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Aims of the Positivist Project

Logical positivism asks the question: what does it mean to say that a proposition is correct? Essentially, logical positivism is empiricism pushed to the extreme, absolutely as far as it can go. It is antimetaphysical, anti-idealist, and convinced that science alone can provide knowledge. Knowledge exists only in the form of empirically confirmed propositions. All else is belief or opinion, and belongs to the enormous category of statements which are deemed to be nonsense or meaningless, in the sense that Wittgenstein defined meaning (see below).

Logical positivism is a robust and vigorous defense of science as the Vienna Circle (Weiner Kreis) understood science to be conceptualized and practiced in the late 1800s and early 1900s, a defense mounted explicitly to stymie the influence of Germanic idealism which the positivists held to be deeply irrationalist and necessarily prone to making unexaminable knowledge claims based on an intuitionist epistemology. There was a small group of like-minded activist philosopher-scientists in Berlin, led by Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953). They held the same anti-idealist views and attitudes toward science as did the Vienna positivists but the two groups remained distinctive in membership. The Wiener Kreis was by far the more influential. From now on this account treats logical positivism as synonymous with the Wiener Kreis.

The logical positivists wanted to establish that only empirical, publicly examinable evidence could furnish statements of belief with the warrant necessary for them to become truths. In the view of the positivists, Germanic idealism had all kinds of potential for social, cultural, and political intolerances, based on private and putatively superior claims to have access to or create knowledge. The positivists lay in direct line of descent from the Enlightenment and British empiricism, which is perhaps why they had more impact in Anglo-America than they did in continental Europe. Their values were such that they would have been quite at home in England or America of that time, so much so that they probably would never have existed as a distinctive movement in either of those countries, as there was no threatening public acceptance of idealism as a practical mode of thinking for them to fight against. Idealism was confined harmlessly to the arcane world of the universities, where it dominated, rather than being the dominant component of public discourse, as it was in the German culture realm.

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Abstract

Logical positivism and logical empiricism developed in the early twentieth century. The Vienna Circle, the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy, and the Lvov-Warsaw School of Logic made important contributions to logic, mathematics, philosophy of science, and language analysis. The Vienna Circle proposed a scientific world-conception. Its goal is unified science; its method is logical analysis, which will unmask traditional philosophical problems as pseudoproblems or transform them into empirical problems. Factual knowledge results only from experience (empiricist), which rests on what is immediately given (positivist). In the 1930s, phenomenalist neopositivism was replaced by realist neoempiricism.

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The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Central to logical positivism was the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements - corresponding to Hume's distinction (implicit in the passage just quoted) between relations of ideas and matters of fact. According to the logical positivists, a statement is analytic if and only if its truth or falsity is determined solely by the meaning of its constituent terms. 'All bachelors are unmarried men,' for example, was seen as true in virtue of the meaning of the term 'bachelor.' Analytic truths were regarded as both necessary and a priori. Their necessity was seen to lie in their tautological nature, a view that the logical positivists took from Ludwig Wittgenstein. Since, on their account, analytic truths could be judged to be true merely by knowing their meaning - without needing to consult the world in any way - they were also regarded as a priori truths.

A statement was seen as synthetic, on the other hand, if it is not analytic, and synthetic truths were regarded as both contingent and a posteriori. It was in explaining synthetic statements that the doctrine of verificationism was formulated. According to this doctrine, the meaning of such a statement lies in its method of verification. A statement is meaningful if and only if its truth or falsity can in principle be determined by experience, that is, be derived in some specified way from the truth of one or more observation statements - statements that record the direct result of an observation. This characterization immediately raises two questions. What exactly is the relationship between the statement whose truth-value is to be determined and the observation statements? And what exactly is an observation statement?

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Logical Positivism and Glossematics

The following four characteristics of logical positivism exerted a strong influence on glossematics:

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Metaphysical sentences are not false but meaningless, and must therefore be avoided.

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Science must account for as many empirical facts as possible by means of logical deduction from as few axioms (initial assumptions) as possible.

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Structural statements are to be preferred to statements of content.

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Scientific language should be a kind of algebra, with all terms being unambiguously defined.

Avoidance of Metaphysical Claims

Traditionally, the glossematicians claimed, the view had been taken that methods appropriate for the humanities were quite different from those appropriate for the sciences. According to this traditional view, the basis for the difference was that the unpredictable 'human factor' was central in the study of the humanities, but missing from the sciences, in which all variables were controllable.

A refutation of this position was attempted in terms of an analogy: "If two candles on the dining-table do not burn exactly alike ... it might, analogously, be inferred that the candle factor is too strong to permit physics and chemistry to be merely mechanical in operation" (Uldall, 1957: 2). Clearly the 'candle factor' could be made explicit in terms of structural differences in the candles, the influence of air currents, and other controllable physical and chemical aspects of the situation. So the issue was whether or not linguistics could attempt to make relevant aspects of the 'human factor' more explicit.

To account for linguistic phenomena in terms of this human factor (or 'mind,' 'world-view,' etc.) without further explanation would clearly be to use language in a metaphysical way, which the logical positivists would have found objectionable. This avoidance of metaphysical language makes an interesting comparison with the antimentalism of the linguistics of the same period in the USA ( see Phonology: Overview; Post-Bloomfieldians).

Deductive Reasoning

'Inductive' reasoning argues from observed data to inferred theory. However, any theory that is arrived at by this method cannot be tested by the same method. Testing needs a different method, 'deductive' reasoning, which proceeds in the opposite direction from inductive reasoning.

Deductive reasoning in fact assumes a theory and on that basis predicts the kinds of data that will be observed; the validity of the assumed theory may be tested by comparing these predictions with the data that actually occur - if the predictions are at variance with the data, the theory is thereby shown to be false, while if the fit between predictions and data is good, the theory is thereby supported, though not shown incontrovertibly to be true.

It is clear that, in any type of scientific enquiry, both types of reasoning are needed. There is, however, an important difference between the two: inductive methods are a matter of trial-and-error, and so are difficult, if not impossible, to describe coherently - deductive methods are a matter of drawing conclusions from premises using well-defined logical processes.

Glossematicians certainly use the two terms 'inductive' and 'deductive,' but it is important to bear in mind that their usage does not conform exactly to the more usual explanation of the terms given here.

Importance of Structural Statements

There are some areas, for example color perception, where it is difficult to make a precise statement of content (e.g., 'A sees this color as a shade of green tending towards turquoise'); it is often easier to achieve precision by making relational statements such as 'A sees colors X and Y as distinct from each other, whereas B sees X and Y as the same color.' This relational statement leaves out of account the 'greenness' or 'turquoiseness' or other specific property of colors X and Y.

Extension of this approach to aspects of language description was one of the key elements in the thought of Saussure. When dealing with the inner system of a language, it was for him much less important to ask 'What are the physical properties of this sound?,' than to ask 'Are these two sounds the same, or distinct?' The glossematicians took this approach to a conclusion judged by some scholars to be beyond the limits of feasibility.

Reduction of Scientific Language to an Algebra

Sentences using constructions of the kind that are typical of metaphysical discourse (such as 'the form of this utterance is governed by certain ideas present in the speaker's mind') should be excluded from scientific discourse; furthermore, all terms used should be defined unambiguously. Although suitable algebras were available to glossematics for its purpose, its proponents, notably Uldall, seem to have expended a good deal of energy in attempting to evolve an algebra of their own.

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Abstract

The Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism or Logical Positivism, sometimes better known as 'Schlick-Circle,' is described as a philosophical movement between the two World Wars in Vienna with its main proponents and its theoretical program based on the manifesto of 1929 covering 'scientific philosophy' and 'scientific conception of the world.' On the one side, the international networking and acknowledgment is characterized, and at the same time the marginalization in Austria and Central Europe caused by the rise of Fascism and National Socialism, on the other, which resulted in the forced migration and placement in the Anglo-Saxon world. As one typical member of this movement Otto Neurath is characterized, who was also dealing with sociology, the social sciences including picture language, although the Vienna Circle is mainly known by its focus on logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences.

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2.1 Unity of Science

Positivism (see Comte, Auguste (1798-1857); Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism) followed in the wake of the natural sciences, endorsing the view that science is to be defined by the methodological procedures that enable us to explain and predict natural phenomena so successfully. If there are to be social sciences, the demand of the unity of science will imply that the method used in natural science ( erklären) must also be applicable to human action. If human action allows for scientific knowledge this will mean, according to the positivist credo, that we can and should try to explain human actions by looking for the causal laws that govern them.

This bold statement evoked worries, misunderstandings, and refinements with respect to the place of verstehen in the social sciences. One plausible reaction (developed by neo-Kantians during the first Methodenstreit) is to defend the unity of science but deny the defining role of erklären. Science, one could say, is an attempt to make systematic and generally accessible sense of all phenomena. But there is more systematic and generally accessible sense to be made of what happens than merely explanatory sense. We can-and in the case of the manifestations of human life, should try to-make empathetic sense of what takes place by looking for the perspective from which these manifestations appear to be meaningful and appropriate.

Part of the positivistic project, however, was to show that there is no need and no place for empathetic sense in science. If the meaning and the appropriateness of human actions are to be accounted for by science in a systematic and generally accessible framework, this should be done, according to the positivists, by investigating objective patterns of behavior and not by telling stories about how these patterns look from the necessarily perspectivistic point of view of the people on the scene. The main problems with this line of reasoning are discussed under the three following subsections.

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3.2.1 Theory Building Through Observation

The use of observation as an approach to gathering knowledge is also called "logical positivism" and suggests that all we need to know about a research issue can be learned through observation. It is a theory-free approach since observation precedes theory. A way of understanding logical positivism in psychotherapy is the belief that by working with a client over time, we can understand the client's behavior and then construct treatment interventions as our theory of the client evolves. This approach to problem solving, while it sometimes results in breakthroughs of a major order (for example, Freud's work), has many problems, not least of which is the objectivity of the observer. The inductive approach it utilizes can be highly subjective, illogical, and inaccurate (Freud's work might also be a good example).

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From Logical Positivism to Scientific Realism

The concepts discussed so far are related to the evolution of scientific thought from logical positivism to postpositivism and scientific realism. For many years, "positivism," a strict empiricism that recognizes as valid only knowledge claims based on experience, has dominated discussions of scientific method. During the 1920s, positivism emerged as a full-fledged philosophy of science in the form of logical positivism. Developed by the Vienna Circle, a group of scientists and philosophers, logical positivism accepted as its central doctrine Wittgenstein's verification theory of meaning, which holds that statements are meaningful only if they can be empirically verified, and inductive inference can never be justified on purely logical grounds. A more moderate version of positivism is known as logical empiricism, which became the "received view" in the philosophy of science. The concept of verification was replaced with the idea of gradually increasing confirmation. Verification is considered a complete and definitive establishment of truth. Universal statements can never be verified, but may be confirmed by the accumulation of successful empirical tests. Logical empiricists believe that all knowledge begins with observations, which lead to generalizations. Science and knowledge are believed to occur inductively from data to theory. A finite number of observations are believed to lead to the logical conclusion that a universal statement is "probably true," tentative, and in need of permanent proof. Observations are always subject to measurement error, and theory depends on observation.

Unlike the positivists, Karl Popper (1902-1994) accepted the fact that observation always presupposes the existence of expectations; hence, the scientific process should begin when observations clash with existing theories, which are subjected to rigorous empirical refutation tests. Contrary to Popper's refutation rule, Thomas Kuhn's (1922-1996) model emphasizes the conceptual frameworks that guide research activities. Kuhn's paradigm includes a number of theories that depend partly on the shared metaphysical beliefs of the scientific community. Given its advocacy of relativism, Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became one of the most carefully analyzed works in the philosophy of sciences. Larry Laudan (1952-), on the other hand, sees science operating within a conceptual framework that he calls research tradition, which consists of a number of specific theories, along with a set of metaphysical and conceptual assumptions that are shared by those scientists who adhere to the tradition. The "truth" or "falsity" of a theory is therefore irrelevant as an appraisal criterion.

Critical relativism is a multifaceted philosophy of science, arguing that knowledge production in the social sciences is impacted by the broader cultural milieu and there is no "scientific method," but disciplinary knowledge claims are viewed as contingent on the particular beliefs of its practitioners. It rejects the basic premise of the positivistic approaches that there is a single knowable reality and accepts different ways of exploring natural phenomena, each with its own advantages and liabilities.

Classical realism believes that the world exists independently of its being perceived and that the role of science is to use its method to improve our perceptual measurement processes, separate illusion from reality, and thereby generate the most accurate possible description and understanding of the world. The claim that a scientific proposition seems true does not mean that it is certain, but rather that the world is as the proposition says it is.

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Early Analytic Approaches and Social Construction

The second generation of Analytic philosophers were in the beginning firmly rooted in either logical positivism or ordinary language philosophy. Their original objectives were to reveal the logical structure of language or to solve philosophical puzzles by analyzing the ordinary usage of words. Both schools of thought shared an empiricist and scientific attitude. For this early reason, analytical philosophers showed little interest in social and political reality or history. A few philosophers within the analytic tradition did pay attention to institutions, however, most notably Peter Winch (1958) and David Lewis (1969). Winch argued on the basis of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations that explaining human action requires an understanding of the forms of life established in the society wherein the action is carried out; hence objective, culture independent explanations like those found in the natural sciences are unavailable in the social sciences. David Lewis, on the other hand, gave a game theoretic account of conventions as a solution to recurrent coordination problems. While Winch tried to justify the traditional distinction between the approaches in the natural sciences and the social sciences, Lewis examined ways of reconstructing classical arguments of social philosophy using modern means. Recently John Searle has developed an ontology of social facts and, in particular, of social institutions based on his speech act theory and philosophy of mind (Searle, 1995). This development marks the beginning of a renewed interest in social facts within analytic philosophy.

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2.1 Empiricism

Beginning in the 1920s psychology came under the influence of the philosophy of science called logical positivism, which insisted that the basic data of science reside in public observation, and that to be acceptable to science concepts must have what came to be called operational definitions. In the words of Kenneth Spence some years later:

Accepting the requirement that all terms employed by the scientist, no matter how abstract, must ultimately be referable back to some primitive or basic set of terms that have direct experiential reference, [the logical positivists] suggested that such a basic ['observable thing-language'] for science is provided by the terms designating directly observable physical objects such as tables, chairs, and cats, their properties, e.g., green, hard and loud, and the relations [among] them such as between, before, and below (Spence 1956, p. 13).

Operationism allowed acceptance of most of what Watson had rejected along with the subjectivity of structural psychology.

2.1.1 Mental states

As early as 1922, Edward C. Tolman offered a 'new formula for behaviorism' which encouraged psychology to treat mental states as intervening variables that are tied to observation by operational definitions. Later on (1925), for example, he defined one such state for a nonhuman organism-a rat's 'purpose' to obtain food at the end of the maze that the animal is learning-in terms of observable quality of the animal's behavior that one might call 'persistence until' the goal is reached. Once it honors its commitment to base its science on stimuli and responses, psychology can use those data to define concepts that are as biological, cognitive, or humanistic as it chooses.

2.1.2 Physiological states

Since Watson's time, advances in neuroscience (PET scans, MRI imaging, computerized electroencephalography) have provided ways of determining whether behavioral concepts have representations in the brain. When they do, most psychologists take these representations as evidence of the physiological reality of their concepts. A minority, with Watson, believe that this is all they are, that the final determiner of the value of a concept for psychology is its relevance to behavior. All that physiology can contribute is the comfort provided by any confirmation of a theoretical idea.

2.1.3 Biological-environmental interaction

Also since Watson, advances in the study of animal behavior (ethology) and behavioral genetics have tempered the behaviorists' radical environmentalism. Now, the standard position is that behavior results from an interaction between environmental and biological influences. The relative importance of environment and biology vary. For instinctive acts, biology makes the stronger contribution; in social behavior environment is more important.

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Logical positivism asks the question: what does it mean to say that a proposition is correct? Essentially, logical positivism is empiricism pushed to the extreme, absolutely as far as it can go. It is antimetaphysical, anti-idealist, and convinced that science alone can provide knowledge. Knowledge exists only in the form of empirically confirmed propositions.

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(This summary was produced for my introductory classes)
Logical Positivism, A. J. Ayer - Summary
©Peter Sjöstedt-H

- Logical Positivism, also known as Logical Empiricism, is a philosophy developed in the early 20th Century, notably by Moritz Schlick. It was also, amongst others, influenced by the work of Bertrand Russell (1872 - 1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951).

- One of the most important Logical Positivists was A. J. Ayer who, in 1936, released his groundbreaking book, ' Language, Truth and Logic '.

- The other leading Logical Positivist, Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) was called to Vienna University in 1922. Other logical positivists gathered around him here, something which led to 'the Vienna Circle': a group associated with logical positivism.

- The philosophy that is Logical Positivism has many far-reaching implications regarding ethics, aesthetics and theology.

- The main tenet of logical positivism is that language causes many illusions. When we properly analyze a proposition, we find that some are literally nonsense.

They can be neither true nor false, and are thus grammatical trickery.

This too applies to questions: some are meaningless (e.g. "Does God exist?")

Language, Truth and Logic (1936)
- Ayer begins his book by accusing metaphysicians of making sentences which have no meaning.

- He says that for a sentence to be literally significant, meaningful, it must conform to certain criteria.

Ayer goes on to formulate this criteria, he calls it the criterion of verifiability:

- 'We say that a sentence is factually significant [meaningful] ... if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.' (p.16)

i.e. a sentence only has meaning if it can be proved true or false by observation.

- Thus, a question is genuine only if it can be observed true or false.

- It is important to note that a sentence's observation should at least be possible in principle. This gives it genuiness: verifiable in principle.

Ayer's example is the proposition 'that there are mountains on the farther side of the moon.' (p.17)

Although (at the time) that proposition was not observed/verified, it was still verifiable in principle: it was a possibility that the farther side of the moon could be observed.
Therefore the proposition was meaningful: it was in principle able to give a truth or falsity, even though it had not done so at the time. It was verifiable in principle, if not in practice.

- An example of a proposition that is meaningless would be, say, " God works in mysterious ways."

This proposition is not verifiable even in principle.

What observations could prove it either true or false? None. It is therefore a meaningless proposition.

- Further qualifying his verification principle, Ayer distinguishes between strong and weak verifiability.

'A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable.' (p. 18)

- Schlick adopted the strong sense.

- Ayer adopts the weaker sense for the following reasons:

Universal Propositions ("all")

Scientific laws, i.e. propositions such as 'arsenic is poisonous', 'all men are mortal', 'a body tends to expand when heated', all are true only by induction.
We could never observe every incident of arsenic intake; it cannot be verified conclusively to be true but only probable.

Some logical positivists have therefore said that such proposition are, in fact, nonsense (albeit an important type of nonsense!)

But Ayer, adopting weak verification, does not consider them nonsense because they are in principle possible to observe to be true or false to a high probability.

Historical Propositions

Another reason Ayer adopts the weaker sense is because of propositions about the past.

How could one verify that England was conquered in 1066 by the Normans, through observation?!

Ayer states that through historical records, archeological finds, geological studies, historical events can be at least rendered highly probable (but never certain).
Propositions about the past are thus verifiable through records, etc., and although this is weak verifiability, it is not nonsense.

- 'Accordingly, we fall back on the weaker sense of verification. We say that the question that must be asked about any putative statement of fact is not, Would any observation make its truth or falsehood logically certain? But simply, Would any observations be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood? And it is only if a negative answer is given to this second question that we conclude that the statement under consideration is nonsensical.' (p. 20)

- Ayer calls verifiable propositions experiential propositions.

- There is another type of proposition that is also meaningful, however, but not experiential, and that is a tautology.

A tautology is where the predicate is already in the subject. It is thus an analysis of the subject and therefore also known as an analytic proposition.

E.g. "All bachelors are unmarried", "A square has four sides."

I.e. true by definition.

- ' Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions' (p. 24)

- Ayer's next task, he says, is to show why nonsensical propositions come to be made.

- He says that language creates illusions which give people metaphysical beliefs.

He gives the example of the metaphysical term, 'substance'.

In our language we cannot speak about the properties of 'something' without introducing a word which appears to stand for thing itself (as opposed to anything that may be said about it).

I.e. when I speak about something, I can give all 'its' properties: (It is blue, hot, round, soft, etc.), but because our language must use the word 'its', one is led to believe that if one takes away all properties of that something, a kind of pure substance remains. The 'thing-in'itself'.

'It is true that in talking of "its" appearances we appear to distinguish the thing from the appearances, but that is simply an accident of linguistic usage ... the metaphysician fails to see this because he is misled by a superficial grammatical feature of his language.' (p. 25)

- So a proposition such as "Things-in-themselves have a noumenal existence" is nonsensical (as it is not verifiable in principle, nor tautological) and this is understandable because the metaphysician has been duped by grammar.

Nietzsche expounded this grammatical delusion 30 years before (1880s).

- Another example is that of 'being' or 'existence'

There have been many philosophical conjectures about the nature of existence.

Existential propositions have the same grammatical structure as attributive propositions:
"Martyrs exist" (e p) & "Martyrs suffer" (a p)

But, as Kant showed, existence is not an attribute. Existence is a covert assertion in an attributive proposition (it must exist to have an attribute).

If existence were an attribute it would mean that all existential propositions were tautologies (whose truth were not touched upon: anything could be asserted as existent: "spaghetti monsters exist"), and all negative existential properties would be self-contradictory ("The spaghetti monster doesn't exist" = contradiction if existence is an attribute of the subject.) This is not the case: the last proposition is not self-contradictory.

- [This grammatical point also does way with the famous 'ontological argument' for the necessary existence of God as propounded by St Anselm & Descartes.]

- 'The postulation of real non-existent entities results from the superstition ... that to every word or phrase that can be the grammatical subject of a sentence, there must somewhere be a real entity corresponding. For as there is no place in the empirical world for many of these "entities", a special non-empirical world is invoked to house them.' (p.27)

- This can apply to both theological propositions and ethical propositions.
Chapter 6: Critique of Ethics and Theology
- A. J. Ayer's Logical Positivism endorses a meta-ethic called Emotivism (developed later by C.L. Stevenson).

- His is a critique against normative ethics, prescriptive ethics. As such his account of ethics is also know as descriptive. It is a non-cognitive ethic.

I.e. his criticism of ethics leads to emotivism.

- Ayer begins by saying that there is a common supposition that our knowledge is of two kinds:

- Questions of value are questions about the value of actions (ethical value) and the value of art, beauty (things of aesthetic value).

- But this latter set of questions surely undermines the whole philosophy of logical positivism because a value proposition cannot be verified in principle (or by definition/analytically).

- Therefore, Ayer says he must give an account of propositions of value.

- He begins this account by generalizing that ethical (& aesthetic) propositions are not literally meaningful but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false.

- As such, ethical philosophy only compromises meta-ethics - normative & practical ethics is an illusion.

- But the question now to be answered is: why are moral propositions not experiential propositions, propositions verifiable in principle?

Examples of moral propositions are, 'Murder is wrong,' 'Intolerance is a vice,' 'Humility is a virtue,' 'Meat-eating is evil,' etc.

- Of course, many philosophers and theologians believe that moral propositions are verifiable propositions. These philosophers are generally called moral realists, or cognitivists.

- I.e. they believe that morals are real, not merely expressions of emotion.

- Utilitarianism and deontology are both types of moral realism, both normative ethics.

- Ayer also rejects subjectivism.

Subjectivism states that an action is morally right, or a thing is good, if it is generally approved of. Therefore a moral proposition is verifiable: is it true or false that it is generally approved of.

E.g. "Theft is wrong"

I could verify that most people approve that proposition.

But that would actually be verifying the proposition, '"Theft is wrong" is a belief generally disapproved of.' -This is not a moral proposition, but a statistical proposition.

"Theft is wrong" by itself could not be verified true or false by any observation. It is therefore nonsense.

- Likewise Utilitarian Propositions, such as "democracy is good", cannot be verified and are not tautologies; they are therefore meaningless as well.

They do not propose facts that can be verified.

- Ayer makes it clear that he is only concerned with normative, prescriptive, ethical propositions; not descriptive ethical propositions.

"x is wrong" could describe the beliefs of a particular society and therefore be a verifiable proposition. Maybe "x is wrong" is not a belief in the society.

But if one takes "x is wrong" as a prescription, a normative ethic, it is not verifiable and therefore nonsense.

Ayer is therefore concerned with properly refuting normative ethics.

- Intuitionism is a normative ethic Ayer criticizes.

Intuitionism states that we know what is 'good' or 'moral' or 'wrong' because we have a feeling, an intuition, that it is. "I just know it's wrong"

But that is obviously unverifiable because what one persons 'knows' to be right may be 'known' to be wrong to another person.
E.g. the right to an abortion (good or bad?).

- Furthermore, it is impossible to verify whether one intuition is 'true' thereby validating that belief over another with a conflicting belief.

I could never verify that my belief - that the right to an abortion is good - is true or false.

It is simply a nonsensical proposition.

- 'the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgements in which they occur.' (pp109/110)

- So the question now emerges as to why we in fact do express prescriptive moral propositions if they are all nonsense.

- The addition of an ethical word in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.

Thus when one says "You acted wrongly in stealing that money" you are not saying anything more than "You stole that money".

The word "Wrongly" adds nothing to the proposition in terms of factual content.

- The addition of the word "wrongly" simply emphasizes one's disapproval of it.

It would be exactly the same as saying "You stole that money" in a peculiar tone of horror, or writing it with many exclamation marks.

The tone, or exclamation marks, add nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence.

- The moral word, the tone, or the exclamation marks serve to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker/writer.

'[By saying] "stealing money is wrong," I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning - that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written "stealing money!!" ... Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing ... but he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement ... So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition.' (pp.110-111)

- Because a moral proposition is not a factual statement, no morals can be right or wrong. Right and wrong are not things that can be experienced.

- What is said of the words wrong and right can be applied to every moral word: good, evil, virtue, vice, sin, moral, ought, should, ethical, etc.

- 'In every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical judgement, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely "emotive". ' (p111)

Therefore Ayer's meta-ethics is known as emotivism.

- Ayer moves on to say that an emotional function is not only to express feeling.

Ethical terms also can have the emotional function of arousing feeling, rather than just expressing one's own.
E.g. "It was so evil of him to do that" ("evil" used to arouse anger in other person as well)

Moreover, some ethical terms are used in order to command.
E.g. "It is your duty to tell the truth" acts as an expression of the command "tell the truth" (Deontology).

- Indeed, the ethical words we use are used to convey the strength of the command.

"You ought to tell the truth" is a less emphatic command.

"It is good to tell the truth" is even less emphatic.

- 'we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily to express, and also the different responses which they are calculated to provoke.' (p111)

- - One must be careful not to confuse the expression of feeling and the valuative assertion of feeling.

It can be verifiable that one actually has a feeling. Therefore this would be a meaningful proposition.

But is that feeling cannot be verified to be 'good' or 'bad', or whatever moral term one chooses.

E.g. It is a fact that someone has an aggressive feeling. However, this cannot be factually proved to be good or bad. It may be deemed good in some warrior societies but deemed bad in civilized societies.

When Richard Dawkins asserts that we have altruism due to evolution, he makes the erroneous logical leap in positing altruism as therefore being 'good'. But this is not a proposition that has any meaning. It just reflects his feelings about altruism. We have aggression due to evolution as well - is that therefore necessarily also a 'good' thing?! Dawkins uses a hidden morality behind his own.

- We often feel that our own social morality is superior to others; but this is merely an expression of feeling never fact.

'We feel that our own system of values is superior ... But we cannot bring forward any arguments to show that our system is superior ... we finally resort to mere abuse.' (p. 115)

- Why we have these differing feelings about our values is a question for psychologists and sociologists, not philosophers.

- Having said this, Ayer presents a brief psychology of the matter.

One of the main causes of moral behaviour is fear (conscious or subconscious).
Fear of God, of the law, of the enmity of society, etc.

Another cause is a society's belief in the cause of its own happiness.

It encourages behaviour conducive to its believed happiness

This is why altruism is recommended in most moral codes, and egotism condemned.

- However, any proposition that stated altruism to be good, or egotism to be bad, would be committing an error. The propositions could never be verified.

- All morality is therefore emotions/desires expressed as facts: Emotivism.

- [I.e. Morality can therefore be seen as a power system, used to control people according to one's, or a society's, will.]

[cf. Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Freud, etc]

Critique of Theology (Ch. 6 continued)

- Ayer continues his chapter by claiming that religious propositions are also insignificant/meaningless/nonsense because they neither can be verified as true or false.

- He begins this section by refuting Kant's claim that God can be inferred to exist because of the existence of a world of morals.

As morals are not facts, one cannot prove God exists from them.

- Ayer then refutes the ontological argument by saying that, as an a priori argument, any uncertainty about the premise must be shared by the conclusion, as the latter is deduced solely from the former.

Descartes: God is perfect; God is perfect; a perfect being must have existence; therefore God exists.

'God is perfect' is unverifiable thus nonsense. Therefore the rest of the argument fails as its basis is withdrawn.

- Ayer then states that although it is generally acknowledged that the ontological argument fails, many people believe that it is at least possible to prove that God probably, if not definitely, exists.

But Ayer says that it is not possible to prove that God probably exists, because the proposition 'God exists' is unverifiable. Therefore, there is no probability that this alleged proposition of fact can be verified true.

The proposition, 'Aliens exist,' is verifiable. We could, in principle discover alien life. Therefore, when people say that aliens probably exist, though we cannot be certain, they are still making a meaningful statement.

There is thus a vast difference between the validity of the propositions, 'God exists' and 'Aliens exist'. The latter is verifiable in principle.

- Ayer moves on to the teleological argument.

'It is sometimes claimed, indeed, that the existence of a certain regularity in nature constitutes sufficient evidence for the existence of a god.' (p. 120)

This belief is often called creationism, or intelligent design. That, because of the complexities of life, organisms, a God, designer, must exist to have created it.

This belief is shared by 45% of the USA's population (in 2006).

But, Ayer indicates that this belief, proposition, is unverifiable. It is verifiable that there is order in nature. But it is not verifiable in principle to prove that an ordered world was designed by a god. Let alone a particular religion's god.

- Interestingly, Ayer goes on to say that 'It is important not to confuse this [his] view of religious assertions with the view that is adopted by atheists, or agnostics.' (p.120)

- So, it would be wrong to say that logical positivism is necessarily atheistic, even though it claims religious assertions are all nonsense...

- If the theist's assertion/proposition that God exists is nonsensical, then the atheist's assertion, that there is no God, is also nonsensical.

God's existence can neither be proved nor disproved, therefore the atheist's proposition (there is no God) is also meaningless: what could be used to verify the proposition as true or false? - Nothing.

Bertrand Russell acknowledged this fact and subsequently called himself a

'tea-pot agnostic':

We cannot prove that God does not exist, but neither can we not prove that a tea-pot does not orbit the earth.

(Richard Dawkins follows by saying that we cannot prove that the spaghetti monster exists, or that tooth-fairies do not exist. He calls himself a 'tooth-fairy agnostic'.)

- Ayer however criticizes agnostics because,

"although he refrains from saying either that there is or that there is not a god, he does not deny that the question whether a transcendent god exists is a genuine question. He does not deny that the two sentences 'There is a transcendent god' and 'There is o transcendent god' express propositions one of which is actually true and the other false ... this means that agnosticism is also ruled out." (p. 121)

i.e. An agnostic believes it is possible to one day prove God does or does not exist. Therefore he sits on the fence until that day! Ayer says the proposition is unverifiable in principle and so the agnostic will be sitting there forever.

- So the beliefs of moralists, theists, atheists and agnostics are all meaningless.

- Ayer shows that, as with the moralists, their assertions are all expressions of feeling. They do not offer meaningful knowledge about the world, only about their psychological and sociological make-up.

- Although Ayer says that logical positivism is not atheism, he nonetheless directs his attack against religion. His point is that religion does not give knowledge about the universe, but neither does atheism. In fact, the very name, 'atheism,' really means lack of belief, a non-belief rather than a positive new belief.

'The point which we wish to establish is that there cannot be any transcendent [non-empirical] truths of religion.'(p. 123)

- But then, Ayer writes, ' An interesting feature of this conclusion is that it accords with what many theists are accustomed to say themselves. For we are often told that the nature of God is a mystery which transcends the human understanding.' (p.123/4)

- Ayer talks about 'mystical intuition', a view held by people such as William James, and Swedenborg. That they have mystical experiences about, say, God; but that their experience is unintelligible, incomprehensible: beyond normal understanding and thus indescribable.

But, 'If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is something which cannot be described, then we must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it.' (p.124)

- Now, a mystical intuitionist may object that he himself, through his intuition, has verified that his experience is real, and therefore that his assertions are not nonsense, but meaningful.

- Ayer responds by saying that no-one is denying that the intuitionist has had some unusual 'mystical' experience. This can arguably be verified (nowadays) through brain scans, etc. But the man who says that he is seeing God is saying not merely that he is experiencing a religious emotion, but also that there exists a transcendent being who is the object of this emotion. This latter assertion of veridicality cannot be verified, and so is nonsense.

Someone may assert that he sees a blue patch and also assert that this seeing corresponds to a real blue patch in the world. So his proposition that the blue patch exists is verifiable.

Someone may assert that he sees God and also that this seeing corresponds to a real God that exists. Although the first part may be verifiable, the second is not verifiable.
There are two assertions: having a sensation & that the sensation corresponds a to a real object.

The point is that although someone may actually have strange mystical visions of God, angels, or whatever; this vision does not prove that it is actually a vision of something real. It could simply be a hallucination, a dream, or a brain malfunction.

Nobody contends that the experiences we have in dreams correspond to real things. Someone having a 'mystical experience' may as well say that they are having a strong dream.

- 'The fact that people have religious experiences is interesting from the psychological point of view, but it does not in any way imply that there is such a thing as religious knowledge, any more than our having moral experiences implies that there is such a thing as moral knowledge.' (p. 126)

When asked later in life, in 1978, what the main shortcomings of Logical Positivism were, Ayer replied that except for the Emotivism part,
"nearly all of it is false!"
(Ayer on Logical Positivism, Men of Ideas, Bryan Magee. BBC. 1978)

---

©Peter Sjöstedt-H

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Logical positivism: Logical positivism, a philosophical movement that arose in Vienna in the 1920s and was characterized by the view that scientific knowledge is the only kind of factual knowledge and that all traditional metaphysical doctrines are to be rejected as meaningless. A brief treatment of logical positivism

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I. Definition

Positivism is a philosophical system deeply rooted in science and mathematics. It's based on the view that whatever exists can be verified through experiments, observation, and mathematical/logical proof. Everything else is nonexistent. In addition, positivists usually believe that scientific progress will eradicate, or at least sharply reduce, the problems facing mankind.

Positivists are almost always strong realists - that is, they believe that what we experience as reality is really out there in the world. In other words, they believe in objective truth. They also tend to deny the influence of things like theoretical and cultural biases that get in the way of science.

Positivism divides all statements into three categories: true, false, and meaningless (neither true nor false). A meaningless statement is one that isn't clear enough to be tested through positivistic means. For example, "The color green sleeps angrily" is a meaningless statement. There's no way you could test whether or not it's true, which means it isn't true or false. It's just nonsense. This is an extreme example, of course, but many other sentences fall into this category when their terms are not clearly defined.

If a statement does have a meaning, then it must be either true or false. But that doesn't mean we necessarily know which one it is. For example, "There are exactly 23.8762 billion domestic cats in the world" has a definite meaning, but no one can say for sure whether it's true or not. It would be impossible to count all the domestic cats one by one, so no one can verify the statement. In principle, though, it could be verified through scientific observation - which just don't have the actual means to carry out the study.

Note: Despite its name, positivism has nothing to do with "positive thinking" or optimism - it's just a coincidence that they have similar names.

II. Positivism vs. Postpositivism

Positivism hit peak popularity in the early 20th century, but after that a new school - the postpositivists - started to notice problems with the theory.

Positivism is an attractive philosophy because it affirms the value of science and maintains a strong distinction between "true" and "false" (a distinction which many other philosophies muddy up!) However, there are also serious problems with it, notably the fact that positivism fails to acknowledge the cultural, political, and psychological factors that get in between the observer and the truth.

Even more importantly, positivism is self-defeating. Here's a schematic of the postpositivist argument:

a. Positivism claims what is true can be verified by science and logical proof.

b. Positivism also claims everything else is either false or meaningless.

1. Claim "a" cannot be verified by science or logical proof.

2. Therefore claim "a" is either false or meaningless.

In other words, if positivism is true, then positivism is false! There is no objective basis for believing in objective truth!

Realizing this flaw, many people decided to abandon positivism altogether - they developed new schools of thinking that completely abandoned the positivist project. The postpositivists, however, still held on to many aspects of the older school. In particular, they still felt that the goal of philosophy should be to aim at objective truth. They believed that there was an objective reality, and felt that science was a flawed but still highly respectable means of understanding it, but they accepted that there were major complications in the process of knowing or understanding that truth. And, of course, they accepted that there was no objective basis for believing in objective truth.

Postpositivism has been so successful in critiquing positivism that there are very few fully-convinced positivists left today. You'll notice throughout the article that the quotes and pop-cultural examples are mostly from people who are slightly critical of positivism - that's because to find full-on positivist examples we'd have to reach back many decades!

III. Quotes about Positivism

"From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all directions, and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law, [which is that] each branch of our knowledge passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the theological, or fictitious; the metaphysical, or abstract; and the scientific, or positive." (Auguste Comte)

Auguste Comte was a French philosopher who lived in the early 19th century and was strongly associated with positivism (though he was more interested in sociology, a science that was just then getting under way, than he was in the natural sciences). In this short quote, he expresses the basic hope of positivism: that human knowledge will inevitably progress through predefined stages, never moving backward or evolving in unexpected directions. Notice, too, that he places religion at the bottom of his hierarchy, referring to it as a fiction. This skepticism of religion is common among positivists.

"Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite." (Karl Popper)

Karl Popper was probably the 20th century's most influential theorist of the scientific method - even today, many scientists base their research on his theories. Despite being such an important scientific figure, however, Popper was skeptical about positivism. As an early postpositivist, he argued that there were limits to scientific knowledge simply because there are limits to what we as human beings can possibly know and understand. Thus, he thought that positivism placed too much faith in science without being attentive enough to its blind spots.

IV. The History and Importance of Positivism

The basic insight of positivism is as old as philosophy itself, and probably a lot older. That is, human beings have always understood that one of the best ways to know about reality is to observe it systematically, and ordinarily people believe pretty easily that the world around them is an objective reality.

The modern form of positivism, however, is defined by the modern form of science, which dates back to around the 17th century. European thinkers developed a system for testing and evaluating their ideas which was not completely new - it was strongly influenced by Indian and Islamic ideas developed in previous centuries - but which did include some striking new elements. For example, the European scientists decided that supernatural ideas could not be used to explain their observations, an idea that would become central in modern positivism.

Positivism reached its peak in the early 20th century, when philosophers in Britain and America were at the height of their efforts to integrate philosophy with the natural sciences. They were understandably impressed with the progress that science had made over the previous centuries, and believed that this progress was due to the inherent superiority of science over all other systems of thought.

As we've seen, the postpositivists punctured this bubble - at least partially. They showed that scientific thinking was not a perfect or complete system, and that it had to be supplemented with other non-scientific ideas. They didn't disparage science or advocate abandoning it, but they did show some of the gaps in positivism and demonstrated the need for a new way of understanding the world that would integrate science with other forms of knowledge.

Today, we live in an age caught between two opposite forces: the continuing advancement of science, and a growing awareness of its limitations. On the one hand, our world is more deeply shaped by science than ever before - our smart phones and 4G networks are obvious evidence of scientific power, but so is the globe's massive population, which can only exist thanks to revolutionary agricultural technologies provided by science. However, we also realize that science is responsible for death and destruction on a massive scale, and that our love of technology has not helped us develop greater love for our fellow human beings. So the allure of positivism is still there, since we all understand the power of the scientific worldview - but at the same time, we are much more aware of its dangers than the original postpositivists ever were.

V. Positivism in Popular Culture

Despite its ambiguous stance on science, the movie Avatar has some positivist underpinnings. For one thing, the nature-forces of Pandora are not spiritual beings - they're flesh-and-blood superorganisms that could in principle be understood through science. So the movie basically takes a positivist stance on what sort of things exist in the world, but it still makes room for a semi-spiritual relationship to the natural world. In addition, the scientists in the movie are mostly good guys, with better values than the film's villains, who are mainly corporate and military types.

In an episode of South Park, Cartman travels into the future to a time when positivism has taken over the world, replacing political and religious ideas with pure science. Although this future world has incredible technology, all the basic problems are exactly the same - war, bigotry, and stupidity are still rampant. The show is communicating a critique of positivism through humor, showing that the "progress" of science won't solve all of humanity's problems.

VI. Controversies

The Existence of God: True, False, or Meaningless?

For many people, the existence of God is a true-or-false question. Atheists say it's false whereas theists say it's true. But some positivists argue that the existence of God is neither true nor false - it's meaningless. They argue that the word "God" is not clear enough for a true-or-false analysis, and that before we can ask whether God exists we have to get much more clarity on what the word "God" actually means.

Of course, "God" is not the sort of word that can have any easy definition. Whatever else they might disagree on, most religions agree that God is in some way beyond our understanding, which means it's impossible to develop a clear, simple definition of the word "God." From a positivist perspective, that means it's impossible to establish whether or not God exists.

Historically, most positivists (and many postpositivists) have been atheists. They believe only in what science can demonstrate, and since science can't demonstrate the existence of God they conclude that God does not exist. But notice that you can't have it both ways - some positivists say that the existence of God is false, while others say that it's meaningless, but it can't be both at the same time. (In order to be false, a statement must have an established meaning.)

So, there are three possible positions for a positivist:

1. God exists, and this can be shown through science (an unusual position!)

2. God does not exist because science cannot show the existence of a god.

3. The word "God" has no meaning.

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I. Definition Positivism is a philosophical system deeply rooted in science and mathematics. It's based on the view that whatever exists can be verified through experiments, observation, and mathematical/logical proof. Everything else is nonexistent. In addition, positivists usually believe that scientific progress will eradicate, or at least sharply reduce, the problems facing mankind.

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Let's start our very brief discussion of philosophy of science with a simple distinction between epistemology and methodology. The term epistemology comes from the Greek word epistêmê, their term for knowledge. In simple terms, epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge or of how we come to know. Methodology is also concerned with how we come to know, but is much more practical in nature. Methodology is focused on the specific ways -- the methods -- that we can use to try to understand our world better. Epistemology and methodology are intimately related: the former involves the philosophy of how we come to know the world and the latter involves the practice.

When most people in our society think about science, they think about some guy in a white lab coat working at a lab bench mixing up chemicals. They think of science as boring, cut-and-dry, and they think of the scientist as narrow-minded and esoteric (the ultimate nerd -- think of the humorous but nonetheless mad scientist in the Back to the Future movies, for instance). A lot of our stereotypes about science come from a period where science was dominated by a particular philosophy --positivism -- that tended to support some of these views. Here, I want to suggest (no matter what the movie industry may think) that science has moved on in its thinking into an era ofpost-positivism where many of those stereotypes of the scientist no longer hold up.

Let's begin by considering what positivism is. In its broadest sense, positivism is a rejection of metaphysics (I leave it you to look up that term if you're not familiar with it). It is a position that holds that the goal of knowledge is simply to describe the phenomena that we experience. The purpose of science is simply to stick to what we can observe and measure. Knowledge of anything beyond that, a positivist would hold, is impossible. When I think of positivism (and the related philosophy of logical positivism) I think of the behaviorists in mid-20th Century psychology. These were the mythical 'rat runners' who believed that psychology could only study what could be directly observed and measured. Since we can't directly observe emotions, thoughts, etc. (although we may be able to measure some of the physical and physiological accompaniments), these were not legitimate topics for a scientific psychology. B.F. Skinner argued that psychology needed to concentrate only on the positive and negative reinforcers of behavior in order to predict how people will behave -- everything else in between (like what the person is thinking) is irrelevant because it can't be measured.

In a positivist view of the world, science was seen as the way to get at truth, to understand the world well enough so that we might predict and control it. The world and the universe were deterministic -- they operated by laws of cause and effect that we could discern if we applied the unique approach of the scientific method. Science was largely a mechanistic or mechanical affair. We use deductive reasoning to postulate theories that we can test. Based on the results of our studies, we may learn that our theory doesn't fit the facts well and so we need to revise our theory to better predict reality. The positivist believed in empiricism -- the idea that observation and measurement was the core of the scientific endeavor. The key approach of the scientific method is the experiment, the attempt to discern natural laws through direct manipulation and observation.

OK, I am exaggerating the positivist position (although you may be amazed at how close to this some of them actually came) in order to make a point. Things have changed in our views of science since the middle part of the 20th century. Probably the most important has been our shift away from positivism into what we term post-positivism. By post-positivism, I don't mean a slight adjustment to or revision of the positivist position -- post-positivism is a wholesale rejection of the central tenets of positivism. A post-positivist might begin by recognizing that the way scientists think and work and the way we think in our everyday life are not distinctly different. Scientific reasoning and common sense reasoning are essentially the same process. There is no difference in kind between the two, only a difference in degree. Scientists, for example, follow specific procedures to assure that observations are verifiable, accurate and consistent. In everyday reasoning, we don't always proceed so carefully (although, if you think about it, when the stakes are high, even in everyday life we become much more cautious about measurement. Think of the way most responsible parents keep continuous watch over their infants, noticing details that non-parents would never detect).

One of the most common forms of post-positivism is a philosophy called critical realism. A critical realist believes that there is a reality independent of our thinking about it that science can study. (This is in contrast with asubjectivist who would hold that there is no external reality -- we're each making this all up!). Positivists were also realists. The difference is that the post-positivist critical realist recognizes that all observation is fallible and has error and that all theory is revisable. In other words, the critical realist is critical of our ability to know reality with certainty. Where the positivist believed that the goal of science was to uncover the truth, the post-positivist critical realist believes that the goal of science is to hold steadfastly to the goal of getting it right about reality, even though we can never achieve that goal! Because all measurement is fallible, the post-positivist emphasizes the importance of multiple measures and observations, each of which may possess different types of error, and the need to usetriangulation across these multiple errorful sources to try to get a better bead on what's happening in reality. The post-positivist also believes that all observations are theory-laden and that scientists (and everyone else, for that matter) are inherently biased by their cultural experiences, world views, and so on. This is not cause to give up in despair, however. Just because I have my world view based on my experiences and you have yours doesn't mean that we can't hope to translate from each other's experiences or understand each other. That is, post-positivism rejects therelativist idea of the incommensurability of different perspectives, the idea that we can never understand each other because we come from different experiences and cultures. Most post-positivists areconstructivists who believe that we each construct our view of the world based on our perceptions of it. Because perception and observation is fallible, our constructions must be imperfect. So what is meant byobjectivity in a post-positivist world? Positivists believed that objectivity was a characteristic that resided in the individual scientist. Scientists are responsible for putting aside their biases and beliefs and seeing the world as it 'really' is. Post-positivists reject the idea that any individual can see the world perfectly as it really is. We are all biased and all of our observations are affected (theory-laden). Our best hope for achieving objectivity is to triangulate across multiple fallible perspectives! Thus, objectivity is not the characteristic of an individual, it is inherently a social phenomenon. It is what multiple individuals are trying to achieve when they criticize each other's work. We never achieve objectivity perfectly, but we can approach it. The best way for us to improve the objectivity of what we do is to do it within the context of a broader contentious community of truth-seekers (including other scientists) who criticize each other's work. The theories that survive such intense scrutiny are a bit like the species that survive in the evolutionary struggle. (This is sometimes called thenatural selection theory of knowledge and holds that ideas have 'survival value' and that knowledge evolves through a process of variation, selection and retention). They have adaptive value and are probably as close as our species can come to being objective and understanding reality.

Clearly, all of this stuff is not for the faint-of-heart. I've seen many a graduate student get lost in the maze of philosophical assumptions that contemporary philosophers of science argue about. And don't think that I believe this is not important stuff. But, in the end, I tend to turn pragmatist on these matters. Philosophers have been debating these issues for thousands of years and there is every reason to believe that they will continue to debate them for thousands of years more. Those of us who are practicing scientists should check in on this debate from time to time (perhaps every hundred years or so would be about right). We should think about the assumptions we make about the world when we conduct research. But in the meantime, we can't wait for the philosophers to settle the matter. After all, we do have our own work to do!

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report this ad report this ad report this ad Let's start our very brief discussion of philosophy of science with a simple distinction between epistemology and methodology . The term epistemology comes from the Greek word epistêmê, their term for knowledge. In simple terms, epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge or of how we come to know.

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Milja Kurki has commented that International Relations (IR) is a 'divided discipline', split between a 'positivist mainstream...camp' and a post-positivist 'camp', and she is not alone in this assessment.[1] This essay will critically examine the benefits and disadvantages of post-positivism in light of this split, as part of what Yosef Lapid has called 'the third debate'.[2] In order to do this I will look at its genesis as a reaction against the positivist majority within IR, which I will locate more broadly within a reaction against positivism in the social sciences as a whole, thus agreeing with Jim George that IR is not independent of wider theoretical debate in the social sciences.[3] Within the scope of this essay it is not possible to give a full overview of the breadth of post-positivist approaches, which include post-modernism, constitutive analysis and more, but I will outline the benefits of some of their corresponding characteristics, and particularly focus on 'critical theory'.[4] Firstly however, it will be necessary to briefly outline what we mean by positivism more generally. I will then move on to question the relationship between positivism and post-positivism in IR by identifying positivism with the realist and neorealist paradigm most common in the discipline, demonstrating the comparative benefits of post-positivism for showing the myths that realism is built on. I will then turn to some of the problems that arise from post-positivism itself. This essay contends that IR can benefit from both positivism and post-positivism; rather than discussing the strengths and weaknesses of post-positivism in IR, it is best to consider the complementary strengths of post-positivism and positivism together.

Positivism has dominated the social sciences as part of the Enlightenment project to study social activity in a 'scientific' way.[5] Positivism follows Hume's radical empiricist conception of cause: knowledge does not exist outside of what we can observe, and thus what we claim to know is simply the associations or 'conjunctions' made on these observations.[6] Kurki notes that 'social scientists are still adamant that only careful observation of regularities (even if of 'localised' regularities) can give us an adequate understanding of human action and society.[7] Thus in the context of this essay positivism is defined as following the Humean principles outlined above, with 'the adoption of methodologies of the natural sciences to explain the social world'.[8] It is noted that this is a loose definition of positivism, but for the purposes of a relative discussion of post-positivism, it conveys the key assumptions that post-positivism has reacted against.

Viewed uncritically, positivism has much force. By presenting knowledge of the social world as similarly formulated as that of science, one can apply the same methodologies as used in the natural sciences to the social sciences and as a result find 'scientific' proof of one's theories.

However, it is the critical analysis of positivist thought that is the main strength of post-positivism. It encourages social science to think more critically towards the status quo, and the reaction against positivist epistemology, questioning its methodology and the claim to formulating 'scientific' theories, is what this essay views as 'post-positivism'. It is important to emphasise that there is no such thing as ' a post-positivist approach, only post-positivist approaches'.[9] Indeed, this too is one of its strengths: it has opened up the debate within social sciences and created 'thinking space'.[10] Whereas positivism is methodologically dogmatic, post-positivism encourages a 'Socratic method'.[11] Lapid points out 'post-positivism is not a unitary philosophical platform', but one can find some common and often' inter-related' themes amongst its adherents.[12] These he identifies as 'the preoccupation with meta-scientific units (paradigmatism), the concern with underlying premises and assumptions (perspectivism), and the drift towards methodological pluralism (relativism)'.[13] The common ground above is the raising of questions regarding accepted practice: questioning paradigms, questioning perspectives, and questioning methodology, which invigorates the academic project, and as such I agree that there should be optimism as to what post-positivism can achieve in IR.[14]

One can easily trace positivist epistemology in IR, where 'rationalist epistemology that relies on scientific inference... has been clearly articulated by the neo-realist and neo-liberal programmes of research.'[15] Thus we can see that positivism has set the standard of how we 'do' IR. However, this essay concentrates on the broadly realist school, because it 'is the most venerable and persisting model of international relations, it provides a good starting point and baseline for comparison with competing models'.[16] In response to the positivist realist programme, I will now argue that post-positivism is very important in showing relations of power in the disciple of IR, highlighting the relative strengths of the post-positivist position.

Critical theory rejects the 'three basic postulates of positivism: an objective external reality, the subject object distinction, and value free social science.' [17] By denying the subject-object distinction, critical theory strikes at the epistemological heart of positivism. Cox has stated that 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose', and therefore where Hume argued that we find knowledge on what we observe, critical theory argues that human 'needs' and 'purposes' are the glue that binds these observations.[18] The theories we postulate are therefore not 'value-neutral' as they purport to be.[19] It is revealing to look at Waltz's epistemologically positivist approach that 'only through some sort of systems structure can international politics be understood'.[20] The observables in IR (states) are 'units' in a structurally anarchical society. All states perform same functions and are equivalent units in this system, but there is an uneven distribution of resources and capacities among states. Fear of domination by other states is the main motivation for inter-state competition.[21] However, as Agnew argues, this is in fact a normative approach: 'It is a dangerous world out there and if a state (read: our state) is not ready for a competitive environment then it is headed for disaster. This was a reassuring hard-headed message for Americans during the Cold War!'[22] Thus, a benefit of the critical theory approach, and indeed the post-positivist approach in general, is considering who theory is working for.

The post-positivist position has responded to the changing nature of international relations in the post-cold-war period, demonstrating the political nature of positivist assertions as to how the world is. Buzan and Little go so far as to say that one of the reason IR has 'failed as an intellectual project' is its failure to move beyond the traditional conception of relationships between states.[23] The realist conception of world order constructed an 'image of reality constituted in particular historical and political circumstances (the struggle with Fascism and the Cold War)... an ahistorical, universalized dogma'.[24] In what sense, therefore, is realism, with it 'ahistorical' universal claims actually reflecting international security issues now? Smith argues that failing to move past positivist dogmatism, cold war political assumptions etc..., and reconsider the implications of violence and development issues has had important consequences in international politics. He goes so far as to say that affectations to impartiality and universality are implicated in post-war developments in international security where the 'West' (specifically Anglo-Saxon IR) sung 'into existence the world of September 11, 2001'.[25]

The post-positivist approach is in better shape to understand this new reality by the very fact that is it not so ontologically dogmatic. Importantly, the debate is widened and marginalized groups which have previously been denied agency in traditional IR are empowered, putting the 'international' back into international theory. The Eurocentric model has been guilty of ignoring the constitutive voices that make up a conversation in IR, for example the failure to acknowledge the role of Cuba in the Cuban Missile Crisis.[26] As Laffey and Barkawi say, 'That the weak play an integral role in shaping world politics is harder to deny when a Southern resistance movement strikes at the heart of Northern power'.[27]

More importantly still, this type of analysis allows IR practitioners to see the power inherent in denying agency when universalizing Western values. As Laffey and Barkawi say, 'a Eurocentric security studies regards the weak and the powerless as marginal or derivative elements of world politics, as at best the site of liberal good intentions or at worst a potential source of threats.'[28] This echoes Said's post-modern approach to Western images of the East, where 'Orientalism depends for its strategy on... positional superiority, which puts the westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand'.[29] Barnett and Duvall conceive of a type of 'productive power' which refers partly to 'the discursive production of the subjects, the fixing of meanings, and the terms of action, of world politics' and this productive power is inherent in the positivist universality of assumptions based on conjunctions of Western experience.[30] By casting non-state actors on the periphery, or by ignoring them as part of IR, the dominant remain dominant as they can produce what is to be a 'them', a 'terrorist', an 'insurgent', a 'rogue state'; there are inherently normative judgements in what is legitimate and what is not legitimate: 'the politics of Eurocentric security studies, those of the powerful, prevent adequate understanding of the nature or legitimacy of the armed resistance of the weak'.[31] Therefore, it is possible again to see positivist value-free credentials deconstructed by post-positivists rejection of positivist assumptions.

However, whilst this essay argues strongly for the benefits of post-positivism in critiquing the positivist mainstream in IR, it must be noted that post-positivism has its disadvantages. Firstly, Biestecker notes that 'however desirable it may be to open international relations to methodological pluralism and relativism, post- positivist scholarship does not offer us any clear criteria for choosing among the multiple and competing explanations it produces'.[32] Post-positivism may in fact lead to intellectual incoherence in IR. Therefore, perhaps rather than invigorating the academic project it just confuses it.

Indeed, it is not just a case of numerous confusing explanations produced. Within the broad post-positivist camp there is no consensus. Whilst post-modernism and critical theory are both post-positivist in nature, postmodernism 'eschews the very goal of critical theory' and would argue critical theory itself is hegemonic, where 'all conversation is power, and it is not possible to move beyond a place tainted by power'.[33] We therefore have an example of post-positivism criticising post-positivism, which in the scope of this essay makes it difficult to discuss the relative merits of post-modernism and critical theory. Perhaps, then, as George says, we should be careful to avoid 'intellectual anarchy.'[34]

Secondly, this essay has devoted considerable time to the relative advantages of post-positivism to positivism, but that is not to say that positivism is no longer important. Conversely, I agree with Holsti that the theories that positivism have given us are valuable, that 'No amount of meta-theoretical debate, or perspectivism, or post-modern relativism renders their work less theoretically useful. '[35] Even critics of traditional positivist methodology in IR can be amongst its adherents, such as Buzan who insists on the benefits of realism, that it 'possesses a relative (not absolute) intellectual coherence. It provides a solid starting point for the construction of grand theory'.[36] We should thus view positivism and post-positivism as complementary in strengthening the discipline of IR as a whole. This essay does not seek to advance the benefits of post-positivism to do away with theory, nor all positivist methodology. I agree, for example that we should be careful not to, as George says 'attempt to overcome universalized humanist premises (progress, dialectics, consciousness) [which may] deprive us of both baby (creative social agent) and bathwater'[37]

Finally, one can question how far post-positivism actually departs from the positivist perspective that it critiques. Kurki argues that the Humean concept of cause is present in the work of critical theorists such as Cox.[38] Thus, for Kurki what the post-positivists purport to reject is evident in their work. Instead, she advocates 'multi-causal' and 'complexity-sensitive' IR theory. Lapid's statement that 'the tragedy of international relations scholars was, of course, that they proved incapable of either fruitfully adopting or decisively rejecting the grail of positivist science'[39] is perhaps still true despite the Third Debate.

However, this essay argues that this is not a tragedy, but instead benefits the discipline. 'Our discipline, like other social sciences, should demonstrate a healthy and tolerant diversity: of theoretical approaches, of relations with policy-makers versus concentration on fundamental questions, of detailed studies alongside broad historical surveys.'[40] This essay considered the strengths and weaknesses of Post-positivism in IR as relative to those of positivism. As such, it has necessitated a discussion of the two in opposition. However, one must not create a false dichotomy and this essay argues that the main strength of post-positivism is as a critic of the positivist mainstream in order to create a questioning, Socratic approach to IR. Even in light of the criticisms of Bierstecker, Kurki and others, post-positivism has invigorated IR, added to its theoretical arsenal, and emphasised the need to remain relevant within the changing nature of the world it seeks to explain, much in the way other social sciences must.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

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The Benefits and Disadvantages of Post-positivism in International Theory

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Rather than discussing their respective strengths and weaknesses, it is best for IR to consider the complementary strengths of post-positivism and positivism together.

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Qualitative Research in Corporate Communication

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Positivism is an epistemological position that holds that the goal of knowledge is simply to describe the phenomena that we experience. The purpose of science is sticking to what we can observe and measure. Knowledge of anything beyond that is impossible. In the positivist view, the universe is deterministic.

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Angelo State University - Library Online Resources

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Unauthorized use is prohibited; Usage may be subject to security testing and monitoring; Misuse is subject to criminal prosecution; No expectation of privacy except as otherwise provided by applicable privacy laws.

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Constructivism Learning Theory & Philosophy of Education

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Constructivism is a learning theory that emphasizes the active role of learners in building their own understanding. Rather than passively receiving information, learners reflect on their experiences, create mental representations, and incorporate new knowledge into

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Contributors

Key Concepts

A reaction to didactic approaches such as behaviorism and programmed instruction, constructivism states that learning is an active, contextualized process of constructing knowledge rather than acquiring it. Knowledge is constructed based on personal experiences and hypotheses of the environment. Learners continuously test these hypotheses through social negotiation. Each person has a different interpretation and construction of knowledge process. The learner is not a blank slate (tabula rasa) but brings past experiences and cultural factors to a situation[3][4].

NOTE: A common misunderstanding regarding constructivism is that instructors should never tell students anything directly but, instead, should always allow them to construct knowledge for themselves. This is actually confusing a theory of pedagogy (teaching) with a theory of knowing. Constructivism assumes that all knowledge is constructed from the learner's previous knowledge, regardless of how one is taught. Thus, even listening to a lecture involves active attempts to construct new knowledge.

Vygotsky's social development theory is one of the foundations for constructivism.

Additional Resources and References

Resources

References

1. Vygotsky, L. S. (1980). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Harvard university press.

2. Piaget, J. (2013). The construction of reality in the child (Vol. 82). Routledge.

3. Ertmer, P. A., & Newby, T. J. (1993). Behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism: Comparing critical features from an instructional design perspective.Performance improvement quarterly, 6(4), 50-72.

4. Cooper, P. A. (1993). Paradigm Shifts in Designed Instruction: From Behaviorism to Cognitivism to Constructivism. Educational technology, 33(5), 12-19.

[cite]

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Key Concepts A reaction to didactic approaches such as behaviorism and programmed instruction, constructivism states that learning is an active, contextualized process of constructing knowledge rather than acquiring it. Knowledge is constructed based on personal experiences and hypotheses of the environment. Learners continuously test these hypotheses through social negotiation.

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A major theme in the theoretical framework of Bruner is that learning is an active process in which learners construct new ideas or concepts based upon their current/past knowledge. The learner selects and transforms information, constructs hypotheses, and makes decisions, relying on a cognitive structure to do so. Cognitive structure (i.e., schema, mental models) provides meaning and organization to experiences and allows the individual to "go beyond the information given".

As far as instruction is concerned, the instructor should try and encourage students to discover principles by themselves. The instructor and student should engage in an active dialog (i.e., socratic learning). The task of the instructor is to translate information to be learned into a format appropriate to the learner's current state of understanding. Curriculum should be organized in a spiral manner so that the student continually builds upon what they have already learned.

Bruner (1966) states that a theory of instruction should address four major aspects: (1) predisposition towards learning, (2) the ways in which a body of knowledge can be structured so that it can be most readily grasped by the learner, (3) the most effective sequences in which to present material, and (4) the nature and pacing of rewards and punishments. Good methods for structuring knowledge should result in simplifying, generating new propositions, and increasing the manipulation of information.

In his more recent work, Bruner (1986, 1990, 1996) has expanded his theoretical framework to encompass the social and cultural aspects of learning as well as the practice of law.

Application

Bruner's constructivist theory is a general framework for instruction based upon the study of cognition. Much of the theory is linked to child development research (especially Piaget ). The ideas outlined in Bruner (1960) originated from a conference focused on science and math learning. Bruner illustrated his theory in the context of mathematics and social science programs for young children (see Bruner, 1973). The original development of the framework for reasoning processes is described in Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1951). Bruner (1983) focuses on language learning in young children.

Note that Constructivism is a very broad conceptual framework in philosophy and science and Bruner's theory represents one particular perspective.

Example

This example is taken from Bruner (1973):

"The concept of prime numbers appears to be more readily grasped when the child, through construction, discovers that certain handfuls of beans cannot be laid out in completed rows and columns. Such quantities have either to be laid out in a single file or in an incomplete row-column design in which there is always one extra or one too few to fill the pattern. These patterns, the child learns, happen to be called prime. It is easy for the child to go from this step to the recognition that a multiple table , so called, is a record sheet of quantities in completed mutiple rows and columns. Here is factoring, multiplication and primes in a construction that can be visualized."

Principles

1. Instruction must be concerned with the experiences and contexts that make the student willing and able to learn (readiness).

2. Instruction must be structured so that it can be easily grasped by the student (spiral organization).

3. Instruction should be designed to facilitate extrapolation and or fill in the gaps (going beyond the information given).

References

Bruner, J. (1960). The Process of Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. (1966). Toward a Theory of Instruction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. (1973). Going Beyond the Information Given. New York: Norton.

Bruner, J. (1983). Child's Talk: Learning to Use Language. New York: Norton.

Bruner, J. (1986). Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J. (1996). The Culture of Education, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bruner, J., Goodnow, J., & Austin, A. (1956). A Study of Thinking. New York: Wiley.

Related Websites

More about Bruner can be found at:
http://www.infed.org/thinkers/bruner.htm

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A major theme in the theoretical framework of Bruner is that learning is an active process in which learners construct new ideas or concepts based upon their current/past knowledge. The learner selects and transforms information, constructs hypotheses, and makes decisions, relying on a cognitive structure to do so.

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In 1909, Taylor published " The Principles of Scientific Management." [1] In this, he proposed that by optimizing and simplifying jobs, productivity would increase. He also advanced the idea that workers and managers needed to cooperate with one another. This was very different from the way work was typically done in businesses beforehand. A factory manager at that time had very little contact with the workers, and he left them on their own to produce the necessary product. There was no standardization, and a worker's main motivation was often continued employment, so there was no incentive to work as quickly or as efficiently as possible.

Taylor believed that all workers were motivated by money, so he promoted the idea of "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work." In other words, if a worker didn't achieve enough in a day, he didn't deserve to be paid as much as another worker who was highly productive.

With a background in mechanical engineering, Taylor was very interested in efficiency. While advancing his career at a U.S. steel manufacturer, he designed workplace experiments to determine optimal performance levels. In one, he experimented with shovel design until he had a design that would allow workers to shovel for several hours straight. With bricklayers, he experimented with the various motions required and developed an efficient way to lay bricks. And he applied the scientific method to study the optimal way to do any type of workplace task. As such, he found that by calculating the time needed for the various elements of a task, he could develop the "best" way to complete that task.

These "time and motion" studies also led Taylor to conclude that certain people could work more efficiently than others. These were the people whom managers should seek to hire where possible. Therefore, selecting the right people for the job was another important part of workplace efficiency. Taking what he learned from these workplace experiments, Taylor developed four principles of scientific management. These principles are also known simply as "Taylorism".

Four Principles of Scientific Management

Taylor's four principles are as follows:

1. Replace working by "rule of thumb," or simple habit and common sense, and instead use the scientific method to study work and determine the most efficient way to perform specific tasks.

2. Rather than simply assign workers to just any job, match workers to their jobs based on capability and motivation, and train them to work at maximum efficiency.

3. Monitor worker performance, and provide instructions and supervision to ensure that they're using the most efficient ways of working.

4. Allocate the work between managers and workers so that the managers spend their time planning and training, allowing the workers to perform their tasks efficiently.

Critiques of Taylorism

Taylor's Scientific Management Theory promotes the idea that there is "one right way" to do something. As such, it is at odds with current approaches such as MBO (Management By Objectives), Continuous Improvement initiatives, BPR (Business Process Reengineering), and other tools like them. These promote individual responsibility, and seek to push decision making through all levels of the organization.

The idea here is that workers are given as much autonomy as practically possible, so that they can use the most appropriate approaches for the situation at hand. (Reflect here on your own experience - are you happier and more motivated when you're following tightly controlled procedures, or when you're working using your own judgment?) What's more, front line workers need to show this sort of flexibility in a rapidly-changing environment. Rigid, rules-driven organizations really struggle to adapt in these situations.

Teamwork is another area where pure Taylorism is in opposition to current practice. Essentially, Taylorism breaks tasks down into tiny steps, and focuses on how each person can do his or her specific series of steps best. Modern methodologies prefer to examine work systems more holistically in order to evaluate efficiency and maximize productivity. The extreme specialization that Taylorism promotes is contrary to modern ideals of how to provide a motivating and satisfying workplace.

Where Taylorism separates manual from mental work, modern productivity enhancement practices seek to incorporate worker's ideas, experience and knowledge into best practice. Scientific management in its pure form focuses too much on the mechanics, and fails to value the people side of work, whereby motivation and workplace satisfaction are key elements in an efficient and productive organization.

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Frederick Taylor and Scientific Management - Understanding Taylorism and Early Management Theory

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In 1909, Taylor published " The Principles of Scientific Management." [1] In this, he proposed that by optimizing and simplifying jobs, productivity would increase. He also advanced the idea that workers and managers needed to cooperate with one another. This was very different from the way work was typically done in businesses beforehand.

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Taylor's Motivation Theory, or Scientific Management, was one of the first theories of motivation in the workplace.

Have you ever tried to boost the productivity of your team, but failed? Perhaps you've given a rousing speech or explained how important it is that the company hits its targets for the year?

Boosting your team's motivation and productivity can sometimes feel like a black art. And it can be frustrating when you try and fail to boost your team's motivation. But it need not be this way.

Motivation theories can be helpful in giving you research-based tools and models to use when attempting to raise the performance of your team.

Taylor's Scientific Management

Taylor's Scientific Management attempts to find the most efficient way of performing any job. He believed that there were universal laws which governed efficiency and that these laws were independent of human judgment. The goal of Scientific Management was to find this "one best way" of doing things as efficiently as possible.

Taylor brought a very scientific approach to productivity. He did not value the human needs of workers. This can be seen from the following quotes:

...what the workmen want from employers beyond anything else is higher wages: what employers want from workmen most of all is low labor costs in manufacture.
Frederick Taylor

In our scheme, we do not ask the initiative of our men. We do not want any initiative. All we want of them is to obey the orders we give them, do what we say, and do it quick.
Frederick Taylor

Because Taylor believed that workers were only motivated by pay and money, then:

Workers don't usually enjoy work. Because of this, they need to be monitored and controlled closely. Essentially, Taylor believed that employees had a natural tendency to take it easy of slack off whenever they could. He called this natural soldiering.

To help with this, managers should break down each employee's job into more manageable, bite-sized tasks.

Training should be given so that all employees perform these tasks in a standard way.

Workers should be paid based on how much they produce (piece rate).

This will create a win-win situation. Workers are incentivized to work hard to earn more and the businesses production is as efficient as it can be (profits are maximized).

Relevance Today

Since Taylor's Motivation Theory is based on managers telling employees what to do, it is closely related to an autocratic style of leadership.

It is also closely related to Douglas McGregor's Theory X model of management, where it is assumed that employees are fundamentally lazy and unmotivated.

Taylor's work heavily influenced production methods at the start of the 20th century. It formed the foundation upon which Henry Ford introduced his mass-production techniques to the production of cars.

Whilst Scientific Management, sometimes simply called Taylorism, may sound obsolete, it is actually still in use today. This is especially so if you need to remain competitive in a labor-intensive industry by keeping costs as low as possible. Examples include:

Amazon: Pay certain warehouse staff using a piece rate basis according to how productive they are. In fact, Amazon is even using a wrist-based tracking system to monitor staff. You can read more about this here.

McDonald's: Every McDonalds across the globe looks the same, and the instructions to create a burger are exactly the same in every branch across the globe. Even the process of mopping the floor is exactly the same across the globe. This breaking down jobs into bite-sized chunks and then describing the most efficient way to do that job is an example of Taylorism in use today.

Using the Model

Taylor's Scientific Management process is summarized in the following diagram:

As you can see from the diagram, the principles of Scientific Management are:

1. Science, not rules of thumb.

Rather than doing things how they've always been done, Taylor wanted each job to be studied scientifically to identify the most efficient way to do that job.

Taylor advocated using time and motion studies as the way to do this. This often involved looking at the most efficient workers to identify why they were so efficient.

The ultimate aim is to describe in a repeatable way how to do the job in the most efficient manner. That way, everyone in the organization doing this job can be trained to do it in the most efficient way.

2. Scientifically train employees.

Don't allow employees to train themselves. Instead, each employee should be taught exactly how each task should be performed.

Taylor didn't want employees thinking for themselves, he simply wanted a simple task performed as quickly (as efficiently) as possible. In a nutshell, workers should be paid for doing, not thinking.

3. Ensure most efficient ways of working are used.

There are two parts to ensuring that the most efficient ways of working are being used:

Monitor: Monitor worker production to ensure that they are efficient.

Cooperate: Work with employees to retrain and recalibrate them, so that they are exactly following the most efficient way to perform their job.

One consequence of this was that organizational structures had to change. Rather than a factory having one single foreman, Taylor advocated several, each one specifically focused on efficiency for a particular area of the factory.

The aim of this step is to maximize production, unlike in situations where 'soldiering' occurs. That is situations where workers naturally slack off because they are not being monitored.

4. Divide work between managers and workers.

Work should be divided almost equally between managers and employees.

Managers should be responsible for developing the processes, ways of working and monitoring employees.

Employees should be responsible for executing a task as quickly as possible.

5. Pay based on results.

Workers should be paid based on how much they produce. This is done using piece-rate pay.

The use of piece-rate pay focuses workers minds on their productivity. If they don't produce, then they don't earn.

Note: Most online sources provide just four principles of Scientific Management. We've included the fifth principle, pay, as we feel its a key component, necessary to really understand Scientific Management.

Criticisms of Taylor

The following criticisms have been leveled at Scientific Management:

Although production is increased it creates very monotonous jobs containing no autonomy.

It was conceived to benefit both worker and company, but the reality is that it benefits the company far more than the worker. This has resulted in much industrial action and strikes in the last 100 years.

Scientific Management is often seen as dehumanizing. This is because workers do not think for themselves, they simply have to follow a few simple instructions as quickly as possible.

Summary

You can think of Scientific Management as being:

First, a philosophy about how employees behave.

Second, a set of principles to maximize efficiency based on this philosophy.

Taylor's Motivation Theory is premised on the fact that employees are motivated to be productive by one thing. Money.

Because of this, Taylor believed that management should exercise close control over employees, to ensure that they were getting their money's worth.

He advocated using science to study jobs and break them down into manageable parts. These parts could then be described in an efficient, repeatable way. Every employee could then be trained to perform the task in this way.

Finally, he advocated using piece rate pay to motivate employees to be productive.

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Taylor's Motivation Theory - Scientific Management

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Taylor's Motivation Theory, or Scientific Management, was one of the first theories of motivation in the workplace. The theory consists of two parts... First, a philosophy about how employees behave. Second, a set of principles to maximize efficiency based on this philosophy.

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Your core products or services are your lifeblood. They are what attract customers, drive revenues and enable a company to thrive. The better your products are, the more customers want it, the faster you grow and the further you distance yourself from your competitors. But a common mistake I see with many entrepreneurs is a mind-set that once the product is built, they can change their focus to other areas of the business, like sales or marketing. That mind-set is their first flawed step right toward their grave.
Your Competition Never Sleeps
Just because you may have a competitive advantage in the market today, does not mean you will keep a competitive advantage in the future. Competition is an entirely fluid ecosystem. Your existing competitors are always watching your moves, and the smart ones will be quick to follow and exceed your efforts. And new startups are popping up all the time. If you lift your foot off the accelerator for one moment, you are providing your racing competitors the opportunity to drive right by you.
Your Customers Always Demand More
Your customers are looking for you to help them innovate over time. Yes, they may love your product today, but that product may become obsolete over time, and they are expecting their best vendors to step up their game with new features and functionality over time. The minute you sit back and rest on your laurels of past success is the same minute you should start to feel the noose tightening around your neck.
Build a Three-Year Product Roadmap
To solve this problem, you need to have a continually evolving and developing product road map. Lay out your product vision for the long term, and tackle one major product upgrade per year (e.g., Version 1.0 evolves to Version 2.0 after a year). That makes it much harder for your competitors to chase a moving target and will establish you as a trusted thought leader and innovator with your customers looking to take their game to the next level.
Gather Ideas From All Stakeholders
In order to build an effective product roadmap, you need to gather inputs from all places. You need to continually keep an eye on new innovations of your competitors. You need to be in constant contact with your customers, asking them for suggested improvements they would like to see from your business. And you need to listen to your own product team, for their own innovation ideas. So gather inputs from all three channels, prioritize them based on which ones will have biggest positive economic impact on your business, and stage them into your three-year product plan over time.
Case Study-Invest Over Time or Pay the Price Later
I had a Red Rocket client that was feeling pretty good. Their business was spit out healthy profits for several years in a row and didn't really feel the need to materially upgrade their products. The business was paying dividends out to the shareholders, and all was good. Until they woke up one day and realized several new competitors had launched with cheaper, faster products and their customers were complaining that the company had gone stale and was overcharging them for what they were selling. They started losing clients, were forced to lower their prices (which materially impacted margins and profitability) and had to start paying refunds for the product that was breaking more than ever. Needless to say, they were not happy to learn they were staring at a multimillion-dollar project to get their products back into a leadership position in the industry-an unaffordable amount hitting all in one year that should have been slowly invested over time.
Closing Thoughts
The point here is: innovate or eventually die. It won't be a fast death, it will be a long drawn-out death, and you most likely won't even see it coming, until it is way too late or too expensive to fix. Emulate the innovative spirit of Steve Jobs during his tenure at Apple, and all will be good. And if you find yourself having to make a choice between investing in your product or investing in other areas of your business (like sales and marketing), it is most likely time to consider raising capital to afford both. Because, as I have written about in the past, your proof-of-concept (driven by sales and marketing) is just as important as your product, and you need to invest in both.

--
George Deeb is an entrepreneurial CEO, growth expert at Red Rocket Ventures, and author of "101 Startup Lessons--An Entrepreneur's Handbook".

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Continue To Innovate Your Products, Or Your Company Will Die A Slow Death

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Your core products or services are your lifeblood. They are what attract customers, drive revenues and enable a company to thrive. The better your products are, the more customers want it, the faster you grow and the further you distance yourself from your competitors.