# data[].attributes.headline
14 dead at mass murder shooting in at movie theater in Colorado.

# data[].attributes.subject
14 dead at mass murder shooting in at movie theater in Colorado.

# data[].attributes.body
In 2012, during the screening of the movie "Batman The Dark Knight", a madman fired in the crowd and killed 14 persons including a little girl of 6 years old.
The lawyer of the murderer might go for insanity defense and James Holmes will escape the death penalty...

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
14 Dead at Mass Murder Shooting  AURORA, COLORADO - ABC NEWS REPORT

# data[].attributes.headline
A dicharged senator after the mass murder in Colorado.

# data[].attributes.subject
A dicharged senator after the mass murder in Colorado.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Deux sénateurs démocrates ont perdu leur siège après un vote de défiance mardi. Une manière pour les électeurs de sanctionner le durcissement de la loi sur les armes, renforcée après la tuerie d'Aurora.

Le contrôle des armes à feu ne passe pas dans le Colorado. Deux sénateurs démocrates ont perdu leur siège après un vote de défiance mardi, rapporte le New York Times. Et pour cause, ils avaient contribué à durcir la loi sur les armes. Le président du Sénat de l'Etat, John Mose, et la sénatrice Angela Giron ont été remplacés par deux républicains.

"Le vote s'est transformé en un référendum pour ou contre le contrôle des armes, observé de près par tout le pays", commente le Los Angeles Times. Le Colorado a connu plusieurs fusillades ces dernières années, à Tucson, Newton ou encore Aurora: des traumatismes qui ne semblent pas pousser les consciences vers le contrôle, une des ambitions du président Obama lors de son premier mandat.

Après la tuerie d' Aurora en juillet 2012, le Colorado a renforcé sa législation. Depuis le 1er juillet 2013, les antécédents judiciaires des acheteurs sont vérifiés lors de ventes de particulier à particulier, et les chargeurs de plus de 15 cartouches sont interdits. Malgré le vote de mardi, cette loi reste en vigueur. Le lobby des armes à feu a gagné une bataille, mais pas la guerre.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Etats-Unis: le Colorado destitue deux élus favorables au contrôle des armes

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Le contrôle des armes à feu ne passe pas dans le Colorado. Deux sénateurs démocrates ont perdu leur siège après un vote de défiance mardi, rapporte le New York Times . Et pour cause, ils avaient contribué à durcir la loi sur les armes.

# data[].attributes.body
This is sad but this law wich is causes of countless victims of firearms...

Make in 1791

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The Second Amendment ( Amendment II) to the United States Constitution protects the right to keep and bear arms. It was ratified on December 15, 1791, along with nine other articles of the Bill of Rights. In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), the Supreme Court affirmed for the first time that the right belongs to individuals, for self-defense in the home, while also including, as , that the right is not unlimited and does not preclude the existence of certain long-standing prohibitions such as those forbidding "the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill" or restrictions on "the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons". In McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) the Supreme Court ruled that state and local governments are limited to the same extent as the federal government from infringing upon this right. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) assured the right to carry weapons in public spaces with reasonable exceptions.

The Second Amendment was based partially on the right to keep and bear arms in English common law and was influenced by the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Sir William Blackstone described this right as an auxiliary right, supporting the natural rights of self-defense and resistance to oppression, and the civic duty to act in concert in defense of the state. While both James Monroe and John Adams supported the Constitution being ratified, its most influential framer was James Madison. In Federalist No. 46, Madison wrote how a federal army could be kept in check by the militia, "a standing army... would be opposed [by] militia." He argued that State governments "would be able to repel the danger" of a federal army, "It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops." He contrasted the federal government of the United States to the European kingdoms, which he described as "afraid to trust the people with arms", and assured that "the existence of subordinate governments... forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition".

By January 1788, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut ratified the Constitution without insisting upon amendments. Several amendments were proposed, but were not adopted at the time the Constitution was ratified. For example, the Pennsylvania convention debated fifteen amendments, one of which concerned the right of the people to be armed, another with the militia. The Massachusetts convention also ratified the Constitution with an attached list of proposed amendments. In the end, the ratification convention was so evenly divided between those for and against the Constitution that the federalists agreed to the Bill of Rights to assure ratification. In United States v. Cruikshank (1876), the Supreme Court ruled that, "The right to bear arms is not granted by the Constitution; neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amendments [] means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress, and has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the National Government." In United States v. Miller (1939), the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment did not protect weapon types not having a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".

In the 21st century, the amendment has been subjected to renewed academic inquiry and judicial interest. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision that held the amendment protects an individual's right to keep a gun for self-defense. This was the first time the Court had ruled that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual's right to own a gun. In McDonald v. Chicago (2010), the Supreme Court clarified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment against state and local governments. In Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016), the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier rulings that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding" and that its protection is not limited to "only those weapons useful in warfare". The debate between various organizations regarding gun control and gun rights continues.

There are several versions of the text of the Second Amendment, each with capitalization or punctuation differences. Differences exist between the version passed by Congress and put on display and the versions ratified by the states. These differences have been a focus of debate regarding the meaning of the amendment, particularly regarding the importance of what the courts have called the prefatory clause.

The final, handwritten original of the Bill of Rights as passed by Congress, with the rest of the original prepared by scribe William Lambert, is preserved in the National Archives. This is the version ratified by Delaware and used by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller:

Some state-ratified versions, such as Maryland's, omitted the first or final commas:

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The ratification acts from New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina contained only one comma, but with differences in capitalization. Pennsylvania's act states:

The ratification act from New Jersey has no commas:

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

Pre-Constitution background

Influence of the English Bill of Rights of 1689

The right of Protestants to bear arms in English history is regarded in English common law as a subordinate auxiliary right of the primary rights to personal security, personal liberty, and private property. According to Sir William Blackstone, "The... last auxiliary right of the subject... is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is... declared by... statute, and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression."

The English Bill of Rights of 1689 emerged from a tempestuous period in English politics during which two issues were major sources of conflict: the authority of the King to govern without the consent of Parliament, and the role of Catholics in a country with a staunchly Protestant majority. Ultimately, the Catholic James II was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution, and his successors, the Protestants William III and Mary II, accepted the conditions that were codified in the Bill. One of the issues the Bill resolved was the authority of the King to disarm his subjects, after King Charles II and James II had disarmed many Protestants that were "suspected or knowne" of disliking the government, and had argued with Parliament over his[whose? ] desire to maintain a standing (or permanent) army. The bill states that it is acting to restore "ancient rights" trampled upon by James II, though some have argued that the English Bill of Rights created a new right to have arms, which developed out of a duty to have arms. In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), the Supreme Court did not accept this view, remarking that the English right at the time of the passing of the English Bill of Rights was "clearly an individual right, having nothing whatsoever to do with service in the militia" and that it was a right not to be disarmed by the Crown and was not the granting of a new right to have arms.

The text of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 includes language protecting the right of Protestants against disarmament by the Crown, stating: "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law." It also contained text that aspired to bind future Parliaments, though under English constitutional law no Parliament can bind any later Parliament.

The statement in the English Bill of Rights concerning the right to bear arms is often quoted only in the passage where it is written as above and not in its full context. In its full context it is clear that the bill was asserting the right of Protestant citizens not to be disarmed by the King without the consent of Parliament and was merely restoring rights to Protestants that the previous King briefly and unlawfully had removed. In its full context it reads:

Whereas the late King James the Second by the Assistance of diverse evil Councillors Judges and Ministers employed by him did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant Religion and the Laws and Liberties of this Kingdom (list of grievances including)... by causing several good Subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when Papists were both Armed and employed contrary to Law, (Recital regarding the change of monarch)... thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons pursuant to their respective Letters and Elections being now assembled in a full and free Representative of this Nation taking into their most serious Consideration the best means for attaining the Ends aforesaid Doe in the first place (as their Ancestors in like Case have usually done) for the Vindicating and Asserting their ancient Rights and Liberties, Declare (list of rights including)... That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defense suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law.

The historical link between the English Bill of Rights and the Second Amendment, which both codify an existing right and do not create a new one, has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court.

There is some difference of opinion as to how revolutionary the events of 1688-89 actually were, and several commentators make the point that the provisions of the English Bill of Rights did not represent new laws, but rather stated existing rights. Mark Thompson wrote that, apart from determining the succession, the English Bill of Rights did "little more than set forth certain points of existing laws and simply secured to Englishmen the rights of which they were already posessed []." Before and after the English Bill of Rights, the government could always disarm any individual or class of individuals it considered dangerous to the peace of the realm. In 1765, William Blackstone wrote the Commentaries on the Laws of England describing the right to have arms in England during the 18th century as a subordinate auxiliary right of the subject that was "also declared" in the English Bill of Rights.

The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. st.2. c.2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

Although there is little doubt that the writers of the Second Amendment were heavily influenced by the English Bill of Rights, it is a matter of interpretation as to whether they were intent on preserving the power to regulate arms to the states over the federal government (as the English Parliament had reserved for itself against the monarch) or whether it was intent on creating a new right akin to the right of others written into the Constitution (as the Supreme Court decided in Heller). Some in the United States have preferred the "rights" argument arguing that the English Bill of Rights had granted a right. The need to have arms for self-defence was not really in question. Peoples all around the world since time immemorial had armed themselves for the protection of themselves and others, and as organized nations began to appear these arrangements had been extended to the protection of the state. Without a regular army and police force, it had been the duty of certain men to keep watch and ward at night and to confront and capture suspicious persons. Every subject had an obligation to protect the king's peace and assist in the suppression of riots.

Influence of the English Militia Act of 1757

In 1757 Great Britain's Parliament created "An Act for better ordering of the militia forces in the several counties of that part of Great Britain called England". This act declared that "a well-ordered and well-disciplined militia is essentially necessary to the safety, peace and prosperity of this kingdom," and that the current militia laws for the regulation of the militia were defective and ineffectual. Influenced by this act, in 1775 Timothy Pickering created "An Easy Plan of Discipline for a Militia". Greatly inhibited by the events surrounding Salem, Massachusetts, where the plan was printed, Pickering submitted the writing to George Washington. On May 1, 1776, the Massachusetts Bay Councell resolved that Pickering's discipline, a modification of the 1757 act, be the discipline of their Militia. On March 29, 1779, for members of the Continental Army this was replaced by Von Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. With ratification of the Second Amendment, after May 8, 1792, the entire United States Militia, barring two declarations, would be regulated by Von Steuben's Discipline.

America before the U.S. Constitution

Ideals that helped to inspire the Second Amendment in part are symbolized by the minutemen.[56]

King Charles authorized the use of arms special defence and safety, on land and at sea, against:

The Military Company of Massachusetts had already ordered munition before the authorization was signed. Early Americans had other uses for arms, besides the uses King Charles had in mind:

safeguarding against tyrannical governments

suppressing insurrection, allegedly including slave revolts, though professor Paul Finkelman has pointed out that the claim of a specific intent to protect the ability to put down slave revolts is not supported by the historical record

facilitating a natural right of self-defense

During the 1760s pre-revolutionary period, the established colonial militia was composed of colonists, including many who were loyal to British rule. As defiance and opposition to British rule developed, a distrust of these Loyalists in the militia became widespread among the colonists known as Patriots, who favored independence from British rule. As a result, some Patriots created their own militias that excluded the Loyalists and then sought to stock independent armories for their militias. In response to this arms build-up, the British parliament established an embargo of firearms, parts and ammunition against the American colonies. King George III also began disarming individuals who were in the most rebellious areas in the 1760s and 1770s.

British and Loyalist efforts to disarm the colonial Patriot militia armories in the early phases of the American Revolution resulted in the Patriot colonists protesting by citing the Declaration of Rights, Blackstone's summary of the Declaration of Rights, their own militia laws and common law rights to self-defense. While British policy in the early phases of the Revolution clearly aimed to prevent coordinated action by the Patriot militia, some have argued that there is no evidence that the British sought to restrict the traditional common law right of self-defense. Patrick J. Charles disputes these claims citing similar disarming by the patriots and challenging those scholars' interpretation of Blackstone.

The right of the colonists to arms and rebellion against oppression was asserted, for example, in a pre-revolutionary newspaper editorial in 1769 objecting to the Crown suppression of colonial opposition to the Townshend Acts:

The armed forces that won the American Revolution consisted of the standing Continental Army created by the Continental Congress, together with regular French army and naval forces and various state and regional militia units. In opposition, the British forces consisted of a mixture of the standing British Army, Loyalist militia and Hessian mercenaries. Following the Revolution, the United States was governed by the Articles of Confederation. Federalists argued that this government had an unworkable division of power between Congress and the states, which caused military weakness, as the standing army was reduced to as few as 80 men. They considered it to be bad that there was no effective federal military crackdown on an armed tax rebellion in western Massachusetts known as Shays' Rebellion. Anti-federalists, on the other hand, took the side of limited government and sympathized with the rebels, many of whom were former Revolutionary War soldiers. Subsequently, the Constitutional Convention proposed in 1787 to grant Congress exclusive power to raise and support a standing army and navy of unlimited size. Anti-federalists objected to the shift of power from the states to the federal government, but as adoption of the Constitution became more and more likely, they shifted their strategy to establishing a bill of rights that would put some limits on federal power.

Modern scholars Thomas B. McAffee and Michael J. Quinlan have stated that James Madison "did not invent the right to keep and bear arms when he drafted the Second Amendment; the right was pre-existing at both common law and in the early state constitutions." In contrast, historian Jack Rakove suggests that Madison's intention in framing the Second Amendment was to provide assurances to moderate Anti-Federalists that the militias would not be disarmed.

One aspect of the gun control debate is the conflict between gun control laws and the right to rebel against unjust governments. Blackstone in his Commentaries alluded to this right to rebel as the natural right of resistance and self preservation, to be used only as a last resort, exercisable when "the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression". Some believe that the framers of the Bill of Rights sought to balance not just political power, but also military power, between the people, the states and the nation, as Alexander Hamilton explained in his Concerning the Militia essay published in 1788:

...it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the defence of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the Government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the People, while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.

There was an ongoing debate beginning in 1789 about "the people" fighting governmental tyranny (as described by Anti-Federalists); or the risk of mob rule of "the people" (as described by the Federalists) related to the increasingly violent French Revolution. A widespread fear, during the debates on ratifying the Constitution, was the possibility of a military takeover of the states by the federal government, which could happen if the Congress passed laws prohibiting states from arming citizens, or prohibiting citizens from arming themselves. Though it has been argued that the states lost the power to arm their citizens when the power to arm the militia was transferred from the states to the federal government by ArticleI, Section8 of the Constitution, the individual right to arm was retained and strengthened by the Militia Acts of 1792 and the similar act of 1795.

More recently some have advanced what has been called the insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment whereby it is the right of any citizen to take up arms against their government should they consider it illegitimate. Such a reading has been voiced by organizations such as the National Rifle Association of America (NRA) and by various individuals including some elected officials. Congressman Jamie Raskin, however, has argued that there is no basis in constitutional law or scholarship for this view. He notes that, not only does this represent a misreading of the text of the Amendment as drafted, it stands in violation of other elements of the Constitution.

State Constitutional Precursors to the Second Amendment

Related Articles & Sections within the first State Constitutions Adopted after May 10, 1776.

Note: On May 10, 1776, Congress passed a resolution recommending that any colony with a government that was not inclined toward independence should form one that was.

Virginia's Constitution lists the reasons for dissolving its ties with the King in the formation of its own independent state government. Including the following:

Keeping among us, in times of peace, standing armies and ships of war.

Effecting to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power.

* These same reasons would later be outlined within the Declaration of Independence.

This is the first instance in relationship to U.S. Constitutional Law of the phrase "right to bear arms".

It is relevant that Pennsylvania was a Quaker Colony traditionally opposed to bearing arms. "In settling Pennsylvania, William Penn had a great experiment in view, a 'holy experiment', as he term[ed] it. This was no less than to test, on a scale of considerable magnitude, the practicability of founding and governing a State on the sure principles of the Christian religion; where the executive should be sustained without arms; where justice should be administered without oaths; and where real religion might flourish without the incubus of a hierarchical system." The Non-Quaker residents, many from the Western Counties, complained often and loudly of being denied the right to a common defense. By the time of the American Revolution, through what could be described as a revolution within a revolution, the pro-militia factions had gained ascendancy in the state's government. And by a manipulation through the use of oaths, disqualifying Quaker members, they made up a vast majority of the convention forming the new state constitution; it was only natural that they would assert their efforts to form a compulsory State Militia in the context of a "right" to defend themselves and the state.

Drafting and adoption of the Constitution

In March 1785, delegates from Virginia and Maryland assembled at the Mount Vernon Conference to fashion a remedy to the inefficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. The following year, at a meeting in Annapolis, Maryland, 12 delegates from five states ( New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) met and drew up a list of problems with the current government model. At its conclusion, the delegates scheduled a follow-up meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for May 1787 to present solutions to these problems, such as the absence of:

interstate arbitration processes to handle quarrels between states;

sufficiently trained and armed intrastate security forces to suppress insurrection;

a national militia to repel foreign invaders.

It quickly became apparent that the solution to all three of these problems required shifting control of the states' militias to the federal Congress and giving it the power to raise a standing army. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution codified these changes by allowing the Congress to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States by doing the following:

raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

provide and maintain a navy;

make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Some representatives mistrusted proposals to enlarge federal powers, because they were concerned about the inherent risks of centralizing power. Federalists, including James Madison, initially argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary, sufficiently confident that the federal government could never raise a standing army powerful enough to overcome a militia. Federalist Noah Webster argued that an armed populace would have no trouble resisting the potential threat to liberty of a standing army. Anti-federalists, on the other hand, advocated amending the Constitution with clearly defined and enumerated rights providing more explicit constraints on the new government. Many Anti-federalists feared the new federal government would choose to disarm state militias. Federalists countered that in listing only certain rights, unlisted rights might lose protection. The Federalists realized there was insufficient support to ratify the Constitution without a bill of rights and so they promised to support amending the Constitution to add a bill of rights following the Constitution's adoption. This compromise persuaded enough Anti-federalists to vote for the Constitution, allowing for ratification. The Constitution was declared ratified on June 21, 1788, when nine of the original thirteen states had ratified it. The remaining four states later followed suit, although the last two states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, ratified only after Congress had passed the Bill of Rights and sent it to the states for ratification. James Madison drafted what ultimately became the Bill of Rights, which was proposed by the first Congress on June 8, 1789, and was adopted on December 15, 1791.

Debates on amending the Constitution

The debate surrounding the Constitution's ratification is of practical importance, particularly to adherents of originalist and strict constructionist legal theories. In the context of such legal theories and elsewhere, it is important to understand the language of the Constitution in terms of what that language meant to the people who wrote and ratified the Constitution.

Robert Whitehill, a delegate from Pennsylvania, sought to clarify the draft Constitution with a bill of rights explicitly granting individuals the right to hunt on their own land in season, though Whitehill's language was never debated.

Argument for state power

There was substantial opposition to the new Constitution because it moved the power to arm the state militias from the states to the federal government. This created a fear that the federal government, by neglecting the upkeep of the militia, could have overwhelming military force at its disposal through its power to maintain a standing army and navy, leading to a confrontation with the states, encroaching on the states' reserved powers and even engaging in a military takeover. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation states:

In contrast, Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the U.S. Constitution states:

Government tyranny

A foundation of American political thought during the Revolutionary period was concern about political corruption and governmental tyranny. Even the federalists, fending off their opponents who accused them of creating an oppressive regime, were careful to acknowledge the risks of tyranny. Against that backdrop, the framers saw the personal right to bear arms as a potential check against tyranny. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts expressed this sentiment by declaring that it is "a chimerical idea to suppose that a country like this could ever be enslaved... Is it possible... that an army could be raised for the purpose of enslaving themselves or their brethren? Or, if raised whether they could subdue a nation of freemen, who know how to prize liberty and who have arms in their hands?" Noah Webster similarly argued:

George Mason also argued the importance of the militia and right to bear arms by reminding his compatriots of the British government's efforts "to disarm the people; that it was the best and most effectual way to enslave them... by totally disusing and neglecting the militia." He also clarified that under prevailing practice the militia included all people, rich and poor. "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers." Because all were members of the militia, all enjoyed the right to individually bear arms to serve therein.

Patrick Henry argued in the Virginia ratification convention on June 5, 1788, for the dual rights to arms and resistance to oppression:

To maintain slavery

Preserving slave patrols

An illustration of Mississippi slave patrol

In the slave states, the militia was available for military operations, but its biggest function was to police the slaves. According to Dr Carl T. Bogus, Professor of Law of the Roger Williams University Law School in Rhode Island, the Second Amendment was written to assure the Southern states that Congress would not undermine the slave system by using its newly acquired constitutional authority over the militia to disarm the state militia and thereby destroy the South's principal instrument of slave control. In his close analysis of James Madison's writings, Bogus describes the South's obsession with militias during the ratification process:

The militia remained the principal means of protecting the social order and preserving white control over an enormous black population. Anything that might weaken this system presented the gravest of threats.

This preoccupation is clearly expressed in 1788 by the slaveholder Patrick Henry:

Legal historian Paul Finkelman argues that this scenario is implausible. Henry and Mason were political enemies of Madison's, and neither man was in Congress at the time Madison drafted Bill of Rights; moreover, Patrick Henry argued against the ratification of both the Constitution and the Second Amendment, and it was Henry's opposition that led Patrick's home state of Virginia to be the last to ratify.

Most Southern white men between the ages of 18 and 45 were required to serve on " slave patrols" which were organized groups of white men who enforced discipline upon enslaved blacks. Bogus writes with respect to Georgia laws passed in 1755 and 1757 in this context: "The Georgia statutes required patrols, under the direction of commissioned militia officers, to examine every plantation each month and authorized them to search 'all Negro Houses for offensive Weapons and Ammunition' and to apprehend and give twenty lashes to any slave found outside plantation grounds."[unreliable source ]

Finkelman recognises that James Madison "drafted an amendment to protect the right of the states to maintain their militias," but insists that "The amendment had nothing to do with state police powers, which were the basis of slave patrols."

To avoid arming free blacks

Firstly, slave owners feared that enslaved blacks might be emancipated through military service. A few years earlier, there had been a precedent when Lord Dunmore offered freedom to slaves who escaped and joined his forces with "Liberty to Slaves" stitched onto their jacket pocket flaps. Freed slaves also served in General Washington's army.

Secondly, they also greatly feared "a ruinous slave rebellion in which their families would be slaughtered and their property destroyed." When Virginia ratified the Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791, the Haitian Revolution, a successful slave rebellion, was under way. The right to bear arms was therefore deliberately tied to membership in a militia by the slaveholder and chief drafter of the Amendment, James Madison, because only whites could join militias in the South.

Conflict and compromise in Congress produce the Bill of Rights

James Madison's initial proposal for a bill of rights was brought to the floor of the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, during the first session of Congress. The initial proposed passage relating to arms was:

On July 21, Madison again raised the issue of his bill and proposed that a select committee be created to report on it. The House voted in favor of Madison's motion, and the Bill of Rights entered committee for review. The committee returned to the House a reworded version of the Second Amendment on July 28. On August 17, that version was read into the Journal:

In late August 1789, the House debated and modified the Second Amendment. These debates revolved primarily around the risk of "mal-administration of the government" using the "religiously scrupulous" clause to destroy the militia as British forces had attempted to destroy the Patriot militia at the commencement of the American Revolution. These concerns were addressed by modifying the final clause, and on August 24, the House sent the following version to the Senate:

A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.

The next day, August 25, the Senate received the amendment from the House and entered it into the Senate Journal. However, the Senate scribe added a comma before "shall not be infringed" and changed the semicolon separating that phrase from the religious exemption portion to a comma:

By this time, the proposed right to keep and bear arms was in a separate amendment, instead of being in a single amendment together with other proposed rights such as the due process right. As a representative explained, this change allowed each amendment to "be passed upon distinctly by the States". On September 4, the Senate voted to change the language of the Second Amendment by removing the definition of militia, and striking the conscientious objector clause:

The Senate returned to this amendment for a final time on September 9. A proposal to insert the words "for the common defence" next to the words "bear arms" was defeated. A motion passed to replace the words "the best", and insert in lieu thereof "necessary to the" . The Senate then slightly modified the language to read as the fourth article and voted to return the Bill of Rights to the House. The final version by the Senate was amended to read as:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

The House voted on September 21, 1789, to accept the changes made by the Senate.

The enrolled original Joint Resolution passed by Congress on September 25, 1789, on permanent display in the Rotunda, reads as:

On December 15, 1791, the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution) was adopted, having been ratified by three-fourths of the states, having been ratified as a group by all the fourteen states then in existence except Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Georgia - which added ratifications in 1939.

Militia following ratification

Ketland brass barrel smooth bore pistol, common in Colonial America

During the first two decades following the ratification of the Second Amendment, public opposition to standing armies, among Anti-Federalists and Federalists alike, persisted and manifested itself locally as a general reluctance to create a professional armed police force, instead relying on county sheriffs, constables and night watchmen to enforce local ordinances. Though sometimes compensated, often these positions were unpaid - held as a matter of civic duty. In these early decades, law enforcement officers were rarely armed with firearms, using billy clubs as their sole defensive weapons. In serious emergencies, a posse comitatus, militia company, or group of vigilantes assumed law enforcement duties; these individuals were more likely than the local sheriff to be armed with firearms.

On May 8, 1792, Congress passed "[a]n act more effectually to provide for the National Defence, by establishing an Uniform Militia throughout the United States" requiring:

[E]ach and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia... [and] every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.

The act also gave specific instructions to domestic weapon manufacturers "that from and after five years from the passing of this act, muskets for arming the militia as herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound." In practice, private acquisition and maintenance of rifles and muskets meeting specifications and readily available for militia duty proved problematic; estimates of compliance ranged from 10 to 65 percent. Compliance with the enrollment provisions was also poor. In addition to the exemptions granted by the law for custom-house officers and their clerks, post-officers and stage drivers employed in the care and conveyance of U.S. mail, ferrymen, export inspectors, pilots, merchant mariners and those deployed at sea in active service; state legislatures granted numerous exemptions under Section 2 of the Act, including exemptions for: clergy, conscientious objectors, teachers, students, and jurors. Though a number of able-bodied white men remained available for service, many simply did not show up for militia duty. Penalties for failure to appear were enforced sporadically and selectively. None is mentioned in the legislation.

The first test of the militia system occurred in July 1794, when a group of disaffected Pennsylvania farmers rebelled against federal tax collectors whom they viewed as illegitimate tools of tyrannical power. Attempts by the four adjoining states to raise a militia for nationalization to suppress the insurrection proved inadequate. When officials resorted to drafting men, they faced bitter resistance. Forthcoming soldiers consisted primarily of draftees or paid substitutes as well as poor enlistees lured by enlistment bonuses. The officers, however, were of a higher quality, responding out of a sense of civic duty and patriotism, and generally critical of the rank and file. Most of the 13,000 soldiers lacked the required weaponry; the war department provided nearly two-thirds of them with guns. In October, President George Washington and General Harry Lee marched on the 7,000 rebels who conceded without fighting. The episode provoked criticism of the citizen militia and inspired calls for a universal militia. Secretary of War Henry Knox and Vice President John Adams had lobbied Congress to establish federal armories to stock imported weapons and encourage domestic production. Congress did subsequently pass "[a]n act for the erecting and repairing of Arsenals and Magazines" on April 2, 1794, two months prior to the insurrection. Nevertheless, the militia continued to deteriorate and twenty years later, the militia's poor condition contributed to several losses in the War of 1812, including the sacking of Washington, D.C., and the burning of the White House in 1814.

In the 20th century, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1903. The act defined the militia as every able-bodied male aged 18 to 44 who was a citizen or intended to become one. The militia was then divided by the act into the United States National Guard and the unorganized Reserve Militia.

The "Federal Farmer"

In May of 1788, the pseudonymous author " Federal Farmer" (his real identity is presumed to be either Richard Henry Lee or Melancton Smith) wrote in Additional Letters From The Federal Farmer #169 or Letter XVIII regarding the definition of a "militia":

A militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops in a great measure unnecessary.

George Mason

In June of 1788, George Mason addressed the Virginia Ratifying Convention regarding a "militia:"

A worthy member has asked, who are the militia, if they be not the people, of this country, and if we are not to be protected from the fate of the Germans, Prussians, &c. by our representation? I ask who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers. But I cannot say who will be the militia of the future day. If that paper on the table gets no alteration, the militia of the future day may not consist of all classes, high and low, and rich and poor; but may be confined to the lower and middle classes of the people, granting exclusion to the higher classes of the people. If we should ever see that day, the most ignominious punishments and heavy fines may be expected. Under the present government all ranks of people are subject to militia duty.

Tucker/Blackstone

The earliest published commentary on the Second Amendment by a major constitutional theorist was by St. George Tucker. He annotated a five-volume edition of Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, a critical legal reference for early American attorneys published in 1803. Tucker wrote:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep, and bear arms, shall not be infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4. This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty... The right of self defence is the first law of nature: In most governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, under the specious pretext of preserving the game : a never failing lure to bring over the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty.

In footnotes 40 and 41 of the Commentaries, Tucker stated that the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment was not subject to the restrictions that were part of English law: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government" and "whoever examines the forest, and game laws in the British code, will readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually taken away from the people of England." Blackstone himself also commented on English game laws, Vol. II, p. 412, "that the prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to government by disarming the bulk of the people, is a reason oftener meant than avowed by the makers of the forest and game laws." Blackstone discussed the right of self-defense in a separate section of his treatise on the common law of crimes. Tucker's annotations for that latter section did not mention the Second Amendment but cited the standard works of English jurists such as Hawkins.

William Rawle

Tucker's commentary was soon followed, in 1825, by that of William Rawle in his landmark text A View of the Constitution of the United States of America. Like Tucker, Rawle condemned England's "arbitrary code for the preservation of game", portraying that country as one that "boasts so much of its freedom", yet provides a right to "protestant subjects only" that it "cautiously describ[es] to be that of bearing arms for their defence" and reserves for "[a] very small proportion of the people[.]" In contrast, Rawle characterizes the second clause of the Second Amendment, which he calls the corollary clause, as a general prohibition against such capricious abuse of government power.

Speaking of the Second Amendment generally, Rawle said:

The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both.

Rawle, long before the concept of incorporation was formally recognized by the courts, or Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, contended that citizens could appeal to the Second Amendment should either the state or federal government attempt to disarm them. He did warn, however, that "this right [to bear arms] ought not... be abused to the disturbance of the public peace" and, paraphrasing Coke, observed: "An assemblage of persons with arms, for unlawful purpose, is an indictable offence, and even the carrying of arms abroad by a single individual, attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that he purposes to make an unlawful use of them, would be sufficient cause to require him to give surety of the peace."

Joseph Story

Joseph Story articulated in his influential Commentaries on the Constitution the orthodox view of the Second Amendment, which he viewed as the amendment's clear meaning:

Story describes a militia as the "natural defence of a free country", both against foreign foes, domestic revolts and usurpation by rulers. The book regards the militia as a "moral check" against both usurpation and the arbitrary use of power, while expressing distress at the growing indifference of the American people to maintaining such an organized militia, which could lead to the undermining of the protection of the Second Amendment.

Lysander Spooner

Abolitionist Lysander Spooner, commenting on bills of rights, stated that the object of all bills of rights is to assert the rights of individuals against the government and that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was in support of the right to resist government oppression, as the only security against the tyranny of government lies in forcible resistance to injustice, for injustice will certainly be executed, unless forcibly resisted. Spooner's theory provided the intellectual foundation for John Brown and other radical abolitionists who believed that arming slaves was not only morally justified, but entirely consistent with the Second Amendment. An express connection between this right and the Second Amendment was drawn by Lysander Spooner who commented that a "right of resistance" is protected by both the right to trial by jury and the Second Amendment.

Timothy Farrar

In 1867, Judge Timothy Farrar published his Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America, which was written when the Fourteenth Amendment was "in the process of adoption by the State legislatures":

The States are recognized as governments, and, when their own constitutions permit, may do as they please; provided they do not interfere with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or with the civil or natural rights of the people recognized thereby, and held in conformity to them. The right of every person to "life, liberty, and property", to "keep and bear arms", to the "writ of habeas corpus" to "trial by jury", and divers others, are recognized by, and held under, the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be infringed by individuals or even by the government itself.

Judge Thomas Cooley

Judge Thomas M. Cooley, perhaps the most widely read constitutional scholar of the nineteenth century, wrote extensively about this amendment, and he explained in 1880 how the Second Amendment protected the "right of the people":

Assortment of 20th century handguns

Until the late 20th century, there was little scholarly commentary of the Second Amendment. In the latter half of the 20th century, there was considerable debate over whether the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a collective right. The debate centered on whether the prefatory clause ("A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State") declared the amendment's only purpose or merely announced a purpose to introduce the operative clause ("the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"). Scholars advanced three competing theoretical models for how the prefatory clause should be interpreted.

The first, known as the " states' rights" or "collective right" model, held that the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals; rather, it recognizes the right of each state to arm its militia. Under this approach, citizens "have no right to keep or bear arms, but the states have a collective right to have the National Guard". Advocates of collective rights models argued that the Second Amendment was written to prevent the federal government from disarming state militias, rather than to secure an individual right to possess firearms. Prior to 2001, every circuit court decision that interpreted the Second Amendment endorsed the "collective right" model. However, beginning with the Fifth Circuit's opinion United States v. Emerson in 2001, some circuit courts recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.

The second, known as the "sophisticated collective right model", held that the Second Amendment recognizes some limited individual right. However, this individual right could be exercised only by actively participating members of a functioning, organized state militia. Some scholars have argued that the "sophisticated collective rights model" is, in fact, the functional equivalent of the "collective rights model". Other commentators have observed that prior to Emerson, five circuit courts specifically endorsed the "sophisticated collective right model".

The third, known as the "standard model", held that the Second Amendment recognized the personal right of individuals to keep and bear arms. Supporters of this model argued that "although the first clause may describe a general purpose for the amendment, the second clause is controlling and therefore the amendment confers an individual right 'of the people' to keep and bear arms". Additionally, scholars who favored this model argued the "absence of founding-era militias mentioned in the Amendment's preamble does not render it a 'dead letter' because the preamble is a 'philosophical declaration' safeguarding militias and is but one of multiple 'civic purposes' for which the Amendment was enacted".

Under both of the collective right models, the opening phrase was considered essential as a pre-condition for the main clause. These interpretations held that this was a grammar structure that was common during that era and that this grammar dictated that the Second Amendment protected a collective right to firearms to the extent necessary for militia duty. However, under the standard model, the opening phrase was believed to be prefatory or amplifying to the operative clause. The opening phrase was meant as a non-exclusive example - one of many reasons for the amendment. This interpretation is consistent with the position that the Second Amendment protects a modified individual right.

The question of a collective right versus an individual right was progressively resolved in favor of the individual rights model, beginning with the Fifth Circuit ruling in United States v. Emerson (2001), along with the Supreme Court's rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), and McDonald v. Chicago (2010). In Heller, the Supreme Court resolved any remaining circuit splits by ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Although the Second Amendment is the only Constitutional amendment with a prefatory clause, such linguistic constructions were widely used elsewhere in the late eighteenth century.

Warren E. Burger, a conservative Republican appointed chief justice of the United States by President Richard Nixon, wrote in 1990 following his retirement:

The Constitution of the United States, in its Second Amendment, guarantees a "right of the people to keep and bear arms". However, the meaning of this clause cannot be understood except by looking to the purpose, the setting and the objectives of the draftsmen... People of that day were apprehensive about the new "monster" national government presented to them, and this helps explain the language and purpose of the Second Amendment... We see that the need for a state militia was the predicate of the "right" guaranteed; in short, it was declared "necessary" in order to have a state military force to protect the security of the state.

And in 1991 Burger stated:

If I were writing the Bill of Rights now, there wouldn't be any such thing as the Second Amendment... that a well regulated militia being necessary for the defense of the state, the peoples' rights to bear arms. This has been the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud - I repeat the word 'fraud' - on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.

In a 1992 opinion piece, six former American attorneys general wrote:

Research by Robert Spitzer found that every law journal article discussing the Second Amendment through 1959 "reflected the Second Amendment affects citizens only in connection with citizen service in a government organized and regulated militia." Only beginning in 1960 did law journal articles begin to advocate an "individualist" view of gun ownership rights. The opposite of this "individualist" view of gun ownership rights is the "collective-right" theory, according to which the amendment protects a collective right of states to maintain militias or an individual right to keep and bear arms in connection with service in a militia (for this view see for example the quote of Justice John Paul Stevens in the Meaning of "well regulated militia" section below). In his book, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the Constitution, Justice John Paul Stevens for example submits the following revised Second Amendment: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms when serving in the militia shall not be infringed."

Meaning of "well regulated militia"

An early use of the phrase "well-regulated militia" may be found in Andrew Fletcher's 1698 A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, as well as the phrase "ordinary and ill-regulated militia". Fletcher meant "regular" in the sense of regular military, and advocated the universal conscription and regular training of men of fighting age. Jefferson thought well of Fletcher, commenting that "the political principles of that patriot were worthy the purest periods of the British constitution. They are those which were in vigour."

The term "regulated" means "disciplined" or "trained". In Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[t]he adjective 'well-regulated' implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training."

In the year before the drafting of the Second Amendment, in Federalist No. 29 Alexander Hamilton wrote the following about "organizing", "disciplining", "arming", and "training" of the militia as specified in the enumerated powers:

If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security... confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority... [but] reserving to the states... the authority of training the militia... A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss... Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the People at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.

Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Heller: "In Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), the Georgia Supreme Court construed the Second Amendment as protecting the 'natural right of self-defence' and therefore struck down a ban on carrying pistols openly. Its opinion perfectly captured the way in which the operative clause of the Second Amendment furthers the purpose announced in the prefatory clause, in continuity with the English right":

Nor is the right involved in this discussion less comprehensive or valuable: "The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed." The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which contravenes this right, originally belonging to our forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and his two wicked sons and successors, reestablished by the revolution of 1688, conveyed to this land of liberty by the colonists, and finally incorporated conspicuously in our own Magna Charta []! And Lexington, Concord, Camden, River Raisin, Sandusky, and the laurel-crowned field of New Orleans, plead eloquently for this interpretation! And the acquisition of Texas may be considered the full fruits of this great constitutional right.

Justice Stevens in dissent:

When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia. So far as appears, no more than that was contemplated by its drafters or is encompassed within its terms. Even if the meaning of the text were genuinely susceptible to more than one interpretation, the burden would remain on those advocating a departure from the purpose identified in the preamble and from settled law to come forward with persuasive new arguments or evidence. The textual analysis offered by respondent and embraced by the Court falls far short of sustaining that heavy burden. And the Court's emphatic reliance on the claim "that the Second Amendment ... codified a pre-existing right," ante, at 19 [refers to p. 19 of the opinion], is of course beside the point because the right to keep and bear arms for service in a state militia was also a pre-existing right.

Meaning of "the right of the People"

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, stated:

Scalia further specifies who holds this right:

An earlier case, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), dealt with nonresident aliens and the Fourth Amendment, but led to a discussion of who are "the People" when referred to elsewhere in the Constitution:

The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms", and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to "the people"... While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.

According to the majority in Heller, there were several different reasons for this amendment, and protecting militias was only one of them; if protecting militias had been the only reason then the amendment could have instead referred to "the right of the militia to keep and bear arms" instead of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms".

Meaning of "keep and bear arms"

In Heller the majority rejected the view that the term "to bear arms" implies only the military use of arms:

In a dissent, joined by justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens said:

A May 2018 analysis by Dennis Baron contradicted the majority opinion:

A paper from 2008 found that before 1820, the use of the phrase "bear arms" was commonly used in a civilian context, such as hunting and personal self-defense, in both American and British law. One scholar suggests that the right to "keep and bear arms" further includes a right to privately manufacture firearms.

Supreme Court cases

In the century following the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the intended meaning and application of the Second Amendment drew less interest than it does in modern times. The vast majority of regulation was done by states, and the first case law on weapons regulation dealt with state interpretations of the Second Amendment. A notable exception to this general rule was Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820), where the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned the Second Amendment in an aside. In the Dred Scott decision (1857), the opinion of the court stated that if African Americans were considered U.S. citizens, "It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right... to keep and carry arms wherever they went."

State and federal courts historically have used two models to interpret the Second Amendment: the "individual rights" model, which holds that individuals hold the right to bear arms, and the "collective rights" model, which holds that the right is dependent on militia membership. The "collective rights" model has been rejected by the Supreme Court, in favor of the individual rights model, beginning with its District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) decision.

The Supreme Court's primary Second Amendment cases include United States v. Miller, (1939); District of Columbia v. Heller (2008); and McDonald v. Chicago (2010).

Heller and McDonald supported the individual rights model, under which the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms much as the First Amendment protects the right to free speech. Under this model, the militia is composed of members who supply their own arms and ammunition. This is generally recognized as the method by which militias have historically been armed, as the Supreme Court in Miller said:

Of the collective rights model that holds that the right to arms is based on militia membership, the Supreme Court in Heller said:

A purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side of the looking glass (except, apparently, in some courses on Linguistics). If "bear arms" means, as we think, simply the carrying of arms, a modifier can limit the purpose of the carriage ("for the purpose of self-defense" or "to make war against the King"). But if "bear arms" means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the carrying of arms only for military purposes, one simply cannot add "for the purpose of killing game". The right "to carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game" is worthy of the mad hatter.

United States v. Cruikshank

In the Reconstruction Era case of United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), the defendants were white men who had killed more than sixty black people in what was known as the Colfax massacre and had been charged with conspiring to prevent blacks from exercising their right to bear arms. The Court dismissed the charges, holding that the Bill of Rights restricted Congress but not private individuals. The Court concluded, "[f]or their protection in its enjoyment, the people must look to the States."

The Court stated that "[t]he Second Amendment... has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government..." Likewise, the Court held that there was no state action in this case, and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable:

Thus, the Court held a federal anti-Ku-Klux-Klan statute to be unconstitutional as applied in that case.

In Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), Herman Presser headed a German-American paramilitary shooting organization and was arrested for leading a parade group of 400 men, training and drilling with military weapons with the declared intention to fight, through the streets of Chicago as a violation of Illinois law that prohibited public drilling and parading in military style without a permit from the governor.

At his trial, Presser argued that the State of Illinois had violated his Second Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Cruikshank, and also held that the Second Amendment prevented neither the States nor Congress from barring private militias that parade with arms; such a right "cannot be claimed as a right independent of law". This decision upheld the States' authority to regulate the militia and that citizens had no right to create their own militias or to own weapons for semi-military purposes. The Court however observed with respect to the reach of the Amendment on the national government and the federal states and the role of the people therin: "It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the states, and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the states cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government." In essence the court said: "A state cannot prohibit the people therein from keeping and bearing arms to an extent that would deprive the United States of the protection afforded by them as a reserve military force."

In Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894), Franklin Miller was convicted and sentenced to be executed for shooting a police officer to death with an illegally carried handgun in violation of Texas law. Miller sought to have his conviction overturned, claiming his Second Amendment rights were violated and that the Bill of Rights should be applied to state law. The Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment did not apply to state laws such as the Texas law, writing: "As the proceedings were conducted under the ordinary forms of criminal prosecutions there certainly was no denial of due process of law."

In Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), the Supreme Court stated in that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms (Art. II) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons."

United States v. Schwimmer

United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), concerned a pacifist applicant for naturalization who in the interview declared not to be willing to "take up arms personally" in defense of the United States. The Supreme Court cited the Second Amendment indirectly by declaring that the United States Constitution obliges citizens "to defend our government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the Constitution" and by declaring further that the "common defense was one of the purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution."

In United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the Supreme Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act prohibiting the interstate transportation of unregistered Title II weapons:

Jack Miller and Frank Layton "did unlawfully... transport in interstate commerce from... Claremore... Oklahoma to... Siloam Springs... Arkansas a certain firearm... a double barrel... shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length... at the time of so transporting said firearm in interstate commerce... not having registered said firearm as required by Section 1132d of Title 26, United States Code... and not having in their possession a stamp-affixed written order... as provided by Section 1132C..."

Gun rights advocates claim that the Court in Miller ruled that the Second Amendment protected the right to keep arms that are part of "ordinary military equipment". They also claim that the Court did not consider the question of whether the sawed-off shotgun in the case would be an applicable weapon for personal defense, instead looking solely at the weapon's suitability for the "common defense". Law professor Andrew McClurg states, "The only certainty about Miller is that it failed to give either side a clear-cut victory. Most modern scholars recognize this fact."

District of Columbia v. Heller

The justices who decided Heller

According to the syllabus prepared by the U.S. Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court held:

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. pp. 2-53.

(a) The Amendment's prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause's text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. pp. 2-22.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court's interpretation of the operative clause. The "militia" comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens' militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens' militia would be preserved. pp. 22-28.

(c) The Court's interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment. pp. 28-30.

(d) The Second Amendment's drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. pp. 30-32.

(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court's conclusion. pp. 32-47.

(f) None of the Court's precedents forecloses the Court's interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. pp. 47-54.

2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court's opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. pp. 54-56.

3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District's total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of "arms" that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition - in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute - would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. pp. 56-64.

The Heller court also stated ( Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), at 632) its analysis should not be read to suggest "the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents." The Supreme Court also defined the term arms used in the Second Amendment. "Arms" covered by the Second Amendment were defined inDistrict of Columbia v. Heller to include "any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another". 554 U. S., at 581." The Michigan Court of Appeals 2012 relied on Heller in the case People v. Yanna to state certain limitations on the right to keep and bear arms:

In some respects, these limitations are consistent with each other. However, they are not identical, and the United States Supreme Court neither fully harmonized them nor elevated one over another. First, the Court stated that "the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes." Id. at 625, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Court further stated that "the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time.'" Id. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citation omitted). As noted, however, this included weapons that did not exist when the Second Amendment was enacted. Id. at 582, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Third, the Court referred to "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" Id. at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citation omitted).

There are similar legal summaries of the Supreme Court's findings in Heller as the one quoted above. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Aguilar (2013), summed up Heller's findings and reasoning:

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court undertook its first-ever "in-depth examination" of the second amendment's meaning Id. at 635. After a lengthy historical discussion, the Court ultimately concluded that the second amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation" ( id. at 592); that "central to" this right is "the inherent right of self-defense" ( id. at 628); that "the home" is "where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute" ( id. at 628); and that, "above all other interests", the second amendment elevates "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home" ( id. at 635). Based on this understanding, the Court held that a District of Columbia law banning handgun possession in the home violated the second amendment. Id. at 635.

Notes and analysis

Heller has been widely described as a landmark decision because it was the first time the Court affirmed an individual's right to own a gun. To clarify that its ruling does not invalidate a broad range of existing firearm laws, the majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, said:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited... Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

The Court's statement that the right secured by the Second Amendment is limited has been widely discussed by lower courts and the media. According to Justice John Paul Stevens he was able to persuade Justice Anthony M. Kennedy to ask for "some important changes" to Justice Scalia's opinion, so it was Justice Kennedy, who was needed to secure a fifth vote in Heller, "who requested that the opinion include language stating that Heller 'should not be taken to cast doubt' on many existing gun laws." The majority opinion also said that the amendment's prefatory clause (referencing the "militia") serves to clarify the operative clause (referencing "the people"), but does not limit the scope of the operative clause, because "the 'militia' in colonial America consisted of a subset of 'the people'.... "

Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, which was joined by the three other dissenters, said:

Stevens went on to say the following:

This dissent called the majority opinion "strained and unpersuasive" and said that the right to possess a firearm exists only in relation to the militia and that the D.C. laws constitute permissible regulation. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens' interpretation of the phrase "to keep and bear arms" was referred to as a "hybrid" definition that Stevens purportedly chose in order to avoid an "incoherent" and "[g]rotesque" idiomatic meeting.

Regarding the term "well regulated", the majority opinion said, "The adjective 'well-regulated' implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training." The majority opinion quoted Spooner from The Unconstitutionality of Slavery as saying that the right to bear arms was necessary for those who wanted to take a stand against slavery. The majority opinion also stated that:

The dissenting justices were not persuaded by this argument.

Reaction to Heller has varied, with many sources giving focus to the ruling referring to itself as being the first in Supreme Court history to read the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, gives explanation of the majority legal reasoning behind this decision. The majority opinion made clear that the recent ruling did not foreclose the Court's prior interpretations given in United States v. Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and United States v. Miller though these earlier rulings did not limit the right to keep and bear arms solely to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia (i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes).

Heller pertained to three District of Columbia ordinances involving restrictions on firearms amounting to a total ban. These three ordinances were a ban on handgun registration, a requirement that all firearms in a home be either disassembled or have a trigger lock, and licensing requirement that prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, such as from one room to another.

Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition - in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute - would fail constitutional muster.... Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the District's licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumed that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and did not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home."

Justice Ginsburg was a vocal critic of Heller. Speaking in an interview on public radio station WNYC, she called the Second Amendment "outdated", saying:

When we no longer need people to keep muskets in their home, then the Second Amendment has no function... If the Court had properly interpreted the Second Amendment, the Court would have said that amendment was very important when the nation was new; it gave a qualified right to keep and bear arms, but it was for one purpose only - and that was the purpose of having militiamen who were able to fight to preserve the nation.

According to adjunct professor of law at Duquesne University School of Law Anthony Picadio, who said he's not anti-gun but rather "anti-bad-judging", Justice Scalia's reasoning in Heller is the product of an erroneous reading of colonial history and the drafting history of the Second Amendment. He argued that the Southern slave states would never have ratified the Second Amendment if it had been understood as creating an individual right to own firearms because of their fear of arming free blacks. After a lengthy historical and legal analysis Anthony Picadio concluded: "If the Second Amendment had been understood to have the meaning given to it by Justice Scalia, it would not have been ratified by Virginia and the other slave states." Picadio pointed out that the right acknowledged in Heller was not originally to be an enumerated right. Instead, he argues, there would be more respect for the Heller decision, if the right acknowledged in Heller would have been forthrightly classified as an unenumerated right and if the issue in Heller would have been analysed under the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He finished with the following observation: "The pre-existing right that the Heller Court incorporated into the Second Amendment is very narrow. As recognized by Justice Alito in the McDonald case, it protects only "the right to possess a handgun in the house for the purposes of self-defense." This narrow right has never been extended by the Supreme Court."

McDonald v. City of Chicago

On June 28, 2010, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), held that the Second Amendment was incorporated, saying that "[i]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty." This means that the Court ruled that the Second Amendment limits state and local governments to the same extent that it limits the federal government. It also remanded a case regarding a Chicago handgun prohibition. Four of the five justices in the majority voted to do so by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the fifth justice, Clarence Thomas, voted to do so through the amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause refers to "citizens" whereas the Due Process Clause refers more broadly to any "person", and therefore Thomas reserved the issue of non-citizens for later decision. After McDonald, many questions about the Second Amendment remain unsettled, such as whether non-citizens are protected through the Equal Protection Clause.

In People v. Aguilar (2013), the Illinois Supreme Court summed up the central Second Amendment findings in McDonald:

Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, ___, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the second amendment right recognized in is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In so holding, the Court reiterated that "the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense" ( id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3026); that "individual self-defense is 'the central component' of the Second Amendment right" (emphasis in original) ( id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599)); and that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day" ( id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3036).

Caetano v. Massachusetts

On March 21, 2016, in a per curiam decision the Court vacated a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision upholding the conviction of a woman who carried a stun gun for self-defense. The Court reiterated that the Heller and McDonald decisions saying that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding", that "the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States", and that the protection is not restricted to "only those weapons useful in warfare". The term "bearable arms" was defined in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and includes any "[w]eapo[n] of offence" or "thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands", that is "carr[ied]... for the purpose of offensive or defensive action". 554 U. S., at 581, 584 (internal quotation marks omitted)."

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, New York

The Court heard New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York on December 2, 2019, to decide whether a New York City ordinance that prevents the transport of guns, even if properly unloaded and locked in containers, from within city limits to outside of the city limits is unconstitutional. The New York Rifle & Pistol Association challenged the ordinance on the basis of the Second Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the right to travel. However, as the city had changed its rule to allow transport while the case was under consideration by the Court, the Court ruled the case moot in April 2020, though it remanded the case so the lower courts could review the new rules under the petitioners new claims.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen

New York law prohibits the concealed carry of firearms without a permit. The issuance of such permits was previously at the discretion of state authorities, and permits were not issued absent 'proper cause'. The New York State Rifle & Pistol Association and two individuals who had been denied permits on the grounds that they lacked proper cause, challenged the licensing regime as a violation of the Second Amendment, with the District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in favor of the state. The Supreme Court ruled on June 23, 2022, in a 6-3 decision that the New York law, as a "may-issue" regulation, was unconstitutional, affirming that public possession of firearms was a protected right under the Second Amendment. The majority stated that states may still regulate firearms through "shall-issue" regulations that use objective measures such as background checks.

United States Courts of Appeals decisions before and after Heller

Until District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), United States v. Miller (1939) had been the only Supreme Court decision that "tested a congressional enactment against [the Second Amendment]". Miller did not directly mention either a collective or individual right, but for the 62-year period from Miller until the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Emerson (2001), federal courts recognized only the collective right, with "courts increasingly referring to one another's holdings... without engaging in any appreciably substantive legal analysis of the issue".

Emerson changed this by addressing the question in depth, with the Fifth Circuit determining that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit conflicted with Emerson in Silveira v. Lockyer, and the D.C. Circuit supported Emerson in Parker v. District of Columbia. Parker evolved into District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Second Amendment protects an individual right.

Since Heller, the United States courts of appeals have ruled on many Second Amendment challenges to convictions and gun control laws.

Heller v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 08-1289 (RMU), No. 23., 25 - On March 26, 2010, the D.C. Circuit denied the follow-up appeal of Dick Heller who requested the court to overturn the new District of Columbia gun control ordinances newly enacted after the 2008 Heller ruling. The court refused to do so, stating that the firearms registration procedures, the prohibition on assault weapons, and the prohibition on large capacity ammunition feeding devices were found to not violate the Second Amendment. On September 18, 2015, the D.C. Circuit ruled that requiring gun owners to re-register a gun every three years, make a gun available for inspection or pass a test about firearms laws violated the Second Amendment, although the court upheld requirements that gun owners be fingerprinted, photographed, and complete a safety training course.

Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025 - On July 25, 2017, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a District of Columbia regulation that limited conceal-carry licenses only to those individuals who could demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the chief of police, that they have a "good reason" to carry a handgun in public was essentially designed to prevent the exercise of the right to bear arms by most District residents and so violated the Second Amendment by amounting to a complete prohibition on firearms possession.

First Circuit

United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3 d 8 (1st Cir. 2009 ) - On August 31, 2009, the First Circuit affirmed the conviction of a juvenile for the illegal possession of a handgun as a juvenile, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 5032, rejecting the defendant's argument that the federal law violated his Second Amendment rights under Heller. The court cited "the existence of a longstanding tradition of prohibiting juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns" and observed "the federal ban on juvenile possession of handguns is part of a longstanding practice of prohibiting certain classes of individuals from possessing firearms - those whose possession poses a particular danger to the public."

Second Circuit

Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 11-3942 - On November 28, 2012, the Second Circuit upheld New York's may-issue concealed carry permit law, ruling that "the proper cause requirement is substantially related to New York's compelling interests in public safety and crime prevention."

Third Circuit

Range v. Attorney General of the United States, Civil Action No. 21-2835 - On June 6, 2023, the Third Circuit ruled that the Second Amendment prohibited a lifetime ban on firearms possession as a result of a conviction for a nonviolent crime.

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Hall, 551 F.3 d 257 (4th Cir. 2009 ) - On August 4, 2008, the Fourth Circuit upheld as constitutional the prohibition of possession of a concealed weapon without a permit.

United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) - On December 30, 2010, the Fourth Circuit vacated William Chester's conviction for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The court found that the district court erred in perfunctorily relying on Heller's exception for "presumptively lawful" gun regulations made in accordance with "longstanding prohibitions".

Kolbe v. Hogan, No. 14-1945 (4th Cir. 2016) - On February 4, 2016, the Fourth Circuit vacated a U.S. District Court decision upholding a Maryland law banning high-capacity magazines and semi-automatic rifles, ruling that the District Court was wrong to have applied intermediate scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the higher strict scrutiny standard is to be applied on remand. On March 4, 2016, the court agreed to rehear the case on May 11, 2016.

Fifth Circuit

United States v. Dorosan, 350 Fed. Appx. 874 (5th Cir. 2009) - On June 30, 2008, the Fifth Circuit upheld , which bans weapons on postal property, sustaining restrictions on guns outside the home, specifically in private vehicles parked in employee parking lots of government facilities, despite Second Amendment claims that were dismissed. The employee's Second Amendment rights were not infringed since the employee could have instead parked across the street in a public parking lot, instead of on government property.

United States v. Bledsoe, 334 Fed. Appx. 771 (5th Cir. 2009) - The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of a U.S. District Court decision in Texas, upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which prohibits "straw purchases". A "straw purchase" occurs when someone eligible to purchase a firearm buys one for an ineligible person. Additionally, the court rejected the request for a strict scrutiny standard of review.

United States v. Scroggins, 551 F.3 d 257 (5th Cir. 2010 ) - On March 4, 2010, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Ernie Scroggins for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court noted that it had, prior to Heller, identified the Second Amendment as providing an individual right to bear arms, and had already, likewise, determined that restrictions on felon ownership of firearms did not violate this right. Moreover, it observed that Heller did not affect the longstanding prohibition of firearm possession by felons.

Sixth Circuit

Tyler v. Hillsdale Co. Sheriff's Dept., 775 F.3 d 308 (6th Cir. 2014 ) - On December 18, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled that strict scrutiny should be applied to firearms regulations when regulations burden "conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right, as historically understood". At issue in this case was whether the Second Amendment is violated by a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968 that prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who has been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital. The court did not rule on the provision's constitutionality, instead remanding the case to the United States district court that has earlier heard this case. On April 21, 2015, the Sixth Circuit voted to rehear the case , thereby vacating the December 18 opinion.

Seventh Circuit

United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3 d 803 (7th Cir. 2009 ) - Steven Skoien, a Wisconsin man convicted of two misdemeanor domestic violence convictions, appealed his conviction based on the argument that the prohibition violated the individual rights to bear arms, as described in Heller. After initial favorable rulings in lower court based on a standard of intermediate scrutiny, on July 13, 2010, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled 10-1 against Skoien and reinstated his conviction for a gun violation, citing the strong relation between the law in question and the government objective. Skoien was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison for the gun violation, and will thus likely be subject to a lifetime ban on gun ownership. Editorials favoring gun rights sharply criticized this ruling as going too far with the enactment of a lifetime gun ban, while editorials favoring gun regulations praised the ruling as "a bucket of cold water thrown on the 'gun rights' celebration".

Moore v. Madigan (Circuit docket 12-1269) - On December 11, 2012, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Second Amendment protected a right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. This was an expansion of the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald, each of which referred only to such a right in the home. Based on this ruling, the court declared Illinois's ban on the concealed carrying of firearms to be unconstitutional. The court stayed this ruling for 180 days, so Illinois could enact replacement legislation. On February 22, 2013, a petition for rehearing en banc was denied by a vote of 5-4. On July 9, 2013, the Illinois General Assembly, overriding Governor Quinn's veto, passed a law permitting the concealed carrying of firearms.

Ninth Circuit

Nordyke v. King, 2012 WL 1959239 (9th Cir. 2012) - On July 29, 2009, the Ninth Circuit vacated an April 20 panel decision and reheard the case on September 24, 2009. The April 20 decision had held that the Second Amendment applies to state and local governments, while upholding an Alameda County, California ordinance that makes it a crime to bring a gun or ammunition on to, or possess either while on, county property. The en banc panel remanded the case to the three-judge panel. On May 2, 2011, that panel ruled that intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard by which to judge the ordinance's constitutionality and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On November 28, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel's May2 decision and agreed to rehear the case en banc. On April 4, 2012, the panel sent the case to mediation. The panel dismissed the case on June 1, 2012, but only after Alameda County officials changed their interpretation of the challenged ordinance. Under the new interpretation, gun shows may take place on county property under the ordinance's exception for "events", subject to restrictions regarding the display and handling of firearms.

Teixeira v. County of Alameda, (Circuit docket 13-17132) - On May 16, 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the right to keep and bear arms included being able to buy and sell firearms. The court ruled that a county law prohibiting a gun store being within 500 feet of a "[r]esidentially zoned district; elementary, middle or high school; pre-school or day care center; other firearms sales business; or liquor stores or establishments in which liquor is served" violated the Second Amendment.

Peruta v. San Diego No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. 2016), (Circuit docket 13-17132) - On June 9, 2016, pertaining to the legality of San Diego County's restrictive policy regarding requiring documentation of "good cause" before issuing a concealed carry permit, the Ninth Circuit upheld the policy, finding that "there is no Second Amendment right for members of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public."

Young v. State of Hawaii No. 12-17808 (9th Cir. 2021) - An en banc ruling of the Ninth Circuit on March 26, 2021 upheld the validity of Hawaii's law that barred open carry of guns outside of one's home without a license. The Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no right to carry weapons in public spaces, and states have a compelling interest for public safety to restrict public possession of guns.

References

1. CRS Report for Congress District of Columbia v. Heller: The Supreme Court and the Second Amendment April 11, 2008 Congressional Research Service T.J. Halsted, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division. Order Code RL34446

2. ^ "How a comma gave Americans the right to own guns". Business Insider. Archived from the original on June 19, 2016.. Business Insider. Retrieved on July 1, 2016.

3. ^ Campbell, Thomas (2004). Separation of Powers in Practice - Thomas Campbell. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804750271 - via Google Books.

4. ^ Campbell, Thomas (2004). Separation of Powers in Practice. Stanford University Press. p. 184. ISBN 978-0804750271. The Bill of Rights, as passed by both houses of Congress, contained twelve articles. The first two articles failed of ratification, and thus it was article four which ultimately became the Second Amendment. The "official copy of the Joint Resolution of Congress proposing articles to the Legislatures of the States," as exhibited at the National Archives Building contains all three commas. However, to facilitate ratification of the proposed amendments, 13 copies were made by hand for forwarding to the states. At least one of these documents (viewed at the National Archives Building) omitted the final comma. In conveying notice of ratification, some states (e.g. Delaware) merely attached the official state action to the copy received. Other states (e.g. New York) recopied the text of the amendments in its notification. The New York ratification document of March 27, 1790, contains only one comma in the fourth article. [quoting a letter by Kent M. Ronhovde, Legislative Attorney for the Library of Congress, c. 1989]

5. Bogus, Carl T. "The Hidden History of the Second Amendment". ^ https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/davlr31&id=319&men_tab=srchresults.

6. ^ "They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in the... (Bill of Rights), that Protestants would never be disarmed:... This right has long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment ... It was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia. To be sure, it was an individual right not available to the whole population, given that it was restricted to Protestants, and like all written English rights it was held only against the Crown, not Parliament."

7. "Where a later enactment does not expressly repeal an earlier enactment which it has power to override, but the provisions of the later enactment are contrary to those of the earlier, the latter by implication repeals the earlier." ^ R v. Burke, [1998] EWHC Admin 913; "[T]he Bill of Rights... was declaratory of the common law. It contained in it its own words of limitation, namely that the right to have arms for self-defence is limited by the words 'and as allowed by Law'. The law is a changing thing. Parliament by statute can repeal the common law... Where the Bill of Rights says that 'the Subjects may have arms for their defence suitable for their condition and as allowed by law', 'and as allowed by law' means 'and as allowed by law for the time being'[.]" R v. Burke, [1999] EWCA Civ 923.

8. e.g., ^ King Henry II's Assize of Arms and the Statute of Winchester of 1285. See "The history of policing in the West, Collective responsibility in early Anglo-Saxon times", "Encyclopædia Britannica online". Archived from the original on June 7, 2009.

9. ^ Bellesiles, Michael A. (2001). Bogus, Carl T. (ed.). The Second Amendment in Law and History: Historians and Constitutional Scholars on the Right to Bear Arms. New Press. pp. 67-69, 239-240. ISBN 1565846990.

10. ^ Bogus, Carl T. (Winter 1998). "The Hidden History of the Second Amendment". U.C. Davis Law Review. 31: 309-408. SSRN 1465114.

11. ^ Stephanie Mencimer (2008). "Whitewashing the Second Amendment". Archived from the original on May 31, 2009. the "well-regulated militias" cited in the Constitution almost certainly referred to state militias that were used to suppress slave insurrections.

12. ^ DeConde, Alexander (2001). Gun Violence in America: The struggle for control. Northeastern University Press. ISBN 978-1555534868.

13. ^ Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book 1, Chapter 1. the fifth and last auxiliary right... when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression

14. ^ Horowitz, Joshua; Anderson, Casey (2009). Guns, democracy, and the insurrectionist idea. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press. pp. 21-25. doi:10.3998/mpub.180934. ISBN 978-0-472-90088-6.

15. ^ Ford, Paul Leicester (September 1895). "The Adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776". Political Science Quarterly. 10 (3): 426-459. doi:10.2307/2139954. JSTOR 2139954.

16. ^ The Federalist Papers No. 46 (James Madison) (concerning the influence of state and federal governments).

17. ^ Webster, Noah (October 10, 1787). "An Examination of the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution". Archived from the original on August 5, 2010.

18. ^ Linder, Doug (ed.). "Theories of Constitutional Interpretation". University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School. Archived from the original on December 16, 2011. article cites Robert Bork: "If the Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of all other law, is the meaning the lawmakers were understood to have intended."

19. ^ Wills, Garry (1999). A Necessary Evil: A history of American distrust of government. Simon and Schuster. pp. 253-254. ISBN 978-0684844893. Whitehill deals with guns in three of his fifteen headings. Article8 begins: "The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times ..." article 7: "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purposes of killing game ..."

20. ^ Garry Wills (1999). A Necessary Evil: A history of American distrust of government. Simon and Schuster. p. 253. ISBN 978-0684844893. The items on the [Whitehill's] list were never discussed in the convention, which went on to approve the Constitution.

21. ^ Madison, James (June 8, 1789). "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress". House of Representatives. Amendments to the Constitution 1st Congress, 1st Session. pp. 448-459 [451]. Archived from the original on January 11, 2011.

22. Letter from ^ Roger Sherman to Simeon Baldwin (Aug. 22, 1789) qtd. in Bickford, et al., p. 16 See also letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789) qtd. in Madison, Writings, pp. 418-19.

23. ^ Rawle, William (2011). "A View to the Constitution of the United States of America" (PDF). Portage Publications. Archived (PDF) from the original on November 5, 2013.

24. Story, Joseph (1833). Commentaries on the U.S. Constitution. Harper & Brothers. §1890. natural defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions.

25. ^ Klukowski, Kenneth A. (2008). "Armed by Right: The emerging jurisprudence of the Second Amendment". Geo. Mason U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 18: 167, 176. Advocates of the collective theories posit that the Second Amendment was written out of fear that the new central government would disarm state militias needed for local defense. Under any sort of collective theory, the government could completely ban all firearm ownership whatsoever.

26. ^ Mocsary, George A. (2008). "Explaining away the Obvious: The infusibility of characterizing the Second Amendment as a nonindividual right". Fordham L. Rev. 76: 2113, 2133. Up until 2001, every federal circuit court of appeals that ruled on the issue had adopted the collective right approach.

27. ^ Klukowski, Kenneth A. (2009). "Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment through the privileges or immunities clause". New Mexico Law Review. 39: 195, 199-200.

28. ^ Mocsary, George A. (2008). "Explaining away the Obvious: The infusibility of characterizing the Second Amendment as a nonindividual right". Fordham L. Rev. 76: 2113, 2133-2134.

29. ^ Silveira v. Lockyer. 9th Circuit Court of Appeal. 2002. 312 F.3d 1052, 1087. cf. for a ruling that endorses the collective rights model

30. Kenneth A. Klukowski, ^ Armed by Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence Of The Second Amendment, 18 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 167, 176 (2008).

31. George A. Mocsary, ^ Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infusibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2113, 2133 (2008).

32. Kenneth A. Klukowski, ^ Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 195, 200 (2009) (citing United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942)).

33. Dorothy J. Hernaez, "^ Parker v. District of Columbia: Understanding the Broader Implications for the Future of Gun Control", 6 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 693, 696 (2008).

34. ^ Rottenberg, Annette T.; Winchell, Donna Haisty (2011). Elements of Argument: A Text and Reader. Macmillan. ISBN 978-0312646998 - via Google Books.

35. ^ Spitzer, Robert J. (October 2000). "Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment" (PDF). Chicago-Kent Law Review. IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 76 (10): 349-401.

36. Heller, Opinion of the Court, Part II-A-2.

37. ^ Lund, Nelson (1996). "The past and future of the individual's right to arms". Georgia Law Review. 31: 26. Archived from the original on March 25, 2018.

38. Cramer, Clayton E. and Olson, Joseph Edward, "What Did 'Bear Arms' Mean in the Second Amendment?". ^ Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086176

39. ^ Cornell. Gun Control. p. 6. Neither of the two modern theories that have defined public debate over the right to bear arms is faithful to the original understanding of this provision of the Bill of Rights.

40. ^ Cramer, Clayton E. (1994). For the defense of themselves and the state: the original intent and judicial interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms. Praeger. ISBN 978-0275949136.

41. McClurg, p. 139. "But when all is said and done, the only certainty about ^ Miller is that it failed to give either side a clear-cut victory. Most modern scholars recognize this fact. For example, Professor Eugene Volokh describes Miller as 'deliciously and usefully ambiguous' in an article about using the Second Amendment as a teaching tool in constitutional law. That is probably the most accurate statement that can be made about the case."

42. ^ Caetano v. Massachusetts', 577 U.S. ___ (2016), slip op. Archived February 19, 2020, at the Wayback Machine at 6-7 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

43. "People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116" (PDF). Illinois Supreme Court. September 12, 2013. pp. 5-6. Archived (PDF) from the original on June 11, 2014.

44. ^ Mauro, Tony (June 27, 2008). "Supreme Court Strikes Down D.C. Gun Ban". Archived from the original on December 4, 2008. In a historic 5-4 decision... the landmark ruling...

45. ^ Biskupic, Joan & Johnson, Kevin (June 27, 2008). "Landmark ruling fires challenges to gun laws". USA Today. Archived from the original on December 5, 2008.

46. ^ Greenhouse, Linda (June 27, 2008). "Justices, Ruling 5-4, Endorse Personal Right to Own Gun". The New York Times. Archived from the original on April 17, 2009. The landmark ruling...

47. ^ Liptak, Adam (March 16, 2009). "Few Ripples From Supreme Court Ruling on Guns". The New York Times. Archived from the original on May 12, 2011. The Heller case is a landmark decision that has not changed very much at all...

48. ^ Harris, Andrew (February 22, 2013). "Illinois' bid for rehearing of gun-carry appeal rejected". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on November 13, 2013. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Denver today ruled the constitutional provision doesn't guarantee a right to carry a concealed firearm ...

49. ^ Kirkland, Michael (December 16, 2012). "Scalia: Right to bear arms is "not unlimited"". UPI. Archived from the original on November 13, 2013.

50. Heller, Opinion of the Court, Part II-A-1-b.

51. ^ Greenhouse, Linda (June 27, 2008). "Justices Rule for Individual Gun Rights". The New York Times. Archived from the original on January 17, 2012. [A] dramatic upheaval in the law, Justice Stevens said in a dissent

52. ^ Caetano v. Massachusetts', 577 U.S. ___ (2016), slip op. Archived February 19, 2020, at the Wayback Machine at 4, footnote 3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).

53. ^ Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115 (2nd Cir. 1984); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 1997); Love v. Peppersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1993); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1978); and United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997)

54. ^ Jones, Ashby (July 9, 2013). "Illinois Abolishes Ban on Carrying Concealed Weapons". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on January 17, 2018.

Bibliography

Bogus, Carl T. (2001). The Second Amendment in Law and History: Historians and Constitutional Scholars on the Right to Bear Arms. New York: The New Press. ISBN 1565846990.

Boynton, Lindsay Oliver J. (1971). The Elizabethan Militia 1558-1638. David & Charles. ISBN 071535244X. OCLC 8605166.

Cornell, Saul (2006). A Well-Regulated Militia - The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control in America. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195147865.

Crooker, Constance Emerson (2003). Gun Control and Gun Rights. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0313321740.

Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne (2018). Loaded: A Disarming History of the Second Amendment. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books. ISBN 978-0872867239.

Halbrook, Stephen P. (1994). That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional Right (Independent Studies in Political Economy). Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute. ISBN 0945999380.

Merkel, William G.; Uviller, H. Richard (2002). The Militia and the Right to Arms, Or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ISBN 0822330172.

Spitzer, Robert J. (2001). The Right to Bear Arms: Rights and Liberties under the Law. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1576073475.

Szatmary, David P. (1980). Shays' Rebellion: the Making of an Agrarian Insurrection. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. ISBN 9780511008740.

Rawle, William (1829). A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (2 ed.). P.H. Nicklin.

Spooner, Lysander (1852). An Essay on the Trial by Jury.

Periodicals

Bogus, Carl T. (Winter 1998). "The Hidden History of the Second Amendment" (PDF). U.C. Davis Law Review. 31 (2): 309-408.

Charles, Patrick J. (2009). "'Arms for their defence?': An historical, legal, and textual analysis of the English right to have arms and whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago". Clev. St. L. Rev. 57 (3). SSRN 1550768.

Cramer, Clayton (June 15, 2007). "The Racist Roots of Gun Control". Libcom.org. Archived from the original on September 30, 2017.

Davies, Ross (Winter 2008). "Which is the Constitution" (PDF). Green Bag 2d. 11 (2): 209-216.

Gunn, Steven H. (1998). "A Lawyer's Guide to the Second Amendment". BYU L. Rev. 35.

Henigan, Denis (1991). "Arms, Anarchy, and the Second Amendment". Val. U. L. Rev. 26 (107).

Heyman, Stephen (2000). "Natural Rights and the Second Amendment". Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 76 (237).

Kates, Don B. Jr. (November 1983). "Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment". Mich. L. Rev. 82 (2): 204-273. doi:10.2307/1288537. JSTOR 1288537.

Konig, David Thomas (Spring 2004). "The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of "the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms"". Law and History Review. 22 (1): 120-159. doi:10.2307/4141667. JSTOR 4141667. S2CID 145796178.

Lund, Nelson (August 18, 2008). "Heller and Second Amendment Precedent". Lewis & Clark L. Rev. SSRN 1235537.

Malcolm, Joyce Lee (1986). "Book Review: That Every Man Be Armed". George Washington Law Review. 54.

Malcolm, Joyce Lee (1993). "The Role of the Militia in the Development of the Englishman's Right to be Armed - Clarifying the Legacy". J. On Firearms & Pub. Pol'y. 5. Archived from the original on August 23, 2010.

McAffee, Thomas B.; Quinlan, Michael J. (March 1997). "Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?". N.C. L. Rev. Archived from the original on August 16, 2000.

McClurg, Andrew (1999). "Lotts' More Guns and Other Fallacies Infecting the Gun Control Debate". J. Of Firearms & Pub. Pol'y. 11.

Rakove, Jack (2000). "The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism". Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 76.

Reynolds, Glenn (1995). "A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment". Tenn. L. Rev. 62 (461). SSRN 960788.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The Second Amendment ( Amendment II) to the United States Constitution protects the right to keep and bear arms. It was ratified on December 15, 1791, along with nine other articles of the Bill of Rights. In District of Columbia v.

# data[].attributes.body
Nearly the half of the civilian-owned gun in the world are carried by the americans!
It's an anormal percentage...

# data[].attributes.headline
The tragedie of SANDY HOOK, an elementary high school of the Connecticuts...

# data[].attributes.subject
The tragedie of SANDY HOOK, an elementary high school of the Connecticuts...

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School: What Happened During Newtown, Connecticut Shooting?

# data[].attributes.body
In December 2012, a gunman walked into Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,Connecticut, and killed TWENTY CHILDREN, SIX ADULTS, and HIMSELF. Since then, there have been more than 1,600 mass shootings!

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16399418/us-gun-violence-statistics-maps-charts

# data[].attributes.body
In this french video we can see the impact of firearms in America. The tragedies, the terror and the madness it causes...

# data[].attributes.headline
When the figures speak better than words.

# data[].attributes.subject
When the figures speak better than words.

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bX4qUsgHa4Y

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8bX_NgLk_I

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Pro-Gun Vs. Anti-Gun: Is There Middle Ground? | Middle Ground