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Sri Lanka is a notable case in which state building has been negatively affected by competing national communities, as the Tamil separationist movement waged a war of independence for over 25 years. This movement was parked by a Sinhalese-dominated state that actively pursued Sinhalese interests, thereby delegitimizing the state in the eyes of the Tamils. Similarly, competing ideas of nation split colonial India in two (eventually three). The remnants of this Hindu-Muslim divide are still felt across the subcontinent, but it is especially evident in India with the ongoing conflict of Kashmir and the recent string of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorist groups.

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"The Sinhalese had shifted blame trans-borderly to India for the frivolity of the Tamil Secessionist Movement." - Krishna

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Needless to say the state's security is challenged on many fronts and the bane of this can be found in its dis-acknowledgement of cultural, and economical factors in it's concept of security by the state, so in relation to the purpose of this wall, almost every cause of conflict in Sri Lanka is intrinsically linked to the political movement of the central political actor. Sri Lanka's ability as a state and its security issues are a real point of concern for future predicaments - the central ethnicity has used its democracy to create a pluralist and somewhat ethnically-exclusive state, which in turn has delegitimized for the majority of the people of Sri Lanka. The way forward will be to adopt a uniform democracy that is not exclusive to a singular ethnie, but one that grants the whole plethora of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka political agency. In the words of Nira Wickramasinghe, "as human security and as state security - the definition of security is contested. It has many faces. This is probably the most important conclusion one can draw about security in Sri Lanka."

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Rationale and Endnotes for articles and papers used in the making of the wall.

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"Among members of majority and minority communities alike there is a sense that the state is incapable of ensuring their security. In the minds of the SInhalese people, terrorist acts of the LTTE constitute the main threat to their own security and that of the country" - Nira Wickramasinghe

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"Finally, long-term reconstruction of course requires good governance. In principle, good governance can underpin a liberal individual rights framework that will make group rights and even devolution of power less important. But here again the evidence suggests the opposite. To promote good governance the first essential step to take is the implementation of the seventeenth amendment to the constitution that was passed unanimously in parliament in 2001 with the strong backing of civil society. This amendment establishes a National Constitutional Council, which is vested with the sole authority to recommend suitable individuals to the president of the country to be appointed to the Elections Commission, Public Service Commission, Police Commission, Human Rights Commission, Bribery and Corruption Commission, Finance Commission (which allocates funds to the provincial councils), and the Delimitation Commission of parliamentary electorates. The council is also vested with authority to recommend suitable appointees for major offices of state, including that of Chief Justice, Supreme Court Justices, Attorney General, Inspector General of Police, and several others. The president can refuse to accept the recommendations of the council but the seventeenth amendment makes no provision for him or her to make alternative appointments. The first National Constitutional Council itself finished its term in October 2005. President Rajapakse has avoided appointing a fresh commission, instead arrogating to himself the task of choosing appointees to commissions and senior official positions in government in violation of the constitution." - S.W.R De A. Saramasinghe

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Post-Conflict Peace-Building in Sri Lanka

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Post-Conflict Peace-Building in Sri Lanka

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"Sri Lanka proudly proclaims that it has one of the longest functioning democracies in the developing world. The first national election under universal franchise was held as far back as 1931. The country also has a history of changing governments peacefully using the ballot box. The two major political parties, UNP and SLFP, have tended to alternate in power. They have governed the country sometimes with coalition partners and sometimes without. From 1947 to 2009 the political party that controlled parliament has changed nine times. The executive presidency that was established in 1978 was held by the UNP for the first 16 years and by the SLFP for the last 14 years. This scenario may appear to suggest a mature democracy. In reality, the position is less straightforward because of the ethnically fragmented polity that Sri Lanka's democracy has produced." - S.W.R De A. Saramasinghe

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Politics and State Building in Sri Lanka

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Politics and State Building in Sri Lanka

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A comprehensive paper on politics and state building in Sri Lanka, by Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits

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Sri Lankan Economy: Future Predictions Across the Board

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Sri Lankan Economy: Future Predictions Across the Board

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The current economic plan is on a warpath - change is required according to Eran Wicknramaratne.

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In the aftermath of the military conflict of May 2009, the country was expecting an economic take off sustainable over a decade. That was possible only by building on the reforms of the liberalization of the late 1970's

A small island, with a limited market, limited capital and resources could only progress by embracing globalization and building competitiveness of its agriculture, industries and services.

The country benefited from the cessation of hostilities and the 3 -5% GDP growth increased to 8% in 2010 and 2011. With the global financial crisis the GDP growth rate has dipped to around 6% in 2012 and will remain in that orbit over the next few years. In short, the economy has not transformed into a competitive economy securing new global markets.

The twin deficit of budget and current account persists. Government revenue is stuck at about 11% of GDP while expenditure, wastage and corruption go unchecked. The trade deficit was Rs.9.7 billion and 9.4 billion in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The trade deficit will only marginally reduce in 2013. Imports are twice as much as exports. Import substitution is limited as oil, fertilizer and textiles are only a substantial proportion of imports. 40% of food imports are wheat. Altering the dietary habits in urban areas and the hill country will take time if wheat is to be substituted and imports are to be reduced. The recent scare created by the import of milk powder has raised the necessity to increase domestic production of milk from the present 30% of our requirements to a possible 50% over time. Meanwhile the government goes ahead with its ambitious roads, ports, airports and infrastructure projects which increase the imports of capital goods and have hardly an impact on increasing exports.
The real issue is that exports are continually declining as a percentage of our GDP from 32% in the past to 16% in 2012, and Sri Lanka's share of global trade is also declining. The present economic strategy fails to arrest the declining export base. We have been unable to attract high technology, ICT related and other high value adding industries or services over the past decade.

The present economic growth has been propelled by a public investment programme of 6% of GDP. The country has not been able to attract any substantial investment and has relied on foreign commercial debt. The present strategy while not delivering sustainable growth has also increased the vulnerability to a financial crisis. There are early warnings signs that our financial institutions are weakening. He cautioned that the Central Bank should take measures proactively to strengthen the finance companies which are vulnerable, not limiting itself to warning the public through media advertisements. On being questioned further, Wickramaratne refused to elaborate on the impending finance company crisis, only saying that the government had a responsibility to protect depositors who are the major Stakeholders in financial institutions.

The debt profile has changed drastically over the past 5 years. The foreign debt has become nearly 50% of the total debt. The commercial debt and non-concessional debt is as much as the concessional debt which is 1.3 trillion rupees.

"The present economic growth has been propelled by a public investment programme of 6% of GDP. The country has not been able to attract any substantial investment and has relied on foreign commercial debt"

The Government's economic goals are to create economic hubs around aviation, commerce, knowledge, energy and the maritime industry to achieve a per-capita income of US $ 4000 by 2016, to reduce poverty and unemployment and attract 2.5 million tourists. While conceding that there has been a reduction in unemployment he points out that it is mostly due to the increased migration of labour to the Middle East and unproductive employment in the state sector.
The Government is in a continual attempt to paint a rosy picture of economic performance based on statistics which are not grounded in reality.
There is a phobia to project the per-capita income as the trophy of economic advancement. Prof. Athukorala of the Australian National University (ANU) recently pointed out that "the doubling of per-capita income in current US $ terms during this period partly reflects domestic inflation and artificial stability of the exchange rate of the Sri Lankan rupee against the dollar. When the data we expressed in real (2000) prices in order to allow for these factors, the increase in per-capita income in 2010 (US$ 1240) was only 30% higher than in 2004 (US $ 959)".

" It is natural that as neighbours, India and China will be confronted with situations that call for a larger political vision. On trans-border rivers, there are worries in India about the possible impact of Chinese development projects on downstream areas. Both common development and mutual respect warrant a more reassuring Chinese position"

The public sector is poorly remunerated, under trained and demotivated. Extreme politicization has broken the backbone of one of post independent Asia's most promising public services.

A radical overhaul is needed. A motivated, remunerated, trained public service is a prerequisite even for the private sector to flourish.

The problem in the public sector and the public corporate cannot be addressed unless radical reform is embraced. The Government does not have the vision or the political will to restructure the public service. Those at the helm of public policy have been around for too many years. They continue to advice on making a poor system better-unable to see the necessity to change direction radically. The inability of the President to replace his 'old' team with people who will promote a new paradigm will adversely affect the development of the country. A new team, if not a new administration is now required.

The 'old' policy makers and big business who plays to the tune of these bureaucrats have wrongly advised the Executive to abandon its application for GSP for the fear that Sri lanka will not be able to comply on its international treaties. The country is estimated to lose US$ 350 Million per annum. The loss over a decade could be US $ 5 billion. But the more important point is that we will lose our markets where Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam and a host of other countries will replace us. A skillful negotiating team could have bifurcated the negotiations on GSP into the pre 2009 and the post 2009 Sri Lanka. Our partners in Europe are looking for transparent Government and international trade. The fear of the past will wreck our own economic prosperity while not achieving the objective of excusing us from our international commitments. New thinking on foreign trade and foreign policy is now the need of the hour.

Sri Lanka's economy will be affected particularly by the performance of China and India over the next decade. The age of fast growth is over. China's economic growth will be 4 - 5 %. China will face a long workout from the credit and debt boom of the 2000s. There is too much debt relative to GDP. It has been taking more and more debt to generate less and less GDP. China has over invested and under consumed over a considerable period. The economic shadow of China will send a shock to the countries in the periphery, namely, Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Brazil and Africa. The impact on Sri Lanka will be limited. The Chinese will meet their obligation to us given the strategic nature of the commitments and the smallness of the investments and debt. However, future credit beyond 2014 may become more restrictive.
India's growth will also be 4 - 5%. The twin deficit of fiscal and current account will persist. The Congress party policy of trading off growth for distribution will compound economic difficulties. Higher inflation than its key trading partners will necessitate an adjustment to the Indian rupee. The real exchange rate may be overvalued by 25 - 30%. A depreciation of the Indian rupee will be inevitable. Then our exports will be under further threat, so the Sri Lankan rupee will have to depreciate.

2014 may be the most challenging year for Asia since the 1997/98 crisis. However, Asia is better positioned than in the 1990s to face the crisis. The adjustment will take longer than expected.

There will be no short cuts to sustainable economic growth. The political economy will have to be extricated from its present dismal state. The separation of power, the restoration of the independence of the judiciary, law and order, will be a prerequisite to improve the business climate and attract foreign investment. It is only in that background economic and financial reforms and public sector reforms will give the country the high and sustainable growth it deserves - Nothing short, nothing less.

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'Sri Lanka Economy Beyond 2014' "SRI LANKA NEEDS A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM PRESENT ECONOMIC PATH"

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'Sri Lanka Economy Beyond 2014' "SRI LANKA NEEDS A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM PRESENT ECONOMIC PATH", In the aftermath of the military conflict of May 2009, the country was expecting an economic take off sustainable over a decade.

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Sri Lanka's past attempts on state creation and reform

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Sankaran Krishna on Conflict Bound by State and Political Dynamics: The Tamil Fight

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Sankaran Krishna on Conflict Bound by State and Political Dynamics: The Tamil Fight

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"The demand for a separate state for the Tamil people arose from the failure of repeated attempts to meet Sri Lanka Tamil aspirations. This failure, together with growing economic problems and rising un-employment, contributed to the rise of assertive and aggressive Tamil militancy."

"After the emergence of a militant Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka, the state's apprehension sharpened and was long focused on the possibility of Indian military intervention in support of Tamil militants in the northern province. Not only has Sri Lanka never integrated with the mainland economies on the subcontinent, it has in fact made overtures for membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)."

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The Great Fight for Autonomy: Going Against the LTTE

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The Great Fight for Autonomy: Going Against the LTTE

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And as recently as a year ago, the external affairs minister of India, S. M. Krishna, said that Mr. Rajapaksa had, in a meeting, "assured me that he stands by his commitment to pursuing the 13th Amendment-plus approach."

Two weeks later, though, Mr. Rajapaksa denied giving any such assurances, and his government has sent clear signals in recent months that it had no intention of building on the 13th Amendment and may move to repeal it.

When the Sri Lankan Supreme Court struck down a law in September 2012 because it violated the amendment, the ruling infuriated the president and soon led to impeachment proceedings against the chief justice. In October, his brother, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, called for the amendment's repeal.

"This speech makes even more clear that the Rajapaksas don't have any interest in sharing power," said Alan Keenan, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group.

The United States has expressed concerns about the impeachment of the chief justice, and the United Nations Human Rights Council is expected in March to ask Sri Lanka about its progress on measures meant to heal the conflict with the Tamils, including investigation of alleged human rights violations during the civil war and greater autonomy for Tamil areas. About 18 percent of Sri Lankans are Tamils; most of the rest are Sinhalese. Tamils also account for a major part of the population of southeastern India.

Mr. Rajapaksa's speech came nearly four years after his government defeated the separatist Tamil Tiger rebels after decades of bloody struggle. The United Nations has estimated that 80,000 to 100,000 people were killed during the war; other estimates put the number higher.

The Tamil National Alliance, the main ethnic Tamil political party in Sri Lanka, said in a statement that the United Nations Human Rights Council must take "stern action" against the Sri Lankan government, which it said had not investigated abuses in good faith, The Associated Press reported.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice released a joint statement on Monday calling on Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of the United Nations to "recognize the continuing deterioration of democracy, human rights and rule of law in its totality" in Sri Lanka.

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Sri Lankan Leader Seems to Reject Greater Autonomy for Tamils

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And as recently as a year ago, the external affairs minister of India, S. M. Krishna, said that Mr. Rajapaksa had, in a meeting, "assured me that he stands by his commitment to pursuing the 13th Amendment-plus approach."

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The Great Fight for Autonomy: Going Against the LTTE

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The Great Fight for Autonomy: Going Against the LTTE

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The Inquirer: Tamil Voting on Autonomy

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JAFFNA, Sri Lanka - A former political proxy for Sri Lanka's defeated Tamil Tiger rebels has swept the country's northern provincial election in what is seen as a resounding call for wider regional autonomy in areas ravaged by a quarter century of civil war.

The country's elections commission announced Sunday that the Tamil National Alliance will form the first functioning provincial government in the northern Tamil heartland after securing 30 seats out of 38 in Saturday's election. President Mahinda Rajapaksa's coalition won eight seats.

The win provides a platform for the party to campaign for an autonomous federal state, although the provincial council is a largely toothless body.

The Tamils have fought unsuccessfully for six decades - through a peaceful struggle and then the bloody civil war - for self-rule.

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War-hit Sri Lankan Tamils vote resoundingly for autonomy in provincial election

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A former political proxy for Sri Lanka's defeated Tamil Tiger rebels has swept the country's northern provincial election in what is seen as a resounding call for wider regional autonomy in areas ravaged by a quarter century of civil war.

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The Great Fight for Autonomy: Going against the LTTE

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The Great Fight for Autonomy: Going against the LTTE

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The Inquirer: Tamil Voting on Autonomy

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JAFFNA, Sri Lanka - A former political proxy for Sri Lanka's defeated Tamil Tiger rebels swept the country's northern provincial election, according to results released Sunday, in what is seen as a resounding call for wider regional autonomy in areas ravaged by a quarter century of civil war.

The country's elections commission announced that the Tamil National Alliance will form the first functioning provincial government in the northern Tamil heartland after securing 30 seats out of 38 in Saturday's election. President Mahinda Rajapaksa's coalition won eight seats.

The win provides a platform for the party to campaign for an autonomous federal state, although the provincial council is a largely toothless body.

The Tamils have fought unsuccessfully for six decades - through a peaceful struggle and then the bloody civil war - for self-rule.

The elections are seen by the United Nations and the world community as a crucial test of reconciliation between the Tamils and the majority ethnic Sinhalese, who control Sri Lanka's government and military.

The result also suggests that a vast majority of voters prefer self-rule over Rajapaksa's effort to win them over through infrastructure development.

However, the provincial council is largely powerless and the new government led by former Supreme Court Justice C.V. Wigneswaran will have to contend with a center-appointed governor who will control most of the council's affairs.

Wigneswaran said before the vote that winning the election would give his administration the public backing to lobby for wider powers based on federalism.

But the central government is against devolving any substantial power and says even existing powers in provincial hands, such as those over land and policing, are a threat to the country.

The country's ethnic divisions widened with the quarter-century civil war that ended in 2009 when government troops crushed the Tamil Tiger rebels, who were fighting to create an independent state. At least 80,000 people were killed in the war, and northern cities, including many on Jaffna peninsula, were reduced to rubble.

Tamils have been demanding regional autonomy to the country's north and east, where they are the majority, since Sri Lanka became independent from Britain in 1948. The campaign took the form of nonviolent protests for many years, but in 1983 civil war broke out between government forces and armed Tamil groups calling for full independence.

The provincial council was created in 1987 as an alternative to separation. But the Tigers - the strongest of the rebel groups, and eventually the de facto government across much of the north and east - rejected it as inadequate. The fighting that followed prevented the council from functioning.

The military defeat of the Tigers meant Tamils were back to where they had started 60 years earlier, with no tangible achievement, tens of thousands of deaths and losing another million people who fled the country as refugees.

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Sri Lankan Tamils vote for wider autonomy

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A former political proxy for Sri Lanka's defeated Tamil Tiger rebels swept the country's northern provincial election, according to results released Sunday, in what is seen as a resounding call for wider regional autonomy in areas ravaged by a quarter century of civil war.

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From National Security to Human Security in Sri Lanka

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Integration: Central with the Rest of the State

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T hree years after the Sri Lankan government successfully concluded its military campaign against the secessionist insurgency led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the country has done little to address the root causes of the ethnic conflict. Many in Sri Lanka and beyond believed that the end of the war would create new opportunities to devolve Colombo's power and increase regional autonomy.

However, political developments since May 2009 do not indicate any breakthrough in political reforms towards power-sharing with ethnic minorities. The debate on how to resolve the ethnic conflict has been reopened not to promote a constructive solution, but only to reproduce the conflict in new forms.

Earlier, the war and the LTTE threat were two important factors in the political balance of forces between the state and ethnic minorities. Those same factors also gave Sri Lanka's ethnic minorities some bargaining power with the two main political parties - the United National Party (UNP) and the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The end of the war has altered the equilibrium in the UPFA-led government's favour. Leaders of most minority parties are aware of the new situation, and their new politics of pragmatism prioritises what they see as 'developmental rights' over political rights.

The Sri Lankan government now insists that there is no ethnic conflict in the country, and that the bloodshed of the past three decades was solely a 'terrorist' problem. Since it recognises no political dimension to the ethnic conflict, the government sees no need for a political solution, and instead focuses on rehabilitation, resettlement and economic development. By ascribing Tamil grievances to economic inequalities, the government's nation-building project now focuses on the economic integration of the North and East with the rest of the country.

The current Rajapaksa government has a very particular understanding of how that integration should be implemented. The post-war discourse on state reform looks to consolidate the unitary state and further centralise power as part of the state's peace-building economic program.

The current administration has ideological objections to solving the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict by decentralising power. President Rajapaksa has clearly stated his preference for "home grown solutions to [Sri Lanka's] domestic problems," implying that the devolution of power - which Western countries continue to advocate and which India more or less forced upon the Jayewardene government in 1987 through the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution - is not a valid option.

Rajapaksa knows that he and UPFA government were elected by an essentially Sinhalese electorate which has little interest in devolution. Political gossip in Colombo has it that Rajapaksa openly expresses his displeasure with the voting behaviour of Tamils and Muslims. At the last presidential, parliamentary and local government elections, most Tamil and Muslim votes went to ethnic parties and the opposition UNP.

This makes resolving Sri Lanka's ethnic problem even more difficult, as any solution must be acceptable to the Sinhalese majority, yet their entrenched scepticism about sharing power with the Tamils is only reinforced at each election campaign by political parties that continue to exploit ethnic distrust for their own political ends.

Still, in response to international pressure - primarily from the US, EU, India and Canada - the government has held discussions with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) about a political solution. That dialogue began in 2010 but, hampered by a lack of clarity on the government's position and the UPFA's deep distrust of the TNA, has produced no result so far. The government has also indicated that it will not devolve control over land and forests, which has been a key TNA demand.

The 13th Amendment officially gives provincial governments police powers and limited powers over land, yet the government has not implemented those provisions, arguing that doing so would encourage secession and threaten the sovereignty of the state. Rajapaksa has disparaged the TNA's claims to land and police powers as demands which "the LTTE has been asking for". Many in the government think that the TNA is trying to obtain through peaceful means - and with the backing of India and the West - what the LTTE failed to secure by military means over three decades.

Buying agreement

The on-going debate on devolution highlights the Sri Lankan ethnic elite's continuing inability to compromise in what they see as a zero-sum game. While the TNA asks for 'Thirteenth Amendment Plus' - implying even more regional autonomy than is guaranteed by the 13th Amendment - the government stands by 'Thirteenth Amendment Minus', which would mean devolving some power to provincial councils, but retaining control over land and policing.

The TNA's stance is rooted in its ideological and political inheritance. The party represents the political aspirations of the Tamil 'nation', which it believes deserves regional autonomy within a federal framework. Even during war, the TNA and its predecessor, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), advocated a federalist alternative both to the state's demands for a unitary Sri Lankan state and to LTTE demands for a separate Tamil state.

But the complete defeat of the LTTE has changed the government's view of the 13th Amendment. During the brutal LTTE insurgency, granting any regional autonomy to the Tamils was seen as dangerous and foolish. With the LTTE crushed, regional autonomy for the Tamils is seen as unnecessary and irrelevant.

The UPFA's approach to ethnic conflict has had broad implications for the government's relations with all of Sri Lanka's ethnic minorities - Tamils, Muslims and Up-country Tamils. The government's policy of involving minority political parties in economic and infrastructure development of the Northern and Eastern provinces requires minority political parties to join the government coalition, accept Cabinet positions and offer their support to the UPFA.

With the exception of the TNA, all Tamil and Muslim political parties have accepted these terms. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, earlier aligned with the opposition UNP, also joined the UPFA coalition in August 2010, accepting the government's wilful ignorance of the political rights of the minorities.

Pragmatically, most of the minority parties now see collaborating with the ruling coalition as the best way to secure development for their communities. It is clear that whatever devolution might come about, the provincial council system will continue to operate under the tight grip of the Centre. Minority parties need access to public office and resources to maintain their clientalist politics, and this largely explains their current allegiances and their capitulation on demands for political rights and greater devolution.

Paradoxically, though the UPFA government completely rejects a consociational programme of ethnic conflict management, the present administration has the appearance of a proto-consociational coalition since it includes representatives from most of the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim parties.

Even the defiant TNA appears to be quite aware of the weakened bargaining position of minority parties, since it has had to mobilise foreign support for a political solution in order to exert any pressure on the Sri Lankan government. The TNA has also repeatedly criticised the Sri Lankan government's lack of accountability over alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law during the last stages of the war, again prompting some critics to accuse the party of promoting a 'Western' agenda at the expense of the actual needs of the Tamil people on the ground.

In its reliance on external actors, the TNA could well be leading itself into a political trap from which there is no easy escape. Meanwhile, despite a number of meetings between the two sides in 2011, the chasm of distrust separating the UPFA and the TNA continues to widen.

The current political impasse suggests that Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict is far from over; the conflict endures due to major structural faults of the state, and is re-emerging in a new form. So far as economic development continues to overshadow political reforms and the debate on devolution, Sri Lanka will get no closer to becoming a pluralistic state. The current government would do best to set up political structures that can deal with the ethnic conflict through accommodation and compromise rather than through state violence and internal war. Yet even after three decades of war the UPFA has still not learned the crucial lesson that a reformed state is the best guarantee against demands for secession.
(Jayadeva Uyangoda is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka, and co-editor of Polity, published in Colombo.This article was published in Himalmag under the heading"A victor's peace")

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Sri Lankan Govt Focuses on Economic Integration of the North and East with the Rest of the Country

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by Jayadeva Uyangoda Three years after the Sri Lankan government successfully concluded its military campaign against the secessionist insurgency led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the country has done little to address the root causes of the ethnic conflict. Many in Sri Lanka and beyond believed that the end of the war...

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Krishna on Ethno-National Diversity and State Building

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Krishna on Ethno-National Diversity and State Building

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"The primary reason for this lack of legitimacy and its continued erosion in the decades since is that nation-building has become equated with remaking a once plural and hybrid space into one where ethnic majority (the Sinhala speaking Buddhists) has the pride of place, and the others (the largely Hindu Sri Lankan Tamils, the Estate Tamils who emigrated to Sri Lanka in the nineteenth century, the Muslims, the Burghers, and the Veddas or aboriginal groups) are seen as secondary actors in deservedly minor roles."

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A Kaleidoscope of Ethno-National Diversity

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Hard-knock life: The true economy of sub-central Sri Lanka?

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Economy of the Conflict Region in Sri Lanka - From Embargo to Repression

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Economy of the Conflict Region in Sri Lanka - From Embargo to Repression

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A comprehensive paper outlining the situation of the economy across a broad range of factors, particularly resources, and the linkages between the adverse economy and adverse political agency in the conflict prone areas of Sri Lanka

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Not My Cup of Tea - Lange on Resources and the Associated Adversaries

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Not My Cup of Tea - Lange on Resources and the Associated Adversaries

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English Breakfast aside, there are problematic "Economic resources; that is, resources that are readily available and can be traded outside of the state for large fiscal gains. Such resources in particular for the Asian region include diamonds and narcotics. These become issues and negatively affect state building as they become incentives from non-state groups to control the trade and production of these resources and will almost always use extreme force to do so. On the other hand, the absolute lack of resources can also have adverse effects on a state’s effectiveness.. Large and very infrastructural powerful states are very expensive to run and organize, making the construction of an effective state a difficult job in a resource-scarce environment."

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"Dilmah, Ceylon's finest tea" - Merril Fernando

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Sankaran Krishna on Geographical Factors Versus the State and it's People

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Sankaran Krishna on Geographical Factors Versus the State and it's People

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"The presence of kindred ethnic minorities or groups across state borders is commonly cited as an important reason for their difficulties in state consolidation and minority integration."

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Sinhalese Vs Tamil - Difference and Comparison

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Sinhalese Vs Tamil - Difference and Comparison

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Touching on Hechter and Herbst, note the geography surrounding both ethnic groups and one can understand the crux of the Tamil Secessionist Movement

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Comparison chart

Sinhalese

Tamil

Geographical distribution

Sinhalese live in the Central, Western and Southern parts of Sri Lanka. It is alleged that in the late 20th century(and in 2002 during cease fire) , the LTTE drove out the Sinhalese population from North and East.

Tamils live in the State of Tamil Nadu in India, Northern and eastern region of Sri Lanka and as Diasporas all around the world.and 2/3 of Tamil population in Sri Lanka are living alongside with Sinhalese in south and central part of sri lanka

Religion

A majority of Sinhalese people adhere to Theravada Buddhism. There is also a Christian minority.

A majority of Tamils are Hindus with a significant minority practicing Christianity or Islam, and a small minority practicing Buddhism, Jainism and atheism.

Population

150 lakhs (15 million)

10 crore (100 million) people speak Tamil as their mother tongue. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil population is about 5 million or about 15% of the total population.

Language

Sinhalese people speak Sinhala.

Tamils speak Tamil.

Traditional Dress

The traditional dress of the Sinhalese people includes Sarong and Kandyan.

The traditional dress of Tamil Women is sari and men is Shirt and Dhoti.

Ancient History and origin

Sinhalese language and culture came from North India, probably Bengal as Mahavamsa says. But Hela ethnic groups were living on the island and are the aboriginal inhabitants.

It is unclear how the Tamils came to Sri Lanka. Some suggest that they came from Southern India, while others suggest that they descend from the ancient Yakkhas and Nagas of Sri Lanka. As a Dravidian language, Tamil descends from Proto-Dravidian.

Origins of Sinhalese and Tamil populations

Sinhalese people inhabit Sri Lanka and are the main ethnic group that make up about 74% of the total population of Sri Lanka. They are also referred to as the Hela, or Sinhala; the word Sinhala, meaning "lion people". According to popular mythology, the Sinhalese people are descendants from the followers of Prince Vijaya who served exile (from 543-483 BC) in Sri Lanka and hailed from a North Eastern Indian kingdom called Singhapur (Modern day Singhur, West Bengal). Genetic studies have shown that the origins of the Sinhalese people lie mainly in West Bengal and South India, with links also to native 'Hela' tribes.

Tamils are a minority group residing in Sri Lanka (the majority of Tamils actually live in India in the state of Tamil Nadu) who predominantly migrated to the island as traders or invaders from South Indian Chola kingdom. They settled in north and eastern parts of the Sri Lankan island. Most Sri-Lankan Tamils are descendants from Chola Kingdom.

Geographical Distribution of Tamils and Sinhalese

The Sinhalese occupy the Central, Western and Southern parts of the island. The majority of Tamils live in the Northern and Eastern Province and there is a Tamil and Sinhalese minority all over the island nation.

Political Strife for a separate Tamil state

The relation between the Sinhalese and Sri-Lankan Tamils has been strained since Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain in 1948, which ensued at the time when the nation's constitution was being drawn. The introduction of the Sinhala-only act in 1956 triggered riots in Sri Lanka. Further discrimination against the Tamil population in Sri Lanka in cultural, political, economic areas led to some Tamils harboring resentment against the Sinhalese groups and the Government.

Militant groups demanding independence for Tamils known as TNT and later as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed in 1972. Since then, many Sinhalese and Tamils have been caught in this conflict and killed. The start of the civil war is said to have been in the July of 1983 with a deadly attack by LTTE on the Sri Lankan army. Many peace talks failed between the government and LTTE. From 1983 till the end of the civil war in 2009, there continued many offensive attacks both by LTTE and the Sri Lankan army. Attack by suicide bombers had become a trademark of the LTTE. This war forced many Tamils to find new homes in other countries like Canada and Australia.

In 2009, the Sri Lankan government mounted a concerted effort to use armed forces to eliminate the LTTE and their terrorism. While they were successful, there have been several allegations of human rights abuses by the Sri Lankan government. The war also resulted in thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil civilians being killed or displaced from their homes and pushed into refugee camps in other regions. The rights of Tamils (refugees and otherwise) continues to be an important diplomatic issue the Sri Lankan government is dealing with.

Differences in Language

Sinhalese people speak Sinhala, an Indo-Aryan language also known as "Helabasa" and have two varieties, written and spoken. This language is influenced by Pali and Sanskrit. Tamils speak the language Tamil, which is a Dravidian language.

Differences in Religion

Sinhalese people follow the Buddhist Faith (Theravada School), which was introduced to them by Ashoka's son Mahinda during the 3rd century BC. Though the majority of Sinhalese are Buddhists, a significant number are also Christians, due to the Portuguese, Dutch and British influence on the island. Tamils are mostly Hindus, with a significant Christian population.

Cultural Differences

Sinhalese culture encompasses many rituals and tradition which are greatly influenced by Buddhist festivals. A majority of Sri Lankan Tamils follow Hindu customs and traditions similar to south Indian rituals.

Traditional Dress

The tradition dress for Sinhalese is sarong and Kandyan for more formal occasions. Men wear a shirt with sarong, and women wear a sari (called Osari). The traditional dress of Sri Lankan Tamils is the sari, worn with a blouse and petticoat.

References

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What's the difference between Sinhalese and Tamil? Sinhalese and Tamil races are the two predominant demographic divisions in Sri Lankan society. While there is a history of political strife between the two races, the Sri Lankan government defeated Tamil guerrillas in 2009 to stamp out the Tamil secessioni...

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Herbst on Geographical Factors Versus the State and it's People

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Herbst on Geographical Factors Versus the State and it's People

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"That human geography affects state structures and capacities, as certain environments and population distributions make it difficult for states to control their lands and peoples. As a consequence, it is not cost-effective to build state infrastructure throughout the territory that is capable all peoples and providing public goods, leaving large pockets of people outside the realm of state power."

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Hechter on Geographical Factors Versus the State and it's People

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Hechter on Geographical Factors Versus the State and it's People

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"Nationalist movements are recent phenomena and argues that their emergence is linked to the expansion of state with the capacity to interfere with social relations across wide swaths of territory."

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Geography in the scheme of Ethnicity, Economy and Territory

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What are the Linkages Between Violence in the Peripheral Regions and Political and Institutional Dynamics at the Center of Each Country: Sri Lanka  

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What are the Linkages Between Violence in the Peripheral Regions and Political and Institutional Dynamics at the Center of Each Country: Sri Lanka  

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By Callan Bice

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Categories of Flashpoints Within the State

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Categories of Flashpoints Within the State