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Despite rising financial pressures to supply weapons and provide public services in its territory, the KIO cancelled a major business deal in response to protests from local communities trying to protect their land and environment.

By Emily Fishbein, Hpan Ja Brang, Zau Myet Awng, and Jaw Tu Hkawng
This article was supported by the Pulitzer Center Rainforest Journalism Fund and is part of a about the coup's impact on natural resource economies in Kachin State.
On April 15, in response to public protests, the Kachin Independence Organization controversial plans to allow new rare earth mining in the eastern district of its territory, in Kachin State's Mansi Township.

KIO chairman, General N'Ban La, made the announcement to more than 1,500 people gathered from 10 villages at the organisation's eastern headquarters of Mai Ja Yang. The mining, he said, had been intended as a way to fund development projects and procure weapons for its war against the military junta. But after listening to the concerns of residents, who feared it would poison their water and destroy their land, the KIO decided against it.

The decision - made before the mining companies had broken ground - marked an abrupt U-turn by the KIO. It came after more than four months of escalating tensions, as a local protest movement gained the support of activists, civil society organisations and much of the Kachin public amid allegations that the KIO had attempted to intimidate and pressure communities into accepting the mining.

These factors collided over the rare earth mining issue. Eventually, the protest movement reached a scale and intensity that drew a response from the KIO which is likely unprecedented in the organisation's 62-year history, according to anthropologist Dr Laur Kiik, who studies the intersection of Kachin nationalism and environmental movements.

The protest movement, he said, reflects the culmination of more than two decades of environmental activism in Kachin, which after the coup, converged with a broader movement directed towards reforming the KIO.

"In my experience, many Kachin people criticise the KIO a lot because they support it; they want it to be better," Kiik said. "They criticise the KIO with love."

Tensions build

Three people involved in the protest movement highlighted a rocky road in the months leading up to the mining project's cancellation. They said communities rallied to protect their land and livelihoods, rejecting financial incentives and enduring intimidation which began shortly after the companies arrived in September last year to assess the soil.

When villagers gathered to discuss how to respond, Brang Nu* said they were interrogated in a way that they would have expected from junta soldiers, but not the KIO.

"They asked people things like what we discussed and who attended the meeting," he said.

On December 14, 10 villages near the planned mining sites in Mansi Township established a committee made up of 43 people, led by 10 Baptist and Catholic clergy. They prepared aletter stating that while they didn't oppose the KIO or its business activities in general, they requested that the KIO cancel the mining project to protect the environment and the people who lived there.

Copies were sent to the KIO's Man Maw (Bhamo) District office, its eastern regional headquarters of Mai Ja Yang and its main headquarters in Laiza. The committee received no direct reply, but locals were summoned to Man Maw on January 5.

Seng Du* recalled that a KIO official said the meeting wasn't meant to be a discussion, but to notify them that they should stop protesting against the mining and disband their committee. A similar message, he said, was relayed by a KIO official from Mai Ja Yang during a visit to Ding Sing Pa village on January 11. The official, he said, also told local people that the mining had been approved by the KIO's central committee.

Then on January 21, more than 50 people met 16 members of the KIO's central committee in Laiza, where Frontier's sources said they were told that the mining was necessary to fund the organisation's fight against the junta, but that it would only proceed with local consent.

Seng Du said that days after the Laiza meeting, the protest committee was informed that the project had been temporarily suspended. But on February 17, KIO officials from Man Maw and Mai Ja Yang visited Ding Sing Pa with a different message.

"They said that the testing and preparation were finished and they were definitely going to start mining," said Brang Nu. "They warned [us] locals that they would take serious action against anyone who stood against them or organised protests."

One woman, Lahtaw Roi, suffered a heart attack during the meeting and died on her way to the hospital. Further incensed, the protest committee sent new calling on the KIO to order a stop to all activities related to the mining and to shut down the workers' housing site by February 28, but received no reply.

On March 21, tensions boiled over. Hundreds of people marched on the housing site and repeated their demands, while calling on the two KIO officials and armed guards stationed there to join the protest movement, but received an unsatisfactory response. "They just told us to discuss it with the central office," said Seng Du. That evening, the protesters demolished the site.

"Even when we met at their headquarters, they didn't listen to us, so we realised that our government wasn't taking action in response to what we had been asking," said Brang Nu.

Global demand fuels an illicit industry

It found that Myanmar's rare earth mining industry is illicit, controlled by armed groups, and involves a complex web of local companies serving as fronts for Chinese investors. Through satellite imagery, it identified nearly 300 clusters of chemical leaching pools - the characteristic sign of rare earth mining - hugging Kachin's mountainous eastern border. Known as Special Region 1 and located in the Pangwa area of Chipwi Township, it is controlled by Zahkung Ting Ying's paramilitary Border Guard Force and connected militias.

While the KIO's involvement in the industry is much smaller, it has also permitted rare earth mining in its territory for the last 10 years, according to Dr Hkalen Tu Hkawng, Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation with the National Unity Government. He told Frontier that the KIO first allowed rare earth mining near Mai Ja Yang around a decade ago, but that after residents raised concerns, it relocated the sites to the N'Hkawng Pa and Gauri Krung mountain ranges, where mining continues today.

A Kachin man who began working at a mining site in the N'Hkawng Pa area in September last year described digging holes into mountains and flushing chemicals through them - a method known as in situ leaching - which is the more common rare earth mining practice in Myanmar.

"All the trees are dying. Some paddy fields are not fertile, and [rice] production has decreased. Some people mentioned that their livestock died near the mining area," said the worker, who is now working at a sugarcane farm, and is still considering whether or not to return to the mining job.

Mining operations in Kachin typically leave little paper or digital trail, and the recently cancelled rare earth project appears to be no exception.

Local sources told Frontier that in September last year, three companies came to conduct soil assessments in preparation for mining, two of which quickly left. They said the remaining company, Shwe Ka, employed Chinese-speaking Burmese and Wa workers.

Frontier was unable to confirm this information with Colonel Naw Bu of the KIO's information department, who said that he was not authorised to speak about the case. But in N'Ban La's speech on April 15, he said the cancelled deal had involved a "Wa armed group" - presumably a reference to the United Wa State Army, Myanmar's largest ethnic armed group.

The UWSA agreed to a ceasefire with the military in 1989, and the military officially recognised some of its territory in Shan State on the border with China. It also awarded the UWSA with business concessions, including in Kachin's lucrative jade mines, where it has since operated alongside the KIO and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army, as well as the military and other armed groups.

Mr Jason Tower, Myanmar country director at the United States Institute of Peace, told Frontier that the possible involvement of the UWSA in rare earth mining in KIO-controlled territory was not surprising, considering its access to capital and Chinese markets and its ties to Kachin's jade industry.

"For the Wa, business is business, and it is unlikely that they would try to leverage involvement in extractives in Kachin to advance political objectives," he said. "The much more significant factor here is the Chinese influence on the political positions of both the UWSA and the KIA."

A 2021 Global Witness on the link between Kachin's multibillion-dollar jade industry and armed conflict described the UWSA as a "key powerbroker" in the mines, and found that it sometimes used weapons to pay taxes to the KIO. The coup, said the report, threatened to further increase jade-linked conflict and corruption.

Ms Hanna Hindstrom, senior investigator at Global Witness, told Frontier that if the KIO had gone forward with the rare earth mining plans in its eastern district, it would have intensified conflict resource dynamics, poisoned the environment, and bred anger and distrust among communities.

"The KIO is undeniably in a difficult position - it is desperate for cash to fund its resistance against a brutal military junta and surging global demand for heavy rare earths offers a lucrative lifeline," she said. "But allowing shadowy entities to mine rare earths risks fuelling corruption, environmental devastation and human rights abuses in Kachin State, while contaminating international supply chains with conflict minerals."

"The rights of indigenous and local communities must not be sacrificed on the altar of democracy," she added.

The KIO backs down

In addition to the threats the mining would have posed to the environment, it also risked jeopardising the KIO's relationship with its key support base - the Kachin people. "They threatened us in many ways. They don't love their people anymore. They only want to protect the businessmen, the tycoons," said La Htoi,* a member of the protest committee, in early April.

By this time, the case had raised wider concerns. Awng Awng,* a young KIA soldier, told Frontier that he worried the situation would "become very intense" if the KIO could not reach a mutual understanding with the people.

Awng Awng also said that he wanted to see his leaders embody the ideals for which he was fighting."We joined the KIA not only to protect our people and our nation, but also to protect our natural resources and environment," he said.

Kachin activists were also worried. "The KIO/A has the responsibility to act in a way to satisfy the local people...[or] it will affect the public's view toward the Kachin revolution," said Sut Seng Htoi, a prominent Kachin activist and spokesperson for the Kachin State Civilian Movement.

On April 13, Kachin civil society organisations released a joint condemning the KIO for pressuring communities, and for failing to seek positive solutions to their concerns. It called on the KIO to cease all rare earth mining across the state, respect local voices and implement "sustainable resource-free systems".

Two days later, the KIO cancelled the project, and criticism and resentment quickly gave way to praise and relief.

"We are very happy and grateful," Kachin activist Khon Ja, one of the most outspoken critics of the mining, in a Facebook post hours after the cancellation was announced.

Nsang Gum San, spokesperson of the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team, told Frontier that the case was unique in that residents "believe the environmental cost of rare earth extraction could not be compensated by any financial incentive or profit sharing", and encouraged Kachin residents to continue raising awareness of environmental degradation, including in regime-occupied areas.

"This case highlights that dissent and freedom of expression are highly valued in KIO-controlled territories," he added. "Projects which were initially planned to operate could be overturned by locals' disapproval."

Sut Seng Htoi also celebrated the success of the protest movement and called on the Kachin public to continue to speak out against all forms of injustice. "I see it as a good impact that the KIO/A government will have to fix itself from now on when building Awm Dawm, the self-determination that we want," she said. "The government has to listen to the voice of the Kachin people."
Nu Nu Lusan contributed to this report
For Brang Nu, the KIO's reversal renewed his confidence in the organisation and its chairman. "We, the local people, came together to fight against the mining," he said. "Our leader didn't waste much time in deciding to halt the mining. He also said he supported the people's protests against it, for which we are very happy. We trust him again as the leader of our nation."

* Denotes use of a pseudonym to protect the source from possible reprisals

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How the Kachin public overturned a rare earth mining project in KIO territory

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By Emily Fishbein, Hpan Ja Brang, Zau Myet Awng, and Jaw Tu Hkawng This article was supported by the Pulitzer Center Rainforest Journalism Fund and is part of a about the coup's impact on natural resource economies in Kachin State.

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There are two questions, some would argue enigmas, at the center of Myanmar's ethnic and social crises: Why has the military, for decades the country's most powerful institution, failed to build a functioning nation state? And why have the soldiers remained so immensely loyal to their officers that they are willing to carry out the most horrendous atrocities against the civilian population, who obviously despise the dictatorship they are being forced to live under? Myanmar's civil wars are the world's longest-lasting, and there has never been any serious factional infighting among the officers, nor have the rank-and-file risen in mutiny against their tyrannical leadership. The answer can be seen at the parade ground in the capital Naypyitaw: three larger-than-life statues of the most prominent warrior kings in Burmese history, Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. On March 27, 2006-when Armed Forces Day was commemorated in the new capital for the first time, and the city's name, Naypyitaw, was announced to the public-then junta leader Senior General Than Shwe declared: "Our Tatmadaw [armed forces] should be a worthy heir to the traditions of the capable tatmadaws established by noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya."

Genuine democratic reforms have never been on the minds of the generals. They see themselves as successors to the pre-colonial warrior kings, a fact reflected in the name of the capital, which means "abode of kings" in old-fashioned usage. Than Shwe oversaw the construction of Naypyitaw, which is populated almost exclusively by military men and their families, associated government officials, and those serving them. But, as any serious study of Burmese history would reveal, while those warrior kings, whom today's military leaders see as role models, may have been excellent warriors and conquerors, they were very bad state builders. The empires they established were poorly organized and never lasted more than a couple of reigns under weaker successors. The kings lost their conquests because they established few administrative institutions-other than those responsible for tax collection-and depended solely on military might to control the people they had subjugated.

Anawratha became king of Pagan, then a small state on the banks of the Irrawaddy River, and founded the First Burmese Empire in 1057 when he conquered the Mon city-state of Thaton. As booty, he brought back 30,000 Mon prisoners of war, who were used by Anawratha and his successors to build temples and pagodas. The Burmans also adopted the Mon writing system, and the presence of the new Mon population brought the kingdom more firmly under the influence of Theravada Buddhism. It is generally assumed by historians that Pagan was ransacked by the Mongols in 1287, which led to the collapse of the First Burmese Empire. There is no doubt that wars were fought between the forces of the First Burmese Empire and the Mongols, but Pagan's temples don't show any serious damage that would be consistent with a destruction of the place. The damage to some of the temples could just as well have been caused by earthquakes-or general neglect and decay of whatever institutions existed at that time. By the 13th century, Pagan was an empire in decline, mainly caused by massive spending on the construction of temples and pagodas and very little actual nation-building.

A Second Burmese Empire was founded under the Toungoo Dynasty in 1531 and Bayinnaung, who reigned from 1551 to1581, was its most celebrated warrior king. He reigned from his palaces on the central plains of Pegu between 1551 and 1581 and conquered territories north of Pagan, parts of the Shan plateau in the east, and pushed as far east as Chiang Mai in northern Thailand and Vientiane in Laos. According to Czech Burma scholar Jan Becka: "He failed, however, to create an effective administration and the stability of his empire rested solely on military strength and allegiance to his person. The incessant military campaigns exhausted the country's human and material resources. On Bayinnaung's death, the people who were subjugated to his rule reasserted their independence." The Second Burmese Empire, with a new capital established at Ava (Inwa) in 1634, saw its ups and downs and began to fall apart due to increasing rivalries among the ruling elite.

An unnamed Englishman wrote around 1750 about an uprising in the province of Pegu against the Court of Ava: "People are chusing to live among the Wild Beasts, than be at the Mercy of the cruel and tyrannical Government, which at present has a King, without any experience, and intirely ruled by Ministers, without any other knowledge but a bare private Interest, which makes the Country in general wish for change, because every petty Governor of Towns or Cities, if he can but satisfy the Minister at Court, can at his pleasure oppress the people under him, without any fear of punishment, which has caused the Revolt of the richest and largest Province of this Kingdom [Pegu], who for this last 10 years has baffled all attempts that have been made by all the King's forces to bring them again under Subjection; having at present no hopes to accomplish it, being quite disheartened by their continual losses, which are wholely owing to the bad Government all over the Kingdom." Although this was written in the 18th century and Ava was sacked in 1752 by ethnic Mon rebels, the account strikingly resembles today's Myanmar. Little has changed since the days of the old warrior kings. The only differences are that the current revolt is not confined to "the richest and largest province" but nationwide, and now there are "hopes to accomplish" the overthrow of the present despotic order.

The last version of the Second Burmese Empire finally collapsed after the fall of Ava, and a Third Burmese Empire ruled by the Konbaung Dynasty was established by Alaungpaya in 1755. He launched wars against the Mons and recaptured and completely destroyed Pegu in 1757. Dr. Than Tun, one of Burma's foremost historians, writes in his study A Modern History of Myanmar 1752-1948: "Most of the buildings [in Pegu] were set on fire. Many fled to Chiang Mai and Thailand. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives during the fightings." Alaungpaya's son Hsinbyushin then sacked the Thai capital of Ayutthaya in 1767, a deed for which the Thais have never forgiven the Burmese. At the same time, he fought the Chinese and his decision to fight two simultaneous wars-against the Chinese and the Siamese-forced him to withdraw from Siam. The Konbaung kings were eventually defeated by the British in the the Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824-1826, 1852-1853 and 1885. Developments before the first of those wars have been described by Dr. Than Tun: "He [the then king Bagyidaw, also known as the Sagaing Min] inherited a large empire and it was left to him to consolidate it and give the people good administration. But he hopelessly failed in this." Bagyidaw, Dr. Than Tun writes, lived on the glory of past empires and "was not able to understand the strength of the English power."

It was not until Mindon became king in 1853 that Burma saw some meaningful reforms. A new revenue system was implemented, industry and commerce were encouraged, and reforms were introduced to make the armed forces more disciplined and professional. Under his reign, a newspaper called Yadana-bon Nay-pyi-daw was published in the new capital of Mandalay. Mindon, an enlightened monarch, even enacted Southeast Asia's first indigenous press freedom law. But it was too late. Mindon died in 1878 and in 1885 his successor Thibaw was led away by the British in front of a mourning and wailing crowd, who had gathered to say farewell to the last monarch of an independent Burmese state. Thibaw was sent with his once-powerful wife Supayalat and their children into exile in Ratanagiri in India, where he died in 1916.

Most empires and kingdoms in ancient Burma were actually chaotically run by rulers who thrived on suppression, and had their resources depleted by costly military campaigns or, as Dr. Than Tun puts it: "The theory of Myanma [Burmese] Kingship was quite different from the Divine Right Theory of Kingship in Europe. In Myanma the claim to rule was through conquest." There might have been a strong center at the court of the kings, but the further away one got from that center, the weaker the administration became. The chaotic nature of the Burmese empires and kingdoms has been thoroughly described and analysed in Victor Lieberman's Burmese Administrative Circles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-1760.

The myth of a strong Burmese state has most prominently been disseminated by Robert Taylor, a British-American academic whose main work is appropriately called The State in Burma, the first edition of which was published in 1987. Taylor's main aim in the book appeared to be to prove a thesis fostered by him and some other Western academics: Traditionally, Burma has been an authoritarian state with a strong center, gradually expanding its authority over the minority-inhabited, peripheral areas in an inevitable process of integration and assimilation of the non-Burman nationalities. Consequently, the 19th- and 20th-century liberalism of the British colonial era, and its extension after independence in 1948, was little more than a brief, alien interlude in the country's history. Following the military coup d'état in 1962, the country "reasserted" the continuity the colonialists and the liberals had upset-hence the title of the book's last chapter: "Reasserting the State 1962-1987." The then dictator General Ne Win, Taylor wrote, emanated some kind of "benevolence". The book had hardly been published before the country erupted in one of the most massive anti-government manifestations in modern Asian history. In August and September 1988-as in 2021-tens of millions of people took to the streets to demonstrate against a repressive regime that had kept them in a choking grip for more than two decades. Taylor's notion of Ne Win being "benevolent" was brutally crushed when his army fired indiscriminately on largely unarmed protesters, killing thousands of men, women and children. A slightly sanitized version of Taylor's book, now called The State in Myanmar, was published in 2009.

Nevertheless, and despite lots of subsequent events that would contradict what Taylor wrote, his theories have led to a belief among certain likeminded Western scholars that only the military is capable of preserving that "strong state." That fiction was expressed by Marie Lall, a London-based academic, in a virtual conversation with the UN University in Tokyo on Feb. 19, 2021: "We have to understand that the Tatmadaw is the glue of the nation" and "is very much perceived by a lot of people as the stalwarts to keep Burma together." Lall made this astonishing comment less than three weeks after the coup-when tens of millions of people in virtually every city, town and major village across the country were demonstrating against the military takeover. So who precisely would "a lot of people" be? Certainly not the vast majority of the people of Myanmar. Lall is also the author of a book titled Understanding Reform in Myanmar: People and Society in the Wake of Military Rule. In the wake of? The military remained the country's most powerful institution even during the decade of relative openness, 2011 to 2021. A longtime observer of the political scene in Myanmar commented after listening to Lall's online claptrap and having read her book: "Her overly optimistic assessments in the early phases of 'reform' were not vindicated by subsequent events, and her failure to understand deep systemic military interests and abusive behavior limited her outlook."

And it is often forgotten that the army Ne Win created is a far cry from Aung San's army of the 1940s. Of the legendary Thirty Comrades who went to Japan for military training before the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942, two-Bo La Yaung and Bo Taya-commanded the People's Volunteer Organization rebellion after independence. Three-Bo Zeya, Bo Ye Htut and Bo Yan Aung-joined the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)-led insurrection when it broke out at about the same time. Of the Thirty Comrades, only Kyaw Zaw, Ne Win and Bo Bala remained in the army in the 1950s. Four of the others-Bo Let Ya, Bo Yan Naing, Bohmu Aung and Bo Setkya-rallied behind the right-wing resistance, which former Prime Minister U Nu organized on the Thai border in the 1950s. And in 1976, Kyaw Zaw, once the most popular commander in the army who had been pushed out by Ne Win in 1957, went underground and joined the CPB. On Sept. 6, 1988, nine of the 11 surviving Thirty Comrades denounced Ne Win and called on the army to join the pro-democracy uprising of that year. Only Kyaw Zaw, who then was still with the CPB, was unable to join the appeal, but, later, he also expressed his support for the pro-democracy movement.

The power base of the military regime that seized power in 1962 was actually a very narrow one. It consisted mainly of officers from Ne Win's old regiment, the 4th Burma Rifles, and nearly all officers who became prominent after the coup came from this particular unit. When the first junta, the so-called Revolutionary Council, was set up in 1962, it was popularly referred to as "the Fourth Burifs Government." What Ne Win established when he had gained control of the armed forces was not a modern, professional force but one that works and functions in a way that could best be described as feudal and deeply rooted in the authoritarian values of the old warrior kings. The king-and now the military dictator-is God and as such he demands and rewards loyalty. He disowns and punishes those who dare to be different, hence the blind loyalty of his soldiers.

The other side of Myanmar's heritage is represented by a solid intellectual and creative tradition. The yearly cycle in any Burmese village traditionally includes a number of pwes, which is usually translated into English as "fairs", but they are actually much more than that. Every pwe worth mentioning includes a theatrical performance and there are few people in the world who are so fond of culture and drama as the Burmese. Sir J.G. Scott, a Scotsman who wrote about Burma under the pseudonym Shway Yoe in 19th century, aptly said that "probably there is no man, otherwise than a cripple, in the country who has not at some period of his life been himself an actor, either in the drama or in a marionette show; if not in either of these, certainly in a chorus dance."

Burma has always had a high literacy rate and education has been a source of national pride since pre-colonial days. At a young age, every Burmese boy was sent to a local monastery to learn to read, write and memorize Buddhist chants and Pali formulas used in pagoda worship. For girls, education was less universal but even so, the census for British Burma in 1872 stated that "female education was a fact in Burma before Oxford was founded." The long and strong tradition of widespread literacy was further enhanced with the introduction of British-style education during the colonial era. Needless to say, the colonial authorities were mainly interested in procuring a stratum of English-speaking civil servants for the administration and skilled clerks for foreign companies, but the inevitable result was also an abundance of bookshops and newspapers. The movie industry flourished and cinemas sprung up all over the country. The highly creative Burmese psyche also became increasingly politicized, which led to an active independence movement. After freedom from colonial rule had been achieved in 1948, Burma had 21 newspapers in Burmese, seven in English, five in Chinese, two in Hindi, and one each in Gujarati, Urdu, Tamil and Telugu. Ne Win's 1962 coup put an end to those freedoms and did not "reassert" anything but a return to an old despotic order that most Burmese thought belonged to ancient history. The period of relative openness during the decade after 2011 saw a return of a vibrant press, active political parties and an abundance of non-governmental organizations.

That brief period of relative freedom also came to end and when Min Aung Hlaing staged his politically, economically and socially disastrous coup in February two years ago, and the feudal, warrior-king mentality of crush-and-subdue remains the guiding principle of the generals. And now, according to a leaked letter dated Feb. 17 and made public by the Democratic Voice of Burma, the regime states it would take action against private schools in Burma teaching what it says is "western democratic culture." More precisely, what Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts-with promises of elections this year or next-call "Myanmar-style democracy" is just another name for a dictatorship that can only push Myanmar further into the abyss. The military is no "glue of the nation", and what Burma's various nationalities need are strong civil society organizations built on their own, creative traditions. Not a return to the middle ages and the worship of some old belligerent rulers who oppressed their own people and waged senseless wars against the neighbors of their respective kingdoms.

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Guest Column | Myanmar's Ruling Generals Trapped in Warrior King Mentality

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There are two questions, some would argue enigmas, at the center of Myanmar's ethnic and social crises: Why has the military, for decades the country's most powerful institution, failed to build a functioning nation state?

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Religious and Psychosocial Support for Displaced Trauma Survivors

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Since Spring 2021 The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) is identifying best practices in psychosocial support to better facilitate collaboration and cooperation between religious actors and mental health professionals who provide services to conflict-affected communities — including trauma-affected dis…

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discusses food weaponization and how the state of food production in post-coup Myanmar is leading to domestic hunger and undermining the regional food basket.

The global problem of conflict and food insecurity

Conflict and food insecurity are intertwined: when one takes place, the other one usually follows. Several economic, environmental, political, or religious factors underlie armed conflicts. Every armed conflict bears tremendous human and environmental costs, but disruptions to food production and supply are often felt most immediately, with significant repercussions and flow-on effects. It is common that conflict-affected populations experience persistent hung e r in the post-conflict setting as it takes time to reconstruct basic infrastructures, such as irrigation systems, roads, and marketplaces needed for the agricultural sector to operate.

When a civil war sparks between two or more warring parties, it has direct and indirect impacts on food and economic insecurity as well as environmental destruction. In Myanmar, opposing nationalisms, a fight for self-determination, and struggles over ethnic identity prolonged a civil war. The government brought to power by a military coup was characterized by its corrupt ruling regime, a lack of power-sharing, centralized political administration, and an ineffective constitution-all factors leading to the emergence of a civil war. The dominant warring party, the Myanmar military (Sit-Tat/Tatmadaw) seized land and controlled food to weaken opposition forces, especially culturally and politically marginalized groups. Deploying 'scorched earth' tactics are deliberately used in such wars. In a conflict state such as Myanmar, the sharp decline in food production is a result of the destruction of rural infrastructure, loss of livestock, deforestation, and the use of landmines and displacement. Consequently, countries heavily reliant on food exports from Myanmar are most vulnerable to this impact.

Introduction to Myanmar and the February 2021 Coup

Myanmar, a resource-rich and ethnically diverse country, has one of the longest civil wars in the world. Many ethnic groups have been fighting for self-determination since independence in 1948. The country experienced several military coups and was under authoritarian regimes. In 2010, it embarked on a political transition where a series of reforms were launched under a quasi-civilian government. In 2016, Myanmar had its first civilian government. Unfortunately, those days were short-lived and followed by a military coup took place in February 2021.

Myanmar is an agricultural-based country. The sector employs 70% of the rural population, and farmers play an important role in state-making. Their livelihoods, similarly, are the engine driving growth for rural development. Myanmar is also a major food supplier for neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, Bangladesh and India.

There has been considerable resistance to Myanmar's military in the months since the coup. Civilians took to the street in mass protests and stopped using government facilities and services. Schools were shut down, and government servants joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Boycotts were implemented against the military and military-back businesses. The international community also imposed targeted sanctions in response to the coup. Following a series of events, the economic, health, and financial sectors came close to collapse and unemployment surged. Myanmar's youth or 'Generation Z' took up arms and established the People's Defense Force (PDF) to uproot the junta regime.

This article discusses how the junta weaponizes food to weaken pro-democracy forces, deploying 'scorched earth' tactics to cause a sharp decline in food production, resulting in local starvation and threatening the regional food supply system. First, I explore the food supply chain mechanism in Myanmar. I highlight how policies related to food are developed in favour of generating government revenue, and at the expense of farmers' welfare. Second, the article discusses the impact of the current country-wide conflict on hunger, specifically the way the junta uses food as a weapon against its opposition. Third, it looks at the state of food production in Myanmar and its impact on regional food security. I conclude by sharing some thoughts on how regional partners should hold the State Administration Council (SAC) accountable for atrocities committed.

Food supply chain mechanisms and the state in Myanmar

Myanmar's food supply system has always been tightly controlled by the state. Land and agricultural policies have long determined farmers' welfare and food accessibility. Burma's first military coup in 1962, led by Ne Win, introduced the ' Burmese Way to Socialism.' Under the socialist system, farmers were forced to sell their farm products at low government-set prices as the government wanted to gain foreign exchange reserves through rice exports. As a result, farmers could not boost productivity, let alone scrape by for their own survival. This form of political intervention pushed them to sell rice on the black market. As food prices skyrocketed, village populations fell into extreme poverty. Due to the miscalculated economic strategy of the Ne Win government, Myanmar encountered economic stagnation and landed in the Least Developed Country list by 1987. The food crisis contributed to an uprising in 1988-this mass protest was brutally cracked down by General Than Shwe, the then-leader of the State Peace Development Council (SPDC).

The SPDC introduced the " Burmese Way to Capitalism" to recover the economy. Under this system, farmers were forced to take credit, which they paid back in the form of fixed portions of rice. This system ultimately trapped farmers in cycles of debt. Consequently, there was a sharp decline in purchasing power. People in hilly regions, such as Bago Yoma range, Shan Plateau and Arakan Yoma range, suffered the most as they had no alternative livelihoods. The State continued to control the food supply system, which suffered from major deficiencies in the distribution of food and further exacerbated political instability.

Ethnic conflict and oppression smouldered for years in various parts of the country. Fast forward to 2010, with a vision to hold nationwide ceasefire talks, the military-backed quasi-civilian government introduced a series of reforms, including the controversial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) law. Many farmlands were officially seized under the pro-business FDI law. Against a backdrop of a decades-long civil war and lack of concrete political settlements with ethnic groups, many issues remained unsolved under the 2016 elected government.

When the coup took place in February 2021, in a speech delivered in January 2022 by SAC Chairman Min Aung Hlaing, the idea of exporting rice to earn foreign income was once again put on the table. He impressed that "efforts must be made to achieve success in the yield of 100 baskets of paddy per acre. If so, paddy rice can be exported to earn foreign income. Local farmers will have increased income which will contribute to the better local circulation of money."

Drawing on examples from Myanmar's history of state policies and practices in the food and agricultural sector, it's clear that military regimes of the past have prioritized generating foreign income from the sale of rice and other agricultural products to serve their own profits, rather than fostering the welfare of people and farmers. Deploying a centralized approach to control the food supply chain, the military regime is positioning itself to further weaponize food against its opponents and ordinary citizens in a bid to remain in power.

The impact of conflict on hunger and the junta's use of hunger as a weapon

The coup has threatened food security in urban and peripheral areas, albeit in different ways. The combination of inflation, skyrocketing food prices and Covid-19 threatens access to quality food for most urban and rural populations. In urban areas, food insecurity and the rising unemployment rate has also contributed to rising criminal activity. As the prices of commodities increased sharply, the SAC has allowed trade associations to sell subsidised cooking oil in urban areas like Yangon. The urban poor line up for long hours to buy supplies at a lower price. The military has forced people to struggle for survival, so much so that they do not have time to deal with politics.

In rural areas, organized crime committed by the military includes destroying crops, stealing livestock and confiscating civilian property to weaken revolutionary resistance. International emergency food providers are not permitted to reach the most vulnerable displaced populations. Moreover, the State Administration Council (SAC) has started to block transportation routes (e.g., to Rakhine, Chin, Magwe, Sagaing and Thanintharyi) where there is ongoing intense fighting and local people are experiencing a severe shortage of food supplies.

This is not the first time the junta has weaponized food to serve themselves. The notorious ' Four Cuts' policy was introduced in the 1960s to fight against the Communist Party of Burma (CBP) and Karen National Union (KNU). This policy cut off food supplies to ethnic armed groups, along with funds, news, and new recruits. Local people living in ethnic areas fighting for self-determination have borne the brunt of this policy, resulting in high mortality rates during the 'Four Cuts' campaign.

This pattern of starvation continues to persist. In 2008, in order not to let the world see the regime's preparation for a national referendum, the banned most international relief efforts from entering the country when Cyclone Nargis left a trail of devastation in its wake. The cyclone wiped out food reserves, and as the authorities failed to provide for survivors, the death toll reached an astounding 140,000 people. In 2017, the Tatmadaw cut off food supplies to conflict-affected marginalized Rohingya communities. This was carried out by the state with the intention to starve particular ethnic groups, and under the Rome Statutes of the International Criminal Court, it is considered a 'crime against humanity' and an act of genocide.

According to data for Myanmar (D4M) from 25 August 2022, a total of 28,434 houses were burned down by the military junta. A majority of casualties are located in Sagaing and Magway -both important hubs for the production of pulses and other food crops. The impact of this attack, once again, drove a sharp decline in production. These atrocities displaced farmers and transformed paddy fields into battlefields. As armed conflict breaks out across the country, there is no doubt that the whole supply chain has been severely disrupted.

Impacts of the conflict on regional food security

Food trade patterns directly correlate to the domestic food supply in various export countries. As Myanmar is a major exporter of rice to China and dried leguminous vegetables (DLV) to India, disruptions in trade also threaten those who rely on its supply to meet domestic consumption. The India-Myanmar border trade was supposed to resume after two years of Covid-19 restrictions, with many traders welcoming the opening of the border as it reduced smuggling activities in the borderlands. However, traders face great security concerns over trade routes as fighting intensifies in Myanmar's border regions (such as Sagaing, where Kalay and Tamu towns are located). People fear that if the border opening is put off till 2023, this will have a negative impact on essential food supplies in India. Due to a lack of transparency and accountability during oppressive military regimes in the past, the data for exports of goods and services from Myanmar has remained undocumented. According to food trade data available from 2000 onwards, there has been a steady increase in demand for food products from Myanmar destined for China, Cambodia, India, Thailand, and other countries. It is important to note that the credibility of the data is hard to assess since it has been managed by different government administrations over the years.

How regional partners should hold SAC accountable for atrocities

Historical and contemporary examples from Myanmar demonstrate that various military regimes have consistently weaponized food to achieve their political agendas. Today, the junta continues to overlook the food insecurity challenges civilians face in the country. Controlling the profits of rice exports, the regime prioritizes generating foreign income to consolidate its own power. There is another way to interpret the trade deals between the junta and neighbouring countries: the junta is attempting to develop a niche market and control larger supply chains, thereby forging cooperation with like-minded allies to gain support and legitimacy.

If regional counterparts are serious about addressing the rapid onset of food insecurity, they must acknowledge the root causes of today's political crisis. Prolonged hostilities not only drive domestic hunger but also undermine regional food security, especially in countries reliant upon Myanmar's agricultural products. Therefore, regional counterparts should make all possible efforts to restore basic human rights and stability in Myanmar and enhance collaboration with governments that are finding ways to end the vicious cycle of hunger and war.

Yu Yu Htay is a development practitioner from Burma with experience in IDPs' issues, public health, food security and livelihood, and transboundary water governance. She holds MSc. Violence, Conflict, and Development from SOAS, University of London.

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Myanmar Food Security Threatens Regional Stability

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discusses food weaponization and how the state of food production in post-coup Myanmar is leading to domestic hunger and undermining the regional food basket. Conflict and food insecurity are intertwined: when one takes place, the other one usually follows. Several economic, environmental, political, or religious factors underlie armed conflicts.

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KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia

1 February 2021 started like any other day for Sayadaw U Yaw Gyi, a Buddhist monk and monastic teacher living in Myanmar's Irrawaddy region. He woke up at 4am, went out to collect alms, and returned to his monastery at 5am. Only then did he check Facebook and learn that the military had staged a coup. The internet and phone line were cut off soon after. By 8am, the coup was confirmed by a state TV broadcast announcing the military had seized power. "When I heard the news, my mind was not on teaching anymore," he said.

Like many people swept up in Myanmar's pro-democracy movement, the 32-year-old was not interested in politics before the coup. But days later, he joined people around the country in what became a nightly ritual of banging pots and pans to symbolically drive out evil. Within a week, U Yaw began leading protests in Kyangin, a town on the Irrawaddy river.

This is no easy thing. The junta has responded to any resistance to its power with deadly force. In the 21 months since the coup, the military has killed more than 2,370 people (including five monks) and arrested almost 16,000 people (including 61 monks) in its crackdowns on the pro-democracy movement, according to the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, a rights group that has been compiling data on the protests. But U Yaw still believes in the power of nonviolent protest to motivate the people. "[I want] to make people think, 'Even these monks continue protesting, why aren't we?'" he said.

In death valley

U Yaw described numerous close calls with military forces and police since last March, when he was charged under Section 505A of Myanmar's Penal Code. The law, which criminalises "causing fear" or "spreading false news" or "incitement", was used against nearly 4,000 people in the year after the coup alone, according to the Free Expression Myanmar rights group.

But the military didn't only go after him through legal channels. As it scaled up its crackdowns in March 2021, some 60 soldiers and police raided his monastery at night. He hid in the toilet and overheard soldiers saying they would "clear him [out]" by shooting him to death if they caught him. "I curled up in the small open corner for about an hour," U Yaw told The New Humanitarian. "I was reciting Buddhist prayers, but I recited them wrong many times because I was scared."

Life on the run

In April 2021, U Yaw moved to Mandalay and joined the Mandalay Sangha Union, which has been active in the nonviolent protest movement despite facing numerous crackdowns, some of them violent. On several occasions, U Yaw has witnessed military forces accelerate vehicles into crowds of protesters, including monks, sometimes hitting them.

In such cases, he has to run for his life and take cover wherever he can - sometimes in the homes of people who have opened their doors at risk to their own lives. "I still have to wear a Buddhist monk robe even when I protest. Because of its bright colour, it is so easy to spot me in the crowd," he said. "Because of kind people like that, I could escape from life-threatening danger."

Under heavy surveillance

The military's lethal crackdowns on peaceful demonstrators and use of intense surveillance to monitor anti-coup movements has led to a sharp decrease of protests since April 2021, and the situation is only getting worse. "Currently, in Mandalay, it is dangerous to strike... CCTV cameras are everywhere," said U Yaw. "We mostly protest in the wet markets, but [the military] planted plainclothes personnel around there too."

Power of solidarity

Monks have historically held a revered social status in predominantly-Buddhist Myanmar. They have also played a prominent role in the country's struggle for democracy, most notably in 1988, when the country erupted into protests, and in 2007, when thousands of monks refused to accept alms from the junta and led demonstrations that became known as the "Saffron Revolution". The military violently suppressed both uprisings, and numerous monks were among the thousands of people jailed or killed.

But the past decade has also seen a schism among Buddhist monks, with large segments swept up in an ultranationalist movement promoting Islam as a threat to Myanmar's Buddhist identity. Since the coup, some monks have given religious blessings to the regime and even participated in pro-junta militias. That said, and despite this division, people from different backgrounds have joined in powerful solidarity since the coup.

In May 2021, U Yaw had to run for his life when the junta forces accelerated their vehicles into a crowd of protesters, hitting two monks. The monk and some fellow protesters took shelter in a mosque. "They gave us their clothes, including kufi hats, so that we could escape from the crackdown," he said. "I will always remember that."

A narrow escape

U Yaw again narrowly escaped junta forces during a May 2021 protest in Inn Wa, an ancient city on the outskirts of Mandalay. To throw soldiers off their trail, the protest group pretended to be pilgrims, but as soon as they started chanting protest slogans, soldiers opened fire, sending the monks running.

First, they hid in a banana field. "Some monks lost their shoes while they were running. One monk even urinated because he was so scared," said U Yaw. "We heard soldiers screaming to 'kill all those monks'. We were hiding in the banana plantations and they were shooting continuously. They were shouting, 'Drop all of your weapons'. And I was thinking, 'What weapon should we drop?'"

With soldiers approaching, the monks made a dash for the banks of the Irrawaddy river. Not daring to make a sound, they waved their robes to summon a boat to ferry them across. "We would rather die drowning in the Irrawaddy River than getting arrested," said U Yaw. They crammed 10 monks into one boat, bailing out water with a small mug to keep it from sinking. They safely made it across and U Yaw soon resumed protesting.

Everything is a target

While the military has a history of destroying churches and mosques, it has also targeted monasteries since the coup, accusing them of sheltering those associated with the anti-coup movement or who have been displaced by military attacks. U Yaw has had to flee several monasteries due to military raids.

On 28 September 2021, one such raid interrupted vassa, a three-month period of intensive meditation for Theravada Buddhism practitioners. When a large convoy of soldiers arrived at U Yaw's monastery, he had to jump over its perimeter and cross a waist-deep pond to avoid being arrested. "Half of my body was covered in mud. I ran past a railway track. People there were looking at me, but I escaped," he said. Since then, soldiers have been actively looking for U Yaw. When they couldn't find him, they sealed the monastery in February 2022 and forced all its monks to evacuate. "This monastery was sealed because of me - because I had been allowed to stay there," U Yaw said.

Hoping for a better Myanmar

Despite the immense danger and high surveillance, U Yaw is still staging guerrilla "flash mob" protests along with his fellow monks as well as laypeople. Due to the military's consistent use of lethal force on the nonviolent protest movement, flash mob protests in which smaller groups run quickly through the streets before dispersing have become popular in Myanmar since April 2021, but even these have been met with deadly crackdowns.

Still, after 20 months of continuous protesting, U Yaw looks forward to the day when he can resume his monastic life. "When we win this revolution, I am not going to be involved in any political movement. I will meditate and teach," he said.

Despite more and more of his fellow protesters being arrested, injured, or even killed by junta forces, U Yaw remains determined to continue resisting nonviolently until peace and democracy are achieved: "I will protest until we win."
Nu Nu Lusan reported from Kuala Lumpur. JC, who prefers to work anonymously for security reasons, created the illustrations in CAEN, France. Edited by Emily Fishbein in Bangkok, Thailand.

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KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia 1 February 2021 started like any other day for Sayadaw U Yaw Gyi, a Buddhist monk and monastic teacher living in Myanmar's Irrawaddy region. He woke up at 4am, went out to collect alms, and returned to his monastery at 5am.

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According to a UN Humanitarian Needs Overview published on Friday by OCHA, the turmoil is projected to have driven almost half the population into poverty heading into 2022, wiping out the impressive gains made since 2005.

The situation has been worsening since the beginning of the year, when the military took over the country, ousting the democratically elected Government. It is now estimated that 14 out of 15 states and regions are within the critical threshold for acute malnutrition.

For the next year, the analysis projects that 14.4 million people will need aid in some form, approximately a quarter of the population. The number includes 6.9 million men, 7.5 million women, and five million children.

Reasons

Price hikes, COVID-19 movement restrictions and ongoing insecurity have forced the most vulnerable people to emergency strategies to buy food and other basic supplies.

Prices for key household commodities have risen significantly, making some food items unaffordable. At the same time, farming incomes have been affected by lower prices for some crops, higher input prices, and limited access to credit.

Monsoon floods in July and August have also affected more than 120,000 people, resulting in crop losses and contributing to food insecurity.

For 2022, the humanitarian affairs office OCHA, says the outlook "remains dire".

The political and security situation is "expected to remain volatile" and a fourth wave of COVID-19, due to relatively low vaccination rates and the emergence of new variants, is considered a rising risk.

Prices are only expected to decrease marginally, while farm gate prices will likely remain low. As a result, consumer prices are projected to be higher, with incomes continuing to decrease.

Other threats

According to OCHA, the " unrelenting stress on communities is having an undeniable impact on the physical and mental health of the nation, particularly the psychological well-being of children and young people."

The risk and incidence of human trafficking, already on the rise in 2021, is expected to further escalate.

In areas affected by conflict, entire communities, including children, are being displaced, increasing the risks for girls and boys to be killed, injured, trafficked, recruited and used in armed conflict.

In 2020 and 2021, learning was disrupted for almost 12 million children, nearly all the school-aged population, and even though schools had began to reopen, the prospect of a full return to classroom education remains slim for many.

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People of Myanmar face 'unprecedented' crisis in 2022

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According to a UN Humanitarian Needs Overview published on Friday by OCHA, the turmoil is projected to have driven almost half the population into poverty heading into 2022, wiping out the impressive gains made since 2005. The situation has been worsening since the beginning of the year, when the military took over the country, ousting the democratically elected Government.

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A soldier at a military checkpoint along the Sai River, which borders Myanmar, in Mae Sai, Thailand, May 9, 2012. (Giulio Di Sturco/International Herald Tribune)

Shocking news reports since July have uncovered the emergence of vastly increased criminal activity in remote areas of Myanmar, where the country's military regime reaps profits from international scams. Lawless enclaves have also emerged in Cambodia and Laos. Crime networks in Cambodia alone have lured an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people into slave-like conditions beyond the reach of law enforcement. In Myanmar, the number could be two to three times higher.

The victims' stories all have a similar ring: A Kenyan national responded to a Facebook ad for a high-paying job in Thailand and was tricked into illegally crossing the border to a scam zone in Myanmar; a Malaysian man began a romantic relationship through social media and, after a single meeting, wound up trafficked into Myanmar; a group of Indian tech workers responding to advertisements for lucrative information technology jobs in Cambodia were trafficked to a remote part of that country. Once in the zones, the victims are given three choices: staff online scams, pay ransom or face physical and psychological torture.

Fueling the Growth of Organized Crime

Two related regional trends are behind the rise of this new form of violent crime.

First, in years before the pandemic, corrupt governing elites in the affected countries ignored and sometimes even promoted development of unregulated areas. Billed as "special economic zones" by the developers, they were meant to house online gambling operations established by Chinese triad groups. Billions of dollars in capital poured into the zones on the assumption they would lure millions of Chinese gamblers, tourists and workers to capture shares of the $ 145 billion a year market in China for illegal online gaming.

Then came COVID. Suddenly, the business plan for huge gambling centers collapsed. Lockdowns and strict border controls meant Chinese workers and gamblers could no longer travel freely to Myanmar and elsewhere. The criminal gangs' need for new sources of revenue and labor intensified exponentially.

Second, in 2021 China initiated an unprecedented campaign to force many of its nationals in Southeast Asia to return home or face strict penalties. In response, the gangs began large-scale trafficking of alternative labor into the zones and developing new tools for international investment or crypto-currency-fraud schemes that rely on large numbers of scammers building personal contacts with potential victims on social media.

At the same time, the global pandemic knee-capped the efforts of media, law enforcement and civil society to monitor, expose and curb these activities. The remote locations of the enclaves carved out by Chinese mafia groups offered a safe space for expanded operations, their impunity reinforced by corrupt relationships involving police, local officials, overseas Chinese associations and Chinese government and party organizations.

Researchers and law enforcement are just beginning to recognize the scale of the problem and the criminal networks' growing influence in weak, corrupt states such as Laos and Cambodia. Post-coup Myanmar, where the army is at war with its people over its attempt to restore a military dictatorship, is in a league of its own.

Southeast Asia's Special Criminal Zones

The criminally run enclaves began systematic subversion of state sovereignty in Southeast Asia in the late 2000s. While occasional enforcement did occur - such as Cambodia's move against criminal gambling operations in 2019 - it only led Chinese gangs to expand across jurisdictions. For example, despite Cambodia's crackdown making little headway, the triads decided to hedge their bets with another base in Myanmar.

One of the region's largest and most sophisticated operations is the notorious Shwe Kokko Yatai New City Project, which its developers billed from 2017 to 2020 by as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Myanmar's National League for Democracy (NLD) government successfully disrupted construction of the Shwe Kokko project by challenging the Chinese government on the developers claims that it represented part of the BRI. China publicly distanced itself from the crime city in late 2020 after a Chinese news report exposed the criminal history of one of the key investors - She Zhijiang - a fugitive from Chinese law enforcement long involved in illegal online gambling in the Philippines and Cambodia. In the wake of that disclosure and the NLD government's actions, Thailand shut off the power and telecommunications services to Shwe Kokko, bringing the illicit activity there to a standstill before 2021.

Myanmar Coup Opens the Floodgates

Then, on February 1, 2021, Myanmar's military overthrew the country's civilian government. The criminal enterprises and their Burmese safe zones got a new lease on life - including restoration of Thai electricity and internet two weeks later.

Between February and March 2022, as the pandemic raged across the region, construction of new enclaves exploded along a 40 kilometer stretch of the Moei River. USIP has so far identified 15 distinct criminal zones in the area.

By late December 2021 the extent of malign activity in the enclaves began to seep out with social media reports of Malaysian nationals being trafficked into the zones and held hostage. Most of the victims had responded to social media ads promising lucrative office jobs in Thailand. After arriving in Thailand, they were smuggled into neighboring Myanmar and ultimately enslaved by operators of the various criminal zones.

Unlike Shwe Kokko, many of the newer zones are designed without physical casinos. Instead, the city-like enclaves appear more like penal colonies. Online social media posts feature one particularly sinister enclave known as the KK Zone, which is located on the Moei River across from a Thai military base at Mae Ku village. By one account, as many as 10,000 people are enslaved there, tortured or, according to some accounts, threatened with having their organs harvested if they fail to generate adequate revenue from operating scams.

Further reports of Indians, Indonesians, Taiwanese, Kenyans, Ukrainians and other nationals trafficked under similar conditions into Southeast Asia continued to appear throughout 2022. The zones had clearly begun to menace the region and were even reverberating globally.

Taking Down a Kingpin?

Regional pressure began to mount as the scale of the problem became apparent. In Cambodia, particularly, media reports prompted ASEAN countries to demand the government take steps to free tens of thousands of Thai, Malaysian and Indonesian victims. Meanwhile, Thai authorities announced on August 17, 2022 that they had arrested the billionaire fugitive investor behind Shwe Kokko, She Zhijiang, on charges of fraud and running a "criminal gang." Law enforcement across the region hailed his apprehension as a "major breakthrough," but few questioned how he managed to hide from the law since 2014 or why he was able to travel to China on a fraudulent Cambodian passport and sign contracts with a key think tank affiliated with China's pre-eminent government planning body.

Following She Zhijiang's arrest, little has changed on the ground. Two of his partners in Shwe Kokko -- gangster Ma Dongli and Hainan political operator Zhong Baojia - remain at large. Zhong continues to hold several official positions with business associations in Hainan and Henan Provinces and was awarded for his "philanthropy work" just months before She's arrest. Meanwhile, construction on Shwe Kokko continues unabated. A spokesperson from the company, which includes among its shareholders the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF), has publicly indicated that the arrest will " not impact the project. "

The cross-border connections of this sinister activity became alarmingly apparent when Cambodia-based Chinese media outlets began running a series of advertisements for the Shwe Kokko Yatai New City.

Starting from September 2022 and continuing to the time of writing, the news site 58cam.com began posting an advertisement reading "Yatai City: Once you have arrived, you will never want to leave." This text is set against a panoramic view of Shwe Kokko, and the Yatai IHG logo and the words "Safe City, Healthy City, Green City, Civilized City, Shwe Kokko, Karen State, Myanmar."

Some of the ads include a QR code that links to an app developed just for the Yatai New City. It advertises a range of businesses present in the city and provides a link to Yatai IHG's investment department and another to a money transfer app. The ads demonstrate that the Yatai IHG continues to operate despite the arrest of She Zhijiang and suggest there is a market in Cambodia for "businesses" to relocate to Myanmar.

Myanmar as a Magnet for Crime

As several countries across the region struggle to address this new form of criminal activity, Myanmar has emerged as the preferred location for criminal groups to base their trafficking and scam operations. For the Myanmar army, revenue from organized crime via corrupt border guard forces has become a key pillar of its survival strategy.

The Karen BGF headed by Bo Chit Thu provides security to all of these zones along the border, and now reaps massive profits from growing criminal empires.

While there are considerable obstacles to a serious crackdown on organized crime in Cambodia or Laos, in Myanmar any reduction under current circumstances is impossible. So long as the current regime - which early this year dismantled six key units of the country's police force - holds power, organized crime will spread to new parts of the country and increasingly pose a global security threat. Even the Chinese police have publicly described Myawaddy as "terrifying" and warned Chinese nationals not to travel there. Unfortunately, every day, dozens of unsuspecting victims from across the globe are trafficked into Myanmar.

A Global Security Threat

This human trafficking crisis is just one example of how Burma's illegitimate military regime damages the security interests not only of its neighbors, but of countries as far away as the United States, where ads for lucrative tech jobs in Southeast Asia have recently begun to appear in California.

Malign activity at this scale represents a global security threat. It must be brought to an end. A first step would be for the United States and like-minded regional partners such as Thailand and India to assess how these lawless zones exploit governance gaps, and to take steps to close off these gaps. Failure to address these growing challenges to global security will only encourage their unchecked spread and mutation into even more sinister forms.

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Myanmar's Criminal Zones: A Growing Threat to Global Security

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International media and law enforcement are waking up to a new post-COVID trend in transnational crime: the proliferation of criminally run zones in Myanmar and across Southeast Asia, and an explosion of human trafficking for labor in these ungoverned enclaves.

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'Life is at a turning point': Inside Myanmar's resistance

Illustration: Raven

THE DOCTOR

Than Oo* stopped working on 3 February 2021. Instead of driving to Mandalay General Hospital, as he has done nearly every day for 15 years, he took to the streets. Thousands of medical workers across Myanmar did the same. Their mass walkout in protest against the coup marked the start of a nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that has brought public services to a virtual standstill.

'It was a really difficult decision,' said the 40-year-old. 'I had to leave my patients.' As it is, he was contending with the lingering fallout of previous junta rule. There was a time, he remembers, when patients arrived for operations carrying their own surgical equipment. By starving the healthcare system of funds, the generals had decimated it. Even after budgets grew, out-of-pocket payments for medical treatment in Myanmar soared and remain one of the world's highest. 'I won't let [dictatorship] happen again. We have to stop it - especially for our next generation.'

Speaking to me on the Signal app in a video call from an undisclosed location, Than Oo looked fatigued. His grey-streaked hair, which he normally cuts short, fell to his shoulders. He was growing a beard for the first time. He and his wife, also a doctor, have been forced into hiding as striking doctors are wanted criminals in junta-ruled Myanmar. 'Many of my colleagues have been charged,' he said. Hundreds of other doctors, nationwide, are on the run too.

Than Oo turned to organizing rallies. But it was impossible to stop being a doctor. He treated former patients at a private hospital for around a week before the generals threatened the clinic with closure. 'Now I have to treat my patients secretly,' he says.

Every morning, seven days a week, Than Oo runs an underground clinic. There are a handful operating across Mandalay. At first his makeshift site got by mostly with tele-consultations. Doctors reached patients who had access to a fixed-line internet connection, even as most of the population was forced offline after the military blocked the internet on mobile phones. But when the protests grew and state violence intensified, this wasn't enough.

'The crackdowns felt like battlefields,' he said, describing how doctors formed mobile clinics near protest sites for emergency care. 'Some were shot in the chest. We inserted emergency tubes. But at that time there were few doctors or facilities, so we lost tens of patients.'

The doctors mobilized. Through donations from Mandalay residents, less than two months after the coup, they opened a 100-bed hospital. 'We made it in a secret place. We have three operation theatres,' said Than Oo. Two ordinary cars, fitted with basic trauma equipment, function as ambulances.

One patient he can't forget is an 18-year-old shot on three separate occasions. 'The first time was in February - he saw his girlfriend die, she was shot in the head. He ran with her body and a gunshot wound to his abdomen.' It didn't stop the teen going to protests. The next time he was shot in his right forehand. When Than Oo saw him, he bore a wound on his right thigh. The team 'repaired the [torn] artery. But unfortunately we needed to amputate the right leg.'

The hospital where Than Oo previously worked is now a military base. Like thousands of others in the CDM, the doctor has drawn no salary since January. 'I know I have a very high chance of being arrested. But I have to fight till the end.'

Almost every day thousands and thousands of people flooded the streets, the bridges. In that moment I felt we were all united

Illustration: Raven

THE ACTIVIST

'Let me see,' she says, counting on her fingers, 'this is the ninth safe house since the coup.' But Thinzar Shunlei Yi went on the run months earlier. As a prominent democracy activist, she was already in the military's crosshairs. While freedoms emerged under Aung San Suu Kyi's leadership, dissent against the army or government could still land activists, journalists and ordinary citizens in jail.

'The previous transition period was fake,' says the 29-year-old plainly. 'It's all collapsed. But I take it as a positive because now we're going for a real revolution against the military dictatorship.'

The days leading up to the first protests, she says, were agonizing. 'We took a week to get on the streets because we were aware of the capability of the military. They're not like the police or the military in other countries. They have been killing innocent civilians in Rakhine, in Kachin, in Shan. We knew they would do this at some point.'

It was with courage, then, but also some hesitation that she led her first march to Sule Pagoda, the golden temple in downtown Yangon that has shimmered over earlier uprisings. The first swathe of protests were huge and energizing. 'Almost every day thousands and thousands of people flooded the streets, the bridges. In that moment I felt we were all united.'

But her worst fears soon materialized. On 9 February, Mya Thwate Thwate Khaing, 19, was shot in the head by security forces during a peaceful demonstration in the capital Naypyidaw. She died after 10 days on life support, the first protester to be killed post-coup. The movement got stronger. 'We were chased like cat and mouse,' kettled into streets for hours, forced to hide in alleyways, says Shunlei, of rallies in Yangon. 'They used stun grenades, sometimes they shot rubber bullets to scare us. We looked out for snipers.' Around 30 of her friends have been detained. She says all have been physically or sexually abused.

Protests, though smaller, still go on. 'We've kept the momentum going... But it's hard to keep people on the street,' says Shunlei, explaining how they've shifted to flash mobs and other guerrilla tactics. In March she was added to the warrant list, now running into the thousands and including actors, social media influencers and journalists. She left Yangon at around the same time. 'They can't arrest all of us at once so I feel kind of relaxed.'

Unlike most people I've interviewed in recent weeks, Shunlei wanted to use her real name. 'My voice is my last defence of my free speech,' she says.

Illustration: Raven

Many of my colleagues have been charged. Hundreds of other doctors, nationwide, are on the run too

THE ARTIST

Shein* was born in 1988, seven months before a mass pro-democracy uprising crushed by the military. Growing up under the shadow of the generals, when Myanmar was largely isolated and free speech muzzled, graffiti offered an outlet for expression. As a teenager she joined a crew that scaled Yangon's walls after dark to mark their dissent, united in their hatred of junta rule. But when the National League for Democracy was elected to power, she stopped. 'I didn't want to destroy the street any more,' Shein said. 'Now they [the military] have come back, so we have to go back.'

Her art is a call to action. But in the initial confusion that engulfed the February coup she urged restraint. On day one, she drew a cat, inspired by a revolutionary Burmese poem, telling people to stay home. Next, she created a 'keyboard fighter' to marshal people 'to spread the message' on social media. By day six, pent-up anger burst onto the streets. In Shein's pictures, bold women stared back, raising sarongs or pots in defiance. They took new life on stickers and vinyl posters held aloft at protests. In the evenings she unfurled banners across city flyovers with the movement's rallying cry: 'You messed with the wrong generation.' They were always gone by the next morning.

'We weren't afraid,' said the 33-year-old, pausing when the din of Yangon traffic - quieter than usual according to Shein - overpowered her voice. Protest art has a long history in Myanmar's democracy movement. Slogans, memes and illustrations have spread wildly online, buoyed by new campaigns such as Raise Three Fingers. Artists like Shein have also been inspired by the tactics of the Milk Tea Alliance - a term coined by protesters in Hong Kong, Thailand and Taiwan last year referring to the drink popular in all three places. Myanmar is a core part of the alliance now as activists see their political struggles as shared in a new era of protests fuelled by online imagery.

Fewer people are protesting outdoors these days, said Shein, but resistance art still lights up pockets of Yangon from time to time, serving to empower as well as heal. 'A lot of my poet and musician friends have been arrested,' she said. But Shein wants to remain in Yangon, where she's focusing on commercial work to raise funds. 'We need to support our brothers and sisters,' she said, of those in the CDM. 'I think I am safe for now.'

Illustration: Raven

THE MP

Crickets hum in the background. The internet connection breaks so often we resort to exchanging voice messages. From a jungle training camp in Myanmar's borderlands, a newly elected MP explains why he has taken up arms.

'They gave me 24 hours,' said Mo Htet*, a bookish 33-year-old, about the ethnic armed group he joined in late February. 'So I decided very quickly. We need a new army to protect our people. Because our army is destroying them.'

Like a growing number of anti-coup protesters he now thinks armed resistance is vital to creating a federal democracy. Wearing black-rimmed square glasses, his hair razed short, Mo Htet radiates conviction and sadness at the same time. 'I got married during the pandemic. It was a very new, a very fresh family,' he begins. In November he was elected to parliament for the first time. 'I was energized, ready to serve my people.'

Instead he found himself by their side, protesting on the streets. He watched as 23 of his constituents were shot dead, with many more wounded, at peaceful anti-coup rallies. Like the hundreds of people now reported to be joining ethnic armies in Myanmar, the massacres catalyzed his decision. 'They are not an army, they are not police, they are a terrorist group,' he said of the security forces.

Speaking from his military base, Mo Htet describes his routine. The day begins at 4.00am with drills in the dark. Mosquito and scorpion bites are a new norm. Food is rationed. In March the former social worker held a gun for the first time. 'I never dreamed that I would have to practise shooting. It feels like life is at a turning point.'

Mo Htet doesn't reveal which ethnic army he has joined. There are some two dozen different groups that have been battling the Tatmadaw for decades. But now the National Unity Government, set up by Myanmar's ousted civilian leaders in April, says it is bringing them together to form a federal army to fight the junta.

Some have raised doubts over whether disparate factions could ever unite, or challenge the powerful Tatmadaw even if they did. Mo Htet thinks they can. Every anti-coup protester I spoke to saw a role for armed resistance - most for the first time - alongside a democracy struggle long powered by nonviolent resistance.

'Even though we don't have battle experience, we can learn the strategies. We believe we can combine as a federal army to fight together. We believe we will win,' he said.

In late February Mo Htet left home without telling a single family member where he was going - hoping that would offer them some protection. It wasn't enough. They too have gone into hiding, expecting arrest, as the authorities hunt for him.

'There are two types of MPs in my country,' says the new soldier. 'One is trying to fight, the other is behind bars.'

*Names changed to protect identities.

This article is from the July-August 2021 issue of New Internationalist.
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'Life is at a turning point': Inside Myanmar's resistance

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'Life is at a turning point': Inside Myanmar's resistance Than Oo* stopped working on 3 February 2021. Instead of driving to Mandalay General Hospital, as he has done nearly every day for 15 years, he took to the streets. Thousands of medical workers across Myanmar did the same.

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"They found that picture and took her away. She said they used a device to check her phone, so that even deleted pictures were recovered," said a villager in Hmawbi Township, recounting the case of a pregnant woman who miscarried after soldiers beat her when they found photos of her at protest rallies. "They used the phone to hunt the protesters."

Reading these words gave me an unpleasant jolt. Just the day before, a well-connected source told me they believe a recent high-profile arrest was based on an intercepted phone call.

I should not have been surprised, though, because for the past three and a half months, I've been looking into the Myanmar military's access to exactly this kind of surveillance technology. I'm talking about tools that can monitor WiFi, crack passwords, extract data from phones, recover deleted files, map people's social media networks, and so on.

The last thing I want to do is unnecessarily alarm people in Myanmar who already have far too many things to worry about, but it is crucial that they are aware of the tools that are out there and how they can protect themselves.

My efforts to learn more about this technology were part of an investigation led by Lighthouse Reports, a Netherlands-based news organisation that invites reporters from different outlets to do deep dives into a particular issue. This time it was on how involved European companies are in providing "dual use" tools-meaning those that can be used for both civilian and military purposes-to Myanmar, if European Union funds were used, and whether EU laws were broken.

I interviewed former detainees, lawyers, activists, former lawmakers and people familiar with these issues in Myanmar. We pored over hundreds of pages of leaked budget documents from activist group Justice For Myanmar, as well as other leaked data and open source materials.

Around 40 Western companies, including from Sweden, Italy, Canada, the U.S. and Israel, appeared in these documents. We don't know how many of these top-of-the-range surveillance products were actually sold, but we know some made it to Myanmar. We discovered tender documents to procure many of these tools, who won these tenders, and shipment details for some of them.

We published our findings in multiple outlets two weeks ago, on the same day the pregnant woman was arrested and beaten. Two days later, Al-Jazeera English (AJE), which was part of the Lighthouse Reports-led investigation, broadcast a chilling documentary exposing both the Myanmar regime's use of the blunt force of violence against its opponents, as well as its deployment of softer, but no less sinister, spy tech tools.

Speaking to AJE, the daughter of one high-profile activist arrested on the morning of the February 1 coup revealed that her father had been charged based on a deleted e-mail. In a discussion with Ali Fowle, the reporter in the documentary, I expressed my concern that it was just a matter of time before the junta started to use these tools widely. But I didn't expect this to happen so soon.

There are valid questions as to whether the regime has the skills or manpower to make full use of these tools, but given the military's past conduct and its awareness of how our electronic devices can incriminate us, we should not underestimate the risks that its access to such technology presents.

The findings

The articles we published paint a disturbing picture of how regulations set up to prevent these technologies from falling into the hands of brutal rulers are either weakly enforced or interpreted liberally, creating loopholes that dictators can exploit.

For example, Italian journalist Riccardo Coluccini wrote about Italian company SecurCube's BTS Tracker for the Investigative Reporting Project Italy (IRPI). This product can monitor radio frequencies and measure signal strength. It appeared in a Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MoTC) budget.

The Council of the European Union tightened its embargo on such dual-use products to Myanmar in 2018 in the wake of widespread condemnation of military atrocities against the Rohingya, but SecurCube told another Italian paper in 2019 that "there was no constraint" on the company to prevent them selling its BTS Tracker in the country. In another piece for Italian newspaper Domani, Riccardo asked how it was possible exports continued despite the ban.

For The Intercept, Zach Campbell and Caitlin Chandler uncovered how MSAB, a Swedish company that appeared on both MoTC and Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) budgets, has been receiving EU funding.

MSAB said its products, which can scan and analyse data on a smartphone, were sold to Myanmar's police in 2019. The Bureau of Special Investigations, a department under MoHA, applied to buy a three-year license for an MSAB product in its 2020-2021 budget. The tender to procure that product was won by MySpace International, renamed Creative Exploration, a company headed by a former military officer and his wife, whose father was a former general and ambassador to Russia, according to a report by the New York Times.

Nathan Vanderklippe's piece in The Globe and Mail zoomed in on two Canadian companies, OpenText and Magnet Forensics, identified in the Lighthouse Reports-led investigation. These companies sold powerful tools that can extract and decrypt information from computers and cell phones.

All of this shows that Myanmar has been building a strong arsenal of high-tech surveillance tools that can be used for internal repression, many of which come from the West.

Flimsy defence

The companies have either denied selling the products or defended the sales, saying they happened during the civilian government's rule. But a quick search on Google would have told them Myanmar's brutal military still held many levers of the government even then, including the control of three key ministries. MoHA is one of them.

In fact, two recent MoHA ministers were former spy chiefs. The current minister, Lt-Gen Soe Htut, was appointed in February 2020 and retained this role, a telling sign when most cabinet members in the National League for Democracy (NLD) government have either been arrested or are in hiding.

The MoTC was nominally under NLD rule, but that was only for five years. It is staffed with former military officials and was behind what Human Rights Watch called the "world's longest internet shutdown" in parts of Rakhine and Chin states in western Myanmar. (Critics have noted that the NLD, which used cyber security as an excuse to buy intrusive technologies, was not much better or more supportive of internet freedom.)

So there is ample evidence, if only the companies had looked, to show they were not dealing with a "civilian" government or "civilian" middlemen. Companies have not only ethical and moral grounds to consider such contexts when doing business, but also a legal responsibility to do so. Now the people of Myanmar may be paying the price for their failures to live up to these responsibilities.

Myanmar people also need to learn to protect themselves. They can find good resources on how to keep their data safe and useful apps on the internet.

When the country opened up dramatically in 2011, with SIM card prices dropping from a few hundred dollars to $1.50, Myanmar suddenly came online. Over the past decade, many of us forgot the years of living in fear and isolation, when we worried if our land lines were tapped and informants were listening in on teashop conversations. Instead, we started sharing mobile phone numbers and locations on social media and discussed sensitive issues on unencrypted apps.

We need to unlearn these habits. Of course, we don't always have a choice, like right now when internet access is still limited in many places in Myanmar. This means lots of people, including journalists, are having to balance two bad options-risk their lives by sharing information, or stay quiet and let injustices go unreported.

Still, if European nations truly care about human rights, justice and democracy in Myanmar as they say they do in statements, they need to tighten their embargo and regulate this industry better. Sure, leaders friendlier to the junta, like those in China and Russia, could still provide such tools, but that is beside the point. The West needs to uphold the values they always lecture us about.

Thin Lei Win is an award-winning multimedia journalist with more than 15 years of experience. For nearly 13 years, she was a correspondent with the Thomson Reuters Foundation, the non-profit arm of the Thomson Reuters global news agency, reporting on humanitarian issues, particularly climate change and food security. She has worked from Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand and Italy, where she is currently based. She also co-founded Myanmar Now in the run-up to the Myanmar elections in 2015, and co-founded The Kite Tales, a unique storytelling and preservation project chronicling the lives and histories of ordinary people across Myanmar.

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Myanmar's junta wants to build a surveillance state. Western companies must not help them.

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"They found that picture and took her away. She said they used a device to check her phone, so that even deleted pictures were recovered," said a villager in Hmawbi Township, recounting the case of a pregnant woman who miscarried after soldiers beat her when they found photos of her at protest rallies.

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myanmar's junta overthrew the government they represented. what happens next for the diplomats in limbo?   - cnn

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The junta overthrew the government they represented. What happens next for Myanmar's diplomats in limbo?

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In a townhouse on a leafy New York street, a political coup thousands of miles away has split the office in two. Downstairs, staffers at Myanmar's Permanent Mission to the United Nations work for the military junta. Upstairs, Kyaw Moe Tun is leading what is effectively an underground foreign ministry.

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The United Nations has failed "at multiple levels" to effectively address Myanmar's military coup and its ensuing upheaval, according to a damning new report released on Monday.

The report, published by the New York-based International Peace Institute ( IPI), says the UN has done little to rein in the violence unleashed by the military since it seized power nearly five months ago.

The UN's handling of Myanmar's ongoing human rights crisis has been "bereft of leadership, direction and coherence at multiple levels," the report found.

With nearly 900 civilians killed by the junta since the February 1 coup, and thousands more imprisoned or disappeared, the world body's response to the crisis has been "woefully inadequate," according to Damian Lilly, the author of the report.

As director of protection at the Myanmar Accountability Project ( MAP), a London-based NGO that works with civil society groups to build criminal cases against individuals responsible for violence against civilians, Lilly based his report on field research and interviews with officials dealing with the crisis.

He found that the UN system "faces systematic, structural and leadership challenges when responding to atrocity crimes" and urged the UN to spearhead "a robust international response" to the situation.

While he singles out China and Russia for their role in obstructing efforts to hold the generals to account, he also faults the UN team within Myanmar for its inaction.

The team has been "unable or unwilling" to implement "basic protection measures such as legal aid, psychosocial support, and case management for the thousands of civilians who have been impacted by the violence," according to Lilly.

Christopher Gunness, the director of MAP, noted that the UN has also failed on a more fundamental level, by not implementing findings from investigations into the military's past atrocities.

This, he suggests, has contributed to the regime's perception that it can act with impunity.

"The UN has been a passive bystander and complicit observer of crimes against humanity committed on an industrial scale," he said.

In addition to highlighting human rights issues, MAP also seeks to use UK courts to deny the regime what it seeks most-acceptance as the de facto government of Myanmar.

It has done this in part by legally challenging the junta's seizure of the country's embassy in London after its ambassador expressed support for the ousted civilian government.

The regime is "desperately seeking recognition and legitimacy and all UN member states must deny them this as they have seized power illegally," Gunness told Myanmar Now.

But with the junta "waging a campaign of terror against their own people," as the IPI report describes the military's efforts to crush opposition to its rule, human rights remain a primary concern.

At present, one of the UN's chief tools for addressing this issue is the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar ( IIMM), established in 2018 to gather evidence of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed by the country's security forces.

Formed in the wake of mass atrocities against the Rohingya people, the IIMM's mandate also extends to the current crisis, according to a commentary on its role published in March.

However, like other UN efforts, this one has also been found wanting.

"The IIMM is slow moving, its officials are far [from] transparent about what they are doing, and for the people of Myanmar who deserve justice now, the IIMM is not fit for purpose," said Gunness.

"I hope that one day soon, the IIMM will be able to show the world its value in promoting justice and accountability. But for the moment, the jury is out on the IIMM," he added.

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New report slams UN's handling of Myanmar crisis

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The United Nations has failed "at multiple levels" to effectively address Myanmar's military coup and its ensuing upheaval, according to a damning new report released on Monday. The report, published by the New York-based International Peace Institute ( IPI), says the UN has done little to rein in the violence unleashed by the military since it seized power nearly five months ago.

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Can the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) thrive amid worsening regional flash points, from the South China Sea to the crisis in Myanmar? Set up in 1967 to promote regional stability and economic growth, ASEAN has never coalesced into a powerful, integrated community like the European Union, nor does it seek to become one. But the bloc has nonetheless been useful: It has largely kept the peace in the region, mainly through slow-burning dialogues and confidence building among its members, which, in turn, has allowed Southeast Asian countries to focus on domestic stability and economic development.

Now, the group is facing severe external and internal challenges. China's growing power, its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, and its brewing strategic competition with the United States are perhaps ASEAN's greatest external challenges. Within the bloc, however, the unfolding crisis in Myanmar since the February coup may be its biggest challenge yet. Although ASEAN still has time to manage great-power politics, it urgently needs to deal with the Myanmar crisis, which could engulf the region and determine the bloc's strategic future.

Can the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) thrive amid worsening regional flash points, from the South China Sea to the crisis in Myanmar? Set up in 1967 to promote regional stability and economic growth, ASEAN has never coalesced into a powerful, integrated community like the European Union, nor does it seek to become one. But the bloc has nonetheless been useful: It has largely kept the peace in the region, mainly through slow-burning dialogues and confidence building among its members, which, in turn, has allowed Southeast Asian countries to focus on domestic stability and economic development.

Now, the group is facing severe external and internal challenges. China's growing power, its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, and its brewing strategic competition with the United States are perhaps ASEAN's greatest external challenges. Within the bloc, however, the unfolding crisis in Myanmar since the February coup may be its biggest challenge yet. Although ASEAN still has time to manage great-power politics, it urgently needs to deal with the Myanmar crisis, which could engulf the region and determine the bloc's strategic future.

After expanding its membership to include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in the 1980s and 1990s, the bloc adopted the ASEAN Charter in 2007. Theoretically, the charter set up ASEAN as an institutionalized, multilateral group and gave it a framework for concerted action, turning what was only a loose intergovernmental forum into a nascent community of nations capable of strategic action.

But the charter is a double-edged sword. Among the principles the treaty enshrines are non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government. In other words, ASEAN is obliged to reject a member's unconstitutional change of government while simultaneously respecting its so-called internal affairs. ASEAN's own principles are therefore in conflict with one another-and that conflict has come to life in ASEAN's splintering efforts in Myanmar.

On the one hand, ASEAN's first instinct was to not interfere-just like it accepted Thailand's 2014 coup. But the scale of the Tatmadaw's violent repression and the gravity of the unfolding crisis has sent shock waves throughout the region. If the crisis worsens, Southeast Asia could be overwhelmed with multiple crises, from refugees fleeing Myanmar and exploding drug trafficking and transnational crime to a worsening pandemic and slower economic recovery.

Realizing that what happens in Myanmar does not stay in Myanmar, Indonesian President Joko Widodo called for a special ASEAN summit. The meeting took place in Jakarta on April 24, was attended by Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, and issued a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar. Three of these points are the outcomes ASEAN is seeking: the cessation of violence, the delivery of humanitarian aid through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Center), and the start of an inclusive political dialogue. The other two points are about the methods to deliver them: a call to create a special ASEAN envoy and a visit with a delegation to Myanmar.

But since then, there has been hardly any meaningful progress. For one thing, the Tatmadaw has used the junta leader's participation in the meeting as a domestic propaganda tool-suggesting the new regime has been accepted by its neighbors-while backtracking from the consensus. Meanwhile, violence in Myanmar continues unabated with more than 870 people killed -at least 140 people since the meeting-and more than 6,100 people detained so far. For another, despite the consensus, ASEAN members differ in their stakes, leverage, and sense of urgency in dealing with the crisis.

Singapore and Thailand are perhaps the two members with the most at stake and the most leverage over Myanmar, given their extensive economic and military ties. But it is Indonesia, which has hardly any leverage on Myanmar, that is consistently providing the ideas and energy to keep ASEAN on top of the problem. Although Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have expressed their support for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, they have largely been quiet. The Philippines has been inconsistent, initially calling the crisis an internal affair but then rallying around the meeting.

But most importantly, Brunei-which currently holds the rotating ASEAN chair-has been missing in action. Indeed, Brunei's leaders seem unhappy the crisis has pushed their own chairmanship agenda to the sidelines. Some ASEAN members had to plead with and prod Brunei to act, including the push for ASEAN to issue a joint position after the coup and organize the summit.

And almost two months after the Jakarta meeting, Brunei has yet to appoint a special envoy. Instead, Brunei seems content with letting the junta choose the envoy from a list of nominees. Brunei's so-called concept paper for the envoy has also been widely criticized. It limits, for example, the envoy's job to only a mediating role, doesn't base the envoy in Myanmar, and only envisions a small staff paid for by the envoy's own country.

Given that the special Myanmar envoy is the lynchpin of ASEAN's engagement, Brunei's behavior is fracturing the Five-Point Consensus, which members increasingly disagree over how to implement. Some believe the consensus might be best delivered as separate lines of effort. If, for example, ASEAN can deliver humanitarian aid without having to wait for political progress, then it should proceed given the unfolding crisis.

But by allowing aid to be delivered by the AHA Center independently from the political process, ASEAN could lose significant leverage to stop the violence and jump-start the dialogue. The Tatmadaw seems likely to favor this option. After all, Myanmar's Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement sits on the governing board of the AHA Center. The junta could thus significantly shape how ASEAN's aid will be administered and delivered-including the possibility of not giving any of it to the people-and simply ignore the other parts of the consensus.

One possible solution is to embed teams from the AHA Center in a dedicated and well-funded ASEAN mission on Myanmar led by the special envoy. The mission should seek to deliver aid as part of an overarching framework, which will also seek to end the violence and facilitate an inclusive dialogue. In other words, ASEAN could implement the Five-Point Consensus as a package deal rather than separate lines of effort.

But such a comprehensive process of monitoring the cessation of violence, delivering aid, and facilitating Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned dialogues is unlikely to be completed in less than two years. Delivering the consensus as a full package, therefore, requires venturing into uncharted territory and having members commit to a multiyear effort continued by the various countries holding the ASEAN chair.

This would be new territory for ASEAN as an organization. The prospect of an open-ended mission to restore democracy in Myanmar is thus making some ASEAN leaders uneasy. That may also be the main reason why the appointment of the special envoy-Brunei's prerogative-has been fraught with delays and plagued by divergent views.

If ASEAN is committed to deliver the Five-Point Consensus as a package deal, for example, the special envoy would need a different set of qualifications to fulfill a different set of mandates and responsibilities than if he or she were limited to the much smaller role of dialogue facilitator. Appointing the special envoy for only the tenure of current chair (Brunei has less than six months left) would make little sense if he or she has to engage in a multiyear, multichair effort.

ASEAN members also disagree on whether the special envoy needs assistance and supervision. Some propose a " Friends of the Chair" group to advise and coordinate all parties-and perhaps also to keep the special envoy in line. Others suggest the formation of an ASEAN Troika made up of representatives from the previous chair (Vietnam), current chair (Brunei), and next chair (Cambodia) to coordinate the effort and ensure continuity. In any case, ASEAN has yet to forge a common view on the special envoy's role, mandate, and authority.

These contending views are another reason-besides the continuing crisis in Myanmar-why Brunei should have acted with more urgency rather than dawdling. That said, ASEAN's divergent interests have not made things easier for Brunei. That different members also hold different views on the role of external parties-such as China, Japan, India, Russia, and the United States-exacerbates the problem. As these countries have more leverage on Myanmar than ASEAN, the absence of a coordinated strategy has been counterproductive.

In the short term, Brunei has the unenviable task of keeping the Five-Point Consensus from fracturing further. But for ASEAN to thrive in the long run, it needs to seriously review and revise the ASEAN Charter, clarifying conflicting principles and streamlining cooperation. Short of such a change, ASEAN still has a responsibility to implement the Five-Point Consensus. If ASEAN fails to deliver in the coming weeks, the international community should seek better options to help the people of Myanmar.

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ASEAN's Future Will Be Decided in Myanmar

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Can the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) thrive amid worsening regional flash points, from the South China Sea to the crisis in Myanmar? Set up in 1967 to promote regional stability and economic growth, ASEAN has never coalesced into a powerful, integrated community like the European Union, nor does it seek to become one.

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This was not at all how Thurain had planned to spend the start of 2021. The young entrepreneur had been expecting to build upon his already impressive worldly achievements. From childhood, he had certainly not had it easy by any stretch of imagination, but after a lifetime of hard work and diligent effort, he had come to find himself in a somewhat comfortable position, with an even more promising future.

To understand the incredible circumstances that have befallen him, it would be helpful to go back to his earlier years. "Thurain" (not his real name) grew up in Kayah State and went to school in Myitkyina in Kachin State. Spending his early life away from the bigger cities in Myanmar, not only did he have fewer educational opportunities or professional training, but he was also exposed from an early age to the Tatmadaw's brutality, which often took place out of sight of the country's main population centers. For example, he recalls volunteering to teach English at an IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) Camp, and hearing bullets flying just miles away.

Eventually an opportunity presented itself in Yangon and so he came to "the big city," which was initially overwhelming. As he remembers, "I didn't know how to take the bus. I didn't know how to order breakfast. I'm a rural guy, so when I saw those tall building, I thought it was New York!"

But Thurain adapted and even thrived there, eventually providing himself with real stability. While many people might struggle holding down one successful business, Thurain had managed to have three going simultaneously! This included one offering interpretation and translation services, another providing consultation to large corporate projects, and a third developing software and computer games.

While Thurain's multiple successes were of course a result of his strong work ethic, his achievements couldn't have come to fruition without the steady reforms also taking place throughout the 2010s. Reflecting on the growing freedoms that defined these years, he recalls, "We enjoyed it. We loved it. And we wanted to get more. Can you imagine, it was just a few little things we got, when compared with other countries. We got only a little sunlight in the past 10 years. We got just a little, but we enjoyed it a lot."

But on February 1st, this came to a crashing halt, and Thurain's mood turned dark. "I felt that it's all black. How dare they just kill the futures of the people in Myanmar? People had put such positive energy, and were trying so hard, working for the country."

Thurain began attending the nonviolent protests with his friends, joining millions throughout the country. But he eventually decided to lend his skills to the resistance in a different way, because Thurain realized that being on the ground wasn't his specialty. "My personality is not a frontline person," he notes, "my skill is more like strategic approach and coordination, and motivating people."

In the interest of safety, he began working with only a small group of people, so that knowledge of the wider movement wouldn't rest in any individual who could give up key details. Unfortunately, this wasn't enough to protect him, as one member was captured, and after being tortured, shared details about the others. The rest of the group quickly dispersed, and Thurain remains in hiding to this day. One other member was caught, and he and the original detained protester were both executed in prison.

While he now takes far greater safety precautions, Thurain is no less devoted to the cause. He is especially active in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), regularly calling civil servants still going to the office and encouraging them to take leave. These are basically cold calls to strangers in which he must find ways to establish immediate trust and rapport, a high-stakes decision-making process that could literally mean life and death for either party. While some workers are keen to leave after a single conversation, others take days or even weeks of persuasion. As Thurain notes, these civil servants "are not risk-takers. Normally, risk-takers would become an entrepreneur, it's very simple."

As challenging as it may be to convince risk-averse civil servants to step into the unknown, Thurain has a far more difficult job when encouraging police and soldiers to join the CDM. As far as the police goes, he estimates that a good 70% would like to defect, but corruption is the biggest impediment. And as for the military, he notes that this is a much more insular community that is largely cut off from mainstream Burmese society, and it is quite difficult to break through all the propaganda they have been fed over the years. "They are being controlled so tightly," he adds, sadly.

Aside from this, Thurain is also focused on preventing the military from installing ward officers at the local level, which he feels is the most critical part of the entire struggle. As he says simply, "Whoever can control that ward level... then they win." This is because ward officers can more easily develop a detailed understanding of all residents in their area, making movements and activities far more difficult.

For most of us, it would be nearly impossible to imagine how we would respond if our own lives were shaken out of their normal routines like Thurain-and in fact the entire nation of Myanmar-and we were thrust into a world of espionage, terror, battle tactics, and evading capture. Thurain admits that he is often terrified, but that he works to calm himself whenever possible. How does he manage amid such stress and danger? First by practicing vipassana meditation, which he does even when in the middle of important discussions. Whenever he realizes his mental state is not balanced, he works to calm his mind so that his decisions will become better. Then, once he attains some sense of calm, if he has the time, he composes poetry and paints, as those supplies are some of the few luxuries he allows himself while on the run. The paintings below are scans of his work from the past month, in fact. He also encourages this mental calm in his friends, trying to get hold of good food and drink during the most stressful of times, and advising colleagues to rest for a day or two after experiencing trauma.

Still, they are all preparing for worse times. By May, Thurain warns that "things will be devastating. If the military doesn't go back, there will be war. And the forests, the outskirts of the town, and in the town... there will be people with weapons. The family of the police, a family of soldiers, they will not be safe, if they don't change their action."

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Episode #47: A Risk-Taker at Risk - Insight Myanmar

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This was not at all how Thurain had planned to spend the start of 2021. The young entrepreneur had been expecting to build upon his already impressive worldly achievements. From childhood, he had certainly not had it easy by any stretch of imagination, but after a lifetime of hard work and diligent effort, he had come to find himself in a somewhat comfortable position, with an even more promising future.

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Capt. Lin Htet Aung left the Myanmar Army's Light Infantry Battalion #528 to join pro-democracy forces resisting the military coup that seized power from the elected government on Feb. 1, citing voting fraud in the November 2020 elections. He told Khin Maung Soe of RFA's Myanmar Service in a telephone interview from an area outside military regime control that about 800 officers and soldiers - roughly five battalions - have defected since the coup. RFA could not independently verify that number. The following Q&A has been edited for clarity. RFA: Can you tell us how many members of the Armed Forces have defected to the people's side?
Lin Htet Aung: There are around 800. That's about the size of five battalions in Myanmar's military structure. Some of them were from the army and many are from the Navy, the Air Force, artillery units, the Defense Service factories, etc.
RFA: How do you get these numbers?
Lin Htet Aung: We have contacts with one another and also from other sources.
RFA: What is the security situation of these people?
Lin Htet Aung: Those who have arrived in the liberated areas and territories held by ethnic armed groups have security. For those who have joined ordinary citizens, we are a bit worried for their security. People are trying to give them some protection, though, and some have contacted us for help.
RFA: What about the welfare of these former soldiers?
Lin Htet Aung: Most of them left their units without much money in hand. Those who have arrived in territories held by ethnic groups do not have to worry about food and lodging.
RFA: What about their families left behind?
Lin Htet Aung: Most of them are single. Those with families who arrived in territories held by ethnic groups do not have any problems. But some of them had left their families in their mother units and we are a bit worried for them.
RFA: How many officers have defected from their units?
Lin Htet Aung: There are about 100 among the officers but the majority are from lower ranks.

RFA: What are you doing now?

Lin Htet Aung: Most of us have decided to join the armed revolution. Those who do not want to join the armed revolution are seeking ways to help the people in whatever capacity they can.
RFA: There are some people who are suspicious of people like you who have defected. Some people think you could be spies. How do you feel about these doubts and suspicions?
Lin Htet Aung: Yes we have faced such situations. But I believe we will gradually win their trust. We will need time but I hope they will soon realize we genuinely want to oppose military dictatorship.
RFA: Do you think we could say there might be military agents among those who have crossed over?
Lin Htet Aung: Of course it is possible. We cannot trust everyone. We systematically checked everyone who contacted us directly. We have to be very careful because they have very qualified people gathering intelligence. We understand why people hated the military so much and that's why we are joining them. We also hate military dictatorship as much as the people do. Our main objective is to join hands with the people and bring down the military dictatorship.
RFA: Do you face any other difficulties?
Lin Htet Aung: Though we can say we are now in liberated areas we don't actually know what we should be doing or what role we should take. Most of us who defected have pure goodwill in our hearts towards the people.
RFA: Do you think there will be more members of the Armed Forces coming over to the side of the public?
Lin Htet Aung: Changing sides is an important tactic for this revolution. At first, we had hoped about 4,000 of the 400,000-strong military would change sides. But now we are expecting more than 4,000 will come to the aid of the people.
RFA: The present revolution relies a lot on the ethnic armed groups and they have been staging a revolution fighting for their rights for many years. How do you think the two revolutions can be combined?
Lin Htet Aung: We cannot just ask for assistance from them and leave but we will have to help them achieve their goals, too. If we leave them after seeking help from them, then it will be like we are fighting for Burma proper only. If we are to fight for the entire country, we will have to complement each other to achieve better results.
RFA: Do you have any progress in working together with the National Unity Government (NUG)?
Lin Htet Aung: The NUG is working very hard through a lot of difficulties and we have found some cooperation between them and us. We are very encouraged.
Translated by Khin Maung Nyane.
Disclaimer: The Post Interview: Captain Who Left Myanmar Army Estimates 800 Troops Have Defected Since Coup was first Published by on www.rfa.org.

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Interview: Captain Who Left Myanmar Army Estimates 800 Troops Have Defected Since Coup

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Capt. Lin Htet Aung left the Myanmar Army's Light Infantry Battalion #528 to join pro-democracy forces resisting the military coup that seized power from the elected government on Feb. 1, citing voting fraud in the November 2020 elections.

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SINGAPORE - Fire and flames ate away at the flag of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during heated protests on the streets of Mandalay, Myanmar's second-largest city, last weekend after two emissaries from the regional organization met with junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

ASEAN chairman Lim Jock Hoi and Brunei's Second Minister for Foreign Affairs Erywan Pehin Yusof visited Naypyitaw on June 4 to discuss the appointment of the grouping's special envoy and delivery of humanitarian aid, but departed amid questions of whether the Bruneian diplomats had inadvertently legitimized Myanmar's military regime.

By Tuesday (June 8) morning, a statement on the visit was removed from the ASEAN secretariat's website after it had referred to the senior general and chief architect of February's coup as the "Chairman of the State Administrative Council" (SAC) - in other words, the leader of the country rather than the leader of the armed forces.

The diplomatic gaffe, coupled with the slow pace of progress on implementing the five-point consensus reached by ASEAN leaders at an April 24 meeting in Jakarta, has sown fury among opponents of the military takeover in Myanmar and fueled rising criticism among the region's commentariat of Brunei's management of the crisis as ASEAN's chair.

"Beyond the complexities of engaging Myanmar right now, for the time being, the biggest challenge is just engaging the chair," said Evan Laksmana, a political scientist and senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Indonesia, who added that Brunei has been regarded as "particularly difficult to work with."

The wealthy sultanate has "stonewalled" Indonesia's efforts to increase pressure on Myanmar's military rulers, claimed Laksmana, who accused Brunei of favoring a bureaucratic approach to decision-making and dragging its feet over the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy, which he described as "absolutely paramount."

ASEAN leaders, including Myanmar's army chief, agreed by consensus to the appointment of a special envoy entitled to "meet with all parties concerned" at April's meeting in the Indonesian capital. But the regional grouping has been unable to agree on a candidate, who would formally represent the chair and be appointed by Brunei.

A source with knowledge of the matter confirmed to Asia Times that Indonesia and Thailand have put forward specific names for consideration, which Brunei's emissaries presented to the junta chief and "sought approval" for, an approach that apparently did not sit well with diplomats from other ASEAN countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

"To get approval for an envoy is shocking. It's supposed to be ASEAN's decision. Brunei was supposed to have this decision because it's the chair," said the source, who requested anonymity. "None of these diplomats are saying anything, and of course when you say nothing in the context of Brunei, that means you can't say anything, which means that it seems to have come from the top."

Ahead of the Bruneian diplomats' visit to Myanmar, Reuters reported that Indonesia, which has been at the forefront of ASEAN's bid to de-escalate the political crisis, and Thailand, whose military has close ties to neighboring Myanmar, were "at loggerheads" over who should be appointed special envoy and the scope of the position's duties.

Bangkok has reportedly lobbied for the appointment of a body of multiple representatives, while Jakarta initially favored a single envoy to lead a task force. Sources told the publication that most ASEAN states were prepared to compromise by supporting a grouping of three envoys representing Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei.

Brunei had also issued a "concept paper" that, according to Reuters, proposed limiting the envoy's job to mediating, not basing them in Myanmar, and giving them a small staff paid for by the home country of the envoy, conditions that other ASEAN states ultimately deemed as undermining the stature and leverage of the yet to be appointed envoy.

Bridget Welsh, an honorary research associate at the University of Nottingham's Asia Research Institute, said that while Brunei has managed its chairmanship "with a certain degree of organized efficiency," the Borneo-based sultanate ultimately lacks the diplomatic experience and gravitas to effect change within the region.

"We are in a situation where ASEAN would be a difficult organization to manage irrespective of who the leader would be given that there are very clear, very distinct differences within ASEAN on how to deal with this regime," said Welsh. "I think it has become increasingly clear that there is no real consensus within ASEAN."

From the onset of the February coup that deposed the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government of Aung San Suu Kyi, ASEAN members have failed to speak with one voice, with authoritarian states in the bloc preferring to describe the putsch as an internal matter.

Observers say Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia have held closely to ASEAN's tradition of non-interference in members' domestic affairs and lean toward recognition of the junta, while Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have been much more vocal in their criticism of the junta's bloody crackdown and calls for a return to democracy.

Despite calls by individual member states for the release of Suu Kyi and others who remain in the junta's custody, ASEAN was unable to include the release of political prisoners as one of its "consensus" points at the April 24 leaders' meeting, likely to avoid opposition from Naypyitaw and a collapse of negotiations.

ASEAN's lack of consensus has held back international pressure in other ways, most notably with the organization's position on removing a call for an arms embargo on Myanmar from a United Nations General Assembly draft resolution proposed by Lichtenstein in an apparent bid to ensure unanimous support from the 193-member body.

Nine ASEAN countries - all except Myanmar, which has dismissed its UN ambassador for opposing the coup - called for a watering down of the non-binding resolution in a letter to its author last month. But according to a Reuters report, several ASEAN members were, in fact, comfortable with the inclusion of a weapons freeze.

Citing unnamed sources, Reuters said resistance to the proposed arms embargo had been pushed by Thailand and Singapore and had led to ASEAN requesting the clause be removed. A scheduled vote on the resolution that was slated to be held on May 18 was postponed and a new date for the vote has not been set.

"The need for consensus decision-making leaves ASEAN incapable of confronting sensitive political or security matters, particularly involving the internal politics of a member, in a timely manner," said Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC.

"The problem is not unique to Brunei; it is the institutional weakness of ASEAN," he added. "In any case, ASEAN is stuck in a debate over the name of an envoy that none of the parties in Myanmar are interested in meeting with anymore. The crisis has moved on and ASEAN has ensured that all sides within Myanmar see the organization as irrelevant."

Following the recent meeting in Naypyitaw, Moe Zaw Oo, who is deputy foreign minister for the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel civilian administration formed in April by deposed elected lawmakers and opponents of the coup, said that pro-democracy forces in the country have "little confidence" in an ASEAN-led mediation process.

The NUG, which claims to be the country's legitimate interim authority, was denied a request for an invitation to April's meeting in Jakarta in place of the junta leader, whose attendance was seen by critics and observers as conferring his legitimacy. Representatives of the shadow government have yet to be formally engaged by ASEAN.

"There has been inadequate engagement with the NUG among ASEAN players," said Welsh. "This is something that has to happen because if they don't engage with NUG, they will end up having a country inside of Southeast Asia that will hate this regional organization, as the majority of people in Myanmar are really now targeting criticism towards ASEAN."

While the five-point consensus was initially seen as a sign of modest progress, the military junta almost immediately prevaricated on its commitments to implement what was agreed. Two days after the Jakarta summit, the ruling SAC said in a statement it would only act on the ASEAN agreement when the situation in the country "returns to stability."

On May 7, a military spokesman reiterated that "only after we achieve a certain level of security and stability, we will cooperate regarding that envoy." But far from stabilizing, the security situation in Myanmar has continued to slide toward full-blown civil war amid criticism that ASEAN's ongoing delay in appointing a special envoy to Myanmar is claiming lives.

"Issue by issue, ASEAN shows problems within, the largest of which is that they cannot even agree on a special envoy," Welsh added. "Every day that there isn't a special envoy, every day that the Myanmar military basically shows the regional organization was played out easily is a day where ASEAN's credibility on everything it does is being undermined."

In May, the NUG announced a People's Defense Force (PDF) it claimed would be a precursor to a "federal union army" in a sign of growing national-level armed resistance. Fighting has since flared in several parts of the country as various ethnic armed organizations and newly formed militias take aim at the junta.

Violence in the country has not abated since the summit in Jakarta, though the number of reported casualties killed by security forces has fallen compared to March and April. At least 860 people have died and more than 4,800 remain jailed, according to the local monitoring group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.

With patience wearing thin and ASEAN's de-escalation strategy having hit a wall amid an upsurge of bombings and shootings targeting security forces around Yangon, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi publicly appealed for help from China when ASEAN foreign ministers met their Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Chongqing on June 7.

In a rare call for Beijing to assert leadership by using its leverage with Myanmar's junta, Marsudi said China's support to "follow up on the five points of consensus will be highly appreciated because this will contribute to efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis." She added that ASEAN's task is to implement the consensus "immediately."

As a key supplier of military equipment and strategic investments, Beijing wields big influence in Naypyitaw. China had carefully cultivated a diplomatic relationship with Suu Kyi during her tenure as state counselor and was among the first countries to congratulate her landslide victory in the November 2020 elections. The junta asserts the elections were fraudulent, an unsubstantiated claim the generals have advanced to justify the coup.

But following the military's takeover, China's state-run Xinhua news agency described the putsch that toppled Suu Kyi's government as a mere "cabinet reshuffle." Anti-China sentiments have since hit fever-pitch in Myanmar, fuelled by Beijing's unwillingness to condemn the military crackdown and mounting perceptions that it has sided with the junta.

The Chinese embassy in Myanmar voiced hope for "the restoration of peace and stability" in a June 5 statement that controversially referred to the junta chief as "the leader of Myanmar." According to the statement, Min Aung Hlaing told Chinese ambassador Chen Hai that he was willing to work with ASEAN on implementing the five-point consensus.

"China and all other ASEAN dialogue partners, including the United States, will continue to voice theoretical support for the five-point consensus as a way to signal their support for ASEAN. That is a matter of polite diplomacy. But Beijing is surely as aware as everyone else that the five-point consensus is already irrelevant," said Washington-based Poling.

"If China can be convinced to support a process within Myanmar, it will be by getting the ethnic armed groups along its border to engage in a future dialogue with the NUG and SAC if the escalating violence eventually forces the junta to the table. But that point is months away and will be unlikely to involve ASEAN as more than an afterthought," he added.

Bejing will ultimately "play ball with whoever's in power," according to academic Welsh. That, she says, owes to China's deep strategic interests in Myanmar, which provides China with mineral and natural gas resources and land access to the Indian Ocean via critical infrastructure projects supporting connectivity between the two neighbors.

"I think it's pretty clear that China is looking out for China, and has become an advocate for the Myanmar regime, if not explicitly, then very quietly," she said. "The reality is that China is pushing towards recognition internationally and is putting a lot of pressure on ASEAN members. And keep in mind, it puts pressure on Brunei as well."

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, said that with Brunei serving both as ASEAN's chair and its secretary-general, "the onus is on the sultanate to coordinate closely and share decision-making with other member states" that are more critical of the junta.

Apart from a lack of transparency in managing the Myanmar crisis, Bandar Seri Begawan has been "deferential and courteous to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing at the expense of ASEAN leverage... taking more of an appeasement line toed by the other ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and even Thailand," said the Thai academic.

"Clearly, the Myanmar crisis is also ASEAN's existential crisis about what kind of organization it is with such a wide spectrum of democratic and autocratic regimes," Thitinan opined.

"Giving too much space and recognition to the junta undermines the parallel NUG that draws its legitimacy from elections last November and betrays the pro-democracy movement inside the country," he told Asia Times. "No wonder ASEAN is being cursed in households across Myanmar."

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SINGAPORE - Fire and flames ate away at the flag of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during heated protests on the streets of Mandalay, Myanmar's second-largest city, last weekend after two emissaries from the regional organization met with junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

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JE YANG CAMP, Myanmar

Uprooted for nearly a decade, women in displacement camps in Myanmar's Kachin State are finding new ways to support their families as coronavirus restrictions squeeze livelihoods and aid.

The New Humanitarian spoke with three women in Je Yang about life in long-term displacement, their hopes for peace, and how the coronavirus has forced communities in Myanmar's northern borderlands to contend with new worries.

June marked nine years since conflict resumed between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and Myanmar's military, ending a 17-year ceasefire. Since 2011, the conflict has displaced more than 100,000 people, including some 38,000 living in KIO-controlled areas near the Chinese border.

Je Yang, Kachin's largest internal displacement camp, holds 8,700 people. They live in cramped shelters perched along mountainous terrain near the KIO base of Laiza.

The women who spoke with TNH - Marip Bawk Nu, 49; Labang Nan Doi, 56; and Lashi Lu, 48 - are the main providers for their families. Female-headed homes are common in Je Yang and other displacement camps. Some men have lost their lives to war or to landmines, while others serve in the KIO or leave in search of work in China or in Kachin's vast jade mines at Hpakant, a government-controlled area about 250 kilometres away.

Before the pandemic, the women all earned a living mainly working on banana, coffee, and peppercorn farms and small construction sites in China's Yunnan Province, returning in the evenings to collect water and cook for their families.

But Yunnan closed its borders with Myanmar in March, putting many people out of work. Most now struggle to find any income at all on the Kachin side.

The women say they are barely able to meet basic food needs, buy soap or masks, or pay for their children to return to school. Humanitarian access has been restricted for years.

But the women say they still dream of peace - and the day they can safely return to farming their own land.

"Whenever I think of my home, livestock, and farm, I am heartbroken," Bawk Nu said. "Not knowing whether I can return, I feel hopeless, like I am in a dark place."

A long-running civil war

Conflict has simmered for decades on multiple fronts in parts of Myanmar. The Kachin conflict, which began in 1961, is one of the longest-running civil wars in the world.

The KIO is one of numerous ethnic armed organisations pushing for political autonomy from the central government - and with it, a greater share of resource control - since Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948.

Eleven armed organisations, but not the KIO, have signed on to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which the government touted as a major step toward peace when it introduced the accord in 2015. But progress stalled in the ensuing years, and plans for formal peace talks with the KIO and its allies have paused during the coronavirus pandemic.

Rice, oil, and salt

A woman in Je Yang IDP camp collects her family's rations, which are available every two months.

Food, healthcare, and shelter in Je Yang are a challenge at the best of times.

It has always been difficult to make ends meet and feed their families, the women who spoke to TNH said. The coronavirus border closures and the loss of jobs have made things worse, they added.

UN travel to KIO-controlled areas has been blocked since June 2016, and local organisations have at times been accused of breaking the law when delivering aid. Associating with the KIO or its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army, can carry a prison sentence of two to three years. Donor funding is also stretched thin; food rations in IDP camps in KIO-controlled areas are limited to rice, oil, and salt.

With COVID-19, fewer jobs

Nan Doi picks peppercorns as a daily worker on a Chinese-owned farm near Je Yang IDP camp.

Farm labour is one of the only ways IDPs in Je Yang and other border camps can earn money, but opportunities to work have plummeted with the March border closures.

Before the pandemic, laborers usually earned about 40 yuan ($5.70) per day working for Chinese employers on both sides of the border, women told TNH. Men typically earned 10 yuan more at the same worksites - some employers pay women a lower daily rate than men, while others pay based on the size of the harvest collected.

"It is exhausting work," said Nan Doi, describing her most common job carrying bananas. "Sometimes I sweat too much and it makes me unwell."

After the border with Yunnan province closed, Nan Doi began working on a peppercorn farm near Je Yang. Although she's paid roughly the same as she earned in China, work is only available two days a week. The harvesting season is about to end, and Nan Doi does not know where she will go next.

Nan Doi, whose husband passed away in 2003, is a grandmother who supports a family of four.

Other women are still searching for work.

Displaced from her village and farmland when the Kachin conflict erupted in 2011, Bawk Nu has persevered to keep her family healthy and educated in Je Yang. Her wages as a daily farm labourer supported her five children's education.

But she hasn't found work in a month. Bawk Nu's two daughters have finished secondary school, but she worries about her three younger sons. The KIO offers schooling from primary to post-secondary levels; tuition is free or less than $10 per year, though students must cover the cost of books.

'Help us have a safe place'

Lashi Lu sits in her shelter in Je Yang. She fled her village in 2011 with her two children, mother-in-law, and niece.

"Since I became an IDP, things got harder and harder and I became dependent on humanitarian aid," said Lashi Lu. "I don't feel like my life is developing."

Unable to find work since the pandemic, she has been foraging for edible plants and leaves. But sometimes her family only eats plain rice with oil and salt.

Hope is fading for a return to the life she remembers before the war. "Sometimes, I don't even think I will be alive when peace comes," Lashi Lu said.

In the past year, the government has pushed to close some northern IDP camps and accelerate returns. But organised returns and resettlements beginning in early 2019 have been fraught with controversy due to the lack of a ceasefire in Kachin, as well as widespread landmine contamination. Mines have killed or injured at least 26 civilians in Kachin and northern Shan states this year, rights groups say.

Lashi Lu said she would not feel safe going back to her village because of the threat of landmines, even if there were a ceasefire. Instead, she hopes to start fresh somewhere else.

"I want the government to build us proper houses, churches, and schools," she said. "I want international and local organisations to build us shelters and help us have a safe place."

Running low on soap and masks

Women walk past a vinyl banner displaying coronavirus protection information in Jinghpaw, a Kachin language.

Women who spoke to TNH said they try to follow COVID-19 prevention guidelines, but donated soap and masks are running out and they cannot afford to buy more.

Myanmar has reported more than 300 cases nationwide as of 2 July, though testing has been limited. No COVID-19 cases have been reported in KIO-controlled areas.

On 11 June, a nurse responsible for screening returning migrant workers at a government-controlled border gate in Kachin tested positive for COVID-19, sparking renewed alarm in border areas. Although no one coming into contact with her has yet tested positive, the KIO has increased movement restrictions, further limiting livelihood options.

Containing an outbreak in IDP camps would be difficult. Each shelter houses multiple families, and water and sanitation facilities are communal. In Je Yang, there are 57 bathing areas and 273 latrines for 8,700 people.

The KIO has formed a COVID-19 prevention committee, and has worked with local aid groups to build hand-washing stations and share health safety messages. But healthcare and coronavirus treatment options are limited in areas under KIO control.

'I really want this war to end'

Women gather to pray in a shelter in Je Yang.

Most Kachin are Christian, and faith is a source of inspiration. Many IDP camps in Kachin are on church grounds, while several local aid providers are faith-based groups.

Nan Doi, Bawk Nu, and Lashi Lu said they long for the day when they can safely return to their old way of life.

"I think both sides should stop fighting and come to peace," said Nan Doi. "I hope I can work on my own farmland soon."

She added: "I am tired of being an IDP with so many adversities. I really want this war to end."
Ring Nu Awng photographed this story in Je Yang. Nhkum La Nu reported from Myitkyina, Myanmar, and Fishbein reported from Falmouth, United States. Additional contributions by Jaw Tu Hkawng in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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In photos: Coronavirus adds new pressure on displaced Kachin women

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JE YANG CAMP, Myanmar Uprooted for nearly a decade, women in displacement camps in Myanmar's Kachin State are finding new ways to support their families as coronavirus restrictions squeeze livelihoods and aid. The New Humanitarian spoke with three women in Je Yang about life in long-term displacement, their hopes for peace, and how the coronavirus has forced communities in Myanmar's northern borderlands to contend with new worries.

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Inside the interrogation room of a Myanmar detention center, what Myat remembers most clearly is looking up from the floor and everything being green. The officials questioning him sat on green plastic chairs behind a green table on a thin green carpet. Myat, a Burmese student in his mid-20s, was arrested in late March in Yangon, one of hundreds of young people who have been detained for protesting the military coup that occurred in February. Myat is a pseudonym: To protect his identity, The Intercept is withholding his real name and the specific date of his arrest.

"When they first caught me, about 30 police just beat me up quite badly. They also dragged me on the road for about 100 meters and I think I lost consciousness," Myat said. "But somehow I wasn't bleeding, so they kept beating me until I bled."

In the police car following his arrest, Myat was forced to unlock his smartphone, which was subsequently confiscated. Then he was moved to a secretive military compound in Shwepyithar Township, which the junta has been using to detain protesters, journalists, and others swept up in mass arrests. Myat was questioned by soldiers who only months before shared power with democratically elected civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who nevertheless presided over a genocide by the same military of the Muslim Rohingya people, displacing some 740,000 to neighboring Bangladesh and according to United Nations investigators, killing more than 10,000.

On February 1, soldiers arrested Aung San Suu Kyi in an early morning raid. The military then declared a state of emergency and took control of the country. For the past four months, mass protests have spread throughout Myanmar, as hundreds of thousands have demonstrated against military rule.

In response, the Myanmar military and police have engaged in an increasingly violent crackdown, killing over 860 protesters and bystanders, injuring thousands, and brutally torturing political prisoners. The generals have restricted internet access; blocked Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Instagram; and used smartphone data as evidence for mass arrests.

According to leaked budget documents from Myanmar's Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Transport and Communications, which were provided by the activist group Justice for Myanmar, the military and police sought to buy a collection of forensic and surveillance technology from American, Chinese, Russian, and European companies between 2018 and 2021 that could extract data from smartphones, access phone conversations, and monitor people's movements. While it's unclear which of these products are currently being used, people who've been detained in Myanmar over the last two months report having had to unlock and hand over their smartphones, sometimes under duress.

One of the products currently in the possession of Myanmar's security forces is a digital forensic tool from the Swedish company MSAB. It's the European equivalent of Cellebrite, the Israeli company known for its phone-hacking devices, which also appears in the leaked documents; MSAB's technology is able to break mobile phone encryption and extract call, contact, GPS, and other records, as well as messages sent and received via SMS, WhatsApp, Signal, and other apps. MSAB's products can also extract passwords and login tokens from mobile devices, allowing authorities to remotely enter someone's online services, including Google, Facebook, cloud storage, and others.

MSAB confirmed that it sold its forensic tools to Myanmar police in 2019, two years after security forces targeted the Rohingya in what the U.N. said could amount to crimes against humanity. According to the leaked budget documents, as well as tender documents found on government websites, MSAB also intended to sell a number of phone extraction products to Myanmar's Bureau of Special Investigations in 2021 via a third-party distributor called MySpace International. The BSI is the intelligence arm of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees domestic security and has long been controlled by the military. Following the February coup, MSAB called off the deal. Yet the company's earlier products remain in the hands of Myanmar's security forces.

MSAB states publicly that its vision is to make the world a safer place. At the same time, the company sold phone extraction hardware to a government still partially run by the military, widely condemned for an ongoing genocide, and known for its suppression of activists and journalists. And the European Union is investing in MSAB's growth. Indeed, EU research money has developed technology that feeds into the same products that MSAB sold to Myanmar in 2019.

In response to critical questions about the 2019 sale, MSAB has said that limited technology was sold to police working for a civilian government and that the licenses for these forensic devices were canceled after the 2021 coup. Still, the scenario raises important questions about EU efforts to create tools for the security sector inside and outside the bloc. How should countries regulate the export of surveillance and forensic technology to places where there is a high risk of abuse, especially if that technology is being developed with public funds?

The Race to Develop Digital Forensics

MSAB is one of several European companies on the receiving end of public EU funding whose products appear in the leaked budget documents. Myanmar's Ministry of Transport and Communications was under military control until the civilian government came into power in 2016, and its IT and Cyber Security Department assists with police investigations. The Ministry of Home Affairs remained under military control even during the civilian government. The past two ministers - Lieutenants General Soe Htut and Kyaw Swe - were both former spy chiefs.

Funding for MSAB and others comes from the EU's flagship technological research program Horizon Europe, previously known as Horizon 2020. MSAB is the lead technology company on the "Formobile" project, a consortium of 19 companies, research institutions, and police departments set up in 2019 to develop technology to unlock mobile devices without user consent and extract and analyze data as evidence in criminal investigations.

In particular, the project members hope to develop technology to run these processes on counterfeit phones that are not typically available in Europe, Christian Hummert, a forensic researcher in Germany and coordinator of the Formobile project, told The Intercept. These types of devices, which present a challenge for European police accustomed to working with standard iOS and Android phones, are especially important because, as Hummert put it, they are often used by "foreign criminal groups with or by people coming to Europe from Africa or from Asia."

Hummert added that the majority of deliverables from the project - which received just under 7 million euros ($8.5 million) in public money from the EU - would feed directly into MSAB's products.

"It was as though we were sitting at the table where criminals were chatting among themselves."

One of the bloc's research priorities has been to rapidly develop digital forensics, a field that encompasses a vast array of technologies that police say are needed to help solve crimes. Such was the case in June 2020, when European police cracked an encrypted communications network and intercepted information about planned arms sales, murders, and torture, leading to hundreds of arrests. "It was as though we were sitting at the table where criminals were chatting among themselves," Jannine van den Berg, chief of the Dutch National Police Force, told the Associated Press.

This technology is not just being used by European police, but also by asylum officials. One of MSAB's flagship products quickly scans and analyzes the data on a person's smartphone; along with other software, it is used in Germany by asylum officials to "verify" the identity of asylum-seekers by assessing outgoing and incoming messages and calls, country domain data from internet browsers, language used in texts, and geolocation data.

In early June, the use of smartphone data to influence asylum requests was declared illegal by Berlin's regional court, showing that the technology's deployment inside the bloc may be outpacing European legal systems. Meanwhile, the sale of digital forensic products to countries outside the bloc such as Myanmar poses a new challenge for those who have been working to regulate technology exports that could be used to violate human rights.

Marietje Schaake was a Dutch member of the European Parliament in 2009, when reporting revealed that Nokia Siemens Networks, a joint venture between Germany's Siemens and Finland's Nokia companies, had exported surveillance technology to Iran, including a product to monitor telephone calls. Nokia's technology was used to monitor leaders of the Green movement. Schaake said she didn't want the EU exporting technology that could be used to spy on opposition leaders and stifle dissent.

Hoping to limit the sale of surveillance, hacking, and exfiltration technologies, Schaake and several other parliament members turned to an EU regulation based on the Wassenaar Arrangement, an international export control agreement that governs dual-use items as well as conventional arms. Dual-use products are those that have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes. When Wassenaar was created in 1996, smartphones didn't exist; its dual-use technology list was limited to computers, telecoms, and IT security. Over the next 10 years, Schaake pushed to change EU regulations to tackle emerging technology and try to prevent sales that could bolster the power of authoritarian-leaning regimes.

Schaake left the parliament in 2019 and is now the international policy director at Stanford University's Cyber Policy Center. Later this year, the changes she fought for will finally come into effect: The EU's new dual-use regulation will regulate "cyber-surveillance technology," and the potential for human rights violations will become a key criterion for limiting exports. Whether or not MSAB's 2019 sales to Myanmar would be prohibited under the new regulation will depend on Sweden's interpretation and updates to its exports policy.

"I would have loved to have a stronger discussion about what is the desirable role of such technologies," Schaake said. "But short of that, I think what becomes more important then is the context in which it can and cannot be used."

Unregulated Spy Tools

While the EU has its own dual-use export control regulation, each member country has its own national body that approves or denies export licenses for dual-use technology. MSAB applied to Sweden's regulator for permission to sell its phone-hacking products in Myanmar in 2018. According to that regulator, Inspectorate of Strategic Products, the application was not approved due to the technology's ability to break encryption.

In response to what it described as "systematic grave human rights violations" by Myanmar's military and security forces, the EU also put in place an embargo on exporting dual-use products in 2018, specifically prohibiting the export of "equipment for monitoring communications that might be used for internal repression."

The products that were eventually sold to Myanmar the following year were "not the most powerful levels of our technology," explained Mike Dickinson, chief business development officer at MSAB. In a blog post on MSAB's website, the company's chair, Henrik Tjernberg, wrote that the products lacked the ability to break a phone's encryption or recover deleted data. According to a spokesperson for the Swedish export regulator, this is the same modification that allowed MSAB to export to Myanmar despite the initial application denial. Yet data analysis and extraction tools can still be used against a person's will - such as when a detainee is forced to unlock a phone that is then searched.

The same year it sold its forensic technology to the police in Myanmar, MSAB began work on the EU-funded Formobile project.

The same year it sold its forensic technology to the police in Myanmar, MSAB began work on the EU-funded Formobile project. MSAB confirmed that some results from the Formobile project have already been incorporated into its extraction software, called XRY. A blog post on the Formobile website also describes updates to MSAB's extracted data visualization tool, XAMN. According to the leaked budget documents, Myanmar authorities sought to buy both tools, as well as MSAB products related to counterfeit phone compatibility, cloud token extraction, and other technology directly related to Formobile's work. Still, it's unlikely that any results from the project made it into updates for the MSAB forensic devices in Myanmar before February 2021, when the company says they canceled the licenses.

Dickinson told The Intercept that MSAB's sales to Myanmar were licit given the country's democratic elections in 2015 after decades of military rule. But local analysts say that a short look at Myanmar's political context would call this reasoning into question. Even during Aung San Suu Kyi's tenure, 25 percent of parliament seats were reserved for the military, which continued to wield influence. Journalists were also subject to persecution: In 2017, two Reuters journalists were arrested and jailed for 500 days for investigating the army's killing of 10 Rohingya Muslim men and boys. Police in Myanmar used forensic tools from Cellebrite - MSAB's largest competitor - to extract data from the journalists' phones and wield it as evidence against them.

"I think the argument that, you know, it was fine because you're selling to a government led by a Nobel laureate just shows a lack of due diligence on the country's context," said a political analyst in Yangon who asked to remain anonymous due to security concerns. "You essentially had parallel centers of power at the top between the military and the civilian government. And the military control not only the armed forces, but also the police force, and also had substantial political power."

"People who get spied on by this stuff should be able to sue the company and the government and get remedies."

"When you look at the framework for human rights in Myanmar, it's just not fit for purpose," the analyst said. "There are no human rights protections on issues like surveillance, data privacy, and data protection."

While Wassenaar attempts to provide transparency and a guiding framework to the issue of technology exports, some say the arrangement will struggle to keep up with the pace of technological change and is unlikely to prevent technology from winding up in the hands of those who want to buy it.

Cindy Cohn, the executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, says that export regulations might not be the best tool for keeping surveillance tools out of the hands of authoritarian regimes. Cohn argues that means for legal redress are needed when European or American surveillance technology is used to spy on citizens. "I think people who get spied on by this stuff should be able to sue the company and the government and get remedies. We've got all these tools out there in the world that are basically letting foreign governments wiretap citizens anywhere in the world without any legal process whatsoever."

But beyond that, Cohn said, is a larger conversation about what kinds of surveillance and forensic technology should be developed and used, regardless of their potential exports. "I think that the problems with these spy tools are not just the problems of them being used by 'bad foreign governments,'" said Cohn. "I think we need to talk about the use of these spy tools by the 'good governments' that we like, and how uncontrolled and unregulated it is." In the U.S., Cohn added, "The big question for a lot of companies now is, should they sell to ICE?"

An Opaque System

When he was released, Myat got his phone back, but friends warned him not to use the same SIM card. He didn't know which parts of his phone had been accessed during his four days in prison. Myat did a factory reset on the phone and now only uses it on Wi-Fi in hopes that he can avoid ongoing surveillance.

Myat still has pain that sometimes jolts his body; when he coughs or sneezes, his ribs and chest ache. He emphasized that the beatings he experienced during his arrest and imprisonment were nothing compared to the suffering of others. "There were one or two detainees from the student unions; they were taken away with black hoods over their heads and they didn't come back."

Myat and other detainees who made it out now lack any redress mechanisms to find out if their data was copied from their phones or if they are still being monitored.

In the EU's race to develop cutting-edge security technology, some of the biggest funding recipients have been arms companies and those building surveillance and forensic tools for law enforcement and border security. Critics say the bloc should be doing more to regulate what new technology is created and where it can be exported, and to make those transactions transparent. "A lot of these companies are not keen to say, 'We're selling to military intelligence in this or that country,'" said Schaake, the former Dutch MEP. "It's an opaque system that we want to open up."

According to Dickinson, the MSAB executive, after the February coup the company stopped plans for any future collaboration with Myanmar and revoked the licenses on the forensic technology it sold two years ago. At least, he said, that meant whoever now had the devices wouldn't be able to update them. Such a distinction means little for Myat and Myanmar's citizens, who are facing the possibility of life under an increasingly violent and well-equipped military dictatorship. Is MSAB confident that its devices aren't currently being used in Myanmar?

Dickinson wouldn't say.
With additional reporting by Thin Lei Win.
Correction: June 15, 2021
This article has been updated to clarify the relationship between the Wassenaar Arrangement and the EU's dual-use export regime.

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Tools for Repression in Myanmar Expose Gap Between EU Tech Investment and Regulation

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Inside the interrogation room of a Myanmar detention center, what Myat remembers most clearly is looking up from the floor and everything being green. The officials questioning him sat on green plastic chairs behind a green table on a thin green carpet.

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Two Canadian companies have sold digital tools to authorities in Myanmar that can be used to extract and decrypt information from computers and cellphones, raising fears that the country's coup regime is using them to target its opponents.

Both OpenText and Magnet Forensics say they sold the equipment before the coup earlier this year and have halted any further sales to Myanmar. Neither company's previous sales appear to violate Canadian sanctions that bar direct transactions with the country's military.

But the tools for accessing information from digital devices, including deleted data, remain in the hands of Myanmar authorities now that the military has removed the country's civilian government.

Human-rights advocates say the sale of such tools to Myanmar gives authorities there Western-backed technological capacity to monitor and interfere with people who have opposed the junta and fought the regime. Across Myanmar, dissidents say security forces are routinely stopping people to examine phones and search for anti-military content.

Myanmar budgetary records were obtained by Justice For Myanmar, a research and advocacy group, and were further analyzed by investigative journalism organizations Lighthouse Reports and the Organized Crime and Corruption Project.

The records show that Myanmar's transport and communications ministry bought equipment for a digital forensics lab for retained data and devices. Among the acquisitions were Magnet AXIOM and Magnet AXIOM Cloud - both made by Magnet Forensics - as well as EnCase Forensic V8 and EnCase Mobile Investigator, made by OpenText.

They are powerful tools that give authorities the ability to peer deeply into a device by decrypting messages, reviving deleted data, bypassing passwords and accessing cloud storage and social-media accounts.

Authorities in Myanmar routinely seek information from digital devices.

"Seizing a phone is a normal phenomenon in [Myanmar]," said Ko Ting Oo, General Secretary of the All Arakan Students' & Youths' Congress, which has advocated for democracy in the country.

"After seizing the phone, they check all of the data on the detainee's phone. They even check people's phone on the bus or vehicles in their check points. They check Messenger, Viber, Facebook status."

In particular, authorities are searching for any content that could be deemed to be "against them."

In statements, the Canadian companies said they had sold their technology to the Myanmar government before the Feb. 1, 2021, military takeover.

"Following the coup, we terminated all relationships with the government of Myanmar and no longer provide any support or product updates," said Chris Plunkett, vice-president of corporate communications at OpenText. The company is "in full compliance" with Canadian sanctions, he said.

Magnet Forensics said in a corporate statement that it "has monitored developments in Myanmar carefully. In 2020, given the deteriorating human-rights situation, the company decided to not renew the single licence of its software in the country held by the Myanmar Police and to restrict any future sales in the jurisdiction."

The tools continue to be functional even without updates, although their ability to extract data can diminish over time as the makers of cellphones and apps change the way they store information.

Digital forensics technology, like that sold by the two companies, can be a valuable tool for authorities to monitor and disrupt illicit activity, such as sexual exploitation, drug networks and human trafficking.

Over the past few years, the government of Canada has funded Project Relay, an Interpol initiative that has delivered training and technology to Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. It is designed "to tackle the growing challenges posed by migrant smuggling in these regions," Interpol says, and includes "providing technology to strengthen operational capabilities, particularly at key border points."

Canada's support for that program, which has included federal spending of up to $18-million a year, has been controversial. Last year, then-foreign affairs minister François-Philippe Champagne told the CBC that "the biggest victims of these irregular migratory flows are often women and children. Our position, our funding, is aimed at stopping those flows."

The Myanmar budget documents show the acquisition of surveillance and digital forensic technology from 40 Western manufacturers and developers, according to a Lighthouse Reports analysis.

Justice For Myanmar has been bluntly critical: "Any international business that supplies arms and dual-use goods to Myanmar is complicit in the shocking human-rights violations inflicted on the people," the group said in a statement.

Inside Myanmar, those who have opposed the coup say they worry about how the military regime could use the sophisticated capabilities enabled by the technology from Canada and other countries.

One of the most frequent requests to Access Now, which operates a digital-security helpline for civil society around the world, is about the military seeking to take over the accounts of citizens, said Raman Jit Singh Chima, global cybersecurity lead for the organization.

"Right now, the junta is very, very keen to be able to monitor, track and as far as possible intercept communications of people at a mass-surveillance level," he said. They are "targeting people they regard as critics and potential opponents."

Companies such as Magnet describe their tools as digital forensic products that cannot, for example, intercept data as it travels through networks to a cellphone.

But "the line between what some firms call forensics technology and what is in fact surveillance technology is very thin," Mr. Chima said.

It has been clear for much of the past year that selling to Myanmar could be problematic, he said, pointing to a government crackdown on dissidents and journalists that long preceded the coup.

Any company that has sold technology to Myanmar in that time should know "what sort of complicated and human-rights-infringing environment they've been entering into," he said.
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Two Canadian companies sold Myanmar powerful tools capable of extracting phone data

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Two Canadian companies have sold digital tools to authorities in Myanmar that can be used to extract and decrypt information from computers and cellphones, raising fears that the country's coup regime is using them to target its opponents. Both OpenText and Magnet Forensics say they sold the equipment before the coup earlier this year and have halted any further sales to Myanmar.

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During the 1970s and 1980s, when international terrorism was capturing global headlines and exercising the minds of governments and security experts, there were heated arguments over how to describe this kind of political violence. It was more than just a theoretical exercise, as a rigorous definition of terrorism was required, not just for greater clarity in diplomatic exchanges and academic debates, but also to make policies and laws surrounding responses to this particular threat.

Countless definitions were offered, but few were very helpful. Some academic efforts were so long and detailed that they were impractical. Others, including a few that eventually found their way into formal legal instruments, were so broad and ambiguous that they could potentially be applied to almost any form of political protest. In the end, most professionals working in the field accepted that a universally applicable definition was impossible.

A key reason for this was that the term "terrorism", strictly speaking a name coined to describe a specific set of violent actions, had become so hopelessly politicised that it could not be applied objectively. Also, in the public mind at least, it was always accompanied by a heavy overlay of moral and emotional considerations. These problems were encapsulated in the maxim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" or, put more simply, "terrorism is what the bad guys do".

This debate has risen again in the context of the current conflict in Myanmar, which has evolved since the February coup from peaceful street protests against the police and armed forces (or Tatmadaw), into a new kind of civil war that threatens to engulf the entire country.

Even if only a small minority of activists conducts bombings and assassinations in Myanmar's urban centres, such a campaign is likely to be seen as representative of the whole opposition movement.

Exploiting popular notions of the term, the junta has branded as terrorists the nation-wide opposition movement, its "National Unity Government" (NUG) and self-styled "defence forces". The opposition movement has in turn labelled the Tatmadaw a terrorist organisation, and branded its brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protesters as "state terrorism". This reciprocal name-calling seems aimed mainly at international audiences, from whom both sides hope to win support.

In this regard, however, the position of the opposition movement has been complicated by the emergence of a number of shadowy groups which are conducting campaigns of terrorist-style attacks against the junta and its supporters. They apparently hope to inspire continued resistance to the regime among the civilian population, while draining the resources and weakening the morale of the security forces.

Since the coup, there have reportedly been more than 300 bombs detonated by opposition elements across the country, in cities and towns, against military bases and police stations, and at the offices and homes of those deemed traitors to the democratic cause. Some have caused unintended casualties. For example, last month a parcel bomb sent to the wedding of a well-known "nationalist" appears to have killed his new wife and two guests.

There have also been assassinations conducted by members of the opposition movement. According to unconfirmed news reports, the targets have included soldiers, police, local officials, suspected informers and others known to support the new military regime. Some victims have been shot or stabbed, while others were killed in bomb blasts. At least one was reportedly kidnapped and later murdered.

These attacks have been associated with, but separate from, the insurgency campaigns being conducted in rural districts by long-established ethnic armed organisations (EAO), and local self-defence " militias " that have been created over the past few months.

It is perhaps not surprising that opposition members have eschewed Aung San Suu Kyi's non-violent approach.

The anger of Myanmar's pro-democracy movement in the face of the military regime's brutal repression is understandable. According to dissident sources, more than 845 people have been killed since 1 February and at least 4,500 have been arrested. Many appear to have been tortured. The Tatmadaw leadership has shown no sign of reconsidering its decision to overthrow Aung San Suu Kyi's popularly elected government.

There is also considerable frustration with the international community's apparent lack of response to these events. Repeated calls for UN intervention, for example under the "Responsibility to Protect" convention, have gone unanswered. Despite pleas, there have been no moves by foreign countries to recognise the NUG. Many governments have expressed concern about internal developments in Myanmar and a few have imposed sanctions, but these measures have been seen by the opposition movement as too little, too late.

In these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that opposition members have eschewed Aung San Suu Kyi's non-violent approach and taken more extreme steps. Many protesters have armed themselves with home-made weapons. Chinese businesses in Myanmar have been attacked, to protest Beijing's support for the generals. Also, 1,000 or more pro-democracy activists have taken to the jungle, to receive weapons training from EAOs. Some seem to envisage a rural guerrilla campaign, but others have clearly had something else in mind.

Even if only a small minority of activists conducts bombings and assassinations in Myanmar's urban centres, such a campaign is likely to be seen as representative of the whole opposition movement. This raises some difficult political and moral questions.

Politics will always play a major role in the classification of different forms of violent protest, but a clandestine urban campaign of assassinations and bombings to achieve political ends falls within most accepted definitions of terrorism. As such, it is a propaganda gift to the junta, particularly when innocent people are killed or injured. Such attacks also permit the generals to raise broader questions about the motives of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy and, by implication, the whole democratic project in Myanmar.

The use of these tactics also restricts the scope for foreign governments and international organisations to assist the opposition movement. The Western democracies and the UN, for example, could never publicly endorse a terrorist campaign, no matter how noble the cause and how great the provocation. They must uphold, and be seen to be upholding, the comprehensive legal structure that has been developed over the past 50 years to help manage the global terrorism problem.

Myanmar's opposition movement is desperate, and doubtless feels that it has few options in its fight against a powerful and ruthless security apparatus that is gradually forcing its will on the civil population, at great cost. Yet, by choosing a clandestine campaign of terrorist-style attacks, some of its members may be contributing to the movement's longer term political problems.

A collected volume of Andrew Selth's Interpreter columns on Myanmar, Interpreting Myanmar: A Decade of Analysis, was recently published by ANU Press.

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Myanmar, terrorism and the demands of international politics

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During the 1970s and 1980s, when international terrorism was capturing global headlines and exercising the minds of governments and security experts, there were heated arguments over how to describe this kind of political violence.

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Beyond the Coup in Myanmar: The Emerging New Politics of Gen Z

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( Editor's Note : This article is part of a Just Security series on the Feb. 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar. The series brings together expert local and international voices on the coup and its broader context. The series is a collaboration between Just Security and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School).

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Myanmar's parallel National Unity Government (NUG) called on China to engage with them to find a solution to the country's political crisis, while warning that any attempts to legitimize the military regime would risk undermining people to people relations between the two countries.

In its open letter to China's State Councilor and foreign minister Wang Yi on Monday, the NUG said that they are "deeply concerned" that China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have failed to adequately engage with the NUG in efforts to find solutions to Myanmar's problems.

The letter said that NUG ministers "look forward to the opportunity to engage in constructive dialogue with China through both bilateral and multilateral platforms". It also said that they are available to engage with China's ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, at his convenience.

In early April, a counselor from the Chinese embassy in Yangon spoke by phone with members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the NUG's parliamentary committee.

The NUG's call for Chinese engagement came a few days after its condemnation of ASEAN for its one-sided engagement with the junta to find solutions for Myanmar's post-coup problems while neglecting the NUG.

Myanmar, one of ASEAN's member countries, has suffered politically, economically and socially since the military takeover of the country. The regime has killed over 800 anti-coup protesters and with armed insurgencies in both urban and border areas, the country's instability has become a pressing regional concern.

China has continued to support ASEAN's efforts to address the crisis in Myanmar. However, the NUG said that there has been "little progress" so far due to the lack of a mechanism that might hold coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing accountable and pressure him to proactively take steps to peacefully end the crisis through dialogue.

"Min Aung Hlaing has noted that ASEAN efforts can begin once stability is achieved in the country, and this position should be strongly rejected by both China and ASEAN. There will be no stability until the legitimate government is restored," it said.

China is currently hosting a Special China-ASEAN summit June 6-8 th in Chongqing, marking the 30th anniversary of the first China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, and a Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Forum Ministers Meeting. Myanmar is the co-chair with China for the meetings and junta-appointed foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin is attending.

The NUG also said that both China and ASEAN have failed to engage with the NUG for the foreign ministers' meeting, while the Chinese side has failed to consult the NUG and instead moved forward with preparations for the LMC with the regime.

That move, the NUG said, risks undermining Myanmar's participation in a critical regional organization and "further threatens the ability of the LMC to address important regional security threats".

Prior to the China-ASEAN meeting, Ambassador Chen Hai met Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw last Friday. The ambassador referred to the coup leader as "Myanmar leader" and reiterated China's support for ASEAN efforts in solving Myanmar's crisis. The reference [as Myanmar leader] sparked ire from the Myanmar people. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/china-supports-aseans-engagement-with-myanmar-junta.html

The NUG's letter read, "The Chinese government should take note that the [junta-governing body] State Administrative Council established by Min Aung Hlaing does not represent the people of Myanmar, and that efforts to legitimize it as the government of Myanmar risk undermining people to people relations between the two countries."

Shortly after the coup, China described the Myanmar military's takeover - internationally condemned as a coup - as a "major cabinet reshuffle". China, along with Russia, also blocked efforts by the United Nations Security Council to condemn the coup, insisting that the seizure of power from the democratically-elected government was an internal affair.

On Monday, during the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, China's Wang Yi said that China continues to play a constructive role and supports ASEAN's constructive engagement in Myanmar affairs as the "Myanmar situation is directly related to China's interests".

ASEAN set out a five-point consensus at a special summit in late April to engage with Myanmar through the appointment of a special envoy and by providing humanitarian support.

Wang Yi added that China and ASEAN share similar views regarding Myanmar's affairs, and repeated previous Chinese calls for a cessation of violence and the holding of political dialogue. China also urged the international community to abide by the aims and policies of the United Nations Universal Charter so that it "will not act to impose one-sided sanctions and inappropriate intervention".

You may also like these stories: Myanmar's Parallel Govt Calls on Civilians to Report Regime Atrocities for Prosecutions Myanmar Junta to Sell More Timber in Search for Hard Currency Under Myanmar Regime's House Arrest, Suu Kyi Short on Cash for Food
Topics: Asean, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Beijing, Chen Hai, China, China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Coup, junta, Lancang Mekong Cooperation Forum, LMC, military regime, National Unity Government, NUG, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, State Administrative Council, U Wunna Maung Ling, United Nations Security Council, Wang Yi

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Myanmar's National Unity Government 'Deeply Concerned' With China

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Myanmar's parallel National Unity Government (NUG) called on China to engage with them to find a solution to the country's political crisis, while warning that any attempts to legitimize the military regime would risk undermining people to people relations between the two countries.

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Junta plan to replace striking staff will wreck education, say teachers | Frontier Myanmar

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Teachers in the Civil Disobedience Movement believe the recruitment of daily wage earners to teach in re-opened government schools will result in "fake education".

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A startling discovery was made last month when passerbys in Myanmar's central city of Pyin Oo Lwin came across a drone-like object resting in front of a small shed on the side of the road. Resembling a model airplane, the drone quickly attracted the attention of locals who rushed to investigate and take photos before it was picked up by unidentified authorities.

While startling for many to see a drone up close, reports of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) sightings over Mandalay, Kayin and Kayah states have surfaced across social media in the months since Myanmar's military staged a coup on February 1.

"Drones are sighted everywhere on the ground. People are taking pictures, people are seeing drones, drones are going around at night," said Hnin, a woman from the ward where the drone crashed who spoke to those who saw it. While not in Myanmar, she asked that only her first name be used for her safety.

Though the UAV was quickly removed from the scene before any concrete evidence was unearthed, rumours of military surveillance tactics abounded across social media, adding fuel to growing fear and paranoia among those opposed to the coup of sophisticated digital surveillance by the military. Though Myanmar's leaders have a long history of monitoring dissent, the rapid uptick in technology and internet usage in recent years has shifted age-old concerns from informants, or dalans, lurking in tea shops to fears of wiretapping, firewalls, drone attacks and facial recognition software.

But despite a growing tech arsenal, which includes imports from China and Russia, a lack of evidence of their use suggests a disconnect between the tools at the military's disposal and the capacities of those in charge. Rather, the reality on the ground points to a reliance on older, more cumbersome forms of surveillance that seem to put the Tatmadaw several steps behind their tech-savvy opposition.

Hnin, also part of a close online group of protestors involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) opposing the coup and military, says those conducting the surveillance often lack subtlety.

"I wouldn't call them dumb, but maybe proud and ignorant. They don't even bother hiding their identity or anything, they're very proudly putting their information [online]," she said about the online informants declaring their political affiliations. "They collect data and information on who posted what."

Also used are invasive in-person methods of spot checks, where police officers can arbitrarily stop anyone deemed suspicious on the street, demanding they hand over their phones for inspection and, at times, arresting them regardless of wrongdoing.

"The real dangerous ones are the ones on the ground," Hnin added.

Back online, surveillance researcher and Information Controls Fellowship Program (ICPF) fellow Phyu Phyu Kyaw says some of the most common tactics by the junta can also be blatant.

In an Open Technology Fund study on Myanmar's rise of cyber surveillance late last year, he found nearly 80% of the 24 activists, researchers and journalists interviewed didn't feel safe online due to the government's monitoring of social media, rather than more subtle means like wiretapping or data theft.

Many experienced harassment and log-in attempts on their accounts, hate speech and lewd photos sent specifically to women, as well as threatening phone calls shortly after posting content. Participants also noted officers from the Special Intelligence Department often created fake accounts to interact with them online, not always with clear intentions.

Within his own group of colleagues, he said these stories of low-level hacking attempts are commonplace among the most outspoken.

"He would get these emails after emails of notifications saying 'someone is trying to log into your account'. And that is something that's happened to a lot of human rights activists," Kyaw said. "People are trying to get into their accounts all the time."

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The military has moved much of its battleground online, although email phishing scams containing malware sent to the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a group of elected officials overthrown in the coup, provides insight into a slightly bumbling campaign.

Even though means for better surveillance is available, Kyaw says the skill level the Tatmadaw has to utilise this technology remains to be seen.

"I can't say they [the military] don't have the capacity to do surveillance when they've already had this technology [for a long time]," he said, citing reports of conversations dating back to 2012 with an Italian spyware company.

"It is not like they don't know this stuff, it's not like this is new to them. This is something they always knew. But how much are they reliant on it [spyware]?"

While it seems unlikely the military will be able to recruit tech-savvy youth from the country's startup scene, a fledgling industry prior to the coup, to fill this skills gap, eyes are turning toward reports of imported tech from authoritarian allies.

Since the coup, unconfirmed reports on Twitter of imported Chinese technology disguised in seafood boxes created concerns for the many activists already in hiding. Fears of a possible Chinese firewall became widespread, but experts say the feasibility of developing and maintaining such a network in Myanmar, or even an intranet,' are unlikely.

An analyst and cyber security researcher, who worked on a May report by the International Crisis Group called Myanmar's Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield, explains the junta simply lacks the funds.

"If you look around the world, which countries have successfully built a parallel internet? In the case of Myanmar, the military is in pretty tight financial constraints and you'd have to be talking hundreds of millions of dollars," said the analyst, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal.

"China spends billions of dollars a year just maintaining its firewall."

There has also been fear of heightened surveillance following a new trade contract with Russia, signed mere days before the coup, in which Myanmar is set to acquire an unspecified number of Orlan-10E UAVs which can be used for both combat and surveillance purposes. However, the impact and use of these drones is yet to be seen.

Prior to the coup, the Tatmadaw also took a note from China in the form of its "Safe City" programme, installing 335 Huawei surveillance cameras in Naypyidaw in December, with Mandalay and three surrounding townships, as well as Yangon, to follow in mid-2021. These cameras use facial recognition and license plate identification software to track those on a "wanted list", but there's been no evidence yet whether any of these devices have yet been used.

Also troubling is the $4 million budget given to the Ministry of Transport and Communications for their " Lawful Interception System", used in part with Norweigan service provider Telenor, to relay voice and data to the government. This surveillance-allotted cash is in addition to the $4.6 million spent in 2017 to monitor social media through a designated task force, the Social Media Monitoring Team.

It's a capacity problem, I mean how do you process that much data? I think this is something that they are completely unprepared for

But as impressive as these projects sound for a country playing digital catch-up after decades of self-imposed isolation, the problem for the military lies largely in what to do with the trove of data.

The anonymous analyst believes the military might not have the ability to harvest anything of value from these calls and data due to their sheer quantity, as well as a lack of a centralised database for license plate and facial recognition, with some records still entirely paper-based.

"The problem for the Tatmadaw is the overwhelming scale of the opposition that doesn't really lend itself to a methodical passing of user data just because the scale of it is so massive," said the analyst. "It's a capacity problem, I mean how do you process that much data? I think this is something that they are completely unprepared for."

Despite the lack of evidence for their use so far, the potential of these large-scale surveillance projects, if deployed properly, has instilled fear and anxiety in the population. Fresh in the memory for Myanmar citizens too are smaller-scale surveillance efforts used in recent years.

In 2018, reports surfaced that the military was using forensic technology from Israeli-owned spyware firm Cellebrite that allows for the transfer of data from one device to another. After Reuters' journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were arrested that year for their reporting on a military massacre in Rakhine State, court documents later showed that Cellebrite technology had been used to pull information, including itineraries and source notes, from their phones.

Cellebrite pulled out of Myanmar shortly after the incident came to light and maintains that in such cases, when their terms of agreement are breached, the company reserves the right to immediately cease functionality of the technology.

"In the extremely rare case when our technology is used in a manner that does not meet international law or does not comply with Cellebrite's values, we immediately flag these licenses for non-renewal and do not provide software updates," Cellebrite wrote in a statement to the Globe

Cellebrite did not comment on whether these blocks were applied to the technology sold to the Myanmar government or whether it was still in use.

Young people in Myanmar browse their Facebook pages at an internet shop in Yangon. Photo: Sai Aung Main/AFP

Yet, even with masses of sophisticated technology seemingly at their disposal, the Tatmadaw continues to depend on low-tech methods of informants, censoring, and surveilling the population.

The same anonymous analyst explains that, while the military puts on a big show, in practice their tactics are lacking. They remain reliant on paper records and lack of centralised database for common information such as addresses, licenses, and households, putting into question the credibility of their high-tech threats.

Even more, while there are military personnel with high levels of training in surveillance technology - with many even sent for training in Russia given the lack of IT education in-country - senior officials with limited technical knowledge, holdouts from the days of extreme isolation, are still the ones calling the shots.

This lack of technological expertise within the outmoded institution is evidenced by its reliance on haphazard nationwide internet shutdowns in recent months. Notoriously inconsistent in their overnight timing, these blackouts were intended to prevent firsthand documentation of evening raids and arrests on anti-junta activists.

As the protest movement grew, the military proceeded to cut access to mobile data in March as well, leaving most of the country offline. Reuters reported that executives from Telenor and Ooredoo, the two international service providers in Myanmar, were told to "stay quiet" or lose their licenses. While reports on the ground indicate that some mobile access has since been restored, it continues to be unreliable.

Along with the internet shutdowns, the military also instated bans on several websites, including Facebook, to stifle communication and quash organised demonstrations. This has led to a notable uptick in Myanmar Twitter users since the coup.

Despite the ban, the Tatmadaw remains dependent on online platforms like Facebook in their surveillance efforts. It deploys pro-military supporters and military personnel across the platform to monitor posts and activity, a tactic used since Facebook first surfaced in Myanmar in 2010.

"They're still using very rudimentary tools to identify people and arrest them for what they're doing on social media. For instance, using informants to infiltrate private groups that are being used to coordinate CDM activities and CRPH activities," said the analyst.

I would say that they're not that high-tech of people. But I think if they want, they can have the help that they want [from China and Russia]. So it's good that we don't underestimate them

Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a prominent activist in the CDM, has managed to stay on Facebook with a VPN.

She reports online trolls as the most common and feared surveillance method. According to Shunlei, these spies spread misinformation and "steer the public narrative using hate speech" to threaten and ultimately target individuals like herself who have been designated as dissidents.

Since the coup, dalans have infiltrated Myanmar's cybersphere, monitoring social media posts, including those in private groups, and recording online interactions with screenshots. These are subsequently used to corroborate trumped-up charges under the 505 penal code, used by the military to to prosecute anyone accused of inciting anti-military sentiment or public unrest, according to Kyaw. As of June 6, there are 886 detained under one of the three 505 charges and 56 arrested, according to statistics provided to the Globe by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.

Facebook, as Myanmar's most popular platform used by nearly half the population of 54 million, has responded to the rise in operations by monitoring activity and blocking accounts run by pro-military supporters and military personnel.

"These networks of accounts, pages and groups were masking their identities to mislead people about who they were and what they were doing by manipulating public discourse and misleading people about the origins of content," Rafael Frankel, director of public policy at Facebook, APAC Emerging Countries, told the Globe in a statement.

Yet, despite Facebook's efforts, monitoring the cyber movements of every single user is impossible. That means Shunlei and fellow protesters must continue to exercise high caution when communicating online.

"We use Signal for secure messaging and VPNs to avoid detection and even for daily use we use different devices - we have our own device for work and for personal [use]," said Shunlei. "We also work with social media platforms, and if something happens we communicate with them directly."

While these protective efforts have so far been effective for some, there is a risk that they could be insufficient in the face of higher-tech efforts if and when the military does decide to utilise their mass arsenal for cyberwarfare - a development that some are anticipating.

"I would say that they're not that high-tech of people," Hnin said. "But I think if they want, they can have the help that they want [from China and Russia]. So it's good that we don't underestimate them."

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The Tatmadaw has mass surveillance technology, but how well is it used?

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A startling discovery was made last month when passerbys in Myanmar's central city of Pyin Oo Lwin came across a drone-like object resting in front of a small shed on the side of the road. Resembling a model airplane, the drone quickly attracted the attention of locals who rushed to investigate and take photos before it was picked up by unidentified authorities.

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If Myanmar's security landscape was devilishly complicated before the February coup d'etat, the growing national-level armed resistance to the military-formed State Administration Council (SAC) junta has rendered it almost incomprehensible.

In recent weeks, veteran ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) have ramped up attacks on the military, or Tatmadaw. Peasant revolts using flintlock rifles and muskets in the hills of Chin state have likewise seen locally raised defense forces inflict major casualties on army units.

In Kayah and Kayin states, EAOs have trained and worked with locally raised defense forces, while in western Sagaing Region such forces have attacked Tatmadaw and police units with lethal effect. In main cities such as Yangon, bombings and shootings targeting security forces have surged in recent weeks, as have vigilante assassinations of suspected security services' informants.

Into this carnage now comes Myanmar's latest "nationwide" military force.

On May 5, the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel government formed to overthrow the SAC, formed the People's Defense Force (PDF) citing "the responsibility to end the civil war of over 70 years, implement effective security sector reforms and establish federal democratic armed forces by controlling and ending the violent actions, military aggression and hostilities of military council."

The NUG announced on June 7 that it has designated the Myanmar military and its affiliated organizations as "terrorist organizations." Yet a series of working documents on the NUG-PDF's framework reviewed by Asia Times underlines the major challenges the PDF will face in mobilization and combat effectiveness against the Tatmadaw.

The PDF's 35 "Defense Policy Principles" say it will be "aligned with democracy and human rights standards...federal values namely equality and self-determination."

The NUG Defense Department will be led by civilians and be under "civilian governance" including for setting the defense budget and further principles. The force will follow provisions of the Geneva Conventions in armed conflict. The principles also promise "no ethnic or religious discriminations while assigning positions...or gender/sexual discrimination."

One document includes impressive organizational charts and "key principles" that promise "Psychological Operations will be our prioritized strategy" and "PDF(s) will have people security unit(s), commanded by Chief of People's Security to avoid collateral damage."

A NUG-PDF "Code of Conduct", meanwhile, provides guidance for compliance with the laws of armed conflict and treatment of civilians. PDF Directive 1/2021 of May 17, which outlines the broad objectives of the force, says potential recruits "...shall attend the designated military training course and shall serve in one of the battalions under the respective military division." Recruits are obliged to serve a two-year minimum.

Much of the PDF's training is being conducted in areas controlled by EAOs in Myanmar's east and north. The NUG-PDF will form five operational division areas: Northern, Southern, Central, Eastern, and Western Division. (The Tatmadaw has 14 Regional Commands).

Within each command, there will be a divisional PDF, divided into three brigades, and each brigade will include three battalions of light infantry, one artillery battery, and one special forces unit (special commando battalion) then broken down into company, platoon and squad size.

Based on the lowest unit strength, a squad of ten soldiers, the overall size of a divisional area can be roughly calculated at 4,860 personnel. Therefore, the overall rough projection troop strength of the entire NUG army is some 24,300 soldiers, not counting command, support and logistics and auxiliary forces.

In comparison, the real strength of the Tatmadaw is impossible to gauge, but most balanced estimates are at around 350,000 for all three branches including army, navy and air force, along with 80,000 in the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) and several thousand Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and People's Militia units.

The NUG-PDF may be able to find and "train" 25,000 people, but it then will need to arm and sustain them in armed conflict. But does the PDF have the leadership to achieve this?

A report in local news outlet Myanmar Now claimed this week that of the estimated 800 Tatmadaw defectors to the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), some 75% have joined or planned to join the NUG-PDF. That could assist with military training but more senior leadership will be needed to take the fight to the Tatmadaw.

The NUG's Minister of Defense, Yee Mon (aka Tin Thit), is a seasoned activist and poet imprisoned by the military during the 1990s, He won a narrow victory in the 2015 election in the capital of Naypyitaw, ironically against the former defense minister in the Thein Sein administration, Wai Lwin.

As a senior member of the toppled National League for Democracy (NLD) and spokesperson of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Yee Mon may have seniority, but he has no military experience and is reportedly in ill-health.

The Deputy Defense Minister, Khin Ma Ma Myo, is a well-known academic and director of the Myanmar Institute of Peace and Security Studies (MIPSS). Her think tank is not to be confused with the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (MIPS), a lavishly Western-funded organization whose former deputy director, Dr Salai Andrew Ngun Cung Lian (an American citizen), was appointed to the SAC Advisory Board soon after the coup.

Khin Ma Ma Myo was a prominent pre-coup workshop convener on security sector issues in Myanmar, but is often criticized for her incomprehensible academic jargon (in English and Burmese), heard in her rambling presentation at the NUG online press conference on June 4.

She is also guilty, like several senior NUG members, of racist statements against the Rohingya minority over the past several years.

The PDF's fate will be decided ultimately by its actual field commanders, not its titular political overseers. Yet its formation raises more questions than there are concrete answers.

What logistical limitations will the PDF face in raising an armed force in multiple areas across Myanmar? What will be the approaches of the PDF to both rural armed resistance and pursuit of urban warfare? Will the PDF include training women and will women be permitted to have combat roles?

How will the NUG-PDF seek cooperation with EAOs who have stayed silent or ambivalent to the coup, such as the powerful Arakan Army and United Wa State Army? These and several other questions were submitted by Asia Times to NUG Deputy Defense Minister Khin Ma Ma Myo in recent weeks. No response was received at the time of publication.

What kind of warfare will the NUG choose? Will a new generation of city-kid insurgents be subjected to jungle warfare? That didn't work out too well for the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), with many succumbing to malaria and other illnesses, military ineptitude, homesickness, internecine squabbles and most notoriously in 1992, a violent purge of its members unfairly accused of being Tatmadaw informants.

At least 80 were tortured, 30 of them to death, and 15 sadistically executed in that paranoid jungle purge.

Or will the NUG-PDF take a multi-path approach of a hinterland standing army slowly trying to absorb the plethora of other PDFs around Myanmar into a coherent Federal Army allied with many EAOs and seek a classical revolutionary strategy of rural mobilization that gradually surrounds the cities and key towns, whilst also pursuing urban sabotage against SAC targets?

That hasn't been tried in decades in Myanmar, not since the Communists' attempt in the 1950s and the KNU's disastrous 1991 attempt to open a new front in Bogalay in the Ayeyarwady Delta.

Most locally raised PDF's, from Mindat in Chin State, to the Ayeyarwady Delta, Sagaing and many other locations throughout Myanmar are unlikely to pledge allegiance to, let alone operational command of, a weak and incompetent parallel government trying to form a "national" army from scratch.

An ethnic Bama-dominated PDF will likely not be welcome in many ethnic communities subjected to decades of vicious violations by the Tatmadaw.

The NUG-PDF, despite its fledgling planning, manifold challenges, obvious shortcomings and the initial appearance of a theoretical exercise gleaned from textbooks and toy soldier dreaming, has nevertheless emerged as one of many aftershocks of an illegal seizure of power and months of extreme violence by the Tatmadaw.

It has already become cynically de rigueur to dismiss the NUG, and now its PDF, but is this premature?

We live in a post-predication Myanmar, and elite pontificating about Syria scenarios saps attention away from understanding urgent unfolding events. Myanmar's will not be like other conflicts; it will be a more complex and violent version of Myanmar.

The NUG and its new armed wing will be one armed actor in a kaleidoscope of violent protagonists, all vying for legitimacy, resources and dominance. How it fares against a Tatmadaw that lost almost all legitimacy in the eyes of most Myanmar citizens is thus anyone's guess.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, peace, human right and humanitarian issues on Myanmar

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Myanmar people's army aims wishfully at Tatmadaw

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If Myanmar's security landscape was devilishly complicated before the February coup d'etat, the growing national-level armed resistance to the military-formed State Administration Council (SAC) junta has rendered it almost incomprehensible. In recent weeks, veteran ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) have ramped up attacks on the military, or Tatmadaw.

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Women across Myanmar have long taken leading roles protecting their villages, land, and forests. We continue to be marginalised, perceived as weak or incapable, but it is women who for generations have courageously led communities through periods of adversity.

The military coup on February 1 crushed the hopes and futures of people throughout the country, and we began a descent back into the nightmare of complete army control. It is hard to find the words to describe the pain we continue to suffer under the military's domination.

But yet again we see women-teachers, garment factory workers, nurses, lawyers-leading the grassroots movement against the junta, standing at the forefront of demonstrations, organising communities, providing support and care for villages and neighbourhoods.

It is women who are again guiding people out of the darkness.

We have no choice. We know that authoritarian military patriarchal rule has grave implications for women throughout the country; the tyranny that the military imposes upon women's bodies is unbearable. Rape and sexual assault have long been weaponised by Myanmar's armed forces against populations in every ethnic state in the country. We have seen this pattern repeated since the coup, now in towns and cities where no one is safe travelling, sleeping or passing through checkpoints. Every act of daily life poses new dangers.

This is why we must stand up, we must fight, and we must win.

In their April briefing paper, the Women's League of Burma reported that more than 800 women had been detained and more than 40 killed since the coup. From those who have been detained there have been reports of torture and grievous sexual violence by the regime's troops.

Airstrikes and artillery shellings in Kachin, Karen and Kayah states have collectively displaced well over 100,000 people. Among them are pregnant women, children, and the elderly, languishing in squalid camps, hiding the jungle like animals, or, in the case of Karen State, stuck on the banks of the Salween River, unable to cross the border to Thailand.

"There is no more peace and security for women," one human rights defender from Kachin State told me recently. She noted that the discrimination and gender-based violence of the past had worsened in the years prior to the coup, and that shootings and sexual assault perpetrated against women were common due to the civil war and Myanmar military occupation of Kachin lands.

Since the coup, this "culture of male violence," as she described it, has intensified.

"It hurts a lot, and it is completely unacceptable. There is no rule of law, no protection-the law has been abolished by the military. The situation is hopeless," she said.

Even as the any guarantee for our safety deteriorates, women continue to be at the forefront of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), which aims to unseat the junta. Its main tool of resistance is a general strike, where people from across all sectors have refused to return to work until democracy is restored.

Much of the CDM campaign has been led by women-dominated industries, as workers sacrifice their wages and their physical safety for the future of the country. Participation in the CDM comes with the risk of arrest, torture and murder by the junta. It started early: in mid-February, two female teachers who had joined the CDM were beaten and arrested in the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina.

Even after the military forced schools to open on June 1, more than half of the country's 400,000 teachers have refused to work while the junta is in power. Most of those on strike are believed to be women. Teachers in the CDM have been temporarily or permanently suspended from their jobs, and more than 100 are facing criminal charges by the regime. Many no longer dare to live in cities and towns and have fled to rural areas, with some even hiding in the jungle.

One ethnic Karen teacher on strike in Tanintharyi told me she was not going back to work because she does not want to "live as a slave under the military dictatorship."

"I do not want to be involved in any administrative machinery that will prolong the new military dictatorship. I do not want to pass on this slave education system to the new generation," she explained as to why she continues her strike.

She is one of many women throughout the civil service who is sacrificing her own safety and livelihood for the benefit of future generations.

Women have also been integral in leading protests against the military, using the power of their own womanhood to destroy the army's control. The htamein campaign-in which women's sarongs were used as flags or strung up above roads in urban areas-showed how women's clothing instilled fear among soldiers, who feared they would lose their masculine power if they passed underneath the clothes.

Images of Kachin nun Sister Rose Nu Tawng have been seen around the world, a symbol of compassion and courage. In the midst of a protest crackdown in Myitkyina in March, she was photographed on her knees with her arms outstretched, begging members of the junta's armed forces to "shoot and kill [her]" instead of children. While the police paused the violence momentarily, they continued shooting at demonstrators only moments after the iconic photos were taken.

In ethnic areas, women have long taken leadership positions through periods of war and hardship. In Karen State, for example, there are many villages where it is women who serve as village heads. Because of the civil war and ongoing military oppression, men have been worried that they would face torture or murder if they took on the role of village head, leaving women to do the job instead. Women throughout the region have had to protect their communities from violent attacks and negotiate with the military when they came to their villages. Being on the frontlines is not new for us.

These leadership positions continued through periods of temporary ceasefire, as women in ethnic areas addressed ongoing persecution and led efforts to recover lands and forests that were confiscated by the military. Women-led organisations across the ethnic states have also played central roles in civil society movements, creating new platforms and spaces for women throughout the country to be heard.

Despite the prominent roles of women within emergent civic spaces, there had been little space for women to participate in official roles within government or the peace process prior to the coup. In the newly formed anti-coup National Unity Government, women make up around one-third of cabinet positions, a presence we have not seen in previous national administrations.

While Myanmar is a deeply conflicted society divided by ethnicity, gender, class, and generational differences, we see that the military's power grab has united us: today we stand together against patriarchal and racist military control. Ethnic groups from the Karen to the Kachin to the Rohingya to the Burmese, from older generations to Gen Z, from women to men, from factory workers to doctors-we all stand against military oppression.

This revolution is for all of us, and in a new Myanmar, women, ethnic minorities, youth and the working class will take a leading role in shaping it. There is no going back, only forwards.

This revolution is ours, and we will defeat our common enemy.

Esther Wah is an indigenous Karen woman. She works with ethnic communities across Myanmar on their right to protect the land and forests.

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Women across Myanmar have long taken leading roles protecting their villages, land, and forests. We continue to be marginalised, perceived as weak or incapable, but it is women who for generations have courageously led communities through periods of adversity.

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Photo:VCG

Myanmar is willing to work with ASEAN and communicate with China to maintain domestic stability, said Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing when meeting with Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai in Nayby on Saturday.

The two met ahead of meetings of foreign ministers from China and ASEAN members that will take place in Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality on June 7, reports said.

Min Aung Lai said that Myanmar is committed to national stability and economic development, and safeguarding democracy and the legal system.

The Myanmar side is willing to work together with ASEAN to maintain domestic stability and coordinate the implementation of a consensus. Myanmar is willing to maintain communication with China, an important neighbor, in this regard, he said.

In turn, Chen said China is willing to continue to play a constructive role, supporting the implementation of the consensus reached between ASEAN and Myanmar.

China always cherishes and values the traditional friendship between China and Myanmar, and sincerely hopes that peace and stability will return to the country as soon as possible, Chen continued.

The two also exchanged views on China-Myanmar relations and anti-epidemic cooperation.

Global Times

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Myanmar willing to work with ASEAN, highlights China's role in maintaining domestic stability

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Photo:VCG Myanmar is willing to work with ASEAN and communicate with China to maintain domestic stability, said Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing when meeting with Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai in Nayby on Saturday. The two met ahead of meetings of foreign ministers from China and ASEAN members that will take place in Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality on June 7, reports said.

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NUG tells Rakhine not to worry about Rohingya

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NUG tells Rakhine not to worry about Rohingya

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MyanmarNow

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ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မှ ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံသို့ ထွက်ပြေးသွားရသူများကို ရိုဟင်ဂျာဟု အသိအမှတ်ပြုခေါ်ဆိုခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုဥပဒေကို ပြင်ဆင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းများအပေါ် ရခိုင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများ မစိုးရိမ်ကြရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) က ဆိုသည်။

"ရိုဟင်ဂျာများကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်းက ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မှာရှိတဲ့ ပြည်သူများကို စော်ကားနှိမ့်ချဖို့မဟုတ်ပါဘူး" ဟု NUG အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဝန်ကြီး ဦးအောင်မျိုးမင်းက Myanmar Now ကို ပြောသည်။

NUG အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ ပထမဆုံးအကြိမ်သတင်းစာရှင်းလင်းပွဲကို ယမန်နေ့ (ဇွန် ၅) ညနေပိုင်းက အွန်လိုင်းမှတစ်ဆင့် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ရာတွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအရေးရပ်တည်ချက်နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍လည်း NUG တာဝန်ရှိသူများက ထည့်သွင်းဖြေကြားခဲ့သည်။

မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းရှိ ပြဿနာများကို ဖြေရှင်းရာတွင် အားလုံးပါဝင်မှုဖြင့် ဖြေရှင်းနိုင်မှ အဖြေမှန်နှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို ရှေးရှုနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာအရေးကို NUG က ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောဆိုရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု လူ့အခွင့်အရေးပညာပေးအဖွဲ့ Equality Myanmar တည်ထောင်သူလည်းဖြစ်သည့် ဦးအောင်မျိုးမင်းက သတင်းစာရှင်းလင်းပွဲတွင် ထည့်သွင်းပြောဆိုခဲ့သည်။

"တစ်ခုခု၊ တစ်ယောက်ယောက်၊ အုပ်စုတစ်စုစုကို ဖွင့်ပေးလိုက်ခြင်းက ကိုယ့်ကိုထိခိုက်မလားဆိုတဲ့ပုံစံမျိုး မမြင်စေချင်ပါဘူး။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းမှာရှိတဲ့ လူတိုင်းလူတိုင်းက ကိုယ့်ရဲ့အသက်ရှင်ခွင့်၊ လုံခြုံခွင့်ကို စိတ်ချမ်းသာစွာနဲ့ ပြည့်ပြည့်ဝဝခံစားနိုင်ဖို့ဖြစ်တယ်" ဟု ၎င်းက ပြောသည်။

NUG က ထုတ်ပြန်ထားပြီးဖြစ်သည့် ၁၉၈၂ ခုနှစ် နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုဥပဒေကို ပြန်လည်ပြင်ဆင်သည့်အခါတွင် ဥပဒေ၌ ကန့်သတ်ထားသည့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ၁၃၅ မျိုးတွင် မပါဝင်က နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်ခွင့်မရှိဟူသော အချက်ကို အဓိကထားသုံးသပ်မည်ဟုလည်း ဦးအောင်မျိုးမင်းက ဆိုသည်။

"ခွဲခြားမှုကိုဖြစ်စေတဲ့၊ လူမျိုးဖြစ်မှုကို ဦးတည်ပြီးသတ်မှတ်တဲ့ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုပုံစံကို ကျွန်တော်တို့ မလိုလားအပ်ပါဘူး။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်ထားသောမိဘများက မွေးဖွားသောသူများအားလုံးကို နိုင်ငံသားအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုဖို့ဦးတည်ချက်ဖြစ်ပါတယ်" ဟု ၎င်းက ပြောသည်။

သို့သော် NUG ၏ လက်ရှိခြေလှမ်းသည် မူဝါဒပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာအဆင့်တွင်သာ ရှိသေးပြီး အကောင်အထည်ဖော်လုပ်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် အဆင့်များစွာ ကျန်သေးသည့်သဖြင့် အသေးစိတ်ကိုမူ ရှင်းမပြနိုင်သေးကြောင်း ဦးအောင်မျိုးမင်းက ပြောသည်။

ရခိုင်အမျိုးသားပါတီ၏ မူဝါဒရေးရာဦးဆောင်ကော်မတီဝင် ဦးဖေသန်းကမူ NUG အစိုးရက ရိုဟင်ဂျာဟု သုံးနှုန်းခြင်း၊ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုကို ပြင်ဆင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းများအပေါ် မေးခွန်းများစွာထုတ်ရန်ရှိသည်ဟု Myanmar Now ကို မှတ်ချက်ပြုသည်။

ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်ဦးဆောင်သည့် အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ်(NLD) အစိုးရမတိုင်မီ အစိုးရအဆက်ဆက်များလက်ထက်ကလည်းက ရိုဟင်ဂျာပြဿနာမှာ ဖြေရှင်းမရသည့် အရှုပ်အထွေးအဖြစ်ရှိနေသည်ကို NUG က မည်သည့်အတွက် ကိုင်တွယ်ရန် စဉ်းစားသည်ကို နားမလည်ကြောင်းလည်း ဦးဖေသန်းက ပြောသည်။

"ဘာလို့အလျင်စလိုလုပ်နေရတာလဲ"ဟု ၎င်းက ပြောသည်။

နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုကို စဉ်းစားမည်ဆိုပါက နယ်စပ်မှ အချိန်မရွေး အင်နှင့်အားနှင့် ခိုးဝင်နိုင်သည့် အခြေအနေကို ထည့်သွင်းမစဉ်းစားလျှင် မှားမည်ဟုလည်း ဦးဖေသန်းက ပြောသည်။

"နိုင်ငံသားဥပဒေပြင်ပြီးတော့ လျှော့ဈေးနဲ့ လက်ခံမယ်ဆိုတဲ့သဘောက ကျွန်တော်တို့ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်နဲ့ ကိုက်ညီမှာ မဟုတ်ဘူး"ဟု ၎င်းက ဆိုသည်။

ရိုဟင်ဂျာအရေးကိစ္စကို ဒေသအတွင်းအတူနေထိုင်ရမည့် ရခိုင်တိုင်းရင်းသားများ၏ သဘောဆန္ဒမပါဘဲ လုပ်ဆောင်လျှင် ကောင်းကျိုးထက်၊ ဆိုးကျိုးသာ ပိုဖြစ်စေနိုင်ပြီး NUG က တာဝန်ခံရလိမ့်မည်ဟု ဦးဖေသန်းက သတိပေးသည်။

အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ်ပါတီ (NLD) ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်သည် ၎င်းအာဏာရခဲ့စဉ်အတွင်း ရိုဟင်ဂျာနှင့် ဘင်္ဂါလီဟူသော အသုံးအနှုန်းအပြင် နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုဥပဒေကို ပြင်ဆင်ရန်ကိစ္စမှာ အမုန်းတရားနှင့် အငြင်းပွားမှုများကိုသာ ဖြစ်စေနိုင်သည်ဆိုသော အကြောင်းပြချက်ဖြင့် သတိထားပြောဆိုလေ့ရှိသည်။

၂၀၁၆-၁၇ ကာလ စစ်တပ်၏ နယ်မြေရှင်းလင်းရေးစစ်ဆင်ရေးများကြောင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်မှ အိမ်နီးချင်း ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ်နိုင်ငံသို့ ထွက်ပြေးရသူ ခုနှစ်သိန်းနီးပါးရှိသည်ဟု ကုလသမဂ္ဂအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းက ပြောဆိုထားသည်။

ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်သည်ဟူသော စွပ်စွဲချက်ဖြင့် ဂမ်ဘီယာနိုင်ငံက မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို နယ်သာလန်နိုင်ငံ၊ ဟိဂ်မြို့ရှိ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားရုံး(ICJ)တွင် တရားစွဲဆိုထားသည်။

၂၀၁၉ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်ကိုယ်တိုင် ICJ တရားရုံးသို့ သွားရောက်ဖြေရှင်းခဲ့ရာတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကိုယ်စား ခုခံလျှောက်လဲခဲ့သည့်အပြင် လူမျိုးတုန်းသတ်ဖြတ်မှု အဓိကတရားခံအဖြစ် စွပ်စွဲခံထားရသည့် စစ်တပ်ကိုလည်း ကာကွယ်ပြောကြားခဲ့သည်။

သို့သော် ၂၀၂၁ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ ၁ ရက်တွင် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်ဦးဆောင်သော အစိုးရအဖွဲ့ကို ဖြုတ်ချကာ အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးချိန်မှ ယနေ့အထိ ICJ တွင် တရားစွဲဆိုခံထားရသည့်ကိစ္စအပေါ် မည်သို့ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်မည်ကို အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီက တိတိကျကျထုတ်ပြန်ပြောဆိုခြင်း မရှိသေးပေ။

မကြာသေးမီရက်ပိုင်းအတွင်းက ပြုလုပ်သည့် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ Phoenix သတင်းဌာနနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံမေးမြန်းခန်းတစ်ခုတွင်မူ ရိုဟင်ဂျာဟူ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်မရှိကြောင်း၊ နိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်မှုကို ၁၉၈၂ ဥပဒေဖြင့်သာ လုပ်ဆောင်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီးမင်းအောင်လှိုင်က ထည့်သွင်းပြောဆိုခဲ့သည်။

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Thailand is concerned by the violence in many parts of Myanmar and wants to see the implementation of steps agreed by Southeast Asian leaders with the military junta to help end the turmoil since the Feb. 1 coup, the foreign ministry said on Sunday.

Myanmar's junta has shown little sign of heeding the five-point 'consensus' agreed among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in April - which calls for an end to violence, political talks and the naming of a regional special envoy.

"We have been following developments in Myanmar closely with much concern, especially incidents of violence in many parts of the country," foreign ministry spokesperson Tanee Sangrat said in a statement.

He reiterated a call for an end to the violence, the release of all detainees and the "concrete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus" as soon as possible.

The junta has failed to impose control since seizing power from elected leader Aug San Suu Kyi, who is among more than 4,500 people detained since the coup. At least 847 have been killed, a rights group says. The army disputes that figure.

Meanwhile, daily protests against the military have evolved in parts of Myanmar into armed insurrections while decade old ethnic conflicts have flared anew.

Opponents of the junta have voiced frustration at the lack of tough action by ASEAN and say the meeting of two representatives of the group with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on Friday gave him greater legitimacy but brought no benefit.

Thailand has a longer border with Myanmar than any other country and fears the conflict could bring a flood of refugees.

Its government is itself led by a former army chief who seized power in a coup before holding elections.

"Much of what Thailand has done may not have been made public as we believe that quiet and discreet diplomacy between neighbors would be more effective and in line with traditional Thai diplomacy," Tanee said.

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Thailand is concerned by the violence in many parts of Myanmar and wants to see the implementation of steps agreed by Southeast Asian leaders with the military junta to help end the turmoil since the Feb. 1 coup, the foreign ministry said on Sunday.

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The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Peter Maurer, visited Myanmar to meet with Commanderin-Chief of Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, on 3rd June 2021.
During the meeting, President Maurer emphasized that ICRC's humanitarian activities in Myanmar have significantly developed and diversified over the past years.

"Caught between armed conflict, COVID-19 and the current situation, people in Myanmar are in need of urgent assistance and protection," said President Maurer.

"This visit aimed to share ICRC's concerns on the current humanitarian situation and reinforce ongoing eorts to ensure space for neutral and impartial humanitarian action".

Given the scope and the scale of current needs, President Maurer made a case for broader humanitarian access including in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Shan and Rakhine States.

He also expressed the importance for the ICRC to resume its purely humanitarian visits and activities in places of detention, which have been on hold since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Such visits and activities are essential to secure humane treatment and conditions of detention for all detainees and to restore communication between detainees and their families.

In the framework of ICRC's confidential dialogue with military and security forces in Myanmar, President Maurer also raised key humanitarian issues including the use of force during security operations.

Finally, President Maurer reiterated ICRC's commitment to reinforce its support to the Myanmar Red Cross Society's humanitarian work, especially in the area of first aid, ambulance services, emergency response and COVID-19 prevention. This support is in close cooperation with other Red Cross Red Crescent Movement partners in Myanmar.

The ICRC has been helping people aected by armed conflicts and violence in Myanmar for more than 30 years. Its exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suering by promoting and strengthening international humanitarian law (IHL) and universal humanitarian principles.

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ICRC President Visits Myanmar to Discuss Humanitarian Issues - Myanmar

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The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Peter Maurer, visited Myanmar to meet with Commanderin-Chief of Defence Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, on 3rd June 2021. During the meeting, President Maurer emphasized that ICRC's humanitarian activities in Myanmar have significantly developed and diversified over the past years.

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The Border Guard Force's support for the Tatmadaw in fighting the Karen National Union appears to have paid off, with the group getting the green light to resume its controversial businesses along the Thai border.

By FRONTIER

In the weeks leading up to the February 1 military coup, the Karen Border Guard Force was in crisis.

The National League for Democracy government was pursuing an investigation into the BGF's Shwe Kokko project, which had allegedly become a hub for illegal online casinos. The Tatmadaw was pressuring the BGF, which is under its command, to give up its lucrative businesses. Three senior BGF officials, including the group's nominal leader Colonel Saw Chit Thu, had submitted their resignations to the Tatmadaw, while rank and file members were threatening to quit en masse. The BGF was canvassing its options with other armed groups, and the prospect of renewed fighting hung over Kayin State.

Fast forward three months, and fighting has indeed engulfed the state - but not between the Tatmadaw and a renegade BGF. Rather, clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union, have reached a level not seen in decades. The KNLA has retaken strategic outposts, including on the Thanlwin (Salween) River bordering Thailand, while the Tatmadaw has launched airstrikes that have forced tens of thousands of villagers to flee their homes.

The BGF has found itself providing valuable support to the Tatmadaw's operations, and suddenly its problematic business dealings are no longer such a problem after all; its casinos and illegal trade gates on the Thai border have reopened, and a BGF member told Frontier there was even talk of the Shwe Kokko project being resumed as a joint venture with the Tatmadaw. But facing off against fellow Karen soldiers has created new tensions that the KNU is increasingly seeking to take advantage of, in order to realise a long-held policy of reuniting the various Karen armed groups.

Karen National Liberation Army soldiers seen at a captured Tatmadaw base near the Thanlwin (Salween) River in Hpapun Township, Kayin State on May 7. (Karen Information Centre / AFP)

Waging the Tatmadaw's war

When mass anti-protests erupted across the country in early February, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Kayin. In the town of Myawaddy on the Thai border, BGF forces supported Tatmadaw crackdowns on demonstrators, while in other areas the KNLA escorted protesters to ensure their safety.

From the start the KNU issued strong statements against the coup, and began engaging the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and, later, the National Unity Government, which was formed by elected MPs and ethnic leaders in mid-April as an underground administration. It also accepted fleeing activists and workers who had joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, and later protesters began to arrive in its territory seeking training to take the fight to Tatmadaw.

Against this backdrop, clashes between the Tatmadaw and KNLA, which had mostly been limited to areas of Hpapun Township in northern Kayin and Kyaukkyi Township in eastern Bago Region prior to the coup, soon began to escalate and spread.

On March 27, the KNLA seized the Thee Mu Hta military base in Hpapun, leaving several Tatmadaw soldiers dead. The military responded almost immediately with airstrikes - the first such attacks in Kayin for decades.

In the days afterwards, the BGF began dispatching groups of 50 to 200 soldiers to support the Tatmadaw in conflict zones around Kayin and beyond, members of the group told Frontier. BGF forces were also brought in to increase security in towns around the state, they said.

In one case, a BGF battalion commander, Major Mann Win Yone, led a force of around 100 soldiers to Kayin's Kyainseikgyi Township to spearhead fighting against the KNLA.

BGF forces have also been sent to Kayin's Hpapun and Kawkareik townships, Thaton Township in Mon State, and even to parts of Tanintharyi Region, according to a BGF soldier who was sent to Kyainseikgyi on April 10 in a deployment of 50 soldiers. It's unclear how many have been sent in total, but sources suggest it could be between 500 and 1,000 men. The BGF has an official fighting force of 3,000, although claims to have another 5,000 in reserve forces.

"It's not like we sent 400 or 500 soldiers to help the military in one location," the BGF soldier said. "They selected people based on where they're from, and sent them to those areas so they can provide local knowledge."

But the deployments didn't go entirely to plan, said a high-ranking BGF member, who also spoke on condition of anonymity.

"Some BGF soldiers complained to their officers that they didn't want to fight against their own ethnic people, even if they are from opposing armed groups," he said. "During some clashes, the KNU soldiers shouted in Karen language that they don't want to shoot Karen soldiers, and that we should get the Bamar soldiers to advance rather than BGF members."

The member said Major Nai Maung Zaw, the BGF's information officer, had later been sent to the front in Kyainseikgyi in order to better supervise BGF forces. In addition to his job as spokesperson for the BGF, Nai Maung Zaw plays an important role in ensuring troop discipline, the official said, and BGF soldiers were intimidated by his presence on the front lines.

"We're not comfortable fighting against fellow Karen," he said. "That's why the headquarters sent more disciplined officers to manage and motivate us."

Nai Maung Zaw could not be reached for comment. Photos and posts on his Facebook account indicate that he has recently been at the front line overseeing BGF soldiers.

On May 7, he posted that he was in Noetday village in the Manerplaw area to attend a Karen literature event and donate rice and other food to residents. "This food from the BGF has been donated to the villagers under the direction of Colonel Saw Chit Thu," he wrote.

Karen BGF soldiers at ease on the sidelines of the group's ninth anniversary ceremony in Shwe Kokko on August 20, 2019. (Frontier)

Fighting erupts

Initially, the deployments resulted in few clashes. The KNU's foreign affairs chief, Padoh Saw Taw Nee, confirmed to Frontier that there had been fighting between KNLA soldiers and BGF members serving alongside the Tatmadaw, but the number of clashes was not high.

"Sometimes there are situations where Karen people are fighting against each other because the Tatmadaw uses the BGF on the front lines," he said in an interview on April 25.

More recently, though, officials from the KNLA's 5th Brigade have suggested the number of BGF forces on the front lines is increasing.

Based in Hpapun, or what the KNU calls Mutraw District, the 5th Brigade has accounted for a large proportion of the clashes with the Tatmadaw, and has managed to seize several strategic outposts. It has also cut off Tatmadaw resupply routes, leaving some military posts in Hpapun short of supplies.

Spokesman Colonel Saw Klerdoh said that about 200 Tatmadaw soldiers had been killed and more than 200 seriously injured in fighting with the 5th Brigade since the third week of March. "If fighting with all [KNLA] brigades was counted, I think the casualties on the Tatmadaw side would be double," he said.

As casualties mount, BGF soldiers are being sent to replace Tatmadaw soldiers, Saw Klerdoh said. A small number were sent to Hpapun in early April, he added, but most have arrived since late April.

"We think that an extra 500 BGF soldiers were sent here recently," he said. "But we're obviously not able to go and do an exact count. Certainly, we've seen that BGF soldiers are present."

The BGF member confirmed to Frontier on May 6 that two groups of BGF soldiers were sent to Hpapun in recent weeks.

"The first group was sent in the last week of April and the second group on May 2," he said. "There were about 150 to 200 people in each group, so there might be around 400 BGF soldiers there in total."

Saw Chit Thu confirmed in an interview on May 6 that the BGF sent around 200 troops to Hpapun, but claimed they were only there to provide "security" after two of its battalions there had become trapped and requested help. He insisted BGF troops had been ordered not to shoot at the KNLA, and said he would "take responsibility" if fighting broke out.

Just three days later, videos on social media showed another 100 BGF soldiers heading to Hpapun from the Myaing Gyi Ngu area, and that same day clashes were reported, with several BGF soldiers apparently killed. Salween Press reported on May 10 that there were now about 600 BGF soldiers fighting alongside the Tatmadaw.

Mr Kim Jolliffe, an independent researcher who has studied Karen armed groups for more than a decade, said the appearance of BGF forces on the front lines was unsurprising, as its battalions take their orders from the Tatmadaw. Each battalion officially has 32 Tatmadaw officers and support staff alongside the Karen fighters.

"It's not so much 'fighting between the BGF and KNLA' as 'Tatmadaw using BGF forces' or 'BGF supporting Tatmadaw operations'," he said.

Karen National Liberation Army soldiers parade at a base near the Thai border to mark the 70th anniversary of the Karen Revolution on January 31, 2019. (KNU / AFP)

A plea for unity

But there is undoubtedly a history of bad blood between the KNU and BGF, who have been on opposite sides of the conflict in southeastern Myanmar since the mid-1990s.

Although the BGF was established shortly before the 2010 election, when the Tatmadaw pressured members of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army to sign up for the Border Guard Force plan, its roots trace back to 1994.

That year, Buddhist KNLA soldiers broke away from the largely Christian-led KNU due to perceived religious discrimination and formed the DKBA. They aligned themselves with the Tatmadaw and played a crucial role in seizing the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw in January 1995, and were later rewarded with lucrative business concessions and large land holdings. Many KNU members and supporters regard them as traitors to the cause of Karen self-determination.

Today the BGF comprises 13 battalions, which are nominally overseen by Saw Chit Thu from his headquarters at Shwe Kokko, about 20 kilometres north of the border town of Myawaddy.

However, Jolliffe cautioned that the BGF should not be seen as monolithic. Chit Thu exerts more control over battalions in central areas than those around Hpapun in the north or Three Pagodas Pass in the south. "It's not unusual for the BGF and KNLA to fight each other in the 5th Brigade area," he said. "They are in fierce competition and have very low trust around there."

Since BGF soldiers began arriving in Hpapun in larger numbers, the KNLA leadership has issued a call for unity with the BGF, as well as two other Karen armed groups that recently met the Tatmadaw's peace team - the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (not to be confused with the similarly named BGF-precursor group) and KNU/KNLA Peace Council.

In a letter to the groups on May 2, KNLA vice chief of staff Lieutenant-General Baw Kyaw Heh said the current political crisis represented the best opportunity in seven decades to achieve self-determination for the Karen people. "Take advantage of this and fight against the Bamar military dictatorship," he wrote, before specifically addressing the BGF. "So BGF, as you are Karen, you need to think carefully about it and make the right decision ... Karen people should not be killing each other."

Jolliffe said uniting the various Karen armed groups was a longstanding policy for the KNU, and it had seen some success. It was partly because of the KNU's influence that, in 2010, a faction of Democratic Karen BuddhistArmy soldiers refused to join the Tatmadaw's Border Guard Force programme with most of their colleagues and broke away to form the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. Both it and the KNU/KNLA Peace Council have largely followed the KNU's political lead since then, he said, but the KNU has not succeeded in getting the BGF battalions on board.

He said recent political upheaval - including the coup, the rising conflict in Kayin and the Tatmadaw's stand-off with the BGF in January - could change the equation, though.

"The gravity of the situation and the opportunity to force the Tatmadaw back probably gives the whole idea of uniting Karen armed groups a lot more impetus," Jolliffe said. "In the past, the differences between the BGF and KNLA were too deep. But if the State Administration Council continues to weaken, the KNU could become a more viable patron once again and a new alliance could be formed."

Buildings under construction for the Yatai New City project, seen in July 2019, at the BGF's headquarters at Shwe Kokko, 20 kilometres north of Myawaddy town. (Frontier)

Back in business

The Tatmadaw seems to be making efforts to shore up BGF support, however. At the same time as Karen BGF forces were being dispatched around Kayin and beyond to respond to the KNLA threat, some of the group's businesses enjoyed a sudden improvement in fortunes.

The BGF member said the group's casinos and border trade gates along the Thaung Yin (Moei) River, which marks the international border between Myawaddy and the Thai town of Mae Sot, had all reopened since early April after a year's closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

"Basically, things have gone back to normal since the coup. The casinos have been open since early April and during Thingyan they remained open for some VIPs," he said. "There have also been talks for some new joint ventures with the Tatmadaw ... we might have to split the profits in half."

Meanwhile, he said the BGF is still negotiating with the military to resume work on the Yatai New City, a purported $15 billion property development at the BGF headquarters of Shwe Kokko. The project is a joint venture between a BGF company and Yatai International, a Hong Kong-registered company set up by a shadowy ethnic Chinese businessman who is reportedly wanted in China on gambling charges, and has been described as a front for online gambling operations targeting Chinese nationals. Work on Yatai New City halted last year after the NLD government launched an investigation into the project.

"Before the coup, the military didn't allow us to continue the Shwe Kokko project, but now we've heard that they will allow us to resume it as a joint venture with the Tatmadaw. They will also stop the investigation launched by the NLD government," the BGF member said.

"We're not privy to discussions about profit sharing and what agreement the BGF has made with the military exactly, but I know for a fact that most businesses resumed in April because I was on security at some of the sites."

On social media BGF members have speculated that its leaders have cut a deal with the Tatmadaw to resume their business activities in exchange for fighting against the KNU.

In a private group for BGF supporters, one account approvingly described it as a "give and take" arrangement, under which the BGF had to send its troops to support the Tatmadaw against the KNU.

"Our leaders won't consider anything other than what's best for the development of our people and our region. KNU supporters will call them traitors, but they won't care. He [Chit Thu] will do anything for the benefit of the people in his area. He will do it for us," the user said.

Writing under a fake name, another BGF member said, "We will resume businesses in our Shwe Kokko area. Once construction is complete, the business will start and our area will develop. At a time when Burma is poor, our leader is beginning to make opportunities for us."

Dignitaries at the Karen BGF's ninth anniversary ceremony on August 20, 2019 included BGF chief Colonel Saw Chit Thu (right, in green uniform), Kayin State Chief Minister Nang Khin Htwe Myint (centre, in red) and the main investor in the controversial Yatai New City project in Shwe Kokko, ethnic Chinese businessman She Zhijiang, aka She Lunkai (centre-left, in Western suit). (Frontier)

Border trade booms again

One of the BGF's most lucrative businesses is a series of 27 illegal crossings along the Thaung Yin River in Myawaddy. Traders use them to skirt restrictions and taxes on particular products, usually imports from Thailand, and to send workers to Thailand.

Goods pass through Customs checkpoints on the Thai side and are then loaded onto small boats that ferry them across the narrow waterway to the Myanmar side, where they are temporarily stored in warehouses run by the BGF. Distributors then collect the goods and send them out across the country. These "boat gates" have been operating for decades and typically handle around 60 percent of all trade through Myawaddy - up to US$1.5 billion in goods a year.

But as COVID-19 spread across the region in March last year, the BGF was forced to suddenly close the gates, shutting off access to a range of products and depriving it of informal income. The KNU and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army also closed seven gates that they had been operating.

Traders and BGF sources told Frontier that the gates reopened in early April this year and were already busy with shipments from Thailand of beer, energy drinks, coffeemix, teamix and dairy products, though still not as busy as pre-COVID times.

U Maung Nyunt runs a boat at one of the BGF gates, where each day he ferries up to 30 boatloads of goods from Thailand to the Myanmar side of the river. Each time he crosses the Thaung Yin, Maung Nyunt pays a K5,000 fee to the BGF. But the force also levies a range of other fees on importers, based on the volume and value of what they're importing.

"Those who [import] things like beer and energy drinks rent space in warehouses at the BGF gate and then later take the goods out for distribution," he said.

Maung Nyunt said that while he's pleased to get his old job back, he's making less money than before and fearful for his safety.

"Generally, I'm upset about the coup - I voted for the NLD in the November election," he said. "When I return home after work, I feel unsafe. I want to live in peace and just have a regular income like before. Now I have a job, but I'm afraid of everything."

Maung Nyunt may soon find himself busier, however, thanks to a ban on the import of five products from Thailand through formal trade that came into effect on May 1. Imports to Myanmar of the products - soft drinks, fruit juices, instant coffee, condensed sweetened milk and fresh milk- usually total around 10 billion baht ($320 million) a year, most of which goes through Myawaddy.

It's not entirely clear why Myanmar's Customs Department introduced the ban, with Thai media speculating it could be related to calls for a public boycott of products linked to the military. Since seizing power, the military regime has also regularly discussed the need to replace imports with domestically produced goods to reduce the trade deficit. The department's April 22 statement said the ban was due to "preparation of food safety inspection infrastructure in border areas".

Imports of the products are still permitted through sea-bound trade, but Thai traders have complained this is slower and more expensive.

Sources in Myawaddy, including Customs officials, said it was inevitable that traders would instead just send the banned products through the BGF boat gates to get around the restrictions.

"These are among the most popular products that come over the bridges through formal trade," said one Customs official. "They'll just send them on the boats instead."

Myawaddy-based trader U Aung Soe said this meant there were unlikely to be any shortages of the banned products.

"When the government temporarily blocks the import of some products, they just go to the boat gate," he said. "This always happens - the bans are never very effective."

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With conflict escalating, Karen BGF gets back to business | Frontier Myanmar

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By FRONTIER In the weeks leading up to the February 1 military coup, the Karen Border Guard Force was in crisis. The National League for Democracy government was pursuing an investigation into the BGF's Shwe Kokko project, which had allegedly become a hub for illegal online casinos.

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Residents believe the coronavirus is spreading via illegal border crossings with nearby India.

Six people have died from COVID-19 in northwest Myanmar's Chin state over the past five days, including three since Wednesday, according to officials, who are struggling to contain an outbreak along the country's border with coronavirus-ravaged India.

The outbreak comes as Chin, Myanmar's poorest state, is wracked with armed conflict between local militias that have risen up to fight the military junta that deposed the country's civilian government four months ago, and a doctor shortage from a nationwide work stoppage by professionals to oppose the army regime.

In the townships of Tonzang and Cikha, bordered to the north and west by the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram, a pregnant woman died of the disease caused by the coronavirus on Sunday, a Christian priest died on Tuesday, and three others died on Wednesday.

A person in nearby Falam township died of COVID-19 on Wednesday after being diagnosed with the disease a day earlier, authorities said.

Tonzang and Cikha now account for the lion's share of the 183 recorded COVID-19 infections throughout Chin state, the director of Tonzang hospital told RFA's Myanmar Service.

"Currently, there are 167 people [infected in the two townships]," he said, adding that his hospital had been inundated with patients and is experiencing a critical shortage of healthcare workers.

"Tonzang township is now designated as a 'stay-at-home' area [as of May 28] and there are a lot of sick people right now. We don't have enough medical staff, although we have sufficient amounts of oxygen, thanks to donations. Still, we need more medicine."

Several COVID-19 infections were first reported in Tonzang and Cikha on May 11 and the number of cases has quickly risen, with at least 82 reported on Monday alone, according to authorities.

Residents of Cikha told RFA that authorities have had to close a testing site in the town hospital due to the sharp increase in patients.

"The hospitals are overcrowded, and people are no longer being admitted," one resident said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"Nurses are visiting houses to give tests and only those in serious condition-such as needing a respirator-are taken in."

A resident of Falam, where a 53-year-old woman died of COVID-19 on Wednesday, has reported 16 cases since May 20 and ordered lockdowns at the homes of people diagnosed with the disease.

In the nearby township of Kalay, six patients were recently diagnosed with COVID-19 at the private Wesley Hospital, according to the facility's superintendent Dr. Lalfakzuala. He said that the hospital was required to close temporarily after eight staff members were found to be infected.

The township's public hospital is seriously understaffed, Lalfakzuala said, because many of the healthcare workers have joined the nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) to protest the military's overthrow of the democratically elected government in a Feb. 1 coup.

Residents of Kalay said that the entire township is under lockdown orders beginning Thursday.
Border areas at risk
Sources told RFA they believe that the coronavirus is spreading through Chin state by people who are illegally crossing the border with India, which has recorded the world's second-highest rate of COVID-19 infections after the U.S. at 28.4 million and rising.

"The virus came from India," said one local resident. "There have been many [unofficial] border crossings and people got infected."

Chin state also accounts for roughly half of Myanmar's 270-km (170-mile) border with Bangladesh.

The first case of COVID-19 in Myanmar was detected in March 2020, and as of Wednesday, the Ministry of Health has recorded 143,629 cases and 3,219 deaths.

According to Ministry of Health spokesman Khin Khin Gyi, at least 18.8 million of Myanmar's 54 million people had received at least one dose of the coronavirus vaccine, and authorities have more than a million doses in reserve.

Before the February coup, around 15,000 people were being tested for COVID-19 each day, but only around 2,000 now receive tests daily, according to the junta's own statistics.
Reported by RFA's Myanmar Service. Translated by Khin Maung Nyane. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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Six Dead of COVID-19 in Five Days as Myanmar Wrestles With Chin State Outbreak

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Residents believe the coronavirus is spreading via illegal border crossings with nearby India. Six people have died from COVID-19 in northwest Myanmar's Chin state over the past five days, including three since Wednesday, according to officials, who are struggling to contain an outbreak along the country's border with coronavirus-ravaged India.

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Hong Kong charity helps students from coup-torn Myanmar

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They fled Myanmar for Thailand as children, and have been helped to study by a Hong Kong charity. Now they look on in horror as their country is rocked by fresh turmoil, prompting a new wave of refugees needing help.

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Myanma Timber Enterprise is selling off hardwoods at low prices as few bidders were interested and the timber market is slow after Myanmar's coup, said industry insiders.

There were few bidders when the state-run firm sold timber at three separate auctions in late May as the military regime sought to acquire hard currency by selling off illegal timber.

Over 10,200 tons of timber were sold for around US$5 million (8.2 billion kyats) at the auctions and industry insiders said the income was low due to limited competition in the bidding.

"There were few companies making bids and bids declined by over 10 percent as the demand fell," said a Myanma Timber Enterprise source.

According to industry insiders, Nagani Group Co, Maung Maung Thein Co, United Industrial Co, Win Enterprise Co, MTK Timber Pte Ltd, United Wood Industries Co, Yadi Shin Thant Co, Thein Than Tun Co, Katpana Timber Ltd, National Wood Industries Co, Green Links Pte Ltd bought wood at the auction.

Earlier anti-regime protesters and the National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow government formed to rival the junta, called on timber companies to boycott the auctions.

The NUG's minister for resources and conservation Tu Hkawng urged the firms to stop cooperating with the military regime and join the civil disobedience movement by not paying for the timber.

Firms bidding for less than 1,000 tons of timber were required to pay a cash deposit of $10,000 (16.4 million kyats), those bidding for between 1,000 and 2,000 tons of timber had to pay $20,000 and those bidding for between 2,000 and 3,000 tons paid $30,000. If they fail to make the payment within 75 days, their deposits and the timber will be seized.

The international Environmental Investigation Agency reported in May that the junta is seeking hard currency by selling off tens of thousands of tons of illegal timber, including some 200,000 tons seized under the National League for Democracy government.

The regime, which is struggling in the face of international sanctions, also sold off jade, gems and pearls at an auction in April in Naypyitaw, earning over 3.3 billion kyats ($2 million).

The NUG has said it would blacklist the companies and traders that participated in the junta's auctions of natural resources. It also warned that it would blacklist government employees involved in auctions for the misappropriation of public property.

Illegal logging has risen since the February coup and the Forest Department has been able to do nothing to stop illegal logging, said a source at the department.

"Illegal logging previously declined because the Forest Department gave rewards for information leading to the arrest of illegal loggers. But we can no longer protect our resources," he said.

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Topics: civil disobedience movement, civilian deaths, Coup, crackdown, Deforestation, Democracy, Environment, Human Rights, junta, Logging, military in politics, military regime, Min Aung Hlaing, Myanma Timber Enterprise, National League for Democracy, National Unity Government, November 8 general election, PDF, People Defense Force, Rule of Law, State Administrative Council, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Tatmadaw, timber

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Myanmar Timber Auction Disappoints Cash-Strapped Junta

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Myanma Timber Enterprise is selling off hardwoods at low prices as few bidders were interested and the timber market is slow after Myanmar's coup, said industry insiders. There were few bidders when the state-run firm sold timber at three separate auctions in late May as the military regime sought to acquire hard currency by selling off illegal timber.

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Although Myanmar's junta opened public schools on Tuesday amid efforts to normalize the country, classrooms remain empty as teachers and students boycott in protest of military rule.

Myanmar Teachers' Federation (MTF) said more than 90 percent of students didn't turn up to attend classes despite the junta's calls for full classrooms.

Myanmar had approximately 9.2 million of students in 2019-2020 school year under the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government. According to MTF, fewer than one million returned to school.

Members of the teachers' federation observed attendance at schools and found most classrooms deserted, which is entirely different from the beginning of previous academic years.

Only a few dozen students have shown up in some schools that had enrollment of 3,000 to 5,000 in previous school years. And there are also several schools in Myanmar that remain completely closed with zero attendance.

Kaung, a high school student in Yangon, and his friends didn't enroll for this academic year.

"We don't want to go to schools opened by the military government which killed students and hundreds of people," he said. Several students shared the same thought, with Kaung saying they won't return to schools under the regime.

A senior student who had been a schoolmate of Kaung and his friends was shot dead during a brutal crackdown by the regime on an anti-regime protest in Yangon.

As of Tuesday, which marked four months since the military coup, at least 841 people had been killed and more than 5,500 people had been arrested. Hundreds of youths including high school students and dozens of children are among those killed by the junta's forces.

A mother of a primary school student said that she didn't enroll her son in school because of her safety concerns. A number of schools across the country have been set on fire or bombed with homemade grenades by unknown attackers. The regime has claimed that school attacks were carried out by civilian resistance fighters who have taken up arms to defend civilians against the junta.

People's Defense Forces formed by civilian resistance fighters in several cities said they will only target regime forces and will not launch attacks that could harm innocent civilians.

Armed junta troops were seen standing guard outside and inside schools, joining school buses, and patrolling around school buildings. Though the patrols are ostensibly to provide security, they have also prompted concerns on the part of parents that their children might be subject to arrest or worse.

"Even for us, we are anxious about potential violence when we go outside as the regime forces continue brutal actions against civilians. How could we send our child to a place where we couldn't see if anything happened to them?" the mother said.

A number of teachers have also boycotted the regime's plan to reopen public schools by refusing to return to work despite threats of arrest, detention and dismissal from their jobs.

According to an initial announcement by the Ministry of Education, more than 100, 000 teachers and education staff out of a total of 450, 000 [that is around 27 percent] in public schools joined the civil disobedience movement.

Starting on May 7, the junta issued suspension orders to striking teachers and education staff at public schools nationwide. Among those who have been suspended are custodial staff, security officers at schools, lab technicians, teachers, principals and officials under the basic education department of the Ministry of Education.

"The junta insisted on opening the schools just to show the country is well under the control of the military rather than [out of any] concern for disrupted education," an official from the teachers' federation, who asked to be anonymous, told The Irrawaddy.

A teacher from Yangon Region who was recently suspended from her job said she is proud to stand against injustice even though it meant she had to give up of a job she adored.

"I will only return to work under our elected civilian government," she added.

Kaung, the high-school student also said he and his friends have decided to return to school only after revolution prevail.

You may also like these stories: Myanmar Regime Jails Journalists for Incitement Myanmar Coup Leaves more than 500,000 Construction Workers Redundant Comfortable in the 'Generals' Village', the UN and EU Lined Myanmar Military's Pockets

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Myanmar Schools Open, But Classrooms Are Empty as Students Boycott

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Although Myanmar's junta opened public schools on Tuesday amid efforts to normalize the country, classrooms remain empty as teachers and students boycott in protest of military rule. Myanmar Teachers' Federation (MTF) said more than 90 percent of students didn't turn up to attend classes despite the junta's calls for full classrooms. Myanmar had approximately 9.2 million of students in 2019-2020 school year under the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government.

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BANGKOK: Three Myanmar journalists who illegally crossed into Thailand to flee a military crackdown have been fined and could face deportation, a member of their legal team said Tuesday, warning the trio's lives will be in danger if they are sent home.

The journalists, who worked for the Democratic Voice of Burma news website, were arrested along with two Myanmar activists in the northern city of Chiang Mai in May and charged with illegal entry.

A court on Friday sentenced them to a one-year probation period and fined them 4,000 baht (US$128) each, said Nadthasiri Bergman, a lawyer with the Human Rights Development Foundation.

The court also said they will face seven months in prison if they were to commit the same offense again.

"By law, they can be deported within 72 hours" after sentencing, Bergman told AFP, although she added they had submitted an appeal letter on Friday which stops immigration authorities from deporting them immediately.

"We are waiting for the process of seeking asylum in the third country."

Thailand has said it was seeking a "humanitarian" solution to avoid deporting the trio back to coup-stricken Myanmar, where their employer has warned their lives would be "in serious danger".

The country has been in turmoil since the military ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi on Feb 1, triggering a mass uprising as large swathes of the population take to the streets.

The junta has responded with force - shooting protesters, arresting suspected dissidents in night raids, and targeting journalists and news outlets by shutting them down.

A well-known news organisation within Myanmar, DVB started as an exile media outlet during the previous junta, broadcasting uncensored reports on TV and radio.

It moved into the country in 2012, a year after the military dictatorship loosened its grip, but had its broadcast licence revoked in March, sending its journalists into hiding.

Despite this setback, it has continued to report, posting regular Facebook updates - as well as broadcasting on satellite TV - about the daily protests and crackdowns.

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Myanmar journalists who fled to Thailand fined, face deportation: Lawyer

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(Updated: ) Share this content BANGKOK: Three Myanmar journalists who illegally crossed into Thailand to flee a military crackdown have been fined and could face deportation, a member of their legal team said Tuesday, warning the trio's lives will be in danger if they are sent home.

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In a safe house in Myanmar, resistance is growing.

Quietly, in the gloomy light, a group of men raise their hands in a three-finger salute.

Traditionally a sign of defiance and support for pro-democracy protesters, for these men it symbolises so much more.

Once police or soldiers, they now plan to fight the forces they used to serve.

Just talking to us is a huge risk; if caught the defectors could be killed.

So in hiding, faces and voices disguised for protection, they explain why they decided to defy the junta.

"We were told that we could shoot the protesters if they gathered in more than five. We could arrest them and shoot them," Officer A, a former police officer says.

"We were ordered to shoot but we couldn't do it."

The allegation echoes the claims of both protesters and human rights groups after February's military coup.

Myanmar's security forces have been accused by Amnesty International of "premeditated" attacks on peaceful protesters - including "extrajudicial executions" and indiscriminately spraying bullets in urban areas.

While a shoot-to-kill policy has never been officially confirmed by the junta, the defectors claim they were encouraged to open fire.

"My friends said if they shot the protesters, they would get a promotion as a reward and be praised for being brave and following the junta's order," another former police officer, Officer B, tells Sky News.

"They were promoted from police second lieutenant to police lieutenant, from corporal to sergeant. As far as I know, those who shot the protesters got promoted."

A former soldier in the group tells a similar story.

According to him, challenging an order wasn't an option.

"The soldiers and police are now abusing the people at the order of Min Aung Hlaing (Myanmar's junta chief)," he says.

"'Shoot. Just shoot. This is my order,' this is how they order the troops. If we did not follow the order, we would be punished."

As well as the shootings, the military is accused of other abuses: of power, of people, and of their duty to protect.

Some female protesters have publicly accused members of the security forces of physical and sexual violence following their arrests.

The soldier isn't surprised.

He says he heard reports of sex assaults during his service, in particular during military operations to ethnic minority areas in Myanmar.

"People are calling soldiers 'military dogs' [and] also accusing them of rape. Let me tell you, yes, we have seen those scenes at the frontline. I wasn't involved in it.

"The officers were calling the women here and there and abusing them. Rape as well. It's happening," he says,

At least 840 people have been killed since the coup, many shot by junta forces according to figures from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma).

We put the allegations made by the defectors to the junta, but on publication Sky News still hadn't received a response.

The men say the command to use violence against civilians is the reason they fled and joined the protest movement.

Their choice means the institutions they swore an oath to are the enemy they must defeat and the decision to defect has come at great personal sacrifice.

They have lost their freedom. They cannot see their families. They cannot return to their hometowns or tell friends where they are.

They now live their lives in hiding and on the run, waiting in dark, cramped and basic accommodation fearing they may be discovered.

Yet still they remain defiant - determined to fight for the democracy lost when the military seized power.

Since the coup, some protesters have travelled to border areas in Myanmar for resistance training and now some of the defectors are planning to use their own skills to help them.

"Those [protesters] who are not familiar with the military training, they need to learn how to use the weapons, to fix them, and set them up.

"I want to teach them. I will join with those organisations that are in the revolution to fight the junta.

"I will fight those power-hungry thugs," the soldier says.

"I will join this revolution until the end. I will give my life. I will kill them wherever I see them."

So in secret they plan, they train, they get strong; preparing to strike back against the generals they followed for so long.

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Ex-Myanmar police officers reveal how they were told to shoot protesters - and why they defected

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In a safe house in Myanmar, resistance is growing. Traditionally a sign of defiance and support for pro-democracy protesters, for these men it symbolises so much more. Just talking to us is a huge risk; if caught the defectors could be killed.

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Five civilians accused of being military informants from two villages in Gangaw, Magwe Region were found dead on Monday afternoon, according to local residents. A local anti-junta civilian resistance group said it targeted the five as they were collaborating with junta forces operating in the area.

The bodies of the five were found with an injured woman and a burned-out vehicle by local residents between Ye Hla and South Khayan villages, some 32 miles from Gangaw, said a Yaw resident who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The five deceased comprised two administrators from Hantharwady and Thintaw villages, a teacher, a nurse and an administrative office clerk.

"The teacher and nurse were on their way back together with the administrators after they collected their salaries. Only one was alive, but she sustained severe injuries," the Yaw resident said.

Another local said, "The victims were targeted because they didn't join the CDM [civil disobedience movement]" of striking civil servants who are refusing to work for the military regime following the Feb. 1 coup.

However, a source close to the Yaw Defense Force (YDF), a local civilian resistance group, said the victims were targeted not merely because they were not participating in the CDM, but because they were military informants who had assisted junta forces' operations in the area.

"They were turncoats, traitors and informants. They informed the junta forces about striking civil servants and got them arrested. They received junta forces into their homes," he said.

The YDF said in a statement on Monday that it ordered the vehicle to stop for a security check after receiving a tip-off that it was carrying explosive materials.

"The YDF stopped them to conduct a check, but they refused and fought back. We heard that junta forces are trying to arm Pyu Saw Htee members. They were transporting arms. We took advantage," said a source close to the incident.

Locals believe the six were informants belonging to a Pyu Saw Htee-groups established, reportedly with support from the military, to counter pro-democracy activists and anti-regime protesters.

Monday's killings are thought to have their roots in an incident in Gangnaw on May 28 in which a number of regime troops were killed in a shootout with the YDF.

"After that incident, the military raided Ye Hla Village and set three houses ablaze. Three people died, including a disabled person who could not speak. It was those killed on Monday who brought the junta forces to the village," the Yaw resident said.

Locals said the police did not arrive at the scene of Monday's killings until around 5 p.m. on Tuesday. Since then, a number of residents of surrounding villages have fled their homes, fearing reprisals.

Following junta forces' lethal crackdowns on peaceful anti-coup protesters, armed resistance to the military regime has become increasingly common in Myanmar. The junta's battalions, police stations and general administration offices have been attacked in various ways, and killings of people deemed to be military informants are on the rise.

You may also like these stories: KIA Uses Artillery on Airport in Northern Myanmar Suspected Myanmar Military Informants Killed in Kale At Least 80 Myanmar Soldiers Killed: Kayah Resistance

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Five Accused of Being Myanmar Junta Informants Found Dead in Magwe

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Five civilians accused of being military informants from two villages in Gangaw, Magwe Region were found dead on Monday afternoon, according to local residents. A local anti-junta civilian resistance group said it targeted the five as they were collaborating with junta forces operating in the area.

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As unrest deepens across China's porous border with Myanmar, the outbreak of an all-out war could trigger a triple security, economic and humanitarian crisis that would motivate Beijing to rein in the conflict before being forced to take more heavy-handed measures that would have far-reaching strategic ramifications.

In early May, as China assumed the rotating presidency of the U.N. Security Council, permanent representative Zhang Jun painted a grim picture of the deteriorating situation in a neighboring country if it continues to devolve into turmoil.

"With further escalation of the tension, there will be more confrontation and with more confrontation, there will be more violence, and with more violence, there will be more casualties, and then we may go further down the wrong direction," Zhang said. "It may also mean a chaotic situation in Myanmar, even a civil war."

He then reminded reporters attending the press briefing of China and Myanmar's approximately 1,800 kilometer, or roughly 1,120 mile, border-a distance comparable to the troubled border between Texas and Mexico.

"We fully understand the situation in Myanmar," Zhang said.

Actually, Myanmar is already in the throes of civil war, and it technically has been since it first won its independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, a tumultuous year across the globe, in which the British monarchy's flight from its Palestinian and Indian colonies also led to regional conflicts. The year also marked the establishment of the two rival Koreas, whose own war would mark China's last major military deployment in a foreign country.

So far, China has managed to avoid the quagmires of intervention associated with its global rise toward superpower status. And while flashpoints glare at the People's Republic along areas of contention near India, Taiwan and the greater South China Sea, Chinese officials are aware that the sudden flare-up of instability in Myanmar, which hosts an array of Chinese economic projects linked to a critical corridor of President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, could prove a major strategic headache.

China's goal is to avoid getting to that point.

"China's ambitions in Myanmar are medium- and long-term," Andrew Davenport, chief operating officer at the RWR Advisory firm, which operates a Belt and Road Monitor, told Newsweek. "The country plays a highly important role in Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and long-term designs for regional infrastructure and port access to, and along, the Indian Ocean."

As such, "any intervention would likely be driven by broader strategic ambitions, rather than any short-term economic calculations," he said. "This doesn't mean they won't intervene, particularly in non-public ways, but any action that puts its longer-term goals at risk, including irreversibly estranging the people of Myanmar, would be a major setback for China."

Displays of anti-China sentiment has already emerged despite the fraternal, so-called "pauk-phaw" relationship with Myanmar, where some blame the titan next door for enabling the military's power grab by continuing to trade with the new government and blocking U.N. Security Council resolutions as the crisis deepened.

"We condemn China's continued business with the Myanmar junta and its conglomerates, including arms sales to the military," Yadanar Maung, a spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar activist group, told Newsweek. "China's business is a key source of revenue for the illegal junta, financing international crimes the military is committing against the people, including deliberate killings, torture and disappearances."

Officially known as the Tatmadaw, the armed forces reasserted their historic power in early February after disputing elections that saw great gains for State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. Troops have since cracked down on widespread protests and, in doing so, sparked a military campaign against at least two of the country's many Ethnic Armed Organizations that rule Myanmar's outskirts.

As the conflict deepened, Yadanar Maung specifically expressed concern about China-Myanmar pipelines and China's mining and hydropower interests in the country, "some of which are in ethnic areas fueling civil war," the spokesperson said. "China cannot continue business as usual after the February attempted coup. They must end complicity in the military's crimes and corruption."

Chinese infrastructure and businesses have already been attacked. In one particularly violent incident, three security personnel were reportedly hacked to death in early May as they stood guard by a Mandalay off-take station of key twin pipelines, which carry 22 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China.

Davenport of the RWR Advisory identifies these pipelines as among the foremost of an array of Chinese projects "in, or linking to, Kyaukphyu, a deep-water port city on the Indian Ocean that holds strategic potential for China for a variety of economic and potentially military reasons."

"These projects are part of a framework that China would like to see enhanced-and publicly supported-to solidify its available options for maritime operational purposes in the region," he said, "and circumventing the strategically and militarily vulnerable Malacca Strait in the event of conflict."

The strategic importance of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor has grown in parallel with China's concerns over the coalescing of some of its top competitors. The U.S. has rallied Australia, India and Japan as part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, whose mission was to ensure "a free and open Indo-Pacific" in a thinly-veiled slight at China, which all four have accused of aggressive geopolitical moves in the region.

And while the Quad has sought to assert its own influence in Asia, finding common ground on Myanmar has proven challenging. A joint statement in March called for a restoration of democracy but fell short of condemnation, and only the U.S. went forward with a familiar path of economic and diplomatic pressure that has yet to show results.

Richard Horsey, senior adviser on Myanmar at the Crisis Group, said that China is in a far more capable position to act than its rivals, but its actions would have consequences on the broader struggle over clout across Asia.

"The outside world has very limited ability to influence the course of events in Myanmar," Horsey, who briefed the U.N. Security Council on the Myanmar crisis in April, told Newsweek. "The U.S. and other Western countries have applied sanctions mainly to signal their disapproval of the coup. China has a much greater ability to act, but it too is constrained by its various interests in Myanmar and the broader geopolitics."

So far, China "has focused on trying to ensure the security of its assets and investments in the country and the stability of its border," Horsey said, adding that Beijing "also wants to ensure that the Myanmar crisis is not internationalized."

China has instead sought to leverage its own efforts toward de-escalation. Its embassy in Myanmar, which is regularly flanked by protests these days, has reportedly been in touch with both the Tatmadaw and members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a government-in-exile represented by the National League for Democracy.

But Myanmar's unrest continues to hit closer to home in China. Last week, fighting broke out between security forces and insurgents at the Myanmar-China border crossing of Muse in Shan State.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian declined to comment on the specifics of the incident, but issued remarks on Beijing's general position, which he called "consistent and clear."

"We do not want to see the bloodshed and conflict in Myanmar," Zhao told reporters. "We call on relevant parties to make efforts to prevent the situation from deteriorating or even getting out of control. China will maintain communication and coordination with all parties in Myanmar to make every effort to stabilize and cool down the situation as soon as possible."

Amid these overtures, Horsey doesn't see the People's Liberation Army crossing the border anytime soon, saying, "We are a long way from any serious Chinese intervention in Myanmar."

That being said, he said such a scenario "would only likely happen if China's interests were gravely impacted-for example, sabotage of its oil and gas pipelines, or violence against Myanmar's Chinese community."

The outcome of such an intervention, while both unanticipated and undesired by China, "is very hard to predict," he said.

The calculations become especially difficult as Myanmar's own inner politics shift with the changing tides of the conflict.

As Thant Myint-U, an award-winning writer and historian of Myanmar origin who authored "The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century," told Newsweek, "Myanmar's armed landscape includes dozens of Ethnic Armed Organizations and hundreds of militia, and all these have responded in very different ways to the coup."

The Kachin Independence Army and the Karen National Liberation Army are two such groups that have so far risen up against the military, which has responded with airstrikes and artillery targeting villages and positions in Ethnic Armed Organization-controlled territory. Several other such organizations have voiced support for the pro-opposition National Unity Government, most recently including the Chin National Front.

But yet to weigh in on the crisis is an even more influential actor, the United Wa State Army, whose position is consequential both for its size and ties to China, which remains a key player in the course of the conflict.

"By far the biggest and most powerful of the Ethnic Armed Groups is the United Wa State Army, with deep links to China," said Thant Myint-U, who formerly served in roles at the U.N. and as a government adviser in Myanmar. "For several Ethnic Armed Organizations, whatever China suggests will be impossible to ignore."

The fighting has not yet reached levels seen in previous years, including clashes in recent years between the armed forces and the Arakan Army-not to be confused with the Rohingya force known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army that has also fought with the Tatmadaw-as well as other major groups prior to a nationwide ceasefire signed in 2015. This truce, however, has already begun to fray, and new People's Defense Forces militias have emerged on behalf of the political opposition.

So far, China has played its cards cautiously. Thant Myint-U notes that China "had very good relations with Aung San Suu Kyi and would probably prefer a quick return to civilian government," under which many of Beijing's economic projects took hold. Taking on Tatmadaw proves risky as well, however, as "Beijing fears instability, and likely believes that increased pressure on the army may lead to state collapse."

Perhaps most daunting of all is the prospect that there is no obvious answer for how China should and will proceed.

"China is responding to events it didn't foresee and doesn't necessarily have a grand strategy for Myanmar," Thant Myint-U said, "thinking it does overemphasizes the country's importance for Beijing."

Just six months ago, he pointed out, "Beijing had exactly what it wanted" in Myanmar, "warming relations and ever-closer economic ties with a Myanmar government that was popular at home but enjoyed at best cool relations with the West."

As of today, however, China is "staring at possible chaos, rising anti-China feelings, and little hope that its planned China-Myanmar Economic Corridor can be materialized anytime soon," Thant Myint-U said.

The disruption of one of China's key economic routes may serve to some degree as a strategic win for the U.S., and by extension, Quad partners such as nearby India. A wider conflict in Myanmar, however, could drag both powers in deep and further compound the miseries of a country torn for generations.

"We're still far from an all-out civil war, but at the same time the situation is incredibly fragile," Thant Myint-U said. "The U.S. and China have a shared interest in preventing a failed state. A proxy war in Myanmar would be in nobody's interest, and would be devastating for a population that's already been through eight decades of armed conflict."

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China faces world's longest civil war in neighboring Myanmar, a crisis it can't avoid

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As unrest deepens across China's porous border with Myanmar, the outbreak of an all-out war could trigger a triple security, economic and humanitarian crisis that would motivate Beijing to rein in the conflict before being forced to take more heavy-handed measures that would have far-reaching strategic ramifications.

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Bloc sent letter asking sponsors of draft General Assembly resolution to remove clause on weapons sales, Liechtenstein's U.N. mission says.

ASEAN wants the United Nations to drop a call to suspend arms sales to the Myanmar military, which has killed hundreds of civilians since mounting a coup in February, a European diplomat told BenarNews on Thursday.

In a letter to core countries sponsoring a draft U.N. General Assembly resolution on Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - minus regional bloc member Myanmar - asked them to omit a sentence that calls for "an immediate suspension" of sales or transfers of all military weapons and munitions to Naypyidaw, said a diplomat from Liechtenstein, which co-sponsored the.

"ASEAN sent a letter to us and among the amendments [to the draft] they proposed is the deletion of the arms [embargo] paragraph," Georg Sparber, deputy permanent representative at Liechtenstein's mission to the United Nations in New York, told BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated online news service.

"There was no reason given in the letter...and when I say ASEAN's letter, I don't mean Myanmar, which is an ASEAN member, but the letter was from the nine other member countries," he said by telephone.

However, he declined to release a copy of the letter. The resolution was crafted at the request of Liechtenstein and with the support of 48 countries.

A high-ranking official from one of the resolution's sponsor-countries, meanwhile, told BenarNews that ASEAN wanted the draft revised because the bloc believes it should take the lead in resolving the crisis in Myanmar, where more than 800 people have been killed in post-coup violence.

Indonesia's and Malaysia's missions to the U.N. did not immediately return email requests from BenarNews for comment about the arms clause in the resolution.

In Jakarta, Indonesia's foreign ministry spokesman declined to comment, and the ASEAN secretariat, which is headquartered in the Indonesian capital, did not respond to calls or text messages from BenarNews.

Last month, leaders of ASEAN states agreed to a five-point consensus on Myanmar that, among other things, called for an envoy of the bloc to be sent to the troubled country. But more than a month later, ASEAN has made no visible progress in naming an envoy, and Myanmar's military government has ignored the consensus it was a party to at the meeting in Jakarta attended by Naypyidaw's junta chief.

The draft resolution, in fact, stresses "strong support for the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations" in facilitating "a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar."

Human Rights Watch denounced ASEAN for lobbying to remove the arms embargo provision from the U.N. resolution.

"To put it bluntly: ASEAN [is] trying to gut the U.N. General Assembly resolution's call for an arms embargo against Myanmar, which is absolutely necessary to stop Burmese junta's violence against its own people," Phil Robertson, deputy director of HRW's Asia division said via Twitter on Wednesday.

"Shameful effort by @MFAsg, @MFAThai & other ASEAN governments," he added, tagging the Twitter accounts of the foreign ministries of ASEAN members Singapore and Thailand.

The draft resolution "calls for an immediate suspension of the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of all weapons, munitions and other military-related equipment to Myanmar," among a host of other calls for international action on Myanmar.
UN resolutions: 'An important barometer'
ASEAN, with its "cherished non-interference approach," likely views an arms embargo as interference in a member-state's domestic affairs, according to Hunter Marston, a Canberra-based expert on international relations.

Still, he said, he would have expected Malaysia and the Philippines to support this resolution.

"Thailand would likely vote against it, though, given its support for the military," Marston, a researcher on Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University, told BenarNews.

A scheduled vote on the resolution at the U.N. General Assembly on May 18 was postponed, so that the measure could get more support, especially from ASEAN countries, Sparber said, adding that a new date for the vote has not been set.

HRW said that countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany - among the 49 sponsors of the resolution - should ensure that a vote is rescheduled as soon as possible, with the resolution including a call to halt arms sales to the Burmese junta.

"They should not play the game of saying this is a regional issue and hiding behind ASEAN to avoid their own responsibilities; ASEAN is built on the principle of noninterference and will never deliver on Myanmar," HRW said in a statement this week.

Resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly are non-binding on its members, but they are "an important barometer of international willingness to condemn the coup," Marston said.

Meanwhile on Thursday, Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin told the U.N. secretary-general that the issue of an ASEAN envoy to Myanmar would be finalized soon, but he did not give a date, government officials said.

Many analysts and rights activists have criticized the Southeast Asian bloc for not taking quick action on Myanmar.

During ASEAN's collective dithering over the past four months, Myanmar's security forces have killed 831 people, mostly anti-coup protesters, since the military seized power in February.

Burmese activists and many citizens are disappointed with the international community, said Aaron Connelly, an analyst at the Singapore-based International Institute for Strategic Studies who specializes in Southeast Asian politics.

"When I speak to people in Myanmar now, there is extraordinary disillusionment with the United States and Europe, and red-hot enmity toward China, ASEAN, and ASEAN member states," Connelly said on Twitter.

"The reputational damage resulting from the international community's response will last a long time."
Reported by BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated online news service.

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ASEAN Lobbying to Remove Arms Embargo Call from UN Resolution on Myanmar

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Bloc sent letter asking sponsors of draft General Assembly resolution to remove clause on weapons sales, Liechtenstein's U.N. mission says. ASEAN wants the United Nations to drop a call to suspend arms sales to the Myanmar military, which has killed hundreds of civilians since mounting a coup in February, a European diplomat told BenarNews on Thursday.

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Pro-democracy demonstrators took to the streets in towns around Myanmar on Tuesday to denounce the country's military, marking four months since it ousted an elected government and unleashed a wave of nationwide anger.

Despite a bloody crackdown by security forces, Myanmar's military is still struggling to impose order amid protests and strikes, and fighting on multiple fronts in border regions as civilians take up arms against the junta.

Protests took place in the south in Luang Lone, several areas of the Sagaing division including Kale and Monywa, and the commercial hub Yangon, according to images carried by mainstream and social media.

"This is not over yet. We still have our turn," read a sign carried by one protester.

Schools officially reopened across Myanmar for the first time since the Feb. 1 coup, but turnout was low due to security concerns and a boycott over the junta's suspension of tens of thousands of teachers opposed to its rule.

Some students held demonstrations with blood-splattered white uniforms.

Security forces have killed 840 people since the coup, according to figures from activists cited by the United Nations. The junta says about 300 people have died.

The military, known as the Tatmadaw, says it seized power because of fraud in a November election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's ruling party.

The state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper carried a quote from junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on Tuesday saying the current crisis was caused by "dishonesty of democracy" in the election, under a large headline that said "Tatmadaw values democracy".

The military's use of lethal force against its own people has caused outrage among western countries, and concern among its neighbours. In April, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced a five-point consensus towards resolving the crisis, though no timeframe was agreed.

But four diplomatic sources have told Reuters that the chair and secretary-general of ASEAN are planning to visit Myanmar this week, to meet junta leaders, among other stakeholders. read more

It was not clear if they would meet detainees or members of a shadow unity government formed to challenge the junta and undercut its efforts to gain international recognition.

HEAVY TOLL

The unrest has taken a heavy toll in the countryside, where clashes between Myanmar's well-equipped military and ethnic minority armies or newly formed People's Defence Forces have displaced tens of thousands of people.

On Tuesday, a local aid group said 8,000 people were in camps having fled the town of Mindat in Chin State, which the army took control of last month after days of clashes with militias armed mostly with hunting rifles.

The people's militias have stepped up ambushes in recent weeks on troops in Kayah state bordering Thailand, where witnesses said fierce fighting and retaliatory shelling and air strikes had taken place late on Monday in the town of Demoso.

A resident shared video and images with Reuters of soldiers he said were killed in Demoso late on Monday. He said he saw six bodies and residents had counted 20.

The Karenni Nationalities Defence Force said on its Facebook page that 80 army soldiers had been killed on Monday, while one of its fighters and a civilian were also casualties.

Reuters could not verify the information and a spokesman for the junta did not answer calls seeking comment.

Myanmar state television made no mention of the Demoso unrest in its nightly news bulletin.

Fighting in Kayah has displaced about 37,000 people in recent weeks, according to the United Nations. Many have fled into jungles and are in need of food and medicine.

The Elders, a group of former national leaders founded by the late Nelson Mandela, on Tuesday called on the international community, including ASEAN, to turn up pressure on the junta.

"Myanmar is currently on a dangerous path towards state failure," its chair, Mary Robinson, said in a statement.

"Allowing the coup to succeed through inaction and disregard would further undermine the international rules-based order upon which global stability depends."

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Demonstrations, defiance as Myanmar marks 4 months since coup

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Pro-democracy demonstrators took to the streets in towns around Myanmar on Tuesday to denounce the country's military, marking four months since it ousted an elected government and unleashed a wave of nationwide anger.

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The National Unity Government (NUG) has expressed serious concerns about the safety of Myanmar's ousted leaders, who are being held in unknown locations by the junta.

"The NUG is deeply concerned for the safety of the state leaders," said the NUG in a statement released on Monday. The statement condemned the junta's ill treatment of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and other detained leaders of the former National League for Democracy (NLD) government.

In her first face-to-face meeting with her legal team last week, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told her lawyers that she doesn't know where she is being detained and that she was isolated from the outside world.

Until recently, she was being held at her residence on Mya Nan Bontha Street, Zabuthiri Township in Naypyitaw, Myanmar's capital. However, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told her lawyer U Khin Maung Zaw that she was moved to another unknown location on May 23.

The 75-year-old pro-democracy leader is also subject to an information blackout with no access to newspapers, TV, radio, internet or phone. She has been provided with a bare minimum of information by the regime since her arrest on Feb. 1, the day of the junta's coup.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's arrest, and that of President U Win Myint on the same day, came a few hours before the convening of what was to be the first session of a new Parliament following the NLD's landslide victory in the November 2020 general election.

President U Win Myint also told his legal team that he has been completely isolated from the outside world since Feb. 1. The two leaders, both former political prisoners of previous military regimes, face various charges and potentially long prison sentences.

Following the meetings with their legal teams, the two democratically-elected leaders made their first appearance in court in Naypyitaw. Previous hearings were all held via video link.

The unprecedented hearing of the cases of the most high-profile prisoners in Myanmar's recent history took place in a special court inside a disused building in the Naypyitaw Council compound.

Regime-controlled television aired the first pictures of the leaders to emerge since they were overthrown in the coup, showing them sitting in the dock of the court with police officers standing behind them. Also on trial with them is detained Naypyitaw Council Chairman Dr. Myo Aung.

The NUG denounced the military regime's release of the images as propaganda and as insulting the human dignity of the ousted leaders. The NUG noted also that, like the NLD leaders, several civilians were also being unlawfully detained at unknown places around the country.

"We will try our utmost to make sure to serve justice and ensure accountability for every single unjust case brought by the military since the coup and also those brought against ethnic minorities for years before," said the NUG in their statement.

You may also like these stories: Myanmar Junta Jets Bomb Civilian Resistance Fighters in Sagaing Region Myanmar Daily Post-Coup Update: May 31 Myanmar Regime Isolates Western Town of Paletwa Following Bomb Blasts

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Myanmar's Shadow Govt 'Deeply Concerned' for Safety of Detained NLD Leaders

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The National Unity Government (NUG) has expressed serious concerns about the safety of Myanmar's ousted leaders, who are being held in unknown locations by the junta. "The NUG is deeply concerned for the safety of the state leaders," said the NUG in a statement released on Monday.

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The chair and secretary-general of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plan to travel to Myanmar this week even as the 10-nation bloc remains divided on how to respond to the military coup there, four diplomatic sources said.

ASEAN, a grouping that includes Myanmar and has a policy of non-interference in the affairs of members, has led the main diplomatic effort to resolve the violent turmoil gripping the country following the overthrow of a democratically-elected government four months ago.

The military has detained Myanmar's civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and imprisoned political opponents amid a deadly crackdown on protesters, resulting in a growing refugee crisis and the collapse of the economy.

Erywan Yusof, the second minister for foreign affairs for Brunei, ASEAN's chair this year, and the bloc's secretary-general Lim Jock Hoi, also from Brunei, are scheduled to meet this week with leaders of the junta, among other stakeholders, the sources, who asked not to be identified, said.

The sources warned that a trip could be delayed or derailed by last-minute logistical and diplomatic impediments.

It is unclear if the pair plan to meet with opponents of the junta, many of whom are imprisoned or in hiding. Spokesmen for ASEAN and the Myanmar opposition's National Unity Government did not respond to requests for comment. Brunei's ASEAN mission also did not respond to a request for comment.

The planned trip comes more than five weeks after ASEAN leaders announced a "five-point consensus" to end violence; promote dialogue; deliver aid; appoint a special envoy; and send a delegation headed by the envoy to Myanmar to meet "with all parties concerned".

However, the special envoy has yet to be appointed amid divisions within ASEAN over the best person or persons for the job, the envoy's mandate and the length of the envoy's term.

A "concept paper" released by Brunei to ASEAN members last month proposed the envoy only hold the position for the rest of the year, when it would be reviewed by the next chair of ASEAN, due to be Cambodia, said three sources familiar with its contents. They said the paper also proposed limiting the envoy's job to mediating, not basing them in Myanmar, giving them a small staff paid for by the home country of the envoy.

The conditions were seen by several ASEAN states as fatally undermining the stature and leverage of the envoy, they said.

Brunei - an oil-rich sultanate of less than 500,000 people with little diplomatic leadership experience - has not responded to the concerns, the sources added. The envoy represents the chair, so is technically appointed by Brunei, said one diplomat.

ASEAN operates on consensus decision-making, but it is a diverse grouping of democracies, an absolute monarchy, along with authoritarian and one-party communist states, and it seldom takes a strong stand on issues involving one of its own.

"ASEAN is haemorrhaging. There is a lot of intra-ASEAN diplomatic sniping. There is unhappiness all around," said one source familiar with negotiations.

"JUNTA BUY-IN"

All four diplomatic sources said Indonesia and Thailand, two of ASEAN's most important members, were at loggerheads over the envoy.

Indonesia initially favoured a single envoy to lead a task force while Thailand, whose military has close ties to neighbouring Myanmar, pushed for a "friends of the chair" body of multiple representatives, the sources said.

Spokespeople for the foreign ministries of Indonesia and Thailand declined to comment on their stance.

The compromise supported by most ASEAN states is for three envoys, likely made up of representatives from Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei, two sources said.

ASEAN foreign ministers will meet in China next week for the annual China-ASEAN summit. If their disagreement on the envoy isn't sorted out beforehand, the sources said it was hoped to be finalised on the sidelines of the summit.

China watered down a UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar but said the current political situation was "absolutely not what China wants to see".

Since the ASEAN five-point consensus was announced, Myanmar's junta has said it will only consider the proposals - including a visit from an envoy - once it has restored stability.

The military regime's position undermined ASEAN's claim of a unified position, but also reflected diplomatic realities given Myanmar's membership of the bloc, diplomats and analysts said.

"All of this only works if there is full buy-in from the junta," said one regional diplomat.

ASEAN's divisions also underpinned its rejection of a draft U.N resolution to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar last week, said three sources. Several ASEAN nations were comfortable with weapons freeze being included in the non-binding resolution, they said, but resistance led by Thailand and Singapore ensured ASEAN requested the clause be removed.

Singapore's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

There is also conflict among ASEAN states about when to deliver aid to Myanmar, amid fears from some that the early deployment of assistance without any commitment from Myanmar to hold dialogue with its opponents could be exploited by the junta for propaganda purposes, two of the sources said.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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EXCLUSIVE Amid divisions, ASEAN leaders plan Myanmar visit this week

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The chair and secretary-general of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plan to travel to Myanmar this week even as the 10-nation bloc remains divided on how to respond to the military coup there, four diplomatic sources said.

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Research highlights the institutional abuse of Myanmar foot soldiers as root cause of human rights crisis

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Research highlights the institutional abuse of Myanmar foot soldiers as root cause of human rights crisis

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Mizzima

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Total suspends gas-linked cash payments to Myanmar junta | Frontier Myanmar

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French energy giant Total said the military regime would no longer receive cash payments linked to a pipeline operated jointly with Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise.

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Advertisement
More than 100 days after the February coup in Myanmar, and with no sign of action from a divided U.N. Security Council, international sanctions and boycott campaigns have assumed an ever greater importance in denying any legitimacy to the new military junta.

Western governments responding to global outrage at the mounting bloodshed have expanded sanctions to target the vast labyrinth of the Myanmar military's economic assets, which are based on two conglomerates: Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).

Even beyond sanctions, Myanmar is an increasingly risky climate for any business venture, with a collapsing economy and a floundering regime that has failed to establish any kind of governance beyond bullets and brutal repression.

Foreign investors in Myanmar are also under pressure from the daily exposures of embarrassing investment links to military-controlled companies, as a result of public scrutiny provided by a new research activist group known as Justice for Myanmar (JFM).

The investigative skills of JFM have led to the naming and shaming of dozens of companies, spurring local boycotts, such as the campaign against Japan's Kirin Beer for its partnership with the military-owned Myanmar Beer. Kirin announced a suspension of dividend payments to the military in February.
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Similar pressure has triggered Telenor, the Norwegian telecommunications provider, to write off $782 million from its Myanmar business following the coup, and India's Adani Ports has been forced to review its military links over a major investment in a new sea-port that may be subject to U.S. sanctions.

Remarkably, a recent business survey found that nearly 13 percent of the companies surveyed have ceased all activities in Myanmar since the coup. Many more companies are cutting back operations and actively considering the reputational risk of being tainted by their financial support to a regime that has joined the premier league of pariah regimes.

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However, a crucial pillar of Western financial support for the faltering regime remains a tough nut to crack: the oil and gas sector. Montreal-based lobbyist for the military and former arms dealer Ari Ben-Menashe has admitted that payments from oil giants like Chevron are "pretty important" to Myanmar's junta, "because they don't have that many revenue streams right now."

"Myanmar earns close to US$1 billion a year from natural gas sales. Much of this money is not paid directly from oil companies to the government. It flows through Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state-owned enterprise with deep links to the military's business empire," Justice for Myanmar explained.

The group "calls for all businesses with commercial ties to MOGE to immediately cut ties," arguing that "[i]f it's business as usual, foreign investors in Myanmar's gas will be funding an illegitimate and brutal military regime as they did before 2011, when the country was under full military rule."

MOGE operates offshore gas fields in joint ventures with international firms, including U.S.-based Chevron and France's Total. Over 400 civil society organizations have also called for Chevron to halt revenue payments to the military junta. However Chevron has hit back with a huge lobbying campaign in a bid to hang onto its lucrative oil and gas assets.

France's Total is equally determined to resist any sanctions in the sector. Total's gas operation in Myanmar has been propping up the military junta by diverting funds from gas sales to offshore accounts instead of the government, according to documents accessed by French newspaper Le Monde. The giant oil corporation retaliated by pulling all of its ads from Le Monde.

Despite the intransigence of the multinationals in the sector, the deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Asia division, Phil Robertson, remains optimistic. "Everyone agrees that cutting off the oil and gas revenues to the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and by extension, the SAC junta, is critical," he told The Diplomat. "It's just a matter of time until that is done. Frustrations are mounting in North America and Europe about the total lack of progress in ending the junta's violence."
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Another gap that needs plugging in the sanctions regime is the deliberate obfuscation and silence of international finance institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, about their ambiguous relations with the military regime.

Paul Sein Twa, president of the Karen Environment and Social Action Network, or Kesan, has pointed out that "international finance institutions are currently funding projects worth an estimated $11 billion in the country, with direct loans, grants, guarantees, and funds going through financial intermediaries."

Are all these funds now up for grabs as an economic lifeline for the junta? The World Bank's own Yangon offices in Sule Square sit on land directly owned by the military junta. Its silence after an open letter dated February 17, 2021 from 218 civil society organizations called for IFI loans to Myanmar to be frozen has aroused suspicions about the World Bank's human rights due diligence on disbursements.

"The SAC junta's dictatorial rule only just passed its 100th day, but the suspension of these projects should have happened on day one," Robertson said. "International campaigners are working hard to pressure the IFIs and ultimately they will succeed."
Advertisement The Trouble With Singapore
Within Southeast Asia, ASEAN's slow, inadequate, and ambiguous response to the burgeoning Myanmar crisis - which threatens to spill over into Thailand and the region - is at odds with the U.N. human rights agenda of reversing the coup and pushing for stronger sanctions from member states.

Singapore, the largest investor in Myanmar, with $24 billion in cumulative approved investments as of December 2020, according to government figures, is not surprisingly an avid opponent of sanctions.

Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan declared that the government "should not embark on widespread, generalized indiscriminate sanctions, because the people who will suffer most would be the ordinary people in Myanmar."

"It is crucial for us in both good times and bad times to maintain this separation between politics and business, and let businesses make commercial decisions, investment decisions, on their own merits," he added.

This Singaporean view is shamefully out of step will the progress made in recent years to encourage ethical and socially responsible business, as highlighted by a press release from the U.N.'s Working Group on Business and Human Rights.

Indeed, U.N. Human Rights Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews said that "businesses, both individually and collectively, should exert the maximum leverage on the military in Myanmar, to halt what the High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to crimes against humanity." In other words, businesses cannot look the other way when people are being massacred in a Yangon street near their office.

Singapore's strong economic ties to Myanmar's military regimes, past and present, reveal a darker side to this renowned international business hub. A 2009 EarthRights International investigation found that Myanmar's military elite was "hiding billions of dollars of the people's revenue in Singapore while the country needlessly suffers the lowest social spending in Asia," in the words of ERI's Myanmar coordinator, Matthew Smith.

Justice for Myanmar has now updated this information, claiming that approximately $5.7 billion of Myanmar's foreign reserves are parked in commercial banks in Singapore and other countries, not including the $1 billion frozen by the U.S. Treasury in response to the coup.

Singapore's central bank has issued a disclaimer, asserting "that there are no significant funds from Myanmar firms or citizens in the city state," but Singapore is also well known for hiding sensitive information behind its tight banking secrecy laws.
Can Sanctions Work?
The debate over the effectiveness of sanctions is bedeviled by many complex variables, including the objectives of the sanctions and the amount of international compliance. In addition, the politics of sanctions could be differentiated into the good, the bad, and the ugly.
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One widely claimed success story dates back to U.N. sanctions imposed on South Africa's apartheid regime in 1977, with a mandatory arms embargo added in 1986. Joseph F. Jordan, the director of the Sonja Haynes Stone Center for Black Culture, explained in the New York Times that "sanctions were crucial to the defeat of apartheid" in South Africa.

By contrast, many unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States have failed because they aroused a storm of protest from people and government around the world. In the case of Cuba, U.S. sanctions were neither multilateral nor supported by the U.N. In 2019, the U.N. overwhelmingly supported an end to the U.S. embargo of Cuba, with the final tally 187 votes against three. These ideologically-driven sanctions have lasted for over 60 years, in defiance of annual condemnation by the U.N. General Assembly.

Between these two extremes - arguably the best and the worst examples of sanctions leveraged to attempt to force political change - where does Myanmar's case stand?

Myanmar sanctions enjoy some modest U.N. backing from the human rights agency, and multilateral sanctions by mostly Western countries are now in force. But the threatened veto of Russia and China has blocked support from the U.N. Security Council, which has reduced the global impact of the sanctions in place. On the other hand, sanctions on the junta are bolstered by the appeals of the Civil Disobedience Movement inside the country for more and tougher sanctions from the outside world.

Meanwhile, sanctions seldom work in isolation. The international anti-apartheid campaign, for example, blocked South African teams from playing cricket and rugby matches. A Burmese athlete has already refused to participate in the Tokyo Olympics in protest. Will this avenue be pursued further?
Starving the Junta But Keeping Aid Flowing
Stronger targeted Myanmar sanctions that starve the junta of dollars could effectively complement ethnic armed resistance and peaceful protest from within the country. But development experts say the peoples' bravery must not result in starvation.

Millions of people have been left with no income after losing their jobs for participating in boycotts, while tens of thousands are fleeing air strikes from the junta. As the military-run economy staggers toward bankruptcy, most Myanmar people are in dire need of humanitarian aid and economic assistance. Under the circumstances, there is an increasingly vital need for an emergency aid corridor from the outside world, but one that bypasses the state banking system to avoid funds being siphoned off by the military.

"If development banks really want to get aid to the people, there are ways to bypass the junta and reconfigure their aid model," said Paul Sein Twa of Kesan. He urged the development banks to provide support to civil society by sending funds directly to them rather than the junta. Development banks, the EU, and Japan must transfer their aid disbursement to a kind of "wartime" distribution network of food and medical supply-lines facilitated by authorized NGO agencies.

Paul Sein Twa explained that the "Lebanon model" showed how this could be done: "These banks should prioritize cross-border aid to ethnic health organizations [and] replicate a framework tested in Lebanon, where the World Bank, U.N., and European Union developed a model to pool funds and disburse them directly to NGOs and businesses as a novel way to counter corruption."

If sanctions on Myanmar can successfully mesh the various components - choking most sources of revenue for the regime, securing supply lines for aid from Thailand and possibly India, and driving the junta into ever deeper political isolation - then the doors could open to possible fragmentation and splits inside the army's ranks. The big question is whether there is a political will to find a way to do this.

Sanctions on Myanmar will start to really bite if Chevron and Total can be dragged into line. Combined with indications that the United Nations General Assembly in September may not accept the weak credentials of the junta to occupy Myanmar's U.N. seat, then the only path for the generals is surely all downhill.

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Advertisement More than 100 days after the February coup in Myanmar, and with no sign of action from a divided U.N. Security Council, international sanctions and boycott campaigns have assumed an ever greater importance in denying any legitimacy to the new military junta.

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Chaw Ei Thein and Moe Satt Condemn Violence in Myanmar

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Chaw Ei Thein and Moe Satt Condemn Violence in Myanmar

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Ocula

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When Captain Lin Htet Aung went public after his defection from the Myanmar armed forces in March following the 1 February attempted coup, he estimated that three-quarters of troops would consider following if they and their families could be guaranteed protection.

This indicates something deeply troubling amongst members of the Myanmar's army, beyond dissatisfaction with the coup.

Widespread poverty and abuse of Myanmar army foot soldiers was not on emerging academic Sai Latt's mind when he started his PhD research journey. However, his focus was gradually honed onto this same reality the more he spoke with people from Shan State displaced to Thailand.

The pervasive experience of Tatmadaw foot soldiers' looting of food and property from civilians in conflict and militarized areas kept sticking in his mind. First, he asked of all the violent and abusive ways Myanmar soldiers treated people in their vicinity, what exactly turned them into food looters?

His research interviews made him realize that looking solely at soldier's poverty in the battlefield was inadequate because it was chronic and systematic. This led to his next question, 'What are the institutional dynamics of the Myanmar military that create poverty that turns soldiers into looters?'

Conversations with former army personnel of various ranks led him deeper and deeper into the internal power dynamics that structured the entire Myanmar army from top to bottom.

Most examinations of military-civilian relations take a macro-level perspective that understands the violence as part of the military's nation-building agenda to forcefully control populations and territories. These crimes have been documented in relation to natural resource extraction, gender-based violence, forced relocation, child soldier recruitment.

While this highlights the oppressive and ruthless nature of Myanmar army as an institution, it also portrays it as homogenous. Sai Latt's micro-level perspective sheds more light on this battlefield relationship and the Myanmar army with insightful results.

He explored how, layer on layer, internal brutal hierarchical power relations and extreme poverty enables foot soldiers to off-load their burdens onto civilians.

In no way does Sai Latt excuse the crimes perpetrated against the locals encountered where they are stationed or on patrol. But he knows that human rights abuses cannot be addressed unless their root causes are understood. Subsequently, he focuses on researching peace processes and reconciliation.

Delving deep into these issues, Sai Latt argued that understanding military-civilian relations must include an appreciation of the class exploitation that structures everyday life in the army. That is, how officers extract personal wealth with impunity from lower ranks through dictatorial authority, physical and mental violence, exploitation and theft leaving the lowest ranks chronically poor and abused.

Rapid Growth of the Myanmar Army

Underlying the institutional dynamics that generate and sustain chronically poor foot soldiers are a cluster of factors related to the transformation of the Myanmar Army from an institution of national pride and protection to one of personal wealth seeking. This began, noted Sai Latt, with the military's rapid expansion in the 1990s-2000s during which, it is estimated, troop number grew from 200,000 to over 400,000 and battalions from 168 to over 500.

First, each battalion was unfunded by the military and responsible for raising its own finances to expand and operate its units, bases and activities. Battalion officers found major sources of income in criminal activities in illicit economies. Second, massive recruitment problems commonly resulted in registering children, youth and adults with histories of poverty, violence, crime and abandonment.

Third, as then dictator, Than Shwe, began opening up the Myanmar economy, battalion officers began corruptly exploiting their authority for personal profit via channels such as approving business licenses and illegal cross-border trade. Fourth, the rapid growth of the Defense Services Academy began graduating officer characterized as power and wealth seeking and arrogant.

Fifth, physically and psychologically brutal military training programs for rank and file soldiers instilled in them a sense of complete loyalty and unquestioned obedience to senior members in the mindset tradition of 'one blood, one voice, one order.'

Since their early days in the military, soldiers, including children, were exposed and became accustomed to violence, exploitation and various forms of injustice committed by seniors. Sai Latt explained,

The common experience of most trainees was extreme poverty, forced labour and endurance of physical violence. They were locked up and denied medical treatment. At night they were forced to sleep naked to prevent desertion. Two or three of them were tied up together if they wanted to use the washroom at night. Often times, loss of life occurred due to malnutrition and physical violence...

The trainees were no strangers to death, violence and atrocious environments.

Combined, these factors have contributed to building a pervasive military culture of pleasing the ones above while pressing the ones below and created a 'spoiled army' where officers abuse subordinates with impunity.

Institutional Dynamics Sustaining Foot Soldier Poverty

From the beginning, soldiers who commit violence against civilians are also victims of violence in their own world. Therefore, Sai Latt turned to considering the institutional dynamics of the Myanmar Army that shaped this world. And he identified three key points.

The first point concerns the characterization of power relations as hierarchical, exploitative and corrupt. To illustrate the impact of this on soldier poverty Sai Latt highlighted the constant battalion funding raising demands. 'My research found that arbitrary taxation, forced labour and cheating in the context of battalion financial management enabled wealth to be extracted from poor soldiers and their families.'

Second, the dictatorial character of power relations produces subservient soldiers and enables officers to exploit their juniors. The culture of unquestioned obedience is pervasive to the extent that subordinates must obey their seniors at all times, including when off-duty.

As Sai Latt explained, 'a top-down command and control system and 'one blood, one voice, one order' tradition had become personalized to such an extent that a senior's power and authority endorsed for military tasks worked similarly in everyday affairs.'

The impossibility of dissent, and intolerance of questioning, even for clarification, has created the conditions for exploitation, abuse, and even stealing and cheating to become cultural practices.

The third point concerns the dominance of patron-client relations. There are wealth seeking power holders at every level of the military and meeting the exploitative wealth needs of senior officials is the only way to rise in rank and improve one's situation.

Pain experienced by abusive demands and orders of seniors is relieved through gift giving and pleasing seniors with the hope of being granted a promotion or some form of advantage. Specifically, gift giving is the means to show loyalty, or phar, to seniors and is measured in terms of how much a subordinate can earn for his seniors.

These constant demands raise the question of where does this money come from? For low ranks soldiers, the demands take the forms of mandatory fees and opportunistic expenses regularly extracted from wages; heavy and constant involuntary labour demands and unpaid involuntary work demands on family members.

'Exploitation of rank-and-file soldiers and their families in the process of Tat financial management was the channel through which wealth was sucked up from the bottom of the hierarchy and eventually reached the top,' Sai Latt explained. This, he concluded, means that the relation between violence and poverty does not occur only at the level of poverty, but involves many actors and all levels. It is institution wide and deep.

Foot Soldier-Civilian Relations

On front lines in Myanmar soldiers often approach villagers and villages starving. They grab what they can in the abusive way they were accustomed to being treated. They use force to get what they want and to avoid begging which, according to an interviewee, is unthinkable.

Their approach is legitimized by the official military discourse that people in areas to which they are deployed are rebel supporters and sympathizers who should be treated as deadly enemies.

The immediate and individual reasons for soldiers' violence against civilians, it turns out, is often for their own everyday survival even though the military's institutional aim may be nationalistic nation-building and capitalistic control over natural resources.

'It is a story,' concluded Sai Latt, 'of systemic harsh exploitation from top to bottom, an extreme form of patron-client relations in the context of a totalitarian military regime and capitalist resource exploitation.'

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Research highlights the institutional abuse of Myanmar foot soldiers as root cause of human rights crisis

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When Captain Lin Htet Aung went public after his defection from the Myanmar armed forces in March following the 1 February attempted coup, he estimated that three-quarters of troops would consider following if they and their families could be guaranteed protection.

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(CNN) -- An American journalist working in Myanmar was detained by local authorities Monday, his family and his news organization told CNN.

Danny Fenster, 37, was stopped at the Yangon airport as he tried to board a flight out of the country, his brother Bryan Fenster said.

Fenster, a US citizen originally from Detroit, Michigan, works for the news site Frontier Myanmar in Myanmar's largest city, Yangon.

"Frontier's managing editor, Danny Fenster, was detained at Yangon International Airport this morning shortly before he was due to board a flight to Kuala Lumpur," the news organization said in a statement.

"We do not know why Danny was detained and have not been able to contact him since this morning. We are concerned for his wellbeing and call for his immediate release. Our priorities right now are to make sure he is safe and to provide him with whatever assistance he needs," the statement said.

The news organization also said it understands Fenster has been transferred to Insein Prison near Yangon. Insein is one of the country's most notorious prisons, known for its deplorable conditions.

Speaking to CNN Monday evening, Bryan Fenster said the family doesn't have much information on his brother's situation.

"I can only assume being a journalist in a country that's run by the military who wants to control the narrative, he was flagged being a journalist when he was at the airport. Can't begin to imagine why it happened," he said. "He was on valid work papers, valid visas, passports, everything. He was voluntarily leaving the country to come visit family, so we can't see what the issue is."

Bryan Fenster said the family are working with elected officials in Michigan and said the US state department is aware of his brother's case.

"We're very hopeful with all the support, we'll be getting him out as soon as possible," he said.

Bryan Fenster said earlier that his brother was flying to the United States to surprise his parents, whom he had not seen for over two years. The family had been concerned about the safety of being a journalist in Myanmar following February's military coup, and felt shocked and worried at the news of his detention, Bryan said, calling it a "nightmare."

A US Department of State official, who used another name for Myanmar, said the agency was monitoring the situation. "We are aware of reports of a US citizen detained in Burma. We take seriously our responsibility to assist US citizens abroad, and are monitoring the situation. Due to privacy considerations, we have no further comment."

The detention comes almost four months after Myanmar's military seized power in a coup on February 1, overthrowing the democratically-elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and detaining government officials. Junta security forces have brutally suppressed almost daily protests across the country, killing more than 820 people and arresting more than 5,400, according to advocacy group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).

The junta has also attempted to silence the country's media by revoking independent publishing and broadcast licenses, raiding newspaper offices and targeting journalists for arrest. Among the thousands of people detained since the coup are 85 journalists, including 48 still in detention, according to Reporting Asean.

Fenster is among a number of foreign journalists to be detained in Myanmar since the coup.

Japanese journalist Yuki Kitazumi was arrested in April and charged with spreading false information. He was held in Insein Prison until the junta released him two weeks ago and returned him to Tokyo.

Many detained reporters are charged with crimes under section 505a -- a law amended by the military that makes it a crime punishable by up to three years in prison for publishing or circulating comments that "cause fear" or spread "false news."

In a statement, the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT) said it was not clear whether Fenster had been charged with any offense.

"The arrests of journalists and the violence used by the security forces on anyone caught trying to report or record their actions, constitute an extraordinary attack on freedom of expression in Myanmar, and should be widely condemned," the FCCT statement said.

The detention comes as ousted civilian leader Suu Kyi attended a court hearing Monday and met with her lawyers -- her first appearance in person since the coup.

In its nightly news bulletin, Myanmar state TV aired the first images of Suu Kyi since the coup. She was detained in the early hours before the military seized power and had not been seen in public since.

The images showed Suu Kyi in the dock with her hands in her lap and wearing a surgical mask. Beside her sat ousted President Win Myint and the former mayor of the capital Naypyidaw, Myo Aung.

Suu Kyi faces a range of charges, from illegally possessing walkie-talkie radios to violating the official secrets act -- the most serious charge which carries a potential prison sentence of up to 14 years.

Last week, Myanmar's junta-appointed election commission said it would dissolve the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) party because of what it claims was election fraud. The military overthrew the NLD government alleging mass voter discrepancies, though the electoral commission at the time rejected the army's complaints.

According to her lawyer Khin Maung Zaw, Suu Kyi struck a defiant note, saying of the NLD: "Our party grew out of the people so it will exist as long as people support it."
CNN's Kylie Atwood, Eric Levenson, Helen Regan and Jessie Yeung contributed to this report.

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American journalist detained in Myanmar while trying to fly out of country

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(CNN) -- An American journalist working in Myanmar was detained by local authorities Monday, his family and his news organization told CNN. Danny Fenster, 37, was stopped at the Yangon airport as he tried to board a flight out of the country, his brother Bryan Fenster said.

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Myanmar’s Arrest of Journalists an ‘Extraordinary Attack on Freedom of Expression,’ UN Says 

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Myanmar’s Arrest of Journalists an ‘Extraordinary Attack on Freedom of Expression,’ UN Says 

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Muhabarishaji News Agency

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As the Myanmar quagmire enters a fourth month, it is clear that all protagonists are still entertaining wishful thoughts that their side will prevail.

Oh Buddha, they should have realized by now that if all stakeholders do not kick off the peace process, the momentum generated by the meeting of the leaders of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on April 24 will be at risk.

If that is the case, not only Myanmar but the whole of Southeast Asia will fall into a dark pit. More instability, more casualties, and more armed resistance would tear up the Land of Golden Pagodas and the Indo-Pacific region.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that the local and external players understand the current overall dynamic inside the besieged country. Otherwise, the conflicting parties will continue to live inside their own echo-chamber, convinced that they are winning. For any peace process to have a chance, they must be on the same page and realize that their current contestation is a lose-lose endeavor.

The most important player at the moment is the Tatmadaw, headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Since he seized power on Feb. 1, the Tatmadaw has shown that the Myanmar people are no longer their parents, as embedded in the military's motto. As days pass, the number of casualties continues to increase and will not subside until the junta feels confident that domestic security is under control.

The Tatmadaw must stop all violence against its own people immediately. If the confrontation continues unabated as it has in the past weeks, it will further destabilize the country and induce the regime to use even more violence to contain the resistance. Worse, it would attract outside assistance and all kinds support for the underdogs.

As for the brave people of Myanmar, they have to come to terms with the fact that they are now moving into a long-haul struggle with the regime. Over the past four months, they have shown their courage and willingness to die for democracy and rule of law. These martyrs will be remembered and recorded in the annals of Myanmar's history. Those who are still breathing have one choice-staying alive and safe from COVID-19 to fight another day.

It is senseless for them to go out and turn themselves into moving targets for the regime's foot soldiers. Although the use of lethal weapons against protestors has reduced since the Jakarta meeting, the regime has resorted to a more subtle oppression by arresting and kidnapping professionals, journalists and activists. So far, according to the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, more than 800 persons have been killed and 4,000 have been incarcerated, including nearly 70 journalists.

The situation on the ground has yet to reach a level of calm or stalemate that would allow for the jump-starting of the dialogue process. To get there, all supporters, both local and international have to act in a concerted manner and encourage their followers to move to the next stage.

If there is a lull in violence and more stability throughout the 14 regions, then ASEAN can move in a more meaningful way. For the time being, the ASEAN chair, Brunei Darussalam, has to endure harsh criticism from his colleagues especially Indonesia, for the lack of action.

ASEAN has already pressured the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the regime is officially known, to come up with dates for an initial visit by a joint team representating the ASEAN chair. Without the ASEAN team on the ground, it will be difficult for other operations to kick in, especially needed humanitarian assistance.

From ASEAN's point of view, dispatching the ASEAN team with eminent persons, including chair's representative and the grouping's chief, into a conflict zone is a difficult decision. Obviously, their safety must be guaranteed and ASEAN has to make sure that no stakeholders take advantage of their visit by instigating violence or other disruptive activities that would impact on their trip.

As of today, the SAC has not yet fixed the dates for the proposed visit. The announcement of the ASEAN envoy and members of the task force for humanitarian assistance will not be made until after the joint visit.
With only 166 days left under Brunei's chairmanship, it is pretty urgent that a clear mandate and framework with specific timelines be agreed upon as stated in the five-point consensus.

The military junta has stated earlier that it would take at least two years before the current emergency rule would come to an end with a democratic Myanmar. Given the Tatmadaw's past activities and recalcitrance, nobody treats their words seriously.

ASEAN's task's will never end until the people of Myanmar's wish for peace and democracy is fulfilled.

The next ASEAN chair, Cambodia, will take up the baton on Oct. 29 and has to continue the implementation of the agreed action plans well into 2022 or even in early 2023, when Indonesia will serve as the chair.

Indonesia's active role in shaping the ASEAN approach to the Myanmar crisis is indicative of its regional vision. As the world's third-largest democracy, it would be fitting if Indonesia could guide and firm up the democratization process in Myanmar.
(Kavi Chongkittavorn is a veteran journalist on regional affairs. His views are his own.) You may also like these stories: Myanmar Military Launches Air Raid in Karen State Myanmar Swimmer to Forgo Tokyo Olympics in Protest at Junta Violence Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Fighting

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Opinion | Give Peace a Chance to End Myanmar Crisis

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As the Myanmar quagmire enters a fourth month, it is clear that all protagonists are still entertaining wishful thoughts that their side will prevail. Oh Buddha, they should have realized by now that if all stakeholders do not kick off the peace process, the momentum generated by the meeting of the leaders of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on April 24 will be at risk.

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Electricity is one of the largest government expenses and the regime is facing a huge budget hole unless it can coerce users to pay up - which many have no intention of doing.

By FRONTIER

On April 22, Ma Lwin Lwin Myint received an electricity bill of K10,585 for March. Despite the modest amount charged, she's determined not to pay it.

"I've decided I won't pay any tax to the dictators, and that includes electricity. If police and soldiers ask me, I'll just tell them I don't have any money. I don't care if they cut off the power to my house," the resident of Yangon's North Dagon Township told Frontier. "Most people in my ward who I've spoken to say they're not going to pay either."

This normally unremarkable event - the distribution of power bills - marks the latest test for a junta intent on consolidating its control. Ranged against it is a broad swath of the public that is determined not to put a single kyat into military hands.

The stakes are high for the regime. Electricity generation costs have been rising rapidly in recent years, and are one of the largest expenses in the national budget. With receipts from key sources of revenue, such as natural gas and taxes, likely to decline this year, failure to recover electricity costs will blow out the budget even further - possibly by billions of dollars.

Hiring and firing

In the wake of the February 1 military coup, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy has had among the highest levels of participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement, with up to 80 percent of staff refusing to work.

The CDM has been particularly strong at township electricity supply offices, which are responsible for checking meters, issuing bills and accepting payments. For months after the coup, electricity staff were a rare sight on the streets of Yangon and other cities, except when they were out fixing downed power lines and faulty equipment.

"Nearly everyone I work with joined the CDM," said one staffer from the Yangon Electricity Supply Corporation, which distributes power to homes and businesses in the country's largest city. "Many township offices haven't been able to distribute bills to homes simply because they have no staff."

The officer - who in normal times would go from house to house, noting how much power they had used for the month - said he joined the CDM because he didn't want to help raise revenue for the junta.

"We are ready to serve the people, though. If the electricity goes out because of a system breakdown or another kind of fault, we're ready to work," he said.

Although CDM rates in the ministry have declined, with some staff returning to work, Frontier understands that many township-level electricity staff remained on strike through to the end of April.

But with costs from electricity generation mounting - even with depressed demand from a flatlining economy - the regime has moved to get bill collection back up and running, and to punish staff who still refused to cooperate.

One tally shows that to May 5, a total of 3,712 staff - including 240 described as "upper level" - from eight of the ministry's departments and enterprises were dismissed for participating in the CDM, mostly during April.

Enterprises responsible for generating revenue from electricity sales accounted for two-thirds of the firings; 285 staff from the YESC lost their jobs, along with 841 from the Mandalay Electricity Supply Corporation and 1,330 from the Electricity Supply Enterprise, which supplies power in other parts of the country.

Although Frontier was unable to confirm the veracity of the entire list, the numbers and dates for urban Mandalay are correct, suggesting the list is likely to be accurate.

The ministry has moved quickly to replace fired staff, and since the Thingyan holiday, which ended on April 19, bills have been distributed in some areas.

The striking YESC official, who has not yet been dismissed, said new staff were brought in in some townships to check meters, distribute bills and receive payments.

"I understand that it's mainly in townships under martial law," he said. "The old staff like me are not working - the people doing this are new staff."

Electricity worker Ko Thura (not his real name) joined the CDM on February 8. Nearly all his colleagues in the MESC office in Mandalay's Chan Aye Thar Zan Township went on strike too - only four of the 97 staff remained at work.

Like his counterpart in Yangon, Thura said his goal was to cut off revenue to the regime. But in an interview with Frontier back in March, he expressed concern about how long he and his colleagues could remain on strike.

"We're not accepting a salary from the junta and we don't have much in savings to cover our living costs," he said. "I don't know how long we can survive like this. So far though we haven't received any money from CDM support groups but I hope we can get some soon."

In the absence of support from civil society groups, Thura began selling vegetables to make ends meet. On April 28, he was among 168 MESC staff who lost their jobs, and received a formal termination letter on May 10. After 14 years' service, Thura was given just nine days to vacate his state-provided housing - but he insisted he had no regrets.

"From the moment I joined the CDM I knew I would be fired eventually. I've already been preparing to move to my relative's house, and I'll find a new job," he said. "But once the revolution is successful, I'll go back to my old department."

Cutting power to large numbers of households would do little to solve the regime's fiscal black hole, as it will have to pay private power plant operators regardless of how much they produce. (Frontier)

A looming struggle

At the end of April, residents in Yangon's outer western Hlaing Tharyar Township, which has been under martial law since mid-March, received their first bills since the coup.

Ko Aung Thu, who lives in the Shwe Lin Ban area of the highly industrialised township, said he had received a bill for January but had no intention of paying.

"They killed people right here, in this township," he said, referring to the security forces' massacre of more than 50 people on March 14. "Why should I pay money to a bunch of murderers? I won't pay any taxes. If we pay taxes, we're just supporting murderers."

Although they haven't yet received bills, some residents and business owners in other parts of the country say they too won't be paying up.

Ko Naing Tun from Nyaung-U Township in Mandalay Region said that he heard the government had hired casual staff to distribute bills elsewhere, but was yet to receive anything himself. As in other areas, he said that CDM rates in the Nyaung-U power supply office were high. "I expect we'll get bills soon but I've already decided to not pay," he said.

A hotel owner in nearby Bagan said he wouldn't pay either and he expected many others would also refuse.

"I just heard today about how the state lottery isn't able to run because so few people bought tickets. I think most people won't pay their electricity bills, either," he said. "We won't support the dictator ... the income from electricity charges is huge and they won't be able to survive without that money."

Another business owner, from Magway Township, said he planned to pay because he couldn't afford to have his electricity cut off. He's only received a bill for February, though, and when he went to pay it, there were no staff in the office to accept the money because most had joined the CDM.

For the regime, the re-staffing of electricity offices is only one half of the problem. As civil disobedience shifts from ministry workers to the power-using public, the regime is likely to face an epic struggle to get people to pay up.

So far, it seems to have avoided taking up the issue. It's the users' responsibility to pay their bill - either in person or online - by the deadline, and in normal times the supply offices are quick to turn off the power when payments are late.

Although both Aung Thu and Lwin Lwin Myint were supposed to pay their bills more than two weeks ago, they said they are yet to hear anything from the authorities, and their power remains on.

On May 14, state media publishing a "request to the public" explaining that "revenue from the electricity fees of people is used to generate stable and reliable electricity from the state-owned power stations and purchase from the private power stations". It urged people to pay their bills by the due date, but also warned that those who fail to do so face having their electricity cut.

Thura, who was recently fired from the Chan Aye Thar Zan electricity office, said the junta would face a huge dilemma if most users refused to pay their bills. He said residents should discuss the issue with their neighbours and collectively agree on a boycott.

"They just don't have the manpower to cut power to a lot of people at the same time," he said. "If every ward [collectively boycotts paying], the ministry is going to be in a lot of trouble."

Power bills mounting

Cutting power to hundreds of thousands, even millions, of households won't just be a manpower challenge for the regime, but also a fiscal nightmare.

Improved electricity supply has been integral to Myanmar's economic transformation over the past decade, but it has come at a cost.

In 2011-12, the government spent around K300 billion on power generation, and turned a small profit. At the time, nearly all power came from state-run hydropower dams and gas-fired plants.

The government of President U Thein Sein, which ruled from 2011 to 2016, encouraged private investment in the sector and signed power purchase agreements (PPAs) with independent power producers, known as IPPs. This boosted generation capacity and reliability, but it dramatically increased the total cost of producing power.

By 2017-18, the last year for which Frontier has figures, the government was spending around K1.9 trillion on electricity generation - a six-fold increase in six years - and recovering just K1.2 trillion from customers, resulting in a loss of K700 billion.

Although the subsequent National League for Democracy government significantly increased electricity prices in 2019, it also engaged private investors to undertake expensive emergency power projects, most notably two liquefied natural gas plants in Yangon Region that were awarded to Hong Kong-listed company VPower, which has partnerships with Chinese state enterprises.

The 2020-21 national budget law shows that economic enterprises under the Ministry of Electricity and Energy - which includes the Electricity Supply Enterprise, but also the profit-making Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise - together with YESC and MESC were expected to spend almost K9.4 trillion, and generate close to K8.9 trillion.

Because expenses and receipts are not broken down according to individual state enterprises, the figures do not reveal the amount spent on electricity alone. However, they are almost double 2017-18 levels, when total receipts were K4.7 trillion and expenses K4.8 trillion. Most of this increase, in both receipts and expenses, is likely attributable to electricity.

Another headache for the military regime is that the tariffs in the PPAs are in US dollars. In some cases, the contracts stipulate that the operator will be paid in US dollars, while under more recent PPAs the producer is instead paid the equivalent in kyat.

An LNG tanker operated by VPower moored in the Yangon River. (Frontier)

Costly contracts

With the kyat rapidly losing value against the dollar - since February 1 it has fallen close to 30 percent - the cost of servicing those agreements is going to rise, but the amount charged to customers remains fixed in kyat.

At the same time, the cratering economy, which some economists are forecasting to contract by up to 20pc, will offer some relief for the regime. With many factories and offices shuttered, demand for power is likely to decline significantly. The ministry has already instructed some IPPs to dial down the amount of power they're producing.

"No economic activity means no demand for electricity," said one operator. "So they've been asking IPPs to run at a fraction of capacity, especially at night."

Nevertheless, there's a limit to how far production can be scaled back, for both technical and financial reasons. Most PPAs, for example, have what's known as a "take or pay" clause, which guarantees the IPP a certain level of revenue regardless of how much power they are asked to produce.

Even delays in payments from power consumers could have consequences for the regime's financial position, said Mr Guillaume de Langre, a researcher and former adviser to the Ministry of Electricity and Energy, because the ministry's budget for electricity is "very cash-flow-sensitive".

"What comes in goes out immediately. If supply and demand are not closely aligned, losses can get out of control faster than we think," he said.

"Right now, demand is declining and payments have collapsed. But the supply side is constrained by PPA commitments and the junta's attempt to reassure investors by continuing the NLD's power projects, such as the Mee Lin Gyaing LNG plant," he added, referring to a China-backed US$2.5 billion project that received Myanmar Investment Commission approval earlier this month.

"Supply and demand are misaligned, causing further losses, which a depreciation of the kyat would only exacerbate. The question is how long can their reserves fill the gap before power sector losses become a systemic risk."

Given the lack of revenue coming into regime coffers, some IPPs are indeed worried about whether they'll continue to get paid, or whether the junta might try to break the contracts.

"What we are worried about is the government will run out of money, that in the next few months the government might not be able to pay all their obligations," said an official from a private power company.

But another said they believed this was unlikely, at least in the short term. "They still have dollar reserves," the source said. "When they stop paying for the electricity, that means the country is really in trouble - that means the government is starting to collapse."

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Unpaid power bills put junta finances on the line | Frontier Myanmar

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By FRONTIER On April 22, Ma Lwin Lwin Myint received an electricity bill of K10,585 for March. Despite the modest amount charged, she's determined not to pay it. "I've decided I won't pay any tax to the dictators, and that includes electricity. If police and soldiers ask me, I'll just tell them I don't have any money.

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Communities defy junta's attempts to rule wards and villages | Frontier Myanmar

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The Tatmadaw is fighting to wrest control of local administration, but many of its appointed officials have been hobbled by fierce, and sometimes violent, opposition.

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The junta-appointed Myanmar election commission chair said on Friday at a meeting in Naypyitaw that Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) could be disbanded due to "electoral fraud" and party leaders prosecuted as "traitors."

Thein Soe, a former judge advocate general in the military and deputy chief justice, was appointed as the new chair of the Union Election Commission (UEC) by the military in the wake of the February 1 coup, which it staged on the pretext of alleged irregularities in last year's election.

Thein Soe said the commission's scrutiny of voter lists would soon be concluded. After this, the commission plans to prosecute the NLD for the alleged "fraud," according to a recording of his speech heard and verified by Myanmar Now.

"What do we do to the NLD party that conspired by breaking the law? Should the party be disbanded? Prosecute those individuals who committed these acts as traitors to the country? We will take action accordingly," he said at the Naypyitaw meeting.

He accused the NLD government of inflating voter lists, allowing those without identity cards to cast ballots, and using advance voting to benefit their party.

"It is an intentional move, to then be able to form a one-party government," Thein Soe told political party representatives at the meeting.

Legal action against the NLD would take place "soon," he added, but did not specify when.

Thein Soe also asked the representatives of parties who attended Friday's meeting to provide evidence of electoral fraud that they may have experienced or witnessed.

Despite the accusations by the junta-led election commission, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) has described the results of the 2020 vote as "by and large, representative of the will of the people of Myanmar" in its final report on the election released earlier this week.

Friday's UEC event in Naypyitaw was the second such meeting of parties since the junta's reappointment of commission members. Representatives of 59 political parties, including the People's Party, which is led by 1988-generation pro-democracy activists, were present. Most of the parties who participated in the meeting did not win any seats in last year's election.

The chair of the People's Party, Ko Ko Gyi, has been a well-known political figure since the 1988 people's uprising against the military. Many of the party's senior leaders resigned out of opposition to the party's decision to attend the meeting with junta-appointed UEC.

Among those parties that boycotted the meeting were the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the Democratic Party for New Society (DPNS), and other prominent ethnic parties.

The chair of the DPNS said his party condemned and rejected the "illegitimate" actions of the military, including the murder of more than 800 civilians since anti-coup protests broke out throughout the country.

Rakhine politician Aye Maung who is the leader of the Arakan Front Party (AFP) was also present at the meeting. He was also a founding member of the Arakan National Party (ANP) until his resignation in 2017.

Aye Maung, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison for high treason in 2019, was released from prison as part of a general amnesty by the military junta on February 12.

He was arrested along with a Rakhine writer in January 2018 for delivering speeches marking the 233rd anniversary of the fall of the Arakan Kingdom at a rally in Rakhine State's Rathedaung Township.

Junta welcomes back UEC's 2010 chair

Current military-appointed UEC chair Thein Soe served as chair of the commission during the 2010 election, which was overseen by Myanmar's military regime headed by Than Shwe.

The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) "won" some 80 percent of seats in that election-the country's first in two decades-but the vote was widely rejected both internationally and by civil society as being neither free nor fair. Thein Soe also barred foreign observers and international media from witnessing voting.

The NLD boycotted the 2010 election out of objection to the military-drafted 2008 Constitution as well as electoral laws barring those with criminal records from candidacy. Prior to that time, more than 2,000 activists, including NLD leaders, had been detained for their political activities.

Suu Kyi, who was general secretary of the NLD, was under house arrest by the military regime when the election was held on November 7, 2010. She was released one week later.

Leaders of the NLD, including its chair Suu Kyi, were again arrested and charged following the February 1 coup. She faces a total of six charges, including alleged violations of the Official Secrets Act which carry a 14-year prison sentence. Party patron Win Htein has been charged with sedition.

Former UEC members appointed by the NLD government were also detained along with many NLD politicians and other activists.

The regime has said that it will hold elections again at an unspecified time. No major pro-democracy party has made an official statement regarding whether they would take part in an election under the coup regime.

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Junta-appointed election commission head suggests disbanding NLD, prosecuting leadership as 'traitors'

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The junta-appointed Myanmar election commission chair said on Friday at a meeting in Naypyitaw that Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) could be disbanded due to "electoral fraud" and party leaders prosecuted as "traitors."

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TOKYO: A Japanese journalist recently freed from a Myanmar jail urged his government on Friday (May 21) to take "concrete action" against the military regime there, including reviewing its development aid.

Myanmar authorities arrested Yuki Kitazumi, a freelance reporter who was covering the unrest that engulfed the country after a military takeover on Feb 1, and charged him with spreading false information.

Kitazumi, who lived in Myanmar for several years and used to run a media company in the main city of Yangon, was freed after negotiations led by the Japanese ambassador. The journalist returned to Japan last week.

"I was freed thanks to the backing of the Japanese government but it's not like that has resolved the problem," Kitazumi told a news conference in Tokyo, referring to Myanmar's turmoil.

Myanmar's security forces have killed more than 800 people since a wave of protests broke out after the military overthrew an elected government led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners activist group says.

The group says more than 4,000 people have been detained, including 20 who have been sentenced to death.

Kitazumi said Japan enjoyed strong influence over Myanmar owing to its historic ties and appealed to his government to take "concrete action" to help resolve the confrontation between the pro-democracy movement and the generals.

"I'd like Japan to use the strength it used to free me to resolve the problem in Myanmar," he said.

Japan has been a big investor and source of technical help and development aid for Myanmar's semi-civilian governments in the decade of political reform that followed the end of the last era of military rule in 2011.

Asked about comments by Japan's foreign minister, Toshimitsu Motegi, that Tokyo could cut all development aid if the situation did not improve, Kitazumi said that cutting some projects would send a "strong message" and that a review of Japan's engagement was necessary.

Kitazumi's media company used produce video content, from news to movie trailers, and trained journalists with emphasis on free speech.

Before his work in Yangon, Kitazumi was a journalist with Japan's largest business daily, the Nikkei.

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Freed Japan reporter calls on Tokyo to take 'concrete action' against Myanmar junta

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Share this content TOKYO: A Japanese journalist recently freed from a Myanmar jail urged his government on Friday (May 21) to take "concrete action" against the military regime there, including reviewing its development aid. Myanmar authorities arrested Yuki Kitazumi, a freelance reporter who was covering the unrest that engulfed the country after a military takeover on Feb 1, and charged him with spreading false information.

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EIA Forests campaigners have learnt that the brutal military junta which seized control of Myanmar on 1 February is seeking an injection of hard currency by selling off thousands of tonnes of illegal timber to international markets.
The auction is due to be held by the Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE), the State-run entity which controls all timber sales in and from the country.

It is understood that during the last term of the legitimate National League for Democracy Government, about 200,000 tons (approximately 203,209 tonnes) of illegal timber were seized and this is among the MTE stockpile due for auction.

Faith Doherty, EIA Forests Campaigns Leader, said: "Why would this State enterprise do this, other than to obtain desperately needed hard currency to continue the junta's brutal persecution of the people of Myanmar?

"This is additional confirmation of EIA allegations that the military regime is using timber to support itself and its reign of terror."

MTE operates an auctions system whereby serious traders place a deposit $10,000 before bidding for a final price. All transactions are finalised in US dollars and the entire process is opaque - any transparency or traceability is hidden, unless one pays the deposit.

Doherty added: " The US and Canada have sanctioned the MTE, along with other relevant entities and individuals in Myanmar, therefore any trader entering into this auction and paying US dollars to do so is knowingly breaking these sanctions to get their hands on illegal timber.

"This is conflict timber, it is illegal in so many ways, and seeking to buy and import it from Myanmar would amount to nothing more than naked profiteering on the country's misery and suffering.

"We strongly urge the EU and the UK to follow the lead of the US and Canada by imposing sanctions of their own, right now.

The military junta, while pretending to adhere to laws and regulations, is breaking one of its own rules by selling seized timber to the international market

EIA campaigners and our in-country partners have been monitoring seizures throughout the years and have long been warning timber traders seeking to import Burmese teak and other precious hardwoods from Myanmar that without clear, verified information on its origin, all timber imported from the country is illegal.

တရားမဝင်သစ်များ လေလံတင်၍ အာဏာသိမ်းမှု စရိတ်အဖြစ် ပြန်သုံးမည့် မြန်မာစစ်အစိုးရ

မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ပြီးခဲ့သော ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် အာဏာသိမ်းလိုက်သည့် ရက်စက်သော စစ်အစိုးရသည် တန်ချိန်ထောင်ချီသော တရားမဝင်သစ်များကို နိုင်ငံတကာဈေးကွက်အား ရောင်းချခြင်းအားဖြင့် ၄င်းတို့၏ အာဏာသိမ်းမှု စရိတ်အတွက် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေရှာရန် ကြိုးစားနေသည်ကို EIA ၏ သစ်တောရေးရာ လှုံ့ဆော်ဆောင်ရွက်သူများက သိရှိလာရပါသည်။

အဆိုပါ သစ်လေလံပွဲကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ သစ်ရောင်းချမှုများအားလုံးအား ချုပ်ကိုင်သည့် အစိုးရပိုင် မြန်မာ့သစ်လုပ်ငန်းက ဦးစီးကျင်းပမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

ယခင် တရားဝင် NLD အစိုးရ သက်တမ်းအတွင်းတွင် သစ်တန်ချိန် ၂၀၃,၂၀၉ မျှသော တရားမဝင်သစ်များ ဖမ်းဆီးရမိထားပြီး ၄င်းတို့သည် ယခု မြန်မာ့သစ်လုပ်ငန်းက လေလံတင်ရောင်းချမည့် သစ်များအတွင်းတွင်လည်း အပါအဝင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

"နိုင်ငံပိုင် လုပ်ငန်းတခုက အခုလို ရောင်းချတာဟာ စစ်အစိုးရက မြန်မာပြည်သူတွေကို ရက်ရက်စက်စက် ဆက်လက် ဖိနှိပ်ထားဖို့ အသည်းအသန်လိုအပ်နေတဲ့ နိုင်ငံခြားငွေ ရှာပေးဖို့ကလွဲလို့ တခြားအကြောင်း မရှိနိုင်ပါဘူး" ဟု EIA ၏ သစ်တောရေးရာ လှုံ့ဆော်ဆောင်ရွက်မှု ခေါင်းဆောင် ဖိတ်သ် ဒိုဟာတီက ပြောဆိုခဲ့ပါသည်။

"ဒါဟာ စစ်အစိုးရက အခုလို မြန်မာ့သစ်တွေကို အသုံးချပြီး သူ့ကိုယ်သူ ထောက်ပံ့ဖို့နဲ့ ရက်စက်စွာ အုပ်ချုပ်ဖို့ လုပ်နေတယ် ဆိုတဲ့ EIA ရဲ့ စွပ်စွဲချက်တွေကို ထပ်ဆင့် အတည်ပြုပေးတာပဲ ဖြစ်ပါတယ်။"

မြန်မာ့သစ်လုပ်ငန်း၏ လေလံစနစ်အရ အမှန်တကယ် လေလံပေး ဝယ်ယူမည့် သစ်ကုန်သည်များသည် စရံငွေ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ တသောင်း ပေးသွင်းရပါသည်။ လေလံပွဲအတွင်း ငွေပေးချေမှုများ အားလုံးတွင် အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာကိုသာ အသုံးပြုရပြီး စရံငွေ သွင်းထားသူက လွဲ၍ ငွေကြေးလွှဲပြောင်းမှု လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်အားလုံး ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင်မရှိပဲ အရင်းအမြစ်လိုက်ဖို့ ခက်ခဲအောင်လည်း ပြုလုပ်ထားပါသည်။

"အမေရိကန်နှင့် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံတို့က မြန်မာ့သစ်လုပ်ငန်းနဲ့တကွ တခြားသက်ဆိုင်သော လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်နှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို စီးပွားရေးဒဏ်ခတ်ပြီးပြီ ဆိုတော့ ဒီလေလံပွဲဝင်ပြီး အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ ပေးသွင်းလိုက်တဲ့ ကုန်သည်တိုင်းဟာ သိသိကြီးနဲ့ တရားမဝင်သစ်ကို လက်ဝယ်ရရှိဖို့ စီးပွားရေး ပိတ်ဆို့ ဒဏ်ခတ်တဲ့ စည်းကမ်းကို ချိုးဖောက်တာပဲ ဖြစ်ပါလိမ့်မယ်" ဟုလည်း ဖိတ်သ် ဒိုဟာတီက ထပ်မံ ဖြည့်စွက် ပြောကြားပါသည်။

"ပဋိပက္ခတွေ ဖြစ်နေတဲ့ ဒေသကထွက်တဲ့ သစ် ဖြစ်တဲ့အတွက် ဘယ်လိုနည်းနဲ့မှ တရားမဝင်ပဲ ဒီလိုဖြစ်နေတဲ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကနေ ဝယ်ယူတင်သွင်းဖို့ ကြိုးစားတာဟာ အဲဒီနိုင်ငံရဲ့ ကံဆိုးမိုးမှောင်ကျမှုတွေကို ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် အမြတ်ထုတ်ဖို့ ကြိုးစားတာပဲ ဖြစ်သွားပါလိမ့်မယ်။"

"ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂ အီးယူနဲ့ ယူကေနိုင်ငံတို့ အနေနဲ့လည်း အမေရိကန်နဲ့ ကနေဒါတို့လို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို စီးပွားရေးပိတ်ဆို့ ဒဏ်ခတ်မှုမျိုးတွေ ချက်ချင်း သတ်မှတ်လိုက်ဖို့ ကျွန်မတို့ ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာ တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါတယ်။"

မြန်မာစစ်အစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ဥပဒေနှင့် စည်းကြပ်မှုတွေကို လိုက်နာချင်ယောင်ဆောင်နေသော်လည်း တရားမဝင်သစ်များအား နိုင်ငံတကာဈေးကွက်တွင် ရောင်းချခြင်းမှာ ၄င်းတို့သတ်မှတ်ထားသော ဥပဒေများထဲမှ တခုကို ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်းသာ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

EIA ၏ သစ်တောရေးရာ လှုံ့ဆော်လှုပ်ရှားသူများနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်တွင်းမှ EIA ၏ လုပ်ဖော်ကိုင်ဖက်များသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း တရားမဝင်သစ် ဖမ်းဆီးရမိမှုများကို နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ စောင့်ကြည့်နေပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ ကျွန်းသစ်နှင့်တကွ အခြား အဖိုးတန်သစ်မာများကို ဝယ်ယူတင်သွင်းလိုသော သစ်ကုန်သည်များကိုလည်း ထွက်ရှိရာ ဇစ်မြစ်နှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်း အတည်ပြုထားခြင်း မရှိသော သစ်မှန်သမျှသည် တရားဝင် သစ်မဟုတ်ကြောင်း အစဉ်တစိုက် သတိပေးနေခဲ့ကြပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ တရားမဝင်သစ်များနှင့် ပတ်သက်သော သတင်းအရင်းအမြစ် အချက်အလက်များကို EIA ၏ ဝက်ဘ်ဆိုဒ်တွင် ထပ်မံသွားရောက် လေ့လာနိုင်ပါသည်။

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Myanmar junta looks to line its pockets and fund the coup with massive auction of illegal timber - EIA

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EIA Forests campaigners have learnt that the brutal military junta which seized control of Myanmar on 1 February is seeking an injection of hard currency by selling off thousands of tonnes of illegal timber to international markets. The auction is due to be held by the Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE), the State-run entity which controls all timber sales in and from the country.

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A man who was collecting donations in Kalay, Sagaing Region to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Chin State was arrested by the military authorities on Wednesday and his funds seized, according to local sources.

Aung Thang Phay had gathered 17 million kyat (more than US$10,000) for IDPs in Mindat while he was in Kalay. He stayed in the home of another local, Thang Marn Kee, who was also reportedly arrested on Thursday.

"There were donors in Kalay so he went to meet the donors and accepted the donations. He was going to come back after buying all the supplies [for the IDPs], but he was arrested with all the cash. I assume he was taken after being questioned about the money," an official from a local aid group helping the IDPs told Myanmar Now.

He described the arrest and the confiscation of the funds as "cruel."

"They won't care about displaced people. They've started the war. And after that, they sabotage the displaced people's efforts to get the help and donations that they need? I'm at a loss for words," he said.

The source expected that formal charges would follow the arrest.

"They'll do whatever they want, as usual," he said of the military council.

People in Mindat, Chin State fled their homes in mid-May when clashes broke out between the junta's armed forces and the local resistance movement, the Chinland Defence Force.

More than 3,000 IDPs were staying in seven camps in the area at the time of reporting.

Although exact figures are not known, the total number of IDPs from Mindat could be more than 10,000, according to Salai Pat Gyaung, a local who has been helping them. He told Myanmar Now on Wednesday that the displaced people were in desperate need of emergency support.

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Junta arrests man fundraising for Mindat IDPs and confiscates donations

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A man who was collecting donations in Kalay, Sagaing Region to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Chin State was arrested by the military authorities on Wednesday and his funds seized, according to local sources. Aung Thang Phay had gathered 17 million kyat (more than US$10,000) for IDPs in Mindat while he was in Kalay.

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UNHCR: No one ever chooses to become a refugee

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UNHCR: No one ever chooses to become a refugee newspaper section: Refugees, people fleeing air strikes by the Myanmar military, and those who are at risk of political persecution, have been the focus of attention in the months since the Feb 1 coup.

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Days after overthrowing Myanmar's elected government, Senior General Min Aun Hlaing also pulled off another coup: making himself the country's de facto military leader for life.

That was revealed in documents that have put his motives for throwing the country into turmoil into sharper focus.

On February 4, the newly installed junta issued a directive that effectively allowed Min Aung Hlaing to stay on as top general for as long as he sees fit.

The directive, which has only recently come to light, removes an age restriction that would have required the senior general to step down later this year.

The issue first came up five years ago, when he acknowledged that under existing rules, he would have to retire once he reached the age of 65.

"The duty of commander-in-chief is not unlimited. There is an age limit that cannot be extended," he told reporters in June 2016, when he was 60 years old.

Now less than two months away from his 65th birthday, Min Aung Hlaing should be making his way to the exit. Instead, he spends his days cementing his hold on power.

In a recent interview with the BBC's Burmese-language service, Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the regime's deputy information minister and military spokesperson, confirmed the move.

The new directive allows both the commander-in-chief and the deputy commander-in-chief to remain in their positions for as long as the situation requires, he said without elaborating.

"It was changed because they are performing state duties," he added, referring to the military's resumption of direct control over the country since ousting its elected leaders.

Even before the coup, there were signs that Min Aung Hlaing was positioning himself to remain as the military's unchallenged supremo, according to observers.

One sign, they said, was his appointment of officers many years his junior to senior military posts, side-lining any prospective rivals from among those closer to him in age and influence.

Many of the military's most powerful commanders are now relatively young men in their fifties or even forties, all of whom are beholden to Min Aung Hlaing for their rapid rise to the highest echelons of power.

The current air force chief is Gen Maung Maung Kyaw, who graduated from the 26th intake of the elite Defence Services Academy (DSA), seven years behind Min Aung Hlaing (DSA 19). His navy counterpart, Gen Moe Aung, is an even younger DSA alumnus from the 28th intake.

Younger still is Lt-Gen Moe Myint Tun (DSA 30), a Min Aung Hlaing favourite who now serves as army chief of staff. He is also a member of the ruling military council and, since the coup, the new chair of the Myanmar Investment Commission.

Lt-Gen Myo Zaw Thein, a DSA 28 graduate who is also closely linked to Min Aung Hlaing, was appointed adjutant general in July 2019, while DSA 35 graduate Lt-Gen Kyaw Swar Linn was named quartermaster general in May of last year, when he was just 49 years old. (He is also the youngest member of the Myanmar military ever to hold his current rank.)

Junta joint secretary Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo, who is also chief of military security affairs, and Lt-Gen Than Hlaing, the deputy home affairs minister and newly appointed police chief, are also at least 10 years younger than Min Aung Hlaing.

Maj Hein Thaw Oo, who served in the military for nearly 20 years before defecting in late March, said the senior general's choices reflect his obsession with holding onto power.

"It's madness. He just doesn't want to transfer power to any of his peers. There are outstanding officers under him, but he doesn't want anyone else to have power," he said.

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Min Aung Hlaing makes himself military supremo for life

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Days after overthrowing Myanmar's elected government, Senior General Min Aun Hlaing also pulled off another coup: making himself the country's de facto military leader for life. That was revealed in documents that have put his motives for throwing the country into turmoil into sharper focus.

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yanmar is facing an economic and humanitarian disaster of epic proportions. There is an urgent need to protect the poorest and most vulnerable and provide assistance in a way that doesn't entrench dictatorship. Equally important is to use this crisis to transform Myanmar's incredibly unequal and singularly exploitative political economy. It's the key to democratic change. It's also the key to creating a fairer, as well as a freer and more prosperous, society.

The army's coup d'état in February has been followed by strikes and protests, and intense repression. The army has not been able to consolidate its coup and has instead unwittingly unleashed revolutionary movements determined to end the military's role in politics once and for all. Years of turbulence lie ahead.

Meanwhile, the economy has collapsed, with tens of millions of people descending fast into extreme poverty and the World Food Programme estimating that 3.4 million people will be unable to feed themselves properly within the next six months. The healthcare system has also collapsed, jeopardising the lives of many more, including the several hundred thousand people dependent on TB and HIV drugs and the 950,000 infants normally inoculated each year against measles, polio and other diseases. There is now next to no Covid-19 testing and no possibility of large-scale vaccination.

The proximate cause of the unfolding catastrophe is the coup and its aftermath but understanding the history of Myanmar's political economy is critical for thinking about what may come next.

Myanmar's economy under British rule was based on the immigration of Indian labourers and the export of primary commodities. After independence in 1948, politics was dominated by the left and efforts to overturn the colonial legacies. But in the late 1980s a new army junta ended the " Burmese way to socialism", creating new markets, in particular around extractive industries tied to China's industrial revolution next door. Taxation and social services were practically non-existent. Inequality skyrocketed and a mix of climate change and massive land confiscations drove millions to Thailand in search of work. In the uplands, alongside a patchwork of army battalions, militia and ethnic minority forces, were money-making networks far richer than even the men with guns, including a methamphetamine racket said by the UN to be worth billions.

The political reforms of the past 10 years were not accompanied by any structural change to the economy. The army took a big step back from business, and liberalisation led to more foreign competition as well as growth in a few sectors such as tourism, property and telecoms. A small middle class emerged but most Myanmar people continued to live on the edge of violence and extreme poverty, including the most vulnerable: upland farmers, landless villagers, new urban slum-dwellers, people of South Asian descent and other minorities. The ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in 2017 was unmatched in scale and brutality. But the Myanmar state has long failed many of its peoples.

With the pandemic came an economic shock that sent an already fragile economy into a tailspin, the result of lockdowns and disruptions to foreign trade. The garment sector, the country's one promising manufacturing industry, was brought to its knees. An international study last October found that income poverty (people making less than $1.90 (£1.36) a day) had risen from 16% to 63% of the population. There was almost no state support.

Now in the aftermath of the coup, the economy is at a virtual standstill. A general strike coupled with the army's internet blockages have shut down much of the financial system, disrupting business and payroll payments worth the equivalent of billions of US dollars a month. With confidence plummeting and the central bank unwilling or unable to provide needed liquidity, families are hoarding as much cash as possible. It's difficult to imagine how ordinary people will survive these coming months, especially the rural poor, most of whom are landless and entirely dependent on casual work.

However, the army regime is likely to survive any economic downturn because Myanmar's system has never veered far from the one that grew up under past juntas and under the toughest possible western sanctions. The new businesses of the past decade, such as manufacturing, will wither, old ones, such as timber and mining, will gain renewed ground, and illicit ones in the uplands, from narcotics to money-laundering and wildlife trafficking will flourish in the protracted instability to come.

Whatever happens, the international priority should be to ensure that Myanmar's poor and vulnerable communities are able to receive the assistance needed to stay alive, with special attention paid to children's inoculations. But this must be done with political skill, so as not to undermine chances for the radical political changes to government that the vast majority of people desperately want.

Today's revolutionary movements aim to cut revenues to the junta and are willing to pay a high economic cost. But a successful transition will come over years, not months, and it's important to identify the economic landscape best suited for democratic change. Measures to weaken the junta that inadvertently strengthen the hand of transnational criminal networks may lead not to state collapse but a mutated political order, one that will take generations to unwind.

Dictatorship must be resisted but democracy is not enough. Over recent months, a new generation of leaders have come to the fore and many have rejected the ethno-nationalism at the heart of Myanmar politics, seeking fresh alliances across racial, ethnic and religious divides. This is not only welcome but essential for any future success. But there should also be a focus on issues of inequality and underdevelopment, protecting the vulnerable now, while reimagining and mobilising around a fairer political economy of tomorrow.

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Remaking Myanmar's devastated economy is the key for a future democracy | Thant Myint-U

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yanmar is facing an economic and humanitarian disaster of epic proportions. There is an urgent need to protect the poorest and most vulnerable and provide assistance in a way that doesn't entrench dictatorship. Equally important is to use this crisis to transform Myanmar's incredibly unequal and singularly exploitative political economy.

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The NUG must commit to human rights for all Myanmar's people | Frontier Myanmar

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To secure international support and an inclusive future, the National Unity Government must pledge to defend the rights of everyone in the country - including the Rohingya.

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Communities defy junta's attempts to rule wards and villages | Frontier Myanmar

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The Tatmadaw is fighting to wrest control of local administration, but many of its appointed officials have been hobbled by fierce, and sometimes violent, opposition.

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Electricity is one of the largest government expenses and the regime is facing a huge budget hole unless it can coerce users to pay up - which many have no intention of doing.

By FRONTIER

On April 22, Ma Lwin Lwin Myint received an electricity bill of K10,585 for March. Despite the modest amount charged, she's determined not to pay it.

"I've decided I won't pay any tax to the dictators, and that includes electricity. If police and soldiers ask me, I'll just tell them I don't have any money. I don't care if they cut off the power to my house," the resident of Yangon's North Dagon Township told Frontier. "Most people in my ward who I've spoken to say they're not going to pay either."

This normally unremarkable event - the distribution of power bills - marks the latest test for a junta intent on consolidating its control. Ranged against it is a broad swath of the public that is determined not to put a single kyat into military hands.

The stakes are high for the regime. Electricity generation costs have been rising rapidly in recent years, and are one of the largest expenses in the national budget. With receipts from key sources of revenue, such as natural gas and taxes, likely to decline this year, failure to recover electricity costs will blow out the budget even further - possibly by billions of dollars.

Hiring and firing

In the wake of the February 1 military coup, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy has had among the highest levels of participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement, with up to 80 percent of staff refusing to work.

The CDM has been particularly strong at township electricity supply offices, which are responsible for checking meters, issuing bills and accepting payments. For months after the coup, electricity staff were a rare sight on the streets of Yangon and other cities, except when they were out fixing downed power lines and faulty equipment.

"Nearly everyone I work with joined the CDM," said one staffer from the Yangon Electricity Supply Corporation, which distributes power to homes and businesses in the country's largest city. "Many township offices haven't been able to distribute bills to homes simply because they have no staff."

The officer - who in normal times would go from house to house, noting how much power they had used for the month - said he joined the CDM because he didn't want to help raise revenue for the junta.

"We are ready to serve the people, though. If the electricity goes out because of a system breakdown or another kind of fault, we're ready to work," he said.

Although CDM rates in the ministry have declined, with some staff returning to work, Frontier understands that many township-level electricity staff remained on strike through to the end of April.

But with costs from electricity generation mounting - even with depressed demand from a flatlining economy - the regime has moved to get bill collection back up and running, and to punish staff who still refused to cooperate.

One tally shows that to May 5, a total of 3,712 staff - including 240 described as "upper level" - from eight of the ministry's departments and enterprises were dismissed for participating in the CDM, mostly during April.

Enterprises responsible for generating revenue from electricity sales accounted for two-thirds of the firings; 285 staff from the YESC lost their jobs, along with 841 from the Mandalay Electricity Supply Corporation and 1,330 from the Electricity Supply Enterprise, which supplies power in other parts of the country.

Although Frontier was unable to confirm the veracity of the entire list, the numbers and dates for urban Mandalay are correct, suggesting the list is likely to be accurate.

The ministry has moved quickly to replace fired staff, and since the Thingyan holiday, which ended on April 19, bills have been distributed in some areas.

The striking YESC official, who has not yet been dismissed, said new staff were brought in in some townships to check meters, distribute bills and receive payments.

"I understand that it's mainly in townships under martial law," he said. "The old staff like me are not working - the people doing this are new staff."

Electricity worker Ko Thura (not his real name) joined the CDM on February 8. Nearly all his colleagues in the MESC office in Mandalay's Chan Aye Thar Zan Township went on strike too - only four of the 97 staff remained at work.

Like his counterpart in Yangon, Thura said his goal was to cut off revenue to the regime. But in an interview with Frontier back in March, he expressed concern about how long he and his colleagues could remain on strike.

"We're not accepting a salary from the junta and we don't have much in savings to cover our living costs," he said. "I don't know how long we can survive like this. So far though we haven't received any money from CDM support groups but I hope we can get some soon."

In the absence of support from civil society groups, Thura began selling vegetables to make ends meet. On April 28, he was among 168 MESC staff who lost their jobs, and received a formal termination letter on May 10. After 14 years' service, Thura was given just nine days to vacate his state-provided housing - but he insisted he had no regrets.

"From the moment I joined the CDM I knew I would be fired eventually. I've already been preparing to move to my relative's house, and I'll find a new job," he said. "But once the revolution is successful, I'll go back to my old department."

Cutting power to large numbers of households would do little to solve the regime's fiscal black hole, as it will have to pay private power plant operators regardless of how much they produce. (Frontier)

A looming struggle

At the end of April, residents in Yangon's outer western Hlaing Tharyar Township, which has been under martial law since mid-March, received their first bills since the coup.

Ko Aung Thu, who lives in the Shwe Lin Ban area of the highly industrialised township, said he had received a bill for January but had no intention of paying.

"They killed people right here, in this township," he said, referring to the security forces' massacre of more than 50 people on March 14. "Why should I pay money to a bunch of murderers? I won't pay any taxes. If we pay taxes, we're just supporting murderers."

Although they haven't yet received bills, some residents and business owners in other parts of the country say they too won't be paying up.

Ko Naing Tun from Nyaung-U Township in Mandalay Region said that he heard the government had hired casual staff to distribute bills elsewhere, but was yet to receive anything himself. As in other areas, he said that CDM rates in the Nyaung-U power supply office were high. "I expect we'll get bills soon but I've already decided to not pay," he said.

A hotel owner in nearby Bagan said he wouldn't pay either and he expected many others would also refuse.

"I just heard today about how the state lottery isn't able to run because so few people bought tickets. I think most people won't pay their electricity bills, either," he said. "We won't support the dictator ... the income from electricity charges is huge and they won't be able to survive without that money."

Another business owner, from Magway Township, said he planned to pay because he couldn't afford to have his electricity cut off. He's only received a bill for February, though, and when he went to pay it, there were no staff in the office to accept the money because most had joined the CDM.

For the regime, the re-staffing of electricity offices is only one half of the problem. As civil disobedience shifts from ministry workers to the power-using public, the regime is likely to face an epic struggle to get people to pay up.

So far, it seems to have avoided taking up the issue. It's the users' responsibility to pay their bill - either in person or online - by the deadline, and in normal times the supply offices are quick to turn off the power when payments are late.

Although both Aung Thu and Lwin Lwin Myint were supposed to pay their bills more than two weeks ago, they said they are yet to hear anything from the authorities, and their power remains on.

On May 14, state media publishing a "request to the public" explaining that "revenue from the electricity fees of people is used to generate stable and reliable electricity from the state-owned power stations and purchase from the private power stations". It urged people to pay their bills by the due date, but also warned that those who fail to do so face having their electricity cut.

Thura, who was recently fired from the Chan Aye Thar Zan electricity office, said the junta would face a huge dilemma if most users refused to pay their bills. He said residents should discuss the issue with their neighbours and collectively agree on a boycott.

"They just don't have the manpower to cut power to a lot of people at the same time," he said. "If every ward [collectively boycotts paying], the ministry is going to be in a lot of trouble."

Power bills mounting

Cutting power to hundreds of thousands, even millions, of households won't just be a manpower challenge for the regime, but also a fiscal nightmare.

Improved electricity supply has been integral to Myanmar's economic transformation over the past decade, but it has come at a cost.

In 2011-12, the government spent around K300 billion on power generation, and turned a small profit. At the time, nearly all power came from state-run hydropower dams and gas-fired plants.

The government of President U Thein Sein, which ruled from 2011 to 2016, encouraged private investment in the sector and signed power purchase agreements (PPAs) with independent power producers, known as IPPs. This boosted generation capacity and reliability, but it dramatically increased the total cost of producing power.

By 2017-18, the last year for which Frontier has figures, the government was spending around K1.9 trillion on electricity generation - a six-fold increase in six years - and recovering just K1.2 trillion from customers, resulting in a loss of K700 billion.

Although the subsequent National League for Democracy government significantly increased electricity prices in 2019, it also engaged private investors to undertake expensive emergency power projects, most notably two liquefied natural gas plants in Yangon Region that were awarded to Hong Kong-listed company VPower, which has partnerships with Chinese state enterprises.

The 2020-21 national budget law shows that economic enterprises under the Ministry of Electricity and Energy - which includes the Electricity Supply Enterprise, but also the profit-making Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise - together with YESC and MESC were expected to spend almost K9.4 trillion, and generate close to K8.9 trillion.

Because expenses and receipts are not broken down according to individual state enterprises, the figures do not reveal the amount spent on electricity alone. However, they are almost double 2017-18 levels, when total receipts were K4.7 trillion and expenses K4.8 trillion. Most of this increase, in both receipts and expenses, is likely attributable to electricity.

Another headache for the military regime is that the tariffs in the PPAs are in US dollars. In some cases, the contracts stipulate that the operator will be paid in US dollars, while under more recent PPAs the producer is instead paid the equivalent in kyat.

An LNG tanker operated by VPower moored in the Yangon River. (Frontier)

Costly contracts

With the kyat rapidly losing value against the dollar - since February 1 it has fallen close to 30 percent - the cost of servicing those agreements is going to rise, but the amount charged to customers remains fixed in kyat.

At the same time, the cratering economy, which some economists are forecasting to contract by up to 20pc, will offer some relief for the regime. With many factories and offices shuttered, demand for power is likely to decline significantly. The ministry has already instructed some IPPs to dial down the amount of power they're producing.

"No economic activity means no demand for electricity," said one operator. "So they've been asking IPPs to run at a fraction of capacity, especially at night."

Nevertheless, there's a limit to how far production can be scaled back, for both technical and financial reasons. Most PPAs, for example, have what's known as a "take or pay" clause, which guarantees the IPP a certain level of revenue regardless of how much power they are asked to produce.

Even delays in payments from power consumers could have consequences for the regime's financial position, said Mr Guillaume de Langre, a researcher and former adviser to the Ministry of Electricity and Energy, because the ministry's budget for electricity is "very cash-flow-sensitive".

"What comes in goes out immediately. If supply and demand are not closely aligned, losses can get out of control faster than we think," he said.

"Right now, demand is declining and payments have collapsed. But the supply side is constrained by PPA commitments and the junta's attempt to reassure investors by continuing the NLD's power projects, such as the Mee Lin Gyaing LNG plant," he added, referring to a China-backed US$2.5 billion project that received Myanmar Investment Commission approval earlier this month.

"Supply and demand are misaligned, causing further losses, which a depreciation of the kyat would only exacerbate. The question is how long can their reserves fill the gap before power sector losses become a systemic risk."

Given the lack of revenue coming into regime coffers, some IPPs are indeed worried about whether they'll continue to get paid, or whether the junta might try to break the contracts.

"What we are worried about is the government will run out of money, that in the next few months the government might not be able to pay all their obligations," said an official from a private power company.

But another said they believed this was unlikely, at least in the short term. "They still have dollar reserves," the source said. "When they stop paying for the electricity, that means the country is really in trouble - that means the government is starting to collapse."

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Unpaid power bills put junta finances on the line | Frontier Myanmar

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By FRONTIER On April 22, Ma Lwin Lwin Myint received an electricity bill of K10,585 for March. Despite the modest amount charged, she's determined not to pay it. "I've decided I won't pay any tax to the dictators, and that includes electricity. If police and soldiers ask me, I'll just tell them I don't have any money.

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Privates Myo Min Tun and Phyo Wai Oo defected from Myanmar's army to join the resistance against the junta.
Myo Min Tun and Phyo Wai Oo, both privates in Myanmar's army, met while in the same basic training unit five years ago. The two ethnic Shan soldiers were then assigned to the Special Construction Operations Command Headquarters in the capital Naypyidaw and became close friends. Myo Min Tun, 40, and Phyo Wai Oo, 26, are members of ethnic Shan minority groups. They joined the army to protect the people of Myanmar, but Phyo Wai Oo said that armed conflicts with ethnic minorities bothered him, so when the military ousted the country's democratically elected government on Feb. 1, the two friends decided to defect to an RFA: Why did you decide to defect? undisclosed region of Shan state in eastern Myanmar. Washington, D.C.-based RFA Myanmar Service reporter Khin Maung Soe conducted a telephone interview with the two soldiers, who said they planned to join the People's Defense Force (PDF), a military organization which the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) hopes will grow to eventually be able to resist the junta by force. The interview has been edited for clarity and length. RFA: Are most soldiers aware of the scope of what is happening? Do they know the extent of the violence and bloodshed?
Myo Min Tun: Since the military coup, I felt very upset when I saw all that was happening. I felt so sorry... especially when the military was treating civilians like that. It got to be worse and worse, so I contacted some people to join the Civil Disobedience Movement. We will work together with the people to overthrow the dictatorship.

Phyo Wai Oo: I don't like the military. Because I come from an ethnic area near the border, I have a different opinion on things. I thought that things would be fine if I could just make it to retirement...but I did not support the coup. What good is it if the people die? I do not like the army shooting at people protesting. When the death toll rose higher and higher, my thinking [about staying until retirement] changed. I felt very bad.
RFA: What do you know about the wealth of coup leader Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and other military leaders?
Myo Min Tun: We did not know much about what was going on. We cannot use the internet in our units. We were not allowed to go out anymore, so we could not use the internet in nearby areas. Some said they had internet in Naypyidaw. I was closely following current events until the lines were shut down.
RFA: Are there others in the military who want to defect?
Phyo Wai Oo: At first, I was still able to watch the news when the internet was only partly shut down during the night. When wireless internet was cut off, we could not follow the news anymore. We learned about the first death in Naypyidaw when Mya Thwei Thwei Khine was killed. Later I heard about the killings in Mandalay. We last heard there were about a hundred deaths, and we only now found out that it was more than 800. I called home and learned from friends who are participating in the protests."
RFA: How were the two of you able to defect?
Phyo Wai Oo: We saw reports about their backgrounds recently. We found out that their daughters owned hospitals. I knew they were rich, but I didn't know what they own. We only found out from online reports recently how much they own and how rich they are. How could he own that much with an official [monthly] salary of 5 million kyat [U.S $3211.12]? Even if he were to starve himself for a whole month there's no way he could be so wealthy on that salary.
RFA: What will you do next?
Phyo Wai Oo: Most soldiers feel the same way I do. There are some people who cannot leave even though they know things are so bad, because they have families and they have to stay because you cannot leave as a family. Many are aware of what is going on though. Everyone knows that what they are doing is wrong. There are so many just waiting for an opportunity to leave, but it is too difficult for this right now.
RFA: What do you think lies in store for the future of Myanmar?
Phyo Wai Oo We had been trying to leave for a long time but we did not get the opportunity. We had no money. We had to wait until the end of the month and soon after getting our salary we left by motorcycle as if we were out shipping to some small villages nearby. We used to go shopping there before.
Reported by Khin Maung Soe for RFA's Myanmar Service. Translated by Khin Maung Nyane. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
Phyo Wai Oo: "I would like to join the PDF if the opportunity comes. That is what we decided to do when we left.

Phyo Wai Oo: This coup is an opportunity for the people. Simply put, they are giving the people a chance to overthrow the dictatorship. The people should take advantage of this opportunity. I just want to say that this is the time when we can get rid of it completely. Additionally, I am very happy that people from the majority are sympathetic to the lives of the ethnic minorities. In the past they did not realize that murders and rapes were happening in the mountains. Now the majority is sympathetic to ethnic minorities because it is now, they too that are being shot, arrested and tortured. Now we are all one.

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Interview: Every Soldier 'Knows What They Are Doing is Wrong'

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Privates Myo Min Tun and Phyo Wai Oo defected from Myanmar's army to join the resistance against the junta. Myo Min Tun and Phyo Wai Oo, both privates in Myanmar's army, met while in the same basic training unit five years ago.

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A military delegation led by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force Maung Maung Kyaw will visit Moscow on Thursday, a representative of the Myanmar Embassy told The Moscow Times.

The representative said that as part of the visit the delegation planned to attend the HeliRussia exhibition, Russia's largest helicopter exhibition that will run in Moscow from May 20-22. Russia's state arms seller Rosoboronexport on Wednesday it planned to showcase its latest Ka-52 and Mi-28NE combat helicopters at the exhibition in the Crocus Center in the capital.

A HeliRussia representative confirmed that Myanmar is "one of over 50 countries" expected at the conference, but declined to say whether or not the military delegation would attend.

The Russian Defense Ministry has not publicly announced any meetings with its Myanmar counterparts. Myanmar's military attache in Moscow also confirmed Maung Maung Kyaw's visit in an email, saying that the air force chief will be on a "tight schedule."

The Irrawaddy news service on Wednesday that formerly U.S.-sanctioned Myanmar tycoon U Tay Za would also be part of the delegation. The Moscow Times was unable to independently confirm this.

Russia has continued to support the Myanmar regime after a military coup ousted Aung San Suu Kyi brought to an end to a decade of civilian rule and led to mass anti-junta protests. In March, Russia's Deputy Defense Secretary Alexander Fomin visited Myanmar in the first high-profile visit to the country by a foreign official after the coup.

While overall trade between Russia and Myanmar remains minimal, Russia and Myanmar have recently deepened their military cooperation and Russia is now the number two military exporter to Myanmar behind China.

In January of this year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to supply Myanmar with Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems, Orlan-10E surveillance drones and radar equipment during a visit to the capital Naypyidaw in January. According to customs data by The Moscow Times, the Myanmar military regime imported $14.7 million in radar equipment in February of this year.

In mid-April, the Myanmar military acknowledged the death of 248 anti-government protesters, saying they were killed after they initiated violence. Human rights advocates in Myanmar say that over 800 protesters have been killed by the junta.

have said Myanmar used Russian-made planes and helicopters to bomb anti-government protests and rebels.

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Top Myanmar Military Delegation to Visit Moscow - Embassy - The Moscow Times

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A military delegation led by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force Maung Maung Kyaw will visit Moscow on Thursday, a representative of the Myanmar Embassy told The Moscow Times. The representative said that as part of the visit the delegation planned to attend the HeliRussia exhibition, Russia's largest helicopter exhibition that will run in Moscow from May 20-22.

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KSCC strives to support CDM employees

The Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) will make an effort to assist the staff who join the CDM which is a Civil Disobedience Movement against the military.

"According to the KSCC, we are working on a policy on the CDM issues, strikes, and other social relief issues. After doing this, the NUG government and we are doing well by connecting with each state to get support and to strengthen them as much as we can.

We will support the CDM movement, which plays a key role in overthrowing the Military Dictatorship and it was also working with the NUG government according to the KSCC.

CDM staff are facing difficulties because the military council intimidated, threatened, suspended, and dismissed the departmental staff who joined the CDM, said an unnamed person who concerns the security.

"I do not get paid. When I don't get paid, I use my savings for eating and drinking. For the living, I don't live in Government Housing, but living in a relative's house, like once living in a relative's house and once in another house".

For more than 100 days after the military coup, some staff of various departments had stopped working under the Military Council and joined the CDM to overthrow the Military Dictatorship.

Employees who have been fired for joining the CDM also face difficulties.

An employee from the Department of Highways in Kayah State who was fired for joining the CDM said her decision on joining CDM to the end that, "I will do it to the end. There is no turning back. We will do the CDM until we win".

The KSCC is working together with various organizations in a discussion to draw up a systematic solution plan to the problems of CDM staff fighting against the Military Dictatorship in the state.

KSCC will work together with a union-level National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the National Unity Government (NUG) to form the Federal Democratic Union in the future due to the statement of KSCC.

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The Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) will make an effort to assist the staff who join the CDM which is a Civil Disobedience Movement against the military. "According to the KSCC, we are working on a policy on the CDM issues, strikes, and other social relief issues.

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The plan to form the People's Defense Force (PDF) is not aimed at carrying out offensive military actions, Mahn Win Khaing Than, Prime Minister of the interim National Unity Government (NUG) clarified at a meeting between the NUG and the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar.

"At the same time the NUG is working on the defensive tasks after the formation of the PDF. The move aims to carry out defensive resistance on the path of rooting out the military dictatorship," the prime minister added.

The NUG members held a meeting with the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar for the first time on May 16th.

The NUG is striving to rebuild democracy, and working to prevent the violation of human rights. In doing so it calls for international cooperation in addition to the public's efforts, the Prime Minister added.

The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar is comprised of Ms. Yanghee Lee, Mr. Chris Sidoti and Mr. Marzuki Darusman who have previously worked on the UN Fact-Finding Panel dealing with the mass violence perpetrated against the ethnic Rohingya people from Rakhine State.

According to the NUG's statement, the meeting mainly focused on the NUG's efforts to get international recognition and the violation of human rights by the military council.

The meeting was attended by Vice-President of the NUG Duwa Lashi La, Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than and the relevant Union Ministers.

The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) announced the formation of the interim NUG on April 16th.

The NUG announced on May 5th that it formed the PDF as the forerunner of the Federal Army in order to protect the people from violence acts committed by the junta troops.

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The strategy of the People's Defense Force is defensive according to NUG

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The plan to form the People's Defense Force (PDF) is not aimed at carrying out offensive military actions, Mahn Win Khaing Than, Prime Minister of the interim National Unity Government (NUG) clarified at a meeting between the NUG and the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar.

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In the months before the Myanmar military's Feb. 1 coup, the country's telecom and internet service providers were ordered to install intercept spyware that would allow the army to eavesdrop on the communications of citizens, sources with direct knowledge of the plan told Reuters.

The technology gives the military the power to listen in on calls, view text messages and web traffic including emails, and track the locations of users without the assistance of the telecom and internet firms, the sources said.

The directives are part of a sweeping effort by the army to deploy electronic surveillance systems and exert control over the internet with the aim of keeping tabs on political opponents, squashing protests and cutting off channels for any future dissent, they added.

Decision makers at the civilian Ministry of Transport and Communications that delivered the orders were ex-military officials, according to one industry executive with direct knowledge of the plans and another briefed on the matter.

"They presented it as coming from the civilian government, but we knew the army would have control and were told you could not refuse," the executive with direct knowledge said, adding that officials from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs also sat in on the meetings.

More than a dozen people with knowledge of the intercept spyware used in Myanmar have been interviewed by Reuters. All asked to remain anonymous, citing fear of retribution from the military junta.

Neither representatives for the junta nor representatives for politicians attempting to form a new civilian government responded to Reuters requests for comment.

Budget documents from 2019 and 2020 for the previous government led by Aung San Suu Kyi that were not disclosed publicly contain details of a planned $4 million in purchases of intercept spyware products and parts as well as sophisticated data extraction and phone hacking technology. The documents were provided by activist group Justice for Myanmar and were independently verified by Reuters.

Reuters was not able to establish to what extent senior non-military people in Suu Kyi's government had been involved in the order to install the intercept.

The idea of a so-called 'lawful intercept' was first floated by Myanmar authorities to the telecommunications sector in late 2019 but pressure to install such technology came only in late 2020, several sources said, adding that they were warned not to talk about it.

The intercept plans were flagged publicly by Norway's Telenor (TEL.OL) in an annual update on its Myanmar business, which is one of the country's biggest telecom firms with 18 million customers out of a population of 54 million.

Telenor said in the Dec. 3 briefing and statement posted on its websites that it was concerned about Myanmar authorities' plans for a lawful intercept able to "directly access each operator and ISP's systems without case-by-case approval" as Myanmar did not have sufficient laws and regulations to protect customers' rights to privacy and freedom of expression.

In addition to Telenor, the affected companies include three other telecom firms in Myanmar: MPT, a large state-backed operator, Mytel, a venture between Myanmar's army and Viettel which is owned by Vietnam's defence ministry, and Qatar's Ooredoo (ORDS.QA). MPT and Mytel are now under the full control of the junta, the sources said. There are about a dozen internet service providers.

Telenor declined to respond to questions from Reuters for this article, citing unspecified security concerns for its employees.

MPT, Mytel and Ooredoo did not respond to requests for comment. Japanese trading house Sumitomo Corp (8053.T), which together with wireless carrier KDDI Corp (9433.T) announced in 2014 planned investment of $2 billion in MPT, declined to comment. KDDI and Viettel did not respond to requests for comment.

Many governments allow for what are commonly called 'lawful intercepts' to be used by law enforcement agencies to catch criminals. But in most democratic countries and even some authoritarian regimes, such technology is not ordinarily employed without any kind of legal process, cybersecurity experts say. The Myanmar military, in contrast, is directly operating invasive telecoms spyware without legal or regulatory safeguards to protect human rights in place, according to industry executives and activists.

Even before the coup, Myanmar's military wielded outsized influence in the democratically elected civilian government led by Suu Kyi. It had an unelected quota of 25% of parliamentary seats and the constitution gave it control of several key ministries. It also had extensive sway at the communications and other ministries through the appointment of former army officers. That has become total control since the coup.

TRACINGS AND INTERCEPTIONS

According to three sources at firms with knowledge of the surveillance system, not every telecom firm and internet service provider has installed the full intercept spyware. Reuters was not able to establish how broadly it has been installed and deployed.

But military and intelligence agencies are conducting some tracing of SIM cards and interception of calls, two of those sources said. One source said calls being redirected to other numbers and connecting without a dial tone were among the signs of interception.

A legal source with knowledge of cases against people involved in the protests also said there was evidence of monitoring spyware being used to prosecute them. Reuters has not seen any documents supporting the claim.

A senior civil servant who is aiding ousted politicians seeking to form a parallel government also said their group has been warned by people working for the junta but sympathetic to protesters that phone numbers are being traced.

"We have to change SIM cards all the time," the senior civil servant said.

According to Amnesty International's Security Lab and three other tech experts, the intercept products outlined in the government budget documents would enable the bulk collection of phone metadata - data on who users call, when they call and for how long - as well as targeted content interception.

CABLES CUT, ACTIVISTS' PHONES BLOCKED

Among the military's first actions on Feb. 1 was to direct armed soldiers to break into data centres nationwide at midnight and slash internet cables, according to employees at three firms who showed Reuters photos of severed cables.

At one data centre where employees resisted, soldiers held them at gunpoint and also smashed monitors to threaten them, said one source briefed on the matter.

Though the internet was mostly restored with hours, the army began shutting it down nightly. Within days, the army had secretly ordered telecom firms to block the phone numbers of activists, junta opponents and human rights lawyers, providing the firms with lists, according to three industry sources briefed on the matter. Those orders have not been previously reported.

The sources added that operators are required by law to share customer lists with authorities.

The army also directed the blocking of specific websites. Facebook (FB.O), which was used by half the country and quickly became crucial to protest organisers, was among the first to be banned, followed by news sites and other social media platforms. read more

When opposition grew in March, the military cut access to mobile data altogether, leaving most in Myanmar without access to the internet.

"Firms have to obey the orders," one industry source said. "Everyone knows that if you don't, they can just come in with guns and cut the wires. That's even more effective than any intercept."

Telenor and Ooredoo executives who protested were told to stay quiet or the companies would face losing their licences, four sources said.

THE ARMY'S TIGHTENING GRIP

Under previous juntas that ruled between 1963 and 2011, activists and journalists were routinely wiretapped and smartphones were scarce.

As Myanmar opened up, it became a telecoms success story with a thriving, if nascent, digital economy. Mobile phone penetration, in 2011 the second-lowest in the world after North Korea at 6.9%, soared to stand at 126% in 2020.

The civilian government's first known move towards nationwide surveillance came in 2018, with the establishment of a social media monitoring system it said was aimed at preventing the influence of foreign forces. It followed that with a biometric SIM card registration drive last year, saying multiple SIM card use was undesirable and a central database was necessary.

Authorities are now seeking still more power over telecommunications.

The communications ministry proposed a new law on Feb. 10 that states internet and telecom firms will be required to keep a broad range of user data for up to three years and remove or block any content deemed to be disrupting "unity, stabilisation, and peace", with possible jail terms for those who don't comply.

In late April, the junta began ordering telecom operators to unblock certain websites and apps, starting with the apps of local banks, said three people briefed on the development. Microsoft Office, Google's Gmail, Google Drive and YouTube have also since been unblocked.

Asked about the unblocking, a Microsoft representative said the company had not engaged with officials in Myanmar. Google did not respond to requests for comment.

Industry sources and activists believe these moves are part of an attempt by the junta to establish its version of the internet, akin to what China has done with the "Great Firewall".

"The military wants to control the internet so it will be a safe zone but only for them," said one industry executive. "We've gone back five years in time."

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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How Myanmar's military moved in on the telecoms sector to spy on citizens

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In the months before the Myanmar military's Feb. 1 coup, the country's telecom and internet service providers were ordered to install intercept spyware that would allow the army to eavesdrop on the communications of citizens, sources with direct knowledge of the plan told Reuters.

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What's new?  After first trying to restrict internet use by banning social media platforms, enacting legal changes and ordering night-time outages, the Myanmar military has shut down nearly all access to the web in the wake of the 1 February coup d'état and started establishing a countrywide intranet with limited services.

Why did it happen?  The military was losing the online battle and felt it had few options. Activists have used social media platforms - particularly Facebook - highly effectively to organise protests, galvanise the public and document abuses, while the military has been banned from Facebook altogether, limiting its outreach abilities.

Why does it matter?  The internet shutdown has undermined the opposition movement - particularly its ability to organise street protests - but at huge social and economic cost. The military faces a long-term strategic challenge in managing internet use as it seeks to consolidate power in the coup's wake.

What should be done?  Technology companies should help keep Myanmar's online space as open and safe as possible, particularly by expanding free access to secure virtual private networks. Foreign governments should embargo "dual-use" items that can be used for repressive purposes, including software, and strengthen enforcement by better policing sales made through middlemen.

Since the 1 February coup d'état in Myanmar, the online space has become a parallel battlefield on which the country's military and its opponents try to rally supporters, share information and control the narrative around events unfolding in the country. This virtual struggle has been vitally important to both sides. The scale of popular anger at the military, the regime's lack of technological capacity and the policies of social media companies have made it difficult for the military, known as the Tatmadaw, to gain the upper hand. At first, the junta resorted to temporary internet cuts and filtering websites, but when these had little impact, it moved to broader shutdowns, leaving the vast majority of people in Myanmar disconnected. It appears to have no viable long-term strategy for controlling online space, and prolonged internet outages are likely while it struggles to consolidate power. Foreign governments and technology companies should endeavour to keep what is left of Myanmar's internet as open and its users as safe as possible, while restricting sales of equipment and software that the military could use to oppress opponents.

The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was a signature achievement of Myanmar's decade-long experiment with democracy. In the early 2010s, then President Thein Sein took the bold step of breaking the monopoly of the state telecoms firm by inviting foreign mobile operators to invest. His semi-civilian government lifted restrictions on websites, overhauled laws and allowed new international gateways connecting the country to the global internet. As a result, billions of dollars of investment flowed into the country and mobile phone penetration rose from just 10 per cent to more than 100 per cent (many users have more than one SIM card) in the space of a few years, with well over half the adult population online through mobile data. This digital revolution brought significant social and economic benefits but also new challenges, particularly in the form of disinformation and hate speech. The use of online platforms to whip up hatred of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State during the Tatmadaw's campaign against them in 2017 is particularly notorious.

While the coup has brought an abrupt end to much of this online freedom, the openness of the internet in Myanmar was under threat even prior to 1 February. Since the National League for Democracy (NLD) took office in 2016, authorities have turned to vaguely worded defamation laws to lock up government opponents and ordinary social media users alike. At the Tatmadaw's request, the NLD government reintroduced filtering of websites and backed internet shutdowns in Rakhine State, where the military was waging war against a local insurgent group, the Arakan Army. Before it was deposed, the civilian government had also been drafting a Cyber Security Law requiring technology companies to keep user data onshore and hand it over to the authorities whenever requested. It was also taking steps to gain real-time access to user data from operators.

After taking power, the Tatmadaw drastically ramped up online repression. It enacted legal amendments to gain access to user data and prosecute prominent opponents. It also issued daily notices to mobile operators and internet service providers to restrict access to certain websites and virtual private networks (VPNs) that can skirt internet filtering. These responses reflect the military's keen awareness of the important role social media plays in spreading information and shaping public opinion; it has grappled with how best to manage the online sphere to support its strategic objectives since the very first hours of the coup.

In spite of the regime's censorship efforts, opposition forces have so far successfully used the internet to promote their political agenda, organise protests and share information about events inside the country with each other and the world. They have primarily relied on free tools that require little skill or knowledge, such as encrypted messaging services, free VPNs and censorship circumvention applications.

The military has responded by almost entirely shutting down internet access. Although the junta has not been technologically sophisticated in its actions, it has approached the challenge methodically, gradually ramping up internet shutdowns as it deemed necessary to achieve the desired effect. The mass outage it eventually opted for has already hurt the opposition movement, making it harder to organise protests and coordinate other activities.

But the junta has also come head to head with forces beyond its direct control, particularly the policies of major social media platforms. Having heeded lessons from the way its platform was used during the authorities' anti-Rohingya campaign of 2017, Facebook removed all military and some Myanmar government pages following the coup, dealing a major blow to the Tatmadaw's ability to spread pro-regime messaging and leaving it reliant on less widely used websites and platforms. Tatmadaw personnel, however, appear to have found an outlet in TikTok, which was initially slow to respond to content that violates its guidelines, such as videos of Myanmar soldiers wielding weapons and making threats against protesters. TikTok has since made efforts to clean up its platform but has stopped short of banning the Tatmadaw.

The Tatmadaw has faced significant online opposition before. In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army has harnessed the power of social media and other communications technologies with great effectiveness over the last few years, which partly explains its success in inflicting heavy losses on the Tatmadaw. There, the military eventually responded by pushing the civilian government to filter websites and shut down the internet on security grounds. The measures were somewhat effective in hindering Arakan Army operations, but also substantially hampered commerce and humanitarian efforts, turning the local population even more solidly against the Tatmadaw. The fact that the military is largely falling back on these same blunt methods of control following the February coup suggests it has not yet developed alternative strategies that could limit disruption and exact a lesser socio-economic toll.

Myanmar's military will face significant challenges shifting to a more sophisticated response to online dissent than wide-scale internet shutdowns. As it lacks the financial and human resources to develop a local version of China's "great firewall", in which access to the global internet is heavily restricted and local content actively censored, it has started developing what appears to be the first stage of an "intranet", where mobile users have access only to whitelisted applications. But this course will inevitably limit its ability to offer anything more than the most basic services, with a major impact on the economy. Even if the regime were to receive assistance from sympathetic outside actors to expand its capacities, domestic opposition would make it difficult to recruit the local expertise needed to maintain a more repressive system, and the more tech-savvy users are likely to find ways to exploit the intranet to gain unfettered access to the wider web.

Nevertheless, technology companies and foreign governments should ensure that they are not directly or indirectly assisting the Tatmadaw's efforts to control the internet or digitally suppress the opposition. Before the coup, the military and civilian-controlled branches of government had acquired or sought to acquire a wide array of technologies from foreign companies - many of them based in the United States - to monitor social media, unlock devices, recover data and watch the public. These technologies are now all under military control and will likely be used to suppress dissent. To stop more from making their way into the generals' hands, foreign governments should introduce or broaden arms embargoes to cover "dual-use" equipment, software and technologies that could be employed to suppress political opposition. They should also enforce such bans properly by strictly policing sales through brokers.

More broadly, both technology companies and foreign governments have a role to play in supporting openness of the internet and user security. As the military increasingly targets social media users for content they post, companies and governments can help internet users in Myanmar gain access to the knowledge and tools to keep themselves safe while online. They should endeavour to make sure secure VPNs are freely available to activists and others likely to be at high risk of surveillance. Social media companies should also ensure they are adequately monitoring the Tatmadaw and its personnel on their platforms in light of both recent events and its past online behaviour.

Yangon/Brussels, 18 May 2021

Telecommunications liberalisation was a signature reform of President Thein Sein's administration, which governed from 2011 to 2016, initiating Myanmar's transition to semi-civilian rule. Under military rule, internet access had been tightly controlled, expensive and slow: a mobile SIM card, without internet access, cost as much as $1,000 shortly before Thein Sein came to power. Reformers in the new government quickly identified the sector as an area in which they could attract investment and deliver tangible benefits to Myanmar's citizens, and announced plans for a tender of two mobile operator licences as soon as 2012.Other important reforms included the lifting of all filtering on dissident websites and steps to encourage investment in international gateways to improve internet speeds.

The pace of change was rapid: by the time Thein Sein left office, in 2016, the telecoms sector had attracted billions of dollars in new foreign investment, and tens of millions of people were enjoying fast, cheap and unfiltered internet for the first time. Because the web reached much of Myanmar so late, most users went straight to 3G or 4G mobile internet, leapfrogging slower connections and broadband.Telenor of Norway and Ooredoo of Qatar launched their services in 2014, joining state-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which partnered with a Japanese consortium to improve its services. The Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, in partnership with Viettel of Vietnam and a consortium of Myanmar companies, launched a fourth operator, Mytel, in 2018.

For many people getting online for the first time, the internet was limited almost exclusively to Facebook. Helped along by the company's "free basics" package that allowed users to log on without incurring data charges, and later by promotions that made it more affordable to use Facebook than other parts of the web, estimated user numbers skyrocketed - from barely one million accounts in 2013 to ten million three years later, eventually reaching over 27 million, or around 50 per cent of the population, as of January 2021.Facebook quickly became not just a place to keep in contact with family and friends, but also a major source of information, and an arena for political discussion, with little competition from other social media platforms.

Although affordable internet access brought many positive changes to Myanmar, the dark side of this rapid liberalisation was illustrated starkly after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked police outposts in northern Rakhine State in October 2016. The Tatmadaw responded with a brutal retaliatory campaign against both the group and the persecuted Rohingya Muslim minority that lives in the region. Violence escalated in August 2017, with the military again employing appalling levels of indiscriminate force and driving mass displacement, and UN experts subsequently called for Tatmadaw leaders to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide.During this period, Facebook became a giant platform for hate speech directed at the Rohingya Muslim minority and, despite numerous warnings that such speech was appearing on its website dating back to at least 2013, the company had few mechanisms in place to counter Myanmar-language content; instead, it relied almost solely on local monitoring networks.

Since then, Facebook has paid much closer attention to Myanmar, in particular by building its capacity to monitor vernacular content through human moderators and artificial intelligence.This experience informed its approach to Myanmar's 2020 election, when the social network moved quickly to remove the relatively small amount of disinformation being posted to its platform.Since the coup, it has banned the Tatmadaw entirely, and removed military-controlled media outlets, including state broadcasters.

If Facebook and other social media platforms have changed the way in which they work in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw has struggled to use the insights it has gained in recent years to develop more sophisticated tactics. In seeking to squelch online opposition following the February 2021 coup, it continues to rely heavily on the crude measures it used in targeting the Arakan Army in 2019 and 2020, notwithstanding their costs and limitations.

This report examines how the military has sought to control internet access and use amid conflict in Myanmar since 2019. It is based on research conducted between October 2020 and April 2021 and builds on Crisis Group's years of fieldwork and analysis on conflict dynamics in Myanmar.Given the constraints on travel due to COVID-19 and the military takeover during this period, the research was conducted remotely via telephone, using pre-existing networks of contacts. In Yangon, these included social media and conflict researchers, data privacy and digital rights advocates, lawyers, security officials, technology entrepreneurs and representatives of major technology firms, while in Rakhine State, interviewees included politicians, activists, civil society leaders and ordinary residents. Crisis Group also consulted social media platforms regarding their Myanmar policies and responses to the coup.

Many of the approaches that the military has employed to try to control the online world since the 1 February coup were tested during an earlier conflict, when it waged a bloody war against the insurgent Arakan Army in central and northern Rakhine State in 2019-2020. During that period, the Tatmadaw witnessed for the first time how its opponents could use social media to devastating effect if given the opportunity. After almost a decade of unfettered internet access across the country, it urged the National League for Democracy (NLD) government to order internet shutdowns and website filtering in order to undermine the insurgency's operations. The conflict gave the Tatmadaw insights into the impact of these restrictions, the technological challenges linked to controlling online content and the domestic and international response it could expect when resorting to such measures.

A. The Arakan Army: Sowing the Seeds of an Insurgency

Among Myanmar's many armed groups, the Arakan Army, which seeks greater rights and autonomy for the Rakhine Buddhist community, has harnessed the country's new online space to greatest effect since its founding in 2009. At first, the group employed traditional techniques, such as newsletters and word-of-mouth campaigns, to build support and recruit.But as it grew in strength and began quietly shifting forces from its base in Kachin State to Rakhine State from 2014, its young leaders - particularly its charismatic chairman Twan Mrat Naing, a former tour guide - started pushing out relatively sophisticated posts and videos on social media. These outlined their vision for self-determination, which they called "The Way of Rakhita", labelled the Tatmadaw and Myanmar government "invaders", and promised to lift the yoke of Burman oppression from Rakhine State and restore it to its former glories. Deputy commander Nyo Twan Awng became a popular presence on Facebook from around 2016, attracting thousands of followers with posts about the group's activities and the political situation in Rakhine State.

At first, I noticed the Arakan Army theme songs spreading on Facebook - these songs were really penetrating Rakhine society, becoming popular. Only later did I find out that the Arakan Army was not actually here [in Rakhine State] and used the internet to spread their information. From 2018, many people - including my friends - talk about the Arakan Army whenever we meet.

The Arakan Army's propaganda landed on fertile ground. Rakhine State is among Myanmar's poorest, and political liberalisation and outbreaks of communal violence since 2012 had heightened ethno-nationalism among its majority Rakhine population. Rakhine political parties had performed strongly in the 2010 and 2015 national elections, but Naypyitaw had blocked them from assuming any real power. Resulting frustrations were at times channelled at the Rohingya Muslim minority to horrific effect, but the Arakan Army used its online propaganda to portray the Burmans, who control the central government, the administrative apparatus and the armed forces, as the real enemy. In January 2018, government forces played into that narrative by opening fire on demonstrators at the town of Mrauk-U, the former capital of the once-flourishing Rakhine kingdom, killing seven people. Later that month, the state's leading politician, Aye Maung, was arrested for a speech in which he said the Burmans treated the Rakhine like slaves. He was later convicted of treason and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.

Despite the longstanding grievances, emerging tensions and growing evidence of a strengthening Arakan Army presence in Rakhine State, the government and Tatmadaw were ill prepared when the group landed its first major blow. On 4 January 2019 - Myanmar's Independence Day - Arakan Army forces staged coordinated attacks on Border Guard Police posts, killing thirteen officers and injuring nine others. Naypyitaw responded swiftly, with the civilian administration ordering the military to undertake "clearance operations" to "crush" the insurgent group, which now controlled somewhere from 5,000 to 10,000 troops.Over the next two years, the fighting in Rakhine and southern Chin States was the fiercest Myanmar had experienced in decades, with thousands of combatants and civilians killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced.

Mobile internet and social media continued to be important tools for the Arakan Army once conflict escalated in January 2019. It used them for operational purposes, for command and control, and to gather intelligence, as well as to solicit donations and to recruit. In the early stages of the conflict, the group relied on mobile internet and common messaging applications to stage mass offensives, as well as highly effective ambushes of Tatmadaw units. The armed group used these tools to receive intelligence from civilians - principally, the location of government forces - and to coordinate its combatants.

Facebook users following the conflict in Rakhine State have felt the effects of this policy in several ways. Posts with content related to the Arakan Army are subject to removal for violating community standards as expressions of "praise, support or representation" for a dangerous organisation. Repeated violations result in a person or page being banned or unpublished (ie, removed from public view). Violations can include posts containing the group's name, the names of its leaders, its logo or its announcements, but also seemingly legitimate political comment about the conflict.

The internet restrictions in Rakhine were among the longest-running anywhere in the world. In June 2019, the government's ministry of transport and communications, at the Tatmadaw's request, ordered mobile operators to stop internet access in eight townships in Rakhine State as well as Paletwa township in neighbouring Chin State. Access was restored in five townships in August 2019, before being interrupted again the following February, and then lifted in one township, Maungdaw, in May 2020. At the start of August 2020, the government permitted a resumption of 2G internet access in all areas, but in practice little changed, as it is difficult to perform even the most basic web-based functions on such low-speed connections.Full internet access was restored on 3 February 2021, two days after the coup, but restricted again on 15 March all over the country (see Section IV.B below).

But a range of factors also limited the impact of the internet restrictions. On an operational level, the Arakan Army increased its use of satellite phones for command and control.Because voice calls and SMS were not restricted, these services could still be used by the group's network of members and supporters on the ground to both send intelligence about Tatmadaw troop movements and disseminate information to communities.Internet access was also not completely severed. Fibre-based connections remained available in several towns in the blackout zone, such as Mrauk-U, and it was often still possible to get a 3G signal in elevated areas.After 2G was restored, those living in areas with unrestricted internet would copy and paste the text of news reports and share them on Facebook groups so that they could be read even with a slow connection.Journalists and civil society groups were able to send information by telephone to contacts who could post online, or travel to areas with internet access to upload it directly.Human rights violations were also still widely documented in mainstream and social media.

The consequences of the mobile internet ban for the Rakhine population in blacked-out communities have been significant, however. The blackout has had a negative social and economic impact on those communities, making it difficult to conduct business, receive remittances, contact friends and relatives abroad, and provide aid to displaced people.Arguably, it has put residents' lives at risk, by depriving them of information about the fighting and the COVID-19 pandemic. As one resident of rural Kyauktaw township observed:

Before the shutdown, news [about the fighting] would pop up in a minute on the internet [Facebook]. That meant we had time to prepare to run or to hide or to store more essential items. ... The internet ban has also affected our livelihoods. Many people were earning income from running internet shopping businesses [on Facebook] but now those are all gone.

Online freedom of expression declined significantly under the NLD. Broadly worded defamation clauses in several laws were regularly used to jail activists and ordinary internet users alike for online comments, usually on Facebook. Although some of these, such as the 2013 Telecommunications Law, were enacted before it took office, the NLD oversaw the introduction of new legislation that was similarly open to abuse, such as the 2017 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, and made only minor amendments to address issues with older laws.One survey by freedom of expression group Athan found that during the first four years of the NLD's term, more than 1,000 people had been prosecuted for social media posts under a range of laws.More than half of the cases were initiated by the government itself, while others were based on complaints filed by the military, the NLD party and lawmakers.

Prior to being removed from office, the NLD government was also in the process of creating a biometrics database for telephone users, which would have included their fingerprints and a scan of their ID.Another initiative would have created "e-IDs" - a system that is not controversial in principle, but under Myanmar's laws implied that the authorities, including the military, could have had access to personal data with few checks and balances.

Those who tried to raise concerns about data privacy and digital rights issues with the NLD government or party lawmakers saw their concerns brushed aside. Although many NLD officials had personally experienced abuses at the hands of the military during junta rule, they seemed indifferent to the possibility that their initiatives could be misused by civil servants or the security forces, including against themselves. Few if any foresaw a scenario in which the military came back to power through force. "When the coup happened, the NLD was a sitting duck because of these programs", said one digital rights advocate. "We had tried to draw their attention to the red flags, but it was like talking to a brick wall".NLD lawmakers and government officials also failed to push back against the military's proposals to equip the police force with advanced surveillance and monitoring equipment that it is now likely to use against the opposition movement, if it is not already doing so (see Section IV.A below).

Since the first hours of the coup on 1 February, the Tatmadaw's actions have reflected a keen awareness of the importance of the internet, social media and communications technology for consolidating control. In an effort to gain the upper hand over its opponents, it has grappled with a range of approaches - from legal amendments and filtering websites to complete internet shutdowns. But given how connected Myanmar citizens have become, and how united they are in opposing military rule, the internet is a battlefield on which the Tatmadaw will struggle to win. It poses significant risks for the regime, for example by enabling the public to organise rallies and document abuses. As a result, the generals have turned to the bluntest of censorship instruments to stifle opposition - an approach it initially avoided due to the economic consequences, but also because it sought to project an image of business as usual to domestic and international audiences. At the time of writing, the country was in a near-total internet blackout, with online access limited to fibre optic connections where available.

A. Targeted Measures Fail

With the internet back on but people initially hesitant to venture into the streets, social media was the natural place for opposition to the coup to germinate. On 2 February, medical workers used Facebook to launch a civil disobedience movement, refusing to work for the regime and calling for the reinstatement of the democratically elected government.The ministry of transport and communications - one of the few ministries in the military regime led by a serving officer, Admiral Tin Aung San - responded by ordering mobile operators and service providers to block access to social media platforms, beginning with Facebook on 3 February and followed by Twitter and Instagram two days later. As the first street protests against the regime gathered steam on 6 February, the ministry shut down the internet for more than 24 hours to thwart online coordination, before reinstating access on the afternoon of Sunday 7 February, prior to the start of the working week.

The military's next tactic was to enact legal changes to restrict freedom of expression and gain access to user data. Its very first public act of law-making after taking power was to distribute a draft Cyber Security Law - based on the NLD government's version - to mobile operators and internet service providers on 9 February. The law would have required tech companies to onshore their data and provide it to the government at any time on vague national security grounds; it also introduced new categories of offence for spreading "misinformation" or "disinformation" that could result in a three-year prison sentence.The draft provoked strong public opposition from activists and businesses, and behind the scenes even some bureaucrats within the ministry of transport and communications urged a more moderate approach.The regime quietly shelved the draft and instead enacted amendments to the Electronic Transactions Law on 15 February. These included some sections of the draft Cyber Security Law but minus the requirement to store data inside the country.

Around the same time, the regime also pursued legal changes that seemed designed to deter online criticism. On 14 February, it announced amendments to the colonial-era Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, including the addition of a new charge, commonly known as Article 505-A, that carries a three-year prison term for "causing fear", "spreading false news" or "agitating directly or indirectly" to commit a criminal offence against a government employee.The regime has since used this law extensively against a wide range of opponents, including journalists, politicians, activists, striking doctors and social media users (see Section IV.B below).

Additionally, from the early hours of 15 February, the military began instituting a nightly internet shutdown that has continued ever since. Initially enforced from 1am to 9am, the blackout was later relaxed to 1am to 6:30am on weekdays, following lobbying by businesspeople.There has been significant speculation as to why the military chose to cut the internet at night, when most internet users are asleep. It seems to have been driven by two factors. The first is that shutting down the internet at night has less impact on the economy and government operations. The second is that it stopped livestreams of night-time raids by security forces, which had caused public outrage and even hindered police operations as in some cases members of the public had rallied to the support of those being arrested, forcing the outnumbered police to back off.

B. Falling Back on Blunt Tools

Recognising it was losing the online battle, the military on 15 March ordered the total shutdown of mobile internet services, which constitute the main source of access to the web for the vast majority of users in Myanmar. Two days later it shut down public wi-fi services, and from 2 April instructed mobile operators and internet service providers to also halt fixed wireless services, which many urban households use for home connections. Only the much less common fibre-to-the-home connections remained operational, leaving rural areas completely disconnected.In urban areas, service providers have been inundated with applications for fibre connections, and are unable to meet demand. In the meantime, many residents are sharing connections with neighbours who have fibre to get around the blackout. But by one estimate, there are likely just 600,000 active internet connections left in the country - barely one for every 100 people - down from close to 25 million prior to the mobile data shutdown.

The mobile, public wi-fi and fixed wireless internet shutdowns have had a discernible impact on the opposition movement. The organisational networks of the civil disobedience and protest movements have been significantly affected. "The impact of losing most communication channels has been very noticeable. Two weeks after losing fixed wireless access, there are some people who are still completely offline", commented one civil society leader.The volume of user-generated content on social media about what is happening inside the country has also diminished significantly. In some regional cities, protests stopped almost immediately because activists were unable to organise; coordination in rural areas, which have been almost entirely cut off, has been even more affected. Underscoring how limited connectivity is, large protests took place in several towns in Mandalay and Sagaing regions on 24 March, with demonstrators apparently unaware that activists had declared a "silent strike" urging the public to stay indoors that day.

Since the coup, the regime has used the police force's social media monitoring team to track celebrities and social influencers who were posting anti-military statements on social media. At the end of March, shortly before the 505-A charges were announced, the team received instructions to begin finding the addresses of targeted social media users. One officer said the team had no technology to match Facebook users with physical addresses and relied instead on informants (known as dalan in Burmese) and data from the General Administration Department. Regarding the charges against ordinary users, the team member explained that some of those facing charges had been active in private Facebook groups, unaware that informers had infiltrated them and were reporting back to the police.

These blunt tactics reflect the lack of other options that the military has to respond to such widespread opposition. Although it has acquired a range of tools to disrupt communications, monitor individuals and unlock devices (discussed in further detail in Section V.A), these are largely ineffective in the face of a mass uprising, particularly given the lack of capacity in the security forces to deploy them at scale.

Although the internet shutdown has also had a significant impact on businesses and government operations, these are no longer major considerations for the Tatmadaw. The escalating protests and the existential threat they pose to military rule mean that security imperatives - the need to consolidate power and crush all opposition - are now the dominating factor in decision-making in Naypyitaw. Asked about the internet shutdown at a 23 March press conference, Deputy Information Minister Brigadier-General Zaw Min Tun replied that the military had "no plan" to restore internet services:

The most fundamental and important task in a country is maintaining the rule of law and stability. Without the rule of law and stability, other activities cannot function. We have found that most of the incitement for the ongoing riots comes from the internet and social media. We will continue to put the restrictions in place for a certain period of time.

C. Propaganda Fail on Social Media

The Tatmadaw's difficulties have not been limited to controlling the online space and undermining the ability of its opponents to organise and challenge its authority. It has also lost control of the narrative about what is happening in Myanmar, to the point that it has struggled to even disseminate messages to its own supporters through major social media platforms. In contrast, anti-military activists have used social media highly effectively to reach domestic and international audiences with key messages and campaigns, as well as to raise funds for striking workers and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a group of parliamentarians elected in November 2020 who have formed a shadow government in the absence of the deposed NLD leadership.

Facebook's decision to completely remove the Tatmadaw from its platform shortly after the coup was a major blow to the military leadership. Following the brutal campaign against the Rohingya in 2017, the company had banned Myanmar's commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and removed twenty military-linked pages, but it had refrained from banning the Tatmadaw entirely. Over the following two years, it also removed at least six military-run networks that had been engaging in "coordinated inauthentic behaviour".

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Myanmar's Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield

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In order to silence opposition to the February coup, Myanmar's military is vigorously policing the internet as it quashes street protests. Outside powers and technology companies should endeavour to keep the online space free of interference and deny the junta tools of virtual repression.

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Myanmar beauty queen Thuzar Wint Lwin won the award for best national costume at the Miss Universe pageant in the United States on Sunday. The 22-year-old used the competition's global platform to urge the world to speak out against the military regime, appearing on stage with a placard saying "Pray for Myanmar".

"Our people are dying and being shot by the military every day," she said in a video message for the competition. "I would like to urge everyone to speak about Myanmar. As Miss Universe Myanmar, I have been speaking out as much as I can since the coup," she added.

However, she now faces an uncertain future telling media that she fears her life may be at risk if she returns to Myanmar.

Thuzar Wint Lwin won the Miss Universe Myanmar pageant representing the Chin State capital Hakha and wore ethnic Chin costume at the 69 th Miss Universe contest in Florida. Fighting between civilian resistance forces and junta troops in Chin State has intensified in recent days, with clashes in both Hakha and Mindat.

Just before the final round of Miss Universe, Thuzar Wint Lwin wrote on her Facebook that she was very sorry to hear about conditions in the mountain-top town of Mindat, where military regime forces reportedly used civilians as human shields during a raid in response to the town's resistance to the junta.

Last week, the regime declared martial law in Mindat, which is home to some 20,000 people, after bombarding the town with artillery.

Thuzar Wint Lwin is one of dozens of Myanmar celebrities, including actors and social media influencers, who have condemned the junta's Feb. 1 coup and the overthrowing of the democratically-elected civilian government led by State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Following the coup, Thuzar Wint Lwin joined Yangon street protests against the regime and donated most of her life savings to family members of pro-democracy supporters who have been killed in the junta's lethal crackdowns on anti-coup demonstrations.

She also called for the military to return the country to civilian rule and for the immediate release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on March 8, International Women's Day.

When some Myanmar beauty pageant fans urged her in early March to stop protesting against the dictatorship and focus on preparations for the Miss Universe contest, she responded that "Miss Universe is very important for me because it is my biggest dream. But, the most important thing at this time is [changing] our political system."

"We will lose everything...our hopes, dreams and our entire lives if we lose this revolution. So I must protest and stand with my fellow citizens for my country and for the truth," she said.

Despite the fact that an airline lost her suitcase, which included original costumes for the pageant, Thuzar Wint Lwin made it to the top 21 of the Miss Universe competition. Other beauty queens loaned her dresses, while Myanmar citizens resident in the US also helped prepare dresses for her.

As of Sunday, she did not know which country she would apply to stay in instead of returning to Myanmar.

Han Lay, winner of Miss Grand Myanmar, also spoke out against the military regime at the Miss Grand International 2020 pageant in Thailand in April, and described Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as her greatest inspiration. She is currently living in Thailand as she also fears being arrested by the junta if she returns to Myanmar.

At least 790 people have been killed by security forces and more than 5,000 arrested since the coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.

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Myanmar Miss Universe Contestant Calls on World to Speak Out Against the Junta

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Myanmar beauty queen Thuzar Wint Lwin won the award for best national costume at the Miss Universe pageant in the United States on Sunday. The 22-year-old used the competition's global platform to urge the world to speak out against the military regime, appearing on stage with a placard saying "Pray for Myanmar".

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One of the co-founders of the People's Party has resigned over a disagreement about whether the party should attend a meeting on Friday organised by the junta's election body.

Ye Naing Aung, the party's General Secretary, told Myanmar Now he argued for boycotting the meeting with the Union Election Commission (UEC) during a discussion with senior party members on Monday.

"I resigned from the party during a meeting with the central executive committee members today," he said, declining to give further details.

Ye Naing Aung founded the party in 2018 with Ko Ko Gyi and other veterans of the 1988 democratic uprising.

Ko Ko Gyi, who is the party's chair, declined to comment on the resignation or the party's stance regarding the UEC meeting.

The People's Party boycotted a first meeting with the UEC in late February, along with others including the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Democratic Party for a New Society, which was also founded by veterans of the 1988 uprising.

Sai Nyunt Lwin, a vice-chair of the SNLD, told Myanmar Now his party will not attend Friday's meeting.

"There are currently clashes in Shan State and Covid-19 is still there. We can't think about this," said Sai Nyunt Lwin.

A number of ethnic political parties from Rakhine and Kachin states, as well as dozens of parties allied with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, attended the February meeting.

The military council arrested former UEC members after it seized power on February 1. It then reappointed its own members to the commission, which held its first post-coup meeting with political parties on February 26.

During the meeting, the junta-appointed chairman announced that the results of last year's election-which Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy won in a landslide-were annulled.

The military alleged-without evidence-that there was widespread voter fraud in the poll, a claim it used as justification for seizing power. The coup regime claims it plans to hold another election and transfer power to the winning party.

The People's Party fielded 140 candidates, including Ko Ko Gyi, in last year's election but did not win any seats.

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People's Party co-founder resigns amid row over whether to attend meeting with junta's election commission

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One of the co-founders of the People's Party has resigned over a disagreement about whether the party should attend a meeting on Friday organised by the junta's election body. Ye Naing Aung, the party's General Secretary, told Myanmar Now he argued for boycotting the meeting with the Union Election Commission (UEC) during a discussion with senior party members on Monday.

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(Editor's Note: This article is part of a Just Security series on the Feb. 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar. The series brings together expert local and international voices on the coup and its broader context. The series is a collaboration between Just Security and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School).

The 2007 democratic uprising in Myanmar looked a lot different from the current anti-coup resistance. Sparked by a rise in fuel prices that created further economic burden on an already struggling population, thousands of Buddhist monks and nuns across the country took to the streets in defiance of the military. In a country in which religious actors, institutions, practices, and ideas are deeply influential, the so-called Saffron Revolution, the most recent mass mobilization prior to the current one, had seismic consequences - contributing to the military's decision to shift to quasi-democratic rule the following year.

This time around, it's not Buddhist monastics but young lay people who are at the forefront of Myanmar's mass protest, with clergy from all faiths following their lead. While religious actors and symbols may be less visible than in 2007, they are still very present. This will surprise no one familiar with how deeply entrenched religion is in Myanmar's social, political, and economic life. And indeed, precisely because of this, exploring the religious dimensions of the current protests provide critical insights on the coup and its aftermath. Among other things, the changing nature of how religion is intersecting with and influencing the protests tells us something about how the country as a whole is changing, and what its future might be.
Religion in Past Political Movements
Religion, and specifically Buddhism, has long been an important cultural factor defining the nation state, shaping its political culture, and, at times, contributing to tensions between diverse communities. While the vast majority of the country - over 85 percent, cutting across ethnic communities - is Buddhist, a significant number of Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Baha'i, and practitioners of the indigenous nat tradition also comprise the nation. Many members of non-Buddhist faiths are simultaneously members of minority ethnic groups, who feel doubly marginalized by the state because of their ethnic and religious identities.

Prior to British colonization, Buddhist monarchs ruled in close entanglement with Buddhist institutions. While British authorities sought to disestablish the sangha (the Buddhist monastic community) from the state, the post-independence state re-established a degree of mutual dependence between the state and Buddhism, including through creating a ministry to "protect and propagate Buddhism," to the frustration of non-Buddhist communities. More broadly, Buddhist monastics often feel a sense of duty to ensure that the state and its leaders are abiding by certain Buddhist principles and responsibilities. This sense of obligation among the sangha is sometimes traced to the state's abrogation of its duty to oversee and support the sangha during the colonial period, which spurred many monks to lead anti-colonial efforts in the mid-twentieth century.

The interplay between the sangha, politics, and the state has not been singularly defined but instead has manifested itself differently through the years and among different actors. During the previous military-led era, for example, a significant number of monks continued to agitate in support of democracy, participating in the 1988 uprising in addition to leading the 2007 one. Bamar Buddhist democratic leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi and her father, General Aung San, have argued that democratic principles and practices are beneficial for the health of Buddhism, an idea endorsed by some Buddhist monastic leaders. Even military leaders have sought through theatrical acts of Buddhist charity to present themselves as righteous Buddhist rulers fulfilling their Buddhist responsibilities, and have their own monk supporters.

This multiplicity of interpretations and political positions among monastics stem in part from the fact that the sangha, constituting some 500,000 monastics (a size, notably, that rivals the number of soldiers in the military), is hardly a monolithic body. Many monks and nuns choose to remain politically neutral and unengaged, while others chose to align themselves more clearly with certain political movements, sometimes at great cost. In fact, three prominent monks who have been critical of the military were among those arrested on the first day of the military's attempt to take power in early February.

By and large, monks and nuns have played a less active role in the current protest movement than in 1988 or 2007. To the extent they have been visibly involved, it has been predominantly on the side of the protestors. Several prominent monasteries have issued statements of solidarity with protests, and monks and nuns across the country, particularly in the Buddhist symbolic center of Mandalay, have taken to the streets. Some have organized food donations while others have offered daily loving-kindness chanting for the protestors.

Buddhist symbols and networks have also played an important role in the protests themselves. As has been a common feature of past movements, protestors hold upside-down alms bowls as they march, signaling the spiritual exile of the military leaders. And Buddhist temples like the Sule Pagoda in downtown Yangon are, once again, serving as symbolic gathering places for the protests. Protest networks of mutual aid that support government workers participating in the strike, meanwhile, are modeled on Myanmar's traditional religious charity networks, parahita. In these ways, the protests are imbued with the moral, cultural, and institutional power of Buddhism, in ways that echo past movements.
Breaking from the Past
But it is the differences - some subtle, some significant - in how Buddhism and religion generally are manifesting in the current movement that reveal how the nation and its democratic vision are changing. Three of these differences are worth highlighting.

First, the dynamics between clergy and lay, as well as between older generations and younger generations within that distinction, are playing out in ways that depart from the past, particularly from 2007. Traditionally, clergy, and especially Buddhist monks, have received significant social deference and are accustomed to operating as cultural leaders. In the same way, there is a great deal of respect and deference given to older generations. While that respect still clearly exists, there has also been a flipping of the traditional forms of leadership with this movement, as young lay people have been shown deference by clergy, including elders. This is not the movement of the recent past; it is a movement led by a new generation of young people with different ideas about inclusive democracy, and these changes are largely being embraced by clergy and older generations - as signaled by the fact that they are following rather than seeking to lead.

Second, the movement is intentionally and visibly uplifting diverse religious expression - not just Buddhist expression. While those of all faiths have participated in protest movements in the past, what is noteworthy about this movement is how members of non-Buddhist faiths are participating with pride and distinction - wearing their religious clothing and claiming their religious identity while marching and demonstrating. Equally surprising, they are being celebrated for doing so by fellow protestors. In a departure from the past, imams across the country have shown up in their Islamic garb. Muslims from the Rohingya ethnic group carry signs identifying themselves as such. Christian clergy don their robes and Christian young people write biblical passages on the shields they hold to protect them from bullets while marching on the streets. The distinct religious expression of non-Buddhist communities has been celebrated by Buddhist participants as a reflection of the diversity of the movement and its vision.

And third, while the Saffron Revolution was endorsed by some formal institutions, it was largely a monastic grassroots mobilization. In contrast, some significant Buddhist institutions are taking "political" and formal stances with respect to the current coup and distancing themselves from the military. Perhaps most significantly, a letter was leaked from the Mahanayeke (MaHaNa) Council, a monastic body appointed and managed by the state to regulate sangha affairs, expressing its own condemnation of the military and supporting potential participation of some members in the strike. If authentic, this would be a significant first; the MaHaNa never broke with the military in previous uprisings. Just as striking, monks from the monastery that is home to the infamous anti-Muslim monk Ashin Wirathu have participated visibly and in large numbers in the diverse movement. Monasteries that have historically sought to stay politically unengaged, including some that notably refrained from participating in the Saffron Revolution, have also issued statements condemning the coup and supporting the protestors.
Prophesying the Future
What do these distinctive characteristics of this protest movement augur? First, as in other places worldwide, youth's frustration with traditional religious institutions' and actors' recent failure to stand up for justice may mean a displacement of the traditional authority they have held in society. This may result in a transformation of religion generally - even, one could say, a democratization of religion. Akin to the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, while institutional religion is not playing the same role it has in past protest movements, that is not to say religion is not manifest among the protest movement. Religious symbols, practices, networks, and values are present in both the substance and process of the protests, in ways that both reflect and spur the transformation of religion in Myanmar society and state.

Clearly, traditional and formal institutions of religion and their figureheads are in a posture of responding to, rather than helping to shape and lead the movement in Myanmar. This may mean that in a future Myanmar, traditional and institutional religion will not play the same prominent role it has previously - though religion and spirituality will likely continue to shape and inscribe social, political, and economic life in meaningful if less formal ways.

Second, the dominance of Buddhism in past democratic movements was always something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it helped provide moral legitimacy to the democratic movement and cohesion for the vast majority of Burmese of different ethnicities who are Buddhist, while undermining the legitimacy of the military who claimed itself to rule in line with Buddhism. But it also, understandably, created misgivings among non-Buddhists who worried that a strongly Buddhist-inflected democratic vision and movement would marginalize them. Today, the collective celebration of Christian, Muslim, and other non-Buddhist religious expression and participation in the movement itself hopefully foreshadows a more inclusive sense of nationalism. If nurtured and institutionalized by the appointed National Unity Government, this inclusive national identity could contribute to a democratic state where diversity is honored and celebrated, and those of non-Buddhist faiths do not face the same degree of institutional and social discrimination they have in the past. This will require significant, likely generational, transformation of state, religious, and cultural institutions and processes that have historically privileged Bamar Buddhists.

And third, should the movement eventually succeed, there is some reason to believe that, institutionally and bureaucratically, the new state would "manage" religion in a different manner. Rather than the state co-opting the sangha through the MaHaNa, there is the potential for the body, or one like it, to be in creative and democratic tension with the state. This would create a healthier relationship between state and religious institutions and actors, where neither is beholden to the other; instead both would critically engage one another as part of the democratic process, helping to ensure that both society and the state truly are living up to the best ideals and principles of religious and democratic values.

Given religion's historical importance to Myanmar's politics, culture, and society, there is little doubt that religion in its diverse and multi-faceted dimensions will continue to affect Myanmar in fundamental ways. As the interaction between society and religion evolves, religion will continue to shape the ongoing competition between authoritarianism and democracy. Likewise, religion will influence the ways diverse communities struggle and persevere in the face of extraordinary challenges. And the evolution of society and the Myanmar state will, in turn, transform religious practices and institutions. The current movement affirms this dynamic reality and foreshadows how these transformations can spur justice and democracy.

Image: Monks take part in a demonstration against the military coup in Yangon on March 11, 2021, holding umbrellas supporting the CRPH and calling for action from the international community (invoking the principle of R2P, Responsibility to Protect) (Photo by STR/AFP via Getty Images)

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Beyond the Coup in Myanmar: Don't Ignore the Religious Dimensions

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(Editor's Note: This article is part of a Just Security series on the Feb. 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar. The series brings together expert local and international voices on the coup and its broader context. The series is a collaboration between Just Security and the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School).

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Myanmar's shadow National Unity Government (NUG) announced yesterday that it had formed a "people's defense force" to protect its supporters from attacks and consolidate opposition to the military junta that seized power in February.

In a statement, it said the move was a prelude to the establishment of a Federal Union Army and that it had the responsibility to "make effective reforms in the security sector in order to terminate the 70 year long civil war."

"Today, May 5, we formed the People's Defense Force. Preparations for this army were made a long time ago. A lot of time has gone into training," Khin Ma Ma Myo, the NUG's deputy minister of defense, told Radio Free Asia. She added that a "defense acquisition department" had been established under her shadow ministry.

The PDF will function as the military wing of the NUG, which was established on April 16 by an array of groups opposed to the junta, including the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, an organization of parliamentarians belonging to the National League for Democracy (NLD), which was ousted from power by the coup.

The NUG's aim is to compete with the military junta for international recognition with the ultimate aim of restoring democracy, excising the military from Myanmar's politics, and building a "federal democratic union." The NUG statement described the PDF a precursor to a Federal Union Army which would seek to come together with Myanmar's raft of armed ethnic insurgent groups to fight the Tatmadaw to these ends.
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The military's takeover has exacerbated a number of long-running conflicts in Myanmar's borderlands, pitting ethnic minority groups against the central state. Serious fighting has erupted between the military and ethnic rebels in Karen and Kachin States, which have been followed by air strikes that have driven thousands of people to flee their homes, including across the border into Thailand. Earlier this week, during one such air raid, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) announced that its armed wing had shot down a Myanmar military helicopter.

Some ethnic armed groups, including the Karen National Union (KNU), have also granted sanctuary and military training to activists who have fled Myanmar's central regions due to military crackdowns. Meanwhile, in other parts of Myanmar, the military's deadly crackdowns on anti-coup protesters have also prompted the creation of citizens' militias that have carried out deadly attacks on soldiers.

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Taken as a whole, these recent developments suggest the existence of an incipient nationwide armed opposition to the military regime led by Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, which the PDF will now aim to unify.
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To be sure, Myanmar's armed forces, or Tatmadaw, are one of Asia's best-equipped militaries and dwarf the combined size of the country's various ethnic armed groups by several times. According to one informed estimate, the military fields around 350,000 troops to 75-000-78,000 for the rebel groups. However, coordinated offensives around the country's periphery could stretch the military thin, taking place alongside mass urban protests, and play an important supplementary role to political efforts aimed at winning international support away from the junta.

However, there is a long way to go before the PDF succeeds in founding a Federal Union Army or fostering the degree of coordination necessary to threaten the Tatmadaw on the battlefield. The past three months have made clear that the NUG and most of the ethnic armed organizations share a common opposition to the military and its recent coup, but it is less certain how far their positive goals align.

Each organization has its own goals, personalities, and history of relations with the central state. While the KIA and KNU have been actively supportive of the NUG and the anti-coup movement, others, like the Restoration Council of Shan State, have been rhetorically supportive without taking significant actions. Still others, most notably the Arakan Army in western Myanmar, continue to harbor a mistrust of the NUG and the former NLD government.

Uniting these various groups into something approaching a common front will therefore involve a protracted process of negotiation.

The announcement by the NUG came as more than 200 global organizations urged the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar.

Arguing that the military junta has demonstrated "a callous disregard for human life" since its takeover, killing at least 769 people, including children and other bystanders, the NGOs stated that "no government should sell a single bullet to the junta under these circumstances."

It added, "Imposing a global arms embargo on Myanmar is the minimum necessary step the Security Council should take in response to the military's escalating violence."

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Can Myanmar's New 'People's Defense Force' Succeed?

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Advertisement Myanmar's shadow National Unity Government (NUG) announced yesterday that it had formed a "people's defense force" to protect its supporters from attacks and consolidate opposition to the military junta that seized power in February.

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A pro-democracy activist in the Sagaing Region town of Monywa was murdered on Friday after being set on fire in an unprovoked attack, according to a witness to the incident.

Factory manager Taing Aung said that he was talking to the victim, 60-year-old Sein Win, on Friday morning when a factory worker poured gasoline over his head and set him alight.

"I saw him pour the gasoline and then immediately set him on fire. I shouted and tried to put out the fire on Ko Sein Win," said Taing Aung, who was a friend of the victim.

"He poured the gasoline on him just like we do with water during the Thingyan water festival," he told Myanmar Now.

Sein Win was immediately admitted to the Monywa General Hospital, but died at around 11pm on Friday, he added.

"He had severe burns on his legs, hands, and head-almost his entire body. His face was burned black. The skin on his legs and hands peeled off," said Taing Aung.

The assailant was identified as Aung Ko, a resident of Monywa's Myawaddy ward. At the time of reporting, he was still at large.

Officials at the Monywa police station could not be reached for comment when contacted by Myanmar Now on Saturday.

Sein Win's family will hold a funeral for him on Sunday afternoon.

A longtime supporter of the National League for Democracy (NLD), Sein Win had been active in politics since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and campaigned for the party in the 1990 election.

According to his daughter Thin Thin Nwe, his political activism often made life difficult for him and his family, including his three adult children.

"None of us ever applied for jobs that required documents or references from ward administrators or the police," she said, explaining that the regime actively discriminated against those known to oppose its rule.

She added, however, that she understood her father's position because he shared his political beliefs with his children and educated them about the nature of the dictatorship.

As a veteran pro-democracy activist, Sein Win joined anti-regime protests in Monywa soon after the military seized power on February 1. He was also close to youth activists and supported the anti-coup activities of Generation Z protesters in the town.

"He believed this revolution would win. He saw rays of hope, and so do we. I am very sad that my father will no longer be able to see our victory," Thin Thin Nwe said.

Sein Win was also a charity worker and a lover of poetry whose poems have been published in a number of magazines.

A fellow poet in Monywa who spoke to Myanmar Now on condition of anonymity said that it was unlikely that the motive for the attack was personal.

"He was an honest and active charity worker and political activist," he said.

At least nine civilians, including poet Kay Za Win and writer Kyi Lin Aye, have been murdered in brutal crackdowns on anti-coup protesters in Monywa.

Monywa-based poet Khet Thi died last week in the regime's custody a day after he was arrested in Shwebo, another town in Sagaing about 100km from Monywa.

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Activist in Monywa dies after being set on fire in horrific attack

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A pro-democracy activist in the Sagaing Region town of Monywa was murdered on Friday after being set on fire in an unprovoked attack, according to a witness to the incident. Factory manager Taing Aung said that he was talking to the victim, 60-year-old Sein Win, on Friday morning when a factory worker poured gasoline over his head and set him alight.

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While many of us in the Western world carry on in our comment sections about what our delicate sensibilities align with the definition of 'punk', for the citizens of Myanmar, the term has vastly outgrown the concept of a music genre, let alone an aesthetic. In Myanmar, punk has become synonymous with protection, community, survival and resistance.

For when Myanmar, already emerging from a crippling national COVID crisis, was placed under siege by a barbaric military coup, it wasn't the government that came to help, nor was it the West. It was the punks.

Though they openly resonate with the term 'band', and indeed release music, perform shows and undertake many of the other traditional tasks of a musical act, The Rebel Riot are far more than that. They're a movement that's saved thousands since the military junta began in February 2021, and indeed, thousands in the years prior. As well as the music and the shows, The Rebel Riot established Food Not Bombs, Books Not Bombs and most recently, a free medical clinic.

Here at Blunt Magazine we discuss at length the immutable power of punk rock, but even The Rebel Riot are outliers, in that their movement transcends speakers and the studio; it's spilled out onto the streets. Speaking with frontman Kyaw Kyaw was as eye-opening as it was inspiring. And if this story - this situation - feels particularly scary, take some reassurance from KK himself: "It is scary."

"I'm scared they'll arrest me or they'll kill me. But, I'm more scared to be a slave in their system...Maybe tomorrow I will die, or tomorrow I will be arrested. But every day, we are the winner, because we do what we really believe in. Even if I'm arrested today, yesterday I did what I believe, so if I go to prison, I can think about what I did yesterday. I'm ready to die. So, tomorrow, I will do it again."

Like many punks who have risen up and raged against the machine in the past, KK explains that as a youth, "Before finding punk, the revolution was already on my mind."

"I didn't know anything about politics, because we lived in a military regime for so long. We have no pro-democracy TV channel, it's only brainwashed TV about the military. When I was young, I had no chance to learn anything. But, we know why the country is so poor. We know why people are silent. We have no human rights. I know that. I know the military system is very bad, and democracy is good. This is what I know."

But before long, having endured through the insufferable trends of glam metal, and Scorpions bootlegs pumped by friends, KK began to find the sound for his state of mind, beginning with Linkin Park. "They're not singing, they're just shouting," he explains of the resonance of their music. "And then I found Slipknot..." And, well, we all know what happens when you find Slipknot - there's no going back.

In the years following, KK would gravitate to a social group of like-minded musicians. But it was in 2007, amidst the wave of economic and political protests named 'The Saffron Revolution', that KK and his friends would be pulled into the world of life-threatening activism.

"We were part of a demonstration," KK recalls. "I saw the soldiers shooting the demonstrators. Lots of people died on the street. I heard gunshots for the first time."

KK and his bandmates were already scared at that point, but after witnessing the massacre, a new emotion arose. "Now," he says referring to the demonstrations, "I'm also angry."

"So I meet with my friends, 'Guys, what should we do? Lots of people are dying...' I'm not brave enough to go on the streets. I don't want to die by a bullet. We should do something. What do we do?"

And so they officially formed The Rebel Riot, using English words they weren't all too familiar with, but that carried the ethos of the band: "We fight for freedom, we fight for justice."

For KK, looking around him as his country continued to decline, it still wasn't enough. "We're only singing. We have no movement yet. We want to do something for the people. We want to fight the system."

Then, during a brief week-long headlining tour throughout neighbouring Indonesia, a chance encounter with the founder of the local chapter of non-governmental organisation Food Not Bombs gave them the opportunity they needed to help in their country. "So, we made the Food Not Bombs Myanmar movement in 2013. The first time, we cooked fried rice or fried noodles for the homeless people, and then around 20 people or 30 people. Not so much."

KK recalls a somewhat clunky start to the project, given that the homeless and rough livers of Mynamar weren't quite accustomed to approaching hordes of denim jacket-clad, mohawk-wearing, stretched-ear punks...

"It was very funny," he laughs. "The first week we tried to give food to the homeless people...They ran away when they saw us! They thought we [were] against them, that we wanted to fight them...I said, 'No, no, no, brother, please wait. This is food for your dinner.' They didn't trust us. 'Are you sure?' They asked, 'Yeah, yeah, yeah. This is good, please try.'

"These days," KK adds, "when they see a punk, they're happy. Every Monday night, we cook..."

"[At first] we didn't make much political music, but we were shouting because we had the trauma of this revolution. So we needed to let our anger out. We were just singing punk songs about how we're sick of this society. But I think 2012 or 2010 we started writing about politics; about the system, and how people are so poor. And also we criticise the monarch."

Helping not just the homeless or cripplingly disadvantaged, Food Not Bombs, and its 2015 offshoot Books Not Bombs, also supports the children impacted by poverty and the junta. That's of key importance to The Rebel Riot and as such, the true impact of their work won't be known for decades - not until this entire generation of children now with access to education, health care, meals and fun have grown up.

There's an unmistakable sense of pride beaming from KK. "Revolution is my relaxing," he says when quizzed on when he takes his downtime, having only taken the Zoom call moments after returning from a Monday night cook. There's victory in the air, which might seem at odds with everything above. But still, it's there, and KK feels it too. The military may have the power, the guns and the money, but they're still losing.

"Revolutionary people are like a fire," KK explains of this. "The military people are like a darkness. The universal truth is, the fire is always beating the darkness. This is my philosophy."

That said, the fight is far from over, and all of us have a part to play. Australians and those around the world can directly make a contribution, as KK explains.

"Honestly, right now, money is very important. We had the COVID crisis last year, then the military coup happened. Our country is one of the poorer countries in the world, so people are getting down and down and down. So this is, I think, very important: we need lots of money. You don't need to donate to our group, also you can donate to other groups."

As well as amplification: "We need more to speak up."

Well, you heard the man.

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The Rebel Riot: Fighting oppressive darkness with revolutionary fire - Blunt Magazine

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While many of us in the Western world carry on in our comment sections about what our delicate sensibilities align with the definition of 'punk', for the citizens of Myanmar, the term has vastly outgrown the concept of a music genre, let alone an aesthetic.

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Rejecting the claims of mass fraud and voting irregularities used by the Myanmar military to justify its coup, an international monitoring group said in its final report on the results of last year's polls that the vote reflected the true will of the electorate.

The November 2020 general election brought another landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Rejecting the regime's allegations of electoral fraud, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), one of two foreign observer missions accredited to monitor the vote, said "Election Day was found to be peaceful and orderly across the country, with no major incidents reported," in its final comprehensive report released on Monday.

The report found that the campaign environment ahead of the general elections was not quite as free or fair as in 2015, however, in part of because of the unprecedented backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Quoting the network's former chair, the report states, "'There are no elections made

in heaven,' meaning there is always room for improvement in the eyes of experienced observers."

"Nevertheless, it is ANFREL's informed opinion that the results of the 2020 general elections were, by and large, representative of the will of the people of Myanmar," the report reads.

"Despite the raging COVID-19 pandemic, 27.5 million people voted thanks to the hard work of polling staff and election or health officials, their voices cannot be silenced," Chandanie Watawala, executive director of ANFREL, is quoted as saying in the report.

Standing in solidarity with Myanmar's democracy supporters, the group repeated in its report a chant that has become popular with protesters: "Give the power back to the people! [Pyithuarrnar Pyithu Pyanpayy!]."

The final report of the international observation mission of ANFREL was initially due to be released in mid-February after the group completed monitoring of the post-election period, including addressing election complaints in election tribunals and investiture of newly elected representatives-processes that were halted by the military coup.

"Until the military coup of 1 Feb. disrupted the final phase of a largely peaceful election process, ANFREL had meant to first congratulate the people of Myanmar, the Union Election Commission (UEC), and the hundreds of thousands of polling staff who made the 2020 general elections a success despite difficult conditions," ANFREL said in the report.

Just hours before the newly elected Parliament was to convene, the military seized power by detaining elected leaders including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, political activists and politicians. MPs-elect who had arrived in Naypyitaw to attend Parliament were confined at their government guesthouse and later forced to leave the capital. In the following months, arrest warrants were issued for many of them, and many have been detained.

Since then, the regime has killed at least 796 civilians, and over 3,900 people are currently detained.

A new, regime-appointed election commission declared the results of last November's election invalid in late February, coercing election officials into signing affidavits purportedly confirming that instances of electoral fraud took place.

ANFREL added that the 2020 election was marked by efforts to increase diversity and achieve greater inclusion, with an increase in women candidates; an emphasis placed by political parties on fielding ethnic candidates and reaching out to 5 million first-time voters; continued efforts to provide advance voting opportunities to the elderly and PWD (persons with disabilities) voters; and the first-ever openly LGBT candidates, among others.

"ANFREL found no reason to doubt the overall integrity of the advance voting process," it said, referring to a phase of the election that drew allegations of fraud from the military and its allied party. To the contrary, ANFREL said, the UEC allowed greater participation in a challenging environment.

Earlier, other poll monitors including the US-based Carter Center and Myanmar's largest election observer group, People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE), said in their reports the election was largely free and fair with no major irregularities.

You may also like these stories: Myanmar Civilian Government Condemns Junta's Atrocities in Mindat Six Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Shootout Myanmar Miss Universe Contestant Calls on World to Speak Out Against the Junta

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2020 Election Result Accurately Reflected Voters' Will: Poll Monitor

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Rejecting the claims of mass fraud and voting irregularities used by the Myanmar military to justify its coup, an international monitoring group said in its final report on the results of last year's polls that the vote reflected the true will of the electorate.

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Photo by Ajay Karpur on Unsplash

Myanmar, like most other countries in the world, has staggeringly high rates of gender-based violence, with a low estimate of 1 in 12 women experiencing intimate partner violence alone in 2019. There are very few formal systems to respond to gender based violence (GBV) - police and doctors are not trained in responding to or treating survivors, there is almost no access to trained psychologists or social workers, and it is all but impossible for women and children to escape abusive homes. Most GBV case management is carried out by grassroots civil society organizations who have done their best to pool limited resources and quickly build their own knowledge and capacity to respond to urgent needs of women and children in their communities. These are the groups of women activists running small but crucial women's shelters and safehouses all over Myanmar, the first people who are called in to help survivors of intimate partner violence, sexual assault or abuse.

Carrying out this work has always been difficult, but it became exponentially more challenging in April of 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic closed workplaces and borders and social distancing measures were put in place in Myanmar. A steep rise in GBV incidence was recorded all around the world, earning the name "Shadow Pandemic", and women's shelters and safehouses in Myanmar filled beyond capacity. Emergency funding helped them stay afloat through 2020, and many anticipated a return to normal in 2021. Instead, since the coup on February 1, responding to GBV cases has become an even greater challenge. A case worker and safehouse manager reported that there were more cases in February compared to January, and that she was having a difficult time following the procedures of supporting and getting justice for survivors. Within her trusted network she was able to find healthcare workers willing to treat survivors outside of the hospital and lawyers to seek legal advice from, but when she tries to file official reports at the police station, they tell her they are participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and refuse to do any work. She highly doubts they are participating in CDM, but this is not the first time she's seen police underperforming on GBV cases and she has alternatives. "We are using community religious leaders to solve the cases". Between the expertise of the case managers and the authority of the religious leaders, survivors get as close to justice as they can during a coup.

Case managers' problems are also now compounded by the loss of the former Department of Social Welfare (DSW), which on a state by state basis had succeeded in building better relationships with civil society GBV responders and were improving their own capacity to respond to survivors' needs. It took years to build any level of trust between CSOs and the NLD-led government, particularly where ethnic based civil society organizations were concerned, and this was wiped clean when the junta's appointees took their place. The newly appointed Directors have already been applying pressure on these case managers to hand over all of their case records, and at least one safehouse supported by the former DSW is confirmed to be closing, with no plan for where to rehome its current residents - mostly teenage girls and young women who may not be safe in their own homes and communities. Case managers are in no hurry to hand over such sensitive information to a department under the leadership of Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement Thet Thet Khine - a known associate of ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups, Rohingya genocide denier and big player in Myanmar's profits-before-people gem industry. Memories of sexual violence committed by soldiers of Myanmar's army linger on the minds of many women in ethnic groups around the country too, and case managers know better than to underestimate the level of cruelty they are capable of.

It is likely many of the frontline GBV case managers in Myanmar will find their own ways to avoid collaborating with the junta appointed DSW for as long as they possibly can, keeping the information of survivors out of the hands of people they don't trust. At some point, the requests may become more forceful. With typical Myanmar humour in the face of crisis, when asked if she feared for her safety in the coming weeks, one case manager said "If they take me they'll have to take all the girls and babies relying on me too, and I don't think they're interested in that responsibility!" (Security forces did in fact come to arrest this woman at her home, but she had already fled to safety. The safehouse remains operational under other staff.)

A troubling story reveals the tragic extent of the impact of the coup and military crackdown on protests to the health of GBV survivors. Often, safehouse residents are pregnant as a result of sexual assault, so maternal and newborn healthcare are an important part of the work. The mothers are often young, sometimes teenagers. In this case, a 15 year old girl went into labour a month before her due date, around midnight when the curfew was in full force. The case manager and the doctor couldn't come to help because the risk of being shot on sight was too high. She even tried to contact the local police department to negotiate her safety while travelling the short 1 minute drive to the safehouse, but there was no answer. Instead, all she and the doctor could do was video call into the scene, where the 23-year old safehouse manager and the teen mother were panicking. To make matters worse, the baby was coming feet first. The internet cut off at 1AM, like it does every night, and the video calls had to end. Over the phone, the doctor did her best to coach the young women on what to do, and the case manager did her best to provide emotional support. When the baby came out, she was blue and unmoving. They had to wait several more hours until 4AM to rush over to the only hospital operating, the military hospital, but it was far too late. The doctor told them the baby had probably died during birth. They were very lucky that the young mother was healthy and survived the incident, but otherwise all they felt was despair. The young safehouse manager is distraught with misplaced guilt and she and the young mother are receiving trauma counselling. The case manager and the doctor are searching desperately for a way to prevent this from happening again. Even through all this, the case manager lamented the fact that she had to use the military hospital services, being wary of its connections to those who might be dangerous.

This coup has threatened women's rights and safety, and a junta administration with almost no female leadership will at most pay lip-service to stopping GBV even while perpetrating it, if they even do that much. Myanmar women know this, and are fighting for their lives. Please help support them by donating to any of the vetted and verified fundraisers listed here, and by following the Global Movement for Myanmar Democracy social media accounts for information on how you can advocate for a return to democracy in Myanmar as soon as possible.
For those facing and responding to GBV in Myanmar, here is a short list of resources:

1. Always listen to and believe survivors of GBV.

2. If you are experiencing or are a witness to GBV, record and document incidents as best as you can.

3. Send recordings or reports to local GBV NGOs.

4. If you believe someone you know may be at increased risk of GBV, reach out to them in a compassionate and supportive manner, or discreetly provide them with resources or contact information for where they can get help.
GM4MD would like to thank the GBV case managers who shared their stories with us, and express our admiration and utmost respect for all GBV first responders in crises situations.

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Responding to gender-based violence in post-coup Myanmar: The almost impossible task and the women...

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Myanmar, like most other countries in the world, has staggeringly high rates of gender-based violence, with a low estimate of 1 in 12 women experiencing intimate partner violence alone in 2019.

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Interview with Central Bank Vice-Governor U Win Thaw on the current state of the banking industry in Myanmar

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Interview with Central Bank Vice-Governor U Win Thaw on the current state of the banking industry in Myanmar

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မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းပြီးနောက်ပိုင်း ဘဏ်တွေကနေ‌ငွေထုတ်ယူတာတွေ ကန့်သတ်လိုက်လို့ လူတွေဟာ ATM စက်တွေ ဘဏ်တွေရှေ့မှာ နာရီပေါင်းများစွာ တန်းစီစောင့်ဆိုင်းပြီး အကန့်အသတ်နဲ့ထုတ်နေရပါတယ်။ ဒီကိစ္စနဲ့ဆက်စပ်ပြီး ရွှေစျေး ဒေါ်လာစျေးတွေပါ ရိုတ်ခက်မှုတွေရှိနေပါတယ်။ အခုလိုရင်ဆိုင်နေရတာနဲ့ ပတ်သက်လို့ ဘဏ်တွေမှာ ငွေထုတ်ရတာ ဘယ်တော့ အဆင်ပြေမှာပါလဲ၊ ဘဏ်စနစ်ကို ပုံမှန်ပြန်ရအောင် ဘယ်လိုလုပ်ဖို့ရှိပါသလဲ ဆိုတာတွေကို လက်ရှိ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီကခန့်အပ်ထားတဲ့ ဗဟိုဘဏ် ဒုတိယ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ဦးဝင်းသော်ကို ဘီဘီစီက မေးကြည့်တော့ သူ ကအခုလို စပြောပါတယ်။

ဖြေ။ ။ အခုဖြစ်စဥ်ဖြစ်လာတဲ့ အကြောင်းရင်းက CDM ပေါ်မှာအခြေခံတယ်၊ဝန်ထမ်းတွေရုံးပျက်တယ်၊ အဲ့ဒီအတွက်ဘဏ်အကုန်လုံးမဖွင့်နိုင်ဘူး၊မဖွင့်နိုင်တော့ ဖွင့်တဲ့ဘဏ်မှာ လူတွေ စုပြုံတိုးတယ်၊ဒါကအခြေခံပဲ။အဲ့ဒါပြီးသွားတော့ကျမှ လူတွေဘဏ် တွေမှာတိုးနေကြပါလားဆိုပြီး စိုးရိမ်တဲ့လူတွေကပါ ထပ်တိုးကြတယ်။

ထပ်တိုးတဲ့ အပေါ်နိုင်ငံရေးပယောဂပါလာပြီး မြှောက်ထိုးပင့်ကော်လုပ်ပြီးတော့ ပိုက်ဆံပေးပြီး တန်းစီတာရှိသလို မလိုအပ်ဘဲနဲ့ ငွေမထုတ်ဘဲ တန်းစီတဲ့သူတွေပါလာတယ်။အဲ့ဒါပထမအဆင့် ၊ ပြီးလည်းပြီးရော ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်တွေမှာ ကြေညာတယ်။ အားလုံး ငွေပဲထုတ်ကြ။ ငွေတွေ ဝိုင်းထုတ်လိုက်ရင် ဒီဘဏ်တွေဒုက္ခရောက်သွားမယ်၊ ငွေတွေထုတ်ကြဆိုတဲ့ ကန်ပိန်းတွေဖြစ်သွားတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီပေါ်မှာမူတည်ပြီး လူတွေတိုးဝှေ့တဲ့ ဇာတ်လမ်းဖြစ်လာသလို ကုမ္ပဏီဆိုရင် သိန်း၂၀၀၊ တစ်ဦးချင်းဆိုရင်၂၀ ဆိုတဲ့ကိစ္စ ပေါ်လာတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဘီဘီစီ ။ ။ ဒုဥက္က ဋ္ဌ ပြောသလို CDM လုပ်တာကနေ ဒီအခြေအနေဖြစ်လာတယ်ဆိုတော့ တကယ်လို့များ ဘဏ်အားလုံး ပြန်ဖွင့်မယ်ဆိုရင်ကော ဗဟိုဘဏ်အနေနဲ့ ဘဏ်အားလုံးကိုထောက်ပံ့နိုင်တဲ့ ငွေကြေးပမာဏရှိပါသလား။

ဖြေ ။ ။ ဒါကတော့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ကိုယ့်ရဲ့ လိုအပ်တဲ့ငွေကြေးပမာဏာကို အချိန်အကန့်အသတ်နဲ့ပမာဏနဲ့ တွက်ချက် လုပ်ထားပြီးသားဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီအတွက်ကြောင့် ပူစရာမရှိပါဘူး။ ဒါကြောင့်မို့လို့ သတင်းစာရှင်းလင်းပွဲမှာ ပြောလိုက်တာက ပြည်သူလူထုအပ်နှံငွေ ဆုံးရှုံးစရာအကြောင်းမရှိဘူးလို့ ပြောခဲ့တယ်။ ဥပဒေအကျိုးအကြောင်းအရလည်း ဘဏ်အပ်နှံငွေတွေ ဘယ်လိုအကြောင်းနဲ့မှ ဆုံးရှုံးစရာမရှိဘူး။ဒါက ဥပဒေကိုက ပြဋ္ဌာန်းထားတာ။

အဲ့လိုပဲ ဘဏ်ဆိုတဲ့သဘောက ပြဿနာတစ်ခုခု ဖန်တီးလာလို့ရှိရင်တော့ အပ်ထားတဲ့သူ တွေအကုန်လုံး ငွေထုတ်လို့မရဘူး။နိုင်ငံတကာမှာလည်း လူတစ်ရာအပ်ထားလို့ရှိရင် လူတစ်ရာလုံးက သူအပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေကို ထုတ်ပါမယ်ဆိုရင် federal reserve bank တောင်ထုတ်လို့မရဘူး။ ဘာကြောင့်လဲဆိုတော့ ဘဏ်အပ်တဲ့ငွေက အပ်သလောက်ကို ဖန်ပေါင်းချောင်ထဲထည့်သိမ်းထားပြီးတော့ မီးခံသေတ္တာထဲထည့်သိမ်းပြီးတော့မှ သူတို့လာရင် ပြန်ထုတ်ပေးဖို့ထားတဲ့ safe box မဟုတ်ဘူး။

ဘဏ်ဆိုတာ အပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေတွေကို ယူပြီးတော့ လိုတဲ့လူကို ချေးတာပဲ၊၅၀ရာခိုင်နှူန်းက ၇၀ရာခိုင်နှူန်း ကြားပမာဏကို ချေးထားတယ်။ ချေးထားတဲ့ငွေကနေ ရလာတဲ့ အတိုးနှူန်းနဲ့ ငွေလာအပ်တဲ့သူကို ပေးတဲ့အတိုးနှူန်းကြားက ရတဲ့ အမြတ်ကိုဘဏ်က အမြတ်ယူတာပါ။ ဝန်ထမ်းလစာပေးတယ်။ပြီးရင် ငွေအပ်ထားတဲ့သူတွေကိုအတိုးပေးတယ်။ ဒီလို circulation လည်ပတ်မှုနဲ့ သွားနေတာ။ ဒီဘဏ်ကို ခုနတုန်းကပြောတဲ့ ပယောဂတွေကြောင့် ငွေတွေဝိုင်းထုတ်တဲ့အခါမှာတော့ ဘဏ်တွေမှာတန်းစီရမယ်။ ကန့်သတ်ချက်တွေ လုပ်ရမယ်ဆိုတာက ထုံးစံပဲ။ အဲ့ဒါဆိုရင် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးက ပိုက်ဆံထုတ်မယ့် သူတွေကို တစ်ပြိုင်နက်တည်းထုတ်ပေးမလားဆိုရင် မပေးနိုင်ဘူး။ ပေးစရာအကြောင်းလည်း မရှိဘူး။ မပေးလို့လည်းရတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီအတွက် သိန်းနှစ်ရာ၊သိန်းနှစ်ဆယ်ဆိုတာတွေ လုပ်ရတယ်။ ဘဏ်တစ်ခုဆိုတာ စည်းမဲ့ကမ်းမဲ့ လုပ်လို့မရဘူး။ ဒီဘဏ်စနစ်တစ်ခုကို ပျက်စီးအောင်လို့ လုပ်တယ်လို့ ယူဆလာပြီဆိုရင် ကန့်သတ်ချက်ကို လုပ်ပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိတယ်။အဲ့ဒီအတွက် ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ကန့်သတ်တာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။ဒုဥက္ကဋ္ဌပြောတဲ့သဘောက ဘဏ်တွေမှာ ပြည်သူလူထုက ‌‌ငွေအပ်တယ်ဆိုရင် အဲ့ဒီအပ်တဲ့ငွေကို သူထုတ်မယ့် အချိန်မှာ ရချင်မှရမယ်ဆိုတဲ့သဘောလား။ ဘယ်လိုမျိုးပါလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ ပုံမှန်အခြေအနေဆိုရင် ကိုယ်အပ်တဲ့ငွေကို ကိုယ်ကြိုက်သလောက်ထုတ်လို့ရတယ်။ အခုမေးနေတဲ့ ဘီဘီစီက လူဟာလည်း ဘဏ်မှာငွေအပ်ဖူးမှာပါ။ ဘဏ်စာရင်းရှိမှာပါ။ အဲ့တော့ ကြိုက်တဲ့ အချိန်မှာ ထုတ်လို့ရခဲ့တာချည်းပါပဲ။ မရဘူးဆိုတာမရှိပါဘူး။ ခုနပြောတဲ့သဘောက လူတစ်ရာအပ်ထားရင် တစ်ပြိုင်နက် လူတစ်ရာလုံးက အကုန် ထုတ်ရင် မရဘူးဆိုတဲ့ သဘောတရားကို ရှင်းပြတာပါ။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ ၂၆ ဘဏ်ရှိတယ်။ ဒီလူဦးရေကလည်း ဒီအတိုင်းပဲ။စီးပွားရေးကလည်း ဒီစီးပွားရေးပဲ။ အပ်တဲ့လူက လာအပ်တယ် ထုတ်တဲ့လူက ထုတ်တယ်။တစ်ချို့ဆိုရင် တစ်ဘီလျံ၊ နှစ်ဘီလျံ ကိုယ့်ငွေကိုယ်ထုတ်တယ်။ လိုတဲ့နေရာသုံးတယ်။ ပိုတဲ့လူကပြန်အပ်တယ်။ ဒီ circulation က သူ့ဟာသူသွားနေတာ။ အခုဟာက ပယောဂပါတဲ့အချိန်မှာ အကုန်ထုတ်မယ်ဆိုပြီး ပြဿနာဖြစ်လာတာ။ ပယောဂပါတဲ့ အခုလိုအချိန်မျိုးမှာ ကိုယ်အပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေကို ခုလိုအခြေနေမျိုး ဘဏ်စနစ်ကိုမလိုအပ်ဘဲ ထိခိုက်မှုမဖြစ်အောင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရတဲ့ အခါကျရင်တော့ ဒီလိုကန့်သတ်ချက်ရှိမယ်။အဲ့ဒီကန့်သတ်ချက် မရှိတော့ဘူးဆိုတဲ့ အချိန်ကျရင်တော့ အရင်အတိုင်း ကြိုက်တဲ့အချိန်အပ် ကြိုက်တဲ့အချိန်ထုတ် ဒါဘဏ်ရဲ့သဘောတရားပဲ။ ဘဏ်ကလည်း အလကားနေရင်းနဲ့ မင်းအပ် မင်းထုတ်လုပ်တာမဟုတ်ဘူး။ တွက်ထားတယ်။ဒီလူက time deposit ထားတယ် ၃နှစ်လား ၁နှစ်လား ၂နှစ်လား တွက်ထားတယ်။ ဒီလူက ၃နှစ်နေမှ ထုတ်မှာ ဒီလူက ၂နှစ်နေမှထုတ်မှာ အဲ့ငွေကဘယ်လောက်ဆိုတာ စီမံခန့်ခွဲထားတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီစီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုကို မှုတည်ပြီးတော့မှ အမြဲတန်း မထုတ်နိုင်မဲ့ အရေအတွက်နဲ့ လာထုတ်တဲ့သူတွေအရေအတွက်ကို တွက်ပြီးမှလုပ်တဲ့အတွက်ကြောင့် လာအပ်သမျှလူတွေ ကြိုက်တဲ့အချိန်ထုတ်လို့ရတယ်။ ဒါကဘဏ်ရဲ့ သဘောတရားပဲ။

ဓာတ်ပုံ ရင်းမြစ်, CJ

ဓာတ်ပုံ ပုံစာ,

ATM စက်ရှေ့ ‌ငွေထုတ်ရန် တန်းစီနေကြစဥ်

ဘီဘီစီ ။ ။ ဒီအခြေအနေတော့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်အနေနဲ့ရှိတယ်။ ဘဏ်စည်းကမ်းအရလဲ ရှိတယ်ပေါ့။ဒါပေမဲ့ လောလောဆယ်မှာ ငွေအပ်ထားတဲ့သူတွေမှာလည်း စိုးရိမ်စိတ်တွေရှိကြတယ်။ စိုးရိမ်စိတ်တွေရှိလို့ ငွေထုတ်တဲ့ကိစ္စမှာ ကြိုးစားကြတာပေါ့။ တစ်ချို့ဘဏ်တွေဆိုရင် ဘဏ်တစ်မျိုးကို စနစ်တစ်မျိုးနဲ့ ငွေထုတ်ပေးနေတာတွေ့ရတယ်။ဥပမာ ဖုန်းဆယ်လုံးလောက်ပေးထားပြီး ဘွတ်ကင်ယူ တုံကင်တင်ပါ‌ပေါ့။ အဲ့ဆယ်လုံးကို ခေါ်လို့မရဘူး အခက်အခဲတွေဖြစ်တယ်။ တစ်ချို့ဘဏ်ကျပြန်တော့လည်း ည၁၂နာရီအချိန်မှာ အွန်လိုင်းတုံကင်ယူရတယ်။၁၂နာရီကျော်လို့ ငါးမိနစ် ဆယ်မိနစ်စွန်းရင်တောင် တုံကင်မရတော့တာမျိုးတွေဖြစ်ကုန်ကြတယ်။ အဲ့လိုအခြေအနေက လူထုကို ပုဂ္ဂလိကဘဏ်တွေအပေါ်မှာရော ဗဟိုဘဏ်တွေပေါ်မှာပါ လူထုက စိုးရိမ်စိတ်တွေတိုးပြီး ယုံကြည်မှုတွေပို မပျောက်စေဘူးလား။ အဲ့တော့ ဘဏ်တွေကို ဘယ်လိုထိန်းကျောင်းဖို့ရှိပါလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ မှန်ပါတယ်။ အခုပြောတဲ့အချက်တွေကို လက်ခံပါတယ်။ ပြည်သူလူထုဘက်က ဒါက အဆင်မပြေဘူး စိတ်ပူစရာဖြစ်တာပေါ့။ နံပါတ်တစ်ချက် ဗဟိုဘဏ်က အခုတာဝန်ရှိတဲ့သူတွေ ထွက်ပြောတယ်ဆိုတာက အစိုးရကိုဘက်ဂရောင်းထားပြီး ဗဟိုဘဏ်ကပြောတာက အပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေတွေ လုံးဝဆုံးရှုံးစရာမရှိဘူးဆို လုံးဝသေချာပေါက်ပြောတာပါ။ အဲ့ဒါတွေကို ပက်ဘလစ်က မယုံဘဲနဲ့ သွားထုတ်နေမယ်ဆိုရင်တော့လည်း အဲ့ဒုက္ခကို ကိုယ့်ဟာကို ခံရတဲ့သဘောလို့ ပြောရမှာပေါ့။ တကယ်လိုလို့ သွားထုတ်တဲ့လူလား သပ်သပ်လုပ်တဲ့လူလား ခွဲခြားရခက်တယ်။အဲ့တော့ CDM လုပ်တဲ့အချိန်မှာ ဘီလျံနဲ့ချီရှိတဲ့ငွေတွေကို ထုတ်ပြီး ဒီလူတွေကိုထောက်ပံ့ခဲ့တဲ့ ဖြစ်စဥ်တွေဖြစ်လာတဲ့ အတွက်ကြောင့် ဒီကိစ္စကို ဟန့်တားလိုက်ရတာလေ။ အဲ့တော့ တစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းတော့ ဒုက္ခရောက်မယ်။ ဘဏ်စနစ်ကြီး တစ်ခုမပျက်စီးဖို့ အတွက် လုပ်တဲ့အတွက်ကြောင့် အခုလို အခက်အခဲ ပြဿနာတွေရှိပါလိမ့်မယ်။ရှိတာကို အနည်းဆုံးလျော့ပါးအောင်လုပ်နေပြီ။ ဥပမာ အစောပိုင်းက အင်တာနက်ကွန်နက်ရှင်တွေ ပြတ်တောက်သွားတယ်။ အင်တာနက်ကွန်နက်ရှင်တွေ ကောင်းနေရင် ဘဏ်ကိုသွားစရာမလိုဘူး။ ဘွတ်ကင်ကလည်း ဖုန်းနဲ့လုပ်ရုံဘဲ။ မိုဘိုင်းဘဏ်စနစ်တွေ ရှိတယ်။ကေဘီဇက်ပေး စီဘီပေး မိုင်တဲလ် ဝေ့ဗ်မန်းနီး စသည်ဖြင့် အဲ့ဒီဟာတွေကနေ ထုတ်လို့ရနေတဲ့အချိန် အကြောင်းအမျိုးမျိုးနဲ့ အင်တာနက်ကွန်နရှင် ယာယီပြတ်တောက်သွားတယ်။ အဲ့ဒါတွေလည်း ဆက်စပ်သွားတာပေါ့။ လူထုအားလုံး ကိုပြောချင်တာက ပြတ်တောက်သွားတဲ့ Digital banking, Mobile Banking အားလုံးပြန်ရနေပြီ။ ဒါကတန်းစီရတာကို လျော့သွားအောင်လုပ်တာပါ။ အဲ့ဒါပထမအချက်။

ဒုတိယအချက်က ဘဏ်တွေရဲ့ အားနည်းချက်ရှိတာကိုလက်ခံတယ်။ဘဏ်တွေရဲ့ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုညံ့ဖျင်းတာလည်း သိတယ်။ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှု ညံ့ဖျင်းတဲ့ဘဏ်တွေ လိုအပ်တာမလုပ်တဲ့ ဘဏ်တွေကို မနေ့က ဒုတိယ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ဒေါ်သန်းသန်းဆွေက ဘဏ်အားလုံးကို အစည်းအဝေးခေါ်ပြီး လူထုယုံကြည်လာအောင် လုပ်နေတဲ့အပေါ် service ဝန်ဆောင်မှုတွေ ဆက်သွယ်မှုတွေ ကောင်းအောင် လုပ်ဖို့ပြောနေတယ်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘက်က အခက်အခဲကတော့ အခုအချိန်ထိ ဝန်ထမ်းက အပြည့်အစုံမရှိသေးဘူး။ အဲ့ဒီအပေါ်မူတည်ပြီး ရှိတဲ့ဝန်ထမ်းတွေနဲ့ လုပ်တဲ့အခါ အနည်းငယ်အခက်အခဲ ရှိတတ်ပါတယ်။ သို့သော် နဂို အခက်အခဲတွေဖြစ်တဲ့ မေးမြန်းတဲ့အချက်တွေမှာပါတဲ့ ဟာတွေကို အရင်တုန်းကအခြေအနေထက် အများကြီးလျော့ပါးအောင် အရင်တုန်းကထက် ပိုချောမွေ့အောင် လူထုယုံကြည်မှုကို ပြန်ရဖို့ တည်ဆောက် ဖို့ အတွက်လုပ်နေပါတယ်။ လုပ်တဲ့အချိန်မှာ အဓိကကတော့အပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေတွေ မဆုံးရှုံးဘူးဆိုတာ ယုံကြည်ဖို့လိုပါတယ်။ အဲ့ဒါအဓိကအချက်ပါပဲ။

မေး။ ။ ဘဏ်တွေဘက်ကပြောတယ်။ အပ်ငွေတွေရဲ့ reserve money ကို ဗဟိုဘဏ်မှာထားတယ်ပေါ့။ ဗဟိုဘဏ်က အကန့်အသတ်နဲ့ထုတ်ပေးနေလို့ သူတို့ကလည်းအကန့်အသတ်နဲ့ထုတ်ပေးနေရတယ်ပေါ့။ ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ၅သိန်းသတ်မှတ်ရင်တောင် သူတို့က၂သိန်းတို့ ၃သိန်းတို့ထုတ်ပေးတဲ့အနေအထားရှိတယ်။ ဆိုတော့ အခု ဒုဥက္ကဋ္ဌက ဗဟိုဘဏ်က လုံးဝအာမခံတယ်လို့ပြောနေတာဆိုတော့ အပြန်အလှန်တ စ်ဖက်နဲ့တ စ်ဖက်ပြောနေသလိုဖြစ်နေတော့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ဘဏ်တွေကို reserve moneyတွေပြန်ထုတ်ပေးတဲ့အခါမှာ အကန့်အသတ်နဲ့ ပြန်ထုတ်ပေးတာမျိုးရှိနေပါသလား။

ဖြေ။ ။ ထိုက်သင့်တဲ့ ကန့်သတ်မှုရှိပါတယ်။ ဘာကြောင့်လဲဆိုတော့ ဘဏ်တွေက စည်းကမ်းတကျနဲ့မလုပ်ဘဲ သတ်မှတ်ချက်ကိုကျော်လွန်ပြီးတော့ ထုတ်ပေးနေတဲ့ ဘဏ်တွေရှိတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီဘဏ်တွေကို အရေးယူဖို့လုပ်နေပါတယ်။ သိန်းနှစ်ရာလောက်ပဲထုတ်နေရတဲ့ လူထုရဲ့ မျက်နှာကို မထောက်ပဲနဲ့ နှစ်ထောင် သုံးထောင်ထုတ်ပေးနေတဲ့ ဘဏ်တွေရှိတယ်။ ဒါအမှန်ပဲ။ အဲ့ဘဏ်တွေ ကျွန်တော်တို့ အခုအရေးယူဖို့ လုပ်နေပါတယ်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့မှာ အဲ့ဒီ ပြဿနာပါ။ ဘဏ်တွေကိုယ်တိုင်က ကိုယ်ကျိုးစီးပွားရေးကို မကြည့်ဖို့ နိုင်ငံအကျိုးစီးပွားကိုကြည့်ဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းထားတယ်။ မနေ့ကအစည်းအဝေးက အဓိက အဲ့ဒါကိုခေါ်ပြောတာဖြစ်တယ်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘက် ချို့ယွင်းချက် လိုချက်တွေဟာအခြေအနေအကြောင်းကြောင်းကြောင့် ဖြစ်တယ်ဆိုတာ လူထုကလည်း နားလည်ပေးဖို့တောင်းပန်လိုပါတယ်။ အစိုးရဘက်ကကော ဗဟိုဘဏ်ဘက်ကကော အကောင်းဆုံးဖြစ်အောင်လုပ်ပါမယ်။ တစ်ခုပြောချင်တာက ယုံကြည်မှုကိုပျက်စေတဲ့ အကြောင်းတရားတွေကို မူတည်ပြီးတော့ အဲ့လိုဝိုင်းလုပ်မှသာ ဘဏ်စနစ်တို့ ငွေရေးကြေးရေးစနစ်တို့ ပျက်စီးသွားမှာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဟိုနေ့က ဖေ့စ်ဘွတ်ခ်မှာတွေ့ပါတယ်။ ကိုယ့်ငွေကိုယ်ထုတ်တာ ဘာလို့ထုတ်လို့မရရမှာလဲ။ ပြည်သူငွေထုတ်လို့ ဘဏ်ပြိုကွဲသွားမယ်။ဒါကအဓိပ္ပါယ်မရှိဘူးလို့ ပြောတယ်။ ရိုးရိုးလေးပဲ စဥ်းစားပါ။ ဘဏ်ရဲ့သဘောတရားက လူတစ်ရာငွေအပ်ထားတာ တစ်ရာလုံးကရအောင်ထုတ်ရင်တော့ အဲ့ဒီဘဏ်မှာပေးစရာမရှိရင် ပြဿနာဖြစ်မှာပဲ။

အဲတော့ မလိုအပ်ဘဲ ‌‌ငွေထုတ်တဲ့ကိစ္စက ပျက်စီးအောင်လုပ်တာပဲ။ ငါ့ပိုက်ဆံ ငါထုတ်တာပဲဆိုတဲ့ အတွေးအခေါ်အစား ဝိုင်းဝန်းဆောင်ရွက်စေချင်တာပါ။ ဒီအပေါ်မှာတော့ ခြုံပြောတာပါ။ negative အဆိုးမြင်သမားနဲ့ positive အကောင်းမြင်သမားဆိုတာရှိပါတယ်။ အခု ကျွန်တော်ပြောတာက negativeသမားကိုပြောတာပါ။ positive အခု လုပ်တာရှိတယ်။ မေလ ၃ ရက်နေ့ကစပြီး အကောင့် အပ်လာတာ ဘီလျံဆယ်ဂဏန်းပဲ။ တစ်ရက်ထဲမှာ နှစ်ဆယ် သုံးဆယ် လာအပ်လာတယ်။ ရှေ့လာမယ့်အပတ်မှာ ဝင်လာလိမ့်မယ်လို့ ထင်တယ်။ဘာကြောင့်လဲဆိုတော့ သူတို့က သိန်းနှစ်ရာကန့်သတ်ချက်နဲ့ ထုတ်မရမှာစိုးလို့ မအပ်တာ။ ဒီလူတွေကိုနားလည်အောင်ပြောရတယ်။ အဲ့အတွက် သူတို့ကို စာရင်းအသစ်ဖွင့်ပါလို့ပြောပြီး အပ်ခိုင်းတယ်။ အပ်ခိုင်းတဲ့အတွက်ကြောင့် ဘဏ်ဆိုတဲ့သဘောက ဘယ်တုန်းကမှာ သူတို့အပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေကို ဗဟိုဘဏ်ကို လာထုတ်တယ်ဆိုတာမရှိဘူး။ သူအပ်တဲ့ငွေ သူထုတ်တဲ့ငွေကို လည်ပတ်ရတာ ဘဏ်စီးပွားရေးလုပ်ငန်းရဲ့ Basic principle အခြေခံသဘောထားပဲ။ Basic Principle အောက်ပြီးတော့ သူတို့ကိုယ်တိုင်က ကြိုးစားအားထုတ်မှုမရှိဘူး။ ကိုယ့် customerမှာကို ယုံကြည်မှုမလုပ်ဘူး၊ အဲ့ဒီငွေကိုရအောင် မတောင်းခံဘူးဆိုတဲ့ အားနည်းချက်တွေ ကိုယ့်ကိုယ်ကိုယ် အားထုတ်အောင်လို့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ကတောင်းသလောက်မပေးဘူး။အဲ့ဒါအမှန်ပဲ။နိုင်ငံရေးအခြေအနေအရ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘက် ချို့ယွင်းမှုတွေရှိပါတယ်။ ဘဏ်တွေရဲ့ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘက်က ကြပ်မတ်မှုတွေအားနည်းပါတယ်။ ဝန်ထမ်းအားနည်းမှုလည်း ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘက်မှာရှိပါတယ်။အဲ့အတွက် ကျွန်တော်တို့ အစွမ်းကုန်လုပ်နေတယ်။ အခုတစ်ဖြည်းဖြည်းနဲ့ အများကြီး ပုံမှန်အခြေနေရောက်လာပါပြီ။ ပုံမှန်အခြေအနေကနေ very quick response နဲ့ Healthy Economy သွားဖို့ဟာ အလကားနေအိမ်ထဲထားပြီးတော့ စိတ်လည်းမချဘူး။မီးခံသေတ္တာလည်းမဆန့်ဘူး။ ကုတင်အောက်မှာ ဆာလာအိတ်နဲ့ ထည့်ထားတယ်ဆိုရင် လုံခြုံမှုလည်း ဘဏ်စနစ်ကိုလည်းကျောခိုင်းရာ ရောက်တယ်။တစ်ခုခုဖြစ်သွားရင် သူ့အတွက်လည်းမသေချာဘူး။ ကျွန်တော်က အဲ့လူတွေကို ငွေထည့်ခိုင်းတယ်။ အဲလိုငွေထည့် ဘဏ်စနစ်က သူ့ဟာသူလည်ပတ်သွားမှာပေါ့။ လိုတဲ့လူကသွားထုတ် ပိုတဲ့သူကအပ်ပေါ့။ လိုအပ်တဲ့သူကထုတ်ပြီး ပိုတဲ့သူကအပ်တဲ့ Banking circulation ဘဏ်ငွေကြေး လည်ပတ်မှု ၊ Banking Business ဘဏ်စီးပွားရေးစနစ်ကို ပြန်လည်ပတ်စေချင်လို့ အခုလိုက်ကြပ်မတ်နေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

ဓာတ်ပုံ ရင်းမြစ်, MPA

ဘီဘီစီ ။ ။ CDM ကြောင့် ငွေတွေကို ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ကန့်သတ်တယ်ဆိုတာခုနတုန်းက ပြောသွားတာရှိတယ်။ CDM တွေကို ထောက်ပံ့တယ်လို့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်အနေနဲ့ယူဆလို့ အဲလိုကန့်သတ်မှုတွေလုပ်တာလား။

ဖြေ။ ။ ယူဆတာမဟုတ်ဘူး။ အခြေခံအချက်အလက်တွေ၊အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုတွေနဲ့ ဘဏ်တွေမှာထုတ်သွားတဲ့ ငွေပမာဏကိုကြည့်ပြီးတော့ ကန့်သတ်တာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ဗဟိုဘဏ်အနေနဲ့ ထင်ကြေးနဲ့လုပ်တာ မဟုတ်ပါဘူး။နိုင်ငံတော်အဆင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်တာကြောင့် အချက်အလက် ကိန်းဂဏန်း ဒေတာတွေနဲ့ လုပ်တာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ ဘယ်ဘဏ်တစ်ခုနေ့တိုင်း ဘယ်လောက်ထုတ်တယ်ဆိုတာ Daily Report ရှိတယ်။ Daily Reportအရ Financial Sector ကို အနှောင့်အယှက်အဟန့်အတားဖြစ်မယ့် အခြေအနေမျိုးဖန်တီးလို့ ကန့်သတ်တာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။

မေး။ ။ ပထမပိုင်းကတော့ CDM လုပ်တဲ့အတွက် CDM ကနေတ စ်ဆင့် ဘဏ်တွေကနေ ပိတ်တယ်။ ပိတ်တော့ ငွေကြေးအပေါ်မယုံကြည်မှုကနေ ဒီလိုပြဿနာမျိုးဖြစ်လာတယ်ပေါ့နော်။ ATM တွေကို ကော အရင်လိုငွေတွေဖြည့်ပေးရင် မရဘူးလား။

ဖြေ။ ။ ATM ကို ဖြည့်ပေးလို့လည်း တန်းစီထုတ်တဲ့လူတွေ ရှိတာပေါ့။

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။ အရင်တုန်းကဆို ကျွန်မလက်ထဲမှာ ငွေငါးထောင်ထဲရှိတယ်ဆိုရင်တောင် ပြေးပြီးသွားမထုတ်ဘူး။ လမ်းကြုံမှထုတ်မယ်ပေါ့။ အဲ့လောက်ထိဘဏ်တွေကို လူထုကယုံကြည်ခဲ့သလို ကျွန်မတို့ကိုယ်တိုင်လည်းယုံကြည်ခဲ့တယ်။ ကြိုက်တဲ့ATM ကို ကြိုက်တဲ့အကြိမ်ထုတ်လို့ရတယ်ဆိုတဲ့ အခြေအနေကနေ အခုတော့ဒီATM မှာဘဲပိုက်ဆံရမယ် ဟိုATM မှာမရတော့ဘူးဆိုတာမျိုး သိန်းရှစ်ရာထည့်တဲ့စက်ကို သိန်းသုံးရာပဲထည့်တော့တယ်ဆိုတာမျိုးတွေ လူထုကလဲကြားတယ်။သူတို့ကိုယ်တိုင်က လူထုကို ကြေငြာတယ်ဆိုတော့ ဘဏ်ပေါ်မှာမယုံကြည်တာကနေ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ထိသက်ရောက်သွားပြီ။ ATM တွေမှာ ငွေတွေကို ပြန်ထည့်ဖို့နဲ့ လည်ပတ်မှု ပုံမှန်ပြန်ဖြစ်ဖို့ကိုလည်း ဘယ်လိုလုပ်ဖို့ရှိပါသလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ အဲ့ဒါအတွက်လည်း စီစဥ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေပါတယ်။ ATM စက်တန်းစီရတာနဲ့ ဘဏ်တန်းစီရတာတူတူပါပဲ။ တန်းစီတဲ့အခါမှာ နေရာလုပြီး နေရာရောင်းပြီး တန်းစီတာတွေရှိပါတယ်။ နောက်တစ်ခါ အလီလီပေါ့နော် ကဒ်တွေအားလုံးကို တစ်ယောက်တစ်လှည့် ထုတ်မယ်ဆိုပြီးတော့ ခုနပြောတဲ့ မလိုဘဲနဲ့ ATM ထုတ်လို့မရအောင် အနှောင့်အယှက်တွေရှိပါတယ်။ မည်သို့ပင်ဆိုစေ ခုနမေးတဲ့ မေးခွန်းအပေါ်မှာ အဆင်ပြေအောင်ဆောင်ရွက်ဖို့ စီစဥ်ထားပါတယ်။

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။ ကျွန်မဆက်ပြီးမေးချင်တာက ငွေကြေးက ဘဏ်တွေကသာငွေထုတ်လို့မရတာ။ ပြင်ပစျေးကွက်မှာတော့ ငွေတစ်သိန်းဘယ်လောက်ရာခိုင်နှူန်း၊။ အရင်တုန်းကဆို ၄ရာခိုင်နှူန်း၊အခုဆို၅ရာခိုင်နှူန်းကနေ ၆.၅ထိတောင်ဖြစ်လာတယ်။ လူထုကငွေကို အသည်းအသန်လိုချင်တော့ လိုက်လဲနေတဲ့အခါမှာ ဒီလိုစျေးကွက်ကြီးက ဖြစ်လာတဲ့ အခါကျတော့ အဲ့ဒီစျေးကွက်ကို ထိန်းချုပ်ပြီး ဘဏ်စနစ်ကိုပိုကောင်းလာအောင်လုပ်ဖို့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်မှာဘယ်လို အစီအစဥ်တွေရှိပါသလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ပြည်ထဲရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနနဲ့ ပူးပေါင်းပြီး ဒီလူတွေကို အရေးယူဖို့လုပ်နေပါတယ်။ စာရင်းလည်းကျွန်တော်တို့မှာရှိနေပါတယ်။ သို့သော် တိုင်းပြည်တစ်ခုမှာ စနစ်တစ်ခု ကူးပြောင်းတဲ့အခါမှာ လူထုက မလိုအပ်တဲ့ပယောဂတွေကြောင့် အစိုးရပေါ်မှာ နည်းပေါင်းစုံနဲ့ တိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွေလုပ်တယ်။ မီဒီယာတွေမှာလည်း အစိုးရကို ဝန်ထမ်းတွေကို လုပ်နေတဲ့အချိန်မှာလည်း မလိုအပ်ဘဲ ပြည်သူလူထုကို အရေးယူတဲ့ အစီမစဥ်မလုပ်ချင်လို့ ဒီကိစ္စတွေကိုလွှတ်ထားပြီး သာမန်သတိပေးနေတာဖြစ်ပါတယ်။ သာမန်သတိပေးနေရာကနေပြီး အခုတော့ ဒါကိုအလေးမမှုတဲ့အတွက်ကြောင့် ကျွန်တော်တို့ အရေးယူပါမယ်။ ရှေ့အပတ်ထဲက စမယ်။ ကျွန်တော့်တို့မှာ စာရင်းရှိပြီးသားပါ။ လက်ဝယ်မှာ ငွေသားတွေအများကြီး ပိုက်ထားပြီးတော့ လုပ်နေတဲ့သူတွေဟာ ဒါလုပ်နေတဲ့သူတွေပဲ။သူ့တို့ ရင်ဆိုင်ရမယ့်အမှုက ကြီးပါတယ်။ ဥပဒေနဲ့ မညီဘဲနဲ့ ဒီငွေကို ရာခိုင်နှူန်းနဲ့ ရောင်းစားတာတစ်မှု၊ ဘဏ်စနစ်ကို ယုံကြည်ပျက်ယွင်းအောင်လုပ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံတော်စီးပွားရေးကို ထိခိုက်ပျက်စီးအောင် လုပ်တဲ့အမှု၊အမှု တော်တော်ကြီးပါတယ်။တစ်ချို့ကလည်း ကြီးမှန်းမသိဘူး။ ကျွန်တော့်မှာရှိတဲ့ သိန်းတစ်သောင်းကို သွားအပ်မယ်။ အပ်ရင် အရင်ကန့်သတ်ချက်အရ တစ်ခါထုတ်ရင် သိန်း နှစ်ရာပဲ ထုတ်လို့ရပါတယ်။အဲ့တော့ သူကမအပ်ဘဲ သိမ်းထားမိတယ်။သိမ်းထားမိတော့ နောက်တစ်ယောက်က ပိုက်ဆံလိုတယ် သူကပဲ နှစ်ရာပဲ ထုတ်လို့ရတယ်ဆိုတော့ တစ်ယောက်နဲ့တစ်ယောက် အကူအညီတောင်းတော့ ငါ့အကောင့်ထဲကို တစ်ထောင်ထည့်လိုက်ပါ။အပြင်မှာ သူ့ကိုသိန်းတစ်ထောင်ပေးလိုက်တယ်။ ဒါပေမဲ့ နောက်တစ်ဆင့်တက်လာတာကတော့ ရာခိုင်နှူန်းပေးပါဖြစ်သွားတာ။ အဲ့ဒါကို ကျွန်တော်ကနားလည်တယ်။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ဘက်က သိန်းနှစ်ရာခန့် သတ်ချက်ပေါ်မူတည်ပြီး သူဖြစ်သွားတာဆိုပြီးတော့ ဒါကိုကျွန်တော်တို့က အ‌ရေးမယူသေးဘူး။ အခုကျွန်တော်တို့က စာရင်းသစ်ဖွင့်ခွင့်ပေးလိုက်ပြီ။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ပိုက်ဆံအများကြီး သွားထည့်ပြီး နှစ်ရာပဲရမှာမို့လို့ ဒီလိုအိမ်မှာသိမ်းပြီးလုပ်လိုက်တာပါဆိုတဲ့ complain ကို လုံးဝလက်မခံဘူး။ အိမ်မှာ အထုပ်အထည်လိုက်ထားတာနဲ့ကိုပဲ နိုင်ငံတော်စီးပွားရေးတည်ငြီမ်မှုကို ပျက်စီးအောင်လုပ်တဲ့ အမှုနဲ့ညှိပြီ။ အဲ့ဒါကြောင့် အခုအကောင့်သစ် ၃ရက်နေ့က ဖွင့်ပေးလိုက်ပြီ။အကောင့်ဟောင်းထဲမှာလည်း ထည့်လို့ရတယ်။ ချက်ခြင်းမလုပ်ဘူး။ တစ်ပတ်စောင့်တယ်။အခုမေးတဲ့ မေးခွန်းနဲ့ အတော်ပါပဲ လာမယ့်သီတင်းပတ်ထဲမှာ ငွေတွေလာအပ်ကြမယ်လို့ ယုံကြည်မျှော်လင့် တယ်။ ဘာကြောင့်လဲဆိုတော့ ကျွန်တော်တို့နဲ့တူတူ ပူးပေါင်းမယ်လို့ ယုံကြည်လို့။ မပူးပေါင်းရင် ဥပဒေအရ အရေးယူခံရမယ်။

ဓာတ်ပုံ ရင်းမြစ်, MPA

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။အရေးယူဖို့ဆိုပေမဲ့လည်း လူထုကလဲ လတ်တလော ကိုယ့်လက်ထဲ ငွေရောက်ဖို့အရေးကြီးနေတဲ့ကိစ္စတွေရှိနေတဲ့အတွက် ပြေလည်အောင်လုပ်ဖို့ အရေးယူတာတင်မဟုတ်ဘဲ ဘဏ်စနစ်ကိုကောင်းအောင်လုပ်ပေးဖို့ အ‌ရေးကြီးတယ်လို့ထင်တယ်။

ဖြေ။ ။ စနစ်ကိုလဲ ကောင်းအောင်လုပ်မယ်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာလဲ အရေးယူမှုကိုလဲ တူတူလုပ်မှာ။ ရှေ့မှာမေးတဲ့ မေးခွန်းတွေမှာ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ဘာလုပ်နေလဲဆိုတာတွေမေးတာရှိတော့ တစ်ချို့ကိစ္စတွေက ကိုယ့်ကိစ္စကိုယ်လုပ်နေတယ်။ လုပ်နေတဲ့အပိုင်းတွေမှာ လူထုဝင်ဆောင်မှုအခက်အခဲတွေ ပြေလည်အောင်၊ ATM တွေမှာ ငွေမပြတ်အောင်လုပ်နေတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီအချိန် မှာ ငွေမလိုဘဲနဲ့ ATM တွေမှာ တန်းစီနေတဲ့သူတွေ ပျောက်အောင်၊ ဘဏ်စနစ် ပုံမှန်လုပ်ငန်းစဥ်အရ ဘဏ်ကိုအပ်ရမယ့်ဟာကို မအပ်ဘဲနဲ့ ကိုယ့်လက်ထဲမှာထားပြီး စီးပွားရေးလုပ်တဲ့သူ‌တွေ ပပျောက်အောင် အားလုံး တစ်ပြိုင်နက်တည်းလုပ်မှာပါ။ တစ်ပြိုင်နက်တည်း ဟန်ချက်ညီညီလုပ်သွားမှာပါ။

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။ အကောင့်သစ်ဖွင့်တဲ့ ကိစ္စပေါ့နော်။အကောင့်သစ်ဖွင့်ရင် အတိုးနှုန်းပိုပေးပြီး ဆွဲဆောင်တာတွေလည်းရှိတယ်။အဲဒီအချိန်မှာ လူထုက တ စ်ဖက်ကနေပြန်စဥ်းစားတာကဗဟိုဘဏ်မှာငွေကြေးလုံလောက်မှုမရှိလို့ တ စ်ဖက်ကနေ အကောင့်အသစ်တွေဖွင့်ပြီး ‌‌ငွေတွေပြန်အပ်အောင်လုပ်တာလားဆိုတဲ့ ဒွိဟဖြစ်မှုတွေဖြစ်လာပြန်တယ်။ အဲ့ဒီပေါ်မှာရော အာမခံချက်တွေဘယ်လိုပေးနိုင်လဲ။ အာမခံချက်နိုင်မယ့် အချက်တွေကဘာတွေလဲ။ ဘာအစီအစဥ်တွေလုပ်ထားလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ အာမခံဆိုတာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာဘဏ်တွေက ဗဟိုဘဏ်ကိုလွှဲချချင်ရင် သူတို့ပိုက်ဆံတွေဗဟိုဘဏ်မှာရှိတယ်ပြောတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီအတွက်ပြည်သူလူထုက ငွေအပ်ထားတာကို သူများကိုပြန်ချေးတာရှိတယ်။ ပြန်ချေးထားတဲ့ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုတွေ အက်ဆက်တွေကလည်းလက်ထဲမှာရှိတယ်။ ငွေတွေ ပစ္စည်းတွေကရှိပြီးသား။ ဘဏ်တွေရဲ့ တာဝန်က ဥပဒေမှာကိုက အပ်နှံထားတဲ့သူတွေကို ပြန်လည်ပေးအပ်ရမယ်ဆိုတာ ဥပဒေမှာရှိပြီးသား။ ဥပဒေအရ ဘဏ်တွေ Balance ကဗဟိုဘဏ်မှာရှိတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီ Balance အရဘဏ်တွေက တစ်ဖက်ကိုထုတ်ချေးထားတယ်။ အဲ့ဒီလူတွေပေးထားတဲ့ အက်ဆက်တွေ အာမခံတွေအရကောငွေတွေရော ပစ္စည်းတွေပါရှိတဲ့အတွက် ဘာမှဆုံးရှုံးစရာမရှိဘူး။ သို့သော် စီးပွား‌‌ရေး စနစ်တစ်ခုတိုက်ခိုက်တာမျိုးဖြစ်လာရင်တော့ ကိုယ့်ငွေကိုယ်ပြန်ထုတ်ဖို့ တစ်လုံးတစ်ခဲတည်းမရနိုင်ဘူး။ အလီလီဖြစ်သွားနိုင်တယ်။ သူတို့စိုးရိမ်သလို ဘဏ်စနစ်ကြီးတစ်ခုခုဖြစ်သွားခဲ့ရင်ပေါ့။ ဖြစ်သွားခဲ့ရင် မဆုံးဆုံးဘူး။ အလီလီပဲပြန်ရမယ်။ တစ်လနဲ့ရမယ့်ဟာကို ၆လကြာရင်ကြာသွားနိုင်တယ်။ ဘဏ်ရဲ့သဘောသဘာဝ စနစ်ကိုကွပ်ကဲတဲ့ ဗဟိုဘဏ်က ဘဏ်အပ်ထားတဲ့ငွေတွေဆုံးရှုံးစရာမရှိဘူးလို့ ပြောတာကြောင့် အလကားနေရင် ဆုံးရှုံးသွားစရာအကြောင်းမရှိဘူး။နားမလည်တဲ့သူတွေက မျိုးစုံဝေဖန်တယ်။သမိုင်းကိုပြန်ကြည့်လိုက် အာရှဓနဘဏ်တို့ ဘာတို့ပျက်တယ်။ ဘဏ်တွေ ရုပ်သိမ်းလိုက်တယ်။ အမှုဖြစ်တယ် ဘဏ်တွေ ပိတ်သွားတယ်။ ဆုံရှုံးသွားတဲ့လူ‌ ဘယ်သူရှိလဲ။ ကိုယ့်ငွေ အရစ်ကျပြန်ရတာလွဲလို့ ဆုံးရှုံးသွားတာမရှိဘူး။ အဲ့လို ဘဏ်ပျက်သွားလောက်အောင် ဆိုးစရာမရှိဘူးလို့ပြောတာ။ ဘဏ်ကလည်း ပျက်စရာရှိဘူး။

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။အခုဆို ဒေါ်လာလဲလှယ်နှုန်းက အရမ်းမြင့်တက်နေပြီးတော့ မြန်မာကျပ်ငွေတန်ဖိုးကျနေတယ်။ပြီးတော့‌ရွှေစျေးက စံချိန်တင်မြင့်တက်နေပြီး လောင်စာဆီးစျေးနှုန်းတွေကမြင့်တက်နေတယ်ဆိုတော့။ ကျပ်ငွေတန်ဖိုးကျဆင်းမှုနဲ့ ငွေကြေးဖောင်းပွမှုတွေကို ဘယ်လိုထိန်းချုပ်ဖို့ရှိပါသလဲ။

ဒေါ်လာစျေးတက်နေတယ်ဆိုတာမှာ လူတွေအော်နေတာ နှစ်ပိုင်းရှိတယ်။ ဒေါ်လာစျေးတက်နေတာ inflation မဆိုင်ဘူး။ အီကော်နော်မီနဲ့လည်း indirect တစ်ဆင့်ပတ်သက်တယ်။တိုက်ရိုက်မပတ်သက်ဘူး။ အခုတက်နေတဲ့စျေးက ရွက်စိမ်းလို့ ခေါ်တဲ့ cash ငွေသားစျေး ပေါ့။ အရွက်စျေးဖြစ်ပါတယ်၊ တစ်ထောင့်ခြောက်ရာ ဖြစ်သွားတာ။ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ကသတ်မှတ်ထားတဲ့ အင်ပို့ အိတ်စ်ပိုလုပ်နေတဲ့ စျေးက ၁၅၆၀ ပဲရှိပါတယ်။သွင်းကုန် ထုတ်ကုန်လုပ်နေတဲ့စျေးက အရင်ပုံစံအတိုင်း အရမ်းတက်တာ မရှိပါဘူး။ဒီ မေးခွန်းလေးကိုဖြေရတာကောင်းပါတယ်။ဘာလို့လဲဆိုတော့ ခုနပြောတဲ့သူတွေက ငွေမအပ်ဘဲ ဒေါ်လာတွေဝယ်တယ်။ ကိုယ့်ငွေကိုယ်အပ်ထားပြီး ပြမရမှာစိုးလို့ အိမ်မှာ သိမ်းတယ်။ဒေါ်လာသိမ်းရတာနဲ့ ကျပ်သိမ်းရတာ ဒေါ်လာသိမ်းရတယ်လွယ်တယ်ဆိုပြီး ဒေါ်လာတွေဝယ်တယ်။ဝယ်လိုအားများ‌တော့ စျေးတက်တာပေါ့။နိုင်ငံမှာ ယူအက်စ်ဒေါ်လာ တစ်သောင်းအထိပဲ ကိုင်ခွင့်ရှိတယ်။ နိုင်ငံခြားသုံးငွေစီမံဥပဒေအရ အရေးယူတဲ့ထဲပါသွားဦးမှာ။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ အဲ့ဒါတွေမလုပ်ဘူး။ ပြည်သူလူထုက ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ကြဖို့ပဲပြောနေတာ။ကျွန်တော်တို့က ဒေါ်လာရောင်းပေးတယ်။ တစ်ခါ‌ရောင်းရင် ဒေါ်လာ ၆ သန်း ၁၀ သန်းစသည်ဖြင့်။ အခုစျေးတက်နေတဲ့ အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာက cashပါ။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ ကုန်သွယ်ရေးလုပ်နေတဲ့ အကောင့်ထရန်စဖာနဲ့ ဟွန်ဒီတို့နဲ့ လုပ်နေတဲ့စျေး ၁၅၆၀ ပါ။

ဘီဘီစီ ။ ။လိုအပ်ချက်အရ ငွေတွေထုတ်ရိုက်နေတယ်ဆိုပြီး ပြောကြတဲ့ အပေါ်မှာရော ဗဟိုဘဏ်အနေနဲ့ ဘယ်လိုတုံ့ပြန်ချင်ပါသလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ဆိုတာတော့ ငွေကို ရိုက်ချင်သလို ရိုက်နေတာမဟုတ်ဘူး။တွက်ချက်ပြီးတော့မှ GDP နဲ့ ပါတွက်ချက်လုပ်တာပါ။ တွက်ချက်တဲ့ဌာနတွေရှိတယ်။အဲ့ဒီကနေပြီး ကိုယ့်ရဲ့ အင်ဖလေးရှင်းက ဘယ်လောက်ရှိတယ်။ လည်ပတ်ငွေကဘယ်လောက်ရှိတယ်။ ဒါတွေပေါ်မူတည်ပြီးတော့ပဲ ရိုက်တာ ရှိပါတယ်။ လက်ရှိအခြေအနေမှာ သပ်သပ်ငွေရိုက်ထုတ်တာ မရှိပါဘူး။ပုံမှန် ရိုက်နေတဲ့အတိုင်းပဲ လုပ်နေတယ်။ တကယ်လို့ ပုံမှန်ရိုက်ထုတ်တဲ့အတိုင်း‌‌ငွေတွေ ပိုရိုက်ထုတ်မယ်ဆိုရင် ဘဏ်တွေမှာ ငွေလာအပ်ဖို့ မလိုအပ်ဘဲ ထုတ်ဖို့ဆိုတာကို ပြောစရာမရှိဘူး။ ဆေးမြီးတိုနဲ့ကုသလို ရိုက်ထုတ်တဲ့စနစ်ကို မလုပ်ချင်လို့ ဒီအီကော်နော်မီထဲ လည်ပတ်နေပြီးသား စီအိုင်စီ ငွေတွေကို ဘဏ်ထဲကိုပြန်လာစေချင်တာ။ ကျွန်တော်တို့ အဓိကလုပ်နေတာ အဲ့ဒါပါ။ ရိုက်ထုတ်လိုက်ရင်ပြီးတာပဲလို့ ပြောလို့လွယ်ပေမဲ့ လိုအပ်ရင်လုပ်မှာပေါ့။ မလိုအပ်လို့ မလုပ်သေးဘူးလေ။ကျွန်တော်ပြောတဲ့ စကားလေးတစ်ခုရှိတယ်။ ဘဏ်က ၂၆ဘဏ်ပဲရှိတာ လူဦးရေကလည်း ဒီအတိုင်းပဲ ပြောင်းမသွားဘူး နိုင်ငံကလည်း ဒီနိုင်ငံပဲ။ အဲ့ဒါကြောင့် ပယောဂကြောင့် ငွေတွေက အပြင်ကိုရောက်ပြီး ဘဏ်ထဲကို မရောက်တာအတွက် ဘဏ်တွေရောက်ဖို့ တွန်းအားပေးတာကို ဗဟိုဘဏ်မှာ‌ ပိုက်ဆံမရှိဘူးလို့ မက်ဆေ့ချ်ပေးတာကိုက အီကော်နော်မီ ပျက်စီးဖို့ တွန်းအားပေးတဲ့လုပ်ရပ်လို့ သုံးသပ်ပါတယ်။

ဘီဘီစီ။ ။ခုနဖြေသွားတာတွေထဲမှာ ဗဟိုဘဏ်ရဲ့လုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တွေ ဘဏ်တွေကိုထိန်းချုပ်မ ယ့် အကြောင်းတွေ တော်တော်ပြည့်ပြည့်စုံစုံပါပါတယ်။ဒါတွေက ဖေဖော်ဝါရီ၁ ရက်နေ့ကမှ စဖြစ်လာတဲ့ကိစ္စတွေဆိုတော့ လက်ရှိနိုင်ငံရေးအခြေအနေပေါ်မှာ မယုံကြည်မှုတွေကနေ ဘဏ်စနစ်ကိုထိခိုက်တယ်လို့ သုံးသပ်ကြ တာရှိပါတယ်။ ဘဏ်စနစ်နဲ့နိုင်ငံရေးအခြေအနေပေါ်မှာရောဘယ်လိုသုံးသပ်ပြောကြားချင်ပါသလဲ။

ဖြေ။ ။ ဘယ်အစိုးရတက်တက် ဘဏ်စနစ်က healthy ဖြစ်နေဖို့လိုတယ်။ ဘာလို့လဲဆိုတော့ ပြည်သူက ဒီပြည်သူပဲ။ ပြည်သူရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်လိုက်တဲ့ အစိုးရတက်လာမယ်။ သူမကြိုက်တဲ့အစိုးရတက်လာတာရှိမယ်။ အဲ့ဒါကအစိုးရက နိုင်ငံရေး။ ဘယ်အစိုးရတက်တက် ဘဏ်စနစ်အားကောင်းပြီး လူတွေက ဘဏ်တွေကိုယုံကြည်နေမှ။ ဘယ်အစိုးရတက်တက် တက်တဲ့အစိုးရ ဘဏ်စနစ်ကိုအားကောင်းအောင်လုပ်မှာပဲ။ ဘဏ်စနစ် အားကောင်းတောင့်တင်းမှ တိုင်းပြည်ကတိုးတက်မှာ။တိုင်းပြည်တိုးတက်မှ ပြည်သူလူထုရဲ့ စားဝတ်နေရေး အခြေခံပြေလည်မှာ။ အဲ့ဒီတော့ တိုက်ခိုက်တာသည် အစိုးရကို တိုက်ခိုက်ရင်းနဲ့ ပြည်သူလူထုရဲ့စားဝတ်နေ‌ရေးဘဝကိုပါ တိုက်ခိုက်သလိုဖြစ်သွားတယ်။ ဒါကတော့ နိုင်ငံရေးနဲ့ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနဲ့ ဘာမှမသက်ဆိုင်ဘူးဆိုတာ ကွဲပြားစေချင်ပါတယ်။

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Myanmar's Military Coup: How The Tatmadaw Have Clung on to Power for More Than 50 years

Myanmar's military, the Tatmadaw, continue to receive weapons from foreign countries despite humans rights abuses.

By Sarosh Bana

01 April 2021

Protesters hold posters with the image of detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi (Source: https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-imposes-sanctions-myanmar-military-leaders-coup#&gid=1&pid=1)

F ebruary's military coup in Myanmar, which saw the country's de-facto head Aung San Suu Kyi and the president Win Myint imprisoned, and hundreds killed in a brutal crackdown, is now entering its second month.

But how much do we know about the military forces that have had a grip on power in the embattled Southeast Asian country for more than 50 years? And which countries continue to supply military hardware to Myanmar's armed forces, despite its reputation for brutal force and human rights abuses?

Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) has served as the country's democratically elected government since 2015. The NLD was about to enter its second term after a landslide victory in last November's elections, but on February 1, the Tatmadaw, the vernacular name for Myanmar's military, ousted Aung San Suu Kyi, alongside other government members.

Public protests erupted in the capital Yangon following Aung San Suu Kyi's arrest, which the Tatmadaw quelled with brute force, resulting in more than 500 deaths .

The NLD's leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has a complicated relationship with the country's military, which no doubt stems from the fact that this powerful well-armed force was founded by her father, the Burmese revolutionary Aung San, who is celebrated as the Father of the Nation for delivering Burma from colonial rule.

Despite the military putting her under house arrest for many years and more recently being responsible for a brutal crackdown against Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims, Aung San Suu Kyi has stated previously that she has tremendous goodwill towards the Army.

Aung San founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in Bangkok in 1941 with the support of Imperial Japan, which was then in occupation of Thailand. His army then helped Japan to seize Burma in 1942, when it was still a self-governing colony of the British.

Doubting Japan's assurances of granting independence to his country, Aung San co-operated with the British and, in 1945, helped the Allies defeat the Japanese occupiers. But he never got to see his beloved Burma gain independence as he was assassinated just six months prior in July 1947 at the age of 32.

Since the country's founding, the Tatmadaw, which literally means 'royal force,' has been deeply involved in domestic politics, running the country for five decades following a military coup in 1962.

COUNTRIES THAT SELL WEAPONS TO MYANMAR

A tremulous democratic transition began in 2011, but despite the NLD winning democratically held elections, a constitution drawn up in 2008 saw the Tatmadaw maintain control of a quarter of parliamentary seats and key ministries such as home affairs, defence and border affairs.

The Tatmadaw's inventory in the past mostly comprised older Chinese and Soviet-era equipment, but modern acquisitions in recent years have transformed the armed forces, with major suppliers including China, Russia, Israel, Belarus, India and South Korea.

The Myanmar Navy, which largely comprises surface combatants, metamorphosed last December into a three-dimensional force upon receipt of a refurbished Soviet era Kilo class diesel-electric submarine from the Indian Navy. The Navy's aerial defence accrues from the Swedish Bofors 40 mm and the Chinese-made ZPU-2/Type 58 anti-aircraft guns.

A 2019 UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar highlighted a vast web of companies which Myanmar's military is alleged to control.

It also highlighted revenues the military is alleged to have earned from domestic and foreign business deals that "substantially enhance its ability to carry out gross violations of human rights," which refers to the brutal crackdown in August 2017, which killed thousands of Rohingya Muslims and forced more than 740,000 to flee Rakhine to bordering Bangladesh.

Despite knowledge of the Tatmadaw's excesses, the UN mission claims that 14 companies from China, Russia, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, India and the Philippines have supplied fighter jets, armoured combat vehicles, warships, missiles and missile launchers to Myanmar since 2016. It also found 59 foreign firms had commercial ties with Tatmadaw businesses.

Human Rights Watch called for a global arms embargo on Myanmar. Following the recent coup and repression, EU member states imposed economic sanctions, travel restrictions and asset freezes on high-ranking individuals within Myanmar's military.

They also stated that "pre-existing EU restrictive measures such as an embargo on arms and equipment remain in place.

Licence-built Thunder armoured personnel carrier of Myanmar Army patroling after the coup (KMK from Myanmar, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons)

HOW THE TATMADAW FUNDSITSELF

The UN Fact-Finding Mission's report also exposed two of Myanmar's "most opaque enterprises," Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which are allegedly owned by senior military leaders, according to the UN mission. Among them, it claims, is February's coup leader, Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing , and his deputy, Vice Senior General Soe Win .
Additional reporting by Anita Hawser
According to the UN Fact Finding Mission, MEHL and MEC own at least 120 businesses involved in everything from construction to pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, insurance, tourism and banking,

Justice For Myanmar (JFM), "a covert group of activists campaigning for justice and accountability for the people of Myanmar," says it has provided evidence about the Tatmadaw's clandestine and extensive corporate set-up to the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), an investigative reporting platform and international media network.

JFM claim that income from MEC and MEHL are not disclosed to parliament, leading to a massive loss of public funds, which it alleges the military can utilise off-budget.

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Myanmar's Military Coup: How The Tatmadaw Have Clung on to Power for More Than 50 years

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By Sarosh Bana 01 April 2021 Protesters hold posters with the image of detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi (Source: https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-imposes-sanctions-myanmar-military-leaders-coup#&gid=1&pid=1) F ebruary's military coup in Myanmar, which saw the country's de-facto head Aung San Suu Kyi and the president Win Myint imprisoned, and hundreds killed in a brutal crackdown, is now entering its second month.

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I wrote the following piece after 3 March 2021, on which 38 people died from the crackdown. Now the protest is over 100 days, and 782 people (as of 10 May), including children, have been killed. Over 3,740 people are in detention. Ordinary people all over Burma are living on edge due to the random acts of violence by "security forces."
When I got up on 1 February, I heard about the coup in Burma, my country. I tried to identify an assortment of feelings: anger, despair, distress, sadness, hopelessness. None of them seemed to fit precisely what I felt. Since I am not in Burma, I rely on Facebook, the communication channel most Burmese use for information, to stay informed. With those unnamable feelings in my chest, I started checking Facebook almost hourly to catch up with the ongoing situation. When a 19-year-old girl died, the first death of the protest, I could finally name the assortment of emotions I was feeling - trauma. A few years ago, a former political prisoner told me the whole country was experiencing trauma because of the violent suppression of resistance over five decades. Her words now came back to me as I tried to understand the emotions running through me.

We are re-experiencing the collective trauma of living under the grip of the military. Every day the violence against protesters escalates and reminds those of us who lived and grew up under the military regime and who witnessed many violent crackdowns since 1962, of "the dark times."

I was born two years after the coup in 1962. I remember talking with my friends about politics and rumours we heard from adults, when we were about ten years old. Had Ne Win died? How much we children and the adults around us wanted him to be gone, the former dictator. My overriding memories of growing up in Burma under the military dictatorship involve a sense of lacking - of lacking necessities, and above all lacking rights and freedom. Economic struggles, censorship, martial laws, fear of the military and people associated with them; these were a big part of our everyday life. In the backdrop, there were ongoing wars with various ethnic groups. I can still recall watching tanks drive through our township to suppress the student demonstrations in 1974. The next day, we heard many young people had been killed or arrested. The atmosphere was full of fear and suppression, and it was suffocating. Then in 1988, the military killed thousands of people during a massive popular uprising for democracy. My mother went into depression in 1988 at the loss of life she witnessed. This is etched deeply in my memory.

History has shown us again and again that it is always the young people who fight back, and now like before, they can be killed, beaten, tortured, raped. Still, these young people go on and take the front line. Now in 2021, Burma is a different country, but it is still beset by endless political, social and economic problems. Despite these problems, people have some freedom and hope, and communication with the outside world. There is also the widespread use of social media, which we didn't have access to in 1988. Hence today's young people, Generation Z, live in a very different political, social, and economic context. However, like many generations before them, they are the ones who dare to start the fight back and sacrifice their lives. The pain, sadness, anger, and anxiety of the families of those young people killed and arrested are unfathomable.

Many people are saying that the revolution is close to victory. I want to believe that the people will win in the end, but at this point, it is not easy to see how the whole debacle is going to unfold. How do you fight an institution that does not hesitate or express remorse about using any weapon available to kill their own people-who are simply asking for their rights to be respected?

People, especially Generation Z, persist despite the violence. On 3 March, Burma mourned the death of Kyal Sin, a 19-year-old girl who got shot in the back of her head. The words on her T-shirt said "Everything will be OK." She left a note asking for her organs to be donated if it were not possible to resuscitate her.

I felt devastated at the death of Kyal Sin and other youths on 3 March. However, it was seeing an emotional video posted on Facebook by a young woman, and recognising her own trauma, that led me to write this piece. In the video, the young woman films herself narrating her experiences of helping protesters on the frontline. This first-hand account is a plea for others to understand the violence that protesters face every day.

This young woman has been helping protestors to flee from police violence. She repeatedly saw young people being brutally beaten up by the police. She had been using her car to block the road to delay the police vehicles so that she could assist the protesters to safety. It had been getting more and more difficult for her to do this because fewer people were turning up for the protests. The increasing use of tear gas, stun grenades, and live bullets emptied some of the main streets, and it was easier for the police vehicles to get through quickly to attack the protesters. Sometimes the makeshift roadblocks put up to deter police forces or police cars from passing through accidentally blocked her from reaching protesters. Other times people taking videos of the protests ignored her request to let her car pass through. Not being able to get through to the people she intended to help, and seeing police beat up her colleagues brought her to breaking point that day. She repeatedly said, "They asked the kids (protestors) to put up their hands on the heads and then they relentlessly beat them on their backs." This broke her heart more than anything else.

This woman knows she might die helping them, but she puts herself at risk to rescue the core young protestors. She wants more people to participate in protests to fight against the military and shield the front-line protestors. Since 1 February, she has hardly slept and has only eaten one meal a day because she is too tired. For her, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is not helping unless everybody participates in the protests. Like most young people, her fear of losing out to the military is far greater than her fear of dying. Her emotional response on Facebook to those criticizing young protestors for confronting the police instead of having small protests near their places of residence, and her plea to people, gave me a glimpse of what young protestors are going through.

There are good days and terrible days in the over-a-month-long ongoing protests. On good days, most protestors get away unscathed, inspired, hopeful, and with renewed aspirations. On terrible days, some get killed, wounded, arrested, but the people do not give up. Every day, they come out to protest the coup. They are determined to make sure the military goes down. That's when you can see the best of Burmese people, their resilience. The younger generation fights with creativity, resilience, and humour that keeps them going even though they are putting their lives on the line. You can see messages or posts on Facebook that encourage unity, such as "we can have different opinions but we are not divided." People set aside religious and ethnic tensions to fight the common enemy - the military, and, by doing so, they have more compassion and understanding of years of atrocity and violence directed at ethnic groups, including the Rohingya.

I have learned from a good friend of mine, a survivor of violence, that post-traumatic growth and resilience emerge in the aftermath of violence. Dealing with trauma is not a walk in the park. There are good days and bad days. Bad days can take you to the edge, but resilience can bring you back to embracing life. Sometimes it comes from inside. And sometimes the help from outside is necessary to keep on going.

More than ever, people in Burma need every possible form of assistance from the international community to continue their long struggle. The UN, ASEAN, China, Russia, India, Japan, and other countries need to take action. Every country can take action if they take their mind off trade, regional competition, and geopolitical influence. The Burmese people have shown their spirit and resilience in the face of the violent suppression by the military. Day by day, people in Burma realize they cannot depend on outside help, not even the UN. Regardless, they are determined to continue their revolt against the military. The protests have grown so large and spread across the country that they have become transformed into revolution. Even if the international community fails to help Burma, the "Early Summer Revolution" (named by the protestors) will go on.

People of Burma have experienced collective trauma, but they have tremendous resilience, and the world needs to stand by them.

The following is an English translation of a post by a poet that was shared on Facebook:[1]

I am afraid of mornings.
When he wakes up, he goes straight to the bathroom, has a shower, changes his clothes, picks up his bag, and gets ready to go out of the door.
He doesn't even notice the breakfast I prepared for him.
I ask, Where are you going today?
He used to tell me whether he was going to Hledan, Sule, Sanchaung, or Bargyar.
Now he only says where the protest is.
I warn him they are going to shoot today.
He said they are shooting every day. Don't spread that kind of talk. Instead of 100 people, only 50 will come to protest. Don't make me afraid. It's not the time for fear.
Looking thin and sunburned, no gun, no bullet, just a backpack and the three fingers salute.
He: Don't keep calling me.
He goes, and I go. I can exhale when everybody comes back home in the evening.
Exhausting days since the coup.
I have absolute empathy for the fallen heroes and their families. Salute to them!

(Featured image by @toraillustrates)
Lili Kyawt (pseudonym) is from Burma and a part-time lecturer based in Japan.
Notes

[1] Little information about the author, including his real name, is available online.

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The Coup in Myanmar/Burma: Collective Trauma and Resilience

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Lili Kyawt (pseudonym) reflects on experiences of trauma shared by different generations. Credit: @toraillustrates I wrote the following piece after 3 March 2021, on which 38 people died from the crackdown. Now the protest is over 100 days, and 782 people (as of 10 May), including children, have been killed.

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As neighbouring countries face rising numbers of coronavirus cases, Myanmar health officials have expressed concern that a third wave of Covid-19 could hit the Southeast Asian nation under a military junta that seized power three months ago.

In India to the northwest, more than 300,000 people are being infected daily and thousands are dying, while Thailand to the southeast is already experiencing a third wave.

Dr Khin Khin Gyi, a spokeswoman for the Ministry of Health and Sports, warned on 27 April that a third Covid-19 outbreak was likely in Myanmar, which has been rocked by nationwide protests against the military regime and subsequent violent crackdowns since 1 Feb.

"There is a possibility of a third wave of the pandemic coming," she said. "It is possible that there are outbreaks among the large crowds of people."

"More than 60 per cent of infected patients don't show symptoms," she said. "Only when they got tested do we have learned about the infections."

Khin Khin Gyi also spoke out on Covid-19 and prevention measures under the civilian-led government under country leader Aung San Suu Kyi before it was overthrown.

On Tuesday, the Ministry of Health and Sports recorded 16 new confirmed Covid-19 cases, bringing the total number of infections to date to 142,858, while the total number of deaths held at 3,209.

Since the military takeover, most of the country's doctors and nurses have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) of striking workers who opposed the junta and have largely boycotted its vaccination drive.

Myanmar received 3.5 million vaccines from India around the end of January under a vaccine drive implemented by the former National League for Democracy government.

Fear of old doses

Though the junta has urged people in residential areas to get vaccinated, its security forces have arrested many health care workers for participating in the CDM, limiting the number of professionals who can administer the jabs.

A doctor in Yangon who requested anonymity for security reasons said that people will not accept vaccines provided by the regime because vials that have sat too long in storage may have lost their effectiveness.

"The remaining vaccines are not effective because of the delay in storage," he said. "The people won't accept them."

A young man from northwestern Myanmar's Sagaing region who did not want to be identified said he would not get a virus vaccine under the military regime for another reason.

"

I will not get the vaccines provided by the terrorist regime because they are murdering hundreds of people, and I don't trust them.

Anonymous, northwestern Myanmar, Sagaing region

He was referring to the nearly 770 people who have been killed by security forces in the weeks following the coup.

Myanmar detected its first positive Covid-19 case on 23 March, 2020. The country, which shares a long land border with China, initially had a low number of confirmed infections and single-digit deaths until mid-August, when the number of Covid-19 cases began to skyrocket during a second wave that was deadlier than the first.

To contain the spread, Myanmar officials put in place stay-at-home orders, lockdowns, and mandatory quarantines for those travelling to other states and regions within the country as well as for those returning to Myanmar from abroad.

In response, Khin Khin Gyi said the storage and maintenance process for the more than one million doses of the vaccine has not been compromised.

"There is no such thing as us stopping our work because of the absence of some people," she said. "The hospitals are still operating. Under the current situation, plans to keep medical facilities operational down to the township level are in place."

No one to provide treatment

At least 1.9 million people of Myanmar's population of 54 million have received the first dose of the Covid-19 vaccine, according to health officials.

The ruling junta has said that the number of people being tested for the virus has dropped to about 2,000 a day compared to nearly 150,000 people daily under the NLD government.

An assistant doctor from Mandalay General Hospital, who is participating in the CDM, said this was due in part to a lack of health care workers.

"There is no medical staff to take the swabs, no staff to analyze the samples in the lab, no doctors to test the results," he said. "Even if someone tested positive, there is no one in the hospital who can provide treatment. All of us are participating in the CDM."T
This story was published with permission from Radio Free Asia.

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Myanmar faced third wave of Covid-19 infections amid anti-coup protests

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As neighbouring countries face rising numbers of coronavirus cases, Myanmar health officials have expressed concern that a third wave of Covid-19 could hit the Southeast Asian nation under a military junta that seized power three months ago.

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Author: Lisa Brooten, Southern Illinois University

Two months after Myanmar's coup, the country's civil disobedience movement is awe-inspiring in its resilience against vicious military crackdowns. According to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, as of 28 March, 459 people have been killed and 2559 arrested, charged or sentenced. Despite this heavy price, the civil disobedience movement's effectiveness is unprecedented. But its unity is not solely due to the current crisis, widespread hatred for the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) or the advent of digital technologies.

The success of today's civil disobedience movement comes from decades of behind-the-scenes activism to build a multi-ethnic civil society and an independent media under military dictatorship - well before the democratisation process began just over a decade ago. The expertise and infrastructure built by media veterans covering earlier crackdowns, including ethnic nationality media and the forging of international alliances, is the base upon which the current flow of accurate information and analysis depends. This work is rarely acknowledged in international media accounts of the current situation, which often focus on the newest technologies.

Platforms like Facebook and Twitter are instrumental in allowing the people of Myanmar to coordinate and communicate with each other and the outside world. Digital technologies and social media provide foreign journalists immediate access to accurate information and more nuanced updates from Myanmar analysts than they themselves would be able to make. Social media sites are key 'weapons' in Myanmar's current struggle, facilitating strategies such as the Social Punishment campaign that shames and ostracises family members and supporters of the Tatmadaw.

Facebook responded to the crisis with a ban on all military-linked accounts. But even Facebook's reaction is the result of years of work by local civil society organisations to push the company to address the dangerous spread of misinformation. This was especially acute during the attacks on the country's Muslim Rohingyas.

Massive protests in 1988 and the crackdown that followed caused thousands of dissident students to flee to the country's border areas, where exile media were first established. While the movement was never solely ethnic majority Burman in its make-up, this was the first time many Burman students met ethnic 'insurgents'. Many ethnic minority peoples in the border areas had also never before met Burmans who were not soldiers they needed to fear. Key alliances were forged and strengthened over the ensuing decades.

Echoes of this same realisation have emerged in the 2021 post-coup period. Rohingya and other ethnic nationality groups quickly joined protests against the coup, despite a long struggle for recognition by the National League for Democracy (NLD) for their own suffering at the hands of the Tatmadaw. On social media, young protestors began to recognise and publicly apologise for their previous lack of empathy for the suffering of these minority groups. These sentiments have gone viral. The divide-and-rule strategy used in 1988 is today being challenged on a much broader scale.

When Myanmar's much-celebrated political opening began in 2011, its exiled media moved cautiously to return. But these media and independent media inside the country had already been pushing for decades for greater freedom of expression. That historical knowledge is playing a vital role in the current conflict, as older generations share their experiences of previous crackdowns, repressive rule and imprisonment. The tactics used by today's protestors and dissident hackers are direct descendants of the post-1988 underground communication system.

Media and civil society groups led by 1988 generation leaders of all ethnicities were among the first to publicly raise concerns about the NLD's governing strategies. Many were bitterly disappointed and angered that crackdowns on media and other groups were worse under the NLD than under its predecessor, the military-backed Thein Sein government. A few expressed outrage at the NLD's silence over the military's inhumane treatment of the Rohingya, and over-simplified coverage of the issue by international journalists.

While the coup does provide a clear common enemy in the Tatmadaw, the insights gained prior to this tumultuous period will undoubtedly have an impact beyond the current crisis. Groups such as Progressive Voice, Athan, the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, Action Committee for Democracy Development and Generation Wave will continue this anti-authoritarian, anti-militarisation critique regardless of the outcome of the current crisis.

Gen Z activists appear the most energetic and resilient in the face of direct attacks, but they are drawing from and supported by a long history of networking and capacity-building that makes this movement for democratisation a game-changer. The civil disobedience movement's multi-ethnic and international alliances are also merging with transnational protest movements. Young activists from Myanmar, Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan and other Asian countries, dubbed the Milk Tea Alliance, are posing a direct challenge to regional authoritarianism.

Still, this is not a Twitter or Facebook revolution. This is what democracy movements look like in the digital age, built upon a historical foundation of struggle. This may not be your parent's revolution, but it is an extension of it, as some children of 1988 generation activists make clear. This collective historical wisdom is the foundation of Myanmar's resilient civil disobedience movement today. Continued support for civil society, including independent media, is the best hope for democratic change.
Lisa Brooten is Associate Professor of Radio, Television and Digital Media at Southern Illinois University, co-editor of Myanmar Media in Transition: Legacies, Challenges and Change (ISEAS, 2019) and a 2021 Fulbright ASEAN Research Fellow.

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Myanmar's civil disobedience movement is built on decades of struggle |

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Author: Lisa Brooten, Southern Illinois University Two months after Myanmar's coup, the country's civil disobedience movement is awe-inspiring in its resilience against vicious military crackdowns. According to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, as of 28 March, 459 people have been killed and 2559 arrested, charged or sentenced.

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Rumours are flying. The camp of Senior General Than Shwe, former leader of the State Law and Order Restoration Council junta that put Myanmar on the path towards a gradual opening to balance increasing dependence on China, is reportedly not at all happy with how Senior General Aung Hlaing has been handling the February 1 military takeover.

Just over three months ago, the military - known as the Tatmadaw - launched a coup against the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government, citing its refusal to address election fraud. The real reason was that through further liberalising Myanmar's economy, addressing deep-seated corruption and pushing for constitutional change, the NLD government undermined the crony-capitalist model that has sustained the military leadership for generations.

The junta is now in trouble, not only economically but also politically and militarily, where it is losing to the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) - led by the NLD and its ethnic minority allies. The Tatmadaw, now universally perceived by the public as deeply violent and illegitimate, can barely hold its troops together, and the junta may soon try to save its skin by offering negotiations on a solution to the crisis.

This may please ASEAN and international partners but would undermine the cohesion of the opposition NUG. International partners need to be wary and support the unity government to defeat the Tatmadaw.

"The NUG needs to be given the space, time and international support to see this through," Janelle Saffin, an Australian MP familiar with the NUG, told me. "The NUG have the capacity and the mandate to bring about a transformation, not just another transition."

The military's old ways have brought the country to the brink of collapse. The Tatmadaw as it is now must go, as the only way to achieve a federal, democratic Myanmar is to end the military culture of impunity by forcing it under the accountability of civilian rule.

Protesters wearing signs in support of the People's Defence Force (PDF) during a demonstration against the military coup in Dawei on May 10. Photo: Handout/Dawei Watch/AFP

That process of undoing the military-led order has already begun.

The junta lost first the streets to the protesters, then the public administration to the Civil Disobedience Movement. Now, the coup-makers may even be losing their grip on Myanmar's Armed Forces.

The opposition has united in a National Unity Government (NUG) promising democratic federalism to the country's ethnic minorities. This nascent government is in alliance with some ethnic armed organisations, including the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in the north of Myanmar and the Karen National Union (KNU) in the southeast, both of which are fighting the Tatmadaw ever more aggressively.

Opposition activists turned guerrilla fighters have organised in what they call "Civil" or "People" Defence Forces, and are now attacking or sabotaging military and police installations and convoys across the country. The NUG has rushed to endorse these forces as the nucleus of their federal army.

The narrow yet crucial coalition the junta has been able to form with ethnic political parties is now breaking apart. The Arakan National Party, the dominant party in southwestern Rakhine State, just last week announced the suspension of its collaboration with the junta. This has the potential to open up yet another military front for the Tatmadaw if the Arakan Army, an ethnic armed organisation closely linked with the Arakan National Party (ANP), decides to more aggressively pursue its bid for far-reaching Rakhine autonomy under what it calls "the way of Rakhita".

With the ANP out, the Mon Unity Party, the other remaining influential ethnic minority ally of the junta and the biggest party in southeastern Mon State, may soon exit as well.

It is no surprise then that deserting Tatmadaw officers have reported low morale in the armed forces and believe mass desertion is only prevented by brutal repression and threats to the lives of soldiers and their families. The Tatmadaw, always a deeply dysfunctional institution, looks to be cracking.

In light of this, they may soon try to change tack and toe a softer line to limit the damage, committing more fully to the five-point plan that ASEAN developed at its April summit on Myanmar. That would include calling a ceasefire, releasing some high-level prisoners, stalling the progress of legal cases against President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and offering negotiations on an end to the state of emergency and a return to power-sharing under some form of arrangement like the 2008 constitution.

During a visit expected this week, the ASEAN Chair, Sultan Hassanal Bokiah, and Secretary-General, Dato Lim Jock Hoi, will test the waters for a compromise solution. Could that set up the breakthrough that ASEAN and the international community have been waiting for?

Myanmar's coup is an uncomfortable event in an increasingly explosive geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia. Japan, China, India, ASEAN and perhaps also the US will all be tempted to diffuse the situation by jumping at any short-term fix that looks to promise an end to the violence now.

On May 4, Teddy Locsin, Jr., foreign secretary of the Philippines, lamented on Twitter the "overreach on the part of the democratic forces" leading to the coup and declared that: "[I] just want the killings to stop and everything back the way it was."

He's surely not alone in that sentiment. Leaders in Thailand, a crucial safe haven and conduit of supplies and money for Myanmar's opposition, are deeply uncomfortable with the ties of anti-junta activists to Thailand's own democracy movement.

Myanmar's fellow ASEAN members, as well as China and India, all want the stability that an NLD-military power-sharing deal had brought over the past five years. If a new military leader were to offer an olive branch, the pressure from the international community on the NUG - or senior NLD figures within that government - to deal may be significant.

Myanmar will have a new constitution that is federal and democratic. These terms will likely not be acceptable to the Tatmadaw leadership - but they may be more palatable to the military's rank and file

Such an agreement, however, would only apply a band aid to an axe wound. Any deal short of a removal of the Tatmadaw from Myanmar politics and full political federalism would alienate ethnic minorities, split the NUG and end the support of ethnic armed organisations.

In a weekend address, NUG Vice President Duwa Lashi La, a Kachin minority politician, said that the "path for negotiations agreed at the ASEAN summit is not what the people of Myanmar want".

In the best-case scenario, a deal with a still-politically powerful military would isolate the NLD, making it vulnerable to the next coup if and when the situation looks more favourable for the new military leadership. In the worst-case scenario, ethnic minority political and armed leaders, joined by the more radical elements in NLD and the civil disobedience movement, might decide to continue the fight and an even more messy conflict might result.

The international community needs to be patient. Any change in approach or short-term concessions by the junta are welcome to ease the suffering of Myanmar people that are slipping into poverty, in particular those who have been displaced by conflict. For example, the junta needs to lift its recent bans on imports via the land route from Thailand, a move designed to squeeze ethnic armed organisations but which is putting vulnerable populations at risk, including many internally displaced people who depend on this trade route.

Myanmar's economy is collapsing and the humanitarian response to the crisis is severely underfunded. ASEAN humanitarian aid needs to be delivered via the land route from Thailand and benefit civilians without discrimination either against territories under control of the NUG and its allies or those held by the junta.

With the consequences of a political military now made clear, it is the role of Japan, Korea, Australia, India and the West to ensure that the terms of any solution remain strict. The Tatmadaw will be reformed and serve the role of a professional army in a democratic country. Its military-economic empire will be broken up and its business holdings will be wound down.

Myanmar will have a new constitution that is federal and democratic. These terms will likely not be acceptable to the Tatmadaw leadership - but they may be more palatable to the military's rank and file.

If negotiations fail, the international community must allow the NUG and its allies to give the wobbling Tatmadaw, a violent and parasitic institution, a final push.
Philipp Annawitt served as an advisor to Myanmar's parliament and government from 2015 to 2020.

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Myanmar's junta is wobbling. The NUG must be allowed to topple it

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Rumours are flying. The camp of Senior General Than Shwe, former leader of the State Law and Order Restoration Council junta that put Myanmar on the path towards a gradual opening to balance increasing dependence on China, is reportedly not at all happy with how Senior General Aung Hlaing has been handling the February 1 military takeover.

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UN human rights experts on Wednesday urged international businesses to take a stand against the Myanmar regime's human rights violations and put pressure on the coup leaders to halt their grave human rights violations across the country.

Amid pro-democracy supporters' calls for urgent action to cut off foreign currency flows to the military junta, the human rights experts said that "businesses must uphold their human rights responsibilities."

"While some businesses have reiterated their public support for the rule of law and human rights, and cut ties with the junta, many continue to engage in business with the military as if nothing has happened," the experts from the UN working group on business and human rights were quoted as saying in a statement from the UN Human Rights Office. However, they did not mention any businesses by name.

The experts urged companies to act in line with the UN's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to avoid contributing to rights violations, or becoming complicit in crimes if they continue to operate in Myanmar.

Surya Deva, vice chair of the UN working group on business and human rights, said, "Because the risk of gross human rights violations has greatly increased in Myanmar, action by states and human rights due diligence by business, and investors, should be rapidly and proportionately heightened."

Following the military takeover on Feb. 1, nearly 50 foreign companies mostly from Western countries investing in Myanmar, including Coca-Cola, Heineken, Nestle, Unilever, Facebook and H&M, signed a statement expressing concern about the military takeover. However, Asian companies have largely remained silent.

Moreover, public campaigns to cut the coup leaders' financial lifelines have intensified both in the country and abroad. Human rights groups have repeatedly asked oil and gas companies to cut ties with the military regime, as the sector earns Myanmar more than US$1.5 billion annually.

However, energy giants like Chevron of the US and Total of France remain reluctant to follow those demands. Chevron has intensively lobbied the US State Department and key congressional offices against sanctions, warning that they could disrupt its joint ventures in Myanmar. Total's gas operation in Myanmar has been propping up the military junta by diverting funds from gas sales to offshore accounts instead of the government, according to documents accessed by French newspaper Le Monde.

"Businesses, both individually and collectively, should exert the maximum leverage on the military in Myanmar to halt what the High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to crimes against humanity," said Tom Andrews, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.

The experts said the military's economic interests, including access to arms and technology, remain largely untouched and unchallenged by other states, and businesses operating in the country.

"The revenues that the military earns from domestic and foreign businesses substantially enhance its ability and capacity to carry out these grave violations," Andrews said.

The UN experts said that measures taken by businesses, such as suspension of payments and financial flows that may aid the perpetration of widespread and systematic human rights violations, should target the military and have the minimum possible negative impact on the rights of employees and the general population.

All states, including leaders of ASEAN and G20 countries, should take strong, decisive and coordinated action, and encourage their businesses operating in Myanmar to prevent further human rights violations, the experts added.

"There may come a point at which businesses might need to suspend operations or even consider [an] exit from the country if risks of involvement in human rights abuse cannot be reasonably managed, while doing so in a manner to safeguard the well-being of workers and affected communities," Deva said.

This week, several international companies and organizations including Coca-Cola, McKinsey and Reuters moved out of Sule Square, a high-end office block in downtown Yangon, after human rights group Justice for Myanmar called on 18 tenants of the complex of offices and shops to stop supporting a military-linked business by renting space there. The complex was built on land owned by the military, according to the UN.

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UN Panel Calls on Int'l Business Community to Take Stand on Myanmar Junta's Abuses

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UN human rights experts on Wednesday urged international businesses to take a stand against the Myanmar regime's human rights violations and put pressure on the coup leaders to halt their grave human rights violations across the country.

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'Now we are starving': After coup, Yangon's most vulnerable struggle to feed themselves | Frontier Myanmar

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Since the February 1 coup pushed Myanmar's economy off the edge, residents living in informal housing on the urban fringe - already battered by the COVID-19 pandemic - are being pushed to the brink of starvation.

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It has long been argued that sanctions against rogue regimes such as Myanmar's military dictatorships are ineffectual and may hurt ordinary people more than those responsible for the acts that made outside powers take action against them. That would also apply for so-called "smart sanctions", which in the case of Myanmar would mean freezing the generals' non-existent foreign bank accounts or barring entry to Western nations they have no intention of traveling to. And any attempt to bring the generals to face charges at the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are bound to fail because China and Russia would block necessary UN Security Council resolutions for the latter to enforce any verdict the court may pass and Myanmar is not a signatory to the Rome statute which created the former.

But there is a new kind of action that may actually work: to bring prosecutions against named individuals in countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Called the Myanmar Accountability Project, or MAP, it was launched in the UK after the Feb. 1 coup at the initiative of Christopher Gunness, a former BBC correspondent who covered the 1988 pro-democracy uprising in Myanmar and later became a UN official working in the Middle East. Section 134 of the UK Criminal Justice Act of 1988 establishes universal jurisdiction over cases that may be filed in the UK or wherever the alleged offense was committed. According to a statement issued by MAP, "The provisions enact the UK's obligations under the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT), specifically the obligation to extradite and prosecute, in Article 5 of UNCAT." Working with Gunness are three legal experts: Tatyana Eatwell of Doughty Street Chambers in London and an expert in public international law, Michael O'Kane, a senior partner at Peters & Peters solicitors in London, and Damian Lilly, a protection and human rights expert with more than 20 years' experience working with the United Nations.

Behind the legalese and expertise lies a simple concept: "The generals are being scrutinized on many fronts, not least because the criminal acts they ordered are being widely shared online. We can see their insignia on the uniforms and we understand the chain of command. They can run, but they can't hide in this digital age," Gunness told The Irrawaddy.

The first test case was filed at the beginning of May against the junta's attempts to remove U Kyaw Zwar Minn, Myanmar's former ambassador to London, from his residence. He went public with his support for Myanmar's civil disobedience movement, and was subsequently fired by the junta. The plan is to persuade an English court to rule that the junta is illegitimate and has no legal standing. Peters & Peters sent a letter to the junta-appointed successor U Chit Win warning him that any attempt to evict U Kyaw Zwar Minn would be unlawful and "any attempt to secure access to any part of the property will be reported immediately to the police."

The next step, according to Gunness, will be to go after those who are committing atrocities: "And that will be done whether it's the torturers in detention centers, the snipers shooting demonstrators in the head or the commanding officers that gave the orders."

It remains to be seen how-and if-the perpetrators can be more than exposed on social media and face justice in foreign courts. There is nothing in international law that prohibits solicitors in the UK from investigating such atrocities and UK courts from prosecuting them. They will be named, shamed and convicted, which will make it difficult for them to travel to any country that has an extradition treaty with the UK, or any other country where similar verdicts have been passed. Red alerts issued by Interpol could also be a legal consequence of such lawsuits.

A legal precedent can be found when the ousted Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet was arrested in the UK in 1998 on the same principle of universal jurisdiction which the MAP refers to. He spent two years under house arrest in a resort outside London while awaiting extradition to Spain, where he had been indicted. Because of his advanced age-he was in his early 80s-he was not seen as fit to stand trial, and was sent back to Chile in March 2000.

Currently, 25 junta leaders and other military officers have been identified and sanctioned by the European Union for what it has termed "serious human rights violations and abuses", among them Senior General and coupmaker Min Aung Hlaing, his deputy Vice Senior General Soe Win, Defense Minister General Mya Tun Oo and Lieutenant-General Than Hlaing, who in mid-April took part in a video conference organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). On Feb. 2, Lt-Gen Than Hlaing was appointed deputy minister of home affairs and chief of police and as such has overseen the crackdown on the civil disobedience movement and the killings of hundreds of pro-democracy demonstrators."

That resulted in a storm of protests from pro-democracy organizations all over the world, who also pointed out that UNODC has a long history of turning a blind eye to official complicity in the trade and that the outfit's annual opium surveys often distort the realities in the poppy growing areas. Its 2013 survey claimed that opium production had increased in areas controlled by the rebel Kachin Independence Army while independent sources refuted such claims, pointing out that the local drug trade in Kachin State was and is run by local militias allied with the Myanmar military.

Such bias makes it difficult for any international sanctions to be effective, as it would be seen as if a UN organ is legitimizing the junta in Naypyitaw. Other UN agencies on Myanmar are also said to be negotiating with the junta-appointed government, which is against the advice of the UN Secretary-General's own adviser not to legitimize or recognize the coup regime. But lucrative jobs are at stake, and money is also the reason why international oil companies are lobbying against sanctions.

Van Tran, a researcher on social movements in Myanmar at Cornell University in the US wrote for the Brookings Institutions' website on Feb. 9 that Western sanctions have "not and will not propel Myanmar's military dictators toward democracy" because "Myanmar's neighbors in Asia are sure to continue prioritizing economic engagement, regardless of Myanmar's political circumstances."

In 2008, when Myanmar was ruled by another junta, the US Congress passed the most extensive sanctions ever, called the Block Burma Jade (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act, which prohibited the importation of gemstones from Myanmar even through third countries. Precious stones were seen as a major source of revenue for the then junta, the State Peace and Development Council, and the aim was to cut its economic lifeline. But most of Myanmar's economy does not show up in official statistics and monetary transactions are mostly carried out through an informal, underground transmittance system known locally as "hundies"-and that includes money transfers between Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and other countries in the region. The Myanmar military has always managed not only to survive but also to prosper when Western sanctions have been imposed on their businesses.

MAP's initiative may therefore make a difference because it avoids all those unseen transactions and official trade channels that are associated with sanctions and focuses on individual officers who have committed crimes against humanity-and does so outside of cumbersome ICJ and ICC bureaucracies. The campaign may not force the generals to reverse the coup, but it will deprive the worst offenders in the leadership of legitimacy and, perhaps, prompt some elements within the armed forces to question the wisdom of supporting the current order.

You may also like these stories: Myanmar Junta Forces Scour Forests in Search of Civilian Resistance Myanmar's Long History of Informants Myanmar Junta Forces Detain Rakhine Chief Minister's Daughter

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Responding to Myanmar's Junta: An Alternative to Sanctions and Boycotts

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It has long been argued that sanctions against rogue regimes such as Myanmar's military dictatorships are ineffectual and may hurt ordinary people more than those responsible for the acts that made outside powers take action against them.

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The day after Thingyan, the festival of water that marks the Burmese New Year, Win Ko Ko Aung slipped across the Burmese border into Thailand, hidden among a group of migrant laborers. He had no passport - the workers were entering illegally anyway - because he'd left it in Yangon when he fled that city in a hurry in early April. Since then, he'd been moving from town to town, never staying in the same place for more than a few days.

Right before the festival, a source inside the military junta had warned Win Ko Ko that his name had been added to the "505A list," a register named after the section in the Burmese penal code that criminalizes online dissent. State television would soon broadcast that he was a wanted man and was marked for arrest. Even if he had a passport, he never would have been able to leave the country through an airport or border checkpoint.

"I had only two options in my mind, either stay here, in Myanmar, and try and live place to place, and one day get arrested," he told Rest of World over a Telegram call from Bangkok, where he is seeking asylum. "Or take the risk, leave the country. ... I picked option two, and decided to survive."

Before the Burmese military seized power on February 1, Ko Ko Aung was an author, digital creator, and social entrepreneur. His Facebook feed, which has more than 485,000 followers, featured a mix of selfies, book endorsements, inspirational quotes, and records of his skincare regime. He was never particularly interested in politics, but like many young Burmese people, the past few months jolted him out of his indifference. "I didn't accept it personally," he said of the coup. "It's an injustice. ... I know the difference between justice and injustice."

The day the military took over, he posted a picture of himself to Facebook giving the three-fingered salute that has become a symbol of the protests. Then, he turned his page over to pictures of mass protests and messages denouncing the junta. Three months later, he was a refugee in a foreign country.

Ko Ko Aung knew it was time to leave after two of his close friends - Win Min Than, a makeup artist and blogger, and Mae Toe Khaing, a model and fashion influencer - were abducted by the regime and charged under 505A. Another friend had been arrested and beaten, his bloodied face shown on national television.

"There are a lot of stories that they will arrest you at night and dump your body tomorrow. That's very scary," Ko Ko Aung said. "Everything is upside-down."

Yangon's digital community of activists, entrepreneurs, and tech workers has been traumatized by the recent coup and the ensuing violence. Many of its members have been thrust into literal firing lines as soldiers turn guns and grenades on peaceful protests. After sweeping up opposition politicians and dissidents, the junta began actively targeting young, connected people, snatching them from the streets and their homes, and rewriting laws to criminalize their online activities. Every night, state TV broadcasts the names of those on the 505A list, which now includes food bloggers, makeup vloggers, influencers, actors, beauty queens, tech entrepreneurs, activists, and opposition leaders - basically anyone with a profile and an opinion. Many of the country's most prominent digital media and tech figures are on the run or in jail.

The junta's direct attacks on free media, activists, and the infrastructure they use to communicate, have gutted a generation that had only begun to assert itself politically, socially, and economically. Over the past decade of civilian-led governance, Myanmar's young people learned to use the country's new openness and connectivity to advocate for their rights, build businesses, and push for political reform. In just over three months, the military has torn down everything they built.

"[Our] empowerment was for a fleeting moment," Nandar, a women's rights activist and podcaster who fled Yangon and is now in hiding, told Rest of World. "There are so many activists like me. They are jailed, they are detained, they are sexually harassed. Many of them are fleeing the country. ... Many people died, and many people are grieving."

When military rule came to an end in Myanmar in 2011, it was as if all the lights had been turned on in Yangon. For the previous five decades, the army, known as the Tatmadaw, had tried to maintain control by hermetically sealing the country. Telecoms, the media, and the internet were tightly restricted. All news reports had to be approved before publication by a state censor. The Burmese internet was shallow and narrow, but few could get onto it anyway, since connections were rare and prohibitively expensive.

Then, facing pressure from a resurgent pro-democracy movement led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the Tatmadaw partially ceded power to a civilian government. Restrictions on free speech were relaxed, and international companies were allowed to enter the country and set up mobile networks. The proportion of people with internet access grew from 1% in 2011 to 43% in 2021. Educated Burmese, many of whom had fled the country after a student uprising in 1988 was brutally suppressed, returned. Through social media, young people connected to global culture en masse. These forces combined to create a thriving digital ecosystem in which entrepreneurship, activism, pop culture, and media overlapped and fed off one another.

The environment was far from free and open - ethnic minorities were still aggressively persecuted, women's rights were restricted, and journalists were routinely harassed and arrested for doing their jobs. But there was all of a sudden a sense that change was possible, which was enough to convince Thin Thin Aung to come home.

As a student, she was a member of the so-called 8.8.88 movement, named after activists who took to the streets on August 8, 1988, to protest military rule. When the demonstrations were quashed, she fled across the border to the state of Mizoram in India. Thin Thin Aung studied business, got a degree, and started working as a journalist for the BBC, while continuing to agitate for democracy and women's rights. In 1998, while still in exile, she and another activist, Soe Myint, launched Mizzima, one of Myanmar's first digital media outlets.

"She continued her efforts to fight for democracy and human rights, especially gender equality," Naw Hser Hser, Aung's friend and general secretary of the Women's League of Burma, a campaign group, told Rest of World. "Till today, she's fighting for that."

After the transition, Thin Thin Aung and Soe Myint returned to Myanmar and set up a Mizzima office in Yangon.

"We were very clear it wasn't democracy that we were going back to. It was the beginning of the long road to democracy," Soe Myint told Rest of World. "We were going back because we thought there was a limited space in which we could continue the struggle for democracy and media freedom and human rights."

Having launched the website in India with only a single donated laptop, they created a media empire. They hired and trained local reporters and IT staff and established their own TV channels - one on the national broadcast network, another on satellite television. They printed newspapers in Burmese and English. They branched out into entertainment, importing Bollywood movies and TV series. They borrowed several million dollars and invested it into equipment and staff. Across all their various platforms, Soe Myint estimated that they had an audience of around 20 million.

"We put our lives and our colleagues' lives and their families' lives into Mizzima," he said. "Into what Mizzima was before the first of February."

They were not the only ones. At the same time, other independent media outlets, large and small, were taking root across the country. After so long without freedom of expression, journalism and human rights activists were suddenly everywhere, giving voice to people who had been silenced under the junta.

Nandar, the women's rights activist who fled in the wake of the coup, was among those who used this new connectedness to build digital communities and address issues considered taboo in Myanmar's patriarchal, often openly misogynistic society. Her Purple Feminists Group campaigned to end the stigma around menstruation, which remains so strong today that protesters hang sanitary products on their makeshift barricades to trigger soldiers' superstitious fears that menstruating women will diminish their virility. She translated and performed The Vagina Monologues in Yangon. On her podcast, G-Taw Zagar Wyne, she hosted discussions about consent and abortion, which remains illegal in Myanmar.

"Generally, we were able to express all we think, out and loudly, without fear of getting arrested or getting killed or being taken away," she said of the period before the coup. "I know some journalists faced that during that time as well, but as someone doing women's rights work, I didn't really feel threatened."

Being able to access the internet without restrictions made women in Myanmar more aware of international norms around rights. The country quietly had its own #MeToo movement in 2018 and 2019, backed by social media campaigns and amplified by a documentary that ran on Mizzima TV.

"Being open to the internet, to the outside world, not only because of the work that we were doing ... made them realize that their rights matter, that their voices matter, that they need to stand up," Nandar said. "They [saw] a lot of examples from outside the country due to the access of the internet."

"How will we be able to focus on creating and producing other things, when we are so invested in anger?"

The morning after the coup, Nandar said she was "frozen" for a week, unable to emotionally process what was happening. Only 25, she hadn't been born when the army last put down a protest movement. But when she first spoke to Rest of World the weekend after the army took over, she was almost jubilant, talking about a carnivalesque atmosphere on the streets, as hundreds of thousands of protesters went out to march. "This empowerment, even for a time, it came back to me; it felt like we can do something; we can win," she recalled, during an interview in early May.

That didn't last. The junta repeatedly cut the internet and blocked social media, limiting activists' ability to organize. On February 9, Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, a 19-year-old protester, was shot in the head during a march. She died 10 days later, becoming the first martyr for the anti-coup movement. Since then, more than 750 people have been killed, and nearly 5,000 have been arrested.

"Our energy is solely focused on those things they have taken away from us," Nandar said. "How will we be able to focus on creating and producing other things, when we are so invested in anger?"

Mizzima's media license was revoked on March 8, along with four other independent outlets. Many international and independent media companies are officially blocked in the country. The junta has confiscated broadcast equipment and closed their offices. Reporters continue to work, a large number from hiding. Some publications have switched entirely to Facebook, which, though officially banned, can be accessed via virtual private networks. Others have gone low-tech, moving onto radio or back to print. At least 40 journalists are in custody, many charged under section 505A, which was broadened after the coup to criminalize almost all criticism of the regime and support for civil disobedience.

Official state television, the only thing still viewable on mainstream channels, has taken to projecting a kind of earnest stupidity: a mix of "everything's fine here" stories, awkward raps about the state of the economy, picture parades of brutalized captives, and lists of people wanted by the regime.

There are persistent rumors among digital rights activists that the junta is preparing a new firewall and may even start whitelisting websites. If this were to happen, it would give the military near total control over the Burmese internet.

On March 9, Mizzima's office in Yangon was raided. The authorities had hoped to seize equipment and personnel, but they found the premises mostly empty. In January, the Tatmadaw had conspicuously refused to rule out taking power by force, so Soe Myint and his colleagues had come up with a contingency plan. After February 1, they scattered across Myanmar and into neighboring countries.

Six Mizzima journalists have been arrested, and another eight, as far as Soe Myint knows, are on the 505A list. Soe Myint is in hiding, as are most of Mizzima's 100 or so remaining employees and volunteers. The company has gone from a multiplatform media business to a guerilla operation. Its TV station is still broadcasting, for now, using a Thai satellite, and its journalists are still publishing online.

"With this stroke of the coup, they destroyed everything. Mizzima could have just collapsed," Soe Myint said. "We are wanted. They ... want us to be silenced. They want us to disappear. But we didn't. We're just fighting back."

Thin Thin Aung didn't make it to safety. It was only a matter of time before she was added to one of the junta's lists, either for her activism or for her journalism. "They had targeted people who had leadership roles," Naw Hser Hser said. "Automatically, she was targeted."

Thin Thin Aung had taken precautions to stay ahead of the authorities, according to Naw Hser Hser, who said her friend had been moving from one place to the next and avoiding her own home. On April 8, the military caught up with her. Thin Thin Aung was arrested while out buying food in Yangon. She was interrogated for two weeks in Yangon, before being transferred to the notorious Insein Prison, where she will face trial at the end of May.

After the 1988 uprising, the military also arrested activists and journalists, packing the jails with political prisoners. This time, however, the junta hasn't stopped with obvious political enemies.

"In the beginning, we could see the pattern of arrests - these people are targeted because of their activism or because of their social work," said Wai Hnin Pwint Thon, a UK-based activist. "But later, in February and March, we couldn't see the pattern anymore, because they were grabbing everyone they saw."

Wai Hnin's father, Mya Aye, one of the leaders of the 8.8.88 movement, was arrested on the day of the coup and is currently being held in Insein Prison. Since then, he has been joined by TV stars, influencers, and ordinary citizens caught up in nightly sweeps.

"We keep teasing each other that Oh, you're not famous until you've got a warrant out under 505A," Wai Hnin said.

Yan Paing Hein's friend occasionally slips into the past tense as he speaks, quickly correcting himself from "Yan Paing was," to "Yan Paing is."

The friend, a leading digital entrepreneur in Yangon who asked not to be identified for fear of reprisals, first met Hein five years ago at a tech industry event. Hein was 19, fresh out of high school, and desperate to break into tech. "He kept messaging me about how he wanted to be an iOS engineer and build iPhone apps, because that was a cool thing back then," the entrepreneur said, when he spoke with Rest of World in late April.

The two became close, and the entrepreneur mentored Hein as he used online tutorials and YouTube videos to learn how to code. Like so many others in Myanmar's tech community, Hein was a bootstrapper by necessity, a striver who thrived in the sudden flowering of the open internet. "These [businesses] didn't exist," the entrepreneur said. "Most of the people in the digital industries are self-taught."

People like Hein - ambitious, creative, driven - blossomed in the newly opened economy. He found work at tech companies in Yangon started by locals or returnees, of which there were suddenly many. Last year, he decided to take a career break to learn new skills. "He was almost having a quarter-life crisis at 24," his friend said. "We joked about it quite a lot."

"He's a very nice guy; he's very warm. I guess the most striking thing is he'd always have this smile. He would just meet and greet different people, even strangers. The sad thing is, ultimately that's the reason he ended up in jail."

On March 10, police entered Hein's neighborhood in Yangon, wearing civilian clothes and driving unmarked cars. Local residents stopped them. Finding weapons and uniforms in their vehicles, they tied the officers up and took them captive. Curious, Hein went down to watch. Friends saw him speaking to the police, apparently trying to reassure them. At one point, he returned to his flat to get them bottled water.

Then, just before 1 a.m. on March 11, soldiers broke down the door of Hein's apartment and dragged him away, apparently because of his presence on the street earlier that night. As they did, he told his sister not to worry. It was nearly a week before his friends found out where he was. They sent gifts addressed to him to the prison where they suspected he was being held. For five days, the gifts were returned - he wasn't there. On the sixth day, they weren't.

A few weeks later, the entrepreneur said, another friend was picked up on the street: Min Gaung, a musician who had reinvented himself as a creative director of a digital marketing company. He had been arrested with two friends in downtown Yangon. The irony, the entrepreneur said, was that Min Gaung had been working on advertising campaigns for Dagon Beer, a brewery owned by the Tatmadaw.

The authorities seem to be targeting anyone who looks young, or, like Min Gaung, were visibly nonconformist - he was covered in tattoos after years of singing in a rock band. This approach now means that everyone feels threatened. "That's the reality that we've now accepted," the entrepreneur said. "I think, until about two weeks ago, everyone was trying to figure out how we make sure we don't get arrested. Now, we've just accepted that the chances are 50-50, regardless of what we do."

"I think, until about two weeks ago, everyone was trying to figure out how we make sure we don't get arrested. Now, we've just accepted that the chances are 50-50, regardless of what we do."

Wai Hnin Pwint Thon, the U.K.-based activist, said she thinks that this randomness is part strategy, part panic. In 1988, the junta was confident that it could control the flow of information and kneecap the protest movement by arresting or intimidating its leaders. Now, faced with a fluid, leaderless opposition, they are using arbitrary arrests and violence to try to deter people from speaking out or joining protests. "It's a threat ... if you're going out against the military, this is what you'll face, torture and humiliation," Wai Hnin said.

At the same time, targeting anyone who posts online is a sign that the junta underestimated the organizing power of social media, and the commitment of a younger generation that is still, after months of brutality, turning out to oppose the coup.

"I think, this time around, social media is a big threat for the military," Wai Hnin said. "I don't think they know how to manage the spread of information and the people mobilizing and supporting each other, so they're targeting anyone that they see."

As they did in 1988, young Burmese are already fleeing the country. Rest of World has spoken to dozens of activists, journalists, and tech workers who have escaped or are currently trying to get out. The difference this time, they said, is that today they have the tools to keep up the resistance from overseas.

Four days after he made it out of Myanmar, Win Ko Ko, the influencer, was named on state TV. By then, he had already set himself up in Thailand. He blocked his mother on social media so she wouldn't worry, moved her to a safe house, and started broadcasting anti-coup messaging. "These terrorist guys couldn't arrest me, so they could go to my mum. But I have a moral responsibility to raise my voice," he said.

The junta's attempts to block the internet and control social media have not succeeded in cutting the country off from the outside world, but they have crashed the economy. Continuing to restrict communications, on which so much business depends, is unsustainable in the long term.

Members of the Burmese diaspora have been strong supporters of the civil disobedience movement since it began, raising both money and awareness. A new rush of evacuees are joining their ranks, many regrouping in the Thai city of Chiang Mai. A unity government in exile has been established, its members scattered across the world and advocating hard over Zoom calls to take the junta's place at international forums.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in Myanmar is getting worse every day. Each time the mobile internet comes back to life after an outage, social media is flooded with images of death and injury: bodies left in the street with signs of torture, corpses burned beyond recognition. Peace deals that limited open conflict between the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups in border regions have collapsed, and a 70-year-old civil war is raging again. But the new generation of activists, even those who have gone into hiding or exile, say that they want to keep fighting and will keep looking for glimmers of light.

"There is hope in the midst of the chaos," Nandar said. "I'd like to think that things we are doing and the sacrifices that we are making for this movement are going to matter. ... Even if we cannot eradicate the system, or eradicate this coup, we can still stay as the scratches on the wall."

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Myanmar's coup threatens to wipe out a generation of vloggers, influencers and entrepreneurs

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The day after Thingyan, the festival of water that marks the Burmese New Year, Win Ko Ko Aung slipped across the Burmese border into Thailand, hidden among a group of migrant laborers. He had no passport - the workers were entering illegally anyway - because he'd left it in Yangon when he fled that city in a hurry in early April.

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Instability and anti-Chinese sentiment are endangering Beijing's plans in the country, but rivalry with the West and its own domestic problems may prevent it from engaging the democracy movement, which remains wary of China.

By FRONTIER

China has stuck to its foreign policy principles by resolutely opposing international action against Myanmar's junta, but 100 days after the military coup, public anger against Beijing for its perceived support of the generals could jeopardise its ambitions in the country.

In a first sign that China's assets were vulnerable, three military guards assigned to the Chinese-financed gas pipeline traversing Myanmar were reported killed by an unidentified group in Mandalay Region's Kyaukse Township on May 5.

The twin oil and gas pipelines that run nearly 800 kilometres from Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State to Yunnan Province are among China's most strategically important investments in Myanmar. Beijing pressed Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's junta in mid-March to guarantee their safety and prevent the spreading of "fake news" against Chinese interests. The plea was made shortly before several Chinese-owned factories were burnt down by unknown persons in Hlaing Tharyar Township on March 14, apparently in response to security forces killing more than 50 protesters in the Yangon industrial suburb.

Although the oil and gas pipelines pre-date the ambitious "China-Myanmar Economic Corridor", they are a core element of the multi-billion dollar infrastructure programme, which also involves railways, ports and highways. With the junta facing increased resistance from ethnic armed groups along the borders, as well as the more urban-based civil disobedience movement, China's plan to build factories, trade hubs and border economic zones tying Yunnan to Myanmar's economic growth is, at least for now, all but impossible.

Meanwhile, existing Chinese businesses in Myanmar continue to face disruptions and some private companies are mulling a market exit. Although work has begun on a Chinese-financed gas-fired power station near the terminal of the oil and gas pipelines at Kyaukphyu, the future of Chinese solar power developers who won 28 of 29 sites in a solar tender last year remains in doubt.

Unprecedented internet restrictions have also raised questions over Alibaba's planned US$73.5 million acquisition of shares in mobile wallet Wave Money, while Chinese companies, particularly Huawei and ZTE, are being targeted by public boycott movements.

Although many in Myanmar believe unsubstantiated rumours (hotly denied by Beijing) that Chinese planes transported IT technicians to Myanmar to build an internet firewall and Chinese soldiers were seen in Myanmar streets after the coup, analysts and China experts doubt that Beijing actively backed - or was even happy with - the military takeover on February 1.

The bigger question is why China is now protecting the junta on the international stage, for instance by blocking punitive action along with Russia at the United Nations Security Council, and repeatedly speaking out against countries imposing unilateral sanctions.

Hongwei Fan, a professor at Xiamen University who specialises in Southeast Asia, told the state-controlled Global Times last month that sanctions against the Tatmadaw, such as an arms embargo, cannot coerce the generals to give up political power. The Chinese academic added that ASEAN countries share China and Russia's scepticism of such measures.

Because European geopolitical interests differ from China and other countries, their "attitude on the Myanmar question is of course different", Fan said.

One likely reason for China's stance is its eagerness to prevent Myanmar at its moment of crisis from becoming a stage for foreign influence and possible intervention by its rivals, particularly countries in the West.

"Beijing wants to give the Tatmadaw breathing space and prevent external stakeholders from supporting democratic forces," said Mr Jason Tower, Myanmar director of the United States Institute of Peace, a US think-tank.

But a defeat for these democratic forces would bring its own dividends for China: "If the Tatmadaw wins, Myanmar will be cornered and forced back into China's orbit, like the time before Thein Sein's presidency," he said referring to the reformist, military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party government that ruled from 2011 to 2016.

Tied to broader questions of geopolitical alignment, many in Myanmar are also suspicious that China will use the junta's isolation to press for better terms for its mega-projects, despite their unpopularity in the country. The Thein Sein government gave a preliminary greenlight for a deep-sea port proposal in Kyaukphyu led by China's state-run CITIC Group, but the National League for Democracy government that was elected in 2015 renegotiated the project to ensure more favourable terms for Myanmar.

An ethnic Chinese-Kokang protester in Yangon who uses the name Aung Htoo expressed a common attitude among the public when he told Frontier, "I suspect that China might be backing the junta regime for their own benefit."

But just as the Tatmadaw's tentative move in 2011 to a quasi-democratic system heralded a shift away from over-reliance on China to an attempt to engage the West, the new junta may also be wary of too close a Chinese embrace.

Mr Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli arms dealer whose firm Dickens & Madson Canada has registered as lobbyists for the junta in Washington, is reported as saying that Myanmar's generals want to move closer to the West and away from China. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was perceived as being too close to Beijing, the lobbyist said.

Yet, despite this spin, and despite being known to be wary of China's covert support for ethnic armed groups based along its border with Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing has brought several old China hands into his team. The new international cooperation minister is U Ko Ko Hlaing; the former adviser to President Thein Sein translated Chinese President Xi Jinping's book The Governance of China into Burmese and has cultivated ties with Chinese companies and universities. He also criticised the NLD administration for "wasting two years" by reviewing Chinese-backed railway and deep-sea port projects.

Meanwhile, the anti-coup movement has made few discernible efforts to court Beijing, and has instead largely placed its hopes in China's rivals in the West.

This has defined the approach of Dr Sasa, the minister for international cooperation in the parallel National Unity Government, which was formed in defiance of the junta by a mix of legislators elected in November's general election and ethnic leaders. The dissident minister has met ambassadors and officials from the US and Europe, including the United Kingdom's minister of state for Asia, Mr Nigel Adams, and has received support for offices and capacity building.

The anti-coup movement has had only one known meeting with Chinese officials, when the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw - which formed the NUG in mid-April - held talks with officials from China's embassy in Yangon.

"China has not been given a chance by the NUG or CRPH. They don't have a China envoy or a senior representative designated to interact with Beijing," said Jason Tower of USIP.

Although Xi and his officials managed to build trust with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and her party and cabinet colleagues, these figures are in detention, Tower said, referring to the junta's incarceration of the top NLD leadership right after the coup.

Myanmar political analyst Ye Salween (a pseudonym) said the NUG and CRPH were largely following Myanmar public sentiment in leaning westwards and away from China, whose statements and actions since the coup have done little to inspire popular trust.

Democratic leaders like Dr Sasa "cannot afford to lose public support and together with that, the momentum of the resistance movement," he told Frontier.

However, China appears to be just as unwilling to engage with anti-coup leaders.

"There are implications for China's domestic politics if Beijing publicly embraces Myanmar's democratic movement, with regards to Hong Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere," Tower said.

China's state media reflects a sense of being threatened by the social media solidarity between popular movements in these territories, even if there is little evidence of material support between them.

In February, China's Communist Party mouthpiece The Global Times accused the Milk Tea Alliance, which it called "a loose online coalition of people mostly from regions including Hong Kong and Taiwan, who like to attack China on social media" of stirring up rumours against China in Myanmar. It also blamed Taiwan for exploiting "chaos in Myanmar" to undermine Chinese interests.

A source involved in Chinese diplomatic discussions in Myanmar said Chinese officials and diplomats blamed what they see as Taiwan's influence in Myanmar for stirring up anti-China sentiment.

China and Taiwan have a tangled history in Myanmar, with both sides contesting for control of border regions after remnants of the fleeing Kuomintang army occupied areas of Shan State during the 1950s, with US logistical support, following their defeat by Chinese Communist forces. Even after many KMT supporters shifted to Thailand, communities stayed behind, building Chinese schools and preserving links that have seen many Myanmar people move to Taiwan for education and work.

Taiwan had little official access to Myanmar during the previous decades of military dictatorship. It opened its de facto embassy, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, in Yangon in early 2016 as Aung San Suu Kyi prepared to launch her government after the NLD's landslide election victory in November the previous year.

But China's blame game on Taiwan has little to do with the KMT history, the source said. Instead, they regard the promotion by the government of Taiwanese President Ms Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan as a tourism destination for Myanmar travellers and investment by Taiwanese banks in Myanmar - including Cathay United Bank, E.SUN Commercial Bank and First Commercial Bank - "as a way to stir up problems [for China]".

However, Tsai has not been active in Myanmar's current crisis, contrary to what Myanmar protesters want, apart from foreign ministry statements criticising the coup and condemning the violence against civilians.

Taiwan's national legislature has gone further. It passed a motion last month urging the junta to restore democracy and expressing support for international actions, but stopped short of asking for targeted sanctions. The parliamentary resolution was the first of its kind in the Chinese-speaking world and stands in striking contrast with Beijing's stance.

Despite the many obstacles to engagement, some argue that the NUG ought to be a little more savvy and should court China by appealing to its desire for stability and a conducive environment for large infrastructure development.

"The NUG should appeal to Beijing's own interests by making the case that the coup, and Min Aung Hlaing's illegitimate military regime, is the cause of instability, and that the solution is the establishment of a federal democracy that brings decades of ethnic conflict to an end by recognising the rights of Myanmar's ethnic nationalities," said Mr Benedict Rogers, a British human rights activist and author of three books on Myanmar who has spoken on virtual panels alongside Dr Sasa. "Only a civilian, democratic system can ensure the stability that Beijing values above all else."

Ye Salween agrees, adding that some people in the exiled leadership want to engage with Beijing, but he said it was vital for the NUG to help the public understand China is indispensable for resolving Myanmar's crisis. "There must be a public reckoning of the importance of China in resolving this crisis," he said.

Meanwhile, the NUG should be wary of being seen as too close to movements that are explicitly opposed to the Chinese government, said Rogers.

"The NUG itself may wish to keep a little distance publicly from regional democracy movements, although it would be wise for them to maintain private channels of communication as they need the support of democracies and democracy movements," Rogers added. "Civil society groups in Myanmar can and should continue their involvement in the Milk Tea Alliance, as such solidarity is vital, but it would be understandable if the NUG chose to play a more careful, discreet and diplomatic role in this regard."

But although the current crisis in Myanmar is hardly conducive to Chinese interests, a victory for pro-democracy forces may be more unfavourable.

"It is extremely uncertain what polity Myanmar would become if the regime falls," said Tower of USIP, explaining that, for China, "the Tatmadaw is a buffer between Myanmar and the West. The worst outcome for Chinese leaders is to have a Western-leaning and democratic Myanmar right beside its borders, a lot less friendly to Beijing than Suu Kyi or her old team, and without the Tatmadaw balancing its leanings."

"Also, if the new democratic government wants to clean up the border areas and sort out Wa, Mongla and Kokang [of Shan State] as well as the associated illicit economy and drug trade, this would open a can of worms for China."

Furthermore, while regime change in Myanmar might end up hurting Beijing's interests, China's global standing also allows it to withstand pressure to intervene.

Russia's open support for the junta and more active diplomacy from ASEAN in recent weeks has helped to shift the spotlight from Beijing, but even if China stood alone in protecting the generals, the US and allied nations would struggle for leverage over it.

Ms Kelley Currie, a former US ambassador in the Trump administration and a Myanmar specialist, said Beijing is hoping to "sit on the fence" and deal with the winning party without a "moral calculus" and being "outcome neutral" amid the crisis. But creative strategies could eventually shift China off the fence, she argued.

"The US and others need to use the tools at their disposal - the UN, ASEAN, G7, etc. - to force choices that Beijing does not want to make and, at a minimum, raise the costs of Chinese neutrality," Currie told Frontier.

She said this approach could complement the actions of the Myanmar public, who will remain opposed to China's plans in the country if it fails to change course.

"Given the fierceness and tenacity of the anti-coup forces - not to mention the strategic direction they have taken of uniting Burma's previously disparate opponents of military rule - China's neutrality is increasingly untenable and puts everything they have worked for in Burma at risk," Currie argued.

However, it's questionable how large Myanmar looms in American foreign policy, even within its approach to China.

Mr Hunter Marston, a Canberra-based political analyst, said he doubted the administration of President Joe Biden would tie specific measures in the US-China relationship to cooperation on Myanmar.

"But there's always the possibility of secondary US sanctions that target Chinese businesses continuing to work with the Myanmar military," he said. "That could shift Beijing's level of support for the regime in Nay Pyi Taw."

For now, he said, both China and the US agree on at least one thing: the importance of ASEAN-led efforts to resolve the crisis. That could provide some room for cooperation. "If Beijing and Washington can both communicate to ASEAN the urgent need for action," Marston said, "they may be able to provide constructive support for diplomacy."

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China is walking a tightrope in Myanmar | Frontier Myanmar

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By FRONTIER China has stuck to its foreign policy principles by resolutely opposing international action against Myanmar's junta, but 100 days after the military coup, public anger against Beijing for its perceived support of the generals could jeopardise its ambitions in the country.

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BANGKOK (AP) - After Myanmar's military seized power by ousting the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, it couldn't even make the trains run on time. State railway workers were among the earliest organized opponents of the February takeover, and they went on strike.

Health workers who founded the civil disobedience movement against military rule stopped staffing government medical facilities. Many civil servants were no-shows at work, along with employees of government and private banks. Universities became hotbeds of resistance, and in recent weeks, primary and secondary education has begun to collapse as teachers, students and parents boycott state schools.

One hundred days after their takeover, Myanmar's ruling generals maintain just the pretense of control. The illusion is sustained mainly by its partially successful efforts to shut down independent media and to keep the streets clear of large demonstrations by employing lethal force. More than 750 protesters and bystanders have been killed by security forces, according to detailed independent tallies, and there have been numerous arrests and human rights violations.

"The junta might like people to think that things are going back to normal because they are not killing as many people as they were before and there weren't as many people on the streets as before, but ... the feeling we are getting from talking to people on the ground is that definitely the resistance has not yet subsided," said Thin Lei Win, a journalist now based in Rome who helped found the Myanmar Now online news service in 2015.

She says the main change is that dissent is no longer as visible as in the early days of the protests - before security forces began using live ammunition - when marches and rallies in major cities and towns could easily draw tens of thousands of people.

At the same time, said David Mathieson, an independent analyst who has been working on Myanmar issues for over 20 years, "Because of the very violent pacification of those protests, a lot of people are willing to become more violent."

"We are already starting to see signs of that. And with the right training, the right leadership and the right resources, what Myanmar could experience is an incredibly nasty destructive, internal armed conflict in multiple locations in urban areas."

The junta also faces a growing military challenge in the always restive border regions where ethnic minority groups exercise political power and maintain guerrilla armies. Two of the more battle-hardened groups, the Kachin in the north and the Karen in the east, have declared their support for the protest movement and stepped up their fighting, despite the government military, known as the Tatmadaw, hitting back with greater firepower, including airstrikes.

Even a month ago, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet was describing the situation as grim, saying Myanmar's "economy, education and health infrastructure have been brought to the brink of collapse, leaving millions of Myanmar people without livelihood, basic services and, increasingly, food security."

It was not surprising that The Economist magazine, in an April cover story, labeled Myanmar "Asia's next failed state" and opined it was heading in the direction of Afghanistan.

The U.N.'s Bachelet made a different comparison.

"There are clear echoes of Syria in 2011," she said. "There too, we saw peaceful protests met with unnecessary and clearly disproportionate force. The State's brutal, persistent repression of its own people led to some individuals taking up arms, followed by a downward and rapidly expanding spiral of violence all across the country."

A hundred days after its takeover, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday renewed his call on Myanmar's military "to respect the will of the people and act in the greater interest of peace and stability in the country," U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric said.

Guterres also encouraged the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes Myanmar, to swiftly implement its commitments including a demand to immediately end violence and start a dialogue mediated by a special ASEAN envoy. And he urged the international community "to support regional efforts to bring an end to the repression by the military," Dujarric said.

Bill Richardson, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations with long experience working with Myanmar, said, "The most immediate step is for the government and the opposition to start a dialogue to end the violence and bloodshed. There has to be a negotiation on humanitarian access to keep the economy and ... health care system from collapsing."

Junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has so far shunned all suggestions of talks from the United Nations as well as ASEAN.

He attended a specially called ASEAN summit meeting in Indonesia in April where leaders adopted a "five-point consensus". But within days of returning, Hlaing's junta brushed aside the initiative. He said Myanmar would "give careful consideration to constructive suggestions made by ASEAN Leaders when the situation returns to stability in the country since priorities at the moment were to maintain law and order and to restore community peace and tranquility."

Myanmar's resistance movement, meanwhile, has organized widely and swiftly underground.

Within days of the junta takeover, elected parliamentarians who were denied their seats convened their own self-styled Parliament. Its members have formed a shadow National Unity Government with guidelines for an interim constitution, and last week, a People's Defense Force as a precursor to a Federal Union Army. Many cities, towns and even neighborhoods had already formed local defense groups which in theory will now become part of the People's Defense Force.

Aside from being morale boosters, these actions serve a strategic purpose by endorsing a federal style of government, which has been sought for decades by the country's ethnic minorities to give them autonomous powers in the border areas where they predominate.

Promoting federalism, in which the center shares power with the regions, aligns the interests of the anti-military pro-democracy movement with the goals of the ethnic minorities. In theory, this could add a real military component to a movement whose armaments are generally no deadlier than Molotov cocktails and air rifles - though homemade bombs have been added to its arsenals in recent weeks.

In practice, at least for the time being, the guerrilla armies of the Kachin in the north and the Karen in the east will fight as they always have, to protect their own territory. They can give military training to the thousands of activists that are claimed to have fled the cities to their zones, but are still overmatched by the government's forces. But on their home ground they hold an advantage against what their populations consider an occupying army. That may be enough.

"The only thing that the military is really threatened by is when all of these disparate voices and communities around the country actually start working against it, not as a unified monolith, but all working against the military's interests," said the analyst, Mathieson. "And I think that's the best that we can hope for moving forward, that the people recognize that all efforts have to go against the military. And if that means fighting up in the hills and doing peaceful protests and other forms of striking back against the military in the towns and the cities, then so be it."

It's hard to gauge if the army has a breaking point.

Mathieson said he's seen no signs the junta was willing to negotiate or concede anything. The Tatmadaw is "remarkably resilient. And they recognize that this is an almost existential threat to their survival."

___

Associated Press journalist Jerry Harmer contributed to this report.

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100 days in power, Myanmar junta holds pretense of control

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BANGKOK (AP) - After Myanmar's military seized power by ousting the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, it couldn't even make the trains run on time. State railway workers were among the earliest organized opponents of the February takeover, and they went on strike...

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About 23 villagers, including 14 civilian resistance force members, were arrested Monday after the junta's troops scoured the forests in Sagaing Region's Kani Township.

Among several townships in Sagaing, Magwe regions and Chin states resisting against the military regime, Kani has been one of the most prominent.

Civilians there have conducted a series of defense actions against the junta's forces since April 2, taking up homemade percussion lock firearms to do battle. Percussion lock firearms use technology dating back to the early 19 th century.

On Thursday and Friday, about eight shootouts occurred across the township when civilian resistance forces attacked the juntas' troops travelling through the area both on land and on the Chindwin River.

In the shootouts, an estimated 16 military troops were killed. Nearly 13,000 villagers from at least two-dozen villages in the township have been hiding in nearby forests in fear of raids by the junta's troops.

After facing the growing civilian resistance, the reinforced junta troops have been conducting not only raids on villages but have also been scouring the forests, using drones and forced guides to uncover the civilian resistance forces.

On Monday morning, about 80 military troops arrested about nine villagers from Thaminchan, Aung Mingalar and Minma villages who had been hiding in the nearby forests, according to a member of Kani's civilian resistance force.

After forcing arrested villagers to act as a guide, the troops also raided the forest of Hman Taung Mountain and arrested 14 members of civilian resistance forces who had been hiding.

Monday afternoon, all of those who had been detained were sent to Monywa of Sagaing Region, according to local residents.

A member of township's resistance force said that about 17 military vehicles loaded with junta troops from Monywa and river boats carrying 100 junta troops from upper Sagaing Region were on their way to Kani on Monday afternoon to conduct further crackdowns on the civilian resistance forces.

"The main thing we need is proper firearms and ammunitions. Our percussion lock firearms do not work well in the shootouts," said the member of the civilian assistance forces.

In the Friday shootouts, military troops used heavy explosives, making use of drones to locate the civilian forces in the forests. In a Friday shootout at Kyauklonegyi Mountain in Kani, about eight military troops were killed and several were wounded, while seven villagers fighting against them were killed.

In a press conference on Friday concerning the armed resistance in Chin State and Sagaing Region, the military regime said that it will not tolerate any armed resistance.

On that day, the National Unity Government, its parliamentary committee and their offshoot civilian defense forces were branded as "terrorist groups" by the military regime, which accused them of incitement against the junta.

You may also like these stories: Myanmar's Long History of Informants Myanmar Junta Forces Detain Rakhine Chief Minister's Daughter Myanmar Junta Declares National Unity Government, CRPH, Defense Forces as 'Terrorist' Groups

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Myanmar Junta Forces Scour Forests in Search of Civilian Resistance

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About 23 villagers, including 14 civilian resistance force members, were arrested Monday after the junta's troops scoured the forests in Sagaing Region's Kani Township. Among several townships in Sagaing, Magwe regions and Chin states resisting against the military regime, Kani has been one of the most prominent.

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Myanmar’s Coup and the Inevitable Return of the ‘Failed State’ Rhetoric

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Myanmar’s Coup and the Inevitable Return of the ‘Failed State’ Rhetoric

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TeaCircle

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Stefan Bächtold argues that calling Myanmar a 'failed state' could reinforce the Tatmadaw's narratives and undermine the protest movements.
Writing about abstract concepts like statehood feels out of place in light of the violent and brutal acts that the Tatmadaw - as the Myanmar military is known - commits against the country's population on a daily basis. More direct, practical accounts seem warranted to raise awareness for Myanmar's suffering and to call upon ASEAN, China, the international community - anybody, really - to act.

Without doubt, such calls are important. But how we make sense of Myanmar's plight matters, too. As critical scholars have reminded us countless times [1], the way we problematise a situation - the words, concepts, narratives we use - shapes the options we have available to respond. In view of the recent trend among even well-respected and knowledgeable observers to refer to Myanmar as on the brink of becoming a ' failed state,' this article cautions against the dangers that come with looking at Myanmar through a 'failed state' lens. I argue that the notion of the 'failed state' is a heavily securitised one that risks reinforcing the Tatmadaw's own narrative; it overly relies on a Euro-centric, Western understanding of statehood that occludes the political nature of (state) service delivery; and its inherent conservatism and focus on upholding 'order' risks undermining the efforts of the protests and the national civil disobedience movement (CDM).

Looking at the historic usage of the notion of the 'failed state' in other places shows that it is not a politically innocent term. Denoting certain places as 'failed states' became prominent after the 9/11 attacks, and during the subsequent 'War on Terror' [2]. 'Failed states' were invoked to urge the international community to 'do something' about places that were portrayed as rogue, lawless, and uncontrollable pockets of 'unrest.' Accordingly, the interventions typically proposed by the proponents of the 'failed state' rhetoric have mainly relied on military means to impose order - either through (armed) intervention by external powers or by strengthening the grip of local security forces on the territories in question.

Needless to say, neither of these options typically gave much weight to the interests, well-being, or suffering of the people living in these areas. What they were concerned with were narrow security considerations: bringing a strong-handed order to uncontrolled territory, and(/or) preventing places from becoming ' breeding grounds ' for extremist groups or illicit economies.

To anybody with knowledge about Myanmar's recent history, such a narrative will sound uncannily familiar: a country threatened by descent into uncontrollable chaos, on the brink of disintegration, and in need of a strong hand to keep order - this is the story the Tatmadaw tells about its own raison d'être. It is the same story the Tatmadaw told the world (and itself) to justify the more than 70 years of war it waged against Myanmar's ethnic minorities. It is the same story the Tatmadaw told to justify its atrocities against the Rohingya in Rakhine state from 2016 onwards, when it claimed to fight against 'terrorists' establishing a foothold in Rakhine. The military campaigns that the Tatmadaw justified with these narratives have displaced over 700,000 people into neighbouring Bangladesh and are currently being investigated as genocide by the International Court of Justice [3].

The 'failed state' rhetoric, warning that chaos in Myanmar could destabilise the whole region, certainly creates urgency to act. But it also securitises [4]: it constitutes security considerations - rather than human rights, or even human life - as the foremost problem in the current situation. By using such a securitised rhetoric, international pundits thus risk inadvertently reinforcing and legitimising the Tatmadaw's own securitised narrative of the current events. After soldiers use live ammunition to fire on protesters, the military regularly claims that security forces were merely responding to what they call violent ' mobs', 'riots' or ' armed terrorists ' to restore 'order' [5].

This 'failed state' image of a country on the brink of chaos thus risks further entrenching the Tatmadaw's framing of the protests as lawless 'riots' that should be treated as a security problem. This framing conveniently allows the military to brush aside the political demands of the protests and opposition to the coup. Instead, the generals can go back to their old, paternalistic tale where they portray the Tatmadaw as the only institution able to guarantee the 'non-disintegration' of Myanmar and to uphold order in a country under 'threat.'

The second problematic aspect of the 'failed state' lens is its conception of the state itself. Critical scholars have pointed out that at its core, the 'failed state' is a Euro-centric concept [6]: It relies on an ideal-typical conception of how (Western European) states have formed. But the 'failed state' rhetoric strips this ideal-typical conception of its historical context and universalises it as a normative blueprint for what every state should look like [7]. To paraphrase Max Weber's famous definition, the state is thus understood as a singular, central authority that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory. In turn, states that do not fit this blueprint are then described as 'lacking,' or 'failed'.

As Mary Callahan [8] has shown, such a monopoly cannot be considered a normative, unpolitical, or ahistorical given for Myanmar. To the contrary, the (central) state and its authority are heavily contested. Such a singular monopoly on the use of force is what the Tatmadaw has been striving for over the last 70 years with its ruthless military campaigns against ethnic minorities and their demands for more autonomy. Myanmar has not one, but a plethora of arrangements [9] that perform authority, govern people, and that look very much like states - although clearly with varying degrees of legitimacy. Besides the central state, there are the institutions created by the ethnic armed organisations [10], the more localised rule of certain militias and their business interests [11], or even the actors and companies involved in land investments [12-14]. Some argue that the Tatmadaw has actively used such arrangements to extend its reach into the country's borderlands [12, 15]; and that economies like the illegal drug trade can be considered as 'statebuilding' [16]. Thus, illicit economies would not just suddenly spring up in the current situation - they have existed and functioned very efficiently in the status quo before the coup. The implied warning in the 'failed state' rhetoric, namely that Myanmar would now suddenly devolve into what has been called a 'bad neighbour' [17] that would draw bordering countries into a quagmire of illicit economies and 'unleashed' criminal forces, thus seems odd. It certainly underplays both the extent of illicit economies and other arrangements before the coup, as well as the complexities of their (stabilising and destabilising) effects.

At the same time, being overly concerned with the central state's (or now, the Tatmadaw's) loss of authority and control, the 'failed state' lens ignores alternative arrangements of how government happens and the potentially positive role these could play. I am thinking particularly of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH, representing the elected parliament) and its National Unity Government (NUG); the quasi-states of the ethnic armed organisations and their administrations; and also of emerging structures in the protest and civil disobedience movements. That ASEAN invited only the coup leader for its recent summit to address the situation in Myanmar, and none of the latter institutions, is a testament to what the 'failed state' rhetoric ignores.

Finally, when calls for intervention base themselves on the dangers of a 'failed state,' what they implicitly call for is order. And more often than not, those making such calls for order look for potential actors to create it according to the (Western) blueprint outlined above. In doing so, they turn their gaze to the various security forces or (central) government administration offices, which, of course, would have to be reformed, have their 'capacity' built, or be sent to human rights awareness trainings. The 'failed state' rhetoric thus has an inherently conservative dimension that prioritises stability over transformation [18]. Such a preference for orderly, gradual change helps explain why the international community so neatly aligned with the Tatmadaw's transition to a 'discipline-flourishing' democracy after 2011. The prospect of an orderly transition and stability seemed sufficient to legitimise an uneasy pact between elites that left the country's power structures largely intact and was bought at the expense of the minorities in the country's periphery - and now also the larger population in the centres - who are bearing the violence unleashed in the name of 'upholding order'.

If we problematise Myanmar's current situation in terms of a 'failed state' in-the-making, the danger is that we only look for solutions to impose order and to prevent collapse of state structures and services. Certainly, human suffering ensues when health and education services are not available, or when economic collapse threatens the livelihoods of large parts of the population. It is not that the striking health professionals, teachers, government administrators, dock and railway workers, or bank staff of the CDM are not perfectly aware of this. They are. But people continue supporting the CDM because general strikes are one of the few strategies Myanmar's people have at their disposal in their struggle against the Tatmadaw's coup. And because they prioritise this struggle over the 'stability' and 'order' under military rule. The smooth functioning and effective delivery of government services may range high in international benchmarks to assess 'state fragility,' but it is not a neutral indicator of the current situation. It is highly political, contested - and exactly what the CDM aims to disrupt. These disruptions are not failures of the state; they are achievements of the CDM's resistance, and they have been won at the cost of immense effort and human suffering. If government services were to return to functioning smoothly, it would not necessarily mean that 'state failure' has been averted. If they were achieved under the current circumstances, it would rather mean that the military coup has succeeded.

In academic discussion, the notion of the 'failed state' has been largely discredited. However, its recent traction in the international discourse on Myanmar illustrates that this securitised framing still haunts much of the thinking of the international community. If interventions to address the current suffering in Myanmar are solely informed by a 'failed state' lens, they are likely to reproduce another elite pact, prioritising order similarly to the compromised status quo that existed before the coup.
(Featured image courtesy of the author) Dr Stefan Bächtold is an associate researcher at the swisspeace Foundation. He has recently held visiting fellowships at the Technical University of Munich, Germany, and Monash University Malaysia. The opinions expressed here are his own.
In contrast, many of the protesters who are imprisoned, tortured, and killed for opposing the coup are demanding something new, a bigger change. They deserve to be heard.

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Myanmar's Coup and the Inevitable Return of the 'Failed State' Rhetoric

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Stefan Bächtold argues that calling Myanmar a 'failed state' could reinforce the Tatmadaw's narratives and undermine the protest movements. Writing about abstract concepts like statehood feels out of place in light of the violent and brutal acts that the Tatmadaw - as the Myanmar military is known - commits against the country's population on a...

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Panel Discussion: Myanmar coup fallout: Illicit economies, trafficking and transnational crime

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Panel Discussion: Myanmar coup fallout: Illicit economies, trafficking and transnational crime

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Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand

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Myanmar’s Generals Run a Nearly Sanction-Proof Business Empire

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Myanmar’s Generals Run a Nearly Sanction-Proof Business Empire

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Bloomberg

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"The military authorities are showing no sign of letting up in their brutal crackdown on opponents in a bid to consolidate their hold on power", spokesperson Rupert Colville told journalists at a media briefing.

Military authorities are showing no sign of letting up in their brutal crackdown on opponents in a bid to consolidate their hold on power
-OHCHR spokesperson Rupert Colville

According to credible reports, as of 10 May, at least 782 people have been killed as security forces used unnecessary, disproportionate and lethal force, to suppress demonstrations and other forms of public participation, since the military coup on 1 February.

"While much of the world's attention has been on the number of peaceful protesters and bystanders killed by the security forces, the authorities continue to commit other gross human rights violations against the people of Myanmar", added Mr. Colville.

The OHCHR spokesperson called for greater international involvement to prevent the human rights situation there from deteriorating further.

In particular, he urged the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to "react quickly and to intensify its actions" to ensure Myanmar's military leadership adheres to the commitments it made in the five-point plan agreed at the regional bloc's meeting of leaders on 24 April, in Jakarta.

The five-point consensus agreed to an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and that dialogue should be held among all parties to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.

Guterres: Respect the will of the people

Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General António Guterres continues to stand with the people of Myanmar, his Spokesperson said in a statement issued later on Tuesday.

The UN chief has renewed his call on the military to respect the will of the people and act in the greater interest of peace and stability in the country.

He encouraged ASEAN "to swiftly follow through on its own commitments", while urging the international community to support regional efforts and also respond to the increased humanitarian needs.

"The Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Christine Schraner Burgener, is in the region and continues to engage intensively with a range of key stakeholders, including in light of the broader ramifications of the crisis. She continues to promote coherent international action," the statement said.

'Daily raids' on homes and offices

Mr. Colville went on to note that there are daily raids on private homes and offices, with more than 3,740 people currently in detention, including many in situations that may amount to enforced disappearances.

"Of those in custody, the vast majority have not been brought before a judge, while most of the 86 people prosecuted thus far have been tried in secret, with limited or no access to any form of legal counsel", he said.

"Military tribunals and courts martial have been established in several townships in which martial law was declared. At least 25 individuals have received the death sentence to date - some 20 of whom were tried in absentia."

Military 'taking relatives'

Over the past month, the military leadership has issued more than 1,561 arrest warrants against civil society activists, trade unionists, journalists, academics, public personalities and online voices, driving the vast majority of them underground.

"To intensify pressure, the military authorities have resorted to taking relatives of wanted people into custody to force them to turn themselves in to the police", Mr. Colville said, adding that there is also increasing pressure on civil servants to go back to work.

In recent weeks, more than 3,000 civil servants - nearly 70 per cent women - have been dismissed, removed, or suspended by the coup leadership. Those suspended also include 990 university professors, researchers and assistants.

In addition, there are reports that up to 11,000 more workers in the education sector were suspended on Monday.

'Deeply concerned' for those fleeing persecution

The OHCHR spokesperson also voiced "deep concerns" for the people fleeing persecution, especially human rights defenders and journalists.

According to the UN refugee agency ( UNHCR), several hundred people from Myanmar have crossed into Thailand and India in recent weeks.

The people seeking safety outside Myanmar must receive such protection and support from Myanmar's neighbours, Mr. Colville urged, adding that while it can take time to decide whether an individual fleeing the country is a refugee or not, "at the very least they should be treated as an asylum seeker and not forced to go back".

"This is particularly important for people with jobs as sensitive as journalists and those active in the civil disobedience movement, opposing the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military)."

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Myanmar coup: 'No sign' of end to brutal crackdown on all fronts

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"The military authorities are showing no sign of letting up in their brutal crackdown on opponents in a bid to consolidate their hold on power", spokesperson Rupert Colville told journalists at a media briefing.

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Nine junta troops have died between Sunday and Tuesday in Hakha, the capital of Chin State, as civilian resistance fighters stepped up attacks.

Four junta troops at a military checkpoint in Hakha near the Light Infantry Battalion 645 headquarters died in an attack on Sunday evening. And four more died in attacks on a junta outpost at an intersection on Monday, said the Chinland Defence Force in Hakha.

Another soldier died in an attack near the military-owned Innwa Bank in the town on Tuesday night. The attacks by civilians are mostly "hit-and-run" operations, said the armed group.

"It happened at around 8.30 pm during an electricity blackout. I heard 15 to 20 shots. A soldier died," said a Hakha resident.

The Chinland Defence Force said it attacked the outpost near Innwa Bank because it was near a key junction. The military did not block the road on Wednesday morning after the attack.

The regime has not reported the attacks in Hakha in the newspapers it controls.

You may also like these stories: New Myanmar Junta-Owned Hospital Targeted by Bombs Bomb Blast in Pyinmana Injures Myanmar Junta Policeman Myanmar Junta Forces Open Fire on Villagers Protesting School Reopening
Topics: Chin State, civil disobedience movement, civilian deaths, Coup, crackdown, Democracy, Hakha, Human Rights, junta, military in politics, military regime, Min Aung Hlaing, National League for Democracy, National Unity Government, November 8 general election, Rule of Law, State Administrative Council, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Tatmadaw

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Chin Resistance Fighters Kill Nine Myanmar Junta Soldiers

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Nine junta troops have died between Sunday and Tuesday in Hakha, the capital of Chin State, as civilian resistance fighters stepped up attacks. Four junta troops at a military checkpoint in Hakha near the Light Infantry Battalion 645 headquarters died in an attack on Sunday evening.

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A portrait of Myanmar poet K Za Win, who was killed in protests on March 3, 2021. Photo supplied

In one of his last Facebook posts before being shot dead at a protest against the Myanmar coup, poet K Za Win explained his commitment to the nationwide revolt in the same poignant language that characterized his writing.

"Though I have different views than you, I'll lay down my life for you all," he said in the Feb. 21 post, uploaded a few minutes before midnight.

Less than two weeks later, on March 3, the 39-year-old poet, activist, and beloved friend of many made good on his promise, shielding younger protesters from harm as security forces fired into the crowd in the central city of Monywa. Junta-controlled state media previously said they were controlling the protests with "minimum force and through the least harmful means."

A horrific video uploaded to YouTube on March 4-which Amnesty International's Evidence Lab confirmed was taken in Monywa-shows lifeless bodies splayed on a blood-stained road near the city's Phaya Ni pagoda. Security forces dragged one away by the hands. K Za Win's body was found at the morgue the same day, according to multiple accounts provided to VICE World News. The place where he died has been named "Martyrs Street."

K Za Win was one of at least 60 people killed across the country since the military seized power on Feb. 1. March 3 was particularly bloody, as 38 people died fighting to save Myanmar's young democracy, using pithy slogans, artistic placards and peaceful rallies against automatic weapons and tear gas. But unbelievably, he wasn't the only poet who fell. On what has been called the deadliest day since the coup, popular teacher and poet Myint Myint Zin was also killed in Monywa. Like other protesters fearing the worst, she wrote her blood type and personal details on her arm should she need to be identified. In addition to the two deaths, at least nine poets have been arrested, with some reportedly sentenced to time in prison, according to advocacy group PEN International.

Friends, relatives and Myanmar's tight-knit poetry community are reeling from the deaths of their colleagues. But in a country where verses have channelled dissent since the British colonial era, where nearly a dozen poets were elected to parliament in 2015, and where poetry has rarely been about navel-gazing, it comes as no surprise that writers have been on the front lines of the uprising.

"In every revolution in Burma, poetry and poets have been in crucial roles. With the arrival of the smartphone in the hands of everyone, it's a great help to send poetry to the people," said an acquaintance of K Za Win's named Ko Than Tun, who used the country's previous name. "To be a poet in Burma is more than being just a poet. There are many obstacles and struggles. Burmese poetry can't escape from the reality of daily lives and settle somewhere."

Well-known in the country's poetry circles, 67-year-old Ko Than Tun first met K Za Win after a 2014 farmers protest against a Chinese-owned copper mine operating on their land in Letpadaung, which is near Monywa. At the height of the clashes, a woman in her 50s was killed. K Za Win-whose given name was Chanthar Swe, but like most poets in Myanmar is better known by his pen name-had more than a tangential connection to the area. He was born in Letpadaung in 1982 to a peasant family. His first piece of writing was published in his school magazine when he was 16, PEN International said. His poems started appearing in local magazines in 2004, and he became a member of the Monywa Poet's Union.

In 2015, he was one of several activists who participated in a storied march for education reform that started in Mandalay and aimed to make it hundreds of miles south to Yangon. Stopped short on the outskirts of the city, the protesters were beaten by police in an incident that made international headlines. K Za Win was jailed for more than a year before being released in a pardon after Aung San Suu Kyi came to power in 2016. Suu Kyi, whose refusal to condemn human rights violations disillusioned former supporters in the country, was herself arrested at the start of the coup and is now facing several charges brought by the junta.

Ko Than Tun became close friends with K Za Win after his release from jail in 2016; he respected the way he used his art in the service of his beliefs.

"Among the handful of poets who write poems for a cause, I accepted him for his poems and his political ideas," Ko Than Tun said.

While in prison, K Za Win wrote a long verse addressed to his father, which touched on the duties of a son, the abuses of the state, and the tensions between them:
the River, whose stomach on our tiny house on the bank, hasn't she? Right in front of the house you must be looking out for someone to straighten the river,
The poem moves from the picture of life at home to much wider themes about authoritarian power structures, corruption and inequality.
If thieves are ungovernable, if thugs are ungovernable, what's the point of government? Whatever happens to the jungles whatever happens to the mountains whatever happens to the rivers just the way they love to grate a coconut,

The night before the military takeover, on Jan. 31, K Za Win slept at the home of his good friend Kyi Zaw Aye, one of Myanmar's most important poets who met him while working on a literary magazine together. They learned about the coup with the rest of the country the next morning, on Feb. 1. Though information was trickling out slowly because of an internet blackout, K Za Win immediately sensed the importance of what was happening.

"He told me a battle is coming, we'll have to go to it," he said. They both took to the streets.

Soon after, Monywa, where K Za Win worked as a teacher, became the site of some of the most turbulent protests against the regime.

Throughout the month of February, his Facebook page was filled with posts about the events, including pictures, short thoughts and statements. On Feb. 23, he uploaded one of his last published poems titled "About the Skulls." Parts of it are a call to action but also a shot across the bow at meaningless international expressions of concern:
Before the revolution blooms, from the busted skull on the road, are there any words for us? When confronted with devils, do statements still matter?
He ended by encouraging everyone to take part in the peaceful demonstrations and not sit on the sidelines.
the detonator of the revolution is
The day before his death, on March 2, K Za Win again stressed the importance of the protests in a short post:
Don't utter a word that will undermine this job. Don't think a thought that will undermine this job. The job at hand is not just for one party or one organization. This job has to do with the future of the entire human race.
Crowds gathered in different groups on March 3 in Monywa, as state-backed forces assembled to confront the protesters. K Za Win was with book designer and publisher Lwin Htet Hlaing, 44, who he has been friends with since 2013, when the younger poet worked for him in Yangon. They later both moved back to Monywa and stayed close. Asked to reflect on what motivated his friend, he said K Za Win was guided by an outlook that seemed to transcend partisanship and groupthink. He added that he did not vote for Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, in elections last year. When the coup happened, they joined the demonstrations not out of loyalty to politicians but because it was wrong.

"We took part in the revolution not for a single party, but we stood up for justice," Lwin Htet Hlaing said.

On that fateful March 3, K Za Win was at the front of a large rally as tensions mounted with security forces, who had not used lethal force on the demonstrations there yet. When Lwin Htet Hlaing came next to him, K Za Win turned, grabbed him by the hand, and told him to go back to where it was safer.

"He told me 'bro, you don't have any gas mask, go back.'" Lwin Htet Hlaing retreated. As he went away, he saw K Za Win picking up a tear gas canister and tossing it away. Another close friend named Khet Thi said K Za Win stayed behind to help students when others ran in terror during the crackdown. He believes K Za Win was shot in the back by security forces, though the claim could not be independently verified.

After the protest, friends regrouped. But they could not reach K Za Win. He wasn't answering his phone the next morning. They went to the hospital to try and find his body but authorities would only let family members in. Eventually, someone staying in his house showed up and positively identified him. Their worst fears were confirmed. Khet Thi said his friend was faithful to his words.

"It's just like he posted on his Facebook page: 'Though I have different views than you, I'll lay down my life for you all,'" he said.

"If necessary, we too have decided to do the same as him."
*Additional biographical information and translation from Burmese to English was contributed by poet and translator Ko Ko Thett.

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Poets Are Among the 'Martyrs' in Myanmar Coup Protests

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A portrait of Myanmar poet K Za Win, who was killed in protests on March 3, 2021. Photo supplied In one of his last Facebook posts before being shot dead at a protest against the Myanmar coup, poet K Za Win explained his commitment to the nationwide revolt in the same poignant language that characterized his writing.