"饭圈"乱象专项整治行动，发挥学校、家庭与社会的教育引导合力。对于"饭圈"中的粉丝群体的引导还要依靠学校教育、家庭影响、社会宣传的协同发力，对其畸形价值观进行矫正。针对"饭圈"的一些积极正面行为要鼓励支持，为其提供合理合法的渠道。其三，各社交平台要增强自我管理意识，及时发现并依法依规治理"饭圈"文化。各社交平台要在保护用户隐私、个人信息的基础上实行实名制注册，让每一名用户自觉约束自己的言行，为自己的言论负责，打破"匿名"这一别有用心之人的保护屏障。

张翼：让民生问题件件有着落事事有回应

现在，中国的常住人口城镇化率已接近64%，消费水平不断提高，社会结构持续优化，全面消除了农村绝对贫困现象。在新基点上，我们还需继续从就业、教育、医疗卫生和社保等人民最关切的地方入手，推进中国特色社会主义建设，丰富人民群众的生活需要。

民生无小事。对民生问题要件件有着落，事事有回应。让群众在发展中看到变化、体验到变化、得到实实在在的好处，增加获得感、幸福感、安全感。与此同时，还需看到，人民群众对生活的期待是不断提升的，是多样的，是多层次的，不仅对物质文化生活提出更高要求，而且还在民主、法治、公平、正义、安全、环境等方面的要求日益增长。于是，改善民生要与经济和社会的发展程度结合在一起。现在我们仍然处于社会主义初级阶段，仍然属于世界上最大的发展中国家，这决定了我们解决问题的前提条件。坚持以人民为中心解决民生问题，也得从这个最大特征出发，不能对人民开空头支票，要防止满口大话、防止空谈、防止吊胃口、防止口惠而实不至，否则，结果会适得其反。

所以，人民当前生活的改善，是在社会主义初级阶段这个基本国情基础上的改善，是在世界上最大的发展中国家这个国际地位基础上的改善。一切从实际出发，坚持实事求是的思想路线，在提高劳动生产率的过程中，逐步提升人民群众的生活水平，才可能将人民美好生活的改善过程建立在经济增长与社会发展的基础上。

原文链接：让民生问题件件有着落事事有回应

刘顺峰：民间法的人类学范式研究

民间法的人类学范式，可以为理解、阐释和适用民间法提供新的思路与视角。在本体论层面，它坚持从结构与文化的多元主义，以及地方性与过程性的微观主义进路理解民间法。在知识论层面，它强调在参与观察中发现与产生民间法知识，再借由三种不同的论证模型对发现与产生的民间法知识予以科学性论证。在方法论层面，它要求针对不同类型的法律民族志呈现不同的书写逻辑，并在此基础上相继展开"文化－功能"与"历史－过程"阐释。建构民间法的人类学范式，对于加快推进中国特色社会主义法学学术与话语的体系化具有重要的理论与实践意义。

王大龙：读懂大脑发育时间表

学前是大脑发展最快的阶段。孩子从出生到2岁左右是大脑成长的敏感期。尽管运动技能和第二外语技能等到孩子15岁左右也同样可以学习，但部分研究者认为上述技能的学习可以在早期开始。

0-2岁大脑发展通常又被称为"机会之窗"，情感、感觉动作、听觉和视觉都会在这个时期重点发育。2-5岁大脑发展要为上学做好准备。此阶段要在学术、情感、社交技巧、营养和健康方面帮助孩子做好学前准备。比如在学术方面，给孩子多读书，给他们时间自己探索和学习。多跟孩子交流，并多问他们问题。提供简单的玩具，让他们的想象力得到充分发挥。在情感和社交情感层面，家长要尽可能增加与孩子的交流时间，同时尽量减少他们看电视的时间。这个年龄段也要多给孩子提供参与社会游戏和活动的机会，为孩子提供稳定的情感依托和善良品质的榜样，教给孩子如何与同辈交流，教给孩子如何在家长不在身边的时候感到舒适。

从5岁到青少年时期，孩子的大脑已经基本掌握一门语言，发展了感觉运动功能，并且开始主动探索世界。尽管大脑发育的速度明显放缓，但是大脑还在持续成长。在接下来的五年里，孩子大脑的重量将发育到成人大脑重量的90%。在这个阶段一定要关注孩子的饮食健康，引导孩子吃健康有营养的食品，尽量少吃垃圾食品。

3岁前，孩子的大脑处在发展特别快的时期，尤其是言语发育，在此阶段，大脑每秒钟都有700个神经原诞生并产生连接。因而这一阶段对孩子的言语能力发展非常重要。

国外的研究实验表明，父母的陪伴和受教育水平都将显著影响孩子的言语发展水平。如父母双方都是受过大学教育的，孩子36个月时能够掌握约1200个单词，而且这个词汇中不单有名词，还有动词、形容词、副词、甚至连词。这表明孩子的言语发展进入了一个很高的水平。而在父母没有受过大学教育的普通家庭，孩子36个月掌握的词汇大约在500-600个，差了近一倍。留守儿童家庭和孤儿院孩子掌握的词汇量就更少。有国外研究者研究过一部分孤儿院的孩子，发现在36个月时只掌握了约200个词汇。

因此，每个家长都要尽可能多地陪伴孩子，多跟他交流说话，进行亲子阅读。之所以说亲子阅读是发展孩子言语能力的重要途径，是因为这个过程能够不断培养孩子的言语交流能力，这是儿童发展的核心素养，它会迁移到其他能力，比如数学、物理、化学和其他课程的学科能力，还有孩子的情商和与社会交往能力等等。因此，三岁前的言语能力是家长尤其需要关注的。

在外语学习方面，一个非常普遍的现象是--非双语家庭里很多3岁前就开始学第二语言的孩子，其第二语言发音非常接近母语。通常认为，7岁前都是孩子学习第二语言的敏感期。7岁前接触第二语言的孩子与7岁后开始学习第二语言的孩子相比，虽然他们在"读""写"和"听"的方面可能差异不大，但在大脑中与语言相关的两个区的激活点差异就比较明显。从脑科学角度来看，虽然外语可以在任何年龄阶段学，但如果条件允许最晚从7岁就可以开始学了。

此外，运动和良好的睡眠对儿童的大脑发育也非常重要。体育运动能够训练大脑整体的认知觉协调，对孩子的手眼协调以及思维、专注度与注意力分配都非常有益，是开发大脑潜能的一个重要途径。

在睡眠方面，家长要尽量培养孩子良好的睡眠习惯，尽可能让孩子自然醒。研究表明，坚持每天按时睡觉起床，自然醒的孩子，一天的智力水平都居高不下。良好睡眠对于孩子正常的学习生活非常有好处，睡眠好的孩子大多学习成绩也好。通常而言，幼儿园阶段到6岁以前的孩子一般需要10个小时睡眠，小学低年级学生需要9小时，小学高年级学生则需要8小时睡眠。

总而言之，抓住孩子大脑发育的"黄金期"，持之以恒地陪伴孩子，"因脑施教"，帮助他们养成良好的生活、道德、学习习惯、都将大大助力孩子的健康成长。

原文链接："因脑施教"破译孩子的"成长密码"

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李友梅：党的人民观 ...

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光明网_新闻视野、文化视角、思想深度、理论高度

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光明网是光明日报在网络时代的新延伸，也是国内唯一一家定位于思想理论领域的中央重点新闻网站。光明网坚持"可读、可信、可用"的办网原则，以"新闻视野、文化视角、思想深度、理论高度"为理念，努力打造"知识分子网上精神家园，权威思想理论文化网站"。

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改革开放后，西方公民社会理论日渐在国内理论界产生影响，一些学者极力推崇西方公民社会理论，也喜欢用西方公民社会理论的概念、话语和观点来研究我国社会主义民主政治发展面临的问题和未来发展的方向。在中国特色社会主义新时代，我们更好坚持和发展中国特色社会主义，需要深入揭示西方公民社会理论实质，防范其误导我国改革开放实践。
西方资产阶级改良主义的意识形态
西方公民社会理论形成于17至18世纪，其理论基础是资产阶级人本主义和自由主义，是当时新兴资产阶级要求经济自由和政治权利的产物。这一时期，西方公民社会理论的主题是反对政府侵犯个人自由和权利，反对过多干预自由市场与社会，主张建立"最小政府""有限政府"，保障个人尤其是资产阶级个人的经济自由、私有财产权和所谓的"社会自治"等一系列民主政治权利。

20世纪70年代后，针对西方国家在福利和税收上的"两难"问题及由此带来的政府"信任赤字"问题，再加上担心所谓"政府失灵"和"市场失灵"现象造成社会失序、失范，西方公民社会理论主张重新界定政府职能，政府角色向公共服务"掌舵者"转变，成为"公民社会"的保护者、监督者、调节者；社会则积极参与公共服务的生产和提供，社会角色向公共服务"划桨者"转变。西方公民社会理论希望通过这种政府与社会的良性互动，对公共事务进行合作管理，达到缓和阶级矛盾、维护"私有财产神圣不可侵犯"的社会秩序和实现西方国家所谓"有效治理"的目的。

虽然西方公民社会理论刻意强调西方国家社会与政府的区别或所谓适当的分离，有时甚至强调社会与政府之间的所谓"对抗"关系，但是，这种"区别"或者"对抗"并不是在要不要维护资本主义私有产权制度、资本主义的经济自由以及资产阶级民主政治权利问题上的原则性对抗，而只是在围绕维护资本主义私有产权制度、资本主义的经济自由以及资产阶级民主政治权利，如何发挥社会和政府的作用存在的策略性的分歧而已。作为西方"公民社会"核心载体的众多社会组织并非西方国家政府的政治反对派，相反却纷纷接受政府和企业的资助，作为西方"公民社会"不可或缺构成要素的各种社会运动从不以推翻西方国家的自由市场经济制度为使命的事实，可以佐证这一点。

西方国家中社会与政府之间这种本质上的非对抗性关系，决定了西方公民社会理论只不过是一种西方资产阶级改良主义的意识形态，也决定了在西方国家普通公民维护人的尊严、人的基本权利和权益，绝不能越过保障资产阶级经济自由、私有财产权和民主政治权利的边界，绝不能妨碍资本尤其是西方垄断资本对国家、社会的统治地位。正如列宁曾经指出的，"只要存在着资本的统治，尽管有某些改善，工人总还是雇佣奴隶"。
西方民主、人权输出的理论工具
虽然西方公民社会理论的形成、发展对维护和促进西方国家普通公民的权利、权益并非毫无裨益，但是，当我们把目光从西方国家转向其他国家和地区的时候，西方公民社会理论的这些本来就微不足道的"裨益"立即就荡然无存了。坚称强大的公民社会是"现代民主"的条件和公民权利保障的西方公民社会理论，渗透、流布于广大发展中国家和苏联东欧等原社会主义国家的历史表明，它纯粹只是20世纪70年代以来西方打着"促进民主""解决冲突""加强公民生活""建立政府、社会和企业之间的平衡"的旗号大肆进行民主、人权输出的一种理论工具而已。

西方国家向世界灌输公民社会理论，进行"民主""人权"输出，其意并非维护世界各国的社会稳定、建立"民主"的世界和改善世界的人权，而是以这种看上去很美、实则包藏祸心的理论来掩饰它们打压反西方政权、扶植亲西方政权，颠覆社会主义政权，维护西方垄断资本对世界的统治这一图谋而已。正是因为广大发展中国家和原来的一些社会主义国家没有深刻洞察到西方公民社会理论背后的这一图谋，西方国家的"民主""人权"输出事业，在20世纪70年代以来进展十分顺利，形成了西方引以为傲的席卷全球的所谓"民主化"浪潮，这股"民主化"浪潮即使在21世纪的今天也并未完全退潮。

事实证明，一些对西方公民社会理论寄予厚望、积极实践西方公民社会理论，满心欢喜地打开大门迎接西方的"民主""人权"输出的国家，结果却并没有迎来经济快速发展、政局长期稳定和民生持续改善的美好"公民社会"，相反却都患上了经济发展遭到重创、政局持续动荡和民生每况愈下的公民社会综合征。20世纪七八十年代，许多拉美国家实施西方"民主化"的结果是其经济在整个80年代陷入停滞，被称为"失去的十年"。许多非洲国家几乎在同时也实施西方"民主化"，其结果也不比拉美国家好些。尽管这些非洲国家资源丰富，却依然无法摆脱贫穷，"经济从越来越困难走向崩溃，非洲陷入了更加苦难的深渊"。苏联东欧等原社会主义国家剧变后一度在西方"民主化"道路上狂奔，结果使经济发展遭受重创。

众多事实也证明，积极实践西方公民社会理论的许多国家，不仅没有通过国家、政府、市场的所谓"平衡"，消纷止争、实现社会稳定，反而因为西方国家一些社会组织的"添柴加油"而导致"街头政治""颜色革命"不断，当然也鲜有民生持续改善的成功案例。在那些为发展中国家"添柴加油"的西方国家的社会组织中，20世纪80年代初成立的美国国家民主基金会可谓声名显赫，它在拉美国家、独联体国家、西亚国家、东南亚国家等，都进行过颠覆活动或推动过"颜色革命"，甚至还频频资助各种反华势力。
防范西方公民社会理论误导我国改革开放实践
从根本上避免西方公民社会理论误导和危害我国的改革开放实践，有效防范国内外反社会主义势力把它作为实现"西化""分化"中国的战略图谋的手段，我们除了要深入揭示其理论实质，廓清其理论迷雾外，尤其需要在其赖以生存的经济和社会基础上做文章。

要毫不动摇巩固和发展公有制经济，加快国有经济布局优化、结构调整、战略性重组，促进国有资产保值增值，推动国有资本做强做优做大，有效防止国有资产流失。

要健全人民当家作主制度体系，发展社会主义民主政治。要坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一。要改进党的领导方式和执政方式，扩大人民有序政治参与，维护国家法制统一、尊严、权威，用制度体系体现人民意志、保障人民权益、激发人民创造活力，保证人民当家作主。

要始终把人民利益摆在至高无上的地位，让改革发展成果更多更公平惠及全体人民。要坚持在发展中补齐民生短板、促进社会公平正义，在幼有所育、学有所教、劳有所得、病有所医、老有所养、住有所居、弱有所扶上不断取得新进展。要深入开展脱贫攻坚，保证全体人民在共建共享发展中有更多获得感，不断促进人的全面发展、全体人民共同富裕。

要加强和创新社会治理，完善党委领导、政府负责、社会协同、公众参与、法治保障的社会治理体制，提高社会治理社会化、法治化、智能化、专业化水平。要着眼促进社会组织健康有序发展，处理好"放"和"管"的关系。我们也要注意参考借鉴一些国家在防范公民社会组织破坏社会稳定方面的好经验好做法。比如，俄罗斯一方面以立法形式收紧对公民社会团体注册和接受境外捐助的规定，另一方面，大力扶持、资助国内以爱国主义为宗旨的民间社会组织。这些经验值得我们重视和借鉴。

（作者：刘志明，系中国社会科学院中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心研究员）

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