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The Polar Code is a set of regulations passed by the IMO for ships operating in polar waters that entered into force in 2017. The Polar Code goes above and beyond existing codes for maritime activities, with more stringent and polar-specific regulations for safety and pollution prevention, including banning heavy fuel oils in the Antarctic (only discouraged in the Arctic), requiring double hulled oil tankers, and banning the discharging of more types of waste. This regulation represents an acknowledgement that ice-free conditions are likely to be the reality for the near future, and that the focus should be on attempts to mitigate the harm of the inevitable increase in industrial activity.

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How does the Polar Code protect the environment?

The following infographic illustrates the environmental requirements of the Polar Code - available to view and download:

Polar Code Summary

The Polar Code ( click for full text) is intended to cover the full range of shipping-related matters relevant to navigation in waters surrounding the two poles - ship design, construction and equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally important, the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar regions.

The Polar Code includes mandatory measures covering safety part (part I-A) and pollution prevention (part II-A) and recommendatory provisions for both (parts I-B and II-B).

The Code will require ships intending to operating in the defined waters of the Antarctic and Arctic to apply for a Polar Ship Certificate, which would classify the vessel as Category A ship - ships designed for operation in polar waters at least in medium first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions; Category B ship - a ship not included in category A, designed for operation in polar waters in at least thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions; or Category C ship - a ship designed to operate in open water or in ice conditions less severe than those included in Categories A and B.

The issuance of a certificate would require an assessment, taking into account the anticipated range of operating conditions and hazards the ship may encounter in the polar waters. The assessment would include information on identified operational limitations, and plans or procedures or additional safety equipment necessary to mitigate incidents with potential safety or environmental consequences.

Ships need to carry a Polar Water Operational Manual, to provide the Owner, Operator, Master and crew with sufficient information regarding the ship's operational capabilities and limitations in order to support their decision-making process.

The chapters in the Code each set out goals and functional requirements, to include those covering ship structure; stability and subdivision; watertight and weathertight integrity; machinery installations; operational safety; fire safety/protection; life-saving appliances and arrangements; safety of navigation; communications; voyage planning; manning and training; prevention of oil pollution; prevention of pollution form from noxious liquid substances from ships; prevention of pollution by sewage from ships; and prevention of pollution by discharge of garbage from ships.

Training requirements

Chapter 12 of the Polar Code on manning and training says that companies must ensure that masters, chief mates and officers in charge of a navigational watch on board ships operating in polar waters have completed appropriate training, taking into account the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) and its related STCW Code.

Mandatory minimum requirements for the training and qualifications of masters and deck officers on ships operating in polar waters were also adopted by IMO's Maritime Safety Committee in November 2016. They became mandatory under the STCW Convention and the STCW Code from 1 July 2018.

Background

The safety of ships operating in the harsh, remote and vulnerable polar areas and the protection of the pristine environments around the two poles have always been a matter of concern for IMO and many relevant requirements, provisions and recommendations have been developed over the years.

Trends and forecasts indicate that polar shipping will grow in volume and diversify in nature over the coming years and these challenges need to be met without compromising either safety of life at sea or the sustainability of the polar environments.

Ships operating in the Arctic and Antarctic environments are exposed to a number of unique risks. Poor weather conditions and the relative lack of good charts, communication systems and other navigational aids pose challenges for mariners. The remoteness of the areas makes rescue or clean up operations difficult and costly. Cold temperatures may reduce the effectiveness of numerous components of the ship, ranging from deck machinery and emergency equipment to sea suctions. When ice is present, it can impose additional loads on the hull, propulsion system and appendages.

The International code of safety for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code) covers the full range of design, construction, equipment, operational, training, search and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant to ships operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles.

The move to develop a mandatory Code followed the adoption by the IMO Assembly, in 2009, of Guidelines for ships operating in polar waters (Resolution A.1024(26)), which are intended to address those additional provisions deemed necessary for consideration beyond existing requirements of the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions, in order to take into account the climatic conditions of Polar waters and to meet appropriate standards of maritime safety and pollution prevention. The Guidelines are recommendatory.

Whilst Arctic and Antarctic waters have a number of similarities, there are also significant differences. The Arctic is an ocean surrounded by continents while the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by an ocean. The Antarctic sea ice retreats significantly during the summer season or is dispersed by permanent gyres in the two major seas of the Antarctic: the Weddell and the Ross. Thus there is relatively little multi-year ice in the Antarctic. Conversely, Arctic sea ice survives many summer seasons and there is a significant amount of multi-year ice. Whilst the marine environments of both Polar seas are similarly vulnerable, response to such challenge should duly take into account specific features of the legal and political regimes applicable to their respective marine spaces.

Protection of the Antarctic from heavy grade oils

A MARPOL regulation, to protect the Antarctic from pollution by heavy grade oils, was adopted by the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), at its 60th session in March, 2010. The amendments entered into force on 1 August 2011.

The amendments add a new chapter 9 to MARPOL Annex I with a new regulation 43 which prohibits the carriage in bulk as cargo, or carriage and use as fuel, of: crude oils having a density at 15°C higher than 900 kg/m3; oils, other than crude oils, having a density at 15°C higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at 50°C higher than 180 mm2/s; or bitumen, tar and their emulsions. An exception is envisaged for vessels engaged in securing the safety of ships or in a search and rescue operation.

Under the Polar Code ships are encouraged not to use or carry heavy fuel oil in the Arctic. IMO's Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR) 7th session in 2020 agreed draft amendments to MARPOL Annex I (addition of a new regulation 43A) to introduce a prohibition on the use and carriage for use as fuel of heavy fuel oil (HFO) by ships in Arctic waters on and after 1 July 2024. The draft amendments will be submitted to the Marine Environment Protection Committee with a view to approval and circulation for future adoption.

Voyage planning in remote areas

The IMO Assembly in November 2007 adopted resolution A.999(25) Guidelines on voyage planning for passenger ships operating in remote areas, in response to the growing popularity of ocean travel for passengers and the desire for exotic destinations, which have led to increasing numbers of passenger ships operating in remote areas. When developing a plan for voyages to remote areas, special consideration should be given to the environmental nature of the area of operation, the limited resources, and navigational information.

The detailed voyage and passage plan should include the following factors: safe areas and no-go areas; surveyed marine corridors, if available; and contingency plans for emergencies in the event of limited support being available for assistance in areas remote from SAR facilities.

In addition, the detailed voyage and passage plan for ships operating in Arctic or Antarctic waters should include the following factors: conditions when it is not safe to enter areas containing ice or icebergs because of darkness, swell, fog and pressure ice; safe distance to icebergs; and presence of ice and icebergs, and safe speed in such areas.

Ship reporting in the Arctic region

The MSC, at its 91st session in November 2012, adopted a new mandatory ship reporting system "In the Barents Area (Barents SRS)" (proposed by Norway and the Russian Federation). The new mandatory ship reporting system entered into force at 0000 hours UTC on 1 June 2013. The following categories of ships passing through or proceeding to and from ports and anchorages in the Barents SRS area are required to participate in the ship reporting system, by reporting to either Vardø VTS centre or Murmansk VTS centre: all ships with a gross tonnage of 5,000 and above; all tankers; all ships carrying hazardous cargoes; a vessel towing when the length of the tow exceeds 200 metres; and any ship not under command, restricted in their ability to manoeuvre or having defective navigational aids.

Ship routeing in the Arctic

The MSC, at its 99th session in May 2018, adopted new and amended ships' routeing measures in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait, aimed at reducing the risks of incidents - the first measures adopted by IMO for the Arctic region where the Polar Code applies.

The measures include six two-way routes and six precautionary areas, to be voluntary for or all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above, in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait off the coast of the Chukotskiy Peninsula and Alaska, proposed by the Russian Federation and the United States. These waters are expected to see increased traffic due to rising economic activity in the Arctic.

In addition, the MSC established three areas to be avoided in the Bering Sea, proposed by the United States, to improve safety of navigation and protect the fragile and unique environment. These measures entered into force on 1 December 2018.

Polar Code (second phase)

IMO's Maritime Safety Committee and related sub-committees are looking at the application of the Polar Code to ships not currently covered by SOLAS.

The Polar Code is mandatory for certain ships under the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions. While SOLAS Chapter V (Safety of navigation) applies to all ships on all voyages (with some specific exceptions), the other chapters of the Convention do not apply to some categories of ships, including cargo ships of less than 500 gross tonnage; pleasure yachts not engaged in trade; and fishing vessels (sometimes termed "non-SOLAS ships").

The IMO Assembly, meeting in November-December 2019, adopted an Assembly resolution urging Member States to implement, on a voluntary basis, safety measures of the Polar Code on ships not certified under the SOLAS Convention ( Download A 31/Res.1137).

IMO's Maritime Safety Committee has also, in 2019 (MSC 101), approved guidance for navigation and communication equipment intended for use on ships operating in polar waters. The guidance includes recommendations on temperature and mechanical shock testing, and on how to address ice accretion and battery performance in cold temperatures.

The MSC also approved Interim guidelines on life-saving appliances and arrangements for ships operating in polar waters.

The Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue (NCSR) is giving consideration to the possible application of chapters 9 (Safety of navigation) and 11 (Voyage planning) of the Polar Code to non-SOLAS ships and discussing how best to enhance the safety of these ships when operating in polar waters. A correspondence group has been established to report back to the next NCSR session.

IMO/Canada training for seafarers operating in Polar waters

IMO and Transport Canada have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to deliver regional capacity-building workshops to provide training for trainers to deliver training programmes for seafarers operating in Polar waters and on the implementation of the Polar Code.

The project harnesses IMO's competence as the United Nations specialized agency responsible for setting global standards for the safety, security and facilitation of international shipping and the prevention of pollution by ships, in collaboration with Canada's financial support and expertise in supporting implementation of the Polar Code.

The regional train-the-trainer workshops aim to assist Governments and their maritime training institutes in enhancing the skills and competence of maritime instructors to develop competence-based training programmes, update existing programmes and improve the delivery of specific IMO model courses (Basic and Advanced training for ships operating in Polar waters).

Under the project, four regional capacity-building workshops will be delivered:

Canada (September 2019) - The seminar (9 to13 September 2019) was attended by eleven participants from seven countries Canada, Bahamas, Chile, Denmark, Iceland, India, Jamaica) with representatives from Governments and maritime academies. The workshop was arranged in co-operation with the Maritime Authority of Canada and was held in the Marine Institute, St. John's, Newfoundland. The aim of this event was to assist maritime training institutes in enhancing the skills and competence of maritime instructors to develop competence based training programmes, update existing programmes and improve the use of the IMO model courses on Basic and Advanced training for ships operating in polar waters. The training was focused on how to implement IMO conventions dealing with ships operating in polar waters, especially the Polar Code and STCW Convention. It included technical presentations, case studies and table-top exercises, simulations on navigation simulator, regional regulations and the required training and certification for seafarers on ships operating in polar waters.

Valparaíso, Chile (18-22 November 2019) -regional workshop.

Republic of Korea - to be confirmed

Russian Federation - to be confirmed

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The following infographic illustrates the environmental requirements of the Polar Code - available to view and download: The Polar Code ( click for full text) is intended to cover the full range of shipping-related matters relevant to navigation in waters surrounding the two poles - ship design, construction and equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally important, the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar regions.

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International Maritime Organization MEPC 77 on Greenhouse Gases and Black Carbon

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International Maritime Organization MEPC 77 on Greenhouse Gases and Black Carbon

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The International Maritime Organization is the body of the UN primarily responsible for the regulation of shipping, and its Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) met for its 77th session in November of this year, passing resolutions on a number of issues relating to the health of the Arctic. The MEPC received some praise from NGOs for its resolution to encourage states to voluntarily use cleaner distillate fuels in their ships operating in or near the Arctic in order to reduce Black Carbon emissions, which are especially damaging to sea ice.
The MEPC also received some criticism from other NGOs for failing to pass a resolution aiming to get the shipping industry to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. This session highlights the disparity between the urgency emphasized by scientists and experts on climate change and the underwhelming level and speed of action taken by international legislators.

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Montreal Protocol and the 2020 Arctic Ozone Hole

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Montreal Protocol and the 2020 Arctic Ozone Hole

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The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is often thought of as the blueprint for international treaties on environmental concerns. It is the only UN treaty to be ratified by every country on Earth, and its ban on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) has allowed the ozone layer to steadily heal. In 2020, record cold temperatures caused by the polar vortex caused a new, large hole to appear in the ozone layer above the Arctic, grabbing headlines and sparking worries that the ozone layer has not healed as much as previously thought.
This MIT study shows that without the Montreal Protocol, the 2020 Arctic ozone hole would have opened earlier and lasted longer, with accompanyingly larger increases in UV radiation. The results of this study also demonstrate that there have already been substantial year-round benefits from the Montreal Protocol for the Arctic, further establishing the treaty as a shining example for international achievements in protecting the environment.

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Wohltmann, I., von der Gathen, P., Lehmann, R., Maturilli, M., Deckelmann, H., Manney, G. L., Davies, J., Tarasick, D., Jepsen, N., Kivi, R., and Lyall, N.: Near-complete local reduction of Arctic stratospheric ozone by severe chemical loss in spring 2020, Geophys. Res. Lett., 47, e2020GL089547, https://doi.org/10.1029/2020GL089547, 2020.

WMO/GAW Ozone Monitoring Community, World Meteorological Organization-Global Atmosphere Watch Program (WMO-GAW): Ozone, World Ozone and Ultraviolet Radiation Data Centre (WOUDC) [data set], https://doi.org/10.14287/10000001, 2021.

World Meteorological Organization (WMO): Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion 2018, Global ozone research and monitoring project, Report No. 58, Geneva, Switzerland, 2018.

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An Arctic ozone hole in 2020 if not for the Montreal Protocol

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Abstract. Without the Montreal Protocol, the already extreme Arctic ozone losses in the boreal spring of 2020 would be expected to have produced an Antarctic-like ozone hole, based upon simulations performed using the specified dynamics version of the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (SD-WACCM) and using an alternate emission scenario of 3.5 % growth in ozone-depleting substances from 1985 onwards.

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WWF "ArcNet" Priority Area Conservation Map

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WWF "ArcNet" Priority Area Conservation Map

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ArcNet is a mapped plan for priority areas of conservation in the Arctic and surrounding seas, developed by the WWF and released in May of this year. This proposal aims to set forth a concrete and research-based plan to maintain the health and biodiversity of the Arctic and to protect the way of life of the region's 4 million indigenous inhabitants by establishing a map of priority areas to be managed by surrounding Arctic governments.

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ArcNET - an Arctic Ocean Network of Priority Areas for Conservation is an initiative to create a network of marine protection throughout the Arctic Ocean.

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Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation

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Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation

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This is one example of several international scientific research agreements concerning the Arctic, signed in 2017 by the eight Arctic states and ratified in 2018. This treaty facilitates international access to research areas, facilities, and data, promotes education, career development, and training opportunities, and encourages activities associated with traditional and local knowledge

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Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation | US Arctic Research Commission

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The Government of Canada, the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Government of the Republic of Finland, the Government of Iceland, the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, and the Government of the United State…

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Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation

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Agreement to Ban Commercial Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean

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Agreement to Ban Commercial Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean

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The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean (or Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, or CAOFA) was signed in 2018 by the Arctic states and Arctic Council Observer States China, Japan, South Korea, and the EU.  The CAOFA consists of a 16-year ban on any commercial fishing in the region with potential five-year extensions, as well as a joint scientific research program to identify any potential for sustainable fishing.
"With the reduction of ice in the Arctic Ocean, it is now feasible that fishing vessels could enter the central Arctic Ocean and fish. The lack of scientific knowledge about the marine ecosystem and the species found in the Arctic Ocean means that such a scenario could be catastrophic. For the duration of this agreement, such a scenario will be prevented."
With this treaty, the Arctic nations cooperatively resisting the urge to immediately exploit the increased access to resources that comes with melting ice, opting for a sound, research based approach for exploiting it later.

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A thick layer of multiyear sea ice once completely covered the central Arctic Ocean. But as the ice continues to retreat, waters that were previously only accessible to heavy icebreakers could soon open up and attract commercial fishing vessels. Yet, little is known about the ecosystem emerging below the ice and unregulated fishing could have detrimental impacts.

This was a concern to the Arctic coastal states. Thus, they decided to prevent commercial fishing until better scientific knowledge was available and to engage other states with distant-water fishing capacity as well. The result was the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean, signed in 2018 by Canada, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union.

We asked Maya Gold for an introduction to the milestone agreement. Maya Gold is a Senior Advisor within International and Intergovernmental Affairs at Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Canada's Head of Delegation to our Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group.

Map showing area covered by the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. (PAME/Arctic Council Secretariat)

In brief, could you explain what the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean is?

The legally binding Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean was signed in Ilulissat, Greenland on October 3rd, 2018. Once it enters into force, the agreement will commit the parties to not authorize any vessel flying its flag to engage in commercial fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean. The agreement will be in place for up to sixteen years, renewable in increments of five years.

This agreement provides a framework for the parties to cooperate to better understand the ecosystems in and adjacent to the central Arctic Ocean. It prevents commercial fishing from occurring until adequate scientific information is available to inform decision making in relation to the viability and sustainability of any potential future fishing activities in the agreement area. Parties intend to meet at least every two years to review implementation progress and the scientific information developed through a joint program of scientific research and monitoring.

To bring the area into perspective: The central Arctic Ocean is the largest area of high seas in the Arctic , it is surrounded entirely by the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (in respect of Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States, and spans an area of approximately 2.8 million square kilometers - virtually the same size as the Mediterranean Sea.

Why was there a need for such an agreement?

Under the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states can exercise jurisdiction over fisheries zones extending 200 nautical miles seaward from coastal baselines. In some instances, the EEZs of adjacent and/or opposite states are geographically positioned such that they totally enclose an area of the "high seas" outside their fisheries jurisdiction. However, despite being entirely surrounded by the EEZ's of states, vessels from any state in principle have the right to fish in these high seas areas, unless they have entered into an international agreement specifying otherwise.

The central Arctic Ocean has historically been an area completely covered with multiyear sea ice and inaccessible except to heavy icebreakers. With climate change, the ice in this area has been rapidly disappearing, with most recent studies indicating the area could be completely free of ice in the coming years, some predictions as early as 2030. In fact, there are now parts of the high seas in the central Arctic Ocean which are already free of ice and accessible to vessels in the summer months. With the reduction of ice in the Arctic Ocean, it is now feasible that fishing vessels could enter the central Arctic Ocean and fish. The lack of scientific knowledge about the marine ecosystem and the species found in the Arctic Ocean means that such a scenario could be catastrophic. For the duration of this agreement, such a scenario will be prevented, since the main objective of this agreement is to prevent commercial fishing from occurring in the near term until better scientific knowledge could be gained about the ecosystem.

How does it tie into other international agreements for the Arctic Ocean?

The three other international legally binding agreements which are specific to the Arctic and were negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council are the Ag reement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation.

Given the operational nature of those agreements, there is in fact no substantial overlap between those agreements and the central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement. Although by name you would expect the scientific cooperation agreement to be relevant, that agreement is rather about the movement of people and equipment for scientific purposes between the Arctic States, and would not be relevant for a science program in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean, which is governed by the freedom of marine scientific research under UNCLOS.

A notable difference between the these three agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council and the central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement is the membership. The fisheries agreement signatories do not mirror the Arctic Council's membership, rather it consists of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, the United States, Iceland, China, Japan, Korea and the European Union.

When and by whom was it initiated?

In 2010, the United States effectively closed its EEZ North of Alaska to commercial fishing. Canada followed suit in 2014 with the "Beaufort Sea Fish Management Framework", which was a partnership between the Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, the Inuvialuit Game Council and the Fisheries Joint Management Committee. It determined: "Potential commercial fisheries will only be considered in light of scientifically supportable estimates of surplus and sustainable stocks" (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2009).

Following several rounds of bilateral discussions, in February 2014 Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States issued the "Nuuk Statement" calling for action on the central Arctic Ocean issue. These same states signed the non-binding "Oslo Declaration" the following year, in which they agreed not to allow their commercial fleets to fish in the central Arctic Ocean until there would be sound scientific base and an appropriate management regime in place (Norway 2015). The Oslo Declaration also recognized that other nations/jurisdictions with the distant-water fishing capacity needed to be engaged on this issue.

In December 2015, negotiations began among the five states that signed the Oslo Declaration as well as China, the European Union (which has competence over fisheries policy on behalf of its member states), Iceland, Japan and the Republic of Korea. David Balton, with the US State Department, was the Chair of the negotiation process and it was the US who initiated the discussions among the coastal states, which resulted in the Oslo declaration.

Who are the signatories?

Canada

Iceland

The Kingdom of Denmark (in respect of Greenland and the Faroe Islands)

Norway

The Russian Federation

The United States of America

China

Japan

South Korea

The European Union

What is the current status of the agreement and when will it entered into force?

As of August 2020, nine of the ten signatories have completed the ratification process for the agreement. The agreement will enter into force 30 days after receipt of the tenth and final instrument of ratification (once all ten parties ratify) and will remain in effect for 16 years. It will be automatically extended for additional 5-year periods if the parties agree.
Read the full agreement here.

Title photo: Alfred-Wegener-Institut / Mario Hoppmann (CC-BY 4.0)

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Exploring the Arctic Ocean: The agreement that protects an unknown ecosystem

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A thick layer of multiyear sea ice once completely covered the central Arctic Ocean. But as the ice continues to retreat, waters that were previously only accessible to heavy icebreakers could soon open up and attract commercial fishing vessels. Yet, little is known about the ecosystem emerging below the ice and unregulated fishing could have detrimental impacts.

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Arctic Ice Projections in the Paris Agreement

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Arctic Ice Projections in the Paris Agreement

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The stated goal of the Paris Agreement is to stabilize the global mean temperature to 1.5-2.0 °C above preindustrial levels, and this study published in Nature is a projection of how Arctic ice conditions would react according to whether this goal is achieved. The research shows that the Arctic would be ice-free once every 40 years at 1.5 °C warming, once every 5 years at 2.0 °C, and at 3.0 °C, which is the projected warming for 2100 based on current emission reduction policies, the Arctic would have ice-free conditions every summer.
This study demonstrates that the goals of the Paris Agreement are good if not necessary for protecting the future of the Arctic. It also shows how much can and will change for the people, ecosystems, and industries in the Arctic on a very short time scale if the international community does not take immediate and serious action on reducing emissions.

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Ice-free Arctic projections under the Paris Agreement - Nature Climate Change

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Nations are currently pursuing efforts to constrain anthropogenic warming to 1.5 °C. In such a world, model projections suggest the Arctic will be ice-free every one in forty years, compared to one in every five under stabilized 2 °C warming.

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This article in the Georgetown Security Studies Review describes some of the inadequacies in the UNCLOS concerning the Arctic. The author argues that "the spirit of the law of the sea" does not sufficiently address the rapid changes to the ice and environment of the region, and what those changes mean for claims for jurisdiction over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The article mentions Part XII, Article 234 of the UNCLOS, arguing that its imprecise language on "ice covered areas," "particularly severe climatic conditions" and "obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation" has enabled confusion and competition in Arctic states' claims of jurisdiction over Arctic waters. This article serves as an example of criticism of powerful IGOs and treaty structures that are simply ill-equipped and unprepared to deal with the effects of melting Arctic sea ice.

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UNCLOS in the Arctic: A Treaty for Warmer Waters

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The Canadian Arctic as seen from space. Photo Credit: NASA. Since its inception, much of the discussion about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has centered on the United…

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Indigenous Perspectives on Arctic Climate Change

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Indigenous Perspectives on Arctic Climate Change

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This article written by the Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (or ICC, one of the six Permanent Participant indigenous organizations in the Arctic Council), explains an indigenous perspective on climate change the Arctic. The author stresses that the Arctic ocean is the Inuit's nunaat, or homeland, and that the way of life for millions of Arctic people is under threat due to climate change and industrial activity causing instability, unpredictability, changes in migration patterns, the presence of new species, and open water where there should be ice. The author concludes that Inuit should lead in researching, monitoring, and managing the region.
This article illuminates the role of indigenous groups like the ICC in managing the Arctic. These groups rightly insist that their generational knowledge of the ecosystem and its management should be highly valued by any international bodies seeking to operate in the area.

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The Arctic Ocean and the Sea Ice Is Our Nuna | United Nations

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For Inuit, the sustainable use of the marine resources and the future of the Arctic Ocean and sea ice is not a luxury—it is life itself; it is about protecting our culture. Inuit are adapting to changes and we will continue to thrive in the changing Arctic. We have much to learn and much to teach th…

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Arctic Council Mission Statement on Climate Change

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Arctic Council Mission Statement on Climate Change

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The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization that serves as a global advocate and knowledge broker for issues related to the Arctic. It is comprised of eight Arctic states ( Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States), six Indigenous Peoples' organizations with Permanent Participant status, and several non-Arctic Observer states and organizations, all of which are involved in the Council's six Working Groups which execute the Council's programs and projects.
The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to global warming, with temperatures in the region rising three times the global average, but the causes and further effects of Arctic climate change extend to all corners of the world. The link above contains an overview of how the Arctic Council addresses these climate issues and the solutions for which they advocate.

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The temperatures in the Arctic continue to rise at three times the global annual average.

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This link comes from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in the United States. They are a nonpartisan thinktank. It gives a good overview of the problems arising in the Arctic as well as recommendations, but it gives a good overview of the backstory of the Arctic and the developing challenges. I found it helpful as it easily explains the back drop for why the Arctic is essential and why States are and will be vying for it in the future.

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Arctic Governance: Challenges and Opportunities

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As national governments, international institutions, and nonstate actors explore approaches to Arctic governance, a cohesive approach is necessary to address the environmental, economic, sociocultural, and geopolitical challenges the region faces.

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2008 Understanding of Arctic Sovereignty

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2008 Understanding of Arctic Sovereignty

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This journal article discusses the issues of developing Oil and Gas within the Arctic as the Arctic softens and International Law falls behind. The article begins by explaining the hardships of governing the Arctic as it has been mainly ruled by soft law, i.e. simple agreements between States to ensure that it is ruled fairly. This is in conflict with the Antarctic which is ruled strictly by hard law, i.e. treaties and legalized agreements. The journal article is important as it draws the problems related to regulating a "common space" at which no single state can do everything alone. The issues began as the Arctic began to melt allowing fisheries and oil exploration to begin, but each State also wished to protect the fragile environment of a pristine sea.

The document continues on to explain the many different agreements that deal with the Arctic, including one in this project (UNCLOS). The issue that the article concentrates on is that no matter what States agree to by verbal consent, they will still do what they want with their territorial waters. In May 28th, 2008, five of the coastal states came together for the Ilulissat Agreement, detailing that there already is a framework necessary to protect the Arctic and nothing else is required of them.

This entire piece could be the cornerstone for future research. It explains in detail the issues with protecting the environment while that runs counter to what the States wish to do in the region. Only in the event that it better serves them rather than the resources they exploit, will they do something. This document explains the foundation of what I am attempting to explain here; the challenges of protecting the Arctic focused on a single aspect of resource extraction of Oil and Gas in relation to State Sovereignty.

To create a better future, the journal article does attempt to explain avenues that could be taken to protect the Arctic, but it would still require States to submit themselves to a treaty and ratify it, which with UNCLOS, the United States is still not a party to it, defeating its entire purpose.

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Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic: Softening of Ice Demands Hardening of International Law on JSTOR

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The melting of Arctice sea ice, caused by climate change, presents opportunities for access to new oil and gas reserves in the Arctic. With access comes the ris...

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This is the convention on the Law of the Sea from the United Nations. It explains the law of the sea, which is important for the Arctic as that is mainly water. This piece is helpful to establish the Exclusive Economic Zone which plays a large part of the conflict in dealing with the Arctic. It is the key piece of legislation that almost all States within the Arctic Circle have ratified, outside of the United States but they follow its provisions without being a party.

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UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI - Preamble and frame index

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This is an agreement in the event of an oil spillage on how these countries should react to it. It explains the exact methods each country should do if a spillage occurs in their territory. I found this piece helpful as it helps piece together what agreements in dealing with oil have been written and agreed upon. Gives hope that even if we do end up drilling in the Arctic, there is a plan in place for mitigating an ecological disaster.

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Information document / Status of Ratification submitted by the Arctic Council Secretariat to the Arctic Council's Senior ARctic Officials meeting in Yellowknife, Canada, March 26-27 2014 on the Agreement on Cooperation ...

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AGREEMENT on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.

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Information document / Status of Ratification submitted by the Arctic Council Secretariat to the Arctic Council's Senior ARctic Officials meeting in Yellowknife, Canada, March 26-27 2014 on the Agreement on Cooperation ...

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Conservation Problems of Arctic Oil and Gas

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Conservation Problems of Arctic Oil and Gas

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Conservation of Oil and Gas in the Arctic is linked via the Murmansk Marine Biological Institute that the impact of Oil and Gas has on the local biological resources.

While fishing has been understood to be a standard in every country. This article dives into the damages of oil and gas drilling in comparison to overfishing that has occurred historically in coastal regions before regulations were in place.

I found it interesting that Oil and Gas production does less harm to fisheries in the area than a spill from oil and gas. It helps to explain in relation to other works that if the extraction of ground resources is inevitable, we can hope that fish populations will be safe regardless of what happens. Extraction of ground resources poses its own problems but basing it around protecting fish is not the end-all be-all of environmental protections.

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Off-Campus Authentication @ Henry Madden Library

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Most online resources are available only to currently registered Fresno State students, faculty, and staff. Community borrowers, alumni card holders, and others can use online resources only from on-campus.

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EU Seeking to Ban Natural Resource Extraction

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EU Seeking to Ban Natural Resource Extraction

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This article contains statements about the EU's increasing desire to appear larger on the world stage through the use of banning gas and oil extraction. Russia currently exploits parts of the Arctic but agrees in the article to ban it as prices increase. I found this one helpful because it is much more recent, as of around 2 weeks ago and brings a different perspective in how world powers are reacting to the Arctic's natural resources.
I found it helpful in understanding the underlying impact that countries near the Arctic have an interest in it outside of natural resources.

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Oct 13 (Reuters) - The European Union will seek a ban on tapping new oil, coal and gas deposits in the Arctic to protect a region severely affected by climate change, according to a proposal for the bloc's new Arctic strategy published on Wednesday.

The European Commission proposal reflects the EU's efforts to boost its role on the global stage, though it has limited influence in the Arctic. It is not a member of the Arctic Council, the regional coordinating body, though three of its member states - Denmark, Finland and Sweden - are.

"The EU is committed to ensuring that oil, coal and gas stay in the ground, including in Arctic regions," the EU executive's proposal said, while acknowledging that the bloc itself still imports oil and gas extracted in the region.

"To this end, the Commission shall work with partners towards a multilateral legal obligation not to allow any further hydrocarbon reserve development in the Arctic or contiguous regions, nor to purchase such hydrocarbons if they were to be produced."

Russia's President Vladimir Putin, whose country is one of the world's largest oil and gas exporters and excavates fossil fuels in the Arctic, said Moscow would eventually benefit from such a ban due to rising prices.

"If such decisions lead to a certain price volatility, (Russia's economy) wouldn't suffer that much. That's because we will reduce production, but will get the prices we wanted," Putin told an energy conference in Moscow.

The Arctic is one of the regions most affected by climate change. It has warmed three times as fast as the planet during the last 50 years, causing the ice covering land and sea to melt, sea levels to rise and permafrost to thaw.

PERMAFROST

The EU also aims under its new strategy to strengthen research into the effects of thawing permafrost that may put oil fields at risk and threaten to release greenhouse gases as well as dangerous germs locked in the frozen ground.

"Over 70% of Arctic infrastructure and 45% of oil extraction fields are built on permafrost," said the document, which must still be approved by the EU's 27 member states.

Potential mitigation measures could include the development of methods for local cooling and stabilisation and the introduction of tougher building standards, the Commission said.

It also suggested the creation of a monitoring and early warning system to detect germs such as anthrax being released from the thawing ground.

The Arctic Council comprises Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia and the United States as well as the three EU states, along with six indigenous organisations, and it acts as a forum for cooperation. The EU has applied for observer status.

To boost its regional presence, the EU plans to open an office in Greenland's capital Nuuk as the United States did last year.

Reporting by Sabine Siebold, additional reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin in Moscow Editing by John Chalmers and Gareth Jones

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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EU to seek ban on oil and gas exploration in the Arctic

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The European Union will seek a ban on tapping new oil, coal and gas deposits in the Arctic to protect a region severely affected by climate change, according to a proposal for the bloc's new Arctic strategy published on Wednesday.

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This article comes from the World Wild Fund, an NGO focusing on animal and nature sustainability. It explains in light detail some of the issues with the Arctic expansion of Oil, mapping, and other issues. I found it particularly interesting as it's an NGO focused on protecting wildlife from the expansion of powers. It contains links to some of their work that explain how the Arctic is being affected by the melting of the ice as States move in to map and utilize the waters for transportation.

In particular, they have a mapping of a theoretical oil spill that could cause major damage. That may become its own resource later on.

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Why it matters

The Arctic's shallow and biologically productive seas are also rich with oil reserves. But oil exploration poses a tremendous risk to vulnerable Arctic ecosystems and communities. Oil and gas development could also damage fisheries, tourism and other, more sustainable economic activities. The production of Arctic oil and gas contributes even more to the climate crisis through increased greenhouse gas emissions.

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The Arctic's shallow and biologically productive seas are also rich with oil reserves. But oil exploration poses a tremendous risk to vulnerable Arctic ecosystems and communities. Oil and gas development could also damage fisheries, tourism and other, more sustainable economic activities.

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This is a news story that reflects, as of September 2021, the expansion of drilling in the Arctic. The article explains that while countries are currently struggling with the ability to reduce our reliance on carbon-based fuel and embrace greener forms of energy, there is major bankrolling of drilling platforms that include Gazprom, Russia's major producer of oil. It elaborates that while the rest of the world is attempting to draw down on relying on oil and gas, there is still major funding towards drilling for more oil in the Arctic. This is negating any benefits that have been sought by other States to reduce carbon output. I found this particularly interesting as there are other sources on this, but it highlights that States, even though they see there is an issue will continue to bankroll what they need for energy. It stresses that we are still in the early stages of exploiting the Arctic and that there is a lack of agreements to restrict this from happening.

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Arctic Oil, Gas Production Is Booming Despite Climate Fears

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Oil and gas companies are being bankrolled by some of the biggest names in finance to tap the Arctic’s vast natural wealth even as warnings grow about the melting ice cap due to man-made global warming.

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No region in the world has so directly and substantially felt the effects of climate change as the Arctic. The livelihoods of its 4 million indigenous inhabitants and the balance of the ecosystem are likely past the breaking point. The ice is melting and year after year there are no signs of it slowing down. The treaty organizations and NGOs that manage the region have succeeded in passing laws with a genuine potential to mitigate future harm or promote vital research, but these laws are passed with a solemn acceptance of the likely failure to meet the goals of the  Paris Agreement and the reality of the future political battle over control of Arctic resources and shipping lanes.
Ultimately, the direction of future protection and management of the Arctic depends entirely on whether or not global emissions can be significantly reduced. Though not likely, it is not impossible. The Montreal Protocol still serves as proof that it is possible to get the whole world on the same page about a looming, universal threat to humanity and the world. The clock keeps ticking, however.
As a college student, it is easy to think that there is nothing you can do to solve this issue. It is this feeling of helplessness and inevitability that allows for widespread ignorance about the severity and immediacy of this global challenge. This feeling must be extinguished and replaced with an imperative to demand action on greenhouse gas emissions and to save our Earth. In the meantime, Arctic and maritime organizations are hard at work making the best of a truly terrible situation.

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Arctic Oil and Gas International or National? 

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Arctic Oil and Gas International or National? 

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This article from the NGO The Arctic Institute delves into the question of whether the Arctic as a whole is an international issue that needs to be tackled or if it is a region issue. It explains that there is a lack of cohesive action being done on the part of the States in the Arctic council itself as they hold the primary power over development in the Arctic. There is a lack of law being drawn up for the area as there hasn't been any major disaster that requires them to take action. The article goes on and argues that until something happens, the Arctic states are free to sit idly by and do nothing. Many other States have joined on as permanent observers but they do not have the power to do anything about it. I found this interesting to the issue of the Arctic and Oil drilling because it takes a realistic look at the Arctic Council and the States that make it up. There is little preventative action at the time this was written, and as of today, there has been some movement, but not much. Through their argument, we can infer that their solution would be to engage these States in drafting international laws to address the Arctic as they would any other ocean.

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The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies

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Arctic Oil and Gas: A Regional or Global Concern? - The Arctic Institute

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Due to environmental concerns, Arctic oil and gas is being scrutinized by governments, local inhabitants and the international community.

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Arctic Oil and Gas: A Regional or Global Concern?

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Russian Exploitation Benefits and Negatives

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Russian Exploitation Benefits and Negatives

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This piece is an NGO explanation of what the Russian strategy for the Arctic is. Specifically, this resource is used for outlining what a singular nation is currently doing with the Arctic in defiance of climate activists.

This piece explains the Russian mindset in the energy field and gives some extrapolation insight into the other coastal states that require energy. It details their reasoning behind exploiting the Arctic along with the cooperation benefits and failures they have had. Exploring the Arctic is a costly endeavour, both physically as a single nation and monetarily.

I found it helpful in explaining the mindset behind the countries that are likely to exploit the resources and by using Russia as an example, as a nation that relies on oil for much of their exports, is important in understanding the challenges that oil consumption and regulation of the Arctic have in common.

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Arctic offshore oil platform "Prirazlomnaya" in the Pechora Sea, south of Novaya Zemlya, Russia. Photo: Gazprom.
This four article series critically examines Russia's military, energy, and shipping interests in the Arctic and how Russian policies and actions compare to the existing academic and journalistic rhetoric about the Arctic region.
As the rate at which sea ice is melting in the Arctic accelerates, analysts have predicted unprecedented access to vast deposits of undiscovered oil, natural gas, and other natural resources. In 2008, the US Geological Survey estimated that the Arctic may contain 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and up to 30% of the world's undiscovered gas resources. Two thirds of Russia's oil and gas is expected in Russia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off its Arctic coasts. Such statistics are often used to back up the academic and journalistic hype over an impending competition for the Arctic's natural resources, even though estimates show that only a small amount of undiscovered resources are in disputed territories.

Competition for Arctic Resources

Given the rising global demand for oil, the Arctic's natural resources have found their way into the debate on Arctic affairs. The mostly unexplored sources of hydrocarbon have propagated a debate on whether the Arctic will be an area of conflict between competing Arctic countries or a zone of cooperation based on mutual interests. Marlene Laruelle characterizes the two sides of this debate as "resource nationalism versus patterns of cooperation."

Since Putin's first presidency in 2000, Russia has undergone a process of re-nationalizing its oil and gas companies. As a result, some of the largest Russian oil and gas companies, such as Rosneft and Gazprom, are under the complete or majority control of Russian state authorities. There is a common argument among writers such as Shane C. Tayloe and Scott Borgerson that Russia seeks to reap the benefits in the Arctic to achieve power parity with the United States and ultimately regain its great power status. They also believe that the possible hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic will lead to competition and an inevitable military clash for resources.

Among the five littoral states, Russia possesses more than half of all the Arctic's estimated oil and gas resources. In other words, Russia is in control of the majority of the Arctic's hydrocarbons because they fall within their maritime boundaries. Further, this is supported by Russia's history of extensive production and exploration in the Far North. The US Geological Survey's probability map of Arctic oil and gas (see map below) shows that most hydrocarbons (indicated by the darker colored territories) are located far from the disputed seabed areas around the North Pole and the Lomonosov Ridge. The conclusion is that there is little incentive for Russia to aggressively seize the North Pole or other nations' territories for their resources because of their own vast resource base.

Arctic Energy Cooperation

International cooperation is becoming increasingly desirable since unilaterally exploring and developing the Arctic is expensive and complicated. The technological and logistical challenges of extraction in the remote and climatically harsh Arctic have led Russia to seek business and technological cooperation with American and European companies. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, many Western oil companies found it difficult to work with Russian companies to explore the Russian Arctic. Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions prevented Western firms from participating in large-scale exploration and extractive efforts. Initially, the sanctions hindered partnerships in the oil industry, but the US (without the EU) has more recently also targeted the Russian gas industry.

Failed Cooperation

One planned energy project involved American energy giant ExxonMobil's plan to partner with Rosneft to develop oil and gas fields in Russia and North America. In 2012, Rex Tillerson and Igor Sechin, the then chief executive officers of ExxonMobil and Rosneft respectively, signed a deal that was worth $500 billion. The deal would have granted ExxonMobil access to the Russian Arctic with exemption from export duties and property tax. It would have been one of the biggest energy extraction projects in history before the sanctions put the deal to a halt. After Rex Tillerson was appointed Secretary of State, there was speculation that the new US administration would reinstate the deal or reduce sanctions. However, in April 2017 the US Treasury decided to not grant a waiver to ExxonMobil after they requested permission to drill in the Russian Arctic. The attempted deal was nonetheless an indication of Russia's openness to cooperating with other states in energy extraction.

Successful Cooperation with Western Europe

There are currently many instances of partnerships moving forward. Since the majority of Arctic hydrocarbons are expected to be in Russia's EEZ, foreign companies are interested in exploring the Russian Arctic in spite of the sanctions. In 2016, British Petroleum formalized a joint venture with Rosneft to assess the prospects of extraction in Western Siberia and the Yenesey-Khatanga basin. In 2017, BP and Rosneft struck another joint venture to extract gas in the Yamal-Nenets region. Russia and Norway have recently agreed to share seismic data on the Barents Sea region to boost the mutual exploration for gas and oil.

Russia looking East

Russian corporations such as Novatek and Rosneft have also been especially successful at cooperating with energy companies from Asia. Russian companies have signed agreements with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Development Bank to fund the Yamal LNG project after Western companies withdrew their support and funding in line with the sanctions in response to the Crimea and Ukraine crises. Although China and Russia have been able to agree on a certain degree of cooperation, there are still challenges that prevent a full-fledged partnership. Russia's reliance on extractive technology from the West and the fear of "China's rise" are such obstacles. Although Russia shares strategic interests with its neighboring countries and other interested parties, low oil prices and high production costs make Arctic oil production less profitable. Nonetheless, the overall trend is that the Russian state and Russian firms have been effective at cooperating with foreign companies in energy extraction and this has not been conflictive.

Official Energy Policy

Russia's official commitments to the Arctic's economic development can be found in the 2013 Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic. One of Russia's strategic priorities is to expand Russia's resource base in the Arctic region so that it can satisfy Russia's need for "hydrocarbon resources, water bio-resources and other types of strategic raw materials." Alexander Pelyasov remarks that the most recent Development Strategy mentions economic priorities more often than it discusses defense priorities. The document is noticeably more open to international cooperation in the interest of developing the region through joint projects. The Arctic is regarded as an enormous source of natural resources. Considering the significance of the energy industry to the Russian economy, exploiting the Arctic is considered an essential mechanism for Russia's social and economic development. Highlighting this objective, former President Medvedev said that Russia's "first and main task is to turn the Arctic into a resource base for Russia in the twenty-first century."

Another important document that presents Russia's official stance is the Energy Strategy for Russia up to 2030. It states that Russia aims to "increase geological exploration, private investments, and state participation in the development of new territories and waters." These are general aims but we learn from the document that the Russian state hopes to enhance Russian energy companies' positions abroad and provide an environment for efficient international cooperation for sophisticated projects in the Arctic. The regions of Eastern Siberia, the Yamal Peninsula, and the continental shelf of the Arctic seas are highlighted as they are relatively under-explored in comparison to other Russian regions. Lastly, one of the main strategic priorities of Russia is to develop the hydrocarbon potential of the Arctic continental shelf and the northern territories of Russia. The move towards the Arctic is intended to compensate for the decreases in oil and gas production in Western Siberia.

In 2012, the State Program for the Development of the Continental Shelf in the Period up to 2030 established the Arctic continental shelf as a territory for exploitation solely by state companies, namely Rosneft and Gazprom. With the support of the Russian state and an unchallenged control over the Russian Arctic, Russia's state-owned oil and gas companies enjoy outstanding exploration and exploitation privileges. However, former Minister of Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev has stated that the preference given to national oil companies over international companies actually hinders development of the Arctic shelf. Russia would benefit from improving its investment climate and making it easier for foreign companies to cooperate with Russian firms. Foreign firms are officially allowed to enter into partnerships with Russian corporations but foreign holdings cannot exceed 50% according to the 2008 Foreign Investment on Strategic Sectors legislation. This legal measure is an example of what Laruelle calls "resource nationalism."

Nationalism in Energy Policy

Writers who subscribe to the concept of "resource nationalism" tend to view Russia's development of natural resources through the perspective of nationalism. Moreover, analysts argue that Russian actions regarding natural resources are based on what they call "harder security or military considerations." For example, Michael L. Roi argues that Russia is using the earnings from its energy industry to rebuild its military capabilities. The narrative points to Russia's historical use of natural gas policies to influence its neighbors and the close ties between the Kremlin and the Russian energy sector. Katarzyna Zysk argues that there is interdependence between the development of the Russian oil industry and Russian military power in the High North. For instance, there are influential Russian officials with great authority in Arctic and defense affairs. The head of Russia's Arctic Commission, Dmitry Rogozin, is also the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian defense and space industries, as well as Russia's former ambassador to NATO. Rogozin is a controversial politician; he is sometimes called the "architect of Russia's Crimea strategy." He is also often regarded as a leading figure in Russia's militarization of the Arctic. Heading the Arctic Commission means he is responsible for the economic development and security of Russia's Arctic regions. Rogozin's role could suggest that defense industries play a pronounced role in Russia's extraction affairs.

Conclusions

In the energy domain, Russia's Arctic policy concurrently involves elements of resource nationalism, competition, and cooperation. Russia is motivated to work independently from Western companies after the Ukraine crisis and has therefore turned to interested partners in Asia. The reinvestment into the Russian Arctic by some Western firms shows though that political tensions do not completely obstruct private sector collaborations. The concept of "resource nationalism" does not necessarily increase the chance of a military confrontation but it contributes to political tensions. As with other spheres of the Russian Arctic policy, the varied nature of Russia's energy practices demonstrates that conflict and cooperation are not mutually exclusive.
I would like to thank my colleagues from The Arctic Institute Ryan Uljua, Dr Kathrin Stephen, Greg Sharp, as well as Dr Felix Ciută, and my family for their support and guidance throughout this project.

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Russia's Arctic Strategy: Energy Extraction (Part III) - The Arctic Institute

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Arctic offshore oil platform "Prirazlomnaya" in the Pechora Sea, south of Novaya Zemlya, Russia. Photo: Gazprom. This four article series critically examines Russia's military, energy, and shipping interests in the Arctic and how Russian policies and actions compare to the existing academic and journalistic rhetoric about the Arctic region.

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The Arctic is ruled by sovereign states which are in agreement that the Arctic is duly governed by the UN Law of the Seas. Oil and Gas drilling is all but expected from States as they require more resources, such as Russia expanding into the Arctic Shelf through Gazprom. As the Arctic is not controlled by hard law like its sister, the Antarctic, it requires each State to agree to reduce the extraction of Oil and Gas. Concerns about this unimpeded extraction range from ice continuing to melt, to local populations of indigenous peoples, to the nearly pristine fish schools that have swum in those waters.

Regulation of the Arctic is limited to mutual agreements to stay within their sovereign waters. The powers claim to have no desire to regulate it outside of their personal areas as they believe that the Law of the Seas has all the necessary framework to allow the Arctic to flourish. Conservation of these resources is being attempted, but as they come up against sovereign power, there is little that the NGOs in the region can do.

The resources I have provided show that the constraints to a major regulation of the Arctic remain in the hands of sovereign powers who refuse, as per the Ilulissat Agreement, to do anything outside of their own waters. Likely, nothing will be done until a major spill happens as States are slow to react to climate change currently, we can expect that preserving the Arctic takes a back seat to preserve the resource usage rate that we currently do.

The challenges that are provided revolve around the ability to extract the resources safely. Since the Arctic States refuse to not extract or limit it, there must be protocol instituted to clean it up. Here is where International Law has actually shined through, in only a single law. While the grand majority of agreements are soft law, there is a hard law that dictates what each State is to do during an ecological disaster of an oil spill. In a system where there is nothing more than just executive agreements, the fact that they were able to unify behind an agreement to protect the environment is a key piece of legislation. Not pictured in this piece is a treaty on scientific exploration as well as a treaty on search and rescue.

In this space, there has only been a single IGO that worked to achieve these goals and that was the Arctic Council. They are made up of the States that border the Arctic including The United States, Canada, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Finland. This IGO allows a location for each of these States to come together and discuss what they need to in relation to the Arctic. The Arctic Council allows observer members that have the ability to work alongside the members of the Council to achieve the goals that they need. These NGOs provide localized insight from groups such as the Saami Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council. They have provided integral support in the creation of the Arctic Council as an IGO, as well as being integral to everything that the Council does in Task Forces, Working Groups, and more.

Outside of the Arctic, there is the United Nations which has created the UN Law of the Seas that has, as stated by those in the council, become the framework for how the Arctic is regulated. Much of the UN's work is based around the generalities that provide for the rest of the oceans of the world, rather than having anything specifically targeting oil and gas production in the Arctic.

Other NGOs have provided insight and research into the damages that Oil and Gas can cause in the Arctic such as the Arctic Institute and groups such as Greenpeace who focus on greener technology to stop the exploitation of climate-damaging resources such as Oil and Gas.

Finally, readers may wonder what they could possibly do to halt the exploitation of oil and gas in the Arctic or find a solution to these problems. The most obvious answer is to write to your local congressmen and advocate that they protect the Arctic from the exploitation of this pristine habitat. There are also NGO groups that focus on this to apply this pressure globally such as Greenpeace. Despite the action that they take, the results they get work. Donating time and money to advocate appears to be the best avenue for affecting change. Spreading the word about the damages that extracting oil and gas from this environment would help. Since we are in college, there is a chance that there are groups on campus that could lead you to jobs in the market that would allow you to shape policy, or to provide influence in decisions globally to shift to greener tech and provide a reason to draw down on resource extraction.