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April 9th - General introduction on South Africa

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April 9th - General introduction on South Africa

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Just follow the 4 steps !

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South Africa has nine provinces. They took their current form following the end of apartheid in 1994 and the beginning of the modern state. This interactive educational game is great way to learn more about the geography of South Africa. It can be especially useful as a supplement to any unit on South African geography and history.

Seterra is an entertaining and educational geography game that lets you explore the world and learn about its countries, capitals, flags, oceans, lakes and more! You can access the Seterra online quiz site using your computer, phone, or tablet running the latest version of most web browsers, including Safari, Firefox, Chrome, and Internet Explorer.

There's also a Seterra app that runs on iOS and Android phones and tablets! Click one of the banners above to download the app from the Apple App Store or from Google Play! The Seterra app offers two game modes, plus high score lists to keep track of your progress. Also, with the app, you can play offline!

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South Africa: Provinces - Map Quiz Game: South Africa has nine provinces. They took their current form following the end of apartheid in 1994 and the beginning of the modern state. This interactive educational game is great way to learn more about the geography of South Africa.

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South Africa: Cities - Map Quiz Game: Many people learned about the cities in South Africa because of the 2010 World Cup of soccer. From Cape Town to Pietersburg, viewers the world over familiarized themselves with the map of South Africa cities. Do you remember where any of them were?

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A last map quiz to learn more South African cities

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A last map quiz to learn more South African cities

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The South African city of Pretoria is one of the country's three capital cities. It's the seat of the administrative branch of government, but Cape Town is the legislative capital and Bloemfontein is the judicial capital. All three of those cities are featured in this quiz game, along with 15 other important cities of South Africa. The centrally located city of Kimberley is notable for its diamond mining past. Port Elizabeth, situated on the southeast coast, is a major shipping port and is known for its numerous beaches. From Port Nolloth in the west, to Durban in the east, this map quiz will help you locate 18 of South Africa's major cities.

Seterra is an entertaining and educational geography game that lets you explore the world and learn about its countries, capitals, flags, oceans, lakes and more! You can access the Seterra online quiz site using your computer, phone, or tablet running the latest version of most web browsers, including Safari, Firefox, Chrome, and Internet Explorer.

There's also a Seterra app that runs on iOS and Android phones and tablets! Click one of the banners above to download the app from the Apple App Store or from Google Play! The Seterra app offers two game modes, plus high score lists to keep track of your progress. Also, with the app, you can play offline!

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South Africa: Cities (Difficult Version)

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South Africa: Cities (Difficult Version) - Map Quiz Game: The South African city of Pretoria is one of the country's three capital cities. It's the seat of the administrative branch of government, but Cape Town is the legislative capital and Bloemfontein is the judicial capital.

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To learn the SA provinces and main cities

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Complete it

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First video on general history of South Africa

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First video on general history of South Africa

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The History of South Africa (3000BC - 1879AD) - with Armchair Historian!

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Birth of the Apartheid

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Compléter les paragraphes et réaliser les activités demandées

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South Africa has learned to turn the most painful moments of its history into lessons for the present, yet the pomp and fanfare that now accompanies these days also threatens to whitewash history.

Now a public holiday, March 21 marks Human Rights Day in South Africa, commemorating the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, which became a catalyst in the fight against apartheid. Yet, just how the day is remembered today ignores the man who at the center of the campaign against apartheid, Robert Sobukwe.

A contemporary of Nelson Mandela's, Sobukwe had been a member of the ANC until 1958, when he and his followers deeply disagreed with the ANC over the Freedom Charter, the guiding document for the liberation movement. Where the ANC argued that South Africa belonged to all who live in it, Sobukwe and his followers called for a prioritization of Africans. Dubbed, the Africanists, Sobukwe and others broke away and formed the Pan Africanist Congress in 1959.

Their first campaign was meant to be the peaceful resistance against pass books, the identity document black South Africans were forced to carry. They planned that black people would leave their passes at home and present themselves at police stations to be arrested. Sobukwe's reasoning was that if thousands of black workers were arrested, it would bring the economy to standstill, and force the apartheid government to reconsider its stance.

Sharpeville massacre

Sobukwe in 1960.

"No one outside the PAC was sure how seriously to take the PAC anti-pass campaign. The ANC leaders derided it. The white press largely ignored the PAC campaign," journalist Patrick Duncan wrote. The ANC went as far as trying to discredit the campaign as "sensational" and without "prospect of success," in an editorial for the Sunday Times newspaper on March 20, 1960.

On the morning of March 21, 1960, thousands went ahead with the campaign in the segregated townships of Sharpeville, in Vereeneging (a city south of Johannesburg), Orlando in Soweto and Langa in Cape Town. Reports of the protest in Sharpeville described it as "more festive than belligerent," as an unarmed crowd of about 5,000 neared a group of 300 policemen. Then a small scuffle broke out and a policeman was accidentally pushed. He opened fire, and his colleagues followed suit, killing 69 people, wounding 180. When news of the deaths reached Langa, hundreds gathered in defiance of the apartheid governments ban on public meetings. Police killed three people and wounded 26 others.

The killings were beamed around the world and marked a shift in South Africa's liberation movement and led to the United Nations recognizing apartheid as a human rights violation. Sobukwe was banished to a farm, then sentenced to jail for three years. Deemed a major threat, the apartheid government created the 'Sobukwe Clause,' which allowed for the specific and indefinite detention of Robert Sobukwe without trail. He was kept in isolation on Robben Island in a bid to reduce his influence. When he was released in 1969, he was banished to the Northern Cape and kept under house arrest until his death in 1978. Now, with his former party in power, Sobukwe's role in freeing South Africa has been diminished.

"It's all very much political," said his son Dinilesizwe Sobukwe, speaking from the town of Graaff-Reinet in the Eastern Cape, where his father was born and where a trust in his name has been established. "It has remained a sore spot for many, many years."

The dead and wounded of Sharpeville.

Indifference.

In isolated detention on Robben Island

Sobukwe's son was five years old when the massacre took place. He has watched how many of the ideals that made his father a pariah, especially the right to land, have become part of the public discourse. At the same time, he has witnessed what seems like the systematic erasure of his father's legacy. As recently as last month, deputy secretary secretary-general of the South African Communist Party, Solly Mapaila, tried to diminish Sobukwe's incarceration on Robben Island.

In 2008, the family launched the Robert Manhaliso Sobukwe Trust to ensure to resurrect his legacy. They also established a learning center in the Eastern Cape town, which remains cleaved by segregation, and will open a museum there later this year. In 2017, the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg renamed a building for Sobukwe, who taught African Studies there in the 1950s at the university.

As South Africa's political landscape leans in to the more radical, with the Fees Must Fall movement, the rise of Julius Malema's Economic Freedom Fighters, and the call for the redistribution of land, Sobukwe's profile is once again beginning to rise. Yet, one of his most important achievements on Mar. 21, 1960, continues to be downplayed. It doesn't help that his former party has never quite recovered from its ban under apartheid, and is torn apart by infighting.

"That it has been changed to Human Rights Day, I don't know why," said the younger Sobukwe. The victims and families of the shootings in Sharpeville, and Langa, and the arrests in Orlando, feel marginalized by the generalization of this day, he adds.
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"Even the people who lost their lives would want all to know that it happened."

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South Africa's Human Rights celebrations ignore the man who fought for it

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South Africa has learned to turn the most painful moments of its history into lessons for the present, yet the pomp and fanfare that now accompanies these days also threatens to whitewash history. Now a public holiday, March 21 marks Human Rights Day in South Africa, commemorating the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, which became a catalyst in the fight against apartheid.

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Quelques éléments pour commencer à s'organiser

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Enseignement à distance – Lycée Français de Tananarive

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All you need to know for a good start

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LESSON 01 - A very short summary of the Vietnam War

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A living memory and its history

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LESSON 02 - The Vietnam War seen by historians in the United States

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Second video on the history since the 15th century

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Second video on the history since the 15th century

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History of South Africa - Episode I: The Beginning!

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Nouvelle version avec un code renouvelé pour le 1er quiz (les deux quiz sont finalement accessibles jusqu'à mercredi 1er avril 18h)

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COURS DNL HG EN ANGLAIS DU JEUDI 26 MARS 2020

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How the media shapes public opinion of war

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We take political news coverage for granted today-even though most people don't understand the assumptions reporters make when writing stories or why certain stories appear in their Facebook news feed. The fact is that the news media shapes public opinion about current events in profound and unexpected ways.

Take the Vietnam War, the country's first "television war." By 1965, more than 90 percent of U.S. households had a television and almost 60 percent of them used it to get most of their news.

The new medium and the lack of government censorship granted the average person living in the U.S. unprecedented access to the Vietnam War.

But how did this really impact what people thought about our involvement in Vietnam?

A shift in public opinion

Public opinion polls are never perfect, but they provide a useful tool for measuring the public's view of the Vietnam War. In 1965, Americans were largely supportive. Fully 64 percent believed that America was right to send troops to Vietnam and only 21 percent disagreed.

These numbers did not change dramatically until May 1966, when the percentage of Americans who saw the Vietnam War as "a mistake" jumped ten points, likely due to increasing casualties. The polls fluctuated over the next year but showed increasing disenchantment with the war.
[ICYMI: Should 12-Year-Olds be Allowed to Vote?]
The power of photographs

The Tet Offensive was a turning point for public opinion. On Jan. 30, 1968, the Vietcong attacked 120 American and South Vietnamese locations. The U.S. regained all its lost ground, but the Tet Offensive was political defeat for the U.S., partly due to media coverage.

Young North Vietnamese join the Youth Shock Brigades Against the Americans for National Salvation. Courtesy of Vietnam News Agency.

Americans were shocked to see Marines battling Vietcong commandos for the U.S. embassy in Saigon, the center of the American presence in Vietnam. A now-famous photo of a South Vietnamese general executing a Vietcong prisoner forced Americans to question their allies. CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite reported that the U.S. was "mired in stalemate." This may not seem devastating today, but there is simply no one Americans trust today like they trusted Walter Cronkite in 1968.

Worst of all, the scale and scope of the offensive led many Americans to believe that their leaders were lying to them about American progress in Vietnam. As a result, the polls shifted. Those who viewed Vietnam as "not a mistake" would never again be in the majority.

The polls continued trending against the war until U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1973. Only two polls showed a significant change. A September 1969 poll showed a seven point uptick in opposition to the war from January. That June, Life magazine published the names and photographs of all 242 Americans killed over a one-week period. Given the nine months between the polls, however, that increase in dissent could also be explained by continuing casualties.

The other large jump was in May 1970. President Richard Nixon's Cambodian Incursion and the ensuing protests, including the Kent State shootings when the Ohio National Guard fired live rounds into a crowd of unruly protesters, increased opposition to the war by five points. Curiously, the percentage of Americans who viewed Vietnam as "not a mistake" increased too.
[Watch: The America From Scratch collection]
Uncensored images had mixed affects

The impact of television coverage of the Vietnam War was meaningful, but probably in a different way than is usually explained. The traditional view holds that Americans watched the news in horror and were pushed against the war by graphic and misleading portrayals of the war.

That interpretation is simply not supported by the Gallup polls conducted throughout the war. Many of the examples used to support the traditional view, including the exposure of the My Lai Massacre and a broadly published photograph of several Vietnamese children, one naked, fleeing a village mistakenly napalmed by the South Vietnamese, did not impact the next poll at all.

New Yorkers demonstrate in support of the Vietnam War, 1970. Courtesy of Burt Glinn/Magnum Photos.

This is not to say, however, that the traditional view of the media's impact during the war is useless. Television coverage, graphic and uncensored for the first time, probably did decrease support for the war over the long-term. It showed the true costs of the war to people in the U.S., who increasingly concluded that Vietnam was not worth the price they were paying.

The traditional narrative also holds true for the Tet Offensive. The shock of media coverage forced Americans to view the war in a new way, and they did not like what they saw. Approval ratings for President Lyndon Johnson and his handling of the war dropped more than 10 percent. The number of people in the U.S. who self-identified as a "hawk," or supportive of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War ("doves" opposed it), dropped almost 20 percent. By June 1968, 72 percent of the country believed the United States was either "losing" or "standing still" in Vietnam.

The intensity of the traditional narrative's anecdotal evidence, however, suggests another impact of the "television war," one that continues today. Perhaps media coverage of Vietnam did not win over "no opinions," turn hawks into doves or vice versa. Instead, it made both sides louder and more entrenched in their opinions.
"The Vietnam War" premiered on PBS in September 2017. Check your local station's schedule for broadcast dates and times. Or watch online at PBS.org. Correction: An earlier version of this article incorrectly identified Time magazine as the publication that published the names and photographs of all 242 Americans killed over a one-week period. This version has been updated to correctly identify the publication as Life magazine.

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How the Media Shapes Public Opinion of War

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We take political news coverage for granted today-even though most people don't understand the assumptions reporters make when writing stories or why certain stories appear in their Facebook news feed. The fact is that the news media shapes public opinion about current events in profound and unexpected ways.

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Vietnam: the first television war

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Today’s post comes from Madie Ward in the National Archives History Office. The Vietnam War (1955–75) was a time of great controversy in the United States. Cold War tensions ran high as the country…

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2 aujourd'hui

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Quizinière : création et partage d'exercices pédagogiques en ligne

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Pour vos évaluations, créez des exercices en ligne simplement et gratuitement à l'aide de textes à trous, QCM, dessins, vidéos, sons, etc.

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Stand up: George Carlin on US involvement and withdrawal in Vietnam

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Stand up: George Carlin on US involvement and withdrawal in Vietnam

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George Carlin on Muhammed Ali and the Vietnam War

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Le cours d'aujourd'hui

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March 2020 - LESSON - Vietnam War through music

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It's For God, and Country, and You Mom (That's Why I'm Fighting in Vietnam)

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It's For God, and Country, and You Mom (That's Why I'm Fighting in Vietnam)

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Ernest Tubb - It's For God, and Country, and You Mom (That's Why I'm Fighting in Vietnam)

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Creedence Clearwater Revival: Fortunate Son

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US escalation and the Vietnam War, 1964 to 1968

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US escalation and the Vietnam War, 1964 to 1968

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Un quizz un peu compliqué qui va vous faire du bien !

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This Vietnam War quiz contains 20 multiple choice questions about American troops in the Vietnam War, 1964 to 1968. To complete the crossword, click on a square and type your answer into the box. A Javascript-enabled browser is required to complete these crosswords.

Content on this page is © Alpha History 2018. Content created by Alpha History may not be copied, republished or redistributed without our express permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use.

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This Vietnam War quiz contains 20 multiple choice questions about American troops in the Vietnam War, 1964 to 1968. To complete the crossword, click on a square and type your answer into the box. A Javascript-enabled browser is required to complete these crosswords. Content on this page is © Alpha History 2018.

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From the Têt Offensive to the fall of Saigon

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From the Têt Offensive to the fall of Saigon

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Vous avez aimé ? Voici la suite : un autre du même genre

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This Vietnam War quiz contains 20 multiple choice questions on the Vietnam War, from the Tet Offensive to the fall of Saigon. To complete the crossword, click on a square and type your answer into the box. A Javascript-enabled browser is required to complete these crosswords.

Content on this page is © Alpha History 2018. Content created by Alpha History may not be copied, republished or redistributed without our express permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use.

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This Vietnam War quiz contains 20 multiple choice questions on the Vietnam War, from the Tet Offensive to the fall of Saigon. To complete the crossword, click on a square and type your answer into the box. A Javascript-enabled browser is required to complete these crosswords.

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Donovan (Scottish singer)

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Simon and Garfunkel

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Simon & Garfunkel - Silent Night/7 O' Clock News

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Bill Anderson

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Bill Anderson - Where Have All Our Heroes Gone

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The Doors

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Edwin Starr

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Eric Burdon and the Animals

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John Lennon

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IMAGINE. (Ultimate Mix, 2020) - John Lennon & The Plastic Ono Band (with the Flux Fiddlers) HD

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Jimi Hendrix

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Jimi Hendrix - Machine Gun (Live Copenhagen 1970)

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Jimi Hendrix

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Jimi Hendrix - Izabella (Jimi Hendrix: Machine Gun: Fillmore East 12/31/1969) (Audio)

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Bruce Springsteen

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Bruce Springsteen - Lost in the flood (lyrics in description)

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Barry McGuire

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Beaucoup d'autres chansons sur la guerre du Vietnam

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Beaucoup d'autres chansons sur la guerre du Vietnam

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The "Fish" Cheer / I-Feel-Like-I'm-Fixin'-to-Die Rag

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Watch the trailers and extracts below. Have fun and try to understand the evolution of the vision of the war seen from Holywood.

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A first trailer to discover : The Green Berets, John Wayne, 1968

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A first trailer to discover : The Green Berets, John Wayne, 1968

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The Green Berets (1968) Official Trailer # 1 - John Wayne HD

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A second extract : The Visitors, Elia Kazan, 1972. 

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A second extract : The Visitors, Elia Kazan, 1972. 

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A third one : M*A*S*H, Robert Altman, 1970

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A third one : M*A*S*H, Robert Altman, 1970

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M*A*S*H (1970) Trailer #1 | Movieclips Classic Trailers

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Apocalypse Now, Francis Ford Coppola, 1979

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Apocalypse Now, Francis Ford Coppola, 1979

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Apocalypse Now (1979) Official Trailer - Martin Sheen, Robert Duvall Drama Movie HD

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Uncommon Valor (1983) Official Trailer # 1 - Gene Hackman HD

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Missing in Action Official Trailer #1 - M. Emmet Walsh Movie (1984) HD

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Rambo: First Blood Part 2 (1985) - Trailer (HD)

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Good Morning Vietnam, Barry Levinson, 1987

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Good Morning Vietnam, Barry Levinson, 1987

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Full Metal Jacket, Stanley Kubrick, 1987

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Full Metal Jacket, Stanley Kubrick, 1987

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Born on the Fourth of July, Oliver Stone, 1989

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Born on the Fourth of July, Oliver Stone, 1989

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Born on the Fourth of July Official Trailer #1 - Tom Cruise Movie (1989) HD

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The Post Official Film Trailer - Streep, Hanks, Spielberg

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Tigerland 2000 Trailer | Colin Farrell | Matthew Davis

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We Were Soldiers (2002) - HD Trailer [1080p]

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Rescue Dawn Official Trailer #1 - Christian Bale, Steve Zahn Movie (2006) HD

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In the Valley of Elah, Paul Haggis, 2007

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In the Valley of Elah, Paul Haggis, 2007

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In the Valley of Elah - Original Theatrical Trailer

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The Post Official Film Trailer - Streep, Hanks, Spielberg

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Lesson to complete and print using the trailers watched on thursday

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Lesson to complete and print using the trailers watched on thursday

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A faire pour le jeudi 09/04

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HOLES - THE VIETNAM WAR SEEN FROM HOLLYWOOD

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https://meet.google.com/koj-epao-whe

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Meet doesn't work on your browser

To join the video meeting

Visit meet.google.com in Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Microsoft Edge

To install and use Meet on a mobile device, go to

or the

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Meet doesn't work on your browser To join the video meeting Visit meet.google.com in Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, or Microsoft Edge To install and use Meet on a mobile device, go to or the

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Read this official presentation on the history of SA

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Read this official presentation on the history of SA

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Modern humans have lived at the southern tip of Africa for more than 100 000 years and their ancestors for some 3,3 million years.

Some 2 000 years ago, the Khoekhoen (the Hottentots of early European terminology) were pastoralists who had settled mostly along the coast, while the San (the Bushmen) were huntergatherers spread across the region. At this time, Bantu-speaking agropastoralists began arriving in southern Africa,
spreading from the eastern lowlands to the Highveld. At several archaeological sites there is evidence of sophisticated political and material cultures.

European contact

The first European settlement in southern Africa was established by the Dutch East India Company in Table Bay (Cape Town) in 1652. Created to supply passing ships with fresh produce, the colony grew rapidly as Dutch farmers settled to grow crops. Shortly after the establishment of the colony, slaves were imported from East Africa, Madagascar and the East Indies.

The first British Settlers, known as the 1820 Settlers, arrived in Algoa Bay (now Nelson Mandela Bay) on board 21 ships, the first being the Chapman. They numbered about 4 500 and included artisans, tradesmen, religious leaders, merchants, teachers, bookbinders, blacksmiths, discharged sailors and soldiers, professional men and farmers.

Conflict

From the 1770s, colonists came into contact and inevitable conflict with Bantu-speaking chiefdoms some 800 km east of Cape Town. A century of intermittent warfare ensued during which the colonists gained ascendancy over the isiXhosa-speaking chiefdoms.

In 1795, the British occupied the Cape as a strategic base against the French, controlling the sea route to the East.

In the 1820s, the celebrated Zulu leader, Shaka, established sway over a vast area of south-east Africa. As splinter Zulu groups conquered and absorbed communities in their path, the region experienced a fundamental disruption. Substantial states, such as Moshoeshoe's Lesotho and other Sotho-Tswana chiefdoms were established.

This temporary disruption of life on the Highveld served to facilitate the expansion northwards of the original Dutch settlers' descendants, the Boer Voortrekkers, from the 1830s.

Occupation

In 1806, Britain reoccupied the Cape. As the colony prospered, the political rights of the various races were guaranteed, with slavery being abolished in 1838.

Throughout the 1800s, the boundaries of European influence spread eastwards. From the port of Durban, Natal settlers pushed northwards, further and further into the land of the Zulu. From the mid-1800s, the Voortrekkers coalesced in two land-locked white-ruled republics, the South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State.

The mineral revolution

South Africa's diamond mining industry dates back to 1867, when diamonds were discovered near Kimberley in what is today known as the Northern Cape. The Kimberley diamond fields, and later discoveries in Gauteng, the Free State, and along the Atlantic coast, emerged as major sources of gem-quality diamonds, securing South Africa's position as the world's leading producer in the mid-twentieth century.

Gold

The discovery of the Witwatersrand goldfields in 1886 was a turning point in South Africa's history. The demand for franchise rights for English-speaking immigrants working on the new goldfields was the pretext Britain used to go to war with the Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1899.

The Anglo-Boer/South African War was the bloodiest, longest and most expensive war Britain engaged in between 1815 and 1915. It cost more than 200 million pounds and Britain lost more than 22 000 men. The Boers lost over 34 000 people and more than 15 000 black South Africans were killed.

Union and opposition

In 1910, the Union of South Africa was created out of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Free State. It was to be essentially a white union. Black opposition was inevitable, and the African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 to protest the exclusion of black people from power. In 1921, the South African Communist Party was established at a time of heightened militancy. More discriminatory legislation was enacted. Meanwhile, Afrikaner nationalism, fuelled by job losses arising from a worldwide recession, was on the march.

Reform

Shaken by the scale of protest and opposition, the government embarked on a series of limited reforms in the early 1980s.

In 1983, the Constitution was reformed to allow the coloured and Indian minorities limited participation in separate and subordinate houses of parliament.

In 1986, the pass laws were scrapped. The international community strengthened its support for the anti-apartheid cause.

Mass resistance increasingly challenged the apartheid State, which resorted to intensified repression accompanied by eventual recognition that apartheid could not be sustained.

Apartheid's last days

Afrikaner élite openly started to pronounce in favour of a more inclusive society, with a number of businesspeople, students and academic leaders meeting publicly and privately with the ANC in exile.

Petty apartheid laws and symbols were openly challenged and eventually removed.

Together with a sliding economy, increasing internal dissent and international pressure, these developments inevitably led to historic changes and the fall of apartheid.

Democratic government

South Africa held its first democratic election in April 1994 under an interim Constitution. The ANC emerged with a 62% majority. South Africa was divided into nine new provinces to replace the four existing provinces and 10 black homelands. In terms of the interim Constitution, the NP and Inkatha Freedom Party participated in a government of national unity under President Mandela, South Africa's first democratically elected president.

The second democratic election, in 1999, saw the ANC increasing its majority to a point just short of two-thirds of the total vote.

In the April 2004 election, the ANC won the national vote with 69,68% and the celebration of 10 Years of Freedom attended by heads of state and government delegations from across the world.

In 2008, Mr Kgalema Motlanthe became President following the recalling of President Thabo Mbeki. On 22 April 2009, South Africa held national and provincial elections with about 76% of registered voters casting their votes. Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as President of South Africa on 9 May 2009.

The following year, a significant milestone for South Africa was the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup TM.

Municipal elections were held on 18 May 2011, electing new councils for all municipalities in the country.

October 2011 saw Statistics South Africa conducting a comprehensive national census. The census, which analysed the country's demographics, population distribution and access to services, average household size, income, migration, and mortality, was the third national population and housing count in post-apartheid South Africa. The exercise saw 156 000 field staff employed to count more than 14,6 million households.

South Africa has continued to build on its international profile. On 1 January 2011, the country started its second term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council between 2011 and 2012, serving alongside the five permanent members, China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as elected members Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria and Portugal.

In 2011, as part of government's commitment to secure a better quality of life for all, the National Planning Commission in The Presidency finalised the draft National Development Plan: Vision for 2030. The plan is a step towards charting a new path for South Africa in dealing with the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

On 8 January 2012, Africa's oldest liberation movement, the ANC, celebrated 100 years of existence. This was a historic achievement, not only for the movement, but also for South Africa and the continent.

In May 2012, the Square Array Kilometre (SKA) Organisation announced that the SKA Project would be shared between South Africa and Australia, with a majority share coming to South Africa. The full dish array and the dense aperture array will be built in Africa.

In November 2012, South Africa was elected by the members of the UN General Assembly to the UN's 47-member Economic and Social Council..

In December 2012, President Zuma was re-elected as the president of the ANC during the ruling party's congress in Mangaung, Free State with Cyril Ramaphosa elected as the party's deputy president.

In July 2013, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, was appointed executive director of the UN Women Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, and Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, was appointed director in the UN Development Programme's Bureau for Development Policy..

On 5 December 2013, South Africa's first democratically elected President and anti-apartheid icon Mandela died at the age of 95. Mr Mandela led South Africa's transition from white-minority rule in the 1990s, after 27 years in prison for his political activities..

He had been receiving intensive medical care at home for a lung infection after spending three months in hospital. His body lay in state at the Union Buildings from 11 to 13 December. He was buried in his home town of Qunu in the Eastern Cape on 15 December 2013..

South Africa celebrated 20 Years of Freedom in 2014, which was a historic milestone for the country. The Twenty Year Review, which was released in 2013, and the National Planning Commission's 2011 Diagnostic Report, highlight that poverty, inequality and unemployment continue to negatively affect the lives of many people.

Despite progress in reducing rural poverty and increasing access to basic services in rural areas over the past 20 years, rural areas are still characterised by great poverty and inequality. As stated in the NDP, by 2030, South Africa's rural communities must have better opportunities to participate fully in the economic, social and political life of the country.

Government's programme of radical economic transformation is about placing the economy on a qualitatively different path that ensures more rapid, sustainable growth, higher investment, increased employment, reduced inequality and deracialisation of the economy. The NDP sets a growth target of at least 5% a year, and emphasises measures to ensure that the benefits of growth are equitably shared..

South Africa's fifth general elections were held on 7 May 2014. It was also the first time that South African expatriates were allowed to vote in a South African national election.

The ANC won the National Assembly election (62,1%) and the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) won 22,2% of the votes, while the newly formed Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) obtained 6,4% of the vote.

The ANC also won eight of the nine provincial legislatures. The EFF obtained over 10% of the votes in Gauteng, Limpopo and North West, and beat the DA to second place in Limpopo and North West. In the other six provinces won by the ANC, the DA obtained second place. In the Western Cape, the only province not won by the ANC, the DA increased its majority from 51,5% to 59,4%..

In 2015, South Africa celebrated the 60th Anniversary of the Freedom Charter, which called for peace and friendship among nations. The 40th Anniversary of the 16 June 1976 Soweto Student Uprising was celebrated in 2016, along with the 20th Anniversary of the signing of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.

The 2016 municipal elections were held on 3 August 2016. The ANC won 53,9% of the total vote, followed by the official opposition DA with 26,9% and the EFF with 8,2%.

In 2017, South Africa celebrated five years since the launch of the National Development Plan, which outlines the goals to achieve the vision of a prosperous South Africa by tackling the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality by 2030..

South Africa celebrated the Centenary of the late Oliver Reginald Tambo in 2017, under the theme: "Life and Legacy of OR Tambo". He was one of the key drivers of South Africa's liberation and one of the founding fathers of the country's constitutional democracy.

At its 54th National Conference held at Nasrec in Soweto on 18 December 2017, the ANC elected Mr Ramaphosa as its president. Following the resignation of President Zuma in February 2018, Mr Ramaphosa was elected unopposed as the fifth President of democratic South Africa by the National Assembly on 15 February 2018.

In 2018, South Africa celebrated the centenary of two Struggle stalwarts, Tata Mandela and Mama Albertina Nontsikelelo Sisulu.

In 2019, South Africa celebrated 25 Years of Freedom. In May 2019, the country also held its sixth national and provincial elections. The ANC won 57,50% of the total vote, followed by the official opposition DA with 20,77% and the EFF with 10.79%.

On 25 May 2019, Mr Ramaphosa was inaugurated as the sixth democratically elected President of South Africa. In a departure from the tradition of holding the inauguration at the Union Buildings, the event took place at Loftus Versfeld Stadium in Pretoria.

On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization reported a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan City, China. 'Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2' (SARSCoV-2) was confirmed as the causative agent of what we now know as 'Coronavirus Disease 2019' (COVID-19). Since then, the virus has spread to more than 100 countries, including South Africa.

On 15 March 2020, President Ramaphosa declared a national state of disaster, and announced measures such as immediate travel restrictions and the closure of schools from 18 March. The declaration of the National State of Disaster
empowered government to take the measures that prevented many more people from becoming severely ill and saved countless lives.

It also provided the legal basis for the introduction of the special R350 Social Relief of Distress Grant and the establishment of the COVID Temporary Employee/ Employer Relief Scheme, which provided wage support to millions of workers.

On 17 March, the National Coronavirus Command Council was established to lead the nation's plan to contain the spread and mitigate the negative impact of COVID-19. On 23 March, a 21-day national lockdown was announced, starting
on 27 March 2020.

President Ramaphosa announced that from 1 May 2020, a gradual and phased easing of the lockdown restrictions would begin. From 1 June, the national restrictions were lowered to Alert Level 3. The restrictions were lowered to
alert Level 2 on 17 August 2020 and from 21 September 2020 restrictions were lowered to Alert Level 1.

Government declared 2021 The Year of Charlotte Mannya-Maxeke under the theme: "The Year of Charlotte Mannya-Maxeke: Realising Women's Equality". She was a pioneer, activist, artist, intellectual, internationalist and visionary. On
1 November 2021, the country held its sixth Local Government Elections. The ANC won the majority seats in 161 municipal councils, followed by the DA in 13 municipalities and the IFP in 10 municipalities. A total of 66 municipal councils
were hung - meaning that no party gained an outright majority in those councils. From the 9th to the 18th of July 2021, South Africa experienced civil unrest mainly in some parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, which left in its wake over
354 people dead.

The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector, led by then Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo (now Chief Justice), handed all its report to The Presidency in 2022.

Source: Official Guide to South Africa
Related links: South African Yearbook

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Modern humans have lived at the southern tip of Africa for more than 100 000 years and their ancestors for some 3,3 million years. Some 2 000 years ago, the Khoekhoen (the Hottentots of early European terminology) were pastoralists who had settled mostly along the coast, while the San (the Bushmen) were huntergatherers spread across the region.

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Watch this short video on the SA history 

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Watch this short video on the SA history 

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NARRATOR: South Africa occupies the southern tip of the African continent and faces both the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The Cape of Good Hope was identified in 1488 by Bartolomeu Dias, a Portuguese navigator on a mission seeking the southern limit of the African continent. Beginning in the 17th century, the Dutch and English followed in the wake of the Portuguese and established settlements.

The land is rugged and varied. The Drakensberg mountain range, which takes its name from the Afrikaans word for "Dragon Mountains," marks the edge of the high central plateau. Table Mountain overlooks Cape Town and lends a background to the city skyline. The Orange River flows west from Lesotho, crossing South Africa and eventually forming the border between South Africa and Namibia.

There are several indigenous ethnic groups in South Africa, including the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, and Tswana. Their languages, along with those of several other ethnic groups, are recognized with English and Afrikaans as official languages of the country. Afrikaans developed from a mix of Dutch, indigenous African, and other languages.

Robben Island lies offshore from the bustling city of Cape Town. The island and the mainland settlement that would become Cape Town originally served as a waypoint for ships between Europe and the East. Colonial pastoralists were drawn to the settlement from Holland, Germany, and France. They and their descendants came to be known as Boers and eventually inhabited much of the area around Cape Town. In the 18th and 19th centuries many Boers moved further inland, initially because they sought more land and later to avoid the British rule that had been established. They often came into conflict with the indigenous Africans they encountered.

The South African War came at the end of the 19th century and pitted Great Britain against the Boers. Great Britain won the war and full control of South Africa. But the Boers negotiated a peace that allied themselves with the British and against the indigenous Africans. When the Union of South Africa was born on May 31, 1910, the nonwhite population was effectively marginalized.

In 1948 the South African government expanded its long-standing practice of racial discrimination with the policy of apartheid. Apartheid enforced racial segregation and the rule of the white minority over all nonwhites. Many South Africans opposed apartheid, including Nelson Mandela. He was jailed at Robben Island with many others, primarily black South Africans, for resisting apartheid.

Over the years, South Africa faced increasing worldwide condemnation for maintaining apartheid. In the early 1990s, laws supporting apartheid were repealed and a new constitution granted rights to all South Africans. Nelson Mandela became the country's first black president, in 1994. The Robben Island prison was closed and became a national monument. It was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1999.

The major branches of government are divided among South Africa's cities: Pretoria is where the executive branch of the national government resides; Cape Town is home to the legislature; Bloemfontein is home to the judicial branch. Johannesburg has no national role in this arrangement but is a provincial capital and among the largest cities in the country. It is a significant business and industrial center, as is Durban, another large city that is also a popular tourist destination.

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History of South Africa and its European influence

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An introduction to South Africa, with a focus on its geography and history.

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Using this site and your knowledge, choose your milestones and create your own basic timeline on SA history

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frisechronos.fr : frise chronologique historique : creer, imprimer, modifier et generer pdf, excel, openoffice

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frise chronologique historique : creer, editer, modifier, imprimer et generer en pdf, image, Excel, OpenOffice et 3D, bibliotheque, version eleve

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Wikipedia article you partly need to read (2 sections)

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Wikipedia article you partly need to read (2 sections)

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Apartheid ( South African English: ; Afrikaans: [aˈpartɦɛit], segregation; lit. "aparthood") was a system of institutionalised racial segregation that existed in South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia) from 1948 until the early 1990s. Apartheid was characterised by an authoritarian political culture based on (or white supremacy), which ensured that South Africa was dominated politically, socially, and economically by the nation's minority white population. According to this system of social stratification, white citizens had the highest status, followed in descending order by Asians, Coloureds, and black Africans. The economic legacy and social effects of apartheid continue to the present day.

Broadly speaking, apartheid was delineated into petty apartheid, which entailed the segregation of public facilities and social events, and grand apartheid, which dictated housing and employment opportunities by race. Prior to the 1940s, some aspects of apartheid had already emerged in the form of minority rule by white South Africans and the socially enforced separation of black Africans from other races, which later extended to pass laws and land apportionment. Apartheid was adopted as a formal policy by the South African government after the ascension of the National Party (NP) during the 1948 general elections.

A codified system of racial stratification began to take form in South Africa under the Dutch Empire in the eighteenth century, although informal segregation was present much earlier due to social cleavages between Dutch colonists and a creolised, ethnically diverse slave population. With the rapid growth and industrialisation of the British Cape Colony in the nineteenth century, racial policies and laws became increasingly rigid. Cape legislation that discriminated specifically against black Africans began appearing shortly before 1900. The policies of the Boer republics were also racially exclusive; for instance, the Transvaal's constitution barred black African and Coloured participation in church and state.

The first apartheid law was the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 1949, followed closely by the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, which made it illegal for most South African citizens to marry or pursue sexual relationships across racial lines. The Population Registration Act, 1950 classified all South Africans into one of four racial groups based on appearance, known ancestry, socioeconomic status, and cultural lifestyle: "Black", "White", " Coloured", and "Indian", the last two of which included several sub-classifications. Places of residence were determined by racial classification. Between 1960 and 1983, 3.5 million black Africans were removed from their homes and forced into segregated neighbourhoods as a result of apartheid legislation, in some of the largest mass evictions in modern history. Most of these targeted removals were intended to restrict the black population to ten designated "tribal homelands", also known as bantustans, four of which became nominally independent states. The government announced that relocated persons would lose their South African citizenship as they were absorbed into the bantustans.

Apartheid sparked significant international and domestic opposition, resulting in some of the most influential global social movements of the twentieth century. It was the target of frequent condemnation in the United Nations and brought about an extensive arms and trade embargo on South Africa. During the 1970s and 1980s, internal resistance to apartheid became increasingly militant, prompting brutal crackdowns by the National Party government and protracted sectarian violence that left thousands dead or in detention. Some reforms of the apartheid system were undertaken, including allowing for Indian and Coloured political representation in parliament, but these measures failed to appease most activist groups.

Between 1987 and 1993, the National Party entered into bilateral negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC), the leading anti-apartheid political movement, for ending segregation and introducing majority rule. In 1990, prominent ANC figures such as Nelson Mandela were released from prison. Apartheid legislation was repealed on 17 June 1991, pending multiracial elections held under a universal suffrage set for April 1994.

Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning "separateness", or "the state of being apart", literally " apart-hood" (from Afrikaans "-heid"). Its first recorded use was in 1929.

Under the 1806 Cape Articles of Capitulation the new British colonial rulers were required to respect previous legislation enacted under Roman Dutch law and this led to a separation of the law in South Africa from English Common Law and a high degree of legislative autonomy. The governors and assemblies that governed the legal process in the various colonies of South Africa were launched on a different and independent legislative path from the rest of the British Empire.

In the days of slavery, slaves required passes to travel away from their masters. In 1797 the Landdrost and Heemraden of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet extended pass laws beyond slaves and ordained that all Khoikhoi (designated as Hottentots) moving about the country for any purpose should carry passes. This was confirmed by the British Colonial government in 1809 by the Hottentot Proclamation, which decreed that if a Khoikhoi were to move they would need a pass from their master or a local official. Ordinance No. 49 of 1828 decreed that prospective black immigrants were to be granted passes for the sole purpose of seeking work. These passes were to be issued for Coloureds and Khoikhoi, but not for other Africans, who were still forced to carry passes.

The United Kingdom's Slavery Abolition Act 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV c. 73) abolished slavery throughout the British Empire and overrode the Cape Articles of Capitulation. To comply with the act the South African legislation was expanded to include Ordinance 1 in 1835, which effectively changed the status of slaves to indentured labourers. This was followed by Ordinance 3 in 1848, which introduced an indenture system for Xhosa that was little different from slavery. The various South African colonies passed legislation throughout the rest of the nineteenth century to limit the freedom of unskilled workers, to increase the restrictions on indentured workers and to regulate the relations between the races.

The Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 instituted limits based on financial means and education to the black franchise, and the Natal Legislative Assembly Bill of 1894 deprived Indians of the right to vote. The Glen Grey Act of 1894, instigated by the government of Prime Minister Cecil John Rhodes limited the amount of land Africans could hold. In 1905 the General Pass Regulations Act denied blacks the vote, limited them to fixed areas and inaugurated the infamous Pass System. The Asiatic Registration Act (1906) required all Indians to register and carry passes. In 1910, the Union of South Africa was created as a self-governing dominion, which continued the legislative programme: the South Africa Act (1910) enfranchised whites, giving them complete political control over all other racial groups while removing the right of blacks to sit in parliament, the Native Land Act (1913) prevented blacks, except those in the Cape, from buying land outside "reserves", the Natives in Urban Areas Bill (1918) was designed to force blacks into "locations", the Urban Areas Act (1923) introduced residential segregation and provided cheap labour for industry led by white people, the Colour Bar Act (1926) prevented black mine workers from practising skilled trades, the Native Administration Act (1927) made the British Crown, rather than paramount chiefs, the supreme head over all African affairs, the Native Land and Trust Act (1936) complemented the 1913 Native Land Act and, in the same year, the Representation of Natives Act removed previous black voters from the Cape voters' roll and allowed them to elect three whites to Parliament. One of the first pieces of segregating legislation enacted by Jan Smuts' United Party government was the Asiatic Land Tenure Bill (1946), which banned land sales to Indians.

The United Party government began to move away from the rigid enforcement of segregationist laws during World War II. Amid fears integration would eventually lead to racial assimilation, the National Party established the Sauer Commission to investigate the effects of the United Party's policies. The commission concluded that integration would bring about a "loss of personality" for all racial groups.

South Africa had allowed social custom and law to govern the consideration of multiracial affairs and of the allocation, in racial terms, of access to economic, social, and political status. Most white South Africans, regardless of their own differences, accepted the prevailing pattern. Nevertheless, by 1948 it remained apparent that there were gaps in the social structure, whether legislated or otherwise, concerning the rights and opportunities of nonwhites. The rapid economic development of World War II attracted black migrant workers in large numbers to chief industrial centres, where they compensated for the wartime shortage of white labour. However, this escalated rate of black urbanisation went unrecognised by the South African government, which failed to accommodate the influx with parallel expansion in housing or social services. Overcrowding, spiking crime rates, and disillusionment resulted; urban blacks came to support a new generation of leaders influenced by the principles of self-determination and popular freedoms enshrined in such statements as the Atlantic Charter. Whites reacted negatively to the changes, allowing the Herenigde Nasionale Party (or simply the National Party) to convince a large segment of the voting bloc that the impotence of the United Party in curtailing the evolving position of nonwhites indicated that the organisation had fallen under the influence of Western liberals. Many Afrikaners, white South Africans chiefly of Dutch descent but with early infusions of Germans and French Huguenots who were soon assimilated, also resented what they perceived as disempowerment by an underpaid black workforce and the superior economic power and prosperity of white English speakers. In addition, Jan Smuts, as a strong advocate of the United Nations, lost domestic support when South Africa was criticised for its colour bar and the continued mandate of South West Africa by other UN member states.

Afrikaner nationalists proclaimed that they offered the voters a new policy to ensure continued white domination. This policy was initially expounded from a theory drafted by Hendrik Verwoerd and was presented to the National Party by the Sauer Commission. It called for a systematic effort to organise the relations, rights, and privileges of the races as officially defined through a series of parliamentary acts and administrative decrees. Segregation had thus been pursued only in major matters, such as separate schools, and local society rather than law had been depended upon to enforce most separation; it should now be extended to everything. The party gave this policy a name - apartheid (apartness). Apartheid was to be the basic ideological and practical foundation of Afrikaner politics for the next quarter of a century.

The National Party's election platform stressed that apartheid would preserve a market for white employment in which nonwhites could not compete. On the issues of black urbanisation, the regulation of nonwhite labour, influx control, social security, farm tariffs, and nonwhite taxation the United Party's policy remained contradictory and confused. Its traditional bases of support not only took mutually exclusive positions, but found themselves increasingly at odds with each other. Smuts' reluctance to consider South African foreign policy against the mounting tensions of the Cold War also stirred up discontent, while the nationalists promised to purge the state and public service of communist sympathisers.

First to desert the United Party were Afrikaner farmers, who wished to see a change in influx control due to problems with squatters, as well as higher prices for their maize and other produce in the face of the mineowners' demand for cheap food policies. Always identified with the affluent and capitalist, the party also failed to appeal to its working class constituents. Populist rhetoric allowed the National Party to sweep eight constituencies in the mining and industrial centres of the Witwatersrand and five more in Pretoria. Barring the predominantly English-speaking landowner electorate of the Natal, the United Party was defeated in almost every rural district. Its urban losses in the nation's most populous province, the Transvaal, proved equally devastating. As the voting system was disproportionately weighted in favour of rural constituencies and the Transvaal in particular, the 1948 election catapulted the Herenigde Nasionale Party from a small minority party to a commanding position with an eight-vote parliamentary lead. Daniel François Malan became the first nationalist prime minister, with the aim of implementing the apartheid philosophy and silencing liberal opposition.

When the National Party came to power in 1948, there were factional differences in the party about the implementation of systemic racial segregation. The " baasskap" (white domination or supremacist) faction, which was the dominant faction in the NP, and state institutions, favoured systematic segregation, but also favoured the participation of black Africans in the economy with black labour controlled to advance the economic gains of Afrikaners. A second faction were the "purists", who believed in "vertical segregation", in which blacks and whites would be entirely separated, with blacks living in native reserves, with separate political and economic structures, which, they believed, would entail severe short-term pain, but would also lead to independence of white South Africa from black labour in the long-term. A third faction, which included Hendrik Verwoerd, sympathised with the purists, but allowed for the use of black labour, while implementing the purist goal of vertical separation.

NP leaders argued that South Africa did not comprise a single nation, but was made up of four distinct racial groups: white, black, Coloured and Indian. Such groups were split into 13 nations or racial federations. White people encompassed the English and Afrikaans language groups; the black populace was divided into ten such groups.

The state passed laws that paved the way for "grand apartheid", which was centred on separating races on a large scale, by compelling people to live in separate places defined by race. This strategy was in part adopted from "left-over" British rule that separated different racial groups after they took control of the Boer republics in the Anglo-Boer war. This created the black-only " townships" or "locations", where blacks were relocated to their own towns. In addition, "petty apartheid" laws were passed. The principal apartheid laws were as follows.

The first grand apartheid law was the Population Registration Act of 1950, which formalised racial classification and introduced an identity card for all persons over the age of 18, specifying their racial group. Official teams or boards were established to come to a conclusion on those people whose race was unclear. This caused difficulty, especially for Coloured people, separating their families when members were allocated different races.

The second pillar of grand apartheid was the Group Areas Act of 1950. Until then, most settlements had people of different races living side by side. This Act put an end to diverse areas and determined where one lived according to race. Each race was allotted its own area, which was used in later years as a basis of forced removal. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 allowed the government to demolish black shanty town slums and forced white employers to pay for the construction of housing for those black workers who were permitted to reside in cities otherwise reserved for whites.

The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 prohibited marriage between persons of different races, and the Immorality Act of 1950 made sexual relations with a person of a different race a criminal offence.

Under the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, municipal grounds could be reserved for a particular race, creating, among other things, separate beaches, buses, hospitals, schools and universities. Signboards such as "whites only" applied to public areas, even including park benches. Black South Africans were provided with services greatly inferior to those of whites, and, to a lesser extent, to those of Indian and Coloured people.

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 created separate government structures for blacks and whites and was the first piece of legislation to support the government's plan of separate development in the bantustans. The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act of 1959 entrenched the NP policy of nominally independent " homelands" for blacks. So-called "self-governing Bantu units" were proposed, which would have devolved administrative powers, with the promise later of autonomy and self-government. It also abolished the seats of white representatives of black South Africans and removed from the rolls the few blacks still qualified to vote. The Bantu Investment Corporation Act of 1959 set up a mechanism to transfer capital to the homelands to create employment there. Legislation of 1967 allowed the government to stop industrial development in "white" cities and redirect such development to the "homelands". The Black Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 marked a new phase in the Bantustan strategy. It changed the status of blacks to citizens of one of the ten autonomous territories. The aim was to ensure a demographic majority of white people within South Africa by having all ten Bantustans achieve full independence.

Interracial contact in sport was frowned upon, but there were no segregatory sports laws.

The government tightened pass laws compelling blacks to carry identity documents, to prevent the immigration of blacks from other countries. To reside in a city, blacks had to be in employment there. Until 1956 women were for the most part excluded from these pass requirements, as attempts to introduce pass laws for women were met with fierce resistance.

In 1950, D. F. Malan announced the NP's intention to create a Coloured Affairs Department. J.G. Strijdom, Malan's successor as Prime Minister, moved to strip voting rights from black and Coloured residents of the Cape Province. The previous government had introduced the Separate Representation of Voters Bill into Parliament in 1951; however, four voters, G Harris, W D Franklin, W D Collins and Edgar Deane, challenged its validity in court with support from the United Party. The Cape Supreme Court upheld the act, but reversed by the Appeal Court, finding the act invalid because a two-thirds majority in a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament was needed to change the entrenched clauses of the Constitution. The government then introduced the High Court of Parliament Bill (1952), which gave Parliament the power to overrule decisions of the court. The Cape Supreme Court and the Appeal Court declared this invalid too.

In 1955 the Strijdom government increased the number of judges in the Appeal Court from five to 11, and appointed pro-Nationalist judges to fill the new places. In the same year they introduced the Senate Act, which increased the Senate from 49 seats to 89. Adjustments were made such that the NP controlled 77 of these seats. The parliament met in a joint sitting and passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act in 1956, which transferred Coloured voters from the common voters' roll in the Cape to a new Coloured voters' roll. Immediately after the vote, the Senate was restored to its original size. The Senate Act was contested in the Supreme Court, but the recently enlarged Appeal Court, packed with government-supporting judges, upheld the act, and also the Act to remove Coloured voters.

The 1956 law allowed Coloureds to elect four people to Parliament, but a 1969 law abolished those seats and stripped Coloureds of their right to vote. Since Asians had never been allowed to vote, this resulted in whites being the sole enfranchised group.

A 2016 study in the Journal of Politics suggests that disenfranchisement in South Africa had a significant negative impact on basic service delivery to the disenfranchised.

Before South Africa became a republic in 1961, politics among white South Africans was typified by the division between the mainly Afrikaner pro-republic conservative and the largely English anti-republican liberal sentiments, with the legacy of the Boer War still a factor for some people. Once South Africa became a republic, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd called for improved relations and greater accord between people of British descent and the Afrikaners. He claimed that the only difference was between those in favour of apartheid and those against it. The ethnic division would no longer be between Afrikaans and English speakers, but between blacks and whites.

Most Afrikaners supported the notion of unanimity of white people to ensure their safety. White voters of British descent were divided. Many had opposed a republic, leading to a majority "no" vote in Natal. Later, some of them recognised the perceived need for white unity, convinced by the growing trend of decolonisation elsewhere in Africa, which concerned them. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's " Wind of Change" speech left the British faction feeling that the United Kingdom had abandoned them. The more conservative English speakers supported Verwoerd; others were troubled by the severing of ties with the UK and remained loyal to the Crown. They were displeased by having to choose between British and South African nationalities. Although Verwoerd tried to bond these different blocs, the subsequent voting illustrated only a minor swell of support, indicating that a great many English speakers remained apathetic and that Verwoerd had not succeeded in uniting the white population.

Under the homeland system, the government attempted to divide South Africa and South West Africa into a number of separate states, each of which was supposed to develop into a separate nation-state for a different ethnic group.

Territorial separation was hardly a new institution. There were, for example, the "reserves" created under the British government in the nineteenth century. Under apartheid, 13 percent of the land was reserved for black homelands, a small amount relative to its total population, and generally in economically unproductive areas of the country. The Tomlinson Commission of 1954 justified apartheid and the homeland system, but stated that additional land ought to be given to the homelands, a recommendation that was not carried out.

When Verwoerd became Prime Minister in 1958, the policy of "separate development" came into being, with the homeland structure as one of its cornerstones. Verwoerd came to believe in the granting of independence to these homelands. The government justified its plans on the ostensible basis that "(the) government's policy is, therefore, not a policy of discrimination on the grounds of race or colour, but a policy of differentiation on the ground of nationhood, of different nations, granting to each self-determination within the borders of their homelands - hence this policy of separate development". Under the homelands system, blacks would no longer be citizens of South Africa, becoming citizens of the independent homelands who worked in South Africa as foreign migrant labourers on temporary work permits. In 1958 the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act was passed, and border industries and the Bantu Investment Corporation were established to promote economic development and the provision of employment in or near the homelands. Many black South Africans who had never resided in their identified homeland were forcibly removed from the cities to the homelands.

The vision of a South Africa divided into multiple ethno-states appealed to the reform-minded Afrikaner intelligensia, and it provided a more coherent philosophical and moral framework for the National Party's policies, while also providing a veneer of intellectual respectability to the controversial policy of so-called baasskap.

In total, 20 homelands were allocated to an ethnic groups, ten in South Africa proper and ten in South West Africa. Of these 20 homelands, 19 were classified as black, while one, Basterland, was set aside for a sub-group of Coloureds known as Basters, who are closely related to Afrikaners. Four of the homelands were declared independent by the South African government: Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981 (known as the TBVC states). Once a homeland was granted its nominal independence, its designated citizens had their South African citizenship revoked and replaced with citizenship in their homeland. These people were then issued passports instead of passbooks. Citizens of the nominally autonomous homelands also had their South African citizenship circumscribed, meaning they were no longer legally considered South African. The South African government attempted to draw an equivalence between their view of black citizens of the homelands and the problems which other countries faced through entry of illegal immigrants.

Bantustans within the borders of South Africa and South West Africa were classified by degree of nominal self-rule: 6 were "non-self-governing", 10 were "self-governing", and 4 were "independent". In theory, self-governing Bantustans had control over many aspects of their internal functioning but were not yet sovereign nations. Independent Bantustans (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei; also known as the TBVC states) were intended to be fully sovereign. In reality, they had no significant economic infrastructure and with few exceptions encompassed swaths of disconnected territory. This meant all the Bantustans were little more than puppet states controlled by South Africa.

Throughout the existence of the independent Bantustans, South Africa remained the only country to recognise their independence. Nevertheless, internal organisations of many countries, as well as the South African government, lobbied for their recognition. For example, upon the foundation of Transkei, the Swiss-South African Association encouraged the Swiss government to recognise the new state. In 1976, leading up to a United States House of Representatives resolution urging the President to not recognise Transkei, the South African government intensely lobbied lawmakers to oppose the bill. Each TBVC state extended recognition to the other independent Bantustans while South Africa showed its commitment to the notion of TBVC sovereignty by building embassies in the TBVC capitals.

Forced removals

During the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, the government implemented a policy of "resettlement", to force people to move to their designated "group areas". Millions of people were forced to relocate. These removals included people relocated due to slum clearance programmes, labour tenants on white-owned farms, the inhabitants of the so-called "black spots" (black-owned land surrounded by white farms), the families of workers living in townships close to the homelands, and "surplus people" from urban areas, including thousands of people from the Western Cape (which was declared a "Coloured Labour Preference Area") who were moved to the Transkei and Ciskei homelands. The best-publicised forced removals of the 1950s occurred in Johannesburg, when 60,000 people were moved to the new township of Soweto (an abbreviation for South Western Townships).

Until 1955, Sophiatown had been one of the few urban areas where black people were allowed to own land, and was slowly developing into a multiracial slum. As industry in Johannesburg grew, Sophiatown became the home of a rapidly expanding black workforce, as it was convenient and close to town. It had the only swimming pool for black children in Johannesburg. As one of the oldest black settlements in Johannesburg, it held an almost symbolic importance for the 50,000 black people it contained. Despite a vigorous ANC protest campaign and worldwide publicity, the removal of Sophiatown began on 9 February 1955 under the Western Areas Removal Scheme. In the early hours, heavily armed police forced residents out of their homes and loaded their belongings onto government trucks. The residents were taken to a large tract of land 19 kilometres (12 mi) from the city centre, known as Meadowlands, which the government had purchased in 1953. Meadowlands became part of a new planned black city called Soweto. Sophiatown was destroyed by bulldozers, and a new white suburb named Triomf (Triumph) was built in its place. This pattern of forced removal and destruction was to repeat itself over the next few years, and was not limited to black South Africans alone. Forced removals from areas like Cato Manor (Mkhumbane) in Durban, and District Six in Cape Town, where 55,000 Coloured and Indian people were forced to move to new townships on the Cape Flats, were carried out under the Group Areas Act of 1950. Nearly 600,000 Coloured, Indian and Chinese people were moved under the Group Areas Act. Some 40,000 whites were also forced to move when land was transferred from "white South Africa" into the black homelands.

The NP passed a string of legislation that became known as petty apartheid. The first of these was the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949, prohibiting marriage between whites and people of other races. The Immorality Amendment Act 21 of 1950 (as amended in 1957 by Act 23) forbade "unlawful racial intercourse" and "any immoral or indecent act" between a white and a black, Indian or Coloured person.

Blacks were not allowed to run businesses or professional practices in areas designated as "white South Africa" unless they had a permit - such being granted only exceptionally. They were required to move to the black "homelands" and set up businesses and practices there. Trains, hospitals and ambulances were segregated. Because of the smaller numbers of white patients and the fact that white doctors preferred to work in white hospitals, conditions in white hospitals were much better than those in often overcrowded and understaffed, significantly underfunded black hospitals. Residential areas were segregated and blacks were only allowed to live in white areas if employed as a servant and even then only in servants quarters. Blacks were excluded from working in white areas, unless they had a pass, nicknamed the dompas, also spelt dompass or dom pass. The most likely origin of this name is from the Afrikaans "verdomde pas" (meaning accursed pass), although some commentators ascribe it to the Afrikaans words meaning "dumb pass". Only blacks with "Section 10" rights (those who had migrated to the cities before World War II) were excluded from this provision. A pass was issued only to a black with approved work. Spouses and children had to be left behind in black homelands. A pass was issued for one magisterial district (usually one town) confining the holder to that area only. Being without a valid pass made a person subject to arrest and trial for being an illegal migrant. This was often followed by deportation to the person's homeland and prosecution of the employer for employing an illegal migrant. Police vans patrolled white areas to round up blacks without passes. Blacks were not allowed to employ whites in white South Africa.

Although trade unions for black and Coloured workers had existed since the early 20th century, it was not until the 1980s reforms that a mass black trade union movement developed. Trade unions under apartheid were racially segregated, with 54 unions being white only, 38 for Indian and Coloured and 19 for black people. The Industrial Conciliation Act (1956) legislated against the creation of multi-racial trade unions and attempted to split existing multi-racial unions into separate branches or organisations along racial lines.

Each black homeland controlled its own education, health and police systems. Blacks were not allowed to buy hard liquor. They were able only to buy state-produced poor quality beer (although this law was relaxed later). Public beaches, swimming pools, some pedestrian bridges, drive-in cinema parking spaces, graveyards, parks, and public toilets were segregated. Cinemas and theatres in white areas were not allowed to admit blacks. There were practically no cinemas in black areas. Most restaurants and hotels in white areas were not allowed to admit blacks except as staff. Blacks were prohibited from attending white churches under the Churches Native Laws Amendment Act of 1957, but this was never rigidly enforced and churches were one of the few places races could mix without the interference of the law. Blacks earning 360 rand a year or more had to pay taxes while the white threshold was more than twice as high, at 750 rand a year. On the other hand, the taxation rate for whites was considerably higher than that for blacks.

Blacks could never acquire land in white areas. In the homelands, much of the land belonged to a "tribe", where the local chieftain would decide how the land had to be used. This resulted in whites owning almost all the industrial and agricultural lands and much of the prized residential land. Most blacks were stripped of their South African citizenship when the "homelands" became "independent", and they were no longer able to apply for South African passports. Eligibility requirements for a passport had been difficult for blacks to meet, the government contending that a passport was a privilege, not a right, and the government did not grant many passports to blacks. Apartheid pervaded culture as well as the law, and was entrenched by most of the mainstream media.

The population was classified into four groups: African, White, Indian and Coloured (capitalised to denote their legal definitions in South African law). The Coloured group included people regarded as being of mixed descent, including of Bantu, Khoisan, European and Malay ancestry. Many were descended from people brought to South Africa from other parts of the world, such as India, Sri Lanka, Madagascar and China as slaves and indentured workers.

The population registration act, (Act 30 of 1950), defined South Africans as belonging to one of three races: White, Black or Coloured. People of Indian ancestry were considered Coloured under this act. Appearance, social and acceptance and descent were used to determine the qualification of an individual into one of the three categories. A white person was described by the act as one whose parents were both white and possessed the "habits, speech, education, deportment and demeanour" of a white person. Blacks were defined by the act as belonging to an African race or tribe. Lastly, Coloureds were those who could not be classified as black or white.

The apartheid bureaucracy devised complex (and often arbitrary) criteria at the time that the Population Registration Act was implemented to determine who was Coloured. Minor officials would administer tests to determine if someone should be categorised either Coloured or White, or if another person should be categorised either Coloured or Black. The tests included the pencil test, in which a pencil was shoved into the subject's curly hair and the subject made to shake their head. If the pencil stuck the person was deemed to be Black; if dislodged the person was pronounced Coloured. Other tests involved examining the shapes of jaw lines and buttocks and pinching people to see what language they would say "Ouch" in. As a result of these tests, different members of the same family found themselves in different race groups. Further tests determined membership of the various sub-racial groups of the Coloureds.

Discriminated against by apartheid, Coloureds were as a matter of state policy forced to live in separate townships, as defined in the Group Areas Act (1950), in some cases leaving homes their families had occupied for generations, and received an inferior education, though better than that provided to Africans. They played an important role in the anti-apartheid movement: for example the African Political Organization established in 1902 had an exclusively Coloured membership.

Voting rights were denied to Coloureds in the same way that they were denied to Blacks from 1950 to 1983. However, in 1977 the NP caucus approved proposals to bring Coloureds and Indians into central government. In 1982, final constitutional proposals produced a referendum among Whites, and the Tricameral Parliament was approved. The Constitution was reformed the following year to allow the Coloured and Asian minorities participation in separate Houses in a Tricameral Parliament, and Botha became the first Executive State President. The idea was that the Coloured minority could be granted voting rights, but the Black majority were to become citizens of independent homelands. These separate arrangements continued until the abolition of apartheid. The Tricameral reforms led to the formation of the (anti-apartheid) United Democratic Front as a vehicle to try to prevent the co-option of Coloureds and Indians into an alliance with Whites. The battles between the UDF and the NP government from 1983 to 1989 were to become the most intense period of struggle between left-wing and right-wing South Africans.

Education was segregated by the 1953 Bantu Education Act, which crafted a separate system of education for black South African students and was designed to prepare black people for lives as a labouring class. In 1959 separate universities were created for black, Coloured and Indian people. Existing universities were not permitted to enroll new black students. The Afrikaans Medium Decree of 1974 required the use of Afrikaans and English on an equal basis in high schools outside the homelands.

In the 1970s, the state spent ten times more per child on the education of white children than on black children within the Bantu Education system (the education system in black schools within white South Africa). Higher education was provided in separate universities and colleges after 1959. Eight black universities were created in the homelands. Fort Hare University in the Ciskei (now Eastern Cape) was to register only Xhosa-speaking students. Sotho, Tswana, Pedi and Venda speakers were placed at the newly founded University College of the North at Turfloop, while the University College of Zululand was launched to serve Zulu students. Coloureds and Indians were to have their own establishments in the Cape and Natal respectively.

Each black homeland controlled its own education, health and police systems.

By 1948, before formal Apartheid, 10 universities existed in South Africa: 4 were Afrikaans, 4 for English, 1 for Blacks and a Correspondence University open to all ethnic groups. By 1981, under apartheid government, 11 new universities were built: 7 for Blacks, 1 for Coloreds, 1 for Indian, 1 for Afrikaans and 1 dual-language medium Afrikaans and English.

Colonialism and apartheid had a major impact on Black and Coloured women, since they suffered both racial and gender discrimination. Jobs were often hard to find. Many Black and Coloured women worked as agricultural or domestic workers, but wages were extremely low, if existent. Children suffered from diseases caused by malnutrition and sanitation problems, and mortality rates were therefore high. The controlled movement of black and Coloured workers within the country through the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923 and the pass laws separated family members from one another, because men could prove their employment in urban centres while most women were merely dependents; consequently, they risked being deported to rural areas.

By the 1930s, association football mirrored the balkanised society of South Africa; football was divided into numerous institutions based on race: the (White) South African Football Association, the South African Indian Football Association (SAIFA), the South African African Football Association (SAAFA) and its rival the South African Bantu Football Association, and the South African Coloured Football Association (SACFA). Lack of funds to provide proper equipment would be noticeable in regards to black amateur football matches; this revealed the unequal lives black South Africans were subject to, in contrast to Whites, who were much better off financially. Apartheid's social engineering made it more difficult to compete across racial lines. Thus, in an effort to centralise finances, the federations merged in 1951, creating the South African Soccer Federation (SASF), which brought Black, Indian, and Coloured national associations into one body that opposed apartheid. This was generally opposed more and more by the growing apartheid government, and - with urban segregation being reinforced with ongoing racist policies - it was harder to play football along these racial lines. In 1956, the Pretoria regime - the administrative capital of South Africa - passed the first apartheid sports policy; by doing so, it emphasised the White-led government's opposition to inter-racialism.

While football was plagued by racism, it also played a role in protesting apartheid and its policies. With the international bans from FIFA and other major sporting events, South Africa would be in the spotlight internationally. In a 1977 survey, white South Africans ranked the lack of international sport as one of the three most damaging consequences of apartheid. By the mid-1950s, Black South Africans would also use media to challenge the "racialisation" of sports in South Africa; anti-apartheid forces had begun to pinpoint sport as the "weakness" of white national morale. Black journalists for the Johannesburg Drum magazine were the first to give the issue public exposure, with an intrepid special issue in 1955 that asked, "Why shouldn't our blacks be allowed in the SA team?" As time progressed, international standing with South Africa would continue to be strained. In the 1980s, as the oppressive system was slowly collapsing the ANC and National Party started negotiations on the end of apartheid. Football associations also discussed the formation of a single, non-racial controlling body. This unity process accelerated in the late 1980s and led to the creation, in December 1991, of an incorporated South African Football Association. On 3 July 1992, FIFA finally welcomed South Africa back into international football.

Sport has long been an important part of life in South Africa, and the boycotting of games by international teams had a profound effect on the white population, perhaps more so than the trade embargoes did. After the re-acceptance of South Africa's sports teams by the international community, sport played a major unifying role between the country's diverse ethnic groups. Mandela's open support of the predominantly white rugby fraternity during the 1995 Rugby World Cup was considered instrumental in bringing together South African sports fans of all races.

Defining its Asian population, a minority that did not appear to belong to any of the initial three designated non-white groups, was a constant dilemma for the apartheid government.

Indian South Africans during apartheid were classified many ranges of categories from "Asian" to "black" to "Coloured" and even the mono-ethnic category of "Indian", but never as white, having been considered "nonwhite" throughout South Africa's history. The group faced severe discrimination during the apartheid regime and were subject to numerous racialist policies.

In a study done by Josephine C. Naidoo and Devi Moodley Rajab, they interviewed a series of Indian South Africans about their experience in South Africa. Their study highlighted education, the workplace, and general day to day living. For one specific participant who was a doctor, said that it was considered the norm for Non-White and White doctors to mingle while working at the hospital but when there was any down time or breaks, they were to go back to their segregated quarters. Not only was there severe segregation for doctors, Non-White, more specifically Indians, were paid three to four times less than their White counterparts. Many described being treated as a "third class citizen" due to the humiliation of the standard of treatment for Non-White employees across many professions. Many Indians described a sense of justified superiority from Whites due to the apartheid laws that, in the minds of White South Africans, legitimised those feelings. Another finding of this study was the psychological damage done to Indians living in South Africa during apartheid. One of the biggest long-term effects was inter-racial mistrust. Inter-racial mistrust is emotional hatred towards Whites. There was such a strong degree of alienation that left damaging psychological effects of inferiority.

Chinese South Africans - who were descendants of migrant workers who came to work in the gold mines around Johannesburg in the late 19th century - were initially either classified as "Coloured" or "Other Asian" and were subject to numerous forms of discrimination and restriction. It was not until 1984 that South African Chinese, increased to about 10,000, were given the same official rights as the Japanese, to be treated as whites in terms of the Group Areas Act, although they still faced discrimination and did not receive all the benefits/rights of their newly obtained honorary white status such as voting.

Indonesians arrived at the Cape of Good Hope as slaves until the abolishment of slavery during the 1800s. They were predominantly Muslim, were allowed religious freedom and formed their own ethnic group/community known as Cape Malays. They were classified as part of the Coloured racial group. This was the same for South Africans of Malaysian descent who were also classified as part of the Coloured race and thus considered "not-white". South Africans of Filipino descent were classified as "black" due to historical outlook on Filipinos by White South Africans, and many of them lived in Bantustans.

Alongside apartheid, the National Party implemented a programme of social conservatism. Pornography and gambling were banned. Cinemas, shops selling alcohol and most other businesses were forbidden from opening on Sundays. Abortion, homosexuality and sex education were also restricted; abortion was only legal in cases of rape or if the mother's life was threatened.

Television was not introduced until 1976 because the government viewed English programming as a threat to the Afrikaans language. Television was run on apartheid lines - TV1 broadcast in Afrikaans and English (geared to a White audience), TV2 in Zulu and Xhosa, TV3 in Sotho, Tswana and Pedi (both geared to a Black audience), and TV4 mostly showed programmes for an urban Black audience.

Apartheid sparked significant internal resistance. The government responded to a series of popular uprisings and protests with police brutality, which in turn increased local support for the armed resistance struggle. Internal resistance to the apartheid system in South Africa came from several sectors of society and saw the creation of organisations dedicated variously to peaceful protests, passive resistance and armed insurrection.

In 1949, the youth wing of the African National Congress (ANC) took control of the organisation and started advocating a radical black nationalist programme. The new young leaders proposed that white authority could only be overthrown through mass campaigns. In 1950 that philosophy saw the launch of the Programme of Action, a series of strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience actions that led to occasional violent clashes with the authorities.

In May 1961, before the declaration of South Africa as a Republic, an assembly representing the banned ANC called for negotiations between the members of the different ethnic groupings, threatening demonstrations and strikes during the inauguration of the Republic if their calls were ignored.

When the government overlooked them, the strikers (among the main organisers was a 42-year-old, Thembu-origin Nelson Mandela) carried out their threats. The government countered swiftly by giving police the authority to arrest people for up to twelve days and detaining many strike leaders amid numerous cases of police brutality. Defeated, the protesters called off their strike. The ANC then chose to launch an armed struggle through a newly formed military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), which would perform acts of sabotage on tactical state structures. Its first sabotage plans were carried out on 16 December 1961, the anniversary of the Battle of Blood River.

In 1976, secondary students in Soweto took to the streets in the Soweto uprising to protest against the imposition of Afrikaans as the only language of instruction. On 16 June, police opened fire on students protesting peacefully. According to official reports 23 people were killed, but the number of people who died is usually given as 176, with estimates of up to 700. In the following years several student organisations were formed to protest against apartheid, and these organisations were central to urban school boycotts in 1980 and 1983 and rural boycotts in 1985 and 1986.

In parallel with student protests, labour unions started protest action in 1973 and 1974. After 1976 unions and workers are considered to have played an important role in the struggle against apartheid, filling the gap left by the banning of political parties. In 1979 black trade unions were legalised and could engage in collective bargaining, although strikes were still illegal. Economist Thomas Sowell wrote that basic supply and demand led to violations of Apartheid "on a massive scale" throughout the nation, simply because there were not enough white South African business owners to meet the demand for various goods and services. Large portions of the garment industry and construction of new homes, for example, were effectively owned and operated by blacks, who either worked surreptitiously or who circumvented the law with a white person as a nominal, figurehead manager.

In 1983, anti-apartheid leaders determined to resist the tricameral parliament assembled to form the United Democratic Front (UDF) in order to coordinate anti-apartheid activism inside South Africa. The first presidents of the UDF were Archie Gumede, Oscar Mpetha and Albertina Sisulu; patrons were Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Allan Boesak, Helen Joseph, and Nelson Mandela. Basing its platform on abolishing apartheid and creating a nonracial democratic South Africa, the UDF provided a legal way for domestic human rights groups and individuals of all races to organise demonstrations and campaign against apartheid inside the country. Churches and church groups also emerged as pivotal points of resistance. Church leaders were not immune to prosecution, and certain faith-based organisations were banned, but the clergy generally had more freedom to criticise the government than militant groups did. The UDF, coupled with the protection of the church, accordingly permitted a major role for Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who served both as a prominent domestic voice and international spokesperson denouncing apartheid and urging the creation of a shared nonracial state.

Although the majority of whites supported apartheid, some 20 percent did not. Parliamentary opposition was galvanised by Helen Suzman, Colin Eglin and Harry Schwarz, who formed the Progressive Federal Party. Extra-parliamentary resistance was largely centred in the South African Communist Party and women's organisation the Black Sash. Women were also notable in their involvement in trade union organisations and banned political parties.

South Africa's policies were subject to international scrutiny in 1960, when UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan criticised them during his Wind of Change speech in Cape Town. Weeks later, tensions came to a head in the Sharpeville Massacre, resulting in more international condemnation. Soon afterwards, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced a referendum on whether the country should become a republic. Verwoerd lowered the voting age for Whites to eighteen years of age and included Whites in South West Africa on the roll. The referendum on 5 October that year asked Whites; "Are you in favour of a Republic for the Union?", and 52 percent voted "Yes".

We stand here today to salute the United Nations Organisation and its Member States, both singly and collectively, for joining forces with the masses of our people in a common struggle that has brought about our emancipation and pushed back the frontiers of racism.

- Nelson Mandela, address to the United Nations as South African President, 3 October 1994

The apartheid system as an issue was first formally brought to the United Nations attention, in order to advocate for the Indians residing in South Africa. On June 22 of 1946, the Indian government requested that the discriminatory treatment of Indians living in South Africa be included on the agenda of the first General Assembly session. In 1952, apartheid was again discussed in the aftermath of the Defiance Campaign, and the UN set up a task team to keep watch on the progress of apartheid and the racial state of affairs in South Africa. Although South Africa's racial policies were a cause for concern, most countries in the UN concurred that this was a domestic affair, which fell outside the UN's jurisdiction.

In April 1960, the UN's conservative stance on apartheid changed following the Sharpeville massacre, and the Security Council for the first time agreed on concerted action against the apartheid regime. Resolution 134 called upon the nation of South Africa to abandon its policies implementing racial discrimination. The newly founded United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, scripted and passed Resolution 181 on August 7, 1963, which called upon all states to cease the sale and shipment of all ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. This clause was finally declared mandatory on 4 November 1977, depriving South Africa of military aid. From 1964 onwards, the US and the UK discontinued their arms trade with South Africa. The Security Council also condemned the Soweto massacre in Resolution 392. In 1977, the voluntary UN arms embargo became mandatory with the passing of Resolution 418. In addition to isolating South Africa militarily, the United Nations General Assembly, encouraged the boycotting of oil sales to South Africa. Other actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly include the request for all nations and organisations, "to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid". Illustrating that over a long period of time, the United Nations was working towards isolating the state of South Africa, by putting pressure on the Apartheid regime.

After much debate, by the late-1980s, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 23 other nations had passed laws placing various trade sanctions on South Africa. A disinvestment from South Africa movement in many countries was similarly widespread, with individual cities and provinces around the world implementing various laws and local regulations forbidding registered corporations under their jurisdiction from doing business with South African firms, factories, or banks.

Pope John Paul II was an outspoken opponent of apartheid. In 1985, while visiting the Netherlands, he gave an impassioned speech at the International Court of Justice condemning apartheid, proclaiming that "no system of apartheid or separate development will ever be acceptable as a model for the relations between peoples or races." In September 1988, he made a pilgrimage to countries bordering South Africa, while demonstratively avoiding South Africa itself. During his visit to Zimbabwe, he called for economic sanctions against the South African government.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963. Its primary objectives were to eradicate colonialism and improve social, political and economic situations in Africa. It censured apartheid and demanded sanctions against South Africa. African states agreed to aid the liberation movements in their fight against apartheid. In 1969, fourteen nations from Central and East Africa gathered in Lusaka, Zambia, and formulated the Lusaka Manifesto, which was signed on 13 April by all of the countries in attendance except Malawi. This manifesto was later taken on by both the OAU and the United Nations.

The Lusaka Manifesto summarized the political situations of self-governing African countries, condemning racism and inequity, and calling for Black majority rule in all African nations. It did not rebuff South Africa entirely, though, adopting an appeasing manner towards the apartheid government, and even recognizing its autonomy. Although African leaders supported the emancipation of Black South Africans, they preferred this to be attained through peaceful means.

South Africa's negative response to the Lusaka Manifesto and rejection of a change to its policies brought about another OAU announcement in October 1971. The Mogadishu Declaration stated that South Africa's rebuffing of negotiations meant that its Black people could only be freed through military means, and that no African state should converse with the apartheid government.

In 1966, B. J. Vorster became Prime Minister. He was not prepared to dismantle apartheid, but he did try to redress South Africa's isolation and to revitalise the country's global reputation, even those with Black majority rule in Africa. This he called his "Outward-Looking" policy.

Vorster's willingness to talk to African leaders stood in contrast to Verwoerd's refusal to engage with leaders such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria in 1962 and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1964. In 1966, he met the heads of the neighbouring states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. In 1967, he offered technological and financial aid to any African state prepared to receive it, asserting that no political strings were attached, aware that many African states needed financial aid despite their opposition to South Africa's racial policies. Many were also tied to South Africa economically because of their migrant labour population working down the South African mines. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland remained outspoken critics of apartheid, but were dependent on South African economic assistance.

Malawi was the first not-neighbouring country to accept South African aid. In 1967, the two states set out their political and economic relations. In 1969, Malawi was the only country at the assembly which did not sign the Lusaka Manifesto condemning South Africa' apartheid policy. In 1970, Malawian president Hastings Banda made his first and most successful official stopover in South Africa.

Associations with Mozambique followed suit and were sustained after that country won its sovereignty in 1975. Angola was also granted South African loans. Other countries which formed relationships with South Africa were Liberia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius, Gabon, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the Central African Republic. Although these states condemned apartheid (more than ever after South Africa's denunciation of the Lusaka Manifesto), South Africa's economic and military dominance meant that they remained dependent on South Africa to varying degrees.

South Africa's isolation in sport began in the mid-1950s and increased throughout the 1960s. Apartheid forbade multiracial sport, which meant that overseas teams, by virtue of them having players of different races, could not play in South Africa. In 1956, the International Table Tennis Federation severed its ties with the all-White South African Table Tennis Union, preferring the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board. The apartheid government responded by confiscating the passports of the Board's players so that they were unable to attend international games.

In 1959, the non-racial South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed to secure the rights of all players on the global field. After meeting with no success in its endeavours to attain credit by collaborating with White establishments, SASA approached the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1962, calling for South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic Games. The IOC sent South Africa a caution to the effect that, if there were no changes, they would be barred from competing at the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo. The changes were initiated, and in January 1963, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) was set up. The Anti-Apartheid Movement persisted in its campaign for South Africa's exclusion, and the IOC acceded in barring the country from the 1964 Olympic Games. South Africa selected a multi-racial team for the next Olympic Games, and the IOC opted for incorporation in the 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games. Because of protests from AAMs and African nations, however, the IOC was forced to retract the invitation.

Vorster years

The first of the "White Bans" occurred in 1971 when the Chairman of the Australian Cricketing Association - Sir Don Bradman - flew to South Africa to meet Vorster. Vorster had expected Bradman to allow the tour of the Australian cricket team to go ahead, but things became heated after Bradman asked why Black sportsmen were not allowed to play cricket. Vorster stated that Blacks were intellectually inferior and had no finesse for the game. Bradman - thinking this ignorant and repugnant - asked Vorster if he had heard of a man named Garry Sobers. On his return to Australia, Bradman released a short statement: "We will not play them until they choose a team on a non-racist basis." Bradman's views were in stark contrast to those of Australian tennis great Margaret Court, who had won the grand slam the previous year and commented about apartheid that "South Africans have this thing better organised than any other country, particularly America" and that she would "go back there any time."

In South Africa, Vorster vented his anger publicly against Bradman, while the African National Congress rejoiced. This was the first time a predominantly White nation had taken the side of multiracial sport, producing an unsettling resonance that more "White" boycotts were coming. Almost twenty years later, on his release from prison, Nelson Mandela asked a visiting Australian statesman if Donald Bradman, his childhood hero, was still alive (Bradman lived until 2001).

In 1971, Vorster altered his policies even further by distinguishing multiracial from multinational sport. Multiracial sport, between teams with players of different races, remained outlawed; multinational sport, however, was now acceptable: international sides would not be subject to South Africa's racial stipulations.

In 1978, Nigeria boycotted the Commonwealth Games because New Zealand's sporting contacts with the South African government were not considered to be in accordance with the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement. Nigeria also led the 32-nation boycott of the 1986 Commonwealth Games because of UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's ambivalent attitude towards sporting links with South Africa, significantly affecting the quality and profitability of the Games and thus thrusting apartheid into the international spotlight.

In the 1960s, the Anti-Apartheid Movements began to campaign for cultural boycotts of apartheid South Africa. Artists were requested not to present or let their works be hosted in South Africa. In 1963, 45 British writers put their signatures to an affirmation approving of the boycott, and, in 1964, American actor Marlon Brando called for a similar affirmation for films. In 1965, the Writers' Guild of Great Britain called for a proscription on the sending of films to South Africa. Over sixty American artists signed a statement against apartheid and against professional links with the state. The presentation of some South African plays in the United Kingdom and the United States was also vetoed. After the arrival of television in South Africa in 1975, the British Actors Union, Equity, boycotted the service, and no British programme concerning its associates could be sold to South Africa. Similarly, when home video grew popular in the 1980s, the Australian arm of CBS/Fox Video (now 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment) placed stickers on their VHS and Betamax cassettes which labeled exporting such cassettes to South Africa as "an infringement of copyright". Sporting and cultural boycotts did not have the same impact as economic sanctions, but they did much to lift consciousness amongst normal South Africans of the global condemnation of apartheid.

While international opposition to apartheid grew, the Nordic countries - and Sweden in particular - provided both moral and financial support for the ANC. On 21 February 1986 - a week before he was murdered - Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme made the keynote address to the Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid held in Stockholm. In addressing the hundreds of anti-apartheid sympathisers as well as leaders and officials from the ANC and the Anti-Apartheid Movement such as Oliver Tambo, Palme declared: "Apartheid cannot be reformed; it has to be eliminated."

Other Western countries adopted a more ambivalent position. In Switzerland, the Swiss-South African Association lobbied on behalf of the South African government. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration and the Thatcher ministry in the UK followed a " constructive engagement" policy with the apartheid government, vetoing the imposition of UN economic sanctions, justified by a belief in free trade and a vision of South Africa as a bastion against Marxist forces in Southern Africa. Thatcher declared the ANC a terrorist organisation, and in 1987 her spokesman, Bernard Ingham, famously said that anyone who believed that the ANC would ever form the government of South Africa was "living in cloud cuckoo land". The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative lobbying organisation, actively campaigned against divesting from South Africa throughout the 1980s.

By the late-1980s, with no sign of a political resolution in South Africa, Western patience began to run out. By 1989, a bipartisan Republican/ Democratic initiative in the US favoured economic sanctions (realised as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986), the release of Nelson Mandela and a negotiated settlement involving the ANC. Thatcher too began to take a similar line, but insisted on the suspension of the ANC's armed struggle.

The UK's significant economic involvement in South Africa may have provided some leverage with the South African government, with both the UK and the US applying pressure and pushing for negotiations. However, neither the UK nor the US was willing to apply economic pressure upon their multinational interests in South Africa, such as the mining company Anglo American. Although a high-profile compensation claim against these companies was thrown out of court in 2004, the US Supreme Court in May 2008 upheld an appeal court ruling allowing another lawsuit that seeks damages of more than US$400 billion from major international companies which are accused of aiding South Africa's apartheid system.

"Total Onslaught"

During the 1950s, South African military strategy was decisively shaped by fears of communist espionage and a conventional Soviet threat to the strategic Cape trade route between the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The apartheid government supported the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as its policy of regional containment against Soviet-backed regimes and insurgencies worldwide. By the late-1960s, the rise of Soviet client states on the African continent, as well as Soviet aid for militant anti-apartheid movements, was considered one of the primary external threats to the apartheid system. South African officials frequently accused domestic opposition groups of being communist proxies. For its part, the Soviet Union viewed South Africa as a bastion of neocolonialism and a regional Western ally, which helped fuel its support for various anti-apartheid causes. From 1973 onwards, much of South Africa's white population increasingly looked upon their country as a bastion of the free world besieged militarily, politically, and culturally by Communism and radical black nationalism. The apartheid government perceived itself as being locked in a proxy struggle with the Warsaw Pact and by implication, armed wings of black nationalist forces such as Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which often received Soviet arms and training. This was described as "Total Onslaught".

Israeli arms sales

Soviet support for militant anti-apartheid movements worked in the government's favour, as its claim to be reacting in opposition to aggressive communist expansion gained greater plausibility, and helped it justify its own domestic militarisation methods, known as "Total Strategy". Total Strategy involved building up a formidable conventional military and counter-intelligence capability. It was formulated on counter-revolutionary tactics as espoused by noted French tactician André Beaufre. Considerable effort was devoted towards circumventing international arms sanctions, and the government even went so far as to develop nuclear weapons, allegedly with covert assistance from Israel. In 2010, The Guardian released South African government documents that revealed an Israeli offer to sell the apartheid regime nuclear weapons. Israel denied these allegations and claimed that the documents were minutes from a meeting which did not indicate any concrete offer for a sale of nuclear weapons. Shimon Peres said that The Guardian's article was based on "selective interpretation...and not on concrete facts."

As a result of "Total Strategy", South African society became increasingly militarised. Many domestic civil organisations were modelled upon military structures, and military virtues such as discipline, patriotism, and loyalty were highly regarded. In 1968, national service for White South African men lasted nine months at minimum, and they could be called up for reserve duty into their late-middle age if necessary. The length of national service was gradually extended to twelve months in 1972 and twenty-four months in 1978. At state schools, white male students were organised into military-style formations and drilled as cadets or as participants in a civil defence or "Youth Preparedness" curriculum. Compulsory military education and in some cases, paramilitary training was introduced for all older white male students at state schools in three South African provinces. These programmes presided over the construction of bomb shelters at schools and drills aimed at simulating mock insurgent raids.

From the late-1970s to the late-1980s, defence budgets in South Africa were raised exponentially. In 1975, Israeli defense minister Shimon Peres signed a security pact with South African defense minister P.W. Botha that led to $200 million in arms deals. In 1988, Israeli arm sales to South Africa totaled over $1.4 billion. Covert operations focused on espionage and domestic counter-subversion became common, the number of special forces units swelled, and the South African Defence Force (SADF) had amassed enough sophisticated conventional weaponry to pose a serious threat to the " front-line states", a regional alliance of neighbouring countries opposed to apartheid.

Total Strategy was advanced in the context of MK, PLAN, and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) guerrilla raids into South Africa or against South African targets in South West Africa; frequent South African reprisal attacks on these movements' external bases in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and elsewhere, often involving collateral damage to foreign infrastructure and civilian populations; and periodic complaints brought before the international community about South African violations of its neighbours' sovereignty.

The apartheid government made judicious use of extraterritorial operations to eliminate its military and political opponents, arguing that neighbouring states, including their civilian populations, which hosted, tolerated on their soil, or otherwise sheltered anti-apartheid insurgent groups could not evade responsibility for provoking retaliatory strikes. While it did focus on militarising the borders and sealing up its domestic territory against insurgent raids, it also relied heavily on an aggressive preemptive and counter-strike strategy, which fulfilled a preventive and deterrent purpose. The reprisals which occurred beyond South Africa's borders involved not only hostile states, but neutral and sympathetic governments as well, often forcing them to react against their will and interests.

External South African military operations were aimed at eliminating the training facilities, safehouses, infrastructure, equipment, and manpower of the insurgents. However, their secondary objective was to dissuade neighbouring states from offering sanctuary to MK, PLAN, APLA, and similar organisations. This was accomplished by deterring the supportive foreign population from cooperating with infiltration and thus undermining the insurgents' external sanctuary areas. It would also send a clear message to the host government that collaborating with insurgent forces involved potentially high costs.

The scale and intensity of foreign operations varied, and ranged from small special forces units carrying out raids on locations across the border which served as bases for insurgent infiltration to major conventional offensives involving armour, artillery, and aircraft. Actions such as Operation Protea in 1981 and Operation Askari in 1983 involved both full scale conventional warfare and a counter-insurgency reprisal operation. The insurgent bases were usually situated near military installations of the host government, so that SADF retaliatory strikes hit those facilities as well and attracted international attention and condemnation of what was perceived as aggression against the armed forces of another sovereign state. This would inevitably result in major engagements, in which the SADF's expeditionary units would have to contend with the firepower of the host government's forces. Intensive conventional warfare of this nature carried the risk of severe casualties among white soldiers, which had to be kept to a minimum for political reasons. There were also high economic and diplomatic costs associated with openly deploying large numbers of South African troops into another country. Furthermore, military involvement on that scale had the potential to evolve into wider conflict situations, in which South Africa became entangled. For example, South Africa's activities in Angola, initially limited to containing PLAN, later escalated to direct involvement in the Angolan Civil War.

As it became clearer that full-scale conventional operations could not effectively fulfill the requirements of a regional counter-insurgency effort, South Africa turned to a number of alternative methods. Retributive artillery bombardments were the least sophisticated means of reprisal against insurgent attacks. Between 1978 and 1979 the SADF directed artillery fire against locations in Angola and Zambia from which insurgent rockets were suspected to have been launched. This precipitated several artillery duels with the Zambian Army. Special forces raids were launched to harass PLAN and MK by liquidating prominent members of those movements, destroying their offices and safehouses, and seizing valuable records stored at these sites. One example was the Gaborone Raid, carried out in 1985, during which a South African special forces team crossed the border into Botswana and demolished four suspected MK safe houses, severely damaging another four. Other types of special forces operations included the sabotage of economic infrastructure. The SADF sabotaged infrastructure being used for the insurgents' war effort; for example, port facilities in southern Angola's Moçâmedes District, where Soviet arms were frequently offloaded for PLAN, as well as the railway line which facilitated their transport to PLAN headquarters in Lubango, were common targets. Sabotage was also used as a pressure tactic when South Africa was negotiating with a host government to cease providing sanctuary to insurgent forces, as in the case of Operation Argon. Successful sabotage actions of high-profile economic targets undermined a country's ability to negotiate from a position of strength, and made it likelier to accede to South African demands rather than risk the expense of further destruction and war.

Also noteworthy were South African transnational espionage efforts, which included covert assassinations, kidnappings, and attempts to disrupt the overseas influence of anti-apartheid organisations. South African military intelligence agents were known to have abducted and killed anti-apartheid activists and others suspected of having ties to MK in London and Brussels.

Botha's years in power were marked also by numerous military interventions in the states bordering South Africa, as well as an extensive military and political campaign to eliminate SWAPO in Namibia. Within South Africa, meanwhile, vigorous police action and strict enforcement of security legislation resulted in hundreds of arrests and bans, and an effective end to the African National Congress' sabotage campaign.

The government punished political offenders brutally. 40,000 people annually were subjected to whipping as a form of punishment. The vast majority had committed political offences and were lashed ten times for their crime. If convicted of treason, a person could be hanged, and the government executed numerous political offenders in this way.

Serious political violence was a prominent feature from 1985-89, as Black townships became the focus of the struggle between anti-apartheid organisations and the Botha government. Throughout the 1980s, township people resisted apartheid by acting against the local issues that faced their particular communities. The focus of much of this resistance was against the local authorities and their leaders, who were seen to be supporting the government. By 1985, it had become the ANC's aim to make Black townships "ungovernable" (a term later replaced by "people's power") by means of rent boycotts and other militant action. Numerous township councils were overthrown or collapsed, to be replaced by unofficial popular organisations, often led by militant youth. People's courts were set up, and residents accused of being government agents were dealt extreme and occasionally lethal punishments. Black town councillors and policemen, and sometimes their families, were attacked with petrol bombs, beaten, and murdered by necklacing, where a burning tyre was placed around the victim's neck, after they were restrained by wrapping their wrists with barbed wire. This signature act of torture and murder was embraced by the ANC and its leaders.

On 20 July 1985, Botha declared a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts. Areas affected were the Eastern Cape, and the PWV region (" Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging"). Three months later, the Western Cape was included. An increasing number of organisations were banned or listed (restricted in some way); many individuals had restrictions such as house arrest imposed on them. During this state of emergency, about 2,436 people were detained under the Internal Security Act. This act gave police and the military sweeping powers. The government could implement curfews controlling the movement of people. The president could rule by decree without referring to the constitution or to parliament. It became a criminal offence to threaten someone verbally or possess documents that the government perceived to be threatening, to advise anyone to stay away from work or to oppose the government, and to disclose the name of anyone arrested under the State of Emergency until the government released that name, with up to ten years' imprisonment for these offences. Detention without trial became a common feature of the government's reaction to growing civil unrest and by 1988, 30,000 people had been detained. The media was censored, thousands were arrested and many were interrogated and tortured.

On 12 June 1986, four days before the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, the state of emergency was extended to cover the whole country. The government amended the Public Security Act, including the right to declare "unrest" areas, allowing extraordinary measures to crush protests in these areas. Severe censorship of the press became a dominant tactic in the government's strategy and television cameras were banned from entering such areas. The state broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), provided propaganda in support of the government. Media opposition to the system increased, supported by the growth of a pro-ANC underground press within South Africa.

In 1987, the State of Emergency was extended for another two years. Meanwhile, about 200,000 members of the National Union of Mineworkers commenced the longest strike (three weeks) in South African history. The year 1988 saw the banning of the activities of the UDF and other anti-apartheid organisations.

The state of emergency continued until 1990, when it was lifted by State President F.W. de Klerk.

Apartheid developed from the racism of colonial factions and due to South Africa's "unique industrialisation". The policies of industrialisation led to segregation of and classing of people, which was "specifically developed to nurture early industry such as mining". Cheap labour was the basis of the economy and this was taken from what the state classed as peasant groups and the migrants. Furthermore, Philip Bonner highlights the "contradictory economic effects" as the economy did not have a manufacturing sector, therefore promoting short term profitability but limiting labour productivity and the size of local markets. This also led to its collapse as "Clarkes emphasises the economy could not provide and compete with foreign rivals as they failed to master cheap labour and complex chemistry".

The contradictions in the traditionally capitalist economy of the apartheid state led to considerable debate about racial policy, and division and conflicts in the central state. To a large extent the political ideology of apartheid had emerged from the colonisation of Africa by European powers which institutionalised racial discrimination and exercised a paternal philosophy of "civilising inferior natives." Some scholars have argued that this can be reflected in Afrikaner Calvinism, with its parallel traditions of racialism; for example, as early as 1933; the executive council of the Broederbond formulated a recommendation for mass segregation.

External Western influence, arising from European experiences in colonisation, may be seen as a factor which greatly influenced political attitudes and ideology. Late twentieth-century South Africa was cited as an "unreconstructed example of western civilisation twisted by racism".

In the 1960s, South Africa experienced economic growth second only to that of Japan. Trade with Western countries grew, and investment from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom poured in.

In 1974, resistance to apartheid was encouraged by Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola, after the 1974 Carnation Revolution. South African troops withdrew from Angola early in 1976, failing to prevent the MPLA from gaining power there, and Black students in South Africa celebrated.

The Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith, signed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Harry Schwarz in 1974, enshrined the principles of peaceful transition of power and equality for all. Its purpose was to provide a blueprint for South Africa by consent and racial peace in a multi-racial society, stressing opportunity for all, consultation, the federal concept, and a Bill of Rights. It caused a split in the United Party that ultimately realigned oppositional politics in South Africa with the formation of the Progressive Federal Party in 1977. The Declaration was the first of several such joint agreements by acknowledged Black and White political leaders in South Africa.

In 1978, the National Party Defence Minister, Pieter Willem Botha, became Prime Minister. His white minority regime worried about Soviet aid to revolutionaries in South Africa at the same time that South African economic growth had slowed. The South African Government noted that it was spending too much money to maintain segregated homelands created for Blacks, and the homelands were proving to be uneconomical.

Nor was maintaining Blacks as third-class citizens working well. Black labour remained vital to the economy, and illegal Black labour unions were flourishing. Many Blacks remained too poor to contribute significantly to the economy through their purchasing power - although they composed more than 70% of the population. Botha's regime feared that an antidote was needed to prevent the Blacks' being attracted to Communism.

In July 1979, the Nigerian Government alleged that the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) was selling Nigerian oil to South Africa, though there was little evidence or commercial logic for such sales. The alleged sanctions-breaking was used to justify the seizure of some of BP's assets in Nigeria including their stake in SPDC, although it appears the real reasons were economic nationalism and domestic politics ahead of the Nigerian elections. Many South Africans attended schools in Nigeria, and Nelson Mandela acknowledged the role of Nigeria in the struggle against apartheid on several occasions.

In the 1980s, anti-apartheid movements in the United States and Europe were gaining support for boycotts against South Africa, for the withdrawal of US companies from South Africa, and for release of imprisoned Nelson Mandela. South Africa was sinking to the bottom of the international community. Investment in South Africa was ending and an active policy of disinvestment had begun.

In the early-1980s, Botha's National Party government started to recognise the inevitability of the need to reform the apartheid system. Early reforms were driven by a combination of internal violence, international condemnation, changes within the National Party's constituency, and changing demographics - whites constituted only 16% of the total population, in comparison to 20% fifty years earlier.

In 1983, a new constitution was passed implementing what was called the Tricameral Parliament, giving Coloureds and Indians voting rights and parliamentary representation in separate houses - the House of Assembly (178 members) for Whites, the House of Representatives (85 members) for Coloureds and the House of Delegates (45 members) for Indians. Each House handled laws pertaining to its racial group's "own affairs", including health, education and other community issues. All laws relating to "general affairs" (matters such as defence, industry, taxation and Black affairs) were handled by a Cabinet made up of representatives from all three houses. However, the White chamber had a large majority on this Cabinet, ensuring that effective control of the country remained in the hands of the White minority. Blacks, although making up the majority of the population, were excluded from representation; they remained nominal citizens of their homelands. The first Tricameral elections were largely boycotted by Coloured and Indian voters, amid widespread rioting.

Concerned over the popularity of Mandela, Botha denounced him as an arch- Marxist committed to violent revolution, but to appease Black opinion and nurture Mandela as a benevolent leader of Blacks, the government transferred him from the maximum security Robben Island to the lower security Pollsmoor Prison just outside Cape Town; where prison life was more comfortable for him. The government allowed Mandela more visitors, including visits and interviews by foreigners, to let the world know that he was being treated well.

In January 1985, Botha addressed the government's House of Assembly and stated that the government was willing to release Mandela on condition that Mandela pledge opposition to acts of violence to further political objectives. Mandela's reply was read in public by his daughter Zinzi - his first words distributed publicly since his sentence to prison twenty-one years before. Mandela described violence as the responsibility of the apartheid regime and said that with democracy there would be no need for violence. The crowd listening to the reading of his speech erupted in cheers and chants. This response helped to further elevate Mandela's status in the eyes of those, both internationally and domestically, who opposed apartheid.

Between 1986-88, some petty apartheid laws were repealed, along with the pass laws. Botha told White South Africans to "adapt or die" and twice he wavered on the eve of what were billed as " rubicon" announcements of substantial reforms, although on both occasions he backed away from substantial changes. Ironically, these reforms served only to trigger intensified political violence through the remainder of the 1980s as more communities and political groups across the country joined the resistance movement. Botha's government stopped short of substantial reforms, such as lifting the ban on the ANC, PAC and SACP and other liberation organisations, releasing political prisoners, or repealing the foundation laws of grand apartheid. The government's stance was that they would not contemplate negotiating until those organisations "renounced violence".

A number of clandestine meetings were held between the ANC-in-exile and various sectors of the internal struggle, such as women and educationalists. More overtly, a group of White intellectuals met the ANC in Senegal for talks known as the Dakar Conference.

Early in 1989, Botha suffered a stroke; he was prevailed upon to resign in February 1989. He was succeeded as President later that year by F.W. de Klerk. Despite his initial reputation as a conservative, de Klerk moved decisively towards negotiations to end the political stalemate in the country. Prior to his term in office, F.W De Klerk had already experienced political success as a result of the power base he had built in the Transvaal. During this time, F.W De Klerk served as chairman to the provincial National Party, which was in favor of the Apartheid regime. The transition of de Klerk's ideology regarding apartheid is seen clearly in his opening address to parliament on 2 February 1990. F.W de Klerk announced that he would repeal discriminatory laws and lift the 30-year ban on leading anti-apartheid groups such as the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the United Democratic Front. The Land Act was brought to an end. De Klerk also made his first public commitment to release Nelson Mandela, to return to press freedom and to suspend the death penalty. Media restrictions were lifted and political prisoners not guilty of common law crimes were released.

On 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from Victor Verster Prison after more than 27 years behind bars.

In 1990, negotiations were earnestly begun, with two meetings between the government and the ANC. The purpose of the negotiations was to pave the way for talks towards a peaceful transition towards majority rule. These meetings were successful in laying down the preconditions for negotiations, despite the considerable tensions still abounding within the country. Apartheid legislation was abolished in 1991.

At the first meeting, the NP and ANC discussed the conditions for negotiations to begin. The meeting was held at Groote Schuur, the President's official residence. They released the Groote Schuur Minute, which said that before negotiations commenced political prisoners would be freed and all exiles allowed to return.

There were fears that the change of power would be violent. To avoid this, it was essential that a peaceful resolution between all parties be reached. In December 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) began negotiations on the formation of a multiracial transitional government and a new constitution extending political rights to all groups. CODESA adopted a Declaration of Intent and committed itself to an "undivided South Africa".

When negotiations resumed in May 1992, under the tag of CODESA II, stronger demands were made. The ANC and the government could not reach a compromise on how power should be shared during the transition to democracy. The NP wanted to retain a strong position in a transitional government, and the power to change decisions made by parliament.

Right-wing violence also added to the hostilities of this period. The assassination of Chris Hani on 10 April 1993 threatened to plunge the country into chaos. Hani, the popular General Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), was assassinated in 1993 in Dawn Park in Johannesburg by Janusz Waluś, an anti-Communist Polish refugee who had close links to the White nationalist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). Hani enjoyed widespread support beyond his constituency in the SACP and ANC and had been recognised as a potential successor to Mandela; his death brought forth protests throughout the country and across the international community, but ultimately proved a turning point, after which the main parties pushed for a settlement with increased determination. On 25 June 1993, the AWB used an armoured vehicle to crash through the doors of the Kempton Park World Trade Centre where talks were still going ahead under the Negotiating Council, though this did not derail the process.

In addition to the continuing "black-on-black" violence, there were a number of attacks on white civilians by the PAC's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). The PAC was hoping to strengthen their standing by attracting the support of the angry, impatient youth. In the St James Church massacre on 25 July 1993, members of the APLA opened fire in a church in Cape Town, killing 11 members of the congregation and wounding 58.

In 1993, de Klerk and Mandela were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for their work for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa".

Violence persisted right up to the 1994 general election. Lucas Mangope, leader of the Bophuthatswana homeland, declared that it would not take part in the elections. It had been decided that, once the temporary constitution had come into effect, the homelands would be incorporated into South Africa, but Mangope did not want this to happen. There were strong protests against his decision, leading to a coup d'état in Bophuthatswana on 10 March that deposed Mangope, despite the intervention of white right-wingers hoping to maintain him in power. Three AWB militants were killed during this intervention, and harrowing images were shown on national television and in newspapers across the world.

Two days before the election, a car bomb exploded in Johannesburg, killing nine people. The day before the elections, another one went off, injuring 13. At midnight on 26-27 April 1994 the old flag was lowered, and the old (now co-official) national anthem ("The Call") was sung, followed by the raising of the new rainbow flag and singing of the other co-official anthem, Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika ("God Bless Africa").

The election was held on 27 April 1994 and went off peacefully throughout the country as 20,000,000 South Africans cast their votes. There was some difficulty in organising the voting in rural areas, but people waited patiently for many hours to vote amidst a palpable feeling of goodwill. An extra day was added to give everyone the chance. International observers agreed that the elections were free and fair. The European Union's report on the election compiled at the end of May 1994, published two years after the election, criticised the Independent Electoral Commission's lack of preparedness for the polls, the shortages of voting materials at many voting stations, and the absence of effective safeguards against fraud in the counting process. In particular, it expressed disquiet that "no international observers had been allowed to be present at the crucial stage of the count when party representatives negotiated over disputed ballots." This meant that both the electorate and the world were "simply left to guess at the way the final result was achieved."

The ANC won 62.65% of the vote, less than the 66.7 percent that would have allowed it to rewrite the constitution. 252 of the 400 seats went to members of the African National Congress. The NP captured most of the White and Coloured votes and became the official opposition party. As well as deciding the national government, the election decided the provincial governments, and the ANC won in seven of the nine provinces, with the NP winning in the Western Cape and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal. On 10 May 1994, Mandela was sworn in as the new President of South Africa. The Government of National Unity was established, its Cabinet made up of 12 ANC representatives, six from the NP, and three from the IFP. Thabo Mbeki and de Klerk were made deputy presidents.

The anniversary of the elections, 27 April, is celebrated as a public holiday known as Freedom Day.

The following individuals, who had previously supported apartheid, made public apologies:

F. W. de Klerk: "I apologise in my capacity as leader of the NP to the millions who suffered wrenching disruption of forced removals; who suffered the shame of being arrested for pass law offences; who over the decades suffered the indignities and humiliation of racial discrimination."

Marthinus van Schalkwyk: "The National Party brought development to a section of South Africa, but also brought suffering through a system grounded on injustice", in a statement shortly after the National Party voted to disband.

Adriaan Vlok washed the feet of apartheid victim Frank Chikane in an act of apology for the wrongs of the Apartheid regime.

Leon Wessels: "I am now more convinced than ever that apartheid was a terrible mistake that blighted our land. South Africans did not listen to the laughing and the crying of each other. I am sorry that I had been so hard of hearing for so long".

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17. ^ "Summary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act". United States Congress. Archived from the original on 22 July 2011.

18. Geldenhuys, Deon (1990). Isolated states: a comparative analysis. Cambridge University Press. p. 274.

19. ^ Ndlovu, Sifiso Mxolisi (2004). "The ANC's Diplomacy and International Relations". The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1970-1980. 2. Unisa Press. ISBN 978-1-86888-406-3.

20. International Labour Office (1991). ^ Apartheid: Special Report of the Directed General on the Application of the Decoration Concerning the Policy of South Africa. International Labour Organization. p. 46.

21. Shultz, Richard (1988). Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press. pp. 121-123, 140-145. ISBN 978-0817987114.

22. ^ Kershner, Isabel (24 May 2010). "Israel Denies It Offered South Africa Warheads". The New York Times.

23. Nigel, Worden, The making of modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2000) p. 3.

24. Paul, Maylam, "The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa", African Affairs, 89.354(1990) pp. 57-84 (p. 54.)

25. Dubow, Saul, "Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the conceptualisation of 'Race'", The Journal of African History, 33(1992) pp. 209-237 (pp. 209, 211)

26. Taylor, Paul (23 December 1993). "S. Africa Approves Charter; White-Led Parliament Votes for Constitution Canceling Its Powers." ^ The Washington Post.

27. "Cops fight crowds at S. Africa elections." ^ Philadelphia Daily News. 28 August 1984.

28. ^ Lieberfeld, Daniel (2002). "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90". Journal of Peace Research. 39 (3): 355-372. doi:10.1177/0022343302039003006.

Naidoo, Josephine C.; Rajab, Devi Moodley (1 September 2005). "The Dynamics of Oppression". Psychology and Developing Societies. 17 (2): 139-159. doi:10.1177/097133360501700204.

Bernstein, Hilda. For their Triumphs and for their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa. International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. London, 1985.

Boswell, Barbara (2017). "Overcoming the 'daily bludgeoning by apartheid': Black South African women writers, agency, and space". African Identities. 15 (4): 414-427. doi:10.1080/14725843.2017.1319754.

Davenport, T. R. H. South Africa. A Modern History. MacMillan, 1977.

Davies, Rob, Dan O'Meara and Sipho Dlamini. The Struggle For South Africa: A reference guide to movements, organisations and institution. Volume Two. London: Zed Books, 1984

De Klerk, F. W. The last Trek. A New Beginning. MacMillan, 1998.

Du Pre, R. H. Separate but Unequal - The 'Coloured' People of South Africa - A Political History.. Jonathan Ball, 1994.

Eiselen, W. W. N. The Meaning of Apartheid, Race Relations, 15 (3), 1948.

Federal Research Division. South Africa - a country study. Library of Congress, 1996.

Giliomee, Herman The Afrikaners. Hurst & Co., 2003.

Goodman, Peter S. (24 October 2017). "End of Apartheid in South Africa? Not in Economic Terms". The New York Times. Political liberation has yet to translate into material gains for blacks. As one woman said, 'I've gone from a shack to a shack.'

Hexham, Irving, The Irony of Apartheid: The Struggle for National Independence of Afrikaner Calvinism against British Imperialism. Edwin Mellen, 1981.

Keable, Ken London Recruits: The Secret War Against Apartheid. Pontypool, UK: Merlin Press. 2012.

Lapchick, Richard and Urdang, Stephanie. Oppression and Resistance. The Struggle of Women in Southern Africa. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 1982.

Louw, P. Eric. The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid. Praeger, 2004.

Makdisi, Saree (2018). "Apartheid / Apartheid / [ ]". Critical Inquiry. 44 (2): 304-330. doi:10.1086/695377.

Meredith, Martin. In the name of apartheid: South Africa in the postwar period. 1st US ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

Meredith, Martin. The State of Africa. The Free Press, 2005.

Merrett, Christopher. "Sport and Apartheid." History Compass 3, no. 1 (2005). doi:10.1111/j.1478-0542.2005.00165.x.

Morris, Michael. Apartheid: An illustrated history. Jonathan Ball Publishers. Johannesburg and Cape Town, 2012.

Newbury, Darren. Defiant Images: Photography and Apartheid South Africa, University of South Africa (UNISA) Press, 2009.

Noah, Trevor. Born a Crime: Stories from a South African Childhood, Random House 2016, ISBN 978-0399588174.

Suze, Anthony (2010). "The untold story of Robben Island: Sports and the anti-Apartheid movement". Sport in Society. 13: 36-42. doi:10.1080/17430430903377706.

Terreblanche, S. A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002. University of Natal Press, 2003.

Visser, Pippa. In search of history. Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2003.

Williams, Michael. Book: Crocodile Burning. 1994

Memorandum van die Volksraad, 2016

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Apartheid ( South African English: ; Afrikaans: [aˈpartɦɛit], segregation; lit. "aparthood") was a system of institutionalised racial segregation that existed in South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia) from 1948 until the early 1990s. Apartheid was characterised by an authoritarian political culture based on (or white supremacy), which ensured that South Africa was dominated politically, socially, and economically by the nation's minority white population.

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Comment publier mon enregistrement sur Padlet (alternative : envoi par mail à patrice.minart@egd.mg)

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Comment publier mon enregistrement sur Padlet (alternative : envoi par mail à patrice.minart@egd.mg)

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1 / Créer une vignette en cliquant sur le +
2 / En bas de cette vignette, cliquer sur les 3 point à droite
3 / Dans la liste qui s'affiche choisir "film" ou "voice" selon que vous voulez l'image avec le son ou pas. Evidemment, vous devez avoir un micro et une webcam...
4 / Enregistrez-vous et publiez.

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A video on a biography of DF Malan

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Lindie Koorts on her autobiographical offering DF Malan

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D.F. Malan was born in 1874 in Riebeeck West in the Cape. He completed his doctorate of divinity at the University of Utrecht in 1905 and was ordained as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. His strong Afrikaner nationalism led him into the arena of politics, and when J.B.M. Hertzog broke his ties with Prime Minister Louis Botha to form the National Party, Malan was one of his first supporters.

In 1915 the newspaper 'Die Burger' was founded and Malan became its first editor, using it as a springboard for entry into parliament. He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Hertzog government of 1924. Malan strongly opposed moves to form a coalition between the National Party and Jan Smut's South African Party in 1933, and rejected the resulting 'fusion' government formed in 1934. He was also a leader in the creation of the 'Purified' National Party, which initially consisted of the few Afrikaner parliamentarians who refused to follow Hertzog or Smuts. Ten years later this new National Party had gained enough strength to defeat the Union Party in the 1948 elections.

As Prime Minister Malan put many principles into effect, which had led to Hertzog's break with Botha 35 years earlier. Notably those that had espoused institutionalised apartheid, or separate development. Malan was dour and unbending and retired from office in 1954 after achieving nearly all of the objectives that had originally drawn him away from the ministry and into national politics. He died in Stellenbosch in 1959.

Potgieter, D. J. (1972). Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa, Vol.6, Nasou: Cape Town, p. 169.| D F Malan [online] Availabe at: stellenboschwriters.com [Accessed 21 October 2009]

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D.F. Malan was born in 1874 in Riebeeck West in the Cape. He completed his doctorate of divinity at the University of Utrecht in 1905 and was ordained as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church. His strong Afrikaner nationalism led him into the arena of politics, and when J.B.M.

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Definition of Apartheid by Hendrik Verwoerd

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Definition of Apartheid by Hendrik Verwoerd

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PM of South Africa (1958-1966)

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A Prezi to watch on Grand and Petty Apartheid(s)

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A Prezi to watch on Grand and Petty Apartheid(s)

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Effects Limited/unwanted contact between races Large class divide (rich/poor) Little/no colored education Black South Africans in poverty cycle Residual racism High crime rate High uneployment Purpose Petty Apartheid Segregation of races White supremacy Better opportunities for

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Located in the southern tip of the continent, South Africa is bordered in the northwestern region by the Orange River that separates it from Namibia, in the eastern region by the Limpopo River that separates it from Zimbabwe and Southeastern Botswana. It is Africa's most multiracial nation comprising peoples of African, Asian and European descent. It has 11 official languages and a population of over 49 million people. Population data compiled in 2010, according to racial categories, put blacks at 79.4%, Whites at 9.2%, Coloured at 8.8%, and Indian or Asian at 2.6%. It is Africa's largest economy and most industrialized nation.

Political system and history

The territory of present day South Africa was formerly a British colony until its accession to independence, as a self governing dominion within the British Commonwealth in 1910. This was shortly after the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act (1909), merging the four British dependencies of Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Natal and Transvaal. Although the objective of the British in merging the dependencies was to unite South Africa and consolidate its imperialist interests, what resulted was a divided South Africa, with blacks excluded from political participation. This development fuelled discontent and racial conflict that would define the country's post colonial and twentieth century history. The practice of exclusionary politics was later institutionalised under the system of apartheid - an extreme form of legal segregation based on race, and enforced by the Nationalist Party government between 1948 and 1994. The year 1994 saw a sudden end to white minority rule as international pressure, democratic winds of change blowing across Africa, and an increasingly unmanageable and violent revolutionary forces within South Africa forced the Nationalist Party (NP) government of President F. W. de Klerk to introduce reforms. These reforms would result in the establishment of a constitutional democracy headed by the first non white president - Nelson Mandela - following his African National Congress (ANC)'s overwhelming win in the first multiracial elections in April 1994.

Constitutional history and development

South Africa's constitutional history and development can be divided into three key phases: the period between 1909 and 1910, the period 1910 and 1990 and finally the period 1990 to present
The Independence Constitutional Development
The South Africa Act of 1909

The period 1909 to 1910 covers the independence period and is essentially the genesis of the constitutional development of South Africa. This period was characterised by the enactment of the South Africa Act by the British Parliament, establishing an independent Union of South Africa comprising the territories of Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Natal and Transvaal. In reality, this was South Africa's Independence constitution.
The Post independence Constitutional Development
The 1931 Statute of Westminster and the Status of Union Act of 1934

The South Africa Act of 1909 only granted independence to South Africa to the extent that British Crown would continue to be a ceremonial head of state represented on the ground by a Governor General. Consequently, certain Acts of the British Parliament continued to be applicable in South Africa. Independence was therefore limited only to matters of internal affairs. In 1931 however, the British Parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster which removed many constitutional limitations on all British dominions reducing the role and presence of the British Crown. Following this Statute, the South African Parliament passed the Status of Union Act of 1934 to the effect that no act of the British parliament could apply to South Africa unless endorsed by the Union parliament.

The Constitution of 1961

In 1960, following the drafting of a new constitution, South Africa's white voters voted in a constitutional referendum to abolish the Union of South Africa created by the South Africa Act of 1909. In its stead, a Republic a South Africa was established. Although premised on the South Africa Act, the 1961 Constitution severed all ties with the British Empire as the state president replaced the Crown and the Governor General. All references to "king," "queen," and "crown" were replaced with "state."

Key features provided by the new constitution were a president, a prime minister, and an executive council (cabinet), based in Pretoria, a bicameral legislature in Cape Town and an independent judiciary sitting in Bloemfontein.

The constitution maintained white dominance over political life through a discriminatory electoral structure that disenfranchised non whites. A Bantu Authorities Act in 1951 restricted the political participation of blacks to the homelands called Bantustan. However, selective reforms in 1964 and 1968 opened some political space to Asians and Coloureds by allowing limited political participation in ethnic affairs. Accordingly, a Coloured Persons' Representative Council was created in 1964 and a South African Indian Council established in 1968.

The Constitution of 1983

In 1983, a series of legislative reforms resulted in the enactment of a new constitution and a reconfiguration of state institutions and power. These reforms were implemented through the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act of 1983. It provided for an executive authority that was shared amongst an executive president elected for a 5 year term, a cabinet appointed from the parliament and a Council of ministers also chosen from parliament. It established a tricameral parliament with a House of Assembly for whites, a House of Representatives for Coloureds and a House of Delegates for Indians. An 88 member Electoral College system was established for electing the president consisting of 50 white electors, 25 Coloured and 13 Indian electors to be chosen by majority vote from their respective Houses.

The three-chambered parliament was based on a fundamental premise of the 1983 constitution, the distinction between a racial community's "own" affairs (encompassing education, health, housing, social welfare, local government, and some aspects of agriculture), and "general" affairs (encompassing defense, finance, foreign policy, justice, law and order, transport, commerce and industry, manpower, internal affairs, and overall agricultural policy). Thus, legislation "affecting the interests" of one community was deliberated upon by the appropriate house, but legislation on "general affairs" of importance to all races was handled by all three houses of parliament. Disagreements among houses of parliament on specific legislation could be resolved by the President's Council, giving the NP-dominated House of Assembly substantial weight in determining the outcome of all legislative debates. The president signed all legislation, and also exercised administrative responsibility for black affairs.

The Constitution also provided for a President's Council on which he relied for advice on urgent matters and for resolution of differences among houses of parliament. The Council comprised twenty members from the House of Assembly, ten from the House of Representatives, five from the House of Delegates, fifteen nominated by the president, and ten nominated by opposition party leaders. This constitution lasted until the demise of apartheid in 1993
Constitutional development in the 1990s
In 1990, mounting international and domestic pressure, and, growing evidence and realization among the white political class that the apartheid system was unsustainable, forced the NP towards dismantling the system. The first step was the lifting of the ban on political organizations - in particular the African National Congress (ANC) and, the release of veteran opposition leader, Nelson Mandela, after 27 years in prison. This was followed by a repeal of the apartheid legislation. Between these developments and 1993 and against a backdrop of intense political violence, the NP, the ANC and other political organizations, engaged in a series of negotiations under the umbrella of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). These negotiations eventually led to the adoption of an interim constitution to govern the transition to a new South Africa. This came after an all white referendum in which over 60 percent of whites voted in favour of absolute reforms.

The Interim Constitution of 1993

Promulgated by the Constitution of South Africa Act of 1993, it provided for a Government of National Unity, a five-year transition. It also provided for a Constituent Assembly consisting of a combined Senate and National Assembly to draft the a new constitution. It is under the terms of this constitution that Mandela would become president in May 1994. This constitution remained in force until 1996 when the current constitution of South Africa was adopted

The Constitution of 1996

Promulgated as the Constitution of South Africa Act, it has been described as a masterpiece of post conflict constitutional engineering in the post cold war era. Designed in the context of South Africa's transition to democratic rule which started with the release of Mandela in February 1990, the constitution completely reconfigured South Africa's political institutions, injecting new dynamics and transformative changes across its political landscape. It effectively ended decades of oppressive white minority rule. The constitution has since been amended sixteen times but remains the basic law of the nation

Key timelines in South Africa's transition to democratic rule and the 1993 constitutional process

The period 1990-1993

The Period 1994- 1997

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Located in the southern tip of the continent, South Africa is bordered in the northwestern region by the Orange River that separates it from Namibia, in the eastern region by the Limpopo River that separates it from Zimbabwe and Southeastern Botswana. It is Africa's most multiracial nation comprising peoples of African, Asian and European descent.

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Watch this video to complet the first paragraph

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Watch this first video on the Freedom Charter

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Watch this first video on the Freedom Charter

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59 years since the adoption of the Freedom Charter in Kliptown

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Leon Levy looks back at The Freedom Charter's first adoption

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11 June 2014 marks 50 years of the Rivonia Trial

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Mandela and his fellow defendants were charged with 221 acts of sabotage designed to "ferment violent revolution".

The ANC had been operating underground since being outlawed in April 1960, one month after the Sharpeville Massacre of 67 protestors by police. The police had collected hundreds of documents from the ANC hideout at Rivonia about Operation Mayibuye (Operation Comeback).

Under the new General Law Amendment (Sabotage) Act of 1962 and the Suppression of Communism Act, the defendants faced the threat of the death penalty.

Mandela had a growing international reputation and the ANC sought to use the trial to win worldwide support and attention, hence Mandela's speech from the dock on April 20th which was delivered from his handwritten script.

For example, the speech was extracted in The Observer on Sunday April 26th, under the headline "Why I am prepared to die".

Mandela was described as "the black pimpernel of South Africa, on trial in Pretoria with eight others on charges of attempting a revolution by violence".

The newspaper told its readers that "the alleged offences are punishable by death. Last week he appeared in the witness-box for four-and-a-half hours to explain his stand. He admitted that he had organised sabotage. He explained why he had turned to violence, and what kind of South Africa he was prepared to die for" to introduce "the historic speech which could be his last".

On June 11 1964, at the conclusion of the trial, Mandela and the seven other defendants - Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki (father of current South African President Thabo Mbeki), Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi, Ahmed Kathrada and Denis Goldberg - were convicted. Mandela was found guilty on four charges of sabotage. All eight were imprisoned to life imprisonment.

The United Nations Security Council condemned the trial and began moves towards international sanctions against the apartheid regime. But it was 27 years before Mandela was released from prison on February 11th 1990, becoming President of South Africa following the first democratic multi-racial elections in 1994.
Topics

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Mandela and his fellow defendants were charged with 221 acts of sabotage designed to "ferment violent revolution". The ANC had been operating underground since being outlawed in April 1960, one month after the Sharpeville Massacre of 67 protestors by police. The police had collected hundreds of documents from the ANC hideout at Rivonia about Operation Mayibuye (Operation Comeback).

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Discover Mandela's speech during Rivonia Trial

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Discover Mandela's speech during Rivonia Trial

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I am the First Accused.

I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May 1961.

At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said.

In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. The names of Dingane and Bambata, Hintsa and Makana, Squngthi and Dalasile, Moshoeshoe and Sekhukhune, were praised as the glory of the entire African nation. I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. This is what has motivated me in all that I have done in relation to the charges made against me in this case.

Having said this, I must deal immediately and at some length with the question of violence. Some of the things so far told to the Court are true and some are untrue. I do not, however, deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites.

I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.

In the statement which I am about to make I shall correct certain false impressions which have been created by State witnesses. Amongst other things, I will demonstrate that certain of the acts referred to in the evidence were not and could not have been committed by Umkhonto. I will also deal with the relationship between the African National Congress and Umkhonto, and with the part which I personally have played in the affairs of both organizations. I shall deal also with the part played by the Communist Party. In order to explain these matters properly, I will have to explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen. I will also have to explain how I became involved in the activities of these organizations.

I deny that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organisation, and which have been charged in the indictment against us. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, but to demonstrate that they could not have been authorized by Umkhonto, I want to refer briefly to the roots and policy of the organization.

I have already mentioned that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto. I, and the others who started the organization, did so for two reasons. Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence.

But the violence which we chose to adopt was not terrorism. We who formed Umkhonto were all members of the African National Congress, and had behind us the ANC tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. We believe that South Africa belongs to all the people who live in it, and not to one group, be it black or white. We did not want an interracial war, and tried to avoid it to the last minute. If the Court is in doubt about this, it will be seen that the whole history of our organization bears out what I have said, and what I will subsequently say, when I describe the tactics which Umkhonto decided to adopt. I want, therefore, to say something about the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was formed in 1912 to defend the rights of the African people which had been seriously curtailed by the South Africa Act, and which were then being threatened by the Native Land Act. For thirty-seven years - that is until 1949 - it adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the Government in the belief that African grievances could be settled through peaceful discussion and that Africans could advance gradually to full political rights. But White Governments remained unmoved, and the rights of Africans became less instead of becoming greater. In the words of my leader, Chief Luthuli, who became President of the ANC in 1952, and who was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:

"who will deny that thirty years of my life have been spent knocking in vain, patiently, moderately, and modestly at a closed and barred door? What have been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty years have seen the greatest number of laws restricting our rights and progress, until today we have reached a stage where we have almost no rights at all".

Even after 1949, the ANC remained determined to avoid violence. At this time, however, there was a change from the strictly constitutional means of protest which had been employed in the past. The change was embodied in a decision which was taken to protest against apartheid legislation by peaceful, but unlawful, demonstrations against certain laws. Pursuant to this policy the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign, in which I was placed in charge of volunteers. This campaign was based on the principles of passive resistance. More than 8,500 people defied apartheid laws and went to jail. Yet there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier. I and nineteen colleagues were convicted for the role which we played in organizing the campaign, but our sentences were suspended mainly because the Judge found that discipline and non-violence had been stressed throughout. This was the time when the volunteer section of the ANC was established, and when the word 'Amadelakufa' was first used: this was the time when the volunteers were asked to take a pledge to uphold certain principles. Evidence dealing with volunteers and their pledges has been introduced into this case, but completely out of context. The volunteers were not, and are not, the soldiers of a black army pledged to fight a civil war against the whites. They were, and are dedicated workers who are prepared to lead campaigns initiated by the ANC to distribute leaflets, to organize strikes, or do whatever the particular campaign required. They are called volunteers because they volunteer to face the penalties of imprisonment and whipping which are now prescribed by the legislature for such acts.

During the Defiance Campaign, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed. These Statutes provided harsher penalties for offences committed by way of protests against laws. Despite this, the protests continued and the ANC adhered to its policy of non-violence. In 1956, 156 leading members of the Congress Alliance, including myself, were arrested on a charge of high treason and charges under the Suppression of Communism Act. The non-violent policy of the ANC was put in issue by the State, but when the Court gave judgement some five years later, it found that the ANC did not have a policy of violence. We were acquitted on all counts, which included a count that the ANC sought to set up a communist state in place of the existing regime. The Government has always sought to label all its opponents as communists. This allegation has been repeated in the present case, but as I will show, the ANC is not, and never has been, a communist organization.

In 1960 there was the shooting at Sharpeville, which resulted in the proclamation of a state of emergency and the declaration of the ANC as an unlawful organization. My colleagues and I, after careful consideration, decided that we would not obey this decree. The African people were not part of the Government and did not make the laws by which they were governed. We believed in the words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that 'the will of the people shall be the basis of authority of the Government', and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time. The ANC refused to dissolve, but instead went underground. We believed it was our duty to preserve this organization which had been built up with almost fifty years of unremitting toil. I have no doubt that no self-respecting White political organization would disband itself if declared illegal by a government in which it had no say.

In 1960 the Government held a referendum which led to the establishment of the Republic. Africans, who constituted approximately 70 per cent of the population of South Africa, were not entitled to vote, and were not even consulted about the proposed constitutional change. All of us were apprehensive of our future under the proposed White Republic, and a resolution was taken to hold an All-In African Conference to call for a National Convention, and to organize mass demonstrations on the eve of the unwanted Republic, if the Government failed to call the Convention. The conference was attended by Africans of various political persuasions. I was the Secretary of the conference and undertook to be responsible for organizing the national stay-at-home which was subsequently called to coincide with the declaration of the Republic. As all strikes by Africans are illegal, the person organizing such a strike must avoid arrest. I was chosen to be this person, and consequently I had to leave my home and family and my practice and go into hiding to avoid arrest.

The stay-at-home, in accordance with ANC policy, was to be a peaceful demonstration. Careful instructions were given to organizers and members to avoid any recourse to violence. The Government's answer was to introduce new and harsher laws, to mobilize its armed forces, and to send Saracens, armed vehicles, and soldiers into the townships in a massive show of force designed to intimidate the people. This was an indication that the Government had decided to rule by force alone, and this decision was a milestone on the road to Umkhonto.

Some of this may appear irrelevant to this trial. In fact, I believe none of it is irrelevant because it will, I hope, enable the Court to appreciate the attitude eventually adopted by the various persons and bodies concerned in the National Liberation Movement. When I went to jail in 1962, the dominant idea was that loss of life should be avoided. I now know that this was still so in 1963.

I must return to June 1961. What were we, the leaders of our people, to do? Were we to give in to the show of force and the implied threat against future action, or were we to fight it and, if so, how?

We had no doubt that we had to continue the fight. Anything else would have been abject surrender. Our problem was not whether to fight, but was how to continue the fight. We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were. But the hard facts were that fifty years of non-violence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation, and fewer and fewer rights. It may not be easy for this Court to understand, but it is a fact that for a long time the people had been talking of violence - of the day when they would fight the White man and win back their country - and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial State by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.

It must not be forgotten that by this time violence had, in fact, become a feature of the South African political scene. There had been violence in 1957 when the women of Zeerust were ordered to carry passes; there was violence in 1958 with the enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukhuniland; there was violence in 1959 when the people of Cato Manor protested against pass raids; there was violence in 1960 when the Government attempted to impose Bantu Authorities in Pondoland. Thirty-nine Africans died in these disturbances. In 1961 there had been riots in Warmbaths, and all this time the Transkei had been a seething mass of unrest. Each disturbance pointed clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out - it showed that a Government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it. Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans, as well as Whites, if not properly directed. Particularly disturbing was the type of violence engendered in places such as Zeerust, Sekhukhuniland, and Pondoland amongst Africans. It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the Government - though this is what prompted it - but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness.

At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.

This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the Government had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of Umkhonto published on 16 December 1961, which is Exhibit AD, we said:

"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices - submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom".

This was our feeling in June of 1961 when we decided to press for a change in the policy of the National Liberation Movement. I can only say that I felt morally obliged to do what I did.

We who had taken this decision started to consult leaders of various organizations, including the ANC. I will not say whom we spoke to, or what they said, but I wish to deal with the role of the African National Congress in this phase of the struggle, and with the policy and objectives of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

As far as the ANC was concerned, it formed a clear view which can be summarized as follows:

It was a mass political organization with a political function to fulfil. Its members had joined on the express policy of non-violence.

Because of all this, it could not and would not undertake violence. This must be stressed. One cannot turn such a body into the small, closely knit organization required for sabotage. Nor would this be politically correct, because it would result in members ceasing to carry out this essential activity: political propaganda and organization. Nor was it permissible to change the whole nature of the organization.

On the other hand, in view of this situation I have described, the ANC was prepared to depart from its fifty-year-old policy of non-violence to this extent that it would no longer disapprove of properly controlled violence. Hence members who undertook such activity would not be subject to disciplinary action by the ANC.

I say 'properly controlled violence' because I made it clear that if I formed the organization I would at all times subject it to the political guidance of the ANC and would not undertake any different form of activity from that contemplated without the consent of the ANC. And I shall now tell the Court how that form of violence came to be determined.

As a result of this decision, Umkhonto was formed in November 1961. When we took this decision, and subsequently formulated our plans, the ANC heritage of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. We already have examples in South African history of the results of war. It has taken more than fifty years for the scars of the South African War to disappear. How much longer would it take to eradicate the scars of inter-racial civil war, which could not be fought without a great loss of life on both sides?

The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into account in formulating our plans. We required a plan which was flexible and which permitted us to act in accordance with the needs of the times; above all, the plan had to be one which recognized civil war as the last resort, and left the decision on this question to the future. We did not want to be committed to civil war, but we wanted to be ready if it became inevitable.

Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision.

In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit AD):

"We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war."

The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.

Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence.

In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the South African Government.

This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z'.

The affairs of the Umkhonto were controlled and directed by a National High Command, which had powers of co-option and which could, and did, appoint Regional Commands. The High Command was the body which determined tactics and targets and was in charge of training and finance. Under the High Command there were Regional Commands which were responsible for the direction of the local sabotage groups. Within the framework of the policy laid down by the National High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select the targets to be attacked. They had no authority to go beyond the prescribed framework and thus had no authority to embark upon acts which endangered life, or which did not fit into the overall plan of sabotage. For instance, Umkhonto members were forbidden ever to go armed into operation. Incidentally, the terms High Command and Regional Command were an importation from the Jewish national underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi, which operated in Israel between 1944 and 1948.

Umkhonto had its first operation on 16 December 1961, when Government buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban were attacked. The selection of targets is proof of the policy to which I have referred. Had we intended to attack life we would have selected targets where people congregated and not empty buildings and power stations. The sabotage which was committed before 16 December 1961 was the work of isolated groups and had no connection whatever with Umkhonto. In fact, some of these and a number of later acts were claimed by other organizations.

The Manifesto of Umkhonto was issued on the day that operations commenced. The response to our actions and Manifesto among the white population was characteristically violent. The Government threatened to take strong action, and called upon its supporters to stand firm and to ignore the demands of the Africans. The Whites failed to respond by suggesting change; they responded to our call by suggesting the laager.

In contrast, the response of the Africans was one of encouragement. Suddenly there was hope again. Things were happening. People in the townships became eager for political news. A great deal of enthusiasm was generated by the initial successes, and people began to speculate on how soon freedom would be obtained.

But we in Umkhonto weighed up the white response with anxiety. The lines were being drawn. The whites and blacks were moving into separate camps, and the prospects of avoiding a civil war were made less. The white newspapers carried reports that sabotage would be punished by death. If this was so, how could we continue to keep Africans away from terrorism?

Already scores of Africans had died as a result of racial friction. In 1920 when the famous leader, Masabala, was held in Port Elizabeth jail, twenty-four of a group of Africans who had gathered to demand his release were killed by the police and white civilians. In 1921, more than one hundred Africans died in the Bulhoek affair. In 1924 over two hundred Africans were killed when the Administrator of South-West Africa led a force against a group which had rebelled against the imposition of dog tax. On 1 May 1950, eighteen Africans died as a result of police shootings during the strike. On 21 March 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans died at Sharpeville.

How many more Sharpevilles would there be in the history of our country? And how many more Sharpevilles could the country stand without violence and terror becoming the order of the day? And what would happen to our people when that stage was reached? In the long run we felt certain we must succeed, but at what cost to ourselves and the rest of the country? And if this happened, how could black and white ever live together again in peace and harmony? These were the problems that faced us, and these were our decisions.

Experience convinced us that rebellion would offer the Government limitless opportunities for the indiscriminate slaughter of our people. But it was precisely because the soil of South Africa is already drenched with the blood of innocent Africans that we felt it our duty to make preparations as a long-term undertaking to use force in order to defend ourselves against force. If war were inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most favourable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparations for the future, to make provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare.

All whites undergo compulsory military training, but no such training was given to Africans. It was in our view essential to build up a nucleus of trained men who would be able to provide the leadership which would be required if guerrilla warfare started. We had to prepare for such a situation before it became too late to make proper preparations. It was also necessary to build up a nucleus of men trained in civil administration and other professions, so that Africans would be equipped to participate in the government of this country as soon as they were allowed to do so.

At this stage it was decided that I should attend the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Central, East, and Southern Africa, which was to be held early in 1962 in Addis Ababa, and, because of our need for preparation, it was also decided that, after the conference, I would undertake a tour of the African States with a view to obtaining facilities for the training of soldiers, and that I would also solicit scholarships for the higher education of matriculated Africans. Training in both fields would be necessary, even if changes came about by peaceful means. Administrators would be necessary who would be willing and able to administer a non-racial State and so would men be necessary to control the army and police force of such a State.

It was on this note that I left South Africa to proceed to Addis Ababa as a delegate of the ANC. My tour was a success. Wherever I went I met sympathy for our cause and promises of help. All Africa was united against the stand of White South Africa, and even in London I was received with great sympathy by political leaders, such as Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Grimond. In Africa I was promised support by such men as Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika; Mr. Kawawa, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia; General Abboud, President of the Sudan; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia; Ben Bella, now President of Algeria; Modibo Keita, President of Mali; Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal; Sekou Toure, President of Guinea; President Tubman of Liberia; and Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda. It was Ben Bella who invited me to visit Oujda, the Headquarters of the Algerian Army of National Liberation, the visit which is described in my diary, one of the Exhibits.

I started to make a study of the art of war and revolution and, whilst abroad, underwent a course in military training. If there was to be guerrilla warfare, I wanted to be able to stand and fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with them. Notes of lectures which I received in Algeria are contained in Exhibit 16, produced in evidence. Summaries of books on guerrilla warfare and military strategy have also been produced. I have already admitted that these documents are in my writing, and I acknowledge that I made these studies to equip myself for the role which I might have to play if the struggle drifted into guerrilla warfare. I approached this question as every African Nationalist should do. I was completely objective. The Court will see that I attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject - from the East and from the West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering such a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara on the one hand, and the writings on the Anglo-Boer War on the other. Of course, these notes are merely summaries of the books I read and do not contain my personal views.

I also made arrangements for our recruits to undergo military training. But here it was impossible to organize any scheme without the co-operation of the ANC offices in Africa. I consequently obtained the permission of the ANC in South Africa to do this. To this extent then there was a departure from the original decision of the ANC, but it applied outside South Africa only. The first batch of recruits actually arrived in Tanganyika when I was passing through that country on my way back to South Africa.

I returned to South Africa and reported to my colleagues on the results of my trip. On my return I found that there had been little alteration in the political scene save that the threat of a death penalty for sabotage had now become a fact. The attitude of my colleagues in Umkhonto was much the same as it had been before I left. They were feeling their way cautiously and felt that it would be a long time before the possibilities of sabotage were exhausted. In fact, the view was expressed by some that the training of recruits was premature. This is recorded by me in the document which is Exhibit R.14. After a full discussion, however, it was decided to go ahead with the plans for military training because of the fact that it would take many years to build up a sufficient nucleus of trained soldiers to start a guerrilla campaign, and whatever happened the training would be of value.

I wish to turn now to certain general allegations made in this case by the State. But before doing so, I wish to revert to certain occurrences said by witnesses to have happened in Port Elizabeth and East London. I am referring to the bombing of private houses of pro-Government persons during September, October and November 1962. I do not know what justification there was for these acts, nor what provocation had been given. But if what I have said already is accepted, then it is clear that these acts had nothing to do with the carrying out of the policy of Umkhonto.

One of the chief allegations in the indictment

Another of the allegations in the indictment is that Rivonia was the headquarters of Umkhonto. This is not true of the time when I was there. I was told, of course, and knew that certain of the activities of the Communist Party were carried on there. But this is no reason (as I shall presently explain) why I should not use the place.

I came there in the following manner:

As already indicated, early in April 1961 I went underground to organize the May general strike. My work entailed travelling throughout the country, living now in African townships, then in country villages and again in cities.

During the second half of the year I started visiting the Parktown home of Arthur Goldreich, where I used to meet my family privately. Although I had no direct political association with him, I had known Arthur Goldreich socially since 1958.

In October, Arthur Goldreich informed me that he was moving out of town and offered me a hiding place there. A few days thereafter, he arranged for Michael Harmel to take me to Rivonia. I naturally found Rivonia an ideal place for the man who lived the life of an outlaw. Up to that time I had been compelled to live indoors during the daytime and could only venture out under cover of darkness. But at Liliesleaf [farm, Rivonia,] I could live differently and work far more efficiently.

For obvious reasons, I had to disguise myself and I assumed the fictitious name of David. In December, Arthur Goldreich and his family moved in. I stayed there until I went abroad on 11 January 1962. As already indicated, I returned in July 1962 and was arrested in Natal on 5 August.

Up to the time of my arrest, Liliesleaf farm was the headquarters of neither the African National Congress nor Umkhonto. With the exception of myself, none of the officials or members of these bodies lived there, no meetings of the governing bodies were ever held there, and no activities connected with them were either organized or directed from there. On numerous occasions during my stay at Liliesleaf farm I met both the Executive Committee of the ANC, as well as the NHC, but such meetings were held elsewhere and not on the farm.

Whilst staying at Liliesleaf farm, I frequently visited Arthur Goldreich in the main house and he also paid me visits in my room. We had numerous political discussions covering a variety of subjects. We discussed ideological and practical questions, the Congress Alliance, Umkhonto and its activities generally, and his experiences as a soldier in the Palmach, the military wing of the Haganah. Haganah was the political authority of the Jewish National Movement in Palestine.

Because of what I had got to know of Goldreich, I recommended on my return to South Africa that he should be recruited to Umkhonto. I do not know of my personal knowledge whether this was done.

Another of the allegations made by the State is that the aims and objects of the ANC and the Communist Party are the same. I wish to deal with this and with my own political position, because I must assume that the State may try to argue from certain Exhibits that I tried to introduce Marxism into the ANC. The allegation as to the ANC is false. This is an old allegation which was disproved at the Treason Trial and which has again reared its head. But since the allegation has been made again, I shall deal with it as well as with the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party and Umkhonto and that party.

The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African Nationalism. It is not the concept of African Nationalism expressed in the cry, 'Drive the White man into the sea'. The African Nationalism for which the ANC stands is the concept of freedom and fulfilment for the African people in their own land. The most important political document ever adopted by the ANC is the 'Freedom Charter'. It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalization, of land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power. It would be a hollow gesture to repeal the Gold Law prohibitions against Africans when all gold mines are owned by European companies. In this respect the ANC's policy corresponds with the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its programme the nationalization of the gold mines which, at that time, were controlled by foreign capital. Under the Freedom Charter, nationalization would take place in an economy based on private enterprise. The realization of the Freedom Charter would open up fresh fields for a prosperous African population of all classes, including the middle class. The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society.

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, and if I understand its policy correctly, it stands for the establishment of a State based on the principles of Marxism. Although it is prepared to work for the Freedom Charter, as a short term solution to the problems created by white supremacy, it regards the Freedom Charter as the beginning, and not the end, of its programme.

The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party's main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction.

It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party. But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal - in this case the removal of white supremacy - and is not proof of a complete community of interests.

The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler. Nobody but Hitler would have dared to suggest that such co-operation turned Churchill or Roosevelt into communists or communist tools, or that Britain and America were working to bring about a communist world.

Another instance of such co-operation is to be found precisely in Umkhonto. Shortly after Umkhonto was constituted, I was informed by some of its members that the Communist Party would support Umkhonto, and this then occurred. At a later stage the support was made openly.

I believe that communists have always played an active role in the fight by colonial countries for their freedom, because the short-term objects of communism would always correspond with the long-term objects of freedom movements. Thus communists have played an important role in the freedom struggles fought in countries such as Malaya, Algeria, and Indonesia, yet none of these States today are communist countries. Similarly in the underground resistance movements which sprung up in Europe during the last World War, communists played an important role. Even General Chiang Kai-Shek, today one of the bitterest enemies of communism, fought together with the communists against the ruling class in the struggle which led to his assumption of power in China in the 1930s.

This pattern of co-operation between communists and non-communists has been repeated in the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. Prior to the banning of the Communist Party, joint campaigns involving the Communist Party and the Congress movements were accepted practice. African communists could, and did, become members of the ANC, and some served on the National, Provincial, and local committees. Amongst those who served on the National Executive are Albert Nzula, a former Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane, another former Secretary, and J. B. Marks, a former member of the Central Committee.

I joined the ANC in 1944, and in my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the ANC, and the close co-operation which existed at times on specific issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress Youth League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one school of political thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since.

It is perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends. But to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with us, live with us, and work with us. They were the only political group which was prepared to work with the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as communists and bans many of them (who are not communists) under the Suppression of Communism Act. Although I have never been a member of the Communist Party, I myself have been named under that pernicious Act because of the role I played in the Defiance Campaign. I have also been banned and imprisoned under that Act.

It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers. Although there is a universal condemnation of apartheid, the communist bloc speaks out against it with a louder voice than most of the white world. In these circumstances, it would take a brash young politician, such as I was in 1949, to proclaim that the Communists are our enemies.

I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist, and I think that in the circumstances I am obliged to state exactly what my political beliefs are.

I have always regarded myself, in the first place, as an African patriot. After all, I was born in Umtata, forty-six years ago. My guardian was my cousin, who was the acting paramount chief of Tembuland, and I am related both to the present paramount chief of Tembuland, Sabata Dalindyebo, and to Kaizer Matanzima, the Chief Minister of the Transkei.

Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation.

It is true, as I have already stated, that I have been influenced by Marxist thought. But this is also true of many of the leaders of the new independent States. Such widely different persons as Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah, and Nasser all acknowledge this fact. We all accept the need for some form of socialism to enable our people to catch up with the advanced countries of this world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty. But this does not mean we are Marxists.

Indeed, for my own part, I believe that it is open to debate whether the Communist Party has any specific role to play at this particular stage of our political struggle. The basic task at the present moment is the removal of race discrimination and the attainment of democratic rights on the basis of the Freedom Charter. In so far as that Party furthers this task, I welcome its assistance. I realize that it is one of the means by which people of all races can be drawn into our struggle.

From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system.

The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world.

I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.

The American Congress, that country's doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judiciary, arouses in me similar sentiments.

I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East . . .

There are certain Exhibits which suggest that we received financial support from abroad, and I wish to deal with this question.

Our political struggle has always been financed from internal sources - from funds raised by our own people and by our own supporters. Whenever we had a special campaign or an important political case - for example, the Treason Trial - we received financial assistance from sympathetic individuals and organizations in the Western countries. We had never felt it necessary to go beyond these sources.

But when in 1961 the Umkhonto was formed, and a new phase of struggle introduced, we realized that these events would make a heavy call on our slender resources, and that the scale of our activities would be hampered by the lack of funds. One of my instructions, as I went abroad in January 1962, was to raise funds from the African states.

I must add that, whilst abroad, I had discussions with leaders of political movements in Africa and discovered that almost every single one of them, in areas which had still not attained independence, had received all forms of assistance from the socialist countries, as well as from the West, including that of financial support. I also discovered that some well-known African states, all of them non-communists, and even anti-communists, had received similar assistance.

On my return to the Republic, I made a strong recommendation to the ANC that we should not confine ourselves to Africa and the Western countries, but that we should also send a mission to the socialist countries to raise the funds which we so urgently needed.

I have been told that after I was convicted such a mission was sent, but I am not prepared to name any countries to which it went, nor am I at liberty to disclose the names of the organizations and countries which gave us support or promised to do so.

As I understand the State case, and in particular the evidence of 'Mr. X', the suggestion is that Umkhonto was the inspiration of the Communist Party which sought by playing upon imaginary grievances to enrol the African people into an army which ostensibly was to fight for African freedom, but in reality was fighting for a communist state. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact the suggestion is preposterous. Umkhonto was formed by Africans to further their struggle for freedom in their own land. Communists and others supported the movement, and we only wish that more sections of the community would join us.

Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the language of the State Prosecutor, 'so-called hardships'. Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists or so-called 'agitators' to teach us about these things.

South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, whilst Africans live in poverty and misery. Forty per cent of the Africans live in hopelessly overcrowded and, in some cases, drought-stricken Reserves, where soil erosion and the overworking of the soil makes it impossible for them to live properly off the land. Thirty per cent are labourers, labour tenants, and squatters on white farms and work and live under conditions similar to those of the serfs of the Middle Ages. The other 30 per cent live in towns where they have developed economic and social habits which bring them closer in many respects to white standards. Yet most Africans, even in this group, are impoverished by low incomes and high cost of living.

The highest-paid and the most prosperous section of urban African life is in Johannesburg. Yet their actual position is desperate. The latest figures were given on 25 March 1964 by Mr. Carr, Manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department. The poverty datum line for the average African family in Johannesburg (according to Mr. Carr's department) is R42.84 per month. He showed that the average monthly wage is R32.24 and that 46 per cent of all African families in Johannesburg do not earn enough to keep them going.

Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. The incidence of malnutrition and deficiency diseases is very high amongst Africans. Tuberculosis, pellagra, kwashiorkor, gastro-enteritis, and scurvy bring death and destruction of health. The incidence of infant mortality is one of the highest in the world. According to the Medical Officer of Health for Pretoria, tuberculosis kills forty people a day (almost all Africans), and in 1961 there were 58,491 new cases reported. These diseases not only destroy the vital organs of the body, but they result in retarded mental conditions and lack of initiative, and reduce powers of concentration. The secondary results of such conditions affect the whole community and the standard of work performed by African labourers.

The complaint of Africans, however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but that the laws which are made by the whites are designed to preserve this situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation.

The present Government has always sought to hamper Africans in their search for education. One of their early acts, after coming into power, was to stop subsidies for African school feeding. Many African children who attended schools depended on this supplement to their diet. This was a cruel act.

There is compulsory education for all white children at virtually no cost to their parents, be they rich or poor. Similar facilities are not provided for the African children, though there are some who receive such assistance. African children, however, generally have to pay more for their schooling than whites. According to figures quoted by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its 1963 journal, approximately 40 per cent of African children in the age group between seven to fourteen do not attend school. For those who do attend school, the standards are vastly different from those afforded to white children. In 1960-61 the per capita Government spending on African students at State-aided schools was estimated at R12.46. In the same years, the per capita spending on white children in the Cape Province (which are the only figures available to me) was R144.57. Although there are no figures available to me, it can be stated, without doubt, that the white children on whom R144.57 per head was being spent all came from wealthier homes than African children on whom R12.46 per head was being spent.

The quality of education is also different. According to the Bantu Educational Journal, only 5,660 African children in the whole of South Africa passed their Junior Certificate in 1962, and in that year only 362 passed matric. This is presumably consistent with the policy of Bantu education about which the present Prime Minister said, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1953:

"When I have control of Native education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them . . . People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my Department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge."

The other main obstacle to the economic advancement of the African is the industrial colour-bar under which all the better jobs of industry are reserved for Whites only. Moreover, Africans who do obtain employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled occupations which are open to them are not allowed to form trade unions which have recognition under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This means that strikes of African workers are illegal, and that they are denied the right of collective bargaining which is permitted to the better-paid White workers. The discrimination in the policy of successive South African Governments towards African workers is demonstrated by the so-called 'civilized labour policy' under which sheltered, unskilled Government jobs are found for those white workers who cannot make the grade in industry, at wages which far exceed the earnings of the average African employee in industry.

The Government often answers its critics by saying that Africans in South Africa are economically better off than the inhabitants of the other countries in Africa. I do not know whether this statement is true and doubt whether any comparison can be made without having regard to the cost-of-living index in such countries. But even if it is true, as far as the African people are concerned it is irrelevant. Our complaint is not that we are poor by comparison with people in other countries, but that we are poor by comparison with the white people in our own country, and that we are prevented by legislation from altering this imbalance.

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of white supremacy. White supremacy implies black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve white supremacy entrenches this notion. Menial tasks in South Africa are invariably performed by Africans. When anything has to be carried or cleaned the white man will look around for an African to do it for him, whether the African is employed by him or not. Because of this sort of attitude, whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realize that they have emotions - that they fall in love like white people do; that they want to be with their wives and children like white people want to be with theirs; that they want to earn enough money to support their families properly, to feed and clothe them and send them to school. And what 'house-boy' or 'garden-boy' or labourer can ever hope to do this?

Pass laws, which to the Africans are among the most hated bits of legislation in South Africa, render any African liable to police surveillance at any time. I doubt whether there is a single African male in South Africa who has not at some stage had a brush with the police over his pass. Hundreds and thousands of Africans are thrown into jail each year under pass laws. Even worse than this is the fact that pass laws keep husband and wife apart and lead to the breakdown of family life.

Poverty and the breakdown of family life have secondary effects. Children wander about the streets of the townships because they have no schools to go to, or no money to enable them to go to school, or no parents at home to see that they go to school, because both parents (if there be two) have to work to keep the family alive. This leads to a breakdown in moral standards, to an alarming rise in illegitimacy, and to growing violence which erupts not only politically, but everywhere. Life in the townships is dangerous. There is not a day that goes by without somebody being stabbed or assaulted. And violence is carried out of the townships in the white living areas. People are afraid to walk alone in the streets after dark. Housebreakings and robberies are increasing, despite the fact that the death sentence can now be imposed for such offences. Death sentences cannot cure the festering sore.

Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable o Africans want to be allowed to live where they obtain work, and not be endorsed out of an area because they were not born there. Africans want to be allowed to own land in places where they work, and not to be obliged to live in rented houses which they can never call their own. Africans want to be part of the general population, and not confined to living in their own ghettoes. African men want to have their wives and children to live with them where they work, and not be forced into an unnatural existence in men's hostels. African women want to be with their men folk and not be left permanently widowed in the Reserves. Africans want to be allowed out after eleven o'clock at night and not to be confined to their rooms like little children. Africans want to be allowed to travel in their own country and to seek work where they want to and not where the Labour Bureau tells them to. Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society.

Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the white man fear democracy.

But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy.

This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live.

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

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FULL TEXT: Mandela's Rivonia Trial Speech

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I am the First Accused. I hold a Bachelor's Degree in Arts and practised as an attorney in Johannesburg for a number of years in partnership with Oliver Tambo. I am a convicted prisoner serving five years for leaving the country without a permit and for inciting people to go on strike at the end of May 1961.

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1960: Macmillan speaks of 'wind of change' in Africa

The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, has had a frosty reception from politicians in South Africa after speaking frankly against the country's system of apartheid.

In a speech to MPs in the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town, Mr Macmillan spoke of the "wind of change" blowing through the continent of Africa, as more and more majority black populations in the colonies claim the right to rule themselves.

"Whether we like it or not," he said, "this growth of national consciousness is a political fact."

The government's aim, he said, was to "create a society which respects the rights of individuals - a society in which individual merit, and individual merit alone, is the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political or economic."

Nationalist Party politicians listened to him in silence, and a number refused to applaud when he had finished.

Dr Verwoerd, the South African Prime Minister and the architect of the apartheid system, thanked Mr Macmillan for his speech, but said he could not agree.

"We are the people who brought civilisation to Africa," he said. "To do justice in Africa means not only being just to the black man of Africa, but also to the white man of Africa."

Mr Macmillan's speech is the first time a senior international figure has given voice to the growing protest against South Africa's laws of strict racial segregation.

The speech was widely anticipated throughout the country, as Mr Macmillan had already said he would take the chance to say what he thought about the situation in South Africa.

Even so, the plain-speaking nature of the speech took many in Cape Town by surprise.

Mr Macmillan is in South Africa at the end of a month-long tour of the African continent, in which he has travelled about 17,000 miles.

His visit was always controversial, and many accused him of giving the Nationalist Party credibility by allowing himself to be a guest of the South African government.

His speech today is likely to lay those criticisms to rest.

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BBC ON THIS DAY | 3 | 1960: Macmillan speaks of 'wind of change' in Africa

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1960: Macmillan speaks of 'wind of change' in Africa The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, has had a frosty reception from politicians in South Africa after speaking frankly against the country's system of apartheid.

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The "Wind of Change" speech was made on 3 February 1960 by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan whilst addressing the South African Parliament in Cape Town during his tour of African Commonwealth states. He had been on tour of Africa since 6 January that year, visiting Ghana, Nigeria, and other British colonies in Africa. It was a watershed moment in the struggle for black nationalism in Africa and the independence movement across the continent. It also signaled a change in attitude towards the Apartheid regime in South Africa.

Macmillan acknowledged that black people in Africa were, quite rightly, claiming the right to rule themselves, and suggested that it was a responsibility of the British government to promote the creation of societies in which the rights of all individuals were upheld.

"The wind of change is blowing through this [African] continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it."

Macmillan went on to state that the greatest issue for the twentieth century would be whether newly independent countries in Africa became politically aligned with the west or with Communist states such as Russia and China. In effect, which side of the cold war Africa would support.

"... we may imperil the precarious balance between the East and West on which the peace of the world depends".

It was the first public statement of Britain's acknowledgment of black nationalist movements in Africa, and that its colonies would have to be given independence under majority rule. (A fortnight later a new power-sharing deal in Kenya was announced which gave Kenyan black nationalists an opportunity to experience government before independence was achieved.) It also indicated Britain's growing concerns over the application of apartheid in South Africa. Macmillan urged South Africa to move towards racial equality, a goal he expressed for the whole Commonwealth.

The South African Prime Minister, Henrik Verwoerd, responded by saying "...to do justice to all, does not only mean being just to the black man of Africa, but also to be just to the white man of Africa". He continued by saying that it was white men who brought civilization to Africa and that South Africa was bare [of people] when the first Europeans arrived. Verwoerd's response was met with applause from the members of South Africa's Parliament.

Whilst black nationalists in South Africa considered Britain's stand a promising call to arms, no real aid was extended to such black nationalist groups in SA. Whilst other African Commonwealth countries continued to achieve independence - it had started with Ghana on 6 March 1957, and would soon include Nigeria (1 October 1960), Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania by the end of 1961 - Apartheid white rule in South Africa pushed through a declaration of independence and the creation of a republic (31 May 1961) from Britain, partly made possible by fears of Britain's interference in its government, and partly a response to increased demonstrations by nationalist groups against Apartheid within South Africa (for example, the Sharpeville Massacre).

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Harold Macmillan's "Wind of Change" Speech

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The "Wind of Change" speech was made on 3 February 1960 by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan whilst addressing the South African Parliament in Cape Town during his tour of African Commonwealth states. He had been on tour of Africa since 6 January that year, visiting Ghana, Nigeria, and other British colonies in Africa.

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Bantu Steve Biko- Architect of Black Consciousness Manifesto- rare TV interview

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A liste of anti-apartheid songs in the 80's

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A liste of anti-apartheid songs in the 80's

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Choose one and work on it. You can sing it and publish it !

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12 Essential Anti-Apartheid Struggle Songs from South Africa & Around the World

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OkayAfrica's mission is connecting a global audience to Africa. We are a youth-driven news site featuring comprehensive coverage of the latest news, culture, art, music and lifestyle from across Africa and the wider diaspora.

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Live news on TV

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Mandela walking out of prison with Winnie