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I think that it is extremely important to consider all people involved in a conflict, and how your actions impact each person and organization involved. The U.S. getting involved in the Vietnam War was seen as selfish and pointless by many, as they believed it was only to beef up U.S. alliances and to look like a grand, amazing hero. In the end, this did not occur, but the U.S. media did try to make it seem as if the U.S. had won and was a total hero. To enter a conflict of this caliber and to risk the lives of others should be a complete necessity, and not a choice that could have gone either way. It seemed that American politicians were avoiding telling the truth about their motives for U.S. involvement in the war, as if they either were ashamed of their reasons, or felt that their motives would not seem important enough to sacrifice the lives of 58,000+ American soldiers, not to mention the millions of Vietnamese that would be killed during the conflict.

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My brief explanation of the U.S.'s involvement in the Vietnam War.

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Nixon says he has a plan for winning the war.

Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam
November 3, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world -- the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for peace? Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20:

- The war had been going on for 4 years. 1,000 Americans had been killed in action.

- The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

- No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

- The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others -- I among them -- have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before; They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation -- and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said:

... we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South VietNam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront. In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiation I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace -- initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from this letter to you now:

Dear Mr. President:

I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one -- least of all the people of Vietnam.

The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as well as the good news -- where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine -- a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with US or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business -- not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new l policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full l responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

- Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

- Most important -- United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in a Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must -- in all candor -- leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

- I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

- Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary, a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace -- not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight -- to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans -- I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated -- the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it. I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with our hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

Explanation: In this speech, it is evident that Nixon sees U.S. involvement as necessary, but understands that many citizens do not share the same opinion. He is seeking unity of the nation behind this cause, as he needs support from the citizens to better make decisions concerning the war. He believes that he could create some forming of lasting peace through winning this war.

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It has been 30 years since the end of the Vietnam War, and the country once known for strife and crushing poverty has emerged as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world.

Foreign investors flooded into Vietnam in the early 1990's, betting that the communist nation's "doi moi" economic reforms could make it the next Asian tiger economy. But by the late 1990's, the investors were pulling out almost as fast as they had come in. Doi moi, which means "renewal", was seen as too slow moving, and investors turned their attention to neighboring China.

Yet, in the past five years, Vietnam's cautious policy on reforms has quietly yielded results. Annual GDP growth has averaged nearly 7 percent a year. Poverty, which once plagued two-thirds of the population, has been cut in half. Average income for Vietnamese has doubled in the last 10 years.

Klaus Rohland, country representative for the World Bank, says those numbers are impressive by any standard.

"Vietnam is a major success story. As of 1992 until now, they have grown on average, by more than 6 percent," he said. "Last year they grew by like 7.5, 7.8 percent. And that is way above average growth. And it's probably, with the exception of China, the best performing economy in the world.

For all its success, Vietnam remains a poor country. Average income may have doubled, but it is still only about $600 a year - far behind wealthier neighbors like Thailand and Malaysia. Still, the mood is optimistic.

In Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the sound of construction has become almost constant. Property prices have jumped by more than half in the past three years, as just about everyone seems to be renovating houses and building new office buildings. Real estate experts say office space in Ho Chi Minh City now costs the same as in suburban Tokyo or Paris.

Much of Vietnam's newfound prosperity comes from commodities exports like oil and agricultural products. The International Monetary Fund says Vietnam is the world's largest pepper exporter, and the second-largest exporter of rice, coffee and cocoa. Tourist arrivals reached three million visitors last year. That is only about a quarter of the tourists that Thailand welcomes, but is still up 50 percent from just three years previously. Nguyen Thanh Huong runs a souvenir shop in Hanoi's busy Hang Gai Street.

"Around late winter and early spring, there are many tourists Vietnam. Business is very good and I have a lot of customers," he said.

Economists say Vietnam still has a long way to go before its economy can match its more developed neighbors. Its expected entry into the World Trade Organization later this year could help. But first the government must further reform its banking and investment sectors - which now lend most of their funds to money-losing state-owned companies instead of private entrepreneurs.

Still, even foreign investors are beginning to regain confidence in Vietnam. This year's foreign direct investment is up by 30 percent. As the Communist Party touts its 30-year-old victory in the Vietnam War this week, Vietnam's economy gives the country something else to celebrate.

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голос америки

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Vietnam Enjoying Economic Recovery 30 Years After War

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It has been 30 years since the end of the Vietnam War, and the country once known for strife and crushing poverty has emerged as one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Foreign investors flooded into Vietnam in the early 1990's, betting that the communist nation's "doi moi" economic reforms could make it the next Asian tiger economy.

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Le Brothers examine the cracks behind a united Vietnam in their first Singapore solo exhibition.

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SINGAPORE: Talking to Vietnamese artists Le Duc Hai and Le Ngoc Thanh can be a disorienting experience. They both dress in a funky way and sport tattoos, have the same long hair and goatee, wear shades and nose rings, and finish each other's sentences. But that is probably to be expected when you are dealing with twins.

The 41-year-old brothers, who go by the collective name Le Brothers, are among the rising stars in Vietnam's contemporary art scene. And for the past decade, they have been using their identities as twins to explore a single theme: The effects of a war that once split their country in two.

This is evident in their first solo show in Singapore, titled North-Center-South. Organised by Chan Hampe Galleries and currently up at the former Louis Vuitton space at Raffles Hotel until Feb 9, the show features lacquer portraits of Ho Chi Minh and other prominent communist leaders; military uniforms and Mao suits flamboyantly embellished with embroidered motifs; and portraits of people who lived in what was then North or South Vietnam.
CLOSE TO HOME

Le Brothers' exhibition North-Center-South explores the world of post-war Vietnam. (Photo: Chan Hampe Galleries)

For the brothers, who were first introduced to Singapore audiences with a video work at the Singapore Biennale in 2013, Vietnam's recent divided past was an issue that hit close to home - literally.

The brothers were born in 1975, just 27 days before the reunification of the country. They grew up in the province of Quang Binh in what was then North Vietnam and they now both live in the city of Hue, which is just 100 kilometres south of the infamous 17 th Parallel that had divided Vietnam.

"We were born in the north and we live in the south. If our country wasn't united now, then who are we? It's a big question for us. The concept of North and South Vietnam made us think a lot as artists," said Hai, citing parallels to other countries that are or were politically split, such as Korea and Germany.

Their parents had first-hand experience of the war but by the time the brothers were born, it was nearly over. Even so, the effects were still all around them. "We basically had a poor life. There were no temples, culturally there was nothing for children to look to or believe in because of the war and the American bombs. But my hometown had a library and we read a lot," said Hai.

Le Brothers' Le Duc Hai (left) and Le Ngoc Thanh. (Photo: Mayo Martin)

Art also proved to be a way out of their situation. "When we finished high school, we didn't know what jobs we'd have and we didn't know how to manage our lives. But we had one uncle who was a painter for the government and he had a good life. So my father asked us if we wanted to be artists and we said yes!" recalled Thanh, with a smile.

But even government-sanctioned artmaking was not good enough. After studying in Hue, they would eventually decide that making portraits for government officials and doing art projects for the state just was not their thing.

THANK YOU, STARBUCKS
The two branched out to teaching and curating, while also doing their own respective works, which were mostly tourist-friendly paintings.

"We used the time to make very beautiful paintings for decoration and to sell to tourists," said Hai.

It was not until 2008 when the twins joined forces to officially make art as Le Brothers - and Starbucks had a say in that.

"When we would travel overseas and buy coffee at Starbucks, they would always ask for our names, but they don't understand Hai or Thanh - they'd say it's too long. So we'd say we were Le - two letters. So we later thought, we're brothers, we look like best friends, why not make one name for two people? We say we're Le Brothers and work together? All because of Starbucks coffee," said Hai, with a laugh.

(Photo: Chan Hampe Galleries)

With a brand new name, the brothers forged a new identity. They left behind their tourist-friendly paintings and went into contemporary art.

And they have certainly been busy - they have been juggling many different projects at the same time, crossing into performance art and video art. One of their projects entails taking photos together every single day as a kind of diary documentation.

And because they are based in Hue - a city that is more known for being a UNESCO heritage site, and is overshadowed by the more prominent art centres of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City - they have been relatively free to explore their art the way they want to.
"SAME SAME BUT DIFFERENT"
They also adopted a kind of pay-it-forward attitude in their artmaking. Around the same time they came up with the Le Brothers moniker, the two artists started the New Space Arts Foundation. The non-profit arts space opens its doors to residencies for artists in Vietnam and all over the world, as well as for exhibitions and other events. To date, it has hosted 120 events and 40 artist residencies.

Despite their busy schedules, they have also had time to run, with the help of their families, an F&B business on the side - a Japanese restaurant called Kyodai (which means "brother" in Japanese) that is now a popular eating haunt.

Despite the Le Brothers' success, the themes they have explored in their art continue to be somewhat contentious. Despite being a united country once more, Vietnam's northern and southern sides still tend to get on each others' nerves, they said.

"It's same same but different," said Hai. "The weather is different, the cultures and accents are different (between north and south Vietnam)."

Added Nguyen Minh Ngoc, project manager of the New Space Arts Foundation: "The mindset of people from the northern and southern areas are not (similar) and there's still much conflict going on. The people from the south sometimes don't like those from the north and vice versa."

One example of the tensions came up in 2014, during an exhibition of a series of paintings for a project called Before 86, which referred to the economic reforms in Vietnam in 1986. The paintings had included soldiers wearing uniforms associated with the southern, pro-American side during the Vietnam War. These were not allowed to be shown in Vietnam.

"That's the thing, Vietnam is united but why would these paintings be blocked? They didn't want to show these southern soldiers," said Ngoc.

(Photo: Chan Hampe Galleries)

Post-war Vietnam is something the Vietnamese continue to come to terms with, but even outsiders still have their misconceptions, said the brothers.

"When people ask where we come from and we say Vietnam, they go 'Oh, the American War, you're poor, the Communists control you. They don't understand but they talk. They haven't been to our country but talk as if they already know (everything)," said Hai.

"But even if we've lived for a long time in my country, we still learn something new every day - the life, the culture, the people. We still try to look and understand."

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Brothers in arms: Twin artists Le Brothers explore life in Vietnam after the war

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Le Brothers examine the cracks behind a united Vietnam in their first Singapore solo exhibition. (Updated: ) Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Share via E-Mail SINGAPORE: Talking to Vietnamese artists Le Duc Hai and Le Ngoc Thanh can be a disorienting experience.

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LOS ANGELES - THURSDAY, the last day of April, is the 40th anniversary of the end of my war. Americans call it the Vietnam War, and the victorious Vietnamese call it the American War. In fact, both of these names are misnomers, since the war was also fought, to great devastation, in Laos and Cambodia, a fact that Americans and Vietnamese would both rather forget.

In any case, for anyone who has lived through a war, that war needs no name. It is always and only "the war," which is what my family and I call it. Anniversaries are the time for war stories to be told, and the stories of my family and other refugees are war stories, too. This is important, for when Americans think of war, they tend to think of men fighting "over there." The tendency to separate war stories from immigrant stories means that most Americans don't understand how many of the immigrants and refugees in the United States have fled from wars - many of which this country has had a hand in.

Although my family and other refugees brought our war stories with us to America, they remain largely unheard and unread, except by people like us. Compared with many of the four million Vietnamese in the diaspora, my family has been lucky. None of my relatives can be counted among the three million who died during the war, or the hundreds of thousands who disappeared at sea trying to escape by boat. But our experiences in coming to America were difficult.

When I first came to this country, at age 4, I was taken from my parents and put into a household of American strangers who were supposed to care for me while my parents got on their feet. I remember a small apartment, or maybe a mobile home, and a young couple who did not know what to do with me. I was sent on to a bigger house, a family with children, who asked me how to use chopsticks. I'm sure they meant to be welcoming, but I was perplexed and disappointed in myself for not knowing how to use them.

As for Vietnam, it is both familiar and strange. I heard much about it as I grew up in San Jose, Calif., in a Vietnamese enclave where I ate Vietnamese food, went to a Vietnamese church, studied the Vietnamese language, and heard Vietnamese stories, which were always about loss and pain. My parents and everyone I knew had lost homes, wealth, relatives, country and peace of mind. Letters and photographs in Par Avion envelopes, trimmed in red and blue, would arrive bearing words of poverty and hunger and despair. My parents had left behind my older, adopted sister, whom I knew only through one black-and-white photograph, a beautiful girl with a lonely expression. I didn't remember her at all. I didn't remember the grandparents who passed away one by one, two of whom I never met because they had stayed in the north while my parents had fled to the south as teenagers in 1954.

My father would never see his mother again, and not see his father for 40 years. My mother would never see her parents again, and not see her sisters for 20 years. And the violence they sought to escape caught up with them. My father and mother opened a grocery store and were shot and wounded in a robbery on Christmas Eve, when I was 10 years old. I was watching cartoons, waiting for them to come home. My brother took the phone call. When he told me what had happened I did not cry, and he shouted at me for not crying.

I would not return to Vietnam for 27 years because I was frightened of it, as so many of the Vietnamese in America were. I found the Vietnamese in America both intimate and alien, but Vietnam itself was simply alien. How I remembered it was through American movies and books, all of them in the English language that I had decided was mine at some unspoken, unconscious level. I heard broken English all around me, spoken by refugees whom I couldn't help but see through American eyes: fresh off the boat, foreign, laughable, hateful. That was not me. I could not see how I could live a life in two languages equally well, so I decided to master one and ignore the other. But in mastering that language and its culture, I learned too well how Americans viewed the Vietnamese.

I watched "Apocalypse Now" and saw American sailors massacre a sampan full of civilians and Martin Sheen shoot a wounded woman in cold blood. I watched "Platoon" and heard the audience cheering and clapping when the Americans killed Vietnamese soldiers. These scenes, although fictional, left me shaking with rage. I knew that in the American imagination I was the Other, the Gook, the foreigner, no matter how perfect my English, how American my behavior. In my mostly white high school, the handful of Asian students clustered together in one corner for lunch and even called ourselves the Asian Invasion and the Yellow Peril.

Such stories are common among the Vietnamese people I know. For many, like the southern Vietnamese veterans who will not find the names of their more than 200,000 dead comrades on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, the war has not ended. That is because they are not "Vietnam veterans" in the American mind. Our function is to be grateful for being defended and rescued, and many of us indeed are. The United States welcomed hundreds of thousands of refugees from Southeast Asia in the years after the war. You would be hard pressed to find a more patriotic bunch than us, from the law professor who helped write the Patriot Act to the scientist who designed a bunker-buster bomb for the Iraq war. You can also count among our numbers many veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But at the same time these Vietnamese Americans fought for America, they also struggled to carve out their own space in this country. They built their own Vietnam War Memorial in Orange County, Calif., home of Little Saigon, the largest Vietnamese community outside of Vietnam. It tells a more inclusive story, featuring a statue of an American and Vietnamese soldier standing side by side. Every April, thousands of refugees and veterans and their children gather here to tell their own story and to commemorate what they call Black April.

This Black April, the 40th, is a time to reflect on the stories of our war. Some may see our family of refugees as living proof of the American dream - my parents are prosperous, my brother is a doctor who leads a White House advisory committee, and I am a professor and novelist. But our family story is a story of loss and death, for we are here only because the United States fought a war that killed three million of our countrymen (not counting over two million others who died in neighboring Laos and Cambodia). Filipinos are here largely because of the Philippine-American War, which killed more than 200,000. Many Koreans are here because of a chain of events set off by a war that killed over two million.

We can argue about the causes for these wars and the apportioning of blame, but the fact is that war begins, and ends, over here, with the support of citizens for the war machine, with the arrival of frightened refugees fleeing wars we have instigated. Telling these kinds of stories, or learning to read, see and hear family stories as war stories, is an important way to treat the disorder of our military-industrial complex. For rather than being disturbed by the idea that war is hell, this complex thrives on it.

An associate professor of English and American studies and ethnicity at the University of Southern California, and the author, most recently, of the novel "The Sympathizer."

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LOS ANGELES - THURSDAY, the last day of April, is the 40th anniversary of the end of my war. Americans call it the Vietnam War, and the victorious Vietnamese call it the American War. In fact, both of these names are misnomers, since the war was also fought, to great devastation, in Laos and Cambodia, a fact that Americans and Vietnamese would both rather forget.

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Lubbock, Tex. - By the beginning of 1967, there were 490,000 American troops in South Vietnam - along with some 850,000 from South Vietnam, South Korea and other allies - and America's civilian and military leaders were starting to think big. This, they believed, would be the year to crush both the southerners fighting as the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies, who had infiltrated the south.

Doing so, though, would require enormous multidivisional operations involving all branches of the military. Already by the end of 1966, they had begun planning for the "era of big battles," and specifically for operations designed to eradicate the enemy from around the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon. In the months to follow, those plans would involve hundreds of thousands of soldiers, lead to the deaths of thousands on both sides, and bring simmering doubts about the war effort to a boil.

In December 1966, intelligence reports indicated that large units of both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops were garrisoned in an area about 12 miles northwest of Saigon known as the "Iron Triangle," bordered by the Saigon River on the southwest leg, the Thi Tinh River to the east and a line between the villages of Ben Suc and Ben Cat to the north. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, who commanded the 100,000-man II Field Force, described the Iron Triangle as a "dagger" aimed at the South Vietnamese capital. The very existence of the Republic of South Vietnam was at risk. But if the Iron Triangle could be destroyed by a major operation, the Americans and their allies could gain the offensive initiative and begin to drive the Communists out of the country.

That operation, Junction City, was set to begin in early January 1967. But there was significant concern among the military leadership that such a large effort required considerably more planning than could be done in a few weeks, and that a better option would be to first unleash a more regional operation - still large in scope, but aimed at specific, vulnerable Viet Cong regiments, as well as the headquarters of the Viet Cong's Military Region IV, which intelligence reports indicated were located within the Iron Triangle.

This relatively smaller, more focused operation, called Cedar Falls, began on Jan. 8. It followed a so-called hammer and anvil plan: American and South Vietnamese units would be inserted to the north as "hammers" that would drive the enemy into an "anvil" created by elements of the First and 25th Infantry Divisions.

At 8 a.m. on Jan. 8, 60 UH-1 "Huey" helicopters, flying in a V formation, approached Ben Suc, a Viet Cong-controlled village. It was to be the first target for the "hammer." Small-arms fire erupted against the invading infantry soldiers, but within a few hours, Ben Suc was under American control, and South Vietnamese troops were brought in to interrogate all men between the ages of 15 and 45. At the end of the first day, 106 had been screened; 28 were determined to be Viet Cong. Soldiers also discovered, beneath the village, a network of Viet Cong tunnels.

The bigger challenge, though, was what to do about the remaining villagers - because the American commanders had decided to raze Ben Suc, rather than let it return to enemy hands (an effort the journalist Jonathan Schell later described in his book " The Village of Ben Suc "). In the end, 582 men, 1,651 women and 3,754 children were relocated, along with 247 water buffalo, 225 cows and 60 tons of rice. When they were gone, the commanders ordered a large hole dug in the center of the village, and 10,000 pounds of explosives were detonated to destroy both the village and the tunnels beneath it.

In an instant, Ben Suc no longer existed. This sort of search-and-destroy mission, and the subsequent relocation of noncombatants, would become routine in 1967, as America and its South Vietnamese allies sought to control the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam.

Subsequent operations over the next 20 days resulted in a "body count" of 750 Viet Cong and 280 prisoners (out of 30,000 American and South Vietnamese soldiers in the operation, 72 Americans and 11 South Vietnamese were killed). But the most significant achievement, according to military sources, was the confirmation of the existence of a huge labyrinth of tunnels northwest of Saigon that would become the elusive target of allied forces for the next six years. In future operations, legs of this tunnel complex would even be discovered directly under the 25th Infantry Division's huge base camp at Cu Chi. These tunnels would also become the headquarters for the planning of the Tet offensive, which would be launched in January 1968, just 12 months later.

Still, these results, especially the body counts, weren't enough for Allied commanders, who expected that search-and-destroy missions like the one at Ben Suc would kill or capture enough enemy troops to blunt the Iron Triangle. Thus another huge operation had to follow almost immediately, this one carrying the original name of Operation Junction City.

If Operation Cedar Falls was a hammer and anvil, Operation Junction City was more of a "horseshoe." More than 25,000 friendly troops would engage the enemy forces by creating a huge inverted U-shape position in the area north of the Iron Triangle known as War Zone C, with the open end of the horseshoe facing south. The plan was to drive the enemy against the opposite legs of the horseshoe in such a way as to destroy the opposing forces through attrition - to destroy units, rather than just drive them from villages. Allied commanders believed that Cedar Falls had deteriorated into too many small-unit skirmishes with minimal enemy casualties, and they believed the use of larger American units would result in more.

On the first day of the operation, 845 men from the 173rd Airborne Brigade jumped from C-130 Hercules aircraft, which also dropped artillery and other military equipment. This was the first, and would remain the only, major parachute assault of the Vietnam War. It was designed to rapidly place soldiers in the center of the legs of the horseshoe and, from there, to search for the elusive Communist Central Office of South Vietnam, or Cosvn, the enemy's main headquarters, supposedly located near the Cambodian border.

The airborne assault was necessary, but it also made for great optics back home: Images of American paratroopers jumping into combat reminded people of World War II operations in Europe. President Lyndon B. Johnson hoped that seeing such pictures in major news stories would give Americans confidence that victory could soon be declared.

But Operation Junction City failed to find and destroy Cosvn - because such headquarters didn't exist, at least as a permanent garrison. The Viet Cong were operating from mobile facilities because of the constant threat of aerial bombardment, infantry maneuvers and logistical considerations. Such mobility enabled them to better coordinate their actions with North Vietnamese planners and to retreat across the border into Cambodia when necessary. After 82 days of combat, Junction City ended with 282 Americans killed and a reported 2,728 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese casualties.

Cedar Falls/Junction City had collectively resulted in approximately 3,500 of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese killed at an American cost of 350 lives. This 10 to 1 ratio would continue through most of the war, but the "era of big battles," for all its size and power, failed to change the war's dynamics.

By never allowing their large units to engage American large units, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units could remain organizationally intact and live to fight another day. The "era of big battles" was supposed to put the Americans on an offensive footing, but 70 percent of all contacts were initiated by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. The Communists were fighting the war on their own terms and chose when, where and how long to fight, which ultimately would result in victory.
"Vietnam '67" explores the meaning and consequences of the Vietnam War by examining its most pivotal period, from early 1967 to early 1968. To contact the editors, please send an email to vietnam67@nytimes.com.

Ron Milam is an associate professor of history at Texas Tech. The author of "Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War," he is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War.
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTOpinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.

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Opinion | 1967: The Era of Big Battles in Vietnam

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Lubbock, Tex. - By the beginning of 1967, there were 490,000 American troops in South Vietnam - along with some 850,000 from South Vietnam, South Korea and other allies - and America's civilian and military leaders were starting to think big.

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U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968

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U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968

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U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968

In late January, 1968, during the lunar new year (or “Tet”) holiday, North Vietnamese and communist Viet Cong forces launched a coordinated attack against a number of targets in South Vietnam. The U.S. and South Vietnamese militaries sustained heavy losses before finally repelling the communist assault. The Tet Offensive played an important role in weakening U.S. public support for the war in Vietnam.U.S. Captain Franklin Eller coordinates with military command during the Tet Offensive

Ho Chi Minh and leaders in Hanoi planned the Tet Offensive in the hopes of achieving a decisive victory that would end the grinding conflict that frustrated military leaders on both sides. A successful attack on major cities might force the United States to negotiate or perhaps even to withdraw. At the very least, the North Vietnamese hoped it would serve to stop the ongoing escalation of guerilla attacks and bombing in the North. Hanoi selected the Tet holiday to strike because it was traditionally a time of truce, and because Vietnamese traveling to spend the festival with their relatives provided cover for the movement of South Vietnamese National Liberation Forces (NLF) who supported the communist forces.

The first phase of the assault began on January 30 and 31, when NLF forces simultaneously attacked a number of targets, mostly populated areas and places with heavy U.S. troop presence. The strikes on the major cities of Huế and Saigonhad a strong psychological impact, as they showed that the NLF troops were not as weak as the Johnson Administration had previously claimed. The NLF even managed to breach the outer walls of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. Although the first phase of the offensive became the most famous, a second phase also launched simultaneous assaults on smaller cities and towns on May 4 and stretched into June. A third phase began in August and lasted six weeks. In the months that followed, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces retook the towns that the NLF had secured over the course of the offensive, but they incurred heavy military and civilian casualties in the process.

At the end of the Tet Offensive, both sides had endured losses, and both sides claimed victory. The U.S. and South Vietnamese military response almost completely eliminated the NLF forces and regained all of the lost territory. At the same time, the Tet Offensive weakened domestic support for the Johnson Administration as the vivid reporting on the Tet Offensive by the U.S. media made clear to the American public that an overall victory in Vietnam was not imminent.

The aftermath of Tet brought public discussions about de-escalation, but not before U.S. generals asked for additional troops for a wide-scale “accelerated pacification program.” Believing that the U.S. was in a position to defeat the North, these military leaders sought to press for a U.S.-South Vietnam offensive. Johnson and others, however, read the situation differently. Johnson announced that the bombing of North Vietnam would cease above the 20th parallel and placed a limit on U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Johnson also attempted to set parameters for peace talks, but it would be several more years before these came to fruition. Within the United States, protests against continued involvement in Vietnam intensified. On March 31, 1968, Johnson announced that he would not seek a second term as president. The job of finding a way out of Vietnam was left to the next U.S. president, Richard Nixon.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/tet

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VIETNAM WAR HISTORY: A Summary by History.com

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VIETNAM WAR HISTORY: A Summary by History.com

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The Vietnam War was a long, costly armed conflict that pitted the communist regime of North Vietnam and its southern allies, known as the Viet Cong, against South Vietnam and its principal ally, the United States. The war began in 1954 (though conflict in the region stretched back to the mid-1940s), after the rise to power of Ho Chi Minh and his communist Viet Minh party in North Vietnam, and continued against the backdrop of an intense Cold War between two global superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. More than 3 million people (including 58,000 Americans) were killed in the Vietnam War; more than half were Vietnamese civilians. By 1969, at the peak of U.S. involvement in the war, more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel were involved in the Vietnam conflict. Growing opposition to the war in the United States led to bitter divisions among Americans, both before and after President Richard Nixon ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973. In 1975, communist forces seized control of Saigon, ending the Vietnam War, and the country was unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the following year.

ROOTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR

During World War II, Japan invaded and occupied Vietnam, a nation on the eastern edge of the Indochina Peninsula in Southeast Asia that had been under French administration since the late 19th century. Inspired by Chinese and Soviet communism, Ho Chi Minh formed the Viet Minh, or the League for the Independence of Vietnam, to fight both Japan and the French colonial administration. Japan withdrew its forces in 1945, leaving the French-educated Emperor Bao Dai in control of an independent Vietnam. Ho’s Viet Minh forces rose up immediately, seizing the northern city of Hanoi and declaring a Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) with Ho as president.

Did You Know?

According to a survey by the Veterans Administration, some 500,000 of the 3 million troops who served in Vietnam suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, and rates of divorce, suicide, alcoholism and drug addiction were markedly higher among veterans.

Seeking to regain control of the region, France backed Bao and set up the state of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in July 1949, with Saigon as its capital. Armed conflict continued until a decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 ended in French defeat by Viet Minh forces. The subsequent treaty negotiations at Geneva split Vietnam along the latitude known as the 17th parallel (with Ho in control in the North and Bao in the South) and called for nationwide elections for reunification to be held in 1956. In 1955, however, the strongly anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem pushed Bao aside to become president of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN).

VIETNAM WAR: U.S. INTERVENTION BEGINS

With the Cold War intensifying, the United States hardened its policies against any allies of the Soviet Union, and by 1955 President Dwight D. Eisenhower had pledged his firm support to Diem and South Vietnam. With training and equipment from American military and police, Diem’s security forces cracked down on Viet Minh sympathizers in the south, whom he derisively called Viet Cong (or Vietnamese Communist), arresting some 100,000 people, many of whom were tortured and executed. By 1957, the Viet Cong and other opponents of Diem’s repressive regime began fighting back with attacks on government officials and other targets, and by 1959 they had begun engaging South Vietnamese Army forces in firefights.

In December 1960, Diem’s opponents within South Vietnam–both communist and non-communist–formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) to organize resistance to the regime. Though the NLF claimed to be autonomous and that most of its members were non-Communist, many in Washington assumed it was a puppet of Hanoi. A team sent by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to report on conditions in South Vietnam advised a build-up of American military, economic and technical aid in order to help confront the Viet Cong threat. Working under the “domino theory,” which held that if one Southeast Asian country fell to communism, many would follow, Kennedy increased U.S. aid, though he stopped short of committing to a large-scale military intervention. By 1962, the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam had reached some 9,000 troops, compared with fewer than 800 during the 1950s.

VIETNAM WAR ESCALATES

A coup by some of his own generals succeeded in toppling and killing Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, in November 1963, three weeks before Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. The ensuing political instability in South Vietnam persuaded Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to further increase U.S. military and economic support. The following August, after DRV torpedo boats attacked two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson ordered the retaliatory bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. Congress soon passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave Johnson broad war-making powers, and U.S. planes began regular bombing raids, codenamed Operation Rolling Thunder, the following February.

In March 1965, Johnson made the decision–with solid support from the American public–to send U.S. combat forces into battle in Vietnam. By June, 82,000 combat troops were stationed in Vietnam, and General William Westmoreland was calling for 175,000 more by the end of 1965 to shore up the struggling South Vietnamese army. Despite the concerns of some of his advisers about this escalation, and about the entire war effort as well as a growing anti-war movement in the U.S., Johnson authorized the immediate dispatch of 100,000 troops at the end of July 1965 and another 100,000 in 1966. In addition to the United States, South Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand also committed troops to fight in South Vietnam (albeit on a much smaller scale).

STRATEGY OF ATTRITION IN VIETNAM

In contrast to the air attacks on North Vietnam, the U.S.-South Vietnamese war effort in the south was fought on the ground, largely under the command of General Westmoreland, in coordination with the government of General Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon. In general, U.S. military forces in the region pursued a policy of attrition, aiming to kill as many enemy troops as possible rather than trying to secure territory. By 1966, large areas of South Vietnam had been designated as “free-fire zones,” from which all innocent civilians were supposed to have evacuated and only enemy remained. Heavy bombing by B-52 aircraft or shelling made these zones uninhabitable, as refugees poured into camps in designated safe areas near Saigon and other cities. Even as the body count (at times exaggerated by U.S. and South Vietnamese authorities) mounted steadily, DRV and Viet Cong troops refused to stop fighting, encouraged by the fact that they could easily reoccupy lost territory. Meanwhile, supported by aid from China and the Soviet Union, North Vietnam strengthened its air defenses.

By November 1967, the number of American troops in Vietnam was approaching 500,000, and U.S. casualties had reached 15,058 killed and 109,527 wounded. As the war stretched on, some soldiers came to mistrust their government’s reasons for keeping them there, as well as Washington’s claims that the war was being won. The later years of the war saw increased physical and psychological deterioration among American soldiers, including drug use, mutinies and attacks by soldiers against officers and noncommissioned officers.

Bombarded by horrific images of the war on their televisions, Americans on the home front turned against the war as well: In October 1967, some 35,000 demonstrators staged a mass antiwar protest outside the Pentagon. Opponents of the war argued that civilians, not enemy combatants, were the primary victims and that the United States was supporting a corrupt dictatorship in Saigon.

IMPACT OF THE TET OFFENSIVE ON VIETNAM WAR

By the end of 1967, Hanoi’s communist leadership was growing impatient as well, and sought to strike a decisive blow aimed at forcing the better-supplied United States to give up hopes of success. On January 31, 1968, some 70,000 DRV forces under General Vo Nguyen Giap launched the Tet offensive (named for the lunar new year), a coordinated series of fierce attacks on more than 100 cities and towns in South Vietnam. Though taken by surprise, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces managed to strike back quickly, and the communists were unable to hold any of the targets for more than a day or two. Reports of the attacks stunned the U.S. public, however, especially after news broke that Westmoreland had requested an additional 200,000 troops. With his approval ratings dropping in an election year, Johnson called a halt to bombing in much of North Vietnam in March (though bombings continued in the south) and promised to dedicate the rest of his term to seeking peace rather than reelection.

Johnson’s new tack, laid out in a March 1968 speech, met with a positive response from Hanoi, and peace talks between the U.S. and North Vietnam opened in Paris that May. Despite the later inclusion of the South Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (the political arm of the Viet Cong) the dialogue soon reached an impasse, and after an election campaign marred by violence, Republican Richard M. Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey to win the White House.

VIETNAM WAR ENDS: FROM VIETNAMIZATION TO WITHDRAWAL

Nixon sought to deflate the antiwar movement by appealing to a “silent majority” of Americans who he believed supported the war effort. In an attempt to limit the volume of American casualties, he announced a program of withdrawing troops, increasing aerial and artillery bombardment and giving South Vietnamese control over ground operations. In addition to this policy, which he called “Vietnamization,” Nixon continued public peace talks in Paris, adding higher-level secret talks conducted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger beginning in the spring of 1968. The North Vietnamese continued to insist on complete U.S. withdrawal as a condition of peace, however, and the next few years would bring even more carnage, including the horrifying revelation that U.S. soldiers had massacred more than 400 unarmed civilians in the village of My Lai in March 1968.

Anti-war protests continued to build as the conflict wore on. In 1968 and 1969, there were hundreds of anti-war marches and gatherings throughout the country. On November 15, 1969, the largest anti-war protest in American history took place in Washington, D.C., as over 250,000 Americans gathered peacefully, calling for withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. The anti-war movement, which was particularly strong on college campuses, divided Americans bitterly. For some young people, the war symbolized a form of unchecked authority they had come to resent. For other Americans, opposing the government was considered unpatriotic and treasonous.

As the first U.S. troops were withdrawn, those who remained became increasingly angry and frustrated, exacerbating problems with morale and leadership. Tens of thousands of soldiers received dishonorable discharges for desertion, and about 500,000 American men from 1965-73 became “draft dodgers,” with many fleeing to Canada to evade conscription. Nixon ended draft calls in 1972, and instituted an all-volunteer army the following year.

In 1970, a joint U.S-South Vietnamese operation invaded Cambodia, hoping to wipe out DRV supply bases there. The South Vietnamese then led their own invasion of Laos, which was pushed back by North Vietnam. The invasion of these countries, in violation of international law, sparked a new wave of protests on college campuses across America, including two at Kent State in Ohio and Jackson State in Mississippi during which National Guardsmen and police killed a total of six student protesters. By the end of June 1972, however, after another failed offensive into South Vietnam, Hanoi was finally willing to compromise. Kissinger and North Vietnamese representatives drafted a peace agreement by early fall, but leaders in Saigon rejected it, and in December Nixon authorized a number of bombing raids against targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. Known as the Christmas Bombings, the raids drew international condemnation.

LEGACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR

In January 1973, the United States and North Korea concluded a final peace agreement, ending open hostilities between the two nations. War between North and South Vietnam continued, however, until April 30, 1975, when DRV forces captured Saigon, renaming it Ho Chi Minh City (Ho himself died in 1969). The long conflict had affected an immense majority of the country’s population; in eight years of warfare, an estimated 2 million Vietnamese died, while 3 million were wounded and another 12 million became refugees. War had decimated the country’s infrastructure and economy, and reconstruction proceeded slowly. In 1976, Vietnam was unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, though sporadic violence continued over the next 15 years, including conflicts with neighboring China and Cambodia. Under a broad free market policy put in place in 1986, the economy began to improve, boosted by oil export revenues and an influx of foreign capital. Trade and diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the U.S. were resumed in the 1990s.

In the United States, the effects of the Vietnam War would linger long after the last troops returned home in 1973. The nation spent more than $120 billion on the conflict in Vietnam from 1965-73; this massive spending led to widespread inflation, exacerbated by a worldwide oil crisis in 1973 and skyrocketing fuel prices. Psychologically, the effects ran even deeper. The war had pierced the myth of American invincibility, and had bitterly divided the nation. Many returning veterans faced negative reactions from both opponents of the war (who viewed them as having killed innocent civilians) and its supporters (who saw them as having lost the war), along with physical damage including the effects of exposure to the harmful chemical herbicide Agent Orange, millions of gallons of which had been dumped by U.S. planes on the dense forests of Vietnam. In 1982, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was unveiled in Washington, D.C. On it were inscribed the names of 57,939 American armed forces killed or missing during the war; later additions brought that total to 58,200.
http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-history

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Interview with Ronald - a Homeless Vietnam Veteran with PTSD

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On the heels of a major nationwide protest against the Vietnam War in October 1969, President Richard Nixon delivers a speech on November 3, laying out his plans for ending the war through diplomatic negotiations and asking for the support of the

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Opinion | Vietnam: The War That Killed Trust (Published 2017)

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The legacy of the war still shapes America, even if most of us are too young to remember it.

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Half a century later, readers recall the pain and destruction on the battlefield and off.

To the Editor: I will never forget the horrors of Vietnam (" The War That Killed Trust," by Karl Marlantes, "Vietnam '67" series, Sunday Review, Jan. 8).

Say what you want about Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy and their domino theories; it was Lyndon B. Johnson's infamous Gulf of Tonkin speech in August 1964 that set the stage for lying about the war.

When I entered the University of Southern California two years later, I had to show several of my freshman classmates where the war zone was on a map. Vietnam fractured the American psyche. I ought to know. I "won" the first draft lottery on Dec. 1, 1969. Parents who had fought 25 years earlier in World War II couldn't understand why their baby-boomer children argued about Vietnam at the dinner table.

As a 21-year-old at the time, I remember watching fathers throw their sons out of the house because they refused to enlist. But I did not serve in Vietnam. That's because I had an accident a few years earlier that disqualified me.

Today, presidents and Congress must answer the question about the elusive end game before sending troops. No such questions were asked about Vietnam. Richard M. Nixon took credit for ending American involvement there, but it was Congress that pulled the plug on funding the war. Absent that, there is no telling when the killing in Vietnam would have ended.

My three children (36, 24 and 22) all know about Vietnam. I felt that it was my responsibility to pass on to them the lessons I learned nearly half a century ago. I hope that my contemporaries have done the same with their families.

DENNY FREIDENRICH

Laguna Beach, Calif.

To the Editor: Over a pay phone, my father told me never to talk to him about it again. I had told him that I was not going to Vietnam and that if drafted I was going to Canada. I was called a Communist and a traitor. After graduating from college in 1969 and moving to Canada that summer, I was never drafted. I became a Canadian citizen and have lived here ever since.

Karl Marlantes's article resonated deeply with my experience growing up in Illinois during the 1950s and '60s. The Vietnam War changed my life more than I ever expected, but I remain a wounded American at some level, too.

STEVE JOHNSON

Toronto

To the Editor: To this day, 50 years later, I can still see the verdant paddies and farmers planting their rice crop for the year. The green was so beautiful to behold. I still ask myself the same question I thought of back then: What are we doing here? These people just want to be left alone.

When will America apologize to the Vietnamese for the murder of their citizens? When will the military-industrial complex be held accountable for creating the weapons that helped destroy Laos and Vietnam? Creating a universal draft for the American military will help maintain high profits for the merchants of war.

HERMAN EDWARD SEISER

Bangkok

The writer served with the United States Marine Corps in South Vietnam from 1966 to 1968.

To the Editor: While I respect Karl Marlantes for his sense of patriotic duty, I disagree with his analysis of the origin of cynicism among the students of the Sixties generation.

Long before students became cynical about Vietnam, they watched as the police on the streets of cities in the South beat men, women and children while the federal government did nothing. If Mr. Marlantes wishes to address the negative effects of Vietnam, he needs to look to the antecedents in the cynical behavior of the political elites of both parties as they dragged their feet in responding to the civil rights struggles in this country.

FRANK MIATA

New York

To the Editor: I wish I shared Karl Marlantes's view that Vietnam was pivotal in breaking down racial barriers. During my 14 months in the war, I noticed a disturbing trend toward re-segregation, with black and white soldiers choosing to associate only with others of their own race whenever possible.

This was most evident by a rear barracks populated exclusively by black junior officers. I often wondered why the leadership of my unit tolerated this.

ART JAEGER

Linden, Va.

To the Editor: I am a 70-plus-year-old woman, and I believe that this article gets to the heart of the political division in the United States. These days, there seems to be no sense of patriotism or "country first," as there was when I was growing up.

Every man and woman must do his or her share for this country. Maybe then we will realize that we are all in this together, and maybe then the people who think "me first" and "political party before country" will realize that this kind of thinking has taken this country down a dangerous path. I am truly afraid that our country is losing its soul.

C. K. CASTILLO

St. Louis

To the Editor: I was in Vietnam in 1967, the same year as Karl Marlantes, performing in "Guys and Dolls" for the U.S.O. My experience was very different.

We spent a night on the U.S.S. Enterprise, staying awake to count the black stealth bombers. They were returning from secret sorties over Laos, contrary to stated United States policy. I never saw racial prejudice in the military, but I was shocked by our indifference to the killing of innocent Vietnamese.

From the cockpit of a chopper I saw people in black pajamas and conical straw hats working the rice paddies. The pilot said, "I'd like to plug some of them." When asked how he could tell friend from enemy, he said: "Who cares? They're not human."

I returned to Vietnam in 2013. Every Vietnamese I spoke to had moved past anger and resentment, expressing a desire to cooperate with us, a former enemy. But what have we Americans learned from the Vietnam War? Our country is more divided than ever.

SUZANNE COGAN

New York

To the Editor: Karl Marlantes is to be commended for his powerful reflection on the legacy of the Vietnam War. But in making the case for a military populated by scions of the elite as well as the working class, he does not mention an additional payoff to universal service: The power brokers who run this country would probably be a lot less inclined toward war, and more inclined toward diplomacy, if their own family members were at risk of death on the battlefield.

ANDREW SCHRANK

Providence, R.I.

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Half a century later, readers recall the pain and destruction on the battlefield and off. To the Editor: I will never forget the horrors of Vietnam (" The War That Killed Trust," by Karl Marlantes, "Vietnam '67" series, Sunday Review, Jan. 8). Say what you want about Presidents Dwight D.

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president eisenhower resolved to continue the support of south vietnam

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president eisenhower's second letter to diem

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president eisenhower opinions about vietnam

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PRESIDENT EISENHOWER RESOLVED TO CONTINUE THE SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM,PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SECOND LETTER TO DIEM,PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ON VIETNAM,PRESIDENT EISENHOWER OPINIONS ABOUT VIETNAM - Magazine Article - Old Magazine Articles

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President Eisenhower Resolved to Continue the Support of South Vietnam,President Eisenhower's Second Letter to Diem,President Eisenhower on Vietnam,President Eisenhower opinions about vietnam

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president eisenhower's 1954 letter to winston churchill about vietnam

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eisenhower letter about vietnam war 1954

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president eisenhower and the lessons of munich

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eisenhower saw vietnam as a vital moment in history

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eisenhower believed 1950s vietnam was analogous to the 1920s spread of fascism

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communist revolt in vietnam interpreted by president eisenhower

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lessons of munich applied to southeast asia

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munich analogy applied to indochina strategy

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communist aggression in vietnam interpreted by president eisenhowerp

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PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S 1954 LETTER TO WINSTON CHURCHILL ABOUT VIETNAM,PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ON VIETNAM,EISENHOWER LETTER ABOUT VIETNAM WAR 1954,MUNICH ANALOGY APPLIED TO VIETNAM 1954,PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND THE LESSONS OF MUNICH,EISENHOWER SAW VIETNAM AS A VITAL MOMENT IN HISTORY,,EISENHOWER BELIEVED 1950S VIETNAM WAS ANALOGOUS TO THE 1920S SPREAD OF FASCISM,COMMUNIST REVOLT IN VIETNAM INTERPRETED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER,LESSONS OF MUNICH APPLIED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA,MUNICH ANALOGY APPLIED TO INDOCHINA STRATEGY,COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM INTERPRETED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER - Magazine Article - Old Magazine Articles

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President Eisenhower's 1954 Letter to Winston Churchill about VIETNAM,President Eisenhower on Vietnam,eisenhower letter about vietnam war 1954,Munich analogy applied to Vietnam 1954,president eisenhower and the lessons of munich,eisenhower saw vietnam as a vital moment in history,Eisenhower believed 1950s vietnam was analogous to the 1920s spread of fascism,communist revolt in vietnam interpreted by president eisenhower,lessons of Munich applied to southeast asia,Munich analogy applied to indochina strategy,communist aggression in vietnam interpreted by president eisenhower

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Wednesday, February 18, 2015

A Soldier's Poems: by Mihanel Pabon
Intrusive Thoughts by Mihanel Pabon

It's a memory embedded
in your brain
that's not so much a memory
as it is a stain.
No matter how long ago it was
when most will say, let it pass

You are not trying to remember it
you're trying to dismember it.
Normalcy becomes an illusion
for when everything seems to be all right,
when it appears you're winning the fight,
BOOM, a trigger appears.

Unfortunately, you never know
when,
where,
or what
a trigger could be,
a smell,
a sound,
or something you see.

I could go on writing for untold pages
and write a manifesto for the ages,
but I just want you to understand
that I'm really trying
against this intrusion
to take a stand.

I'm going to go straight to the core.
You see, I want to enjoy
this precious moment of normalcy.
It was all caused
by war.

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arty: shorthand term for artillery
AWOL: absent without leave; leaving a post or position without official permission

ba: married woman; used as a title, like "Mrs."

band-aid: medic
tanglefoot: single-strand barbed wire strung in a meshwork pattern at about ankle height. A barrier designed to make it difficult to cross the obstructed area by foot. Usually placed around permanent defensive positions.

zit: derogatory term for Vietnamese people

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Pete Seeger: Waist Deep in the Big Muddy

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rock on, one of the few times a live version is the best one