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Manual for Human Rights Education with Young people

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No one is born a good citizen, no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from birth.
Kofi Annan

What is Democracy?

The word democracy comes from the Greek words "demos", meaning people, and "kratos" meaning power; so democracy can be thought of as "power of the people": a way of governing which depends on the will of the people.

There are so many different models of democratic government around the world that it is sometimes easier to understand the idea of democracy in terms of what it definitely is not. Democracy, then, is not autocracy or dictatorship, where one person rules; and it is not oligarchy, where a small segment of society rules. Properly understood, democracy should not even be "rule of the majority", if that means that minorities' interests are ignored completely. A democracy, at least in theory, is government on behalf of all the people, according to their "will".

Question: If democracy is government by the people, are there any real democracies in the world?

Why democracy?

The idea of democracy derives its moral strength - and popular appeal - from two key principles:
1. Individual autonomy: The idea that no-one should be subject to rules which have been imposed by others. People should be able to control their own lives (within reason).
2. Equality: The idea that everyone should have the same opportunity to influence the decisions that affect people in society.

These principles are intuitively appealing, and they help to explain why democracy is so popular. Of course we feel it is fair that we should have as much chance as anyone else to decide on common rules!

The problems arise when we consider how the principles can be put into practice, because we need a mechanism for deciding how to address conflicting views. Because it offers a simple mechanism, democracy tends to be "rule of the majority"; but rule of the majority can mean that some people's interests are never represented. A more genuine way of representing everyone's interests is to use decision making by consensus, where the aim is to find common points of interest.

Question: What are the advantages and disadvantages of making decisions by consensus, compared to using majority rule? How are decisions made in your youth group?

The development of democracy

Ancient history

The ancient Greeks are credited with creating the very first democracy, although there were almost certainly earlier examples of primitive democracy in other parts of the world. The Greek model was established in the 5th century BC, in the city of Athens. Among a sea of autocracies and oligarchies - which were the normal forms of government at the time - Athenian democracy stood out.
However, compared to how we understand democracy today, the Athenian model had two important differences:

1. Theirs was a form of direct democracy - in other words, instead of electing representatives to govern on the people's behalf, "the people" themselves met, discussed questions of government, and then implemented policy.

2. Such a system was possible partly because "the people" was a very limited category. Those who could participate directly were a small part of the population, since women, slaves, aliens - and of course, children - were excluded. The numbers who participated were still far more than in a modern democracy: perhaps 50,000 males engaged directly in politics, out of a population of around 300,000 people.

Question: What are the advantages and disadvantages of direct democracy?

Democracy in the modern world

Today there are as many different forms of democracy as there are democratic nations in the world. No two systems are exactly the same and no one system can be taken as a "model". There are presidential and parliamentary democracies, democracies that are federal or unitary, democracies that use a proportional voting system, and ones that use a majoritarian system, democracies which are also monarchies, and so on.

One thing that unites modern systems of democracy, and which also distinguishes them from the ancient model, is the use of representatives of the people. Instead of taking part directly in law making, modern democracies use elections to select representatives who are sent by the people to govern on their behalf. Such a system is known as representative democracy. It can lay some claim to being "democratic" because it is, at least to some degree, based on the two principles above: equality of all (one person - one vote), and the right of every individual to some degree of personal autonomy.

Question: What should an elected official do to make sure he or she is representing properly those who elected him or her?

Improving democracy

People often talk about countries "becoming" democracies, once they start to have relatively free and open elections. But democracy includes far more than just elections, and it really makes more sense to think about the will of the people idea, rather than about institutional or voting structures, when we are trying to assess how democratic a country is. Democracy is better understood as something that we can always have more - or less - of, rather than something that either is, or is not.

Democratic systems can nearly always be made more inclusive, more reflective of more people's wishes, and more responsive to their influence. In other words, there is room to improve the "people" part of democracy, by including more people in decision making; there is also room to improve the "power" or "will" part of democracy, by giving the people more real power. Struggles for democracy throughout history have normally concentrated on one or the other of these elements.

Today, in most countries of the world, women do have the vote but the struggle has been won only relatively recently. New Zealand is said to be the first country in the world to have introduced universal suffrage, in 1893, although even here, women were only granted the right to stand for parliament in 1919. Many countries have granted women the right to vote first of all, and only several years later, have allowed them to stand for elected office. Saudi Arabia has only granted women the power to vote in elections in 2011.
Today even in established democracies, there are other sections of society, which commonly include immigrants, migrant workers, prisoners and children, who are not given the right to vote, even though many of them might pay taxes and all are obliged to obey the laws of the land.

Prisoners and voting rights

Prisoners are allowed to vote in 18 European countries.
Prisoners' rights to vote are restricted in 20 countries, depending on such things as length of sentence or severity of the crime committed, or the type of election.
In 9 European countries, prisoners are not allowed to vote at all.
Prisoners' voting rights, Commons Library Standard Note SN/PC/01764, last updated in 2012, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01764
In the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom in 2005, the European Court found that the universal ban on prisoners from voting in the UK was a violation of Article 3, Protocol 1 of the European Convention, which says that:
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature."

Question: Can excluding certain sectors of society from the democratic process ever be justified?

Democracy and participation

The most obvious ways to participate in government are to vote, or to stand for office and become a representative of the people. Democracy, however, is about far more than just voting, and there are numerous other ways of engaging with politics and government. The effective functioning of democracy, in fact, depends on ordinary people using these other means as much as possible. If people only vote once every 4 or 5 years - or do not vote at all - and if they do nothing else in the interim, then government really cannot be said to be "by the people". It is hard to say that such a system is a democracy.
You can read in more detail about ways of participating in the section on Citizenship and Participation. Here are a few ideas - perhaps the minimum that might be needed for members of parliament to be able to act democratically, on your behalf:
Stay informed about what is happening, what is being decided "in the name of the people", and in particular, about the decisions and actions being taken by your own representative.
Make your opinions known - either to your representatives in parliament, or to the media, or to groups working on particular issues. Without feedback from "the people", leaders can only lead according to their own will and priorities.
Where decisions appear to be undemocratic, or against human rights, or even when you just feel strongly about them, make efforts to get your voice heard, so that the policies may be reconsidered. The most effective way of doing this is probably by joining with other people so that your voice is louder.
Vote, when the possibility arises. If people do not vote, then members are effectively unaccountable.

Question: Have you ever participated in any of these ways (or others)?

Democracy and Human Rights

The connection between human rights and democracy is deep, and goes both ways: each is in some way dependent on the other, and incomplete without the other.

First of all, the values of equality and autonomy are also human rights values, and the right to take part in government is itself a human right. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) tells us that "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government": so democracy is in fact the only form of government which is consistent with human rights.

However, a "democracy" is also incomplete without a thorough-going respect for human rights. Taking part in government, in a genuine way, is almost impossible to do without people having other basic rights respected. Consider the following, as examples:
1. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (UDHR, Article 18). This is one of the first rights which are essential in a democracy: people need to be able to think freely, to hold whatever beliefs are important to them, without being punished for doing so. Governments throughout history have tried to limit this right because they are afraid that if people think about other forms of government, this will endanger the current system. So they have locked people away simply for thinking the "wrong" thoughts. (Such people are known as prisoners of conscience.) However, a society without a pluralism of views is not just intolerant; it also limits its own possibilities to develop in new and possibly improved directions.

2. Freedom of Expression (UDHR, Article 19). It is important not just to be able to think what you want, but also to be able to express that opinion out loud, whatever that opinion may be. If people are prevented from discussing their views with other people, or presenting them in the media, how can they "take part" in government? Their opinion has essentially been discounted from the possible alternatives under consideration.

3. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association (UDHR Article 20). This right allows you to discuss ideas with others who want to do so, to form interest groups or lobbying groups, or to gather together for the purposes of protest against decisions you disagree with. Perhaps such an activity is sometimes inconvenient for governments; however it is essential if different views are to be made known and taken into account. And that is part of what democracy is all about.

These are just three human rights which are intrinsically bound up with the idea of democracy, but any infringement of other human rights will also affect the extent to which different people are able to take part in government. Poverty, poor health, or the lack of a home, can all make it more difficult for someone to have their voice heard, and diminish the impact of their choice, compared with others. Such infringements of rights almost certainly make it impossible for the person concerned to be elected to government office.

Question: How well are the three "democratic" rights (listed above) respected in your country?

Problems with democracy

Voter apathy

For a number of years, there has been concern about the status of democracy, perhaps particularly in the more established democracies. Much of this is based on the decreasing levels of citizen participation at elections, which appear to indicate a lack of interest and involvement on the part of citizens. A low voter turnout calls into question the legitimacy of so-called democratically elected governments, which are, in some countries, actually elected by a minority of the total electorate.

Elections and apathy

Turnout at elections to the European Parliament has fallen every year since the first elections in 1979. In 2009, only 43% of the electorate used their vote, and in some countries, turnout fell as low as 34%.
In national elections throughout Europe, turnout ranges from just over 50% in some countries, to over 90% in others.
Some countries, for example, Greece and Belgium in Europe, make voting compulsory. In such countries turnout is obviously much higher than the average for countries where voting is optional.

Question: What proportion of the electorate voted in your country's most recent elections?

Although it is undoubtedly a problem that people are increasingly failing to vote in elections, there are some studies which indicate that participation in different forms may actually be on the increase, for example, pressure groups, civic initiatives, consultative organs, and so on. These forms of participation are just as important to the effective functioning of democracy as voter turnout at elections, if not more so.

Democracy and civic participation

The so-called Arab Spring, where masses of people - many of them young - took to the streets in order to express their dissatisfaction with the government, has shown a new level of civic participation in countries which have not traditionally been regarded as democracies. In Europe as well, even in the more traditional democracies, "people power" appears to have found a new lease of life: students have protested in many countries against moves by governments to impose fees on education. Trade unions have brought people onto the streets to protest about the impact of economic cuts. In addition, autonomous groups of activists have invented new and creative forms of demonstrating against climate change, the power of large corporations, the withdrawal of key state services, and also against oppressive measures of policing.

Rule of the Majority

There are two problems that are more intricately connected to the notion of representative democracy, and these concern minority interests. The first problem is that minority interests are often not represented through the electoral system: this may happen if their numbers are too few to reach the minimum level necessary for any representation. The second problem is that even if their numbers are represented in the legislative body, they will have a minority of representatives and these may not therefore be able to summon up the necessary votes to defeat the majority representatives. For these reasons, democracy is often referred to as "rule of the majority".

Majority rule, if not backed up by a guarantee of human rights for all, can lead to decisions which are harmful to minorities, and the fact that these decisions are the "will of the people" can provide no justification. The basic interests of minorities as well as majorities need to be safeguarded in any democratic system by adherence to human rights principles, reinforced by an effective legal mechanism, whatever the will of the majority may be.

Question: If the majority of the population is in favour of depriving certain people their human rights, do you think "the people should decide"?

The rise of nationalism

A related problem is the worrying trends across Europe towards support for extreme right parties. These parties have often played on nationalist feelings, and have targeted "non-indigenous" members of the population, particularly asylum seekers, refugees, and members of religious minorities, and sometimes in violent ways. As a defence, such parties often appeal to their support among the population, and the democratic principle that they represent the opinions of a large number of people. However, where a party advocates violence in any form, and where it fails to respect the human rights of every member of the population, it has little right to appeal to democratic principles.

Depending on the extent of the problem, and the particular cultural context, it may be necessary to limit the right to freedom of expression of certain groups, despite the importance of this right to the democratic process. Most countries, for example, have laws against inciting racial hatred. This is regarded by the European Court as an acceptable limitation of freedom of expression, justified by the need to protect the rights of other members of society, or the structure of society itself.

Question: Is nationalism any different from racism?

Young People and Democracy

Young people often do not even have the vote, so how can they be a part of the democratic process?
Many people would answer this question by saying that young people are not ready to be part of the process, and that only when they are 18 (or at whatever age their country gives them the vote) will they be able to participate.

In fact, many young people are politically very active long before they get the vote, and in some ways, the impact of such activity can be stronger than the single vote they receive later on - and may or may not decide to use - once every 4 or 5 years. Politicians are often anxious to appeal to the youth vote, so they may be more likely to listen to the concerns of young people.

Many young people are engaged in environmental groups, or in other protest groups campaigning against war, against corporate exploitation, or against child labour. Perhaps one of the most important ways that young people can begin to be engaged in community life and political activity is at a local level: here they will be more aware of the particular issues that are of concern to them and those with whom they come into contact, and they will be better able to have a direct impact. Democracy does not only deal with national or international issues: it needs to begin in our own neighbourhoods!
Youth organisations are one of the ways through which young people experience and practise democracy and, therefore, have an important role in democracy, provided, of course, that they are independent and democratic in the way they function!

Question: If a 16-year-old is considered mature enough to marry and get a job, should he or she not be able to vote?

Work of the Council of Europe

Democracy is one of the core values of the Council of Europe, together with human rights and the rule of law. The Council of Europe has a number of programmes and publications looking at the improvement and future of democracy. In 2005, the Forum for the Future of Democracy was established by the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe. The aim of the Forum is to "strengthen democracy, political freedoms and citizens' participation through the exchange of ideas, information and examples of best practices". A meeting of the Forum takes place every year, and brings together about 400 participants from the 47 Council of Europe member States and observer States.

Support for development and implementation of standards for democracy is carried by the European Commission for Democracy through Law - also known as the Venice Commission - which is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. The commission has been particularly active in assisting in the drafting of new constitutions or laws on constitutional courts, electoral codes, minority rights and the legal framework relating to democratic institutions.

In addition to this standard-setting work, the Council of Europe promotes democracy and its values by programmes on democratic participation, education for democratic citizenship and youth participation, because democracy is much more than voting in elections!

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Democracy - Manual for Human Rights Education with Young people - www.coe.int

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No one is born a good citizen, no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime. Young people must be included from birth.

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The ancient Romans had a working democracy for the early part of their history. The Forum in Rome is where political meetings and votes were held. The Forum can still be seen today, but most of its buildings are in ruins.

Nowhere is the word "democracy" mentioned in the Declaration of Independence or the U.S. Constitution. How could that be? Our government is a democracy!

Well, for one, as we'll discuss later, the Founders actually feared democratic rule. James Madison expressed this attitude in Federalist #10: "...instability, injustice, and confusion ...have in truth been the mortal disease under which popular governments everywhere perished..." In the late 18-century, rule by the people was thought to lead to disorder and disruption. Yet a democratically-based government was seen as superior to the monarchies of Europe.

Democracies did not originate with the founding of the United States. The term "democracy" comes from two Greek words: "demos" (the people) and ""kratia" (power or authority). So of course democracy is a form of government that gives power to the people. But how, when, and to which people? The answer to those questions changes through history.

In present-day New England, many small towns hold town meetings in which issues important to the citizens are decided by vote. These meetings are one of the few instances of direct democracy that still operate today. These New Englanders check in at a town meeting.

Democracies are based on "rule of law." The ancient Greeks (particularly Aristotle) valued natural law, the notion that human societies should be governed by ethical principles found in nature. The Greeks are famous for practicing direct democracy , a system in which citizens meet to discuss all policy, and then make decisions by majority rule. However, only free males were considered to be citizens. So their democracy was certainly limited. Today direct democracy is practiced in New England town meetings, where all citizens of voting age meet to decide important political decisions.

But how could direct democracy work in a large, diverse population spread over a geographical distance? Generally, the answer has been that it can't. In its place, the American Founders put "indirect" or "representative" democracy. In this system, representatives are chosen by the people to make decisions for them. The representative body, then, becomes a manageable size for doing the business of government. The Founders preferred the term "republic" to "democracy" because it described a system they generally preferred: the interests of the peopled were represented by more knowledgeable or wealthier citizens who were responsible to those that elected them. Today we tend to use the terms "republic" and "democracy" interchangeably. A widespread criticism of representative democracy is that the representatives become the "elites" that seldom consult ordinary citizens, so even though they are elected, a truly representative government doesn't really exist.

Britain has had a representative democracy since the seventeenth century. Members of the British Parliament are elected from across Britain and represent the interests of their constituents to the government.

Another modern version of democracy is called "democratic centralism," a term made famous by Vladimir Ulyinov Lenin. As the leader of the Russian Revolution in 1917, he established a communist government that allowed no private property to exist. All members of society were theoretically equal. However, Lenin considered a small "vanguard of the revolution" necessary to guide the people and establish order. So a small group of leaders make decisions in the name of the people, based on their perceptions of what the people want and need.

Democracies have come in many shapes and sizes as reflected by the different answers to questions of how, when, and to which people power is given. And although it is not mentioned in the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution, democracy clearly links to "rule of law" to form a basic principle that profoundly shapes American government.

Plato's Republic
Plato had a lot to do with our definition of democracy. His book The Republic, is a lengthy and sometimes difficult description of the ideal city and government. Plato proposes a division of classes along lines of intelligence, and promotes the idea of a "philosopher-king," the wisest man in a state as the ruler. The Friesian Society makes it all much easier to understand in this summary and explanation of Plato's work.

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Vladimir Lenin - Democracy and Dictatorship
Vladimir Lenin considered democracy the goal of communism, but at the same time thought that until democracy could be reached, a dictatorship in the name of the proletariat (working class) should rule. In this article from the Soviet newspaper Pravda, Lenin justifies his ideas. This article is reprinted online at the Marx Internet Archive.

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The Federalist
The Federalist Papers were written by advocates of a federalized government for the United States. James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton warned against the dangers of direct democracy and loose associations among the states.

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The ancient Romans had a working democracy for the early part of their history. The Forum in Rome is where political meetings and votes were held. The Forum can still be seen today, but most of its buildings are in ruins. Nowhere is the word "democracy" mentioned in the Declaration of Independence or the U.S.

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Many more countries have become democracies over the last two hundred years. The chart shows - based on data from Regimes of the World (RoW) - that a much larger share of countries are now democracies.

In the late 18th century, no country could be meaningfully characterized as a democracy. RoW classifies almost all of them as closed autocracies, in which citizens do not have the right to choose their political leaders through elections.¹

Elections spread throughout the 19th century, but they were often marred by limitations. Many countries became electoral autocracies, in which political leaders were chosen through elections, but citizens lacked additional freedoms to make those elections free and fair. Only a few countries held elections that were sufficiently meaningful to call them electoral democracies.² And even fewer had the additional individual and minority rights and the constrained governments to consider them liberal democracies.³

Electoral and liberal democracy then spread to many countries in the 20th century. By the end of the century, they had become common political systems around the globe and could be found across all world regions.

Today, the world is about evenly split between autocracies and democracies, according to this data. Most non-democracies are electoral autocracies. And more than a third of all democracies have the additional individual and minority rights that characterize liberal democracies.

Billions of people have gained democratic rights over the last two centuries. The chart shows that many more people now live in democracies, based on the Regimes of the World (RoW) data.

In the 19th century, few people had democratic political rights. In 1800, almost everyone lived in political systems that RoW classifies as closed autocracies. No country was a democracy, and only 22 million people lived in the two countries classified as electoral autocracies: the United Kingdom and the United States.

Since then, many have gained democratic political rights, especially in the second half of the 20th century. By 2022, about 1.3 billion people lived in electoral democracies in all regions of the world: many live in the populous countries of Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa. Another billion people lived in liberal democracies, such as those living in Chile, South Korea, and the United States.

While democratic rights have spread far, they are still far from universal. Because the world's population grew faster than democracy spread, the total number of people without democratic rights is higher than ever. Almost all of them reside in just one country: China.

There have also been recent setbacks, with many people losing political rights. Most prominently the 1.4 billion people living in India, which - according to the RoW data - became an electoral autocracy in 2017. Other data sources agree that India has become less democratic, but overall still consider India a democracy.⁶

We have an article that discusses the trends in more detail:

Democracy is young in most countries that are democratic today. The chart shows that most electoral democracies are younger than its more senior citizens, relying on the Regimes of the World data.

Based on the data, many democracies are less than a generation old. Some are younger than 18 - not older than the children in these countries - and others are only as old as the country's young adults. In these democracies, most young people have experienced authoritarian rule, and older people have lacked democratic political rights for most of their lives.

A larger group of countries have been electoral democracies for one to three generations. In them, children and young adults have only known life in a democracy. But their parents and grandparents have still experienced non-democratic rule.

Only a few countries have been democratic for a long time and have been electoral democracies for three generations or more. Democracy there is older than almost all of their citizens.

Because electoral democracy is defined as political rights being broad, but not necessarily universal, not everyone has enjoyed democratic political rights in these countries. For example, governments in some countries have forbidden parts of the population, such as women, to vote and stand in elections.

Liberal democracy, in which citizens enjoy additional individual and minority rights, is an even rarer and more recent achievement than electoral democracy. And democracy is a recent achievement regardless of the measure used.

We have an article that provides more detail:

There are large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights - between democracies and non-democracies, but also within each group. The chart - relying on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data - shows that some countries are much more democratic than others.

While almost all countries are much more democratic than they were 100 years ago, there are still large differences between them.

Some countries - mostly located in Europe and the Americas - are highly democratic: they have elected political leaders, elections are broadly free and fair, and most citizens have the right to vote.

Others, especially in Asia, are highly undemocratic. Based on V-Dem, this includes countries such as China, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia. There, citizens do not have the right to choose their political leaders in popular elections.

Most countries, often in Africa and Asia, fall somewhere in the middle. Political leaders are elected and citizens have the right to vote there, but their rights to associate and express their opinions are limited, and elections are not entirely free and fair.

The chart looks at electoral democratic institutions. Looking at liberal democracy or data from other leading approaches shows similar differences.

We have an article that provides more detail and discusses the trends over time:

The world has become less democratic in recent years. The chart shows that more countries have been autocratizing recently, based on the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) data.

The number of countries that are autocratizing has been increasing: for 2022, ERT identifies 40 that were autocratizing - an all-time high.

For a long time, the number of autocratizing countries was offset by democratizing ones. But since 2012, the number of countries that are becoming more autocratic has been higher.

The countries that are becoming less democratic are both eroding democracies and hardening autocracies.

Other approaches to measuring democracy also suggest that the world has recently become less democratic - the number of democracies has declined; fewer people are living in democracies, countries and people have on average fewer democratic rights, and more people live in autocratizing countries.

The world was at its democratic 'all-time high' in the early 2010s. But since then it has fallen, and now looks more like the 2000s, the 1990s, or even the late 1980s, depending on which democracy measure we rely on.

We have seen similar democratic declines before, and past declines were reversed. People fought previous phases of autocratization in the 1930s and 1960/70s, turned the tide, and pushed democratic rights to unprecedented heights. We can do it again.

We have an article that provides more detail:

Bastian Herre, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser (2013) - "Democracy" Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: 'https://ourworldindata.org/democracy' [Online Resource]

BibTeX citation

@article{owid-democracy, author = {Bastian Herre and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser}, title = {Democracy}, journal = {Our World in Data}, year = {2013}, note = {https://ourworldindata.org/democracy} }

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How has democracy spread across countries? Are we moving towards a more democratic world? Explore global data and research on democracy.

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If a friend were to ask you to define democracy, you could probably muster up a fairly good response, talking about having elections where the people vote and choose those they want to be in government. And that would be a perfectly fine answer. But then your friend, who's in quite a curious mood, asks where the line is - what needs to be there to make it a democracy, without which it's something else?

In fact, there are certain elements that must exist in order for a democracy to be a democracy. From free and fair elections to human rights to basic values like equality and accountability, here are 14 things that must be present in order to have a strong and stable democracy.

What are the 14 principles of democracy?

1. Participation of citizens

By its very definition, democracy allows the people a voice in charting the course of their government and their future. In direct democracies, this can mean citizens vote directly on the laws they live under. In representative democracy, it means they get to choose who represents them and have a free voice to express their opinions and desires. In either case, citizen participation is the foundation that makes democracy strong.

Participation is not just voting on election day, although this is surely its most notable form. But equally important are public debate, town meetings, and peaceful protests, among other things. Each of these are forms of participation that help make people informed when it does come time to mark a ballot. Citizens' groups and civil society help make sure people have the ability to do all of these things and should be supported to ensure greatest participation.

2. Equality

It is not only important but necessary that all people are treated equally in a democracy. This means that they are not discriminated against because of their ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation. It also means that people have equal access to the free enjoyment of their rights - for example, equal access to the voting booth. And when it does come time to vote, it means that every vote counts the same - your vote is just as valuable and counts just as much as the wealthiest or most powerful person in your country. That's the most fundamental element of equality in a democracy.

3. Accountability

People entrust powers to those they elect, and they are tasked to use those powers to enrich their communities. Politicians are accountable to the people, must act consistent with their will, and have a duty not abuse their power to enrich themselves and their friends. When authoritarian governments take control of the newspapers and news channels, when they hamstring and harass civil society groups, it becomes all too easy to keep corruption and abuses of power out of the public eye, and this makes it harder for the people to hold the government accountable on election day.

4. Transparency

In order to make informed choices at the ballot box, voters have to know the score. They have to know if their government is making good decisions or its policies aren't working, if it's following the rules or plundering public money. Transparency means government actions are clear to the people, as are the results and outcomes. Information of the government should, with few exceptions, be available to the public upon request, journalists and people alike should be able to ask their politicians questions, and groups that work on transparency should be free to operate.

5. Political tolerance

Although majority rule is at the heart of democracy, this does not mean that the minority is forgotten. In a true democracy, the rights of all citizens are equal and must be respected regardless of who's in power. And even though their views may not have carried election day, they still have the right to continue to share those views to other citizens and the government. And this is healthy, if not necessary. Democracy thrives on openness and richness of thought; by suppressing the rights and freedoms of the minority, the majority holds itself back.

6. Multi-party system

Citizens must have a choice on election day. That means that more than a single political party is able to freely participate in an election campaign and be an option for the people. And when opposition parties do win, there is a transfer of power and renewed public debate on how to steer the country forward. If there's just a single party then it's most probably a dictatorship, although some countries have managed to develop democratic systems under the rule of a single party.

7. Control over the abuse of power

Democracy can only survive if everyone buys in - the citizens through their support on voting day and all other times of year, and politicians by playing by the rules and working to improve the lives of everyone. Abuse of power occurs when a government decides it is above the law, when politicians believe a different set of rules apply to them, when the levers of the state are moved to favor only a certain segment of society at the expense of others, or when public money is funneled into accounts of corrupt leaders and their friends. We see this often in the world's "democracies" and increasingly so in Europe too.

There are ways to insulate democracy from such abuse, but there is no way to protect it completely. Diffusing powers across different branches of government helps to hold them all to account, for example. Protecting free and fair elections are also important. This includes protecting independent media so citizens can get good information in the lead up to voting, and means protecting election laws to make sure the process is fair.

8. Freedom of economy

In a democracy, a person should be able to decide what they want to do with their life. As long as they follow the rules, it's not the government's place to tell them what they must study or what job they must take or what they must grow. Economic freedom is important in order to develop strong communities and strong national economies.

9. Bill of rights

Another way to protect the people from abuse of power by the government is through a bill of rights. This is a list of the rights and freedoms people have, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. As a bill, the document is a part of law, and many countries have enshrined it into their constitution. So when someone thinks their government is violating their rights, they can turn to the courts for help.

10. Human rights

Many of the rights protected by a bill of rights are what are called human rights. These are rights people are supposed to have regardless of the country they live in, but democracy in particular is supposed to protect and promote these rights. Human rights like freedom of expression, free association, and freedom of assembly are also cornerstones of democracy and in fact allow its proper functioning.

11. Free and fair elections

Change should be considered a natural and healthy feature of democracy. As the government exists to serve the people, and public opinion shifts all the time on all sorts of issues, it is only natural that elections will produce different results at different times. So it is essential that these elections occur freely and fairly. This means that people are given good and accurate information before voting, and that they are free to discuss and debate it. It also means that on election day, people have equal access to the polls, that everyone's vote has the same value, and that all votes are counted. Moreover, elections shouldn't come irregularly or be called whenever it suits the government.

12. Free courts

Even in a perfectly functioning democracy, disputes will arise. In these situations, it's important that both sides have equal access to an independent body that can resolve the dispute. In democracies, this is the judicial system. Judges are a bit like referees - they're an independent body that is supposed to apply the rules the same to all. A football match would be a sham if the ref was picked by one of the teams, and democracy is similarly shambolic when the government packs the courts with its friends or disregards judicial decisions.

13. Accepting election results

When elections don't go the way of those in power, they must accept them and step down. The peaceful transfer of power defines the democratic process. Losers of elections must accept defeat, and though they can and should continue to openly share their ideas and participate in public debate, they must accept that their positions do not at present have majority support.

14. Rule of law

Democratic societies operate under the rule of law. This essentially means that a nation's laws apply equally to all people, and everyone, especially the government, must play by the rules. It means that the rights and freedoms and democratic processes described above are respected and nurtured. And it means that the laws are also enforced in a fair and consistent way, and there's an independent body, like the courts, to settle disputes that do arise. Liberties recently published its shadow report to the EU on the current rule of law situation across the bloc, finding a number of concerning trends across many member states.

Image Credit: Christopher Alvarenga/unsplash.com

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What makes a democracy a democracy? What are the basic principles of a democracy? What should you know about these? Why are they important?

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What is a democracy? The word "democracy" comes from the Greek words "demos", meaning "citizen", and "kratos", meaning "power" or "rule". At its most fundamental, a democracy is a form of government in which a nation's citizens have the power to decide the laws under which they will live. These decisions are made via either a vote of the people in a "direct democracy" (also called a "true" or "pure" democracy), or through elected officials who vote on behalf of their constituents in a "representative democracy".

Not all democracies are the same. A myriad of democratic sub-types exist, including constitutional democracy, green democracy, demarchy, illiberal democracy, industrial democracy, and more. In fact, one scholar identified more than 2000 different variations of democracy. What's more, the majority of these classifications overlap with one another. As a result, any given democracy will fit into many different subtypes.

For example, the United States is a representative democracy because most decisions are made not by the people themselves, but by representatives who act on the people's behalf. It is also an electoral democracy because those representatives are selected in elections, a presidential democracy because the head of government is also the head of state and leader of the executive branch, and a constitutional democracy because its fundamental principles and laws are guided by a constitution (which some argue makes the U.S. a republic rather than a democracy-more on that below).

What are the "must-have" ingredients of a democracy?

There are multiple theories about what specific elements are required for a government to qualify as a democracy. For example, in preparing its annual Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit scores each of the world's countries in five distinct categories-which we can examine to determine several of the Economist's democratic wish list:

1. A pluralistic system in which at least two legitimate-but-different political parties coexist

2. A free and fair electoral process that enables the people to choose between candidates from those parties

3. A government that operates openly and transparently, works for the good of all the people, respects its own rules, has proper checks and balances, and gives its citizens free choice and control over their lives

4. Politically engaged citizens who support democratic principles, "fight fair", vote regularly, accept the will of the voters, and commit to a peaceful transfer of power after each election

5. An emphasis on preserving civil liberties and personal freedoms of both the majority and minorities

6. A free and independent media unhindered by government interference, influence, or intimidation

Stanford University political scientist Larry Diamond has a similar list, maintaining that any democracy must include four key elements:

1. A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections

2. The active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life

3. Protection of the human rights of all citizens

4. A rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens

Finally, the Museum of Australian Democracy also teaches that all liberal democracies are based upon four main principles:

1. A belief in the individual: since the individual is believed to be both moral and rational

2. A belief in reason and progress: based on the belief that growth and development is the natural condition of mankind and politics the art of compromise

3. A belief in a society that is consensual: based on a desire for order and co-operation not disorder and conflict

4. A belief in shared power: based on a suspicion of concentrated power (whether by individuals, groups or governments)

The Democracy Index

The Democracy Index is an annual report compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The index measures the state of democracy in 167 of the world's countries by tracking 60 indicators in five different categories: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. The indicators are combined to give each category a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the five category scores are averaged to determine the overall index score.

Countries with a total Democracy Index score between 8.01 and 10 (out of 10) are considered full democracies. Those whose score lands between 6.01 and 8.00 are classified as flawed democracies. While these countries have free and fair elections and basic civil liberties, there are faults in other aspects, such as low levels of participation in politics or an underdeveloped (or heavily partisan) political culture. The lower two categories of the index are reserved for countries that did not score well enough to be considered democracies. Nations that score between 4.01 and 6.0 earn the title of hybrid regime, and anything lower than 4 is labeled an authoritative regime. The 2020 Democracy Index categorized 23 countries as full democracies, 52 as flawed democracies, 35 as hybrid regimes, and 57 as authoritarian regimes.

The 10 most democratic nations in the world (2020):

The United States scored 7.92 in 2020 and again landed in the "flawed democracy" category, where it has resided since falling from "full democracy" in 2016. Intolerance of COVID-19 restrictions, distrust in the government, bipartisan gridlock, and especially the increasing ideological polarization between democrats and republicans are all cited as contributors to the lower score. For the full list of all 167 countries and their 2020 scores, see the table further down this page.

Is the United States a democracy, a republic, or both?

Political terminology can be difficult to parse. A frequent topic of debate in modern circles is whether the United States is actually a republic rather than a democracy. In truth, the most accurate answer may be that the United States is both a republic and a democracy-but a specific type of each. The lynchpin of this debate is the fact that republics are very similar to direct democracies, but are different in one very important way.

A direct democracy has no elected officials and no constitution. The people have absolute power and make all decisions themselves via direct votes. While this may seem like an ideal system at first glance, direct democracy has one significant shortcoming: The lack of a constitution laying out basic guiding principles means that whatever at least 50.1% of the people want is what happens. There are no checks, no balances, and no limits. As such, a direct democracy offers little to no protection for up to 49.9% of the people, and leaves minorities particularly vulnerable.

By comparison, a republic is a government in which power is held by both the people and their elected representatives. Moreover, that power is limited by the laws established in a formal constitution, which preserves the rights of minorities and limits abuses of power. For example, the United States constitution and its amendments include such safeguards as the distribution of power among three branches of government (executive, judicial, legislative), the Bill of Rights, and the abolition of slavery. Elected officials must adhere to the constitution's rules.

Given these differences, it's easy to see why many people consider the U.S. a republic instead of a democracy. However, it's important to note that this is the difference between a republic and a direct democracy. Most other variations of democracy utilize elected officials just as republics do, and many variations also have a constitution (or Magna Carta or other founding document). Plus, as previously discussed, many political labels overlap with one another. Most governments can be described by not just one term, but several. As a result, those who say the U.S. is a republic and those who call it a democracy are both correct. The United States is a constitutional democracy, a democratic republic, and many other types of government as well.

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What is a democracy? The word "democracy" comes from the Greek words "demos", meaning "citizen", and "kratos", meaning "power" or "rule". At its most fundamental, a democracy is a form of government in which a nation's citizens have the power to decide the laws under which they will live.

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In the year 507 B.C., the Athenian leader Cleisthenes introduced a system of political reforms that he called demokratia, or "rule by the people" (from demos, "the people," and kratos, or "power"). It was the first known democracy in the world.

This system was comprised of three separate institutions: the ekklesia, a sovereign governing body that wrote laws and dictated foreign policy; the boule, a council of representatives from the ten Athenian tribes and the dikasteria, the popular courts in which citizens argued cases before a group of lottery-selected jurors. Although this Athenian democracy would survive for only two centuries, its invention by Cleisthenes, "The Father of Democracy," was one of ancient Greece's most enduring contributions to the modern world. The Greek system of direct democracy would pave the way for representative democracies across the globe.

Who Could Vote in Ancient Greece?

"In a democracy," the Greek historian Herodotus wrote, "there is, first, that most splendid of virtues, equality before the law." It was true that Cleisthenes' demokratia abolished the political distinctions between the Athenian aristocrats who had long monopolized the political decision-making process and the middle- and working-class people who made up the army and the navy (and whose incipient discontent was the reason Cleisthenes introduced his reforms in the first place).

Ostracism, in which a citizen could be expelled from Athens for 10 years, was among the powers of the ekklesia.

However, the "equality" Herodotus described was limited to a small segment of the Athenian population in Ancient Greece. For example, in Athens in the middle of the 4th century there were about 100,000 citizens (Athenian citizenship was limited to men and women whose parents had also been Athenian citizens), about 10,000 metoikoi, or "resident foreigners," and 150,000 slaves. Out of all those people, only male citizens who were older than 18 were a part of the demos, meaning only about 40,000 people could participate in the democratic process.

The Ekklesia

Athenian democracy was a direct democracy made up of three important institutions. The first was the ekklesia, or Assembly, the sovereign governing body of Athens. Any member of the demos-any one of those 40,000 adult male citizens-was welcome to attend the meetings of the ekklesia, which were held 40 times per year in a hillside auditorium west of the Acropolis called the Pnyx. (Only about 5,000 men attended each session of the Assembly; the rest were serving in the army or navy or working to support their families.)

At the meetings, the ekklesia made decisions about war and foreign policy, wrote and revised laws and approved or condemned the conduct of public officials. (Ostracism, in which a citizen could be expelled from the Athenian city-state for 10 years, was among the powers of the ekklesia.) The group made decisions by simple majority vote.

The Boule

The second important institution was the boule, or Council of Five Hundred. The boule was a group of 500 men, 50 from each of ten Athenian tribes, who served on the Council for one year. Unlike the ekklesia, the boule met every day and did most of the hands-on work of governance. It supervised government workers and was in charge of things like navy ships (triremes) and army horses. It dealt with ambassadors and representatives from other city-states. Its main function was to decide what matters would come before the ekklesia. In this way, the 500 members of the boule dictated how the entire democracy would work.

Positions on the boule were chosen by lot and not by election. This was because, in theory, a random lottery was more democratic than an election: pure chance, after all, could not be influenced by things like money or popularity. The lottery system also prevented the establishment of a permanent class of civil servants who might be tempted to use the government to advance or enrich themselves. However, historians argue that selection to the boule was not always just a matter of chance. They note that wealthy and influential people-and their relatives-served on the Council much more frequently than would be likely in a truly random lottery.

The Dikasteria

The third important institution was the popular courts, or dikasteria. Every day, more than 500 jurors were chosen by lot from a pool of male citizens older than 30. Of all the democratic institutions, Aristotle argued that the dikasteria "contributed most to the strength of democracy" because the jury had almost unlimited power.

There were no police in Athens, so it was the demos themselves who brought court cases, argued for the prosecution and the defense and delivered verdicts and sentences by majority rule. (There were also no rules about what kinds of cases could be prosecuted or what could and could not be said at trial, and so Athenian citizens frequently used the dikasteria to punish or embarrass their enemies.)

Jurors were paid a wage for their work, so that the job could be accessible to everyone and not just the wealthy (but, since the wage was less than what the average worker earned in a day, the typical juror was an elderly retiree). Since Athenians did not pay taxes, the money for these payments came from customs duties, contributions from allies and taxes levied on the metoikoi. The one exception to this rule was the leitourgia, or liturgy, which was a kind of tax that wealthy people volunteered to pay to sponsor major civic undertakings such as the maintenance of a navy ship (this liturgy was called the trierarchia) or the production of a play or choral performance at the city's annual festival.

The End of Athenian Democracy

Around 460 B.C., under the rule of the general Pericles (generals were among the only public officials who were elected, not appointed) Athenian democracy began to evolve into something that we would call an aristocracy: the rule of what Herodotus called "the one man, the best." Though democratic ideals and processes did not survive in ancient Greece, they have been influencing politicians and governments ever since.

Modern representative democracies, in contrast to direct democracies, have citizens who vote for representatives who create and enact laws on their behalf. Canada, The United States and South Africa are all examples of modern-day representative democracies.

HISTORY Vault: Ancient History

Fact Check

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In the year 507 B.C., the Athenian leader Cleisthenes introduced a system of political reforms that he called demokratia, or "rule by the people" (from demos, "the people," and kratos, or "power"). It was the first known democracy in the world.

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This lesson is from the first edition of We the People: The Citizen & the Constitution, Level 1, for upper elementary students. For sample lessons from the latest edition, please click here.

This lesson will help you understand why the Founders thought a republican form of government was best. You will also learn about civic virtue and the common welfare.

The Founders Studied History

The Founders studied the history of governments. They were very interested in what they read about the government of the Roman Republic. It was located in what is now the country of Italy. The Roman Republic existed more than 2,000 years before our nation began.

The Founders liked what they read about the Roman Republic. They learned some important ideas from their study of the government of ancient Rome. They used some of these ideas when they created our government.

What is a Republican Government?

The government of Rome was called a republican government. The Founders read that republican government was one in which:

The power of government is held by the people.

The people give power to leaders they elect to represent them and serve their interests.

The representatives are responsible for helping all the people in the country, not just a few people.

Representatives: people elected to act for others

interests: those things which are to a person's benefit

What are the Advantages of Republican Government?

The Founders thought a republican government was the best kind of government they could choose for themselves. They believed that the advantages of republican government were:

Fairness. They believed that laws made by the representatives they elected would be fair. If their representatives did not make fair laws, they could elect others who would.

Common welfare. The laws would help everyone instead of one person or a few favored people.

Freedom and prosperity. People would have greater freedom and be able to live well.

What is the Common Welfare?

When a government tries to help everyone in a country, we say it is serving the common welfare. The common welfare is what is good for everyone in the country, not just a few people.

Your Interests and the Common Welfare

How do you decide what the common welfare is? When should you give up your own interests to do something that is good for everyone? Each person has to answer this question for himself or herself. The following exercise will help you do this.

Work in groups of about three to five students. Each group should discuss the following questions. Be prepared to explain your group's answers to the class.

1. Describe a situation in which you think you should try to help others instead of just doing what you want for yourself.

2. Explain a situation in which you think you should do something for yourself instead of trying to help others.

3. Sometimes people disagree about what is the best thing for everyone. Describe a situation where this might happen. How do you think such disagreements should be settled?

4. Describe some things your government does to help everyone in the country. What other things could your government do? Why?

When you work to help others and promote the common welfare, you are showing civic virtue. The Founders thought civic virtue was important for a republican government. People with civic virtue are interested in having the government help all the people.

The Founders thought it was necessary to teach children the importance of helping others. Young people learned about civic virtue in their homes, schools, and churches. Adults also heard about civic virtue from their religious and political leaders.

The Founders thought a republican government would work in our country. They believed most of the people had civic virtue. They thought the people would select leaders who would work for the common welfare.

Reviewing and Using the Lesson

1. What is republican government?

2. Define "common welfare." Give examples of how your school helps the common welfare.

3. Define "civic virtue." Give examples of people with civic virtue in your school and community.

4. Where was civic virtue taught in early America?

5. Describe a situation in which your interests might conflict with the common welfare.

6. Explain these terms: republican government, representative, interests, common welfare, civic virtue.

All rights reserved. Permission is granted to freely use this information for nonprofit educational purposes only. Copyright must be acknowledged on all copies. The development of this text was originally funded and cosponsored by the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. The US Department of Education disclaims the responsibility for any opinion or conclusions contained herein. The Federal Government reserves a nonexclusive license to use and reproduce for governmental purposes, without payment, this material where the government deems it in its interest to do so.

ISBN 0-89818-169-0

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Lesson 3: What Is a Republican Government?

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This lesson is from the first edition of We the People: The Citizen & the Constitution , Level 1, for upper elementary students. For sample lessons from th...

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“Democracy” vs. “Republic”: Is There A Difference?

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Is the US a “democracy” or a “republic”? This question is coming up a lot during election season, so read up on the difference while you cast your ballot.

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By the middle of June 1787, the convention in Philadelphia called to deliberate over a new plan of government for the United States had reached an impasse in their debate over the Virginia Plan. On June 18, after initial debate on an alternative plan recommended by William Paterson of New Jersey, Alexander Hamilton - who, according to James Madison's notes, "had hitherto been silent on the business before the Convention" - introduced his own plan for national government.

Hamilton's plan included a bicameral national legislature with comprehensive (indeed, plenary) legislative power. Members of the body's lower house (the Assembly) would be elected directly by the people for a term of three years, and those of the upper house would be appointed indirectly by the people (via electors) from distrincts, to serve "during good behaviour" - i.e., for life. He proposed that the "supreme Executive" be appointed by electors chosen by the people, in their districts, "to serve during good behaviour" as well. Judges would also be appointed for life or good behavior. All officers appointed to serve during good behavior could also be impeached for bad and corrupt conduct and, "upon conviction," be both "removed from office, and disqualified" from holding any future office under the United States.

This national government was to be completely supreme to the states. Hamilton proposed the following: "All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States [would] be utterly void." But "to prevent such laws" from being passed in the first place, he suggested "the Governour or president of each State shall be appointed by the General [i.e., national] Government and shall have a negative upon [i.e., a veto over] the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is Governour or President." Hamilton's proposed dependency of state governors on the national executive went hand in hand with his rejection of imperium in imperio: "Two sovereignties cannot co-exist within the same limits," Hamilton contended. "The general power whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them."

Aware that critics would challenge his plan as un-republican, Hamilton sought to preempt them: "But is this a Republican Government, it will be asked?" "Yes," he insisted, "if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of election originating with the people."

Yet it seems the convention rejected his claim that the plan of government he proposed was truly republican in form - containing, as it did, elements of what can only be described as elective monarchy and elective aristocracy. Moreover, while Hamilton defended his plan as consonant with republican form, he also heaped praise on the British constitution, from which the states had recently declared independence. Madison's notes from the convention debates recount Hamilton saying that in "his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise and good, that the British [government] was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether anything short of it would do in America." Hamilton joined French finance minister Jacques Necker's praise of the British constitution as "the only Government in the world 'which unites public strength with individual security.'" Hamilton added, "Their house of Lords is a most noble institution." By Hamilton's own reckoning, his plan adapted the British constitution - including elective monarchy and elective aristocracy - to American circumstances.

Little wonder, then, that the convention did not take seriously Hamilton's initial claim that his plan was republican in form. And by June 26th, Hamilton "acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Government," though he "addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it."

Hamilton thus admitted he was no friend of republican form, a remark that seems equally applicable to his plan for national government. In his essay "Democracy and the Constitution," Gordon Wood describes the Federalists in terms that very much capture Hamilton's argument on behalf of his plan: "[T]he Federalists in their public statements were not able to say candidly what at least some had said within the secrecy of the Philadelphia Convention: that the source of their difficulties came from too much local democracy, and that the solution was to limit this local democracy by erecting a more aristocratic structure over it." Yet this "solution" could be construed as the replacement of republican form with something else.

That an opponent of republican government like Hamilton felt compelled to justify his proposal as consonant with republican form, even in the secrecy of the Philadelphia convention, indicates the degree to which republicanism had become the normative basis for constitutional design in the Revolutionary era. Yet those who invoked republicanism as the basis of their various proposals often disagreed as to the right plan of government, including appropriate limits on majority rule and the extent to which local control should be checked by the national government. This poses the question: What is a republic? Does the American order present us with an instance of republican form?
REPUBLIC VERSUS DEMOCRACY
In Federalist Nos. 10 and 14, Madison defined republican form so as to distinguish it from the democracies of antiquity. His definition in those essays is idiosyncratic, but we might frame Madison's position this way: He identified a genus without denominating it - we might call it "popular rule" or "popular government" - and then differentiated two species within it: democracy and republican form.

Democracy, in Madison's account, refers to direct rule by the people assembled. ("Direct democracy" would have been redundant to citizens of such regimes in antiquity.) A democracy is necessarily confined to a small extent of territory, since the citizens must be able to assemble regularly in order to make law and to decide all other important matters of government. As Madison put it in Federalist No. 10, the term republic refers to a regime "in which a scheme of representation takes place" - in which the people do not themselves assemble for the purpose of making law but instead make law by means of chosen (i.e., elected) agents or representatives. A republic, therefore, can be extended over a much greater span of territory than a democracy.

Madison's famous definition seems to make representation - in contrast to rule by the citizens assembled - the desideratum or necessary condition of republican form. Thus, insofar as a regime does not rely on representation, although it may still be a species of popular rule (if the people administer the government in person), it is not a republic.According to Madison, where previous writers thought republics had to be small - because they conflated democracy and republican form and because pure democracies necessarily are confined to a small extent of territory - in fact, the small size of democracies was the source of the problem. Together with the fact that a popular assembly in a democracy simply recapitulated the citizenry, the small size of ancient democracies made them vulnerable to majority factions, which subsequently roiled those regimes. Indeed, the democracies of antiquity - sometimes improperly denominated republics - almost all exhibited the following pattern: They were short lived; while alive they oscillated between the extremes of anarchy and tyranny; and they died sudden and violent deaths.

Madison understood that the small number of people needed for a majority in an ancient democracy rendered the regime and the instruments of power easily captured by a majority faction - indeed, easily captured by one iteration of majority faction after another. A large republic, by way of contrast, would take in so many factions that a majority faction would be unlikely to exist. If a majority faction nevertheless did exist, a large republic makes it unlikely that it would discover itself (i.e. that it exists as a majority faction), given the distribution of its members across a large expanse of territory. But if one both existed and discovered its existence as a majority faction, a large republic renders it unlikely that a majority faction could successfully coordinate its actions and carry its plans into effect.

Moreover, given relatively large electoral districts, representation meant that the factional alignments of the public need not be recapitulated in the legislative body. Thus the laws passed by the legislative body might be more consonant with the public good than if the people themselves had assembled in order to make law. At the same time, because members of the legislative branch are themselves members of and advocates for various factions - that is, members of competing interests the regulation of which is the principal task of modern legislation - Madison refused to rely on representation alone in order to achieve this goal.

A large republic with large electoral districts for representatives in the legislature's most populous branch (or the lower house) creates a certain amount of distance between the people and their chosen agents. According to a number of scholars today, that was precisely the point: to mitigate the pernicious effects of local (or state and local) democracy. Wood writes: "The Revolution had democratized the state assemblies by increasing the number of representatives and by altering their social character. Men of more humble, more rural origins, less educated, and with more parochial interests than those in the colonial legislatures became state representatives after 1776." Legislative blocs composed of these men "took consistently localist positions on many issues that their cosmopolitan elite opponents criticized as 'illiberal,' 'interested,' and 'unprincipled,'" and enacted "what the Federalists described as the confused, unjust, and narrowly based legislation of the 1780s."

The Federalists, says Wood, desired "a structure of government that would inhibit such localist kinds of men from gaining power." According to Wood, in Federalist No. 10 Madison sought to keep "[m]en of factious tempers" and "localist prejudices" out of government by "enlarging the arena of politics" and "[r]aising important governmental decision making to the national level." This "would expand the electorate and at the same time would reduce the number of those elected. This expanded electorate and elevated government would then act as a kind of filter, refining the kind of men who would become national leaders." Wood thus frames Madisonian republicanism as "cosmopolitan" rather than localist - indeed, as anti-localist.
MAJORITY RULE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE
If we look beyond Federalist No. 10, Madison proffered at least two additional accounts of republican form: one in "Vices of the Political System of the United States" and one in Federalist No. 39.

In "Vices of the Political System of the United States" (a document written prior to the Philadelphia convention and that informed his arguments there), in speeches delivered at the convention, and in a letter to Thomas Jefferson (dated October 24, 1787), Madison claimed that the republican principle is rule by the majority. In "Vices," he contended that the worst vice of the entire political system of the United States was the injustice of state laws. More than any other vice, the injustice of state laws called into question whether republican government can be justified. This injustice resulted from two main causes.

The first cause lay in the character of the representatives. According to Madison, people seek representative office (and perhaps political power more generally) for three reasons: ambition (the love of power and dominion over others), personal interest (i.e., for personal gain), and to advance the public good. The vast majority of those who seek and ultimately win elective office are motivated by ambition and personal interest rather than the public good. Moreover, those most likely to succeed in getting policy enacted into law are likewise the interested and the ambitious.

The second cause lay in popular majority factions (that is, majority factions in the society) that in turn drove unjust legislative majorities. Madison viewed this second cause as more worrisome because it subverted the justification for republican form over and above other regimes: namely, that the people (i.e., the majority) who govern in such republics are the safest guardians of both private rights and the public good. But in the states, popular majorities frequently trampled these underfoot in pursuit of their own gain. "In republican government, the majority however composed ultimately give the law," wrote Madison. Thus, within the compass of a small republic (like states or local communities at the time), there is no restraint to prevent an unjust majority pursuing its own power or gain from oppressing the minority in that society.

In a letter to George Washington prior to the convention (dated April 16, 1787) and in speeches there on June 8, Madison argued that a national veto on state legislatures was "absolutely necessary" to a perfect system. The Virginia Plan lodged this veto (as Madison intended) in the national legislature (which could in turn be vetoed by a national Council of Revision, though it could, in turn, override a Council veto simply by repassing the original veto on state legislation).

The national veto on state laws would allow the large national republic - itself protected from majority faction by virtue of its large extent of territory and comprised of large electoral districts that favored the election of wiser and more virtuous candidates for office and that included a system of checks designed to frustrate majority factions at the national level should they exist, discover their existence, and attempt to coordinate their actions - to provide a check on unjust state laws, whether those laws resulted from the character of the representatives in the state legislature or unjust majority factions driving unjust legislative factions within a state. The point of Madison's large, national republic was to hold state legislative and popular majorities in check.

Madison provided yet another account of republican form in Federalist No. 39. Here, Madison wrote, "we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior." He proceeded to stipulate a necessary condition of republican form:

It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic.

On Madison's definition, a republic qua republic traces all governmental authority back to the whole of society, not just some part.

Hamilton's argument for his plan of national government at the convention seems to treat what Madison called necessary for a republic (that government be derived from the great body of society and not from some part) as sufficient instead. But Hamilton also rather clearly conflated the nature of the regime with its authorization.

Madison's sufficient condition, at first glance, seems to eliminate the necessity of the people participating in the exercise of political authority for republican form:

It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character.

If Madison meant that republican form does not require the people's participation in the exercise of political authority, in the exercise of government, and that the role of the people can, consonant with republican form, be reduced to electing rulers or officials, then Madison misapprehended republican form. But Madison need not be understood this way.

If we focus our attention on Madison's position on the relations of the nation and the states - recalling that in "Vices" he claimed the injustice of the laws of the states was the worst vice of the political system of the United States and unjust popular majorities the most "fatal" cause of this vice - we must also note that he called for the states to be checked, but not for them to be abolished or displaced. In Federalist No. 14, he wrote:

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.

Madison was clearly concerned about the biases and prejudices that animated too much state legislation. He maintained that the states should be held in check. But he also insisted that the states would not be abolished or absorbed by the proposed Constitution, and that they ought not be - if the public good were to be adequately provided for. Put another way, Madison rejected as misguided the notion of entrusting the whole power of providing for the common good to a fully consolidated or wholly centralized, national government. Rather, the national government exists to supply or help supply those goods that state and local communities cannot provide by themselves.

What Madison said about the proper relation between the nation and the states applies also to state and local government. At first glance, it might seem that Madison sought to displace local governments or to effectively abolish their role in the exercise of political authority. But as with the states, Madisonian constitutionalism is better interpreted as seeking to hold them in check - that is, to check the excesses of popular sovereignty or community rule at the local level rather than to dissolve or replace local self-government.

In On Revolution, Hannah Arendt famously lamented the Constitution's failure to protect local communities the way that it did the states. She wrote of the "failure" of the Constitution "to incorporate the townships and the town-hall meetings, the original springs of all political activity in the country." She called this failure to protect local governments "a death sentence for them." Arendt's claim concerning the demise of local communities is empirically unsound. Moreover, most of the framers of the Constitution almost certainly took for granted the design of state legislatures in the first state constitutions, according to which the chambers or houses of a state assembly were chosen by local communities (which chose a greater or lesser number of representatives depending on their size), often by the very town-hall meetings to which Arendt refers. But for the sake of argument, suppose Wood rightly construes Madison as hostile to local government because local rule does little more than give expression to local prejudices. In that case, Madison would then have to be understood as subverting - not preserving - republican form.

Modern statist regimes construe political order and authority from the top down. Republics, by contrast, must be built from the ground up. Moreover, restricting the definition of a republic to representation - even to representation in which all appointments and authority trace back, whether directly or indirectly, to society as a whole and not to some part - is clearly insufficient for republican form. As Aristotle knew, election (or selection) is the characteristic means by which oligarchies choose their rulers. If oligarchies employ elections as their characteristic means for choosing officials, then elections (and, by implication, voting and representation) cannot be sufficient for republican form; something more is required.

To be sure, one way Aristotle suggested for constituting a middle regime (a polity or politeia) included conjoining the oligarchic mechanism of electing or selecting officials with the democratic policy of having no property qualification for holding office. Thus, Aristotle seems to hold that election of officials - or even elections and representation - can be an element in a regime we in our day or Madison in his might denominate a republic. That is, elections and representation are compatible with, or can be part of, republican form. But again, elections are clearly not sufficient for a republic, since election (or selection) of officials derives from oligarchy rather than democracy (i.e., electing officials is for Aristotle the oligarchic component in a mixed regime). After all, democracy in the proper sense for Aristotle, as for Madison, referred to political rule exercised by the citizens assembled (though the constitution of Athens obviously involved more than rule by the Assembly).

Moreover, while Aristotle in places seems to reject the natural equality of all human beings, he nevertheless held that insofar as individuals are equal (i.e., with respect to individuals "who are alike by nature"), "Justice demands that no one should do more ruling than being ruled, but that all should have their turn." When individuals are equal, they should take turns "ruling and being ruled."Yet, simply electing officials does not amount to participating in political rule. Ruling and being ruled in turn requires sometimes participating in the exercise of political authority and consequently not just being involved in the appointment of officials who exercise it.

If we take republican form to mean self-government, and self-government to mean a community that governs itself, and if we take human beings to be constituted essentially (though not exhaustively) by the relations in which they stand to others, then it follows that a republic must be built from the bottom up and not imposed from the top down. For only in local communities can individuals participate (or take turns participating) in the exercise of political rule or government and not just in the selection of officials who exercise authority over them. We might call the necessity of building republican order from the bottom up the grassroots basis of society or political order.
FEDERALISM, SUBSIDIARITY, AND REPUBLICAN FORM
In Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenantal Tradition, J. Wayne Baker and Charles McCoy maintain that the term "federalism," at its origin, meant building more comprehensive levels of political society (for instance a commonwealth) from smaller, less comprehensive communities, where these communities - and individuals only as members of various communities and not individuals as such - serve as the building blocks of anything more extensive. Federalism so understood - whether as a matter of historical development or simply as a description of the structure of a political society, especially when construed along the lines of Madison's description of the national-state relation in Federalist No. 39 - instantiates the principle of subsidiarity.

Like federalism, subsidiarity requires ordering society from the bottom up. In his encyclical Quadragresimo Anno, on the proper construction of social order, Pope Pius XI wrote:

Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help [ subsidium] to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them [emphasis added].

Subsidiarity recognizes that human beings are not only social by nature, but members of various kinds of both local and more comprehensive communities. The purpose of more comprehensive communities - like provinces and nations - is to help more concrete local communities and associations, closer to the real lives of individuals, fulfill their proper function. Like federalism, subsidiarity thus requires ordering society from the bottom up. In both cases, things like families, professional associations, religious congregations, neighborhoods, and various clubs serve as the building blocks for local political association, and local political association for more comprehensive or "higher" levels of political order.

Under the principle of subsidiarity, then, local political communities should be allowed to govern themselves to the extent that they are able to provide for the common good of their members. More comprehensive levels of government exist to help local communities and local governments in instances where they cannot perform this function on their own (for instance, providing protection from external dangers) and to address spillover problems or externalities that impose costs on other communities.

It is also compatible with this view to affirm that a more comprehensive community might hold a smaller community in check when it comes to injustice in policy or ordinance. Thus, in a compound republic constructed in accord with subsidiarity, a more comprehensive government might rightly have the power to veto the unjust policies (for instance, slavery or excluding individuals from voting based on the color of their skin) of local communities. That is, a more comprehensive community (like the nation or the state) could and arguably should have the authority to check policies born of parochial prejudice rather than the requirements of the common good.

What subsidiarity debars is more comprehensive communities like the nation or the state abolishing or absorbing local (or regional) communities - that is, subsidiarity forbids the nation to abolish or absorb the states (as Hamilton proposed at the convention) and forbids the states to abolish or absorb local communities and governments.

The principle of subsidiarity is very much in line with Madison's account of federalism in Federalist No. 14 and, in his treatment of the extent of national power under the Constitution, in Federalist No. 39.
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE
In a simple, large, national republic - one in which local or regional governments have been abolished as governments in their own right and have become only outposts of the national regime - individuals equal by nature do not and cannot take turns ruling and being ruled. They cannot do so, at any rate, insofar as ruling and being ruled means taking turns exercising authority. In a nation of any size, the vast majority of people can only participate in exercising rule at the local level - in concrete, local communities. Thus, a simple, large, national "republic" (in contrast to Madison's partly national and partly federal, compound republic) is not really a republic at all.

To be a republic, a regime must be constituted by local communities that are self-governing except with respect to goods that local communities cannot provide by themselves; to externalities that spill over the boundaries of local communities, negatively affecting other communities; and to checking local injustices (where power to provide such a check has been delegated to the relevant comprehensive level).

If Madison had meant to define republican form entirely in terms of representation, and if he also aimed the displacement of self-government by local communities, then he would have completely abdicated republican form, replacing it with a regime oligarchic in nature. Just as representation and an extended republic are necessary to address the problem of majority faction - a problem that, if unaddressed, results in republican failure and capitulation to tyranny or anarchy - so also self-governing local communities are necessary to have a republic at all.

A large national regime - mass national democracy, for instance - is not really republican or democratic. In such a regime people choose their leaders, but they do not themselves rule. After all, we can think of aristocracies or monarchies in which offices are filled by election. Election of officials, even with very broad suffrage, does not by itself alter the character of such regimes - at least if we distinguish between choosing rulers who exercise authority on the one hand, and the people, the community, exercising it on the other.

Fixed terms or procedures to remove officials for bad behavior are likewise insufficient to render a regime republican rather than monarchic, aristocratic, or a mixed regime in the classical sense (as in the Spartan or British constitutions. In a republic, the people themselves take turns exercising the instruments of power, even if they are also helped and held in check by more comprehensive levels of political association.

Even if a regime is not republican in form, subsidiarity, which is a basic principle of human flourishing, rules out a purely simple national regime and, in fact, requires a compound and layered political order in a regime of any size. This is not to claim that the principle of subsidiarity entails republican form. Rather, republican form requires subsidiarity and federalism precisely because these are necessary to a regime in which the people actually exercise authority instead of merely choosing those who do. Thus, republican form, a community that governs itself, requires viewing local associations and communities as the building blocks of anything more comprehensive. The question for us, then, is not whether republican form can be defined away from the people actually exercising political power, as Hamilton sought to redefine it. Republican form cannot be redefined without abdicating it completely. Rather, the question for us is whether we are partisans of republican form, or whether we would prefer an elective regime in which the people play some role in the selection of some officials but do not meaningfully participate in the exercise of authority and so do not really govern themselves.

If we judge republicanism - self-government or popular rule - to be the form of political order we wish to pursue, then preservation of local communities, rather than their absorption or abolishment, is incumbent upon us. We must seek a way of life in which the people do not merely choose their leaders but actually exercise political rule. Reclaiming American republicanism would therefore require substantial decentralization and a significantly more engaged citizenry. In the absence of these, the phrase "government by the people" becomes an empty phrase, or what St. Paul called "a resounding gong."
Paul R. DeHart is professor of political science at Texas State University.

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Republicanism was a core concept in the vocabulary of the American founders, but is largely lost to us. Recovering it would help us seek a way of life in which the people do not merely choose their leaders but actually exercise political rule. Ignori...

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The Romans established a form of government - a republic - that was copied by countries for centuries In fact, the government of the United States is based partly on Rome's model.

The ladder to political power in the Roman Senate was different for the wealthy patricians than for the lower-class plebeians.

It all began when the Romans overthrew their Etruscan conquerors in 509 B.C.E. Centered north of Rome, the Etruscans had ruled over the Romans for hundreds of years.

Once free, the Romans established a republic, a government in which citizens elected representatives to rule on their behalf. A republic is quite different from a democracy, in which every citizen is expected to play an active role in governing the state.

Citizen

Frescoes line the walls of long-forgotten Etruscan tombs. This painting, found in the Tomb of Augurs in Tarquinia, is titled Hell's Door.

The aristocracy (wealthy class) dominated the early Roman Republic. In Roman society, the aristocrats were known as patricians. The highest positions in the government were held by two consuls, or leaders, who ruled the Roman Republic. A senate composed of patricians elected these consuls. At this time, lower-class citizens, or plebeians, had virtually no say in the government. Both men and women were citizens in the Roman Republic, but only men could vote.

Tradition dictated that patricians and plebeians should be strictly separated; marriage between the two classes was even prohibited. Over time, the plebeians elected their own representatives, called tribunes, who gained the power to veto measures passed by the senate.

Gradually, the plebeians obtained even more power and eventually could hold the position of consul. Despite these changes, though, the patricians were still able to use their wealth to buy control and influence over elected leaders.

The Roman Senate

Occasionally, an emergency situation (such as a war) arose that required the decisive leadership of one individual. Under these circumstances, the Senate and the consuls could appoint a temporary dictator to rule for a limited time until the crisis was resolved. The position of dictator was very undemocratic in nature. Indeed, a dictator had all the power, made decisions without any approval, and had full control over the military.

The best example of an ideal dictator was a Roman citizen named Cincinnatus. During a severe military emergency, the Roman Senate called Cincinnatus from his farm to serve as dictator and to lead the Roman army. When Cincinnatus stepped down from the dictatorship and returned to his farm only 15 days after he successfully defeated Rome's enemies, the republican leaders resumed control over Rome.

The Twelve Tables

One of the innovations of the Roman Republic was the notion of equality under the law. In 449 B.C.E., government leaders carved some of Rome's most important laws into 12 great tablets. The Twelve Tables, as they came to be known, were the first Roman laws put in writing. Although the laws were rather harsh by today's standards, they did guarantee every citizen equal treatment under the law.

Laws from the Twelve Tables

With respect to the law and citizenship, the Romans took a unique approach to the lands that they conquered. Rather than rule those people as conquered subjects, the Romans invited them to become citizens. These people then became a part of Rome, rather than enemies fighting against it. Naturally, these new citizens received the same legal rights as everyone else.

The Punic Wars

The early Roman Republic often found itself in a state of constant warfare with its surrounding neighbors. In one instance, when the Romans were fighting the Carthaginians, Rome was nearly conquered. The people of Carthage (a city in what is today Tunisia in north Africa) were a successful trading civilization whose interests began to conflict with those of the Romans.

The two sides fought three bloody wars, known as the Punic Wars (264-146 B.C.E.), over the control of trade in the western Mediterranean Sea. In the second war, Hannibal, a Carthaginian general, successfully invaded Italy by leading an army - complete with elephants - across the Alps. He handed the Roman army a crushing defeat but was unable to sack the city of Rome itself. After occupying and ravaging Italy for more than a decade, Hannibal was finally defeated by the Roman general Scipio at the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C.E.

Why "Punic"?

By the Third Punic War, Rome was ready to end the Carthaginian threat for good. After a successful several-year siege of Carthage, the Romans burned the city to the ground. Legend has it that the Romans then poured salt into the soil so that nothing would ever grow there again. Carthage was finally defeated, and the Roman Republic was safe.

Great Battles of the Roman Republic
For all its size and might, the Roman Republic truly feared the north African general Hannibal. He marched through the Roman countryside virtually unopposed for 16 years until his defeat at the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C.E. ended the Second Punic War. After it destroyed Hannibal's city, Carthage, the Roman Republic became an international power that later grew into a giant empire.

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The Romans established a form of government - a republic - that was copied by countries for centuries In fact, the government of the United States is based partly on Rome's model. The ladder to political power in the Roman Senate was different for the wealthy patricians than for the lower-class plebeians.

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A republic is a form of government in which the power is held by the people, but instead of ruling directly, the people loan their power to elected representatives who represent them and their interests. The word "republic" comes from the Latin term res public, which means "public things," "public matter," or "public affair." This reflects the fact that governing in republics is considered the right and duty of the people as a whole, not the exclusive privilege of a small, elite group of rulers. In some countries, such as the United States, "Republican" is also the proper name of a political party. In those countries, a "republican" government is one in which the people elect politicians to represent them, but a "Republican" government is one run by members of the Republican party.

Republic vs representative democracy vs direct democracy

Republics are also referred to as representative democracies. These differ from direct democracies, in which citizens govern the state themselves, not through representatives. While it sounds ideal, in actual practice a true direct democracy in which every citizen voted on every government decision would be logistically impractical, if not impossible. Moreover, because most people lack the time it would take to be fully educated about every decision, it's likely that most votes would include a huge number of poorly informed voters.

In light of these complications, all current modern democracies are republics. Direct democracies and republics are both considered the opposite of dictatorships, monarchies, or authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, in which decisions are made by just a few people-perhaps even a single person. Most often, a republic is a single sovereign state. In some cases, however, a republic is a union, often called a federation, of smaller, sub-sovereign states. These states are typically also republican in nature. Each of the U.S. states is guaranteed a "republican form of government" by the United States Constitution. The Soviet Union-formally known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or U.S.S.R.-was another federation. Its fifteen individual nations were all sub-sovereign republics.

History of the republic

Before the 1600s, the term "republic" was used to designate any state that was not an authoritarian regime. Republic could encompass not only democratic states but also oligarchies, aristocracies, and monarchies. French philosopher Jean Bodin wrote a definition of the republic in his Six Books of the Commonwealth in 1576. It read, "the rightly ordered government of a number of families, and of those things which are their common concern, by a sovereign power." The definition of a republic began to shift during the 17th and 18th centuries, amid growing resistance to absolutist regimes and a series of revolutions. These include the American Revolution and the French Revolution. These events shaped the term "republic" to designate governments in which the leader is periodically appointed under a constitution (as opposed to inherited as it would be in a monarchy), typically by an election.

Which countries are really republics?

159 of the world's sovereign states use the word "republic" in their official names. For example, the proper name of the country we usually call South Korea is actually the Republic of Korea. However, compiling a list of which countries truly operate as republics is no easy feat. This is partly due to the generously broad modern definition of a republic and partly due to the fact that the term is occasionally incorporated into the titles of countries that have arguably distorted its definition. One well-known example of this is North Korea, whose official name is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, despite the fact that the country is widely considered to be a military dictatorship and a totalitarian regime rather than a republic. At the same time, many of the world's most prominent true republics, such as the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, do not include the word "republic" in their names at all.

Even without considering nations' official names, the distinction between what qualifies as a republic and what does not can be fuzzy at times. For instance, Russia is theoretically a republic because its government is composed largely of elected representatives. However, significant evidence exists that the elections are heavily controlled and influenced, if not rigged outright, by the current government. This casts doubt upon the integrity of the nation's elections and calls into question just how much power the people have when choosing their representatives and whether those representatives' actions truly reflect the will of the people.

Other governments, such as Cuba and China, have goen one step further and established a "one-party" system in which all political parties other than the ruling party are illegal. If elections are held, they feature only specific candidates-often only one per position-hand-picked by the existing government. The ruling officials are indeed voted in by the people, but the people have no choice in the matter, which arguably subverts the concept of a republic and usurps the power from the people.

On the other hand, several other countries (mostly former British colonies) would likely be republics if not for a technicality. Countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom are defined as constitutional monarchies because they have a queen or king who acts as the head of the state. However, that monarch's role is largely ceremonial and the rest of the government functions nearly identically to a parliamentary republic, with the people choosing the overwhelming majority of their representatives in free and fair elections.

Scenarios such as these are why the political terms de jure and de facto are often used. De jure refers to the legally recognized (read: theoretical or official "on paper") version of the government, while de facto refers to the way a government actually operates. It is not uncommon for a country's de jure government to be a republic, but for its de facto version to be something quite different (or vice versa). In light of these intricacies, it's important to remember that whether a country is a republic or not is not necessarily an accurate indicator as to the level of freedom, electoral choice, or government oppression in that country.

Presidential republics and parliamentary republics

There are many countries in the world with republic governments, although the specific type of republic they have can vary. The two most common basic types of republic are the presidential republic and the parliamentary republic. The differences are largely in the structure and the distribution of power.

For instance, in a presidential republic, the executive branch of the government is led by a president who is elected by the people. In a parliamentary republic, the executive branch is led by a group of elected officials, which may or may not be called a parliament, and that group elects a prime minister from among themselves. Both of these configurations have numerous variations, including semi-presidential systems in which power is more balanced between the president and the prime minister.

The United States is a presidential republic. After the American Revolution ended and the colonies won independence from Great Britain, the Constitution was written, establishing the United States as a federal constitutional democratic republic. Every four years, American citizens over the age of 18 elect a new President and participate in other smaller elections. Like many other nations, the U.S. is considered a hybrid government and is simultaneously a constitutional republic, a representative democracy, and a democratic republic.

The republican government in the U.S. is based on three basic principles:

The power and authority comes from the people and not a supreme authority (king)

A written constitution protects the rights of the people

Through the vote of the people, power is given to elected representatives based on majority rule to serve the interests of the citizens and act on their behalf. Additionally, the representatives of the country are responsible for helping all the people in the country, not just a few.

Germany is another example of a republic, although because it is a parliamentary republic its various branches are structured slightly differently from those in the United States. Germany's government is considered to be a federal democratic constitutional republic. The German Constitution emphasizes the protection of individual liberty and the civil rights of the people. Article 38 of German Basic Law states that elections are to be universal, direct, free, equal, and secret. Elections in Germany include elections to the Bundestag, Germany's federal parliament, every four years.

Countries with a republic government

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A republic is a form of government in which the power is held by the people, but instead of ruling directly, the people loan their power to elected representatives who represent them and their interests. The word “republic” comes from the Latin term res public, which means “public things,” “public m…

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A monarchy is a form of government in which total sovereignty is invested in one person, a head of state called a monarch, who holds the position until death or abdication. Monarchs usually both hold and achieve their position through the right of hereditary succession (e.g., they were related, often the son or daughter, of the previous monarch), although there have been elective monarchies, where the monarch holds the position after being elected: the papacy is sometimes called an elective monarchy.

There have also been hereditary rulers who weren't considered monarchs, such as the stadtholders of Holland. Many monarchs have invoked religious reasons, such as being chosen by God, as a justification for their rule. Courts are often considered a key aspect of monarchies. These occur around the monarchs and provide a social meeting place for monarch and nobility.

Titles of a Monarchy

Male monarchs are often called kings, and females queens, but principalities, where princes and princesses rule by hereditary right, are sometimes referred to as monarchies, as are empires led by emperors and empresses.

Levels of Power

The amount of power a monarch wields has varied across time and situation, with a good deal of European national history comprising a power struggle between the monarch and either their nobility and subjects. On the one hand, you have the absolute monarchies of the early modern period, the best example being French King Louis XIV, where the monarch (in theory at least) had total power over everything they wished.

On the other, you have constitutional monarchies where the monarch is now little more than a figurehead, and the majority of power rests with other forms of government. There is traditionally only one monarch per monarchy at a time, although in Britain King William and Queen Mary ruled simultaneously between 1689 and 1694. When a monarch is either considered too young or too ill to take full control of their office or is absent (perhaps on crusade), a regent (or group of regents) rules in their place.

Monarchies in Europe

For the Western world, our perception of monarchy is mostly colored by the history of European monarchies. These governments were often born out of unified military leadership, where successful commanders transformed their power into something hereditary. The Germanic tribes of the first few centuries CE are believed to have unified in this way, as peoples grouped under charismatic and successful war leaders, who solidified their power, possibly at first taking on Roman titles and then emerging as kings.

Monarchies were the dominant form of government among European nations from the end of the Roman era until around the eighteenth century (although some people class the Roman emperors as monarchs). A distinction is often made between the older monarchies of Europe and the 'New Monarchies' of the sixteenth centuries and later (rulers such as King Henry VIII of England), where the organization of standing armies and overseas empires necessitated large bureaucracies for better tax collection and control, enabling projections of power much above those of the old monarchs.

Absolutism was at its height in this era, with monarchs often able to govern mostly unchecked and unquestioned. Many monarchies subscribed to the concept of the "divine right of kings," which tied religion and politics together. The idea of "divine right" stated that a monarch's authority derived from God, not from the people they govern; from that, these governments could conclude that rebellion or treason was the ultimate crime, as a sin against God's own authority.

The Modern Age

After the absolute era, a period of republicanism took place, as secular and enlightenment thinking, including the concepts of individual rights and self-determination, undermined the claims of the monarchs. A new form of "nationalist monarchy" also emerged in the eighteenth century, whereby a single powerful and hereditary monarch ruled on behalf of the people to secure their independence, as opposed to expanding the power and possessions of the monarch themselves (the kingdom belonging to the monarch).

In contrast was the development of the constitutional monarchy, where the powers of the monarch were slowly passed down to other, more democratic, bodies of government. More common was the replacement of monarchy by a republican government within the state, such as the French Revolution of 1789 in France. In general (though not exclusively), many of the monarchies that survived this era intact did so by giving up a large part of their power to elected governments and retainin mostly ceremonial and symbolic roles.

Remaining Monarchies of the World

Today, some monarchies still remain around the world, although there are far fewer absolute monarchs than there once were and far more variations on power-sharing between monarchs and elected goverments. The following list comprises the world's monarchies as of 2021:

Europe

Andorra (principality)

Belgium

Denmark

Liechtenstein (principality)

Luxembourg (grand duchy)

Monaco (principality)

The Netherlands

Norway

Spain

Sweden

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Vatican City (elected ruler)

Polynesia

Africa

Asia

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Discover how the monarchy system of rule has worked throughout history. See examples of monarchies that exist even now in modern times.

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Totalitarianism is a form of government that prohibits opposing political parties and ideologies, while controlling all aspects of the public and private lives of the people. Under a totalitarian regime, all citizens are subject to the absolute authority of the state. Here we will examine the political and philosophical perspectives of totalitarianism, as well as its level of prevalence in the modern world.

Key Takeaways: Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism Definition

Often regarded as the most extreme form of authoritarianism, totalitarianism is generally identified by dictatorial centralized rule dedicated to controlling all public and private aspects of individual life, to the benefit of the state, through coercion, intimidation, and repression. Totalitarian states are typically ruled by autocrats or dictators who demand unquestioned loyalty and control public opinion through propaganda distributed via government-controlled media. An even darker description of living under totalitarianism comes from George Orwell's classic dystopian novel 1984, when the main character Winston Smith is told by Thought Police interrogator O'Brien, "If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face - for ever."

Totalitarianism vs. Authoritarianism

Both totalitarianism and authoritarianism depend on quashing all forms of individual freedom. However, their methods of doing so differ. Through largely passive techniques such as propaganda, authoritarian states work to win the blind, voluntary submission of their citizens. In contrast, totalitarian regimes employ extreme measures such as secret police forces and imprisonment to control the private and political lives of their citizens. While totalitarian states typically demand a practically religious loyalty to a single highly developed ideology, most authoritarian states do not. Unlike totalitarian states, authoritarian states are limited in their ability to force the entire population to adopt and pursue the regime's goals for the nation.

Totalitarianism vs. Fascism

While fascism and totalitarianism are similar-both being forms of authoritarianism-and often used interchangeably, there are some differences between the two.

Fascism is a much older political ideology than totalitarianism. A more extreme rightwing authoritarian concept, fascism demands absolute and uncompromising loyalty to the nation or predominant race. Fascists seek to instill a superiority complex and feelings of fear among the citizens against perceived enemies of the race or the nation. The entire population is urged to stand behind the fascist leaders to either protect the superior identity of the population or to defeat the enemy as perceived by the leaders and their followers. Ruling class propaganda artfully scripts unquestioned loyalty to the leader in the minds of the people, who are influenced to believe that the personal welfare of individuals is subordinate to the interests of the nation or predominant race.

Fascist regimes use secret police forces and specially trained party insiders to spy against the citizens and deter them from indulging in anti-regime thought, speech, propaganda, and activities and encourage selective violence against perpetrators of such acts. A fascist however need not be a totalitarian in that the leader may or may not be interested in curbing individual freedoms so long as they are not beyond the control of the nation. Societal spheres like education, sports, health, and business are infiltrated by party loyalists through the establishment of closed unions. Secret killings and often genocide of so-called inferior hostile races are common under fascist regimes. As seen in some east European and African countries, fascists often encourage ethnic cleansing across borders in the name of ideological and racial purity.

In contrast, totalitarian regimes rely mainly on government propaganda machinery to publicize the cause of the nation and spread half-truths or false stories about the failures of other systems and the successes of the regime. Though ardently opposed to true democracy, which ensures the protection of natural rights and civil liberties, fascist regimes have occasionally come to power via democratic means. However, they do so with the intent of seizing all executive powers whether constitutionally approved or not. As such, fascist regimes ruthlessly suppress all true democratic political forces in society.

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between fascist and totalitarian regimes has been their attitudes toward multinational domination. While most totalitarian regimes have confined their activities within the geographical boundaries of the nations they controlled, fascist regimes have often harbored imperialistic ambitions.

Characteristics of Totalitarianism

While they differ individually, totalitarian states have several characteristics in common. The two most notable characteristics shared by all totalitarian states are an overarching ideology addressing all aspects of life as the means of attaining the state's final goal, and a single, all-powerful political party, usually led by a dictator.

While there is only one platform, participation in the political system, especially voting, is mandatory. The ruling party controls all aspects and functions of government, including the use of a secret police force to brutally suppress dissent. The government itself is riddled with the duplicity of roles and functions, creating a hopelessly complex bureaucracy creating a false impression of a non-existent separation of powers -the antithesis of totalitarian regimes.

Mandatory Devotion to a State Ideology

All citizens are required to adopt and serve a single apocalyptical ideology dedicated to defeating a shadowy and corrupt old order to be replaced by a new, racially pure, utopian society. Renouncing all traditional forms of political orientation-liberal, conservative, or populist-the totalitarian ideology demands a virtually religious and unconditional personal devotion to a single charismatic leader.

Unwavering and total loyalty to both the regime's ideology and its leader are demanded. Total obedience to authority is required and enforced through physical intimidation and the threat of imprisonment. Citizens are made to be aware that they are under constant surveillance. Individual thought is discouraged and publicly ridiculed as a potential threat to the goals of the state ideology. As often attributed to totalitarian Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, "Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas?" All basic liberties, such as the freedoms of speech and assembly, are denied and punishable.

State Control of Media

Totalitarian governments control all mass media, including art and literature. This control enables the regime to produce a constant stream of propaganda designed to " gaslight " the people and prevent them from realizing the hopelessness of their situation. Often riddled with clichéd, confusing catchphrases, this propaganda is typified by the poster created by the totalitarian government depicted in George Orwell's classic novel 1984: "War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength."

State Control of the Economy

To further its predatory militaristic goals, totalitarian regimes own and control all aspects of the economy, including capital and all means of production. The personal economic incentives of capitalism are thus rendered impossible. Theoretically unburdened by the independent thought and effort required to succeed under a capitalistic system, individual citizens are free to concentrate solely on furthering the regime's ideological goals.

A System of Terror and Constant War

Domestic terrorism conducted in support of the regime against dissidents is celebrated through the wearing of party uniforms and the use of complimentary metaphors for terrorists such as "storm troopers," "freedom fighters," or "labor brigades." To further rally universal support for their ideology, totalitarian regimes strive to convince all individuals that they are civilian soldiers in an endless war, against an often loosely-defined evil enemy.

As early as 430 BCE, a system of rule resembling totalitarianism was applied in the ancient Grecian state of Sparta. Established under King Leonidas I, Sparta's "educational system" was essential to its totalitarian society, in which every aspect of life, down to the rearing of children, was dedicated to maintaining the state's military might. In his "Republic," written around 375 BCE, Plato described a rigidly caste-based totalitarian society in which the citizens served the state and not vice versa. In Ancient China, the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BCE) was ruled by the philosophy of Legalism, under which political activity was virtually prohibited, all literature was destroyed, and those who opposed or questioned Legalism were executed.

Modern Examples of Totalitarianism

Most historians consider the first truly totalitarian regimes to have been formed during the chaotic aftermath of World War I when the rapid modernization of weapons and communications enabled totalitarian movements to exert their control. In the early 1920s Italian fascist Benito Mussolini coined the term "totalitario" to characterize the new fascist state of Italy, ruled under his philosophy of, "Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state." A few well-known examples of totalitarian regimes during this period include:

Soviet Union Under Joseph Stalin

Coming to power in 1928, Joseph Stalin's secret police force had eliminated all potential opposition within the Communist Party by 1934. During the ensuing Great Terror in 1937 and 1938, millions of innocent Soviet citizens were either arrested and executed or sent to labor camps. By 1939, the Soviet people were so fearful of Stalin that mass arrests were no longer necessary. Stalin ruled as the absolute dictator of the Soviet Union throughout World War II and until his death in March 1953.

Italy Under Benito Mussolini

After rising to power in 1922, Mussolini's Fascist police state eliminated virtually all constitutional and political restraints on his power. In 1935, Italy was declared a totalitarian state by the Doctrine of Fascism: "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian ..." Through propaganda and intimidation, Mussolini built a nationalistic fervor, convincing all "loyal" Italians to abandon their individualism and willingly die for their leader and the Italian state. In 1936, Mussolini agreed to join Nazi Germany as one of the Axis Powers of World War II.

Germany Under Adolf Hitler

Between 1933 and 1945, dictator Adolf Hitler transformed Germany into a totalitarian state where nearly all aspects of life were controlled by the government-the Third Reich. Through genocide and mass murder, Hitler's totalitarian regime strove to turn Germany into a racially pure military superpower. Starting in 1939, from 275,000 to 300,000 German citizens with mental or physical disabilities were murdered. During the Holocaust between 1941 and 1945, Hitler's Einsatzgruppen "mobile killing squads" along with German armed forces murdered some six million Jews across Germany and German-occupied Europe.

People's Republic of China Under Mao Zedong

Chinese communist Mao Zedong, also known as Chairman Mao, ruled the People's Republic of China from 1949 until he died in 1976. From 1955 to 1957, Mao's Anti-Rightist Campaign resulted in the persecution of as many as 550,000 intellectuals and political dissidents. In 1958, his Great Leap Forward agricultural to industrial conversion economic plan resulted in a famine that caused the deaths of over 40 million people. In 1966, Chairman Mao declared the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 10 years of class warfare marked by the destruction of countless cultural artifacts and the rise of Mao's adoring "cult of personality." Despite his nearly God-like popularity, Mao's Cultural Revolution resulted in the deaths of thousands to millions of people.

Current Totalitarian States

According to most authorities, North Korea and the East African state of Eritrea are the world's only two nations recognized as still having totalitarian forms of government.

North Korea

Established as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948, North Korea remains the world's longest-lasting totalitarian state. Currently ruled by Kim Jong-un, North Korea's government is considered one of the most repressive in the world by Human Rights Watch, maintaining power through brutality and intimidation. Propaganda is widely used to support the government's totalitarian ideology of Juche, the belief that true socialism can be achieved only through universal loyalty to a strong and independent state. Although North Korea's constitution promises human rights, freedom of expression is restricted and the people are constantly supervised. The same constitution contradictorily defines North Korea as "a dictatorship of people's democracy." Politically, the constitutionally recognized Workers' Party of Korea enjoys legal supremacy over any other political parties.

Since gaining full independence in 1993, Eritrea has remained a totalitarian one-party dictatorship. Under President Isaias Afwerki, national legislative and presidential elections have never been held and none are anticipated. While Afwerki has dismissed the allegations as politically motivated, Human Rights Watch has condemned Eritrea's human rights record as one of the worst in the world. Falsely claiming to be on a constant "war footing" with neighboring Ethiopia, Afwerki's totalitarian government uses mandatory, indefinite military or civilian national service to control the Eritrean people. According to Human Rights Watch, the entire working life of many Eritreans is spent serving the government.

Schäfer, Michael. "Totalitarianism and Political Religions." Oxford: Psychology Press, 2004, ISBN 9780714685298.

Laqueur, Walter. "The Fate of the Revolution: Interpretations of Soviet History from 1917 to the Present." New York: Scribner's, 1987, ISBN 978-0684189031.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. "Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s." New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, ISBN 9780195050004.

Buckley, Chris. "China Enshrines 'Xi Jinping Thought,' Elevating Leader to Mao-Like Status." The New York Times, October 24, 2017.

Shorten, Richard. "Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present." Palgrave, 2012, ISBN 9780230252073.

Engdahl, F. William. "Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order." Third Millennium Press, 2009, ISBN 9780979560866.

"World Report 2020." Human Rights Watch.

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What Is Totalitarianism? Definition and Examples

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Totalitarianism controls all aspects of the public and private lives of the people. Learn the characteristics of this repressive form of government.

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What Is a Military Dictatorship? Definition and Examples

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A military dictatorship uses the power of the armed forces to rule a country. Learn about this now rare autocratic form of government.

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Aristocracy is a form of government in which the people are ruled by a small, privileged-class of people called aristocrats. While aristocracy is similar to oligarchy in that they place power in the hands of a few people, the two types of government differ in several key ways. Once the most common form of government, elite aristocracies have ruled major countries including the United Kingdom, Russia, and France during their histories.

Key Takeaways: Aristocracy

Aristocracy Definition

The term aristocracy comes from the Greek word aristokratia, meaning "rule by the best," being those individuals considered to be most qualified to govern the society because of their moral and intellectual superiority. The term aristocracy may apply not only to a governmental ruling class but also to the highest social class in a given society. Holding honorary titles, such as Duke, Duchess, Baron, or Baroness, members of the aristocratic class enjoy both political powers as well as social and economic prestige.

The most distinguishing characteristics of both political and social aristocracies are the methods by their elite few members are selected.

Most often, aristocrats inherit their positions, often through centuries of family lineage. This method reflects the ancient but unfounded belief that members of some families are genetically more fit to rule than others. Aristocrats, especially in governmental aristocracies, may be chosen based on their superior intellect and proven leadership ability. Aristocrats may also be selected by favor-the granting of high rank by monarchs to individuals who have served them best. Finally, positions within the aristocracy may be based purely on personal wealth, either earned or inherited. In wealth-based aristocracies, members of the lower economic classes have no chance of attaining political power, no matter how great their intellect or merit.

In modern times, membership in the aristocratic ruling class may be based on heredity, wealth, military or religious status, education, or a combination of similar attributes. In any of these cases, the people of the common classes are not allowed to participate in an aristocratic government, as they are in a representative democracy or a parliamentary monarchy.

Aristocracy vs. Oligarchy

Aristocracy and oligarchy are both forms of government in which the society is ruled by a small group of people. However, there are some key differences. Most significantly, while aristocracy is "rule by the best," oligarchy is "rule by the few."

Aristocracies are comprised of individuals considered best fit to rule because of their nobility-a level of moral and intellectual superiority that is assumed to have been genetically passed down through family lines. Oligarchies, on the other hand, are made up of people who are simply more wealthy and powerful than the rest of the population. In the words of Aristotle, "...wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy."

Since their position is typically insured through inheritance, aristocrats tend to act in the best interest of society. In contrast, oligarchs, whose status is typically dependent on maintaining their current level of wealth, tend to act out of their economic self-interest. In this manner, oligarchy is often associated with corruption, oppression, and tyranny.

First conceived in Ancient Greece by philosopher Aristotle, aristocracy grew to be the predominant form of governmental power throughout Europe. In these medieval aristocracies, the aristocrats were chosen simply because they were considered to be the best suited to rule and lead their particular community. As societies grew larger and more economically diverse during the late Middle Ages (1300-1650 CE), people began to demand more than mere leadership from their ruling classes. In the wake of momentous events like the Hundred Years War, the Italian Renaissance, and the Wars of the Roses, virtues like bravery, nobility, morality, and civility grew more important to an individual's social status. Eventually, the power and privilege afforded to the aristocracy became reserved for a few upstanding social leaders and military heroes.

The French Revolution in 1789 marked the beginning of the end for the world's most powerful aristocracies as many of the aristocrats lost their lands and power. During the early 18th century, the prosperity created by the Industrial Revolution in Europe allowed many wealthy businessmen to buy their way into the aristocracy. However, as the middle class began to become more prosperous after the 1830s, more aristocrats lost their dominance over wealth, and thus, their political power.

By the end of the 19th century, aristocracies still maintained precarious political control in Great Britain, Germany, Austria, and Russia. By 1920, however, that control largely evaporated as a result of World War I.

While social aristocracies still exist in most countries today, they have little if any political influence. Instead, the long-past "golden age" of aristocratic government rule is best typified by the aristocracies of the United Kingdom, Russia, and France.

United Kingdom

While it has lost most of its original monarchial political power, the British aristocracy continues to evolve today as reflected in the history of the British Royal Family.

Now known as the "peerage system," the British aristocracy dates to the end of the Norman Conquest in 1066, when William the Conqueror - King William I-divided the land into manors overseen by Norman noblemen barons, who often also served as the king's closest advisers. In the mid-13th century, King Henry III drew the barons together to form the basis for what is today known as the House of Lords or the House of Peers. By the 14th century, the House of Commons, with its elected representatives from the towns and shires, joined the hereditary nobles in the House of Lords to form the British Parliament.

Membership in the British aristocracy continued to be determined by a system of hereditary until the late 1950s when it was replaced by the creation of the current "life peers" system. Appointed by the Crown, life peers are members of the aristocracy whose positions cannot be inherited.

The Russian aristocracy arose during the 14th century and held offices of power within the monarchial Russian government until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

By the 17th century, the princes, lords, and other nobles of the Russian aristocracy made up the majority of landowners. With this power, they made their Landed army the primary military force of the Russian Empire. In 1722, Czar Peter the Great changed the system of promotion to membership in the aristocracy from one based on ancestral inheritance to one based on the value of actual service provided to the monarchy. By the 1800s, the wealth and thus the influence of the Russian aristocrats had been reduced due to their extravagant lifestyles and poor estate management combined with a series of laws limiting their political power.

All classes of Russian nobility and aristocracy were abolished after the Revolution of 1917. Many descendants of former Russian aristocrats remained in Russia, living as merchants, common citizens, or even peasants, while some people descended from serfs-like Vladimir Lenin's father-gained formal nobility. Many members of the aristocracy who fled Russia after the Revolution settled in Europe and North America where they established associations dedicated to preserving their cultural heritage.

Emerging during the Middle Ages, the nobility of the French aristocracy remained in power until the bloody French Revolution in 1789. While membership in the French aristocracy was mainly inherited, some aristocrats were appointed by the monarchy, bought their titles, or attained membership through marriage.

Members of the French aristocracy enjoyed exclusive rights and privileges, including the right to hunt, to wear a sword, and to own land. Aristocrats were also exempt from paying property taxes. Also, certain religious, civic, and military positions were reserved for aristocrats. In return, aristocrats were expected to honor, serve, and advise the king, and to serve in the military.

After being almost wiped out during the 1789 Revolution, the French aristocracy was restored in 1805 as an elite titled class but with very limited privileges. However, after the Revolution of 1848, all aristocratic privileges were permanently abolished. Hereditary titles with no privileges attached continued to be granted until 1870. Today, the descendants of the historic French aristocrats retain their ancestor's titles merely as a social custom.

Sources and Further Reference

Doyle, William. "Aristocracy: A Very Short Introduction." Oxford University Press, 2010, ISBN-10: 0199206783.

Cannadine, David. "Aspects of Aristocracy." Yale University Press, 1994, ISBN-10: 0300059817.

Robinson, J. "The English Aristocracy: A Beginner's Guide to Their Titles, Rank, and Forms of Address." CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2014, ISBN-10: 1500465127.

Smith, Douglas. "Former People: The Final Days of the Russian Aristocracy." Picador, 2013, ISBN-10: 1250037794.

Figes, Orlando. "Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History of Russia." Picador, 2003, ISBN-10: 0312421958.

L. Ford, Franklin. "Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV." Harvard University Press, 1953, ISBN-10: 0674774159

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What Is Aristocracy? Definition and Examples

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Aristocracy means rule by the best, a few elite and privileged people. Learn about what used to be the most common form of government.

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Transcript

Monarchic governments are headed by a king or queen, or an emperor or an empress. They are part of the royal family and pass out their responsibilities to their offspring. They also have absolute control over the countries they rule. There are several types of monarchic governments, each differing from each other.

I want to take a look at a few of those that are written up here on the board, first being absolute monarchy. This is when someone has complete control over the country they rule and pass off the responsibility to their offspring. A constitutional monarchy is when the person in charge does not have complete control over the country.

Instead, a constitution has been put in place, which limits the powers of the king or queen, or emperor or empress. However, they still do pass off their powers to their offspring. A diarchy is when you always have two monarchs in control at the same time.

An elective monarchy is when someone is elected to the role of king or queen, or emperor or empress, instead of being passed on through the family. A federal monarchy is when states with their own forms of government are banded together under one, single monarch. Those are several forms of monarchic governments.

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Monarchical System of Government (Video)

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Did you know there are multiple types of monarchic governments? Discover brief overviews of each type, including diarchies and elective monarchies!

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A monarchy is a form of government in which a person, the monarch, is head of state for life or until abdication. Until the 20th century, the most common form of government was the monarchy. This article will throw light on the monarchy system of governance.

Monarchy System - Facts

The authority and political legitimacy of monarchy may vary from largely symbolic, restricted and autocratic. It can expand across the domains of judicial, legislative, and executive. The succession of monarchs is, in most cases, hereditary, often building dynastic periods.

Constitutional monarchy is largely symbolic.

Absolute monarchy is known as fully autocratic.

Monarchs - Various Titles

The various titles given to the Monarchs are Pharaoh, Shah, Sultan, Tsar, Khan, Raja, Queen, King, Empress, and Emperor.

Monarchy - Current Status

Currently, 43 nations in the world have a monarchy. 15 commonwealth nations share Queen Elizabeth II as their head of state. Modern monarchies are constitutional monarchies.

Constitutional Monarchy - Countries

A constitutional monarchy, also known as the parliamentary monarchy or democratic monarchy, is a form of monarchy in which the monarch exercises their authority in accordance with a constitution and is not alone in deciding. Absolute monarchy and constitutional monarchy are different.

Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Belgium, Sweden, Canada, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, and Cambodia are examples of constitutional monarchies. In these countries, the monarchs retain significantly less personal discretion in the exercise of their authority.

The other countries which are examples of constitutional monarchies are Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Monaco, and Liechtenstein.

Constitutional Monarch - Lack of real power

A constitutional monarch is a sovereign who reigns but does not rule.

A constitutional monarch does not choose political leaders.

A constitutional monarch does not set public policies.

In the European constitutional monarchies, the governments may operate in the name of the monarch, but those monarchs have no formal authority.

Absolute Monarchy

In an absolute monarchy, the king or the queen has absolute power. An absolute monarchy is a form of monarchy in which the monarch rules in their own right. Absolute monarchy in Europe reduced drastically after the French Revolution and World War I. The autocratic rule of the Tsar in Russia came to an end after the Russian revolution.

Examples of Absolute monarchy are Saudi Arabia, Vatican City, Oman, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Eswatini (formerly known as Swaziland), and Brunei.
Related Links

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A monarchy is a form of government in which a person, the monarch, is head of state for life or until abdication. Know more about the monarchy system of governance. Visit BYJU'S for more information on topics related to Social Science.

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A constitutional monarchy is a form of government in which a hereditary monarch-a king or queen-serves as the head of state, but political power is also constitutionally granted to a body such as a legislature or representative council.
There are 38 constitutional monarchies in existence today split into two types: parliamentary and semi-constitutional.

Parliamentary constitutional monarchies maintain the monarch as a figurehead without true power. Most are formerly absolute monarchies wherein internal political pressure on the monarch led the monarch to cede political power to a democratic institution. Fourteen of these maintain the British monarch as their figurehead.

In semi-constitutional monarchies, however, the monarch retains power that is analogous to the power of a president in a republican system.

Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchies

1. Antigua and Barbuda

Antigua and Barbuda is a single Caribbean nation. It has been a constitutional monarchy since 1981, when the country gained independence from the United Kingdom. The figurehead monarch remains to be Queen Elizabeth II, and she appoints the governor-general, who is the head of state. The prime minister and parliament are both democratically elected.

2. Australia

Australia became a constitutional monarchy on 1 January 1901 when the British colonies on the continent united to create a nation-state with 7 states and territories. The figurehead monarch continues to be Queen Elizabeth II, and she appoints the governor-general as her representative. There was a failed republican movement and referendum to succeed in 1999 which was led by Malcolm Turnbull, who went on to become prime minister.

3. The Bahamas

The Bahamas gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1973 and became a constitutional monarchy. The figurehead monarch is Queen Elizabeth II. The parliament is unicameral, meaning it does not have a senate or house of Lords like the USA and UK respectively.

4. Belgium

Belgium is a federal monarchy with a bicameral parliament. It became a constitutional monarchy in 1831, when it gained its independence from the Netherlands. The figurehead monarch is the King of Belgium who appoints the elected prime minister as the leader of the government. The parliament has two houses: the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate.

5. Belize

Belize became a self-governing colony of the United Kingdom in 1862 and eventually achieved independence as a constitutional monarchy in 1981. The monarch is Queen Elizabeth II and her representative is the governor-general. However, power lies with the prime minister who is the head of the parliament.

6. Cambodia

Cambodia has been a constitutional monarchy on and off between various colonizations, wars, coups, and changes of government. Most recently, the King of Cambodia was reinstated as a figurehead in 1993. The king is selected among male descendants of King Ang Duong (who reigned from 1841-1860). They must be at least 30 years old but, unlike most monarchies, do not necessarily have to be the eldest son of the previous monarch.

7. Canada

Canada is another country with Queen Elizabeth II as a figurehead monarch. Canada became a country in 1867 when it was united under the British North America Act. The act united the provinces of Canada (now Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick into a single federation. Polls show Canadians are split on whether to become a republic, with many believing the British monarch figurehead provides political stability.

8. Denmark

Denmark has had kings and queens from as far back as the 8th Century BCE. It was once an elected monarchy, but since Frederick III it has been hereditary. The constitution of 1849 instated a democratic constitutional monarchy with the monarch only holding a ceremonial role.

9. Grenada

Grenada is a nation in the Carribean that was ruled by Britain through the colonial era. It became an independent Commonwealth country in 1974 and a constitutional monarchy one year later. The figurehead monarch is Queen Elizabeth II who appoints the governor-general as her representative. The prime minister is the leader of the government and is democratically elected.

10. Jamaica

Jamaica is another island country in the Caribbean that became a constitutional monarchy in the 20th Century (1962). The figurehead monarch is Queen Elizabeth II. Jamaica's relationship with the monarch has been tense at times as, under British rule, Jamaica was a stopover point for the transatlantic slave trade.

11. Japan

Japan is a constitutional monarchy with a divine emperor. The emperor is the son of the sun goddess and is considered sacred. He has a ceremonial role and is not involved in politics. The prime minister is the head of government and is elected by the people. Japan's monarchy is one of the oldest in the world, dating back to 660 BCE.

12. Lesotho

Lesotho has had kings belonging to the House of Moshoeshoe since 1822. It became a constitutional monarchy in 1966 after breaking from the British Crown. The politics of Lesotho has led to kings being exiled on several occasions, only to be reinstated years later. The kings have more-or-less been merely figureheads.

13. Luxembourg

Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a grand duke as the figurehead monarch. The royalty in Luxembourg have very close ties to the royalty in Belgium which as throughout history been both a protectorate and adversary to Luxembourg. The prime minister exercises power in the government of Luxembourg and is democratically elected.

14. Malaysia

Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy with a Yang di-Pertuan Agong as the figurehead monarch. A Yang di-Pertuan Agong is elected by the hereditary rulers of each Malaysian state for a five-year term (making it an elective monarchy). The prime minister is the head of government and is elected by the people.

15. The Netherlands

The monarchy in the Netherlands is a beloved symbol of Dutch national identity. The monarch's colors, orange, are also the colors of the nation in sporting events. However, the monarch lost most of its true powers in 1848 through constitutional reform, which was instituted against William I's wishes. In response to the movement for reform, William I abdicated, and William II accepted the reforms.

16. New Zealand

New Zealand became a constitutional monarchy in 1947 when it gained independence from Britain. It belongings to the Commonwealth nations with the Queen of England as the figurehead. The prime minister is the leader of the government and is democratically elected. Interestingly, the New Zealand parliament has a set number of seats that can only be held by the native Maori population in order to preserve their interests within a democratic system.

17. Norway

Norway is a constitutional monarchy whose figurehead leader is the descendant of Harald Fairhair who ruled from 872 CE to 930 CE. The monarchy today is a ceremonial one, with the prime minister as the head of government. Interestingly, the constitution still assigns significant powers to the king. However, by virtue of tradition and custom, all mentions of the king are today generally understood to be a reference to the king's counsel, or in other words, the elected government.

18. Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea belongs to the Commonwealth of nations, with the British monarch representing the head of state. Interestingly, they were a protectorate of Australia up until 1975, and Australia had the British monarch as their head of state. By extension, she was also the figurehead of Papua New Guinea. When Papua New Guinea gained independence from Australia, they asked the Queen of England to remain their monarch.

19. Saint Kitts and Nevis

Like other Caribbean islands like Jamaica and Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis was colonized by the British during the colonial era. Saint Kitts and Nevis became independent in 1983 and retained the British monarch as their head of state. The prime minister is the leader of the government.

20. Saint Lucia

Saint Lucia became a British colony in 1814 and gained independence in 1979. The British monarch was retained as the head of state and the prime minister was appointed as the head of government. Saint Lucia is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

A Note on Samoa: Samoa would fit here in an alphabetical list. While Samoa behaves like a constitutional monarchy with a ceremonial head of state who is named in the constitution, this is not technically a requirement within the constituion. So, it technically is a parliamentary republic. Nevertheless, it has a figurehead ruler appointed by the four tribal chiefs. The appointed figurehead is called 'O le Ao o le Malo'.

21. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Another set of Caribbean islands colonized by the British, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines gained independence from Britain in 1979. As with its neighboring islands, it decided to retain the British monarch as their head of state. The prime minister is the leader of the government.

22. Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands became a British protectorate in 1893 and gained independence in 1978. The British monarch was retained as the head of state and the prime minister was appointed as the head of government. As a nation that retains the British monarch as its figurehead, the Solomon Islands is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

23. Spain

Spain has had a long history of controversial monarchs, including the Catholic monarchs such as King Ferdinand II and Queen Isabella I who instituted the Spanish Inquisition. Even into the 20th Century and during the General Franco dictatorship, the kings of Spain were involved in backroom politics. Spain became a democracy in 1978 and, since, the kings of Spain have mostly faded into ceremonial positions.

24. Sweden

Sweeden has had a hereditary monarch since the 16th Century. Since 1917, the king has had little political power. However, it wasn't until 1975 that the constitution was amended so the king did not need to give royal assent to laws that pass through parliament.

25. Thailand

Thailand has had various coups and constitutions in recent decades, but the king has maintained a figurehead position through most of these machinations. While the king does not officially hold political power, lèse-majesté laws criminalize criticism of the king. These laws continue to be exercised, providing him with significant protections that regular citizens do not enjoy.

26. Tuvalu

Tuvalu is a remote pacific island nation near Fiji, Vanuatu, and Tonga. Its population is just over 11,000 people. It became a British protectorate in 1892 and gained its independence in 1978. The British monarch was retained as the head of state and the prime minister was appointed as the head of government.

27. United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is the most famous example of a country with a constitutional monarchy. The King or Queen serves as the monarch, but holds little actual power. The British Parliament, led by the Prime Minister, is responsible for making laws and governing the country. As a hangover effect of British imperialism, the monarch is also the figurehead of 14 other nations.

Semi-Constitutional Monarchies

28. Bahrain

Since 1783, Bahrain has been ruled by the descendants of Khalifa bin Mohammed.

Powers still held by the king of Bahrain include the ability to unilaterally dissolve parliament, veto legislation, and call for new elections. The king is involved in daily political decision-making and has significant religious authority as the head of the Bahraini branch of Sunni Islam.

29. Bhutan

The Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan has had a hereditary monarchy since 1907. Over time, the Druk Gyalpo (translation: head of state) has ceded a lot of power to the parliament, but not all. The Druk Gyalpo clan can appoint government officials, issue pardons, and grant citizenship. Through his ability to appoint officials, he can still exercise limited power over the nation.

30. Jordan

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy that has been in place since the Arab Spring of 2011. The figurehead monarch is King Abdullah II and the prime minister is the head of government. King Abdullah II accepted the demands of Arab Spring protesters to cede more of his power to the democratic bodies.

Jordan is one of the most liberal Arab countries, as reflected in the power of the parliament. However, the 2010s did have some troubles, with the king sacking 3 prime ministers. He appears to still wield more power than most figurehead kings, but has on paper ceded much of his power to the elected bodies.

31. Kuwait

The ruler of Kuwait, called the Emir, is always a member of the Al Sabah dynasty. Rule generally alternates between two branches of the dynasty, although there have been occasional diversions from this pattern due to backroom political deals. While there is a constitution and elected legislature, the Emir appoints all judiciary positions and chooses the prime minister. Through these appointments, he wields ongoing power, leading it to be called effectively a dictatorship by most democracy indexes.

32. Liechtenstein

Liechtenstein is a small country in central Europe with a population of just over 37,000 people. The monarchy has been in place since 1719 and the current prince is Hans-Adam II. For a central European nation, it is quite backward politically. In fact, women were only granted the vote in 1984, and the referendum was only passed with 51% of the vote.

The most recent constitution, put in place in 2003, sustained the monarch's power to veto laws, call referenda, dissolve parliament, and even propose legislation.

33. Monaco

The Principality of Monaco is a city-state on the Mediterranean coast, ruled since 1297 by the House of Grimaldi. The monarch gets a list of five candidates for prime minister proposed by the French government and he can choose a leader from among the list. Because the prime minister is appointed by the monarch and not through a public vote, the monarch retains serious power. However, the legislature needs to pass all bills.

34. Morocco

Morocco has slowly been moving toward democratic status over recent decades, although the king maintains control over appointing a prime minister, directing the military, and directing foreign affairs.

A 2011 referendum, instigated to show reform following the Arab Spring, curtailed the king's power. It means the king must appoint a prime minister from the party that wins the most votes and it reaffirmed several civil liberties. However, it's still considered a hybrid regime due to flaws such as lack of press freedom.

35. Qatar

Qatar has a constitutional parliament with 30 of the 45 seats elected through popular vote. The remaining 15 seats are chosen by the emir. The emir also unilaterally selects a prime minister and cabinet, giving him almost complete power. Thus, of all the constitutional monarchies on this list, Qatar, alongside the UAE, remains one that leans closer to absolute monarchy than democracy.

36. Tonga

Tonga is the only Pacific nation that maintains an indigenous monarch called Tuʻi Tonga. The monarch ceded some power in 2010, although the hereditary nobles continue to exercise significant power in government. Eight of the 25 seats in parliament are elected by a group of 33 nobles.

37. United Arab Emirates

Despite its status as a constitutional monarchy, the UAE is undemocratic and the seven Sheiks wield hegemonic power. Seats in the Federal Superme Council, are divided up among the emirs of the seven Sheikhdoms that make up the UAE. The Federal Supereme Council elects the president every five years, although there have only been two presidents in the history of the UAE, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and his son.

Conclusion

Constitutional monarchies have a monarch as the head of state but also a constitution in which power is granted to a representative body. Most constitutional monarchies today have a democratically elected parliament that holds the majority of power. The monarch is merely a figurehead.

However, there are some constitutional monarchies that continue to grant power to the monarch. Some, such as Qatar and the UAE, are effectively still absolute monarchies where the monarch has near-complete control over the constitutional bodies.

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38 Constitutional Monarchy Examples (That Still Exist)

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A constitutional monarchy is a form of government in which a hereditary monarch-a king or queen-serves as the head of state, but political power is also

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Aristocracy, asort of political government administered by a small number of the noble and wise; [from] ἄρης, Mars , or powerful , or from ἄριστος, very good , very strong , and from κράτος, force , power , or the power of the great. Authors who have written on politics prefer aristocracy to all other forms of government. The Republic of Venice and that of Genoa are governed by nobles, the people being excluded. It would seem that aristocracies and oligarchies have much in common with one another; although an oligarchy is only a vitiated aristocratic government, since in the oligarchy the administration, entrusted to a small number of persons, is found concentrated in one or two [of them], who dominate over all of the others. See .

*As for the laws relative to aristocracy , one may consult the excellent work of Monsieur de Montesquieu. Here are the principle ones:

1. In an aristocracy , the body of nobles casting votes, these votes cannot be too secretive.

2. Suffrage must not be given by lot; only inconveniences would result from it. Indeed, once distinctions that raise a few citizens above the others are established, even if one were chosen by lot, one would not be less odious because of it. It is not the magistrate, but the noble that one envies.

3. When nobles are numerous, there must be a senate that regulates the affairs which the body of nobles will not be able to decide and that prepares that on which it rules; in that case, one might say that aristocracy is in a way, in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, and that the people are nothing.

4. It will be a very good thing in an aristocracy , if by some indirect measure the people are freed from annihilation. Thus in Genoa the Bank of Saint George, which is directed by the people, gives them a certain influence in the government, from which all of their prosperity is derived.

5. The Senators must not have the right to fill empty seats in the senate; it is up to the Censors to name new Senators, if one does not wish to perpetuate abuse.

6. The best aristocracy is that in which the portion of the population who have no power is so inconsiderable and poor, that those who dominate have no interest in oppressing them.

7. The most imperfect is that in which the portion of the people who obey are in a state of civil servitude to those who rule.

8. If in an aristocracy the people are virtuous, they will always enjoy, more a less, a feeling of contentment equal to that of a popular government, and the state will become powerful.

9. The spirit of moderation is what one calls virtue in an aristocracy ; it takes there the place of equality in a popular state.

10. The modesty and simplicity of manners constitute the strength of aristocratic nobles.

11. If the nobles had personal and individual prerogatives, distinct from the corporative body, an aristocracy would diverge from its nature and its principle, in order to take those of monarchy.

12. There are two principle sources of disorder in aristocratic states: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and inequality among those who govern.

13. The first of these inequalities will occur if the privileges of the principal [citizens] are honorable only because they are shameful to the people, and if the condition relative to taxes is different among citizens.

14. Commerce is the profession of equal persons; the nobles must therefore not participate in trade in an aristocracy .

15. The laws must be such that the nobles are constrained to render justice to the people.

16. They must mortify entirely the desire to dominate.

17. It is necessary that there be, either temporarily or perpetually, an authority that is feared by the nobles.

18. Extreme poverty of nobles [and] exorbitant riches of nobles [are] pernicious in an aristocracy .

19. There must be no primogeniture among nobles, so that the distribution of inheritances always levels the members of this order into approximate equality.

20. It is necessary that disputes that arise among the nobles not last long.

21. The laws must tend to abolish the distinctions that vanity raises among noble families.

22. If [the laws] are good, they will bring about more of a feeling among the nobles of the inconveniences of ruling than of its benefits.

23. Aristocracy will be corrupted when the power of nobles having become arbitrary, there will no longer be virtue in those who govern, or in those who are governed. See l'Esprit des lois , pp. 1ff., 13ff., 114ff., where these maxims are supported by ancient and modern examples, which hardly permit one to contest their truthfulness.

1. This is the end of Mallet's contribution. The rest of the article, denoted by the asterisk, is by Diderot.

2. Most points in the list are paraphrased selections from Montesquieu's commentary on aristocracy in l'Esprit des lois .

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Aristocracy, asort of political government administered by a small number of the noble and wise; [from] ἄρης, Mars , or powerful , or from ἄριστος, very good , very strong , and from κράτος, force , power , or the power of the great. Authors who have written on politics prefer aristocracy to…

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Aristocracy A privileged social class whose members possess disproportionately large shares of a society's wealth, social prestige, educational attainment and political influence, with these advantages having been acquired principally through gift or inheritance from a long line of similarly privileged and cultivated ancestors.

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definition
challenges confronting aristocracy
the special case of the british
bibliography
In 1914, at the end of the long nineteenth century, the European aristocracy was in a weaker position than had been the case on the eve of the French Revolution. In regard to political power, social status, and cultural influence, the traditional ruling and landowning class faced more powerful competition than had existed in the 1780s. Nevertheless, in most of Europe the aristocracy still remained a very powerful force in government, politics, and society. One hundred and twenty years after the French Revolution had challenged the old European order, what may in fact be most surprising was just how much power and status parts of the aristocracy had retained.

It is important to stress the word parts, however. While many of the greatest aristocratic families had become the core of an evolving plutocratic elite, the wealth of most of the traditional landowning class had declined sharply in comparison to non-landed fortunes in the half-century before 1914. Meanwhile in some European states the political power of the aristocracy had declined steeply, whereas in others the power of the traditional ruling class had remained very great or even in certain respects had grown between 1789 and 1914.

Before going into these issues in more detail, it is useful to define briefly what aristocracy means in the nineteenth-century European context. In almost every European state in 1789 there existed a group called the nobility whose membership was defined in law and that enjoyed a range of privileges. The term nobility had vastly different meanings from one European society to another, however. In England, at one end of the European spectrum, it meant the peerage, a group numbered in the low hundreds. At the other end of the spectrum lay Poland and Hungary, where nobles constituted 5 percent of the population or more. Between lay France, where roughly 1.5 percent of the population enjoyed noble status in 1789. Clearly all European nobles were not aristocrats.

It was much more nearly the case that all titled nobles (from barons up to dukes and princes) were aristocrats, but even this was actually an illusion. Again England was the extreme case in which not only titles but all landed property were inherited exclusively by eldest sons. In almost all cases throughout the nineteenth century one could assume that an English (though not necessarily an Irish) peer was a wealthy man with high status in his society. Elsewhere in Europe, where titles and property were often inherited by all sons, the automatic English correlation of title, wealth, and status did not apply. Russia, where all children-both sons and daughters-inherited titles and only a minority of the greatest aristocratic families passed their main estates to eldest sons (save in the Baltic provinces where this custom was more widespread), provides the counterpoint to England. It was the case in

nineteenth-century Europe that the great majority of the richest and most prestigious aristocratic families were titled, but there were exceptions, even in Britain and in Russia. Throughout the period 1700 to 1914, for example, the Naryshkins were one of the richest, most powerful, and most respected aristocratic families in Russia and were indeed closely related to the Romanovs. They never, however, had titles. Nor in late-nineteenth-century Britain did the statesman Arthur Balfour, whose wealth, connections, and values made him an unequivocal aristocrat.

Aristocracy ultimately can be defined only in relatively loose sociological terms, rather than in more tight legal ones. Aristocrats were members of the traditional ruling class. They inherited wealth, status, and power from their ancestors. In the over-whelming majority of cases in 1789 the core of their wealth lay in land. The precise nature of their political power differed from one European country to another. In 1789 the English and Scottish aristocracy dominated Parliament, which itself wholly controlled government. The British aristocracy was a ruling class in the fullest meaning of the word. Matters were a little more equivocal in most of continental Europe where supposedly absolute monarchs ruled through various species of bureaucracy. Even in Russia, however, where monarchical absolutism was most extreme, the emperor could not rule without the landowning elite. Without the landowners' cooperation the tiny bureaucracy even in 1825 had no hope of governing (i.e., taxing and conscripting) the peasant masses, on whose fiscal and military exploitation the whole tsarist state rested. Moreover, the aristocracy totally dominated the court, the guards regiments, and the top ranks of government in St. Petersburg. Monarchs who alienated this aristocratic elite between 1725 and 1825 risked their lives.

The best definition of European aristocracy in 1789 therefore is "traditional ruling and landowning elite." It makes sense to reserve the term aristocracy proper for the top echelon of this elite, usually very wealthy, usually titled, and dominating the top positions in metropolitan government. The lesser, usually nontitled, landowners who dominated provincial society and who possessed the means to live the lives of leisured gentlemen are best defined as gentry. Herein, however, the word aristocracy is used to cover both groups, save where an attempt is being made to distinguish between them.

Two overall challenges confronted aristocracy in the long nineteenth century. The first were the egalitarian values and ideologies that sprang from the eighteenth-century radical Enlightenment and were embodied in the French Revolution. The second were a number of interrelated changes in society that can broadly be defined as modernization. These included industrialization and urbanization; mass literacy; the vast growth in industrial, commercial, and financial wealth; and the increasing complexity of both society and government, which gave birth to a vast swathe of professional and technical experts without whose skills a modern community could not flourish.

Enlightenment and French Revolution

The radical Enlightenment and the French Revolution rejected corporate privilege and inherited inequality in the name of rationality, efficiency, and individual merit. They asserted that the individual rather than the family or the corporation was the building block of society, and they assumed a fundamental equality between individuals, at least in regard to the rights possessed by all of a community's citizens. These ideas had great appeal to many Europeans in the nineteenth century. The French Revolution turned these ideas into political reality and provided a model to which subsequent generations of European radicals looked with admiration.

The impact of the Revolution was equivocal, however. In the first place, though the French Revolution was hostile to legal inequality and inherited privilege, it was far less egalitarian in socioeconomic terms and did not reject private property. Indeed some of the reforms pushed through in Europe in the Napoleonic era actually strengthened private property by, for example, handing church and common land over to wealthy individuals. Though the aristocracy were not in most countries the major beneficiary of these changes, they were nevertheless very great property owners and could often turn to their own advantage the new era of absolute property rights. A striking example of this were the great profits that many nineteenth-century aristocrats made from their forests, whose use was previously very often shared with the peasantry, but which now became the unrestricted possession of noble landowners. In a century in which wood prices grew enormously, this could be a crucial factor in the survival of large sections of the traditional rural elite.

Though the 1790s inflicted a very heavy blow to the French aristocracy from which the latter never fully recovered, the damage was not mortal. Napoleon I went out of his way to reconcile the aristocracy to his regime and to draw them back into court, civil, and military service. He was partly successful in this endeavor. To some extent one can see the evolution of the French aristocracy from 1789 to 1815 as a sudden and very brutal example of a change that overtook much of the European aristocracy in the nineteenth century. Losing part though not most of its land, the French aristocracy turned in the direction of becoming a government service elite. In this sense it moved closer to the pattern of the Russian, Prussian, and even lesser Austrian aristocracies of the late eighteenth century. Like them but in the face of much stiffer non-noble competition, it had to sustain its status by military and civil service to the growing bureaucratic state. Over the long nineteenth century one was to see a variant on this theme even in Britain. Financial pressures, changing aristocratic values, and the need to sustain aristocratic legitimacy by public service all pushed in this direction throughout Europe, albeit to differing degrees.

It is also important to remember that if the memory of the French Revolution attracted some Europeans, it appalled others-including very many nonaristocrats. If the French aristocracy as a group had been the single largest victim of the Terror, most of those who died under the guillotine were not aristocrats. What had seemed initially a movement for moderate and rational constitutional reform had spiraled quickly into a terrifying dictatorship that had consumed innocent bystanders and its own children alike. Particularly in Brittany, the civil war unleashed by the Revolution had been waged with near-genocidal frenzy by the republic. The army that had emerged from the Revolution as the dominant force in French politics had created a military despotism in France and subjected Europe to twenty-two years of warfare and conquest. Relative to its population, Europe suffered more casualties in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars than in World War I.

Not surprisingly, the lesson many Europeans drew from this was that even moderate reform could easily spiral out of control and that the traditional pillars of political order (monarchy, church, aristocracy) were crucial bulwarks against anarchy and terror. The history of the unicameral French National Assembly was used to justify conservative upper houses in much of nineteenth-century Europe. Most of the newly created upper houses gave many seats to aristocrats. This was just one reflection of a broader result of the French Revolution, namely the coming together of those old rivals monarchy, aristocracy, and church against the common revolutionary enemy.

This new unity was not total or immediate in the nineteenth century. The 1848 revolutions in Hungary and Italy had much of the old court versus country flavor. Because monarchical absolutism survived longest in Russia, so too did traditional aristocratic resentment of dynastic regimes that denied political representation or guaranteed civil rights even to aristocrats. The last fling of traditional European court versus country aristocratic liberalism was the Russian gentry's participation in the run-up to the Revolution of 1905. But the events of 1905 provided graphic evidence why in the modern age monarchs and aristocrats could no longer afford to fight. Having weakened the tsarist regime by its opposition in the decade before the revolution, the Russian nobles saw their estates overrun by peasant rioters in 1905 and then threatened with wholesale expropriation by the parliament that the regime had been forced to concede. As a result of this experience regime and aristocracy drew back together in the period from 1906 to 1914, not least in united support for policies that made private property in land secure. In so doing, the Russians conformed to a European conservative norm.

Modernization

Radical ideologies were dangerous because they were underpinned by the social changes inherent in modernization. Industrialization, urbanization, and mass literacy had the potential to transform the consciousness of the masses and their capacity for political organization, while making them much less susceptible to control by the landowning elite. As democracy spread in the last quarter of the

nineteenth century the aristocracy usually lost control over the urban mass electorate, though this was not universally and immediately true. The English Conservatives had many working-class supporters in the late nineteenth century, not least in Lancashire, where the earls of Derby were able to tap not just local deference but also the Protestant mass electorate's dislike of Catholic Irish immigration. In Germany the Catholic Centre Party, in whose leadership aristocrats were still important in the early twentieth century, had mass electoral support even from many urban workers. Nevertheless in time it was the case that mass urban politics everywhere ultimately undermined the power of traditional rural elites.

A number of factors determined whether the aristocracy could effectively mobilize rural society as a conservative bulwark against urban radicalism. In England the Conservative Party succeeded in doing this to a great extent by the 1880s but by that time the degree of urbanization in England, added to rural radicalism in the Gaelic fringe of the United Kingdom, made this of limited use. In the two 1910 general elections, fought in large part over the role and power of Europe's most aristocratic and most powerful upper house, the Conservatives actually won by a narrow margin in England, only for that victory to be reversed by the votes of the Scots, Welsh, and Irish. More successful was the German aristocracy, who provided the core leadership for the Bund der Landwirte, Europe's most formidable agrarian lobby group in the early twentieth century. Not merely, however, did this force the aristocratic leaders to accept the overriding logic of rural populist politics (e.g., the ruthless pursuit of agrarian sectional interests and a demagogic anti-Semitism that did not sit easily with the claim to provide responsible national leadership), it also was a weakening asset as Germany became Europe's increasingly urbanized industrial powerhouse.

Meanwhile in Europe's "second-world" western, eastern, and southern periphery-an arc that stretched from Ireland through Iberia and Italy to Hungary and Russia-where the population was still overwhelmingly rural, it was also usually radical and often very hostile to the aristocracy. In these countries mass politics by 1900 often entailed the risk of social revolution and the expropriation of aristocratic landholding. Huge differences in wealth and culture between rural elite and mass, combined with the masses' growing political consciousness and organization, made this a real threat in much of Europe's second-world periphery at the turn of the twentieth century. The threat might become reality through peasant revolution and jacqueries (peasant revolts) or, in those countries where democracy was spreading, through the ballot box. Because by 1905 even Russia had acquired a parliament elected by near universal (though not equal) male suffrage, the challenge of managing democracy was becoming a matter of life and death for much of the aristocracy of peripheral Europe.

Social revolution was somewhat less likely in rural societies where the Catholic Church was strongly rooted and where the aristocracy had powerful potential allies in a substantial peasant farmer class owning its own land and employing a handful of laborers, who might or might not be family members. The perfect example of such a conservative society was the Spanish province of Navarre, home of Carlism, a mass Catholic and royalist movement that opposed the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and all other aspects of modernity. But though equivalent areas did exist in other parts of rural and peripheral Europe in 1900 they were exceptional. At the other end of the spectrum, rural radicalism was enhanced if the local aristocracy was alien to the rural masses not just in wealth and culture but also in ethnicity and religion. Facing this reality in Ireland as the era of democratic politics dawned, the British government bought out the landed elite on generous terms, thereby disarming social (though not national) revolution. But this policy reflected not just British wisdom but also the unique wealth of Britain's state and society. Nowhere else in the European periphery was such a policy either politically or financially conceivable, and almost everywhere the landowners were the most vulnerable element within the property-owning and relatively wealthy minority.

In the wealthy "first-world" core of Europe where by 1900 a big middle class existed and property was much more secure, the aristocracy could find powerful allies in both urban and rural society against emerging working-class socialist parties, let alone social revolution. To somewhat varying degrees and with many local nuances the aristocracy increasingly allied itself politically with the representatives of commercial, industrial, and financial wealth. In many countries parts of the rapidly growing professional middle class might also be potential recruits for the conservative alliance, especially where professional elites were traditionally linked to the gentry (e.g., English lawyers) or in countries where the expanding state bureaucracy was recruited very often from the sons (often younger sons) of aristocratic or more often gentry families. Hungary, after the creation in 1867 of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, was probably the perfect example of the latter phenomenon, and its administrators for that reason retained an unusually clear gentry ethos and style. But in relatively unbureaucratic England the Indian and colonial services provided a similar outlet for the sons of the gentry, and the British public schools created common elite values and lifestyles that served to integrate the sons of aristocracy, gentry, high finance, big business, and the professions into a single expanded ruling class. Just as Britain's immense wealth, power, and prestige helped to legitimize this elite in the nineteenth century, so a similar process could be seen in Germany in the period between 1871 and 1914, though in the German case religious differences and very recent unification made this process more fraught.

Every European aristocracy came to its own compromise with newly emerging, modern business, financial, and professional elites. Some of these compromises were more successful than others, but each case inevitably embodied the specific national context to which an aristocracy brought its own values (e.g., militarist or civilian, authoritarian or parliamentary), as did the often very heterogeneous elements of the new "bourgeois" elite.

For example, the very wealthy British aristocracy with its old and close links to the London financial world found it relatively easy to embrace (very often literally via marriage) the enormous fortunes made by nineteenth-century financiers and to consolidate a united plutocratic ruling class by the Edwardian era (1901-1910). In Prussia/Germany, Europe's other financial-industrial superpower, the process was bound to be much more difficult. The traditional Prussian core elite was not a true aristocracy but the relatively poor and somewhat puritanical gentry of the eastern provinces. By tradition this group had minimal contact with the world of high finance and shared neither its wealth nor its values. Indeed most of the key families in the Prusso-German financial world originated not in old Prussia but in Frankfurt, which had been very unwillingly (on both sides) absorbed into the Hohenzollern state in 1815. The fact that so much of this new financial wealth by 1900 was Jewish greatly complicated the consolidation of a united Prusso-German plutocratic elite on British Edwardian lines. But the very different natures of the British and Prussian aristocratic and gentry elites goes a long way to explaining why the British aristocracy found it easier to live alongside the (also very often Jewish) vast wealth of the London financial elite in the early twentieth century.

Even the most successful aristocratic compromise with the new business, financial, and professional classes entailed some dilution of aristocratic power and some change in aristocratic values. Thus Otto von Bismarck, probably the most important aristocratic politician of the nineteenth century, succeeded brilliantly in legitimizing the Hohenzollern dynastic-aristocratic elite by annexing and controlling the energies of German nationalism. But as his conservative critics pointed out, he did so by twisting many of the traditional religious and political values of the Prussian aristocracy. The next generation of aristocratic politicians, ever deeper enmeshed in the logic of agrarian and nationalist populism, strayed even further from the Pietist and dynastic loyalties of their grandfathers. Equally the English plutocratic grandee of the Edwardian era was already halfway to being a member of a rentier, leisured elite rather than of a true ruling class in the sense of the English aristocracy of 1800.

Coming to terms with the industrial-era European economy was far easier for some sections of the European aristocracy than for others. For that reason, although gradations of wealth within the aristocracy were already considerable in 1800, they were far more extreme by 1914. A large gap had opened between a plutocratic-aristocratic elite that had made huge fortunes from the growth of the urban and industrial economy, and the bulk of the aristocracy and almost all the provincial gentry. Inevitably this was most true in the more advanced economies, but all European landowners were hit by the decline of agricultural prices in the last decades of the nineteenth century. No one whose core income depended on agriculture could hope to even remotely match the wealth of those who had a stake in the new urban and industrial economy, and the financial and commercial worlds that sustained it.

A minority of aristocrats did have a huge stake in this world. Unlike in previous centuries, few of these aristocrats were themselves industrialists in the sense of owning and running big industrial enterprises. By 1900 even most of the great Silesian landowners, the most successful aristocratic entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century, were retreating from this role. Running big enterprises required great effort, huge capital, and entrepreneurial talent. For rich men usually deeply conscious of their responsibility to pass on a family's wealth and status to their heirs, the risks of industrial entrepreneurship were often unacceptable. Even the duke of Devonshire was embarrassed by the sums he poured into the new town and shipbuilding industry he created at Barrow-in-Furness on one of his estates. The collapse in 1909 of the business interests of Prince Christian-Kraft von Hohenlohe-Ohringen, the Duke of Ujest, caused great scandal in Wilhelmine Germany.

By 1900, however, it was possible to tap the wealth of the Industrial Revolution through shareholding without taking the risks or bearing the burdens of unlimited liability, ownership, and management of industrial enterprises. By then many aristocrats had invested large sums in government, railway, and corporate bonds and shares. Though most great aristocrats in 1914 still owned big rural estates, almost everywhere they had diversified their assets and bought significant amounts of government and private paper. The Russian aristocracy and gentry are a case in point. After the emancipation of the serfs many estates in infertile, central Great Russia became uneconomical as agricultural enterprises, nor did the aristocracy have the capital to develop them. With the onset of the agricultural depression in the 1870s, matters worsened. Meanwhile relations with the local peasantry were often conflict-ridden, and rural life was less attractive than the cities. With the growth in population leading to ever-rising land prices, the logic for the individual aristocrat of selling out and becoming an urban rentier was often clear, even if this logic undermined the aristocracy's dominant position in rural society. Very similar though less pronounced shifts occurred in Piedmont: if the overall pressures were the same, noble-peasant relations were on the whole not as strained as in Russia and rural life was not so isolated.

For much of the gentry financial pressures might mean withdrawal from the countryside and absorption into the urban professional and rentier world. For wealthy aristocrats such stark choices were unnecessary, however. At the very top of the German aristocratic world, for example, Prince von Thurn und Taxis still owned 1.3 million hectares (3.2 million acres) in 1895, but the family had also received massive financial compensation from a number of German states for lost seignorial and other inherited rights in the nineteenth century. Even by the late 1850s when the process remained uncompleted, recorded compensation exceeded £800,000-a vast sum in the mid-nineteenth century and one that allowed large-scale and diverse investments in stocks, bonds, and shares.

Though all the great aristocratic families had far more chance than the gentry to diversify their assets and enrich themselves by tapping the urban and industrial economy, the greatest fortunes were usually made by families who owned urban property or coal mines. In 1914 probably the richest aristocrat in Europe was the duke of Westminster, with an income of roughly £1 million per year. Though the Grosvenors had never played a very prominent role in British political or military affairs, they were the happy beneficiaries of a seventeenth-century marriage that brought them a large slice of what later turned into London's fashionable West End. The other richest aristocrats in Britain at that time were also either great urban landlords or owners of extensive coal mines or both. In Germany the history of the Holy Roman Empire meant that very few aristocrats were big urban landlords, but Prussia's richest aristocrats in 1914 usually derived a huge slice of their incomes from Silesian or Ruhr mines. The vagaries of Italian history meant that some regional aristocracies were far likelier to own urban property than others. Meanwhile Russian aristocratic incomes from urban property and mines in 1914 were usually less enormous than British or German for the simple reason that the urban-industrial economy was less developed, but in a few cases they topped £200,000 per year. With urbanization and industrialization taking off in Russia before 1914 there was every reason to expect that the fortunate minority of aristocrats who owned extensive urban property or mines would in time match the very richest German and British plutocrats.

The most accurate generalization about aristocracy's fate in the long European nineteenth century would therefore emphasize the very powerful trans-Continental challenges to which all aristocrats were subject, the common fundamental strategies that they used to meet those challenges, but at the same time the way in which the aristocracies of some countries and regions, and above all certain sections of the aristocracy, were much better placed to cope with these challenges than others.

Throughout the long nineteenth century the British aristocracy was the most admired and emulated in Europe. To some extent this was but one aspect of widespread admiration and emulation of the world's richest, most powerful, but also in many ways most liberal, society and polity. There were also, however, very specific aristocratic reasons for admiring Britain. At a time when Continental aristocracy was coming under increasing challenge, there was comfort to be had from the fact that Britain was both Europe's most successful country and the one in which the aristocracy was uniquely powerful.
See also Bourgeoisie; Class and Social Relations; Landed Elites; Peasants; Popular and Elite Culture.
As already mentioned, of all European aristocracies in 1815 the British came closest to meeting every definition of a ruling class. In terms of power and wealth, the British monarch was at best primus inter pares (first among equals) with regard to the aristocratic elite. No absolute monarch could infringe the civil rights or deny the freedoms of the British aristocracy, nor indeed challenge their role as hereditary legislators or rulers of the polity. Nevertheless, Britain remained a monarchy down to 1914 and this was important for aristocrats in Britain as elsewhere in Europe. The monarch and his court accentuated, legitimized, and put a stamp of public approval on the social hierarchy.

Even in 1914 royal patronage and traditions still mattered a great deal in the core institutions of the old regime, meaning the armed forces and diplomacy. Despite the continuing role of French aristocrats in the army, diplomatic service, and (especially) navy of the Third Republic, there was a big difference in the overall origins and ethos of British and French top soldiers and diplomats.

It was not just the power, wealth, and freedom of British aristocracy that were envied and emulated by many of its European peers. So too was the English cool aristocratic hauteur, the public face of Victorian aristocratic respectability and service, and the gentlemanly lifestyle. If French remained the lingua franca of European high society in 1914, the English nanny was making a growing impact on upper-class European values and mentalities. British bloodstock, horse racing, and fox hunting were widely admired. As is always the case with high society's fashions there was much that was silly and superficial in this emulation of England. But there was also a more serious and political aspect to the admiration of English aristocratic public rectitude and political skill, not to mention English rural sports and county lifestyle. Faced with the challenge of the urban and industrial world an aristocracy needed to justify its position as a ruling class under the gaze of middle-class newspapers and public opinion.

It needed also to consolidate its leadership of rural society. It was a commonplace among nineteenth-century aristocratic publicists that the royalist counterrevolution in the Vendée and other areas of western France in the 1790s owed its strength in part to local loyalty to a resident and paternalist rural nobility. It was therefore seen as important for other European aristocrats to spend more time on their estates, providing patronage, example, and leadership to their rural neighbors. Because traditionally much of the European high aristocracy had devoted its life to royal courts, military service, or metropolitan society and politics, this required a considerable change in lifestyles and mentalities. What better model than the English aristocrat, whose manic pursuit of foxes kept him deeply attached to county society, in whose life the aristocratic household remained a great source of patronage and leadership throughout the nineteenth century.

By 1914, however, the British aristocracy's political power was clearly slipping. The aristocracy no longer dominated the Liberal Party, a mass socialist party was emerging, and the House of Lords had been stripped of much of its power. The logic of democratic politics with a mass electorate had persuaded even the Conservative Party to buy out the Anglo-Irish landlords and reject agricultural protection. As a result the British gentry had suffered much more severely than reforms than was the its Prusso-German counterpart from the collapse of agricultural prices in the late nineteenth century. After three election defeats and facing the threat of Irish Home Rule, many Conservative British aristocrats were beginning to harbor very serious doubts about the virtues of democracy in 1914. Not at all surprisingly, in the rest of Europe, where democracy might prove far more dangerous to aristocracy than was the case in Britain, doubts about democracy went much deeper in aristocratic circles, and the British political model was losing some of its charm.

Nevertheless as the European aristocracy approached 1914, its political position was by no means everywhere weak. In Germany, the Austrian empire, and by 1905 Russia the monarchical regimes' creation of aristocratic upper houses and lower houses with restricted franchises had actually given the aristocracy much more freedom to articulate its interests, choose its own leaders, and block reforms than was the case in the heyday of absolutism. In that sense constitutionalist and semidemocratic politics had actually enhanced the leverage of a traditional social elite that had most to lose from democracy. Everywhere in Europe by 1914 aristocracy felt itself under increased challenge, but in 1914 most European aristocracies were by no means powerless or resigned to extinction.

Becker, Seymour. Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia. DeKalb, Ill., 1985.

Berdahl, Robert M. The Politics of the Prussian Nobility: The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848. Princeton, N.J., 1988.

Cannadine, David. The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. New Haven, Conn., 1990.

Cardoza, Anthony L. Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy: The Piedmontese Nobility, 1861-1930. Cambridge, U.K., 1997.

Gibson, Ralph, and Martin Blinkhorn, eds. Landownership and Power in Modern Europe. London, 1991.

Higgs, David. Nobles in Nineteenth-Century France: The Practice of Inegalitarianism. Baltimore, 1987.

Lieven, Dominic. The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815-1914. Houndmills, U.K., 1992.

Reden-Dohna, Armgard von, and Ralph Melville, eds. Der Adel an der Schwelle des Bürgerlichen Zeitalters, 1780-1860. Wiesbaden, Germany, 1988.

Reif, Heinz. Westfälischer Adel, 1770-1860. Göttingen, Germany, 1979.

D. Lieven

THE ARISTOCRACY IN 1914
THE ARISTOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN PERIPHERY
THE ARISTOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN CORE
THE ARISTOCRACY IN POST-1945 EUROPE
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Since the early 1980s historians have debated the importance and the role of the aristocracy in early-twentieth-century Europe.

This debate originated from the thesis advanced by Arno J. Mayer in a book titled The Persistence of the Old Regime (1981). Mayer argued both that aristocracy still dominated much of European political, social, and cultural life in 1914, and that this domination was a key cause of Europe's descent into war.

Mayer's book was very useful in encouraging modern historians' attention to the aristocracy, which had hitherto been a neglected topic. Nor is his thesis without some virtue. In political terms, for instance, the Russian and Prussian aristocracies were in some ways more powerful in 1914 than a century before. Ironically, this was due to the retreat of absolute monarchy and the introduction of parliamentary institutions. Not merely did aristocrats often dominate upper houses, but the restricted franchise gave them great power in lower houses too. This allowed the aristocracy unprecedented opportunities to articulate and defend common interests, choose its own political leaders, and block legislation it disliked. Both Petr Arkadyevich Stolypin in Russia and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in Germany had reformist legislation wrecked by aristocratic intransigence in the years before 1914.

Mayer is also correct in pointing to the immense wealth and continuing prestige of some great magnate families, and to the continuing predominance of men of aristocratic origin in the armed forces and the diplomatic services of monarchical Europe. Nor is he wrong to argue that a sense that modernity was increasingly marginalizing the aristocracy was a source of pessimism, even cultural and political despair, for some aristocrats, and that this could sometimes feed into political radicalism (e.g., the British Conservatives' unconstitutional encouragement of Ulster rebellion from 1912 to 1914) or even into willingness to accept the "heroic remedy" of war as a solution to intractable domestic political crisis.

Nevertheless, Mayer takes his argument much too far. By 1914 landed wealth was well outstripped by financial, industrial, and commercial fortunes. To the extent that a small minority of the richest and most prestigious aristocratic families had consolidated their position at the core of the emerging European modern plutocracy, this was possible only because they had tapped into these new "industrial era" sources of wealth-always in the form of stocks and bonds, but often as owners of coal mines or urban property. Moreover even these untypical aristocratic families risked being marginalized as a mere leisure class and losing their traditional position at the core of political life as a true ruling elite. This had much to do with the increasing complexity of society and its management, which had spawned a swath of professional bureaucracies, politicians, and experts.

Even in the armed forces, in which officers of aristocratic origin remained very important, increasing professionalization greatly affected the mentalities of the military elites. As regards the decision to go to war in 1914, railway timetables and the logic of mass mobilization were at least as important as aristocratic values. Moreover, in the military context it is wrong to associate aristocracy with belligerence, and modernity with more pacific values. Young turks at the cutting edge of military modernity- Erich Ludendorff in Germany or Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Alexander Nemitz in Russia-were more wholehearted advocates of aggressive "total" war than aristocratic courtier generals desperate to sustain the traditional social order of which they were major beneficiaries.

This bears on the more general issue of aristocracy, modernity, and democracy. Particularly in the United States there is a strong tendency to automatically equate modernity with virtue, liberalism, and democracy. American identity to some extent always defined itself against an aristocratic "other" and therefore finds it easy to condemn aristocracy for the world's problems. Moreover to blame "premodern" aristocracy for many of the twentieth century's political disasters is very comforting because in the early twenty-first century aristocracy is dead, liberal democracy has triumphed, and therefore disaster is by definition a thing of the past. In reality matters were never so simple.

In Imperial Germany, for instance, the Junkers adapted very successfully to the pressures of modernity through a military professionalism that made the German army a model for the world, and by creating the world's first mass agrarian interest group, the Bund der Landwirte. There is unfortunately nothing unmodern about the latter's organizational sophistication, its ruthlessly single-minded pursuit of sectional interest, or its brilliant exploitation of popular self-interest and ethnonational prejudice. Moreover, the single most dangerous element in German foreign policy, namely the pursuit of Weltpolitik and naval power, had far more to do with new professional and industrial groups than with the aristocracy. The German naval lobby saw Junkers as an anachronism and itself as the epitome of modernity. Given the geopolitics of imperialism and the history of nineteenth-century liberalism, they had a point. Nor were these trends a merely German phenomenon. The French and American republics played an enthusiastic part in the imperialist expansion of Western power and territory. White settler democratic electorates yielded to no one in their racism or their hunger to expropriate native land. The land and culture of Algerian natives were better preserved under the military despotism of Napoleon III than under the Third Republic. In 1914 European aristocracy was not as powerful nor was its influence as baneful as Mayer argues. Nor was European modernity as virtuous. The coming of war was closely linked to the logic of imperialism, but neither the world war nor imperialism can simply be explained by the Primat der Innenpolitik (primacy of domestic politics), let alone by supposed aristocratic hegemony and wickedness.

World War I hastened the decline of the European aristocracy. Particularly in Germany and Britain, young male aristocrats suffered disproportionately heavy casualties partly because of their traditional role as officers but also perhaps because they saw the war unconsciously as a time to relegitimize their leading role in society through sacrifice for the national cause. In the less "national" and less modern Romanov and Habsburg empires, aristocratic self-sacrifice was less universal, depending much more on individual motivation and the differing traditions of military service from one aristocratic family to another.

The war destroyed the Russian and part of the Austrian aristocracy. Expropriated wholly in Transylvania and to a much lesser extent in Czechoslovakia, the only place where the Habsburg aristocracy retained its prewar wealth and political influence was in the rump Hungarian state. In Hungary the aristocracy survived thanks to successful foreign (Romanian) intervention, which led to the victory of the counterrevolution in the Hungarian civil war and the overthrow of the Hungarian "Bolshevik" regime. Though the establishment of Admiral Miklós Horthy's regime was accompanied by a "white terror" against its socialist enemies, once Horthy was firmly in place the traditional aristocratic liberalism of the Hungarian elites reestablished itself.

The self-esteem and identity of the Hungarian traditional elites were linked to Hungary's ancient constitution, laws, and parliament, which the Hungarian aristocracy had defended for centuries against Habsburg absolutism. The aristocracy's role in the 1848 revolution also became part of its defining myth and added a modern twist to Hungarian elite liberalism. The Hungarian aristocracy was never democratic even by British aristocratic standards, but on the whole its traditions did distance it from the right-wing populism, anti-Semitism, and fascism that came to dominate much of eastern and central Europe in the 1930s.

Hungary can usefully be seen as part of Europe's peripheral "Second World," which stretched from Ireland and Iberia in the west, through Italy and the Balkans in the south, to the Habsburg and Romanov empires' territory in eastern Europe. Many features distinguished this periphery from Europe's "First World" core in Britain, France, Germany, and the Low Countries. For example, almost everywhere in the periphery society was poorer and more lawless, middle classes were much smaller, and property was less secure. In most countries, of all forms of wealth and property, the big estates were the most vulnerable to expropriation. In many cases traditional peasant resentment of the aristocracy had been exacerbated by the effect that market-oriented capitalism had on the way the aristocracy fenced off and exploited its forests and farms. Peasants deprived of access to common land or to the aristocracy's forests could be willing recruits for the socialist and anarchist movements that were beginning to spread their tentacles into rural areas, which the railways and growing literacy were making less inaccessible to urban "agitators."

It was therefore not unrealistic for large landowners in peripheral Europe to fear social revolution and the arrival of mass democracy in the first years of the twentieth century. Inevitably the disruption of society and radicalization of politics caused by World War I increased such fears. So too above all did the Russian Revolution of 1917, which resulted in the total expropriation of the Russian aristocracy and the death or exile of many of its members. Although the Bolsheviks ratified the expropriation of the landowners in 1917 and 1918, the peasantry had itself taken the initiative in this matter, frequently also burning down the manor houses though seldom murdering their occupants. Had democracy triumphed in Russia the Constituent Assembly would have expropriated the estates without compensation. Only successful military counterrevolution would have saved the property of the Russian aristocracy, as Admiral Horthy and General Francisco Franco subsequently did for their Hungarian and Spanish peers.

Responses to the threat of agrarian revolution differed across the European Second World. In the generation before 1914 the British government bought out most of the Anglo-Irish landowning class. This was crucial in averting social, though not national, revolution in the period from 1918 to 1923. Nevertheless the "Troubles" caused the destruction of some aristocratic houses and hastened the retreat of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy to England. Somewhat similar was the fate of the Baltic German aristocracy in newly independent Latvia and Estonia. A key justification for expropriation here was the avoidance of social revolution and the attractiveness of communism, which in 1917 and 1918 had strong support, particularly in Latvia. The key difference between the fate of the Baltic German and Anglo-Irish landlords was that the former did not have the immensely wealthy British taxpayer willing and able to buy them out on generous terms. In Romania too, the immediate postwar years saw radical land reform with minimal compensation, designed once again to remove the threat of social revolution. In terms of Barrington Moore Jr.'s famous thesis about the agrarian origins of democracy, fascism, and communism, the Baltic and Romanian land reforms are of great interest. Though these reforms were successful in undermining mass support for social revolution, they did not guarantee lasting democracy. In Romania in particular populist politics moved to the nationalist right of the political spectrum, with anti-Semitism at its core.
See also Alfonso XIII; Bourgeoisie; Churchill, Winston; Diana, Princess of Wales; Franco, Francisco; Horthy, Miklós; Nicholas II; Working Class.
In Italy and Spain the landed aristocracy survived, though in both cases it did so in alliance with right-wing authoritarian regimes. In the immediate aftermath of World War I the liberal regimes of both Spain and Italy collapsed. The landowning class in northern Italy played an important role in funding and protecting fascist bands in order to terrorize increasingly rebellious agrarian labor and to save themselves (so many believed) from Russian-style social revolution. The traditional Italian elites then lived in relatively comfortable cohabitation with the fascist regime for a generation, their confidence, status, and interests being boosted by the survival of the key political institutions of the prefascist era-namely the monarchy, royal army, and diplomatic corps on the one hand, and the Vatican on the other. Fascist Italy then played an important role in ensuring Franco's victory in the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) and thereby saving the estates of the Spanish aristocracy. By 1936 it was not unrealistic for the aristocracy of, in particular, Andalusia to believe that only military counterrevolution would save its lands from expropriation. Extreme class conflict in parts of the Spanish countryside was probably not the most important reason why Spanish democracy collapsed in the 1930s, but it was a significant contributory factor.

Ultimately, however, Europe's future and aristocracy's role within it would be decided mostly in the Continent's First World core. By 1914 the British aristocracy was much weaker than it had been in 1850. British agriculture, unprotected by tariffs, had suffered severely in the four prewar decades. The great majority of the population now lived in towns. Financial, industrial, and commercial wealth far outstripped the proceeds from agriculture. A mass socialist party had emerged by 1914, and the House of Lords had lost most of its power in 1911. The long-term trends that underlay these developments continued in the interwar years. Nevertheless the British aristocracy remained very significant in political, cultural, and social terms, and some of its members were still extremely wealthy. Victory in World War I enhanced the legitimacy of monarchy, political system, and aristocracy alike, not least because the British aristocracy's sacrifices in the war had earned it respect. The collapse of the global capitalist economy in the 1930s split the socialist movement and resulted in fourteen years of what was in essence Conservative rule (1931-1945). Though the three prime ministers of the 1930s were not aristocrats, many of their key ministers were. Most famously, Winston Churchill, a scion of one of England's greatest aristocratic families, led the country to victory in World War II.

Victory in the war ensured that the swansong of the British aristocracy continued for some time after 1945. Even in the 1960s the head of one of Scotland's leading aristocratic families could serve as Britain's prime minister. By the end of Margaret Thatcher's era (1979-1990), however, aristocrats were marginalized even in the Conservative Party. British mass culture, influenced by American values, had become much less deferential and more self-confident. Education at the elite Eton College had become a positive disadvantage in public life.

The fate of the German aristocracy was less happy. Defeat in World War I and the fall of the German monarchies weakened the prestige of traditional elites, institutions, and values. Except to some extent in territory annexed by Poland, the German aristocracy nevertheless preserved its estates. Moreover the Weimar regime was actually quite generous in the protection it offered to large-scale agriculture. The great suffering caused by the British wartime blockade had convinced many Germans that agricultural self-sufficiency might be more than just a cover for Junker selfishness. Moreover the German army and diplomatic service remained aristocratic havens. Nevertheless most of the German aristocracy despised the Weimar Republic and were not unhappy to see it replaced by the Nazis. Key members of the aristocratic political and military elite, led by Franz von Papen, were instrumental in bringing Adolf Hitler to power, believing that the perks of office would undermine the radicalism of the Nazis and that the latter would be controllable by Germany's traditional elites.

In Germany as in Italy it was only when the fascist regime was clearly losing the war that core elements in the traditional elite sought to overthrow it. The German conservatives, unlike in Italy, had no king through whom to remove the fascist leader, and many of them paid with their lives for the failure of the attempt to assassinate Hitler and assume power by coup d'état in 1944. There was symbolism in the fact that Hitler's would-be assassin was Count Claus von Stauffenberg, a member of the South German Catholic aristocracy. With few exceptions the Catholic, and above all Bavarian, aristocracy was not closely associated with fascism, unlike significant sections of the Protestant nobility. Nevertheless it is worth noting that many of the key figures in the July assassination plot came from the cream of the Prussian aristocracy and that their opposition to Hitler was deeply rooted in Christian ethics and dated back to his first moments in power. Though it is nonsense to see most of the Protestant German aristocracy as long-term enemies of Nazism, the aristocracy was certainly not more pro-Nazi than the professional middle class or indeed the mass electorate. Given contemporary ideology and the balance of political forces in early-twenty-first-century Germany, it is often convenient, however, to pretend otherwise.

World War II hugely weakened the German and European aristocracy. Everywhere in the Soviet bloc the aristocracy was expropriated. Because the core of German aristocratic power and wealth lay in the territories that fell to communism, this in itself reduced the significance of the traditional elites in German life, even though unlike in Japan the victorious Western Allies did not expropriate the aristocracy in their German occupation zones. In addition, however, all significant sections of West German society after 1945 were determined to make a clean break with the past and had an unconditional commitment to democratic values.

Whereas the great majority of East German aristocrats fled to noncommunist parts of Germany, many Polish and Hungarian aristocrats lived on in their countries, with some individuals playing notable roles in cultural life and even in post-1989 politics. Some property was restored to aristocratic families after 1989, though this amounted to relatively little; some of the most spectacular acts of restitution occurred in the Czech Republic.

Interestingly, the postcommunist Czech Republic was more generous to its Habsburg-era aristocracy than Germany was to the former landowning class of Prussia, Saxony, and Mecklenburg, the great majority of whom were excluded from the restitution of property. Though legal (and indeed Russian) obstacles to restitution were cited, the widespread belief that the eastern aristocracy had been historical enemies of democracy and supporters of fascism facilitated this decision.

By 2000 the aristocracy was of minimal importance in Europe, though some heads of great aristocratic families were still extremely wealthy, especially in Britain, and a disproportionate number of aristocrats could still be found in the higher reaches of some European diplomatic services. The European monarchs and their families had mostly escaped from the traditional aristocratic social circle and had become part of the international world of celebrities, alternately fawned on and hounded by the paparazzi and their readership. Thus the restoration of the Bourbons in 1975 did not much enhance the role of aristocracy in Spain. Even royalty was finding it increasingly hard to compete in the European public imagination with the heroes of the screen and the sports stadium.

Cannadine, David. The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. New Haven, Conn., 1990.

Cardoza, Anthony L. Aristocrats in Bourgeois Italy: The Piedmontese Nobility, 1861-1930. Cambridge, U.K., 1997.

Gibson, Ralph, and Martin Blinkhorn, eds. Landownership and Power in Modern Europe. London, 1991.

Lieven, Dominic. The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815-1914. Houndmills, U.K., 1992.

Malinowski, Stephan. Vom König zum Führer. Berlin, 2003.

Mayer, Arno J. The Persistence of the Old Regime. London, 1981.

Reif, Heinz. Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Munich, 1999.

Dominic Lieven

aristocracy. A vague term, derived from the Greek aristokratia, meaning the rule of the best. In ancient Roman society it was represented by the patricians. It is broader than peerage or even nobility. In common parlance, it was usually taken to mean the upper classes or 'betters' and was confined largely to landowners. Since, unlike peerage, there was no legal definition, it was a matter of opinion who constituted the aristocracy, whether the concept included the gentry, and, if so, how far down that group it went.

In origin, nobility applied largely to kings and their immediate families. As kingdoms grew larger, the surviving members of previous royal families were often incorporated into the aristocracy, together with particularly trusted advisers and supporters. A characteristic of aristocracy was therefore a tendency for it to grow larger. The early 7th-cent. laws of Æthelbert of Kent already distinguished eorls from ceorls for the payment of wergeld. Elaborate justification was scarcely needed. It was assumed that an eorl was a man of honour, whose word could be trusted on oath. Noble blood guaranteed bravery in youth and sage counsel in age.

Hereditary membership of the aristocracy was established at an early period, save for upheavals like the Norman Conquest, which brought in a new governing élite, and in most parts of the country the practice of primogeniture ensured the survival of estates intact. Only in Kent and in Wales did the custom of gavelkind produce the partible inheritance which reduced many noble families to penury on the continent.

In Alfred's day, governors of counties or regions were called ealdormen, though the reassertion of Danish influence in the early 11th cent. meant that the word gave way to eorl, which remained for three centuries the only recognized title. After the Norman Conquest the high aristocracy consisted of the 1,400 tenants-in-chief, to whom had been allocated all the land not expressly reserved for the crown or the church, and who held it directly from the king. But some of the subtenants also accumulated substantial property and formed part of the governing élite. The knightly class soon ceased to be purely professional soldiers and became landed proprietors in their own right, acting as seigneurs or lords of the manor. The local jurisdiction which they exercised under the crown gave them great power at a time when government at Westminster was very distant.

The 'barons' who confronted John in 1215 were not peers in the formal sense and titles were so rare that in the reign of Henry I there were only eight earldoms in existence. Two developments in the 13th and 14th cents. transformed the situation. The summoning of parliaments, with a separate upper chamber, made it necessary to establish which lords were entitled to attend and began the process of separating lords of Parliament from the rest of the aristocracy. Secondly, a diversification of titles led to a considerable increase in peerage numbers. To the old title of earl was added dukedoms (1337) which were at first reserved for the royal family, marquisates (1385), baronies (1387), and viscountcies (1440). By the end of Henry VI's reign the peerage had grown to about 60. In the Tudor period, commentators like Sir Thomas Smith began to distinguish a greater nobility from a lesser nobility, or gentry. But the size of the greater nobility remained small, making it inevitable that it should rely upon the gentry for help in governing the country.

Two further developments in the Tudor period strengthened the position of the aristocracy. At the dissolution of the monasteries most of the estates found their way, sooner or later, into the hands of the nobility and gentry. The Russells were one of many families whose fortunes were established at this time, picking up many monastic estates, including Covent Garden and Woburn abbey. The removal of abbots from the upper house of Parliament after the Reformation left that chamber dominated by secular lords. The growing prestige of Parliament as an institution gave the aristocracy a powerful base from which to challenge the monarchy and defend itself against the commonalty.

The 17th cent. was full of vicissitudes. The lavish creation of titles by the early Stuarts, including the introduction of baronetcies, threatened to dilute the aristocracy and weaken its powers of resistance. The long struggle with the crown, which was attempting to find non-parliamentary sources of revenue, seemed at one stage to have brought down aristocracy and monarchy alike: in 1649, with the king executed and the House of Lords declared useless and dangerous, it looked as though the split in the upper classes had handed power to the forces of radical dissent. For many aristocratic families, the 1650s were particularly hard, their houses and property plundered, their church disestablished and derided, their income subject to swingeing taxes levied by the parliamentary victors. Worst of all was the short rule of the major-generals, several of them men of humble origins.

After the Restoration, the aristocracy recovered much of its wealth and influence. But the underlying rivalry with the crown re-emerged in the 1680s. This time the outcome was decisive, with gentry and nobility united against James II, and supported by most of the nation.

The 150 years following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was the golden age of aristocrats, victorious on both flanks. They were no longer menaced by radicals or republicans, nor by a quasi-absolutist monarchy. Decades of Hanoverian prosperity saw the manor-houses rebuilt and enlarged, the old muddy villages and duck ponds removed to a respectful distance, the parks enclosed and embellished. The greater aristocracy built up their estates, often in several counties, and protected them from the follies of spendthrift heirs by the entail or strict settlement. Their monopoly of office, national and local, was almost complete: cabinets were composed almost exclusively of noblemen, while the gentry, as justices of the peace, looked after the shires. Parliament itself was firmly under the control of the landed interest, though the trading towns sent their own merchants and businessmen to protect their concerns.

In an increasingly utilitarian age, rather less was heard of noble blood and more of service to the nation. Though the aristocracy retained a particular interest in the armed forces, and especially the cavalry, the invention of guns and the introduction of standing armies had deprived them of their former rationale as a military class. In Pitt's words, the iron barons were replaced by silken barons. Nevertheless, their claims were still formidable-that they were superior in education, experienced in making decisions, enjoyed the leisure necessary to consider public affairs, and, above all, that their great possessions gave them a unique concern for the well-being of the country, since they had so much to lose. They also claimed a distinctive political role, as a balancing or stabilizing force, which prevented the country from sliding into royal despotism or democratic licence.

Ideological challenge to noble ascendancy came with the American and French Revolutions, in which titles were abolished and aristocrats denounced. But the identification of egalitarianism with national enemies may have given the British aristocracy a further lease of life. More insidious dangers were developments not overtly political-the growing complexity of public business, which put the amateur at a disadvantage; the growth of new industrial towns, where the symbols of aristocracy were less obvious; the improvements in schooling, which meant that education was no longer the preserve of the wealthy; the eventual decline of agriculture until the great landed interest looked less a national concern than a farming lobby; perhaps, most of all, the gradual effects of new forms of taxation which steadily encroached upon aristocratic fortunes. Significantly, the introduction of a tax upon incomes, which Charles Fox rightly saw must do vast damage to aristocracy, came in the darkest moment of the war against revolutionary France in 1799. Nevertheless, judicious concessions, like the Great Reform Act of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, enabled the landed classes to preserve much of their influence throughout the 19th cent. But signs of decay were increasingly apparent and the extravagance of the Edwardian period had all the hallmarks of an Indian summer. The Great War of 1914 proved a cataclysm, but it was a crumbling building that was knocked down.

Gentry and aristocracy survive into the 21st cent. in their own world, but it is shrunken and private. They retain many houses and much social prestige, but the houses are often open to the public, with tea served in the stables; others, like Lambton castle, have been turned into fun-fairs, taken over as schools, or developed as conference centres. Aristocrats are still much sought after as patrons, presidents, chancellors, and board members, but the days when a cabinet of nine could contain eight peers of the realm, the ninth being merely the son of a peeress in her own right, have vanished into the past.

J. A. Cannon

Bibliography

Beckett, J. V. , The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 (Oxford, 1986);
Bush, M. L. , The English Aristocracy: A Comparative Synthesis (Manchester, 1984);
Cannadine, D. , The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy ( New Haven, 1990);
Cannon, J. A. , Aristocratic Century: The Peerage of Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1984).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The term aristocracy derives from the Greek words aristos and kratos, meaning rule by the best. In denoting hierarchy and social differentiation, aristocracy has often been used synonymously with elites or oligarchy. More broadly, the term has been used in modern formulations such as Americas aristocracy to denote a plutocracy of wealth and privilege in the United States, or as labour aristocracy in the United Kingdom to refer to a privileged stratum of skilled workers within the nineteenth-century working class. Indeed, its modern usage is so broad that many commentators have concluded that aristocracy is now impossible to define.

The aristocracy in preindustrial European states combined specific economic, social, and political characteristics that differentiated it from other social strata at the time, and from subsequent notions of aristocracy in industrial and postindustrial societies. For a period of over five hundred years, before the rapid spread of industrialization in the nineteenth century, predominantly agrarian societies in Europe were structured in feudal hierarchies and governed by monarchs in varying alliances with landed aristocrats. In these hierarchies, aristocrats were differentiated from monarchs in one, upward direction, and from gentry, merchants, and peasants in the opposite direction.

In economic terms, aristocracy in preindustrial societies was defined in relationship to the land. Initially in feudal systems, monarchs granted feudal lords the rights to income from large estates or manors in return for military support and local administration of justice. Thus, aristocrats derived their income primarily from land, either directly through the extraction of services and dues from peasants, or, latterly, indirectly through sharecrop-ping contracts or lease-renting arrangements with small farmers.

The economic differentiation of the aristocracy was reinforced by social distinctiveness. Monarchs conferred not only economic rewards but also status rewards in the form of titles. Although titles were not an exact indicator of membership in the aristocracy, they were, when combined with land ownership, the most effective defining characteristic of the aristocracy. Noble rank reinforced notions of social exclusivity, and even among the aristocracy there was an internal hierarchy of titles that distinguished landed magnates from lesser nobility.

The aristocracys combined economic and social dominance was sustained over centuries through inheritance laws based on primogeniture (where succession passes to the firstborn son). In this manner, the indivisibility and continuity of landed estates was secured and the social status of titular rank was passed from one male generation to the next.

A deliberate cult of ostentation characterized the lifestyle of most European aristocrats. Living nobly entailed architectural recognition in the construction of grand country residences and palatial dwellings in capital cities; cultural recognition in the patronage of the arts and music; fashionable recognition in elaborate dress and tailoring; and educational recognition in, for example, the value placed upon multilingualism by European aristocrats.

Political power was closely associated with the economic and social power of the aristocracy. Nonetheless, there were wide variations in the political relationships between monarch and aristocracy from one country to the next. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were marked contrasts between France, where the aristocracy was politically enfeebled, and England, where the landed aristocracy effectively restricted monarchical power through representation in Parliament. Eventually, with the transition to industrial capitalist economies, the political, social, and economic ascendancy of the aristocracy was eroded in all European states. Even in the twenty-first century, however, residues of aristocratic status and wealth can still be traced in many European countries.

SEE ALSO Authority; Conspicuous Consumption; Distinctions, Social and Cultural; Elitism; Feudalism; Gentility; Hierarchy; Landlords; Meritocracy; Monarchy; Monarchy, Constitutional; Power; Wealth

Clark, Samuel. 1995. State and Status: The Rise of the State and Aristocratic Power in Western Europe. Cardiff, U.K.: University of Wales Press.

Wasson, Ellis. 2006. Aristocracy and the Modern World. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
David Judge

ocial inequality was an accepted part of Renaissance society. Every European culture awarded special powers and privileges to the aristocracy, or nobility. However, societies had different ways of defining what it meant to be noble. The role of the aristocracy varied throughout Europe and changed over the course of the Renaissance.

Definitions of Aristocracy. The men and women of the Renaissance based their ideas about aristocracy on concepts inherited from the ancient world. In Greek philosophy, an aristocracy was a state or community ruled by the best men. Eventually, the term came to refer to the ruling class in such a society.

Societies used three different concepts to identify the "best" individuals. According to the political definition, aristocrats were those who held political power-usually the wealthiest members of society. The hereditary definition, by contrast, depended on birth. The idea behind this view was that great people passed on their qualities to their descendants. By the 1000s and 1100s, many cultures had developed a military definition. According to this view, a nobleman was a man who fought. This idea presented the aristocracy as one of three main segments of society, along with the clergy (those who prayed) and the commoners (those who worked).

All three definitions of aristocracy relied on the notion that some people were better than others. In other ways, however, the three definitions were quite different. The political and military visions allowed individuals to rise from one class to a higher one, while the hereditary view fixed a person's social class at birth. The hereditary and military models recognized the idea that poor people could be noble, but the political view usually defined nobles as wealthy.

These three contrasting views all remained powerful between the 1400s and 1600s. Europeans admired individuals who combined all three ideals-men from old families who fought in battles and governed. However, new ideas about nobility began to gain ground during the Renaissance. Humanists* such as Dutch scholar Desiderius Erasmus and English statesman Thomas More mocked ignorant and violent noblemen. They suggested that to be truly noble, people needed education. Aristocrats across Europe responded to this message. During the 1500s, they attended universities in large numbers. Learning became a requirement for high positions in society and government. This shift in values improved the position of aristocratic women. Women could not compete in battle, but they could interact with men on more equal terms in the field of learning.

Varying Roles. The aristocracy's role in society varied from region to region. Wars in Poland, Hungary, and Spain created a large class of noble warriors. About 10 percent of the people in these regions were members of the aristocracy. Although many of these nobles were poor, a few held vast estates. In France and central Germany, by contrast, nobles made up about 2 percent of the population in 1500 and perhaps as little as 1 percent by 1650.

The position of the nobility also differed between northern and southern areas of Europe. Aristocrats in the Mediterranean region, especially northern Italy, had close ties to urban life. The governments of many Italian city-states made nobles live in the cities as a way of controlling them. Italian aristocrats also tended to be involved in the business of the cities, such as trade and banking. In northern Europe, by contrast, most aristocrats lived on country estates and avoided any involvement with banking or trade. However, these differences faded during the 1400s and 1500s. Urban Italian aristocrats began building country houses, and nobles in England and France spent more time in the cities.

The 1300s and 1400s were a time of crisis for nobles throughout Europe. Many died in wars and in civil conflicts within nations. They also faced economic problems. Wars and the plague* kept Europe's population low between 1348 and 1500, making labor more costly and lowering the value of crops. Aristocratic income, which depended heavily on land, shrank. At the same time, Europe's lower classes grew more dissatisfied with aristocratic power and privilege. They began to question the nobility's value to society. A series of rebellions broke out among peasants in England, France, Germany, and Spain. The wave of discontent climaxed in the great Peasants' War of 1525, which involved hundreds of thousands of villagers in Germany.

Nobles' fortunes improved after 1500, as the population rose and the economy grew stronger. However, inflation had lowered the value of the rents that lords typically received from villagers. To profit from the growing economy, aristocrats took direct control of lands and forests. Some nobles managed their own farms, but most found ways to profit from other people's work. Nobles in England leased land to tenant farmers. In Italy and southern France, aristocrats drew huge incomes from sharecropping. In this arrangement, they allowed farmers to work their land in exchange for half or more of the harvest it produced. In eastern Europe, some nobles forced villagers to work the land without any form of pay.

Aristocracy and the State. The growing power of governments in western Europe helped to transform aristocracies after 1500. The most significant change was government's more active role in defining the nobility. In the past, social status had depended on informal understanding within a society. By 1600, a person required a formal letter from the government to be considered noble. Governments also established elaborate systems for ranking members of the aristocracy.

Governments also took steps to control the aristocracy in other ways. They stepped in to end the tradition of private wars between aristocratic families. Governments encouraged aristocrats to spend more time at court, under the eyes of their rulers. In addition, nobles faced new social competition from the growing ranks of state administrators. These government officials, who were often commoners or minor nobles, gained power and wealth during the 1500s.

Although aristocrats lost some independence, they gained other benefits. In many countries, nobles no longer had to pay taxes. In addition, many gained wealth through direct gifts from monarchs and high-paying government and military positions. By the end of the Renaissance, the aristocracy had survived social, economic, and political change and remained a central part of European society. In fact, many writers and artists of the 1600s focused on aristocrats as useful examples for all social classes.

* humanist

Renaissance expert in the humanities (the languages, literature, history, and speech and writing techniques of ancient Greece and Rome)

* plague

highly contagious and often fatal disease that wiped out much of Europe's population in the mid-1300s and reappeared periodically over the next three centuries; also known as the Black Death

The Perils of Power

Being a Renaissance aristocrat was not always an advantage. Nearly half of all English dukes in the 1300s and 1400s died violent deaths. Many perished in the Wars of the Roses, a struggle for the English crown that lasted from 1455 to 1485. Civil wars elsewhere in Europe also made nobles' lives risky. Kings acted quickly against aristocrats whose loyalty they doubted, leading to more deaths and the complete disappearance of some noble families.

The rule by a few by reason of their wealth, nobility, or virtue.

Early Concepts. For plato ( c. 427347 b.c.) the perfect state was the aristocratic state. This ideal was given its best expression in the Republic: "Unless philosophers become kings, or those now called kings become philosophers, there will be no end of evils for mankind" (473). Plato describes a state in which social justice would be fully realized as embracing three classes of men: the king-philosophers, or the ruling class, who constitute the legislative and executive power; the soldiers or guardians of the state; and the workers. The rulers must be intensely trained to become true philosopher-kings and must be subjected to a rigid process of selection that will bring the best philosophic minds to the top. Rulers and soldiers must be supported by the state; they cannot hold private property or enjoy normal family life because these are incompatible with full devotion to their duties. This system is proposed as a "model fixed in the heavens for human imitations, but not attainment" (592). Aristotle (384322) attempted to describe the existent state. To discover an ideal state, he observed in the Politics, it is necessary to begin by examining both the best states of history and the best that the theorists have imagined. The best practical policy is aristocracy, the rule of the informed and capable few; this is nowhere described realistically, however.

St. thomas aquinas ( c. 122574) also insisted that the state should be governed by the ablest. Right order among men demands naturally that the more intelligent should rule ( C. gent. 3.81). Later St. Thomas more (14781535) revived Plato's conception in his Utopia, describing an imaginary communist state so governed as to secure universal happiness. The City of the Sun of Tommaso campanella (15681639) substituted wise priests to rule instead of philosophers. In the New Atlantis, Francis bacon (15611626) placed scientists at the head of the state.

Modern Forms. An imitation of an aristocracy might have been the appropriate political form under feudalism, in which ownership of land was accompanied by special duties of armed defense. In modern circumstances, aristocracy can be described as the dominance of a single, well-organized interest group over other community groupings. Perhaps the most obvious examples are the hereditary aristocracies that alternated in power with absolute monarchies in European history until the time of the French Revolution and even later. Also, merchant groups ruled many prosperous European states, such as Venice and the states of the Hanseatic League.

Plato's Republic has also been the source of inspiration for modern and contemporary theorists, such as Charles de montesquieu, G. W. F. hegel, J. F. renan, Thomas Carlyle, Ralph Waldo emerson, Edmund burke, Friedrich nietzsche, and George santayana. These theorists generally claim that men have always been governed by aristocratic institutions; that political power has changed its shape but not its nature; that every people is governed by an elite, by a chosen element in the population; that aristocracies have been more favorable to literature, arts, and sciences; and, in a phrase that summarizes their theory, that all civilization is the work of aristocracies.

The managerial aristocracy of business corporations corresponds to the members of a mediocre state bureaucracy. It is an aristocracy of wealth. In 1933 President F. D. Roosevelt enlisted a so-called brain trust to cure national ills. Some theorists advocate an aristocracy of talent and the reconstruction of the federal and state system to arm the executive branch with great and immediate power. They find traditional democracy dangerously unworkable when faced by the challenge of the cold war. They fear collapse and defeat by default for the democratic Western world unless something along this line is attempted.

Democratic theorists, on the other hand, such as K. R. Popper or D. Spitz, deny the above allegations, and indict Plato and his followers as forerunners of modern totalitarianism. Plato's ideal state is not regarded as a means to an end, but becomes an end in itself. Such a view militates against sound philosophy and Christian belief. Plato held that each individual and family exists for the state; Christianity holds that each individual and family possesses certain natural rights that every government must respect and protect. Among these rights are the right to life and to a reasonable amount of liberty of movement, of self-assertion, and association.

Bibliography: r. h. crossman, Plato Today (London 1937). h. w. eldredge, The Second American Revolution ( New York 1964). The Works of Plato, tr. b. jowett ( New York 1936). d. grene, Man in His Pride (Chicago 1950). k. r. popper, The Open Society (Princeton 1963). b. f. skinner, Walden Two (New York 1948). d. spitz, Patterns of Anti-democratic Thought (New York 1949). j. wild, Plato's Theory of Man (Cambridge, Mass. 1946).

[a. j. osgniach]

ar·is·toc·ra·cy / ˌariˈstäkrəsē/ * n. (pl. -cies) [treated as sing. or pl.] (usu. the aristocracy) the highest class in certain societies, esp. those holding hereditary titles or offices. ∎ a form of government in which power is held by the nobility. ∎ a state governed in this way. ∎ fig. a group regarded as privileged or superior in a particular sphere: high-level technocrats make up a large part of this "technical aristocracy." ORIGIN: late 15th cent.: from Old French aristocratie, from Greek aristokratia, from aristos 'best' + -kratia 'power.' The term originally denoted the government of a state by its best citizens, later by the rich and wellborn, hence the sense 'nobility,' regardless of the form of government (mid 17th cent.).

1. Almanach de Gotha German social register. [Ger. Lit.: Benét, 26]

2. Beaucaire, Monsieur portrays English aristocracy as shallow, inept snobs. [Am. Lit.: Monsieur Beaucaire, Magill I, 616-617]

3. blue blood said to flow in the veins of the nobility. [Western Cult.: Brewer Dictionary ]

4. Brahmin appellation accorded members of old, "aristocratic" New England families. [Am. Hist.: EB, II: 226]

5. portrays wealthy esoterics, mysteriously influential in governmental affairs. [Am. Lit.: The Cabala ]

6. First Families of Virginia elite families of prestigious rank. [Am. Usage: Misc.]

7. Four Hundred, the social elite; the number of people Mrs. Astor could accommodate in her ballroom. [Am. Usage: Misc.]

8. gold on white symbol of elite class. [Chinese Art: Jobes, 357]

9. Junkers Prussian elite. [Ger. Hist.: Hitler, 387]

10. Social Register book listing names and addresses of social elite. [Am. Usage: Misc.]

11. St. Aubert, Emily young French woman of wealth and position. [Br. Lit.: The Mysteries of Udolpho, Magill I, 635-638]

12. Winthrop English upper-class family; America's parliamentary governors. [Am. Hist.: Hart, 937-938]

aristocracy government by 'the best' citizens; political supremacy of a privileged order XVI; patrician order, nobles XVII. - (O)F. aristocratie - Gr. aristokratíā, f. áristos best; see -CRACY.
So aristocrat XVIII. - F. aristocrate (a word of the French Revolution). aristocratic XVII. - (O)F. - Gr. -ical XVI.

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aristocracy.* A vague term, derived from the Greek aristokratia, meaning the rule of the best. In ancient Roman society it was represented by the patricians. It is broader than peerage [1] or even nobility.

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Aristocracy (from Ancient Greek ἀριστοκρατίᾱ (aristokratíā), from ἄριστος (áristos) 'best', and κράτος (krátos) 'power, strength') is a form of government that places strength in the hands of a small, privileged ruling class, the aristocrats. The term derives from the Greek aristokratíā, meaning 'rule of the best'.

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A dictatorship is a form of government in which all (or nearly all) of the ruling power is possessed by one person or one ruling entity. This absolute power is often enforced through extreme measures and may come with laws viewed as rather strict by other forms of government. It is also worth noting that the person or entity with the ruling power often is not held accountable by Constitutional limitations or other governing bodies.

The History Behind Dictatorships

A dictatorship is a more recent form of government as far as world history goes, not rising to prominence until the 19th and 20th centuries. However, it was during this time that it became one of the top two forms of government around the globe, the other being constitutional democracy. This was, in large part, due to the rapid decline of monarchies. Latin America specifically saw a rise in dictatorships after Spain relinquished its rule of their former colonies. Most dictators at this time were military officers or privatized army leaders who easily overtook the new and unstable governments and appointed themselves in office. Similarly in Africa after World War II, weakened African governments that had seen their connections and aid from Western nations lowered considerably were then overthrown by self-appointed military dictators.

Still, some of the best known dictators in history were the totalitarian dictators during World War II (totalitarianism is where the state seeks to control nearly every aspect of life for its citizens). Adolf Hitler, for example, rose to power as dictator of Nazi Germany after the country's economy was considerably weakened in the first world war. He remains infamous for having been at the center of the Holocaust and World War II. Rather than be tried for crimes against humanity or be assassinated like numerous other dictators before him, Hitler took his own life at the end of the war.

Modern Dictatorships

Though dictatorships are no longer nearly as prevalent as they once were thanks to the growth of parliamentary republics and democracies (among other forms of government), there are still some in existence today. However, the true number of them may be difficult to measure, since what some may consider a dictator may be considered a democratically elected leader by others (Russian president Vladimir Putin is one example). Still, one of the best known modern day dictators is North Korea's Kim Jong-Un, who took power in 2011 after the death of the country's former dictator, his father Kim Jong-Il.

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What is a Dictatorship? - Follow My Vote

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Learn about what exactly a dictatorship is and how it works. Also, find out about its different forms and examples of it around the world.

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A dictatorship is a form of government which is characterized by a leader, or a group of leaders, which holds governmental powers with few to no limitations on them. The leader of a dictatorship is called a dictator. Politics in a dictatorship are controlled by the dictator and facilitated through an inner circle of elites that include advisers, generals, and other high-ranking officials. The dictator maintains control by influencing and appeasing the inner circle while repressing any opposition, which may include rival political parties, armed resistance, or disloyal members of the inner circle. Dictatorships can be formed by a military coup that overthrows the previous government through force or by a self-coup in which elected leaders make their rule permanent. Dictatorships are authoritarian or totalitarian and can be classified as military dictatorships, one-party dictatorships, personalist dictatorships, or absolute monarchies.

The term dictatorship originates from its use in the Roman Republic. The earliest military dictatorships developed in the post-classical era, particularly in Shogun-era Japan. Modern dictatorships first developed in the nineteenth century, which included Bonapartism in Europe and caudillos in Latin America. The twentieth century saw the rise of fascist and communist dictatorships in Europe. Fascism was eradicated in the aftermath of World War II in 1945, while communism spread to other continents, maintaining prominence until the end of the Cold War in 1991. The twentieth century also saw the rise of personalist dictatorships in Africa and military dictatorships in Latin America, both of which became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. Several dictatorships have persisted into the twenty-first century, particularly in Africa and Asia.

Dictatorships frequently hold elections in order to establish their legitimacy or provide incentives to members of the ruling party, but these elections are not competitive for the opposition. Stability in a dictatorship is maintained through coercion and political repression, which involves the restriction of access to information, the tracking of the political opposition, and acts of violence. Because dictatorships serve the interests of the few and are not answerable to the people, those that fail to repress the opposition are susceptible to collapse through a coup or a revolution.

The power structures of dictatorships vary, and different definitions of dictatorship consider different elements of this structure. Political scientists such as Juan José Linz and Samuel P. Huntington identify key attributes that define the power structure of a dictatorship, including a single leader or a small group of leaders, the exercise of power with few limitations, limited political pluralism, and limited mass mobilization.

Totalitarianism is a form of dictatorship characterized by the presence of a single political party and more specifically, by a powerful leader who imposes personal and political prominence. Power is wielded through a collaboration between the government and a highly developed ideology. A totalitarian government has "total control of mass communications and social and economic organizations." Political philosopher Hannah Arendt describes totalitarianism as a new and extreme form of dictatorship composed of "atomized, isolated individuals" in which ideology plays a leading role in defining how the entire society should be organized. Political scientist Juan José Linz identifies a spectrum of political systems with democracies and totalitarian regimes separated by authoritarian regimes with varied classifications of hybrid systems.He describes totalitarian regimes as exercising control over politics and political mobilization rather than merely suppressing it.

A dictatorship is formed when a specific group seizes power, with the composition of this group affecting how power is seized and how the eventual dictatorship will rule. The group may be military or political, it may be organized or disorganized, and it may disproportionately represent a certain demographic. After power is seized, the group must determine what positions its members will hold in the new government and how this government will operate, sometimes resulting in disagreements that split the group. Disaffected members either withdraw or are sometimes persecuted, jailed or executed. Members of the group will typically make up the elites in a dictator's inner circle at the beginning of a new dictatorship, though the dictator may remove them as a means to gain additional power.

Unless they have undertaken a self-coup, those seizing power typically have little governmental experience and do not have a detailed policy plan in advance. If the dictator has not seized power through a political party, then a party may be formed as a mechanism to reward supporters and to concentrate power in the hands of political allies instead of militant allies. Parties formed after the seizure of power often have little influence and only exist to serve the dictator.

Most dictatorships are formed through military means or through a political party. Nearly half of dictatorships start as a military coup, though others have been started by foreign intervention, elected officials ending competitive elections, insurgent takeovers, popular uprisings by citizens, or legal maneuvering by autocratic elites to take power within their government. Dictatorships can be inherently unstable. Between 1946 and 2010, 42% of dictatorships began by overthrowing a different dictatorship. Another 26% began after achieving independence from a foreign government. Many others developed following a period of warlordism.

Types of dictatorship

A classification of dictatorships, which began with political scientist Barbara Geddes in 1999, focuses on where power lies. Under this system, there are three types of dictatorships. Military dictatorships are controlled by military officers, one-party dictatorships are controlled by the leadership of a political party, and personalist dictatorships are controlled by a single individual. In some circumstances, monarchies are also considered dictatorships if the monarchs hold a significant amount of political power. Hybrid dictatorships are regimes that have a combination of these classifications.

Military dictatorships are typically formed by a military coup in which senior officers use the military to overthrow the government. In democracies, the threat of a military coup is associated with the period immediately after a democracy's creation but prior to large-scale military reforms. In oligarchies, the threat of a military coup comes from the strength of the military weighed against the concessions made to the military. Other factors associated with military coups include extensive natural resources, limited use of the military internationally, and use of the military as an oppressive force domestically. Military coups do not necessarily result in military dictatorships, as power may then be passed to an individual or the military may allow democratic elections to take place.

Military dictatorships often have traits in common due to the shared military background of the dictators. These dictators may view themselves as impartial in their oversight of a country due to their nonpartisan status, and they may view themselves as "guardians of the state." The predominance of violent force in military training manifests in an acceptance of violence as a political tool and the ability to organize violence on a large scale. Military dictators may also be less trusting or diplomatic and underestimate the use of bargaining and compromise in politics.

One-party dictatorships are governments in which a single political party dominates politics. Single-party dictatorships are one-party states in which only the party in power is legalized and all opposition parties are banned. Dominant-party dictatorships or electoral authoritarian dictatorships are one-party dictatorships in which opposition parties are nominally legal but cannot meaningfully influence government. Single-party dictatorships were most common during the Cold War, with dominant-party dictatorships becoming more common after the fall of the Soviet Union. Ruling parties in one-party dictatorships are distinct from political parties that were created to serve a dictator in that the ruling party in a one-party dictatorship permeates every level of society.

One-party dictatorships became prominent in Asia and Eastern Europe during the Cold War as communist revolutions installed one-party governments in several countries. One-party rule also developed in several countries in Africa during decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, some of which produced authoritarian regimes. A ruling party in a one-party dictatorship may rule under any ideology or it may have no guiding ideology. Marxist one-party states are sometimes distinguished from other one-party states, but they function similarly. When a one-party dictatorship develops gradually through legal means, in can result in conflict between the party organization and the state apparatus and civil service, as the party rules in parallel and increasingly appoints its own members to positions of power. Parties that take power through violence are often able to implement larger changes in a shorter period of time, but generally at a higher cost in lives lost.

Personalist

Personalist dictators typically favor loyalty over competence in their governments and have a general distrust of intelligentsia. Elites in personalist dictatorships often do not have a professional political career and are unqualified for positions they are given. A personalist dictator will manage these appointees by segmenting the government so that they cannot collaborate. The result is that such regimes have no internal checks and balances, and are thus unrestrained when exerting repression on their people, making radical shifts in foreign policy, or starting wars with other countries. Due to the lack of accountability and the smaller group of elites, personalist dictatorships are more prone to corruption than other forms of dictatorship, and they are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship. Personalist dictatorships often collapse with the death of the dictator. They are more likely to end in violence and less likely to democratize than other forms of dictatorship.

Absolute monarchy

An absolute monarchy is a monarchy in which the monarch rules without legal limitations. This makes it distinct from constitutional monarchy and ceremonial monarchy. In an absolute monarchy, power is limited to the royal family, and legitimacy is established by historical factors. In the modern era, absolute monarchies are most common in the Middle East. Montesquieu made a distinction between despots that ruled unrestrained and monarchs that ruled within the laws of a kingdom. Political parties are relatively rare in monarchic dictatorships compared to military or civilian dictatorships. Monarchies may be dynastic, in which the royal family serves as a ruling institution similar to a political party in a one-party state, or they may be non-dynastic, in which the monarch rules independently of the royal family as a personalist dictator. Monarchies allow for strict rules of succession that produce a peaceful transfer of power on the monarch's death, but this can also result in succession disputes if multiple members of the royal family claim a right to succeed.

Early dictatorships

Dictatorship is historically associated with the Ancient Greek concept of tyranny, and several ancient Greek rulers have been described as "tyrants" that are comparable to modern dictators. The concept of "dictator" was first developed during the Roman Republic. A Roman dictator was a special magistrate that was temporarily appointed by the consul during times of crisis and granted total executive authority. The role of dictator was created for instances when a single leader was needed to command and restore stability. At least 85 such dictators were chosen over the course of the Roman Republic, the last of which was chosen to wage the Second Punic War. The dictatorship was revived 120 years later by Sulla after his crushing of a populist movement, and 33 years after that by Julius Caesar. Caesar subverted the tradition of temporary dictatorships when he was made dictator perpetuo, or a dictator for life, which led to the creation of the Roman Empire. The rule of a dictator was not necessarily considered tyrannical in Ancient Rome, though it has been described in some accounts as a "temporary tyranny" or an "elective tyranny."

Asia saw several military dictatorships during the post-classical era. Korea experienced military dictatorships under the rule of Yeon Gaesomun in the seventh century and under the rule of the Goryeo military regime in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Shoguns were de facto military dictators in Japan beginning in 1185 and continuing for over six hundred years. During the Lê dynasty of Vietnam between the 16th and 18th centuries, the country was under de facto military rule by two rival military families: the Trịnh lords in the north and the Nguyễn lords in the south. In Europe, the Commonwealth of England under Oliver Cromwell, formed in 1649 after the Second English Civil War, has been described as a military dictatorship by its contemporary opponents and by some modern academics. Maximilien Robespierre has been similarly described as a dictator while he controlled the National Convention in France and conducted the Reign of Terror in 1793 and 1794.

Dictatorship developed as a major form of government in the nineteenth century, though the concept was not universally seen pejoratively at the time, with both a tyrannical concept and a quasi-constitutional concept of dictatorship understood to exist. In Europe it was often thought of as either Bonapartism or Caesarism. The former describes the military rule of Napoleon and the latter describes the imperial rule of Napoleon III in the vein of Julius Caesar. The Spanish American wars of independence took place in the early-nineteenth century, creating many new Latin American governments. Many of these governments fell under the control of caudillos, or personalist dictators. Most caudillos came from a military background, and their rule was typically associated with pageantry and glamor. Caudillos were often nominally constrained by a constitution, but the caudillo had the power to draft a new constitution as he wished. Many are noted for their cruelty, while others are honored as national heroes.

Interwar dictatorships

In the socio-economic struggles between World War I and World War II, several dictatorships were established in Europe through coups which were carried out by far-left and far-right movements. The aftermath of World War I resulted in a major shift in European politics, establishing new governments, facilitating internal change in older governments, and redrawing the boundaries between countries, allowing opportunities for these movements to seize power. The societal upheaval caused by World War I and the unstable peace it produced further contributed to instability that benefited extremist movements and rallied support for their causes. Far-left and far-right dictatorships used similar methods to maintain power, including cult of personality, concentration camps, forced labor, mass murder, and genocide.

The first communist state was created by Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks with the establishment of Soviet Russia during the Russian Revolution in 1917. The government was described as a dictatorship of the proletariat in which power was exercised by soviets. The Bolsheviks consolidated power by 1922, forming the Soviet Union. Lenin was followed by Joseph Stalin in 1924, who consolidated total power and implemented totalitarian rule by 1929. The Russian Revolution inspired a wave of left-wing revolutionary movements in Europe between 1917 and 1923, but none saw the same level of success.

At the same time, nationalist movements grew throughout Europe. These movements were a response to what they perceived as decadence and societal decay due to the changing social norms and race relations brought about by liberalism. Fascism developed in Europe as a rejection of liberalism, socialism, and modernism. The first fascist political parties formed in the 1920s. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini seized power in 1922, and began implementing reforms in 1925 to create the first fascist dictatorship. These reforms incorporated totalitarianism, fealty to the state, expansionism, corporatism, and anti-communism.

Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party created a second fascist dictatorship in Germany in 1933, obtaining absolute power through a combination of electoral victory, violence, and emergency powers. Other nationalist movements in Europe established dictatorships based on the fascist model. During World War II, Italy and Germany occupied several countries in Europe, imposing fascist puppet states upon many of the countries that they invaded. After their defeat in World War II, the fascist dictatorships of Europe collapsed, with the exceptions of Spain and Portugal. The Soviet Union occupied nationalist dictatorships in the east and replaced them with communist dictatorships, while the Western Bloc established liberal democratic governments.

Latin America

Dictatorships in Latin America persisted into the twentieth century, as yet further military coups established new regimes, often in the name of nationalism. After a brief period of democratization, Latin America underwent a rapid transition toward dictatorship in the 1930s. Populist movements were strengthened following the economic turmoil of the Great Depression, producing populist dictatorships in several Latin American countries. European fascism was imported to Latin America as well, and the Vargas Era of Brazil was heavily influenced by the corporatism practiced in fascist Italy.

Cold War dictatorships

The decolonization of Africa prompted the creation of new governments, many of which became dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s. Early African dictatorships were primarily personalist socialist dictatorships, in which a single socialist would take power instead of a ruling party. As the Cold War continued, the Soviet Union increased its influence in Africa, and Marxist-Leninist dictatorships developed in several African countries. Military coups were also a common occurrence after decolonization, with 14 African countries experiencing at least three successful military coups between 1959 and 2001. These new African governments were marked by severe instability, which provided opportunities for regime change and made fair elections a rare occurrence on the continent. This instability in turn required rulers to become increasingly authoritarian to remain in power, further propagating dictatorship in Africa.

The Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, splitting the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek and the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong. Mao established the People's Republic of China as a one-party communist state under his governing ideology of Maoism. While the People's Republic of China was initially aligned with the Soviet Union, relations between the two countries deteriorated as the Soviet Union underwent de-Stalinization in the late-1950s. Mao consolidated his control of the People's Republic of China with the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, which involved the destruction of all elements of capitalism and traditionalism in China. Deng Xiaoping took power as the de facto leader of China after Mao's death and implemented reforms to restore stability following the Cultural Revolution and reestablish free market economics. Chiang Kai-shek continued to rule as dictator of the National government in Taiwan until his death in 1975.

Marxist and nationalist movements became popular in Southeast Asia in response to colonial control and the subsequent Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, with both ideologies facilitating the creation of dictatorships after World War II. Communist dictatorships in the region aligned with China following the latter's establishment as a communist state. A similar phenomenon took place in Korea, where Kim Il-sung created a Soviet-backed communist dictatorship in North Korea and Syngman Rhee created a US-backed nationalist dictatorship in South Korea. While South Korea ultimately reformed into a democracy, the North Korean communist dictatorship became a hybrid personalist/one-party state dictatorship. It became the first hereditary communist state as dictatorial power was passed down from Kim Il-Sung to his son, Kim Jong-Il who passed it to his son, Kim Jong-Un. (Later, in 2011, Fidel Castro would pass dictatorial power to his brother, Raúl, but he did not wield the same power as Fidel, and the Cuban communist party ultimately replaced him in 2021 with Miguel Díaz-Canel, a non-Castro, as the party reasserted its authority over the government.)

The Middle East was decolonized during the Cold War, and many nationalist movements gained strength post-independence. These nationalist movements supported non-alignment, keeping most Middle Eastern dictatorships out of the American and Soviet spheres of influence. These movements supported pan-Arab Nasserism during most of the Cold War, but they were largely replaced by Islamic nationalism by the 1980s. Several Middle Eastern countries were the subject of military coups in the 1950s and 1960s, including Iraq, Syria, North Yemen, and South Yemen. A 1953 coup overseen by the American and British governments restored Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as the absolute monarch of Iran, who in turn was overthrown during the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that established Ruhollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of Iran under an Islamist government.

During World War II, many countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been occupied by the Soviet Union. When the war ended, these countries were incorporated into the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union installed puppet regimes and exercised control over their governments. Josip Broz Tito declared a communist government in Yugoslavia during World War II, which was initially aligned with the Soviet Union. The relations between the countries were strained by Soviet attempts to influence Yugoslavia, leading to the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. Albania was established as a communist dictatorship under Enver Hoxha in 1944. It was initially aligned with Yugoslavia, but its alignment shifted throughout the Cold War between Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China. The stability of the Soviet Union weakened in the 1980s. The Soviet economy became unsustainable, and communist governments lost the support of intellectuals. In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would no longer use military force to back its client states in Eastern Europe. The Berlin Wall was torn down, and communism was abandoned by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe through a series of revolutions. After an aborted coup against Gorbachev, the Soviet Union itself was dissolved in 1991.

Latin America

Military dictatorships remained prominent in Latin America during the Cold War, though the number of coups declined starting in the 1980s. Between 1967 C.E. 1991, 12 Latin American countries underwent at least one military coup. Haiti and Honduras experienced three while Bolivia experienced eight. A one-party communist dictatorship was formed in Cuba when a US-backed dictatorship was overthrown in the Cuban Revolution, creating the only Soviet-backed dictatorship in the western hemisphere. To maintain power, Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet organized Operation Condor with other South American dictators to facilitate cooperation between their respective intelligence agencies and secret police organizations.

Twenty-first century dictatorships

The nature of dictatorship changed in much of the world at the onset of the twenty-first century. Between the 1990s and the 2000s, most dictators moved away from being "larger-than-life figures" that controlled the populace through terror and isolated themselves from the global community. This was replaced by a trend of developing a positive public image to maintain support among the populace and moderating rhetoric to integrate with the global community. The development of the internet and digital communication in the twenty-first century have prompted dictatorships to shift from traditional means of control to digital ones, including the use of artificial intelligence to analyze mass communications, internet censorship to restrict the flow of information, and troll farms to manipulate public opinion.

Dictatorship in Europe largely ended after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the liberalization of most communist states. Belarus under the rule of Alexander Lukashenko has been described as "the last European dictatorship," though the rule of Vladimir Putin in Russia has also been described as a dictatorship. Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 indicates his power and control over Russian politics.

Measurement

One of the tasks of political science is to measure and classify regimes as either democracies or dictatorship (authoritarian) countries. Freedom House, the Polity data series, and the Democracy-Dictatorship Index are three of the most used data series by political scientists. Generally, two research approaches exist: the minimalist approach, which focuses on whether a country has continued elections that are competitive, and the substantive approach, which expands the concept of democracy to include human rights, freedom of the press, and the rule of law. The Democracy-Dictatorship Index is seen as an example of the minimalist approach, while the Polity data series is more substantive.

Most dictatorships exist in countries with high levels of poverty. Poverty has a destabilizing effect on government, causing democracy to fail and regimes to fail more often. The form of government does not correlate with the amount of economic growth, and dictatorships on average grow at the same rate as democracies, though dictatorships have been found to have larger fluctuations. Dictators are more likely to implement long-term investments into the country's economy if they feel secure in their power. Exceptions to the pattern of poverty in dictatorships include oil-rich Middle Eastern dictatorships and the East Asian Tigers during their periods of dictatorship.

The type of economy in a dictatorship can affect how it functions. Economies based on natural resources allow dictators more power, as they can easily extract rents without strengthening or cooperating with other institutions. More complex economies require additional cooperation between the dictator and other groups. The economic focus of a dictatorship often depends on the strength of the opposition, as a weaker opposition allows a dictator to extract additional wealth from the economy through corruption.

Legitimacy and stability

Several factors determine the stability of a dictatorship, and they must maintain some degree of popular support to prevent resistance groups from forming and growing. One factor is the use of incentives, such as distribution of financial resources or promises of security. Another approach is repression for failing to support the regime. Stability can be weakened when opposition groups grow and unify or when elites are not loyal to the regime. One-party dictatorships are generally more stable and last longer than military or personalist dictatorships.

Dictatorships are typically more aggressive than democracy when in conflict with other nations, as dictators do not have to fear the electoral costs of war. Military dictatorships are more prone to conflict due to the inherent military strength associated with such a regime, and personalist dictatorships are more prone to conflict due to the weaker institutions to check the dictator's power. In the twenty-first century, dictatorships have moved toward greater integration with the global community and increasingly attempt to present themselves as democratic. Dictatorships are often recipients of foreign aid on the condition that they make advances toward democratization. A study found that dictatorships that engage in oil drilling are more likely to remain in power, with 70.63% of the dictators who engage in oil drilling still in power after 5 years, while only 59.92% of the non-oil producing dictators survive the first 5 years.

Most dictatorships hold elections to maintain legitimacy and stability, but these elections are typically uncompetitive and the opposition is not permitted to win. Elections allow a dictatorship to exercise some control over the opposition by setting the terms under which the opposition challenges the regime. Elections are also used to control elites within the dictatorship by requiring them to compete with one another and incentivizing them to build support with the populace, allowing the most popular and most competent elites to be promoted in the regime. Elections also support the legitimacy of a dictatorship by presenting the image of a democracy, establishing plausible deniability of its status as a dictatorship for both the populace and foreign governments. Should a dictatorship fail, elections also permit dictators and elites to accept defeat without fearing violent recourse. Dictatorships may influence the results of an election through electoral fraud, intimidation or bribing of candidates and voters, use of state resources such as media control, manipulation of electoral laws, restricting who may run as a candidate, or disenfranchising demographics that may oppose the dictatorship.

In the twentieth century, most dictatorships held elections in which voters could only choose to support the dictatorship, with only one-quarter of partisan dictatorships permitting opposition candidates to participate. Since the end of the Cold War, more dictatorships have established "semi-competitive" elections in which opposition is allowed to participate in elections but is not allowed to win, with approximately two-thirds of dictatorships permitting opposition candidates in 2018. Opposition parties in dictatorships may be restricted by preventing them from campaigning, banning more popular opposition parties, preventing opposition members from forming a party, or requiring that candidates be a member of the ruling party. Dictatorships may hold semi-competitive elections to qualify for foreign aid, to demonstrate a dictator's control over the government, or to incentivize the party to expand its information-gathering capacity, particularly at the local level. Semi-competitive elections also have the effect of incentivizing members of the ruling party to provide better treatment of citizens so they will be chosen as party nominees due to their popularity.

In a dictatorship, violence is used to coerce or repress all opposition to the dictator's rule, and the strength of a dictatorship depends on its use of violence. This violence is frequently exercised through institutions such as military or police forces. The use of violence by a dictator is frequently most severe during the first few years of a dictatorship, because the regime has not yet solidified its rule and more detailed information for targeted coercion is not yet available. As the dictatorship becomes more established, it moves away from violence by resorting to the use of other coercive measures, such as restricting people's access to information and tracking the political opposition. Dictators are incentivized to avoid the use of violence once a reputation of violence is established, as it damages the dictatorship's other institutions and poses a threat to the dictator's rule should government forces become disloyal.

Institutions that coerce the opposition through the use of violence may serve different roles or they may be used to counterbalance one another in order to prevent one institution from becoming too powerful. Secret police are used to gather information about specific political opponents and carry out targeted acts of violence against them, paramilitary forces defend the regime from coups, and formal militaries defend the dictatorship during foreign invasions and major civil conflicts.

Terrorism is less common in dictatorships, although in multi-ethnic states with minorities that feel oppressed, terrorism is more likely. Allowing the opposition to have representation in the regime, such as through a legislature, further reduces the likelihood of terrorist attacks in a dictatorship. Military and one-party dictatorships are more likely to experience terrorism than personalist dictatorships, as these regimes are under more pressure to undergo institutional change in response to terrorism.

1. Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli, "Political Order and One-Party Rule," Annual Review of Political Science 13(1) (June 15, 2010): 123-143. Retrieved January 10, 2023.

2. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics 18(1) (February 23, 2006): 1-26. Retrieved January 11, 2023.

3. Salim Yaqub, "The Cold War and the Middle East," in The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, eds. Richard H Immerman and Petra Goedde (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0199236961), 246-264.

4. George Schöpflin, "The end of communism in Eastern Europe," International Affairs 66(1) (January 1, 1990): 3-16. Retrieved January 12, 2023.

5. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, "Fear and Spin," in Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022, ISBN 978-0691211411), 3-29.

6. Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture Appendix "Unlike substantive measures of democracy (e.g., Polity IV and Freedom House), the binary conceptualization of democracy most recently described by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vree-land (2010) focuses on one institution-elections-to distinguish between dictatorships and democracies. Using a minimalist measure of democracy rather than a substantive one better allows for the isolation of causal mechanisms (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 73) linking regime type to human rights outcomes."

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Further reading

Behrends, Jan C. "Dictatorship: Modern Tyranny Between Leviathan and Behemoth (Version 2.0) (english version)," Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte (March 14, 2017). Retrieved January 25, 2023.

Dikötter, Frank. How to Be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2019, ISBN 978-1635573800. scholarly analysis of Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, as well as Kim Il-sung of North Korea; François Duvalier, or Papa Doc, of Haiti; Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania; and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia.

Dobson, William J. The Dictator's Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy. Harpswell, ME: Anchor, 2013. ISBN 978-0307477552

Fraenkel, Ernst, and Jens Meierhenrich. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0191025334

Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 2nd. ed. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1965. ISBN 978-0674332591

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. New York, NY: Random House, 2011. ISBN 978-1610390446

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A dictatorship is a form of government which is characterized by a leader, or a group of leaders, which holds governmental powers with few to no limitations on them. The leader of a dictatorship is called a dictator.

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Dictatorships for kids - Teaching Wiki and Resources

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Here you’ll find information on dictatorships for kids - what a dictatorship is, how it differs from other forms of government, and how to teach about it.

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The word ‘meritocracy’ finds its origin in both Latin and Ancient Greek. The word ‘merit’ has Latin origin meaning ‘to earn’ whereas ‘cracy’ stems from Greek word ‘kratos’ meaning strength or power. Therefore, meritocracy is the term given to a system by individuals characterized by their ability, s…

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1. Meritocracy: A Brief History

By tradition, Michael Young is credited with coining "meritocracy" for his 1958 satire, The Rise of the Meritocracy. In fact, the term appeared in print two years earlier: In Jean Floud's "Sociology and Education", Alan Fox's "Class and Equality", and Paul Lamartine Yates's "Fairer Shares". Young claimed to have invented it, which is certainly possible given that all four were English academics who moved in similar, leftist circles. While only Young explained what he meant by "meritocracy" in any detail (and his sentiments towards it were mixed), for these academics, the term had a negative connotation.

Now it has been claimed that "meritocracy" first appeared in Hannah Arendt's "1954" article "The Crisis in Education". And there are copies of this article, so dated, circulating on the Internet which include the term. However, "The Crisis in Education" came out in 1958 (and was based on "a lecture delivered at Bremen, May 13, 1958"). Further, "meritocracy" does not appear in that original version of Arendt's article. It does appear in edited reprints of it (e.g., Arendt 1961).

Only the briefest survey of the history of meritocracy can be provided here. For the ideas that government should be populated by the meritorious, and that a just distribution is merit-based, are ubiquitous. As Louis Pojman says,

it is interesting to observe how deeply the notion of justice as desert or merit is embedded in human history. It seems a prereflective, basic idea of primordial or Ur-justice. One finds it grounded in every known culture and religion. (1999: 90)

(Pojman surveys some history; Wooldridge 2021 is more comprehensive.)

There is an Eastern meritocratic tradition which has its roots in Confucius (551-479 BC). This tradition has influenced political and social institutions in Asia and beyond and remains vibrant ( §3.1). (Meritocratic notions are found elsewhere in ancient Chinese thought, too; e.g., the Mohists [c. 400 BC] sought to "elevate the worthy" into government for utilitarian reasons. See Pines 2013.)

The core ideas of this tradition are found in Confucius, Mencius (372-289 BC), and Xunzi (c. 310-c. 235 BC). In short: The purpose of government is to promote the well-being and virtue of the people. That requires that political power be wielded not on the basis of noble blood-the prevailing system-but virtue and talent. Political leaders serve as role models and sage decision-makers, and to do that they must be meritorious.

Such a system will create hierarchies. For these meritocrats, that is not a problem. Indeed, it is natural and welcome:

That things are unequal is a matter of fact.... If you rank them the same, it will bring confusion to the world. If a roughly finished shoe sells at the same price as a finely finished one, who would make the latter? ... How can one govern a state in this way? ( Mencius, 3A.4, trans. Bai [2020: 103])

The most famous realization of the Eastern meritocratic tradition was the Imperial Examinations, which began in China during the Sui Dynasty (AD 581-618). Until that point, entry into the state bureaucracy was mainly controlled via nepotism and aristocratic influence. (Although there was some openness to granting political power to competent and virtuous people, even if they came from the lower class, since the Qin Dynasty [226-206 BC]. For a discussion of meritocratic practices before the Imperial Examinations, see Wang 2017.) The Imperial Examinations replaced, to some extent, that route to power with a single, impartial, rigorous examination, which was open to the public. Although the Imperial Examinations were discontinued in the early twentieth century, similar civil service examinations proliferated, and today are used world-wide (including in China).

The Eastern meritocratic tradition is largely concerned with governance. It does not hold that other social goods, like non-political jobs or income, should be distributed on the basis of merit. And its justification is largely consequentialist: People will be more virtuous, and better cared-for, if they are ruled by the meritorious. Although some meritocratic institutions, like the Imperial Examinations, might have laudable side-effects like improving social mobility, they are not generally justified on those grounds.

Plato's (c. 428-c. 348 BC) meritocratic political theory (found primarily in the Laws, Republic, and Statesman) is similarly focused on governance. His argument for meritocracy and against democracy is simple: Managing a state is hard. It requires specific skills, like bravery, sobriety, graciousness, and love of wisdom. These skills are not found among the common people or the wealthy. If political power were entrusted to them, the "ship of state" ( Republic 488a-89c) would run aground. Not to mention, the sailors-democratically-elected leaders-are always squabbling. Only a "true pilot"-a philosopher-king-can safely guide his ship to its destination. (See also, e.g., Republic 412a-e, 473c-d, and 484a ff.)

How Plato justifies meritocracy is a debated matter of interpretation. On one interpretation, meritocracy is desirable for its good consequences; to wit, it brings justice and happiness to the state (and, by analogy, citizens' souls). On another interpretation, meritocracy constitutes justice and happiness, which are intrinsically desirable. (On this interpretive issue, see, e.g., Brown 2003 [2017].)

Aristotle (384-322 BC) is different in that his concern (in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics) is the distribution of social goods generally-not just political offices. And his justification for merit-based distribution is squarely deontological. (At least, that is a common interpretation. On Aristotle's theory of distributive justice, see, e.g., Keyt 1991.)

Justice is, for Aristotle, giving people what they deserve, and this happens when they are rewarded in proportion to their merit. (This view is arguably presaged by Plato in the Laws [757c] and the Republic [331e ff.]) Indeed, for Aristotle this is not just correct but obvious: "All men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit [ἀξία]" ( NE, 1131a, trans. Ross [1925]).

Aristotelian desert defines a notion of equality, known as proportional equality. (It is most frequently studied within social psychology, under the heading equity theory.) What Aristotle seeks to equalize are the ratios of merits to rewards between persons.

For example, suppose that there are 100 units of some good to be distributed among 3 persons. Persons A and B are equally meritorious; C is twice as meritorious as they are. Justice is done by giving 25 units of the good to A, 25 units to B, and 50 units to C. Note that an equal distribution is just only in the special case in which all recipients are equally meritorious.

Now, what is merit? For Aristotle, this is determined by the nature of the thing being distributed:

When a number of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them ... the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist. ( Politics, 1282b, trans. Jowett [1885])

Meritocratic ideas are found in Islamic philosophy, in which scholars developed political theories compatible with divinely revealed Islamic law ( Sharī'a). For example, Al-Fārābī (also known as Alpharabius, AD c. 870-c. 950) sought a political system which would bring happiness and perfection to the people living under it. Democracy could not do this (although it had, for al-Fārābī, some admirable features). What is required, rather, is (i) a ruler who is a hybrid philosopher-king and prophet- imām, with qualifications drawn from both Platonic and Islamic thought, and (ii) an elaborated hierarchy between citizens. Similar ideas may be found in the work of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, AD c. 980-1037), Ibn Bājja (Avempace, AD c. 1085-c. 1139), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes, AD 1126-1198).

Francesco Patrizi of Siena (AD 1413-1494) argued that merit-understood as virtue-was a precondition for the legitimate exercise of political power. For Patrizi, a meritocratic state is justified, stable, and functional. Further, the state is responsible for inculcating virtue in its citizens so that they are sufficiently meritorious to participate in government. This requires, among other things, a public literacy program. Patrizi designed his political institutions to ensure that (i) only meritorious citizens (i.e., the educated and experienced) would be chosen as magistrates and senators, and (ii) wealthy and powerful families could not corrupt the political process. (On the almost-forgotten Patrizi, see Hankins 2023.)

Meritocracy was an important Enlightenment value. Thinkers in Europe and elsewhere sought grounds for regarding people as individuals (rather than undifferentiated group members) and replacing monarchical politics.

For instance, Article VI of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) says:

All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, shall be equally eligible to all dignities, public positions and occupations, according to their ability, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents.

This is almost precisely the meritocratic rule for distributing jobs ( §4.2).

Napoleon lived up to this principle, adopting the slogan la carrière est ouverte aux talents -careers open to talents-and ascribing his success (not entirely, of course) to the meritocratic nature of his reign.

Across the Atlantic, Thomas Jefferson desired a "natural aristocracy" for his new nation, in which hierarchies would reflect "virtue and talents" rather than "wealth and birth". Indeed, Jefferson regarded this natural aristocracy as "the most precious gift of nature, for the ... government of society" (1813).

There is also a meritocratic ideal of justice associated with the United States. This is the American Dream, expressed by the person who coined the phrase thus:

It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of a social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position. (James Adams 1931: 404)

The suggestion is that a just state is one in which there is equal opportunity and people are judged on their merits ( §4).

2. Conceptual Issues

2.1 What is merit?

"Merit" connotes worth, quality, virtue, excellence, and more. If we are to build a society upon merit, as meritocrats desire, it seems necessary to understand exactly what merit is. Yet conceptual analysis of merit is nascent (see Clavero García 2023; Vlastos [1962] also offers some comments).

One thing that is clear is that merit is a contextual phenomenon, as Aristotle suggested ( §1). We cannot answer the question of whether some person (book, painting, etc.) is meritorious unless we have a context in mind. If, in the middle of a discussion about the all-time great baseball players, one asks, "was Albert Einstein meritorious?", the appropriate answer is "no". To be sure, we talk about people being meritorious simpliciter. We say things like, "Einstein was a meritorious man". But in these cases we understand the context implicitly.

It is also possible to broadly condemn a person while conceding his merit within a narrow context. One may say that Hitler had merit as an artist without making any commitments to his merit in other contexts, or to his overall merit.

A crucial conceptual issue is the relationship between merit and its real-world effects. Especially when it comes to governance ( §3), meritocracy is frequently justified by the good outcomes it creates. And this much seems incontrovertible: All else equal, a meritorious politician will make higher-quality decisions than an unmeritorious one.

But this is not necessarily true. Merit, which is internal, is distinct from the outcomes which issue from it. The outcomes are external, although they are sometimes used as evidence of merit. A Nobel Prize in physics is good evidence that Jones is a meritorious physicist. But it is no guarantee: Jones could have stolen the research that won him the Prize, falsely publishing it under his own name.

As Hume puts in the Treatise:

The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them. (1739-40: 3.2.1)

An example, which we will return to, illustrates the importance of the merit-outcomes distinction. Suppose that Daryl and John are applying for jobs at the widget factory. Daryl is more skilled than John, works faster, is more careful, more collegial, and so on. But this factory is filled with racists and Daryl belongs to the disfavored race. As a result, Daryl would perform worse-make fewer widgets per hour-than John would. (This is a case of taste discrimination -Becker 1957.)

Observe that, conceptually, Daryl remains more meritorious than John even though hiring John would generate better outcomes. Those who support hiring John rather than Daryl-utilitarians, say-would not claim otherwise. They would simply say that here there are good reasons to hire the less meritorious applicant.

Ronald Dworkin once held a contrary view:

If a black skin will, as a matter of regrettable fact, enable another doctor to do a different medical job better, then that black skin is by the same token "merit" as well. (1985: 299)

But later he recanted (as Segall [2012] points out):

I do not mean ... that black color is in itself a virtue or an aspect of merit.... We do not count a person's height as a virtue or a merit. But someone who is tall may just for that reason be better able to contribute, on a basketball court, to one of a university's traditional goals, and in the same way, though for sadder reasons, someone who is black may for that reason be better able to contribute to its other goals, in the classroom and dormitory and in the course of his or her later career. (2000: 404)

The meritocrat must decide whether merit-based distribution is desirable on consequentialist or categorical grounds. If the former, then meritocracy will be valuable only contingently. For at least in principle, merit-based distribution may lead to suboptimal outcomes. On other hand, meritocrats who say that merit-based distribution is categorically desirable-because, for example, it gives people what they deserve ( §4)-must concede that their system will not always produce the best results.

2.2 Merit and desert

Merit's closest conceptual cousin is desert, the concept underlying commonplace claims like "Joe deserves the job" and "workers deserve higher wages". As we shall see ( §4.1), some meritocrats explicitly invoke desert in their theories of justice. And desert is implicit in much other work on meritocracy. (Seminal research on desert includes Feinberg 1963, Kleinig 1971, and Sher 1987.)

There is no consensus about the precise link between merit and desert. Thomas Mulligan (2018b) argues that merit is an important basis for desert and thereby has moral force. Jeppe von Platz (2022) uses "desert" to describe an agent's character and "merit" to characterize the real-world effects (e.g., achievements) of that character. John Lucas (1980) uses the terms in just the opposite way. Owen McLeod says that merit is "quite a specific kind of desert" (1999: 67). Pojman disagrees: "Merit is a broader concept, the genus of which desert is the species" (1999: 86). No attempt has yet been made to evaluate these disparate views, let alone reconcile them. Observe, too, that merit and desert are sometimes used synonymously-we might say that Sam "deserves the prize" or, apparently equivalently, Sam "merits the prize".

Two of desert's conceptual features are especially relevant to meritocracy. First, desert is a pre-institutional notion. What a person deserves is not, and cannot be, determined by the rules (organizations, practices, etc.) governing distribution. Rather, desert should determine those rules.

Imagine a race in which all blonde runners get a 10 second head start. The race is run, and a blonde beats a brunette by a nose. Institutionally-within the rules of this race-the blonde should get the medal. But she does not deserve it. The brunette deserves the medal; she was fastest. For the desertist, the brunette ought, morally, to receive it. The blonde is merely "entitled" to the medal. Further, for the desertist, this is a bad race; its rules ought to be changed so that institutional entitlements line up with deserts.

In contrast, a libertarian view of justice denies that there is a deeper, fiducial standard against which the institution can be judged ( §5.4). So long as all the runners freely chose to participate in this race (and weren't misled about the rules, etc.) the blonde ought, morally, to receive the medal. The fact that rules do not ensure that the fastest runner receive the medal is, for the libertarian, irrelevant to justice. (For discussion of desert-based versus entitlement-based arguments, see Olsaretti 2003a.)

Second, desert is often thought to contain principles of aboutness and fitness. The aboutness principle holds that the basis for desert must be "about" (somehow construed) the subject of a desert-claim for that claim to be bona fide. One cannot, for example, deserve prison on the basis of someone else's crimes. One common construal of aboutness is responsibility -if a person is not responsible for a crime, he cannot deserve prison for it.

Arguments abound about the influence of luck on people's character and achievements. Luck plausibly severs aboutness and thereby people's claims to deserve on the basis of their merit. If Jones is the most meritorious applicant because of his hard work, he has a strong case to deserve the job. If Jones is meritorious because he had the good luck of being raised in a rich family, things are murkier.

The fitness principle holds that there is a natural connection between the basis for desert and the object being awarded. If a person commits a crime, he deserves prison-not a medal. Prison fits crime; a medal is unfitting.

As will be discussed in §4, meritocrats debate what the appropriate understanding of "merit" is when it comes to distributing political offices, jobs, income, and other goods. Does a just, meritocratic wage reflect a person's skill? His effort? The contribution he makes? Or is "merit" conceptually primitive, unable to be defined in any of these terms?

2.3 Equal opportunity

A classic example of meritocracy (perhaps first used by Lyndon Johnson in a 4 June 1965 address at Howard University) is a footrace. Justice is done-the race is fair-only if the medal is given to the runner who crosses the finish line first (and not, say, to the runner with the lightest skin). However, that is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for justice. For if some runners had a head start-if there was unequal opportunity -then the race was unjust, and the "winner" has no moral claim on the medal. But if the medal is awarded purely on the basis of merit, and against a background of equal opportunity, then the winner deserves that medal, and justice has been done.

In a meritocracy there is an "equal starting line" (or, to use another common, athletic metaphor, a "level playing field") from which people compete for scarce social goods. That equal starting line, when coupled with a merit-based distributive rule, provides a full theory of distributive justice. (For more on the connection between meritocracy and equal opportunity, see Arneson 2002 [2015], Daniels 1978, Mulligan 2018b, and Goldman 1977.)

Sometimes the aforementioned idea of equal opportunity is referred to as "fair" or "substantive" equal opportunity, and the merit-based distributive rule as "formal" equal opportunity. When things are put in those terms, a meritocracy is simply a society in which there is equal opportunity (fair and formal).

While the equal starting line metaphor is handwavy, equal opportunity has been made rigorous (see Roemer 1998). And the ideal has clear ramifications for public policy, such as estate/inheritance taxes (so people don't accrue wealth on the basis of family circumstances instead of merit) and public education (so that the children of poor families receive the same quality education as the children of the rich).

There are two salient debates within the equal opportunity literature important to meritocracy. The first is whether there is a moral difference between (i) social advantage, like being born into a rich family, and (ii) natural advantage-like intelligence (important: insofar as it is genetically- rather than environmentally-derived). The meritocrat is committed to nullifying the former through equal opportunity, but what about the latter? (Nullifying natural advantage would consist in providing extra resources to those who are naturally disadvantaged.)

The second debate involves the extent to which the state may interfere in family affairs to establish equal opportunity (see Fishkin 1983). Even with robust "external" measures (estate taxes, public education), different families will show different degrees of care for their children. That will lead to some inequality of opportunity.

Indeed, different kinds of care-not just parental attention versus neglect-may lead to inequalities of opportunity. One family may inculcate a love and aptitude for music in their child; another family may stress sports. The philosophical issues here are to explain what is problematic and what is not, and to draw the line between the government's interest in establishing equal opportunity and the liberty of parents to raise their children as they see fit.

3. Meritocratic Governance

This section and the following one are the core of this entry. They address the two principal senses in which meritocracy has arisen within philosophy. This section considers meritocracy as a form of government.

Terminologically, these systems are referred to as "political meritocracies" in the Eastern philosophical literature and "epistocracies" in the Western literature. The latter term is due to David Estlund (2003) and stresses the superior knowledge- episteme -which meritocratic political rulers possess. This entry follows the former usage.

Three broad questions face proposals for meritocratic governance. The first asks what constitutes merit or, equivalently, "who are the meritocrats?" The meritocratic class could consist of citizens who are competent (somehow defined); who are more likely than others to produce good political results (which could be different from the class of competent citizens- §2.1); who are best able to represent their constituents; or something else.

The second question asks, "how should the meritocrats rule?" It is not enough to show that there is a well-defined meritocratic class. A particular form of government, harnessing the meritocrats, must be elaborated.

The third question asks, "is meritocracy justifiable?" That is, proponents of meritocracy must defend their system against the charge that it is unfair. Discussion of these challenges is delayed until §5.

With one deontological exception (to be discussed), meritocratic political systems are justified on consequentialist grounds. Meritocrats claim, that is, that their systems would produce better political outcomes-more justice and prosperity, say-than prevailing political systems do.

Many contemporary meritocrats are motivated by a perception that contemporary democracy is dysfunctional. They adduce a range of empirical research: voters don't know basic political facts (e.g., Somin 2013); they treat politics as a sport, in which what is important is not achieving good social outcomes or even promoting their own interests but that their "team" win (Lenz 2012); they are afflicted by motivated reasoning, seeking out evidence to confirm existing beliefs and generating specious grounds to ignore disconfirming evidence (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler 2017); and more. (The relevant research was pioneered by Converse [1964]. Brennan [2016] provides a contemporary survey.)

3.1 New Confucian meritocracy

In recent years, scholars have looked to the Confucian tradition ( §1) to inspire and ground political theories. (See, e.g., Bai 2020; Bell 2006 and 2015; Bell & Li 2013; Bell & Wang 2020; Chan 2014; and Jiang 2013. The reader may also consult recent special issues of Culture and Dialogue [2020, volume 8, issue 2] and Philosophy & Social Criticism [2020, volume 46, issue 9], devoted to New Confucian meritocracy.) Incidentally, there has been insufficient interaction between the epistocracy literature and this one. That is an intersection ripe for research.

This literature is part political theory and part comparative politics. New Confucian meritocrats frequently point to China's stability and economic success and contrast it with contemporary democratic dysfunction. That said, it should not be thought that the above-cited scholars, nor New Confucian meritocrats broadly, are apologists for the Chinese Communist Party. They are not.

These theories incorporate some liberal democratic features while rejecting others, like robust freedom of speech or the "one person, one vote" principle. All deny the truth and usefulness of regarding citizens as equals when it comes to voting. New Confucian meritocratic theories are, thus, best understood as hybrids of classical Confucianism and contemporary democratic theory.

They vary in their particulars. For example, Daniel Bell (2015), drawing from an ideal informing contemporary Chinese politics, calls for "democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top" (2015: 9). Bell's meritocracy is purely political (he rejects meritocratic distribution of the sort discussed in §4), and mainly applicable to the highest political offices. Nevertheless, the political system is structured to funnel the most meritorious citizens to its apex (by using, e.g., examinations for public officials).

Tongdong Bai (2020), drawing from Mencius, endorses the "liberal" part of liberal democracy but not the democratic part. He argues for a government that is "for the people, of the people, but not by the people" (2020: 32). In Bai's hybrid regime, liberal features like the rule of law and human rights do not emerge from Western values of individuality and equality but from classical Confucian values. Bai concedes that, so grounded, these features

may be more contextual and less absolute than the rights derived from an asocial and autonomous [i.e., Western] conception of the individual. (2020: 259)

Democracy should be rejected, according to Bai, because it is less legitimate than a meritocratic alternative. Political authority derives from service to the people, and democracy is not doing that well (because of, e.g., the aforementioned voter ignorance/irrationality). Bai invokes a notion common among meritocrats: There are real differences in virtue, intelligence, etc. between people; these differences render us appropriate for different positions in social and political hierarchies; and that sorting is in fact desirable (see also Bell & Wang 2020).

The idea that liberal features might emerge from Confucian principles has been most fully explored by Joseph Chan (2014), whose perfectionistic theory appeals to the Confucian conception of the good life. Chan describes this conception as one that

takes material well-being, moral self-cultivation, and virtuous social relationships as constituents ... with the ideal of sagehood as the highest good. (2014: 44)

Chan's preferred political system is one in which this account of the good life is best promoted. In his view, such a system will contain both liberal features, such as human rights, and meritocratic features. As regards the latter, Chan recommends a bicameral legislature, with one chamber chosen democratically and the other filled meritocratically (elite citizens selecting from a pool of experienced public servants).

Like Bai, Chan's affinity for liberal features, like human rights, is not categorical. We do not possess rights because we are human; we possess them because they are instrumentally useful in promoting the Confucian good life. In fact, for Chan they are ever more contingent than that: They are merely a "fallback apparatus" for the non-ideal circumstances we find ourselves in. In ideal circumstances, in which all citizens were virtuous and able to resolve disputes through mediation, human rights would be unnecessary, even destructive.

In addition to the broad challenges that New Confucian meritocrats, qua meritocrats, face ( §5), there are detractors within the Confucian tradition. Some "Confucian democrats" argue that democratic political participation is essential for cultivating Confucian virtues (see, e.g., Angle 2012, Hall & Ames 1999, and Tan 2004). These virtues include humaneness ( ren, 仁), wisdom ( zhi, 智), righteousness ( yi, 義), ritual propriety ( li, 禮), and integrity ( xin, 信)-the "Five Constant Virtues".

Sungmoon Kim's (2017 and 2018) pragmatic Confucian democracy holds that democracy has instrumental power which meritocracy lacks. Democracy better promotes

legitimacy and order acquired through an effective and sustained coordination of complex social, economic, and political interactions among citizens who have profound moral and economic disagreement. (2018: 6)

Democracy, that is, is better able to cope with the disagreement and value-pluralism which marks contemporary political life.

Elena Ziliotti (forthcoming) argues on epistemic grounds: Because social well-being is an essential Confucian value, and because democracy is a better instrument toward that end than meritocracy is, democracy is more faithful to the Confucian tradition.

3.2 Restricted suffrage

A natural meritocratic approach is to limit political power to citizens who are sufficiently competent. American women did not secure a right to vote until 1920, with the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. John Adams explains his reasoning why:

Their delicacy renders them unfit for practice and experience in the great businesses of life, and the hardy enterprises of war, as well as the arduous cares of state. (1776)

Unsurprisingly-given its history-restricted suffrage has found little philosophical purchase. But it's worth remembering that we continue to deprive classes of people of political power without outcry. Children, for example, cannot vote. In Adams' words, they "have not judgment or Will of their own". (López-Guerra [2014] argues for a full expansion of the suffrage, to include children.)

Jason Brennan (2011) is the salient exception to philosophers' resistance to restricted suffrage. He argues that citizens have a right "not to be subject to high stakes decisions made by incompetent and morally unreasonable people" (2011: 702), and that this right is violated under universal suffrage.

Brennan analogizes electorates to juries: We would think a defendant's rights had been violated if he were convicted by an ignorant, irrational, or morally unreasonable jury. And since real-world electorates are, according to Brennan, ignorant, irrational, and morally unreasonable, those affected by their decisions find their rights violated.

Brennan's argument is distinctive not only because it defends restricted suffrage but because it gives a deontological justification for political meritocracy. The other justifications surveyed in this section are consequentialist. While such a justification for restricted suffrage might be given, Brennan's concern is the alleged rights-violations that universal suffrage inflicts.

3.3 Plural voting

Perhaps the most famous meritocratic proposal in the Western literature is John Stuart Mill's (1859a, 1859b, 1861) plural voting. Mill's proposal integrates his liberal desire for universal suffrage with an anti-egalitarian streak:

If it is asserted that all persons ought to be equal in every description of right recognised by society, I answer, not until all are equal in worth as human beings. It is the fact, that one person is not as good as another; and it is reversing all the rules of rational conduct, to attempt to raise a political fabric on a supposition which is at variance with fact. (1859b: 23)

(Notice how similar this sentiment is to Mencius' [ §1].)

Mill's proposal is simple: Everybody gets a vote (thereby satisfying universal suffrage) and some people get more than one (because they are, in some sense, of greater "worth"). Mill offers several justifications for plural voting (see Dale Miller 2015), including-unsurprisingly for the utilitarian Mill-that it will produce better political consequences.

An immediate challenge facing the plural voting proponent is how to specify voting weights. Mill (1859b: 25-26) gives one potential specification:

Unskilled laborers: 1 vote

Skilled laborers: 2 votes

Foremen and "superintendents of labor": 3 votes

Farmers, manufacturers, and traders: 3-4 votes

Professionals (e.g., lawyers, doctors, clergymen, "literary men", artists, "public functionaries"): 5-6 votes

University graduates and members of "learned societies": At least as many votes as professionals.

While this assignment has prima facie plausibility, Mill does not provide a rigorous defense of it. It is surely sub-optimal (why 3 votes for foremen? Why not 2? Or 3.5?) And perhaps its prima facie plausibility is misleading. Maybe professionals possess biases which laborers do not, thereby making the former less likely than the latter to vote well. (The same may be said of Harwood's [1998] proposal.)

To overcome this difficulty, Mulligan (2018c) advances a statistical approach to plural voting which attempts to rigorously derive optimal voting weights from voting history. And Trevor Latimer's (2018) "egalitarian" plural voting proceeds in two stages: The first operates under "one person, one vote" and determines voting weights; the second determines the substantive political question using those (generally unequal) weights.

Two technical notes: First, some forms of plural voting may de facto restrict the suffrage. For example, suppose that there are four voters. Voters A, B, and C have 2 votes each. Voter D has 1 vote. There are no voter coalitions in which D 's vote affects the result. He is effectively disenfranchised. The flip-side of this is that plural voting is compatible with democrats' treasured "one person, one vote" principle: If voters are equally competent, a plural voting system will grant them an equal number of votes.

Second, there is no unique assignment of voting weights. For example, all weights in Mill's system may be multiplied by 2, with the same results.

3.4 Limited epistocracy

The aforementioned proposals would radically change political practice. As such, they invite a criticism that they are insufficiently democratic ( §5.3). This has led some philosophers to develop "limited epistocracies" which would improve political performance without straying too far from the democratic status quo.

Perhaps, for example, we can provide extra political influence to citizens who know "basic political facts" (Gibbons 2021)-facts which are both politically relevant and uncontroversial, like candidates' policy platforms. Or perhaps "specialized institutions" (Jeffrey 2018), like the World Health Organization, can be granted unilateral-but narrow or temporary-political power via the democratic process.

There is no obvious dividing line between democracy and political meritocracy. All contemporary democracies seek to harness expertise, albeit to different extents and through different processes. The U.S. Senate, for example, was envisioned as a "portion of enlightened citizens" (Madison 1787: Tuesday, June 26) to serve as a bulwark against the "fickleness and passion" of the more democratic House of Representatives. Institutions like that plausibly qualify as limited epistocracies and might be defended on those grounds.

3.5 Other approaches

Although Brennan has written in support of restricting the suffrage ( §3.2), his preferred form of governance is, apparently, what he calls government by simulated oracle (see Brennan 2016):

Every citizen may vote. When citizens vote, they (a) indicate their policy preferences or their preferred political outcomes, while (b) indicating their demographic information, and (c) taking a test of basic political knowledge. The government then uses data sets (a), (b), and (c) to determine, statistically, what a fully informed electorate would want, while correcting for the influence of race, income, sex, and/or other demographic factors on the vote. In short, government-by-simulated-oracle estimates what a demographically identical but fully informed electorate would want, and then implements that instead of what the uninformed electorate in fact wants. (Brennan 2018: 55-56)

What ought to count is not voters' expressed preferences-which are affected by ignorance, irrationality, and the other dysfunctions which so trouble him and other meritocrats-but their enlightened preferences. If I cast a vote for X rather than Y because I hold false beliefs or am biased, then perhaps my vote should accrue to Y rather than X. For Y is what I would vote for, if not for my ignorance or irrationality.

While there has been significant work on enlightened preferences in economics and political science (e.g., Althaus 2003, Caplan 2007, and Gilens 2012), Brennan has not explored this system in any detail. (Ahlstrom-Vij [2022] does so, and thinks the system qualifies as democratic, not meritocratic.) One challenge is that it's unclear what is meant by demographic bias. Our political preferences are shaped by myriad elements of our identity, including our demographics. Evangelical Protestants are much more opposed to abortion than adherents of other religions (Pew 2022). Is this bias of the sort that must be neutralized? Or a predictable and bona fide consequence of a deeper ideology?

A second strategy for dealing with the voter ignorance/irrationality problem is distinguishing two political classes and assigning them different roles. On the one hand there are regular citizens, who are responsible for setting political goals and determining their society's values. That is done democratically. On the other hand, there are legislators and bureaucrats. They are responsible for pursuing, in the manner they deem best, the ends identified by the regular citizens.

The ignorance/irrationality problem is thus putatively solved: While the latter task requires expertise which the public does not have, the former task does not. Indeed, perhaps the former task is enabled by the folk wisdom which legislators/bureaucrats lack. One is reminded of William F. Buckley's quip:

I would rather be governed by the first 2,000 people in the telephone directory than by the Harvard University faculty. (Quoted in Meyer 1961: 143)

This approach, which has come to be known as values-only voting (Beerbohm 2012; Christiano 1996 & 2008), puts the public and legislators/bureaucrats in a principal-agent relationship. For instance, the public may decree, via the democratic process, that the economy ought to be more equal. That goal is adopted by the legislators/bureaucrats, who choose and implement the policies which, in their superior judgment, will best promote it. In doing so, they can avoid pitfalls which the general public might not, like levying a luxury tax whose burden falls on workers.

As with Brennan's government by simulated oracle, there is a dividing line problem here: What counts as an end and what counts as a means and can they be distinguished? Dimitri Landa and Ryan Pevnick give the example of a public that seeks to "minimize the innocent loss of life" (2020: 10). In response, legislators dutifully ban guns and abortion. It seems like a large portion of the public would be dissatisfied with how "its vision" was carried out. Landa and Pevnick also point out that under values-only voting, citizens may be unable to exert sufficient oversight-an example of a principal/agent problem which may afflict this division of labor.

Another proposal, most fully explored by Claudio López-Guerra (2011, 2014, 2020), uses lotteries to reduce political influence from the public broadly to a proper subset of it (see also Guerrero 2014; Landemore 2020; and Saunders 2010 & 2012). In López-Guerra's envisioned system (which he does not unreservedly endorse and which, he says, qualifies as democratic), there is universal suffrage in the sense that virtually all citizens are eligible to vote. But for any given election, not all do. Some citizens are chosen at random to participate. The rest are disenfranchised (for that election). The chosen citizens engage in an "exhaustive informative program designed to acquaint them with the alternatives regarding the ballot" (López-Guerra 2011: 212). Then they cast their votes. That program ensures that all citizens who actually exercise political influence are well-informed.

In this way, all citizens are potential meritocrats, and the meritocratic class-which changes from election to election-is determined purely at random. All citizens, regardless of intelligence, race, age, etc. have an equal chance to exercise political influence.

A potential problem is the loss of aggregative power when the electorate is reduced in this way. The primary justification for this system is epistemic quality: We would get better political outcomes under it, according to López-Guerra, relative to the democratic status quo. But one important argument in favor of the status quo ( §5.3) is that a large group of relatively incompetent voters may outperform a small group of relatively competent voters. Under López-Guerra's system, the electorate is smaller but competence is higher. Absent modeling it is unclear how it would perform relative to democracy.

4. Meritocratic Justice

In its second sense, meritocracy is a theory of justice. It is a competitor to egalitarianism (in its various forms-strict, luck, Rawlsian, etc.), utilitarianism, libertarianism, and the other theories of justice. A meritocrat in this sense is someone who believes that a just state is a meritocracy.

Little work has been done on the relationship between meritocracy's two senses-an approach to governance and a theory of justice (although see Mulligan 2022)-and it is unclear what, if any, connection there is between them. It certainly seems coherent to believe (e.g.) both (i) social goods should be distributed on the basis of merit and (ii) we should have a democratic, not a meritocratic, approach to politics.

Now, theories of justice across the aforementioned traditions may tentatively endorse meritocratic principles. For these principles may be instrumentally useful in promoting their preferred ideal of justice. For example, it is plausible that merit-based hiring ( §4.2) promotes the general welfare, to some extent. Thus, a utilitarian may endorse meritocracy of that sort, instrumentally.

As Adam Swift and Gordon Marshall put this view,

a meritocratic allocation of individuals to occupations can be justified on the grounds that a society in which people are doing what they are best able to do will be optimally productive, but a meritocratic allocation of rewards to individuals can not be justified on the grounds that such an allocation gives people what they deserve. (1997: 44)

(See also Daniels 1978.)

This is certainly a defensible view of meritocracy's allure, and it appears to be backed up empirically. As Roland Bénabou puts it,

the analysis generally validates the common intuition that meritocracy, appropriately defined, is desirable ... on grounds of efficiency. (2000: 319)

But this instrumental connection between merit and good consequences is contingent ( §2.1). The most vocal proponents of meritocracy hold that there is a deontological requirement to distribute on the basis of merit. And so any good consequences are, at best, a happy side-effect of adherence to a moral rule. But why does such a requirement exist?

4.1 Justification

While not endorsing it, Swift and Marshall previewed the principal answer to that question: In a meritocracy, people get what they deserve. And because, it is argued, justice is giving people what they deserve, meritocracy is just. Meritocrats thus follow in the Aristotelian tradition ( §1) of seeking to match social goods, like jobs and income, with facts about the people who desire them, like their qualifications or economic contributions.

Like desert-based approaches to justice broadly, meritocracy has not been popular within contemporary philosophy. But there have been defenders. David Miller (1999) gives "two cheers" to the ideal. This qualification is rooted in Miller's pluralistic view of justice. He identifies three "modes of human interaction", with desert (meritocracy) governing one of them (viz. "instrumental association"). (Principles of equality and need govern the other two.)

Miller appeals to Aristotelian proportional equality ( §1) to ground the desertist portion of his theory. Understanding "merit" as social contribution, he argues that a just society rewards people in proportion to their contributions (or, in the case of jobs, the qualities that will enable them to make contributions).

Hiring by merit is the policy that in general brings about the closest correspondence between individuals' contributions and their rewards.... Nepotism or discrimination is unfair because it predictably creates a state of affairs in which there is a discrepancy between deserts and income rewards. Moreover, the best-qualified candidate who is passed over can legitimately complain that she is the victim of an injustice through being prevented from earning rewards commensurate with her potential contribution. (Miller 1999: 166)

Mulligan's (2018b) meritocratic theory of justice is, in contrast to Miller's, monistic. That is, Mulligan claims that justice is a matter of desert, and only a matter of desert. And doing justice to people-giving them what they deserve-is about establishing equal opportunity and judging them on their merits alone.

Mulligan advances several justifications for meritocracy, but most salient is meritocracy's intuitive appeal. People feel that meritocratic distribution is just, and this sentiment appears stable across race, gender, socioeconomic class, political persuasion, and culture (cf. §6). The research adduced comes from equity theory ( §1), experimental economics (e.g., Almås, Cappelen, & Tungodden 2020; Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden 2010; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Kurki 2004), the child development literature (Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier 2012; Kanngiesser & Warneken 2012; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack 2014), evolutionary psychology (Aarøe & Petersen 2014; Baumard, André, & Sperber 2013; Petersen 2012), neuroeconomics (Cappelen, Eichele, et al. 2014; Vostroknutov, Tobler, & Rustichini 2012), and other fields of empirical study.

Other justifications for meritocratic norms have been given, independent of comprehensive theories of justice. George Sher (1987) gives one which is grounded in autonomy (sometimes put in terms of respect or dignity). When we distribute a scarce good on the basis of merit, we appeal only to attributes which constitute persons, and in particular those persons who are competing for the good. These attributes include skills, talents, and preferences. Meritocratic distribution thus provides people maximal control over their lives (or shows them maximal respect/dignity).

When we hire by merit, we abstract from all facts about the applicants except their ability to perform well at the relevant tasks.... We treat them as agents whose purposeful acts can make a difference in the world.... Selecting by merit is a way of taking seriously the potential agency of both the successful and the unsuccessful applicants. (Sher 1987: 121)

(See also Mason 2006 and Varga 2016. Dobos 2016 provides an overview of justifications for merit-based hiring.)

Another idea is that the social good itself-its very nature-points to merit as the morally proper basis for distribution. This Aristotelian notion ( §1) is today more commonly put in terms of "fittingness" or "relevant qualifications".

The idea may be elaborated in conceptual terms (see Sher 1987 and Williams 1973). It is morally fitting to give the job at the widget factory to the applicant who is best at making widgets, a fact which may be discerned from the concept of widget-making (cf. Williams: "The proper ground of distribution of medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth" [1973: 240]).

Put differently, there is a conceptual connection between social goods and merit. There is no such connection between social goods and the other commonly-cited grounds for distribution, such as maximizing productivity or treating people equally. While in those cases connections doubtless exist and may seem weighty, they are external. They do not participate in our understanding of the social good itself.

The fittingness of merit-based distribution might be regarded as primitive and thus neither in need of nor amenable to further justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it,

I am not sure how, if at all, these judgments of moral appropriateness are to be verified; but I suspect that they resemble certain aesthetic judgments-for example that crimson and orange are clashing colors. (1963: 92)

4.2 The meritocratic distribution of jobs

Meritocratic hiring is often described using the language of discrimination. It is unjust, according the meritocrat, to discriminate against applicants for a job on any ground other than merit:

According to a widely held view, when there are a number of applicants for an available job, justice demands that the job be offered to the best-qualified applicant. We express this by saying that ... the principle involved is one of hiring by merit. This is the principle that condemns discrimination on grounds of sex, race, or religion when hiring employees, as well, of course, as good old-fashioned nepotism. (David Miller 1999: 156)

This is the moral principle seemingly at work (as Schmidtz [2006] points out) in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream" speech, in which King yearns that his children "not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character". For the meritocrat, racial discrimination is morally wrong because all non-merit-based discrimination is wrong.

The principle has been operationalized. In "blind auditions", pioneered by symphony orchestras, applicants play behind screens so that the jury cannot discover their race, sex, appearance, etc. and can only assess the quality of the performance.

In the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was defended, in part, on meritocratic grounds (see Kershnar 2003). The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. (The U.S. Supreme Court later decided-in Bostock v. Clayton County -that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity runs afoul of the Act's injunction against sex-based discrimination, and so is illegal.)

Lacking a theory of merit ( §2.1), it is not always clear which features of applicants count as merits and which do not. In toy cases-say, hiring a new bricklayer-things are simple. A bricklayer must be strong, reliable, precise in his work, and so on. Race, gender, and appearance are obviously irrelevant to bricklaying.

In the real world, things are murkier. One example of this is "reaction qualifications" (Wertheimer 1983). These are

qualifications that count as such because of the reactions of recipients, where the recipients are those with whom the successful candidate will interact as a result of filling the relevant position. (Mason 2017: 49)

The taste discrimination case considered in §2.1 involves a reaction qualification which is not a bona fide merit. Racist customers may react positively to a saleswoman of their preferred race. But her race is not a merit. On the other hand, customers will buy more widgets from a saleswoman who is personable, and that is a merit.

Between these there are difficult cases. Suppose the saleswoman is beautiful, and her beauty entices customers to buy from her when they otherwise would not. Is beauty a merit in the context of selling widgets? In the context of modeling? Working at McDonalds? Is being a woman a merit in the context of gynecology (because many women would prefer a female doctor)? A satisfying conceptual analysis of merit would distinguish meritocratic reaction qualifications from non-meritocratic reaction qualifications.

A salient and philosophically interesting issue is affirmative action. Some forms of affirmative action do not appear to conflict with meritocratic hiring. For example, making special efforts to solicit applicants from historically underrepresented groups and then judging those applicants (along with everyone else) on the basis of merit seems compatible.

But the crux of affirmative action-quotas and preferential treatment-is incompatible with meritocratic hiring. As Robert Fullinwider (2002 [2018]) says, "the aims of real world affirmative action make race and ethnicity (and sometimes gender) salient, not personal desert or merit". (See also Nagel 1973.)

Affirmative action thus helpfully puts the question to meritocratic justice. For some, affirmative action's incompatibility with meritocracy reveals that affirmative action is unjust. For others, this incompatibility is evidence that meritocracy is an erroneous view of justice.

Three notes on this. First, meritocrats' resistance to affirmative action should be viewed in light of their commitment to equal opportunity ( §2.3). Their argument is not that there are no racial injustices, but that the proper remedy is bolstering equal opportunity rather than quotas / preferential treatment.

Second, affirmative action again illustrates the cleavage between merit and consequences. It might be the case that hiring on the basis of race or gender produces better consequences, owing to, for instance, the benefits of a diverse workforce. For the meritocrat, that is irrelevant-it remains unjust, because discriminatory.

Third, all that said, meritocratic hiring and affirmative action are not necessarily incompatible. Suppose, for example, that there exists "implicit bias" against some group-that is, selectors unconsciously regard members of that group as less meritorious than they actually are. If so, then by showing "preference" to members of this group, selectors would merely nullify the bias and ensure that every candidate is judged on his merits. Obviously, whether implicit bias exists is an empirical issue. As of now, it is a hotly debated one (see, e.g., Jussim et al. forthcoming).

4.3 The meritocratic distribution of income

Meritocrats most commonly hold that economies ought to compensate people on the basis of their contributions. That is, when it comes to the distribution of income (and thus wealth, being merely a stock of unspent income), "merit" should be interpreted as economic contribution. (For discussion of the matters arising in this section, see Dekker 2010, Hsieh 2000, Mankiw 2010, David Miller 1989 and 1999, Mulligan 2018b, Riley 1989, Sheffrin 2013, Von Platz 2022, and Weinstein 2011.)

Imagine a garden which produces a harvest (the "output") as a result of citizens' contributions to it-seeding, watering, weeding, fertilizing, and so on ("inputs"). The meritocrat holds that each citizen deserves a share of the harvest proportional to her contribution to it. If Lane contributes twice as much during the growing season as Rory, then Lane deserves twice as much in return. (This is, again, Aristotle's notion of proportional equality.)

Before we examine this metaphor-its complexities and whether it is apposite in the first place-it is worth noting that this distributive principle is idiosyncratic, politically. To many, the idea that people who contribute more should be paid more, an obviously inegalitarian idea, sounds conservative. And it has been defended by conservatives (e.g., Mankiw [2013]).

Yet this is at the very same time the rule favored by Marx (in "Critique of the Gotha Program") for his penultimate, socialist phase of history. This is, in part, why it is fair to say that "Marx is more a meritocrat than Rawls, Nielsen, Dworkin, and most contemporary liberal political philosophers" (Pojman 1999: 93).

An obvious question for this distributive view is how to interpret "contribution". For some scholars, the proper index is willingness-to-pay (WTP)-the maximum price a person will pay for some good or service. Thus, if a person P produces X, by aggregating the WTP for X across consumers we obtain a measure of P 's contribution.

A slightly different interpretation relies on the concept of consumer surplus. Observe that if a consumer pays exactly her WTP for X, in a sense she has received no benefit. For at that price she is, by definition, indifferent between buying X and saving her money. Whereas, if there is a large difference between her WTP and X's price, then her welfare (as measured in dollars) increases when she buys X. That increase is the consumer surplus.

The typical person's WTP for a diamond ring is high and WTP for a jug of water is low. But plausibly the producer of the latter contributes more than the producer of the former.

Standard (neoclassical) economic theory also provides an interpretation of contribution, as marginal product. This is the change in economic output a person's economic participation creates, holding all else fixed. In simple models, this in fact is how economies remunerate. In these models, compensation equals contribution.

Still, it is important that compensation be proportional to contribution, since, in general, total output will not equal the sum of marginal products. (It's true only for the special case of constant returns to scale.) But in all cases, proportional compensation is possible.

All of these interpretations of "contribution" rely on the standard idea that economic value is subjective -that goods and services are valuable because, and only insofar as, they are desired by consumers. That might be disputed. Perhaps producers of firearms and social media make no contribution at all or indeed are destructive. That possibility is not captured in any of the aforementioned interpretations, and would require elaboration by a meritocrat so inclined.

Another question is how to disentangle individuals' contributions from the collective economic effort. In particular, people's contributions emanate not only from their labor, but from capital as well.

Suppose a worker produces 100 widgets per day in a factory. On his own, the worker could produce nothing. Without workers, the factory would sit idle. How many of those 100 widgets reflects the worker's contribution? How many reflect the contribution of the capitalist who owns the factory?

This entanglement problem speaks to the essential role that equal opportunity plays in a meritocracy. If the capitalist inherited the factory from his father, it is hard to see why he should be rewarded on meritocratic grounds. His contributions do not reflect his merit. If, in contrast, the capitalist bought the factory himself, with money he earned via his economic contributions, that seems meritocratic.

An issue which has arisen in the literature, which is empirical rather than philosophical, is how well actual economies approximate this meritocratic ideal. One important way they do not is the presence of economic rent (see Lamont 1997 and Mulligan 2018a).

Classically, economic rents were payments for "free gifts of nature", like unimproved land. Imagine a wild orchard controlled by O, who charges people for the right to harvest it. That portion of O's income is economic rent. The orchard makes its contribution-bears fruit-whether O receives an income or not. This is obviously different from typical compensation, which is necessary to bring factors of production into use. If you want a person to make widgets, you have to pay him. Economic rents are, thus, payments to a person unrelated to his economic contribution. And unlike typical forms of income, economic rents can be taxed without loss of economic efficiency.

In contemporary economies, economic rents are diverse. They include income that (i) executives receive by gaining control over their own pay-setting (see, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried 2004); (ii) is obtained through luck (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001); (iii) is connected to unproductive activity (think: hedge funds that exploit technical inefficiencies in markets, Bivens & Mishel 2013); and (iv) attractive people make because they are attractive-the beauty premium (Hamermesh & Biddle 1994).

Typically, when economists and philosophers object to economic rent it is on the grounds that it is inefficient. For the meritocrat, it is worse than that: It is unjust.

The most famous opponent of economic rent is Henry George, who states his opposition in recognizably meritocratic terms:

When all rent is taken by taxation for the needs of the community, then will the equality ordained by nature be achieved. No citizen will have an advantage over any other citizen save as is given by his industry, skill, and intelligence; and each will obtain what he fairly earns. Then, but not till then, will labour get its full reward, and capital its natural return. (1879: book VIII, chapter III, last paragraph)

One might wonder: Just how unequal would a meritocracy be? While the precise distribution of jobs, income, and wealth will depend on the particulars of the meritocratic theory, meritocracy would be egalitarian by contemporary standards. Observe that, in a meritocracy, differences in merit may arise in only two ways: differences in natural traits and differences in individual choice (about which skills to develop, what career to pursue, how much to work, etc.) (A meritocrat could even hold that equal opportunity requires nullifying differences in natural traits- §2.3 -leaving individual choice as the sole source of inequality.)

In addition, in a meritocracy there is little to no inheritance of wealth. This is for the same reason that there is no inheritance of hereditary titles and their concomitant privileges: It violates equal opportunity. Inherited wealth also severs the critical connection between contribution and income. If one doesn't deserve some wealth-which one doesn't, if it's inherited-then one doesn't deserve the investment income it produces.

Further, the largest divergences between contribution and income are seen at the top of the distribution. Economic rents, for instance, are extracted by the very rich. Meritocratic policies to remedy the problem of rent have the effect of redistributing wealth from the top of the distribution downward.

5. Objections

All philosophical theories garner objections. Meritocracy is unusual in that its critics come from all over: egalitarians and libertarians; liberals and conservatives; leftists and reactionaries.

5.1 Rawls

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls assures his readers that his theory would not produce a meritocratic society. That is not to say that there is no common ground between Rawls and meritocrats. Both agree that equal opportunity is an essential element of a just society. But Rawls pairs equal opportunity not with a meritocratic distributive rule, but with his Difference Principle. A just society, according to Rawls, will respond to merit only insofar as that benefits the worst-off members of society. Conceivably, by allowing meritorious citizens to earn more than non-meritorious citizens, we can grow the social pie and thereby enable greater redistribution to the worst-off. If that is the case, and only if that is the case, will Rawls' theory pay any heed to merit. But merit's role in Rawlsian distribution will always be mild, instrumental, and contingent.

Rawls has four other objections to meritocracy. The first targets desert-based theories of justice broadly. Rawls claims that no one deserves anything because all bases for desert originate in "fortunate family or social circumstances". A person is intelligent, for instance, either because she has a naturally high IQ or because she was raised in an environment that cultivated that trait. Either way, that kind of "fortune" undermines desert-based distribution. (Marx makes a similar argument in "Critique of the Gotha Program".)

Second, Rawls regards meritocracy as unworkable. It may just be practically impossible to track people's merits in sufficient detail to enable merit-based distribution.

Third, perhaps meritocracy is only justified by "comprehensive doctrines", and does not emerge from free and equal people in a system of cooperation (Rawls 1993). If that is so (and if Rawlsian public reason is sound), then that is a problem. But Margaret Holmgren (1986) and James Sterba (1974) argue that Rawlsian contractors would in fact choose a desert-based system of justice, like meritocracy.

Fourth, Rawls says that meritocracy is insufficiently democratic. This is interesting because later in A Theory of Justice he suggests an openness to meritocratic governance:

Now the ship of state is in some ways analogous to a ship at sea; and to the extent that this is so, the political liberties are indeed subordinate to the other freedoms that, so to say, define the intrinsic good of the passengers. Admitting these assumptions, plural voting may be perfectly just. (1971: 233)

5.2 Relational egalitarianism

By definition, egalitarians regard the ideal of equality as morally salient. Meritocrats, on the other hand, regard equality as irrelevant or even inimical to justice. (Unless we are talking about Aristotelian proportional equality.)

One important class of equality-based objections to meritocracy comes from relational egalitarians like Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and Harry Brighouse (1996), who argue that it is morally important that people be able to relate to each other as equals. That seems threatened in a meritocracy, in which differences in merit create differences in political power, social goods, or both. How could an unmeritorious person regard a meritorious person as an equal, especially when the latter is wealthier, or has more votes, than the former? Mightn't there be problems of oppression, domination, and hierarchy in a meritocracy? Don't meritocrats even celebrate hierarchies?

Relational egalitarianism is used to defend democratic political arrangements. Brighouse, for example, advances the "equal availability of political influence [EAPI]", which includes the "one person, one vote" principle:

The argument for EAPI is that guaranteeing that equal influence will be available to them over our collective circumstances is a requisite of expressing respect for our fellow citizens. (1996: 123)

Thus for Brighouse, a meritocratic political arrangement (that, e.g., violated "one person, one vote") would obstruct citizens' mutual respect, and therefore be morally unacceptable. Analogous objections to meritocracy would be lodged by other relational egalitarians, with specifics depending on the particular relational egalitarian theory.

5.3 Democratic theory

Unsurprisingly, democrats object to meritocratic politics. There are three main classes of objection.

For epistemic democrats (e.g., Goodin & Spiekermann [2018] and Landemore [2012]), democracy is valuable and legitimate because of its ability to make correct (e.g., just) decisions. They either resist meritocrats' claims ( §3) about the ignorance and irrationality of the democratic voter or, more commonly, reject the inference from individual dysfunction to collective dysfunction. This is the most direct objection to meritocracy given that nearly all arguments for meritocratic governance are epistemic in character.

The most commonly-adduced argument for the "wisdom of the [democratic] crowd" is Condorcet's Jury Theorem (Condorcet 1785). In its simplest form, the theorem considers a group of voters choosing between two alternatives (e.g., a Democrat and a Republican). Each voter has a probability of choosing the "correct" (e.g., more just) candidate. That probability is shared and >50%. Assuming votes are statistically independent and the group uses "one person, one vote", Condorcet's theorem tells us that (i) the larger the group gets, the more likely it is to choose correctly and (ii) the probability that the group chooses correctly goes to 100% as the number of voters goes to infinity.

The meritocrat may avail himself of three broad rejoinders here. First, he may deny the relevance of the model on the grounds that its assumptions are violated in the real world. (Statistical independence is particularly troublesome given the many ways voters interact.) Second, he may concede that the collective performance of democracy is good for Condorcetian reasons, but insist that meritocracy does better. For it too may enjoy benefits from aggregation. Third, he may reply that the theorem itself commends unequal political influence: When some citizens are more competent than others, "one person, one vote" is (generally) suboptimal. The group does better if more competent voters are given more influence (see, e.g., Nitzan & Paroush 1985).

Epistemic democrats have drawn on other theoretical grounds. Perhaps "diversity trumps ability" (Hong & Page 2004): Democracy effectively harnesses diversity within contemporary electorates, and thereby does better, epistemically, than meritocracy does. Or perhaps while democratic voters do frequently err, as meritocrats claim, those errors cancel out to allow an accurate minority to prevail-the "miracle of aggregation" (Surowiecki 2004).

Procedural democrats take a different tact. For them, what justifies democracy and rules out meritocracy is adherence to certain morally necessary procedures. For (pure) proceduralists, whether meritocracy "tracks the truth" or makes decisions better than democracy does is irrelevant (if indeed these notions make sense at all).

If, for example, some voting procedure-like "one person, one vote"-is required by justice, and democracy embodies this procedure while meritocracy rejects it, no further analysis is necessary: Democracy is justified and meritocracy is not. Many relational egalitarian arguments ( §5.2) are proceduralist, and other kinds of proceduralist theories have been developed (see, e.g., Habermas 1992 [1996] and Waldron 1999).

Finally, Estlund (2008) has advanced an influential objection which is a hybrid of the epistemic and proceduralist approaches- epistemic proceduralism. Estlund argues against pure proceduralist approaches on the grounds that if procedural fairness were all we cared about, democracy would be no better than simply flipping a coin. In both cases, all citizens have an equal chance of affecting an election (because, in the latter case, none has any chance at all). So there must be an epistemic component to political justification.

On the other hand, the fact that some meritocratic system might do better than democracy is insufficient to justify it. Our political system, Estlund argues, must be "generally acceptable" to all reasonable citizens (i.e., this is a public reason argument). According to Estlund, of all the generally acceptable systems, democracy does best.

5.4 Libertarianism

The conflict between meritocracy and libertarianism is most obvious when one considers right-libertarian theories, like Robert Nozick's (1974). But conflict exists, too, for left-libertarian theories that have some common ground with meritocracy, like an affinity for equal opportunity (e.g., Otsuka's [2003]). (For a full discussion, see Mulligan 2018d.)

To begin with, the meritocrat's distributive rule-hire, compensate, etc. on the basis of merit-violates a libertarian right to contract. For libertarians, business owners are free to hire whomever they want. They are not obligated to hire the most meritorious applicant. An owner may wish to hire on the basis of race, or gender, or with an eye toward maximizing profits. She may wish to hire a friend or family member. So long as owner and employee enter into their contract freely (and without fraud and the other typical caveats), libertarian justice is done.

A meritocratic government may enforce an alignment between contribution and compensation. But that requires government interventions into market exchanges which are unacceptable to the libertarian. These interventions could include, for example, high top marginal income tax rates and limits on executive compensation in order to disincentivize economic rent ( §4.3).

Most libertarians also reject equal opportunity, and certainly the demanding form required under meritocracy. In a meritocracy, extensive redistribution enables (among other things) education and healthcare for the children of the poor. Coercive taxation is part and parcel of redistribution. Equal opportunity may also require that the government confiscate and redistribute estates. All of this is problematic from the libertarian perspective. (Although see Bird-Pollan 2013 and Braun 2010 for arguments that libertarianism is compatible with estate taxes.)

Friedrich Hayek (1960) explicitly criticizes merit-based distribution. He gives two arguments. First, he correctly observes that a meritocratic economy may not be optimally efficient.

We do not wish people to earn a maximum of merit but to achieve a maximum of usefulness at a minimum of pain and sacrifice and therefore a minimum of merit. (1960: 96)

Hayek's point is that one way to distribute (the right way, to his mind) is with an eye toward maximizing the economic surplus; another way is to distribute on the basis of merit. This objection does not rest in a Nozickian freedom of contract but in libertarianism's classical liberal tradition, which typically appeals to the consequentialist benefits of free markets.

Second, Hayek objects to the idea of a "merit czar" who would monitor market activity and intervene to enforce merit-based distribution. That would be tyrannical. However (as Schmidtz & Boettke [2012 [2021]]) point out), this is not a normative objection to meritocracy but an objection to central planning. Indeed, Hayek's argument can be turned around: Perhaps we should prefer market economies to central planning on the grounds that the former does a better job than the latter at recognizing merit.

One final objection, sometimes attributed to Hayek, is that meritocracy is heartless. In the actual world, the objection goes, "losers" can somewhat justifiably attribute their condition to having grown up poor or to external factors, like racial discrimination. Those are psychologically useful excuses. But in a meritocracy, in which there is equal opportunity and people are judged on their merits, those excuses are unavailable.

5.5 Other objections

Meritocracy promises efficiency benefits and other good consequences, but only contingently. Meritocracy is not a utilitarian theory, and focused utilitarian objections have been lodged against it (see, e.g., Durlauf 2008).

Meritocracy strikes some as insufficiently attentive to the needs of the poorest citizens; it is not a prioritarian theory (Wilson 2003). (Although if the poor are underpaid given their merit, and the rich are overpaid, as many meritocrats claim, then meritocracy will do better than the status quo from the prioritarian point-of-view. Meritocratic equal opportunity will also have an enormous effect.) Richard Arneson (1999) rejects Rawls's Fair Equality of Opportunity ( §5.1) as an unacceptable "compromise with meritocracy" because it constrains the prioritarian Difference Principle.

Some scholars make what is essentially an empirical argument, denying the existence of an elite class of citizens on which meritocratic governance can rely (Gunn 2019; Hannon 2022; Mendéz 2022; Reiss 2019). If the "meritocrats" are not more knowledgeable than common people, or if they suffer from unique and damaging biases, then, whatever its theoretical virtues, meritocracy cannot be operationalized.

6. The Public Debate

There's been a flurry of recent, public-facing work on meritocracy. This work addresses meritocracy as a theory of justice ( §4), and is largely critical (e.g., Carneval et al. 2020; Littler 2018; Mandler 2020; Markovits 2019; and Sandel 2020).

The public debate tends to be convoluted for two reasons. First, commentators often fail to make clear what they mean by "meritocracy". The meritocratic ideal is more or less compelling depending on how it is defined (e.g., with robust equal opportunity or without). To avoid talking past each other, it is critical that commentators have a common definition in mind.

Second, one sees the classic conflation of the normative and the positive. This entry is concerned with the normative question: Ought we live in a meritocracy? (Or, almost equivalently, is meritocracy just?)

But then there is the positive question: Is the world meritocratic? Do people enjoy equal opportunity? All else equal, do poor children and rich children face equal prospects? Are jobs and income being distributed on the basis of merit? Or are non-meritocratic features-race, gender, family connections, appearance, luck, and so on-playing roles as well?

It is useful to partition commentators on meritocracy along the normative/positive dimensions. Some commentators (e.g., Mankiw [2013]) believe that meritocracy is both desirable and largely realized in the actual world. Others (Mulligan [2018b]) think that meritocracy is desirable but that we do not live in one. Still others (Markovits [2019]) say that we live in a meritocracy and that this is a bad thing. Finally, there are some (Gheaus [2015]) who think that meritocracy is neither achieved nor a worthy ideal in the first place.

Further complicating matters is the way perceptions of merit affect the public's normative evaluation of policy. Consider affirmative action. While divisive, many supporters of affirmative action and many opponents appear to agree morally: Both want the most meritorious applicant to be hired. What they disagree about is whether affirmative action contributes to or detracts from this shared goal. Supporters think that affirmative action nullifies racial bias and other forms of disadvantage, ensuring that the most meritorious applicant gets hired. Opponents of affirmative action think that the policy violates meritocratic hiring by giving some applicants advantage (and others, perforce, disadvantage) on the basis of race (see, e.g., Reyna et al. 2005).

As Suhay, Tenenbaum, and Bartola describe things,

Even controlling for partisanship and various demographic characteristics, perceptions of whether the U.S. economy is meritocratic are strongly associated with people's views on taxation, social welfare policy, affirmative action, and presidential candidates.... If citizens could develop a shared understanding of the ways in which the American economy fails to deliver meritocratic outcomes, perhaps they would demand the two parties find common ground on policies designed to combat inequality. (2022: 9 ff.)

The way the public perceives social and economic realities-as meritocratic or not-appears to play a crucial role in their moral assessment of those realities.

A curious feature of the debate is how both opponents and supporters of meritocracy appeal to the same facts in making their cases. Michael Sandel (2020), for example, attacks today's culture of "credentialism" (also known as "pedigree"), in which a diploma from an elite college is a de facto requirement for entry into elite professions. Frequently, a less meritorious but credentialed person (from, say, Harvard) is preferred to a more meritorious but uncredentialed person (UMass). Credentialism is, by Sandel's lights, a feature of meritocracy.

Mulligan (2018b) also attacks credentialism, arguing that meritocracy is the solution to it rather than its cause. A Harvard education is not markedly better than a UMass education, but the returns to a Harvard education are enormously better than the returns to a UMass education. The returns to a Harvard education are, thus, largely rent ( §4.3), and so credentialism is unmeritocratic.

The meritocracy debate is, to put it mildly, unsettled. This is a reflection of its philosophical richness. While meritocratic ideas have been expressed and implemented for millennia, we still struggle to say exactly what meritocracy is and if it is desirable. We do not have full answers to those questions. But perhaps we are now, at least, beginning to understand them.

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By tradition, Michael Young is credited with coining "meritocracy" for his 1958 satire, The Rise of the Meritocracy. In fact, the term appeared in print two years earlier: In Jean Floud's "Sociology and Education", Alan Fox's "Class and Equality", and Paul Lamartine Yates's "Fairer Shares".

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Meritocracy is a social system in which success and status in life depend primarily on individual talents, abilities, and effort. It is a social system in which people advance on the basis of their merits.

A meritocratic system contrasts with aristocracy, for which people advance on the basis of the status and titles of family and other relations.

From the days of Aristotle, who coined the term "ethos," the idea of awarding positions of power to those most capable have been a part of political discussion not only for governments but for business endeavors as well.

Many Western societies--the United States chief among them--are commonly considered to be meritocracies, meaning these societies are built on the belief that anyone can make it with hard work and dedication. Social scientists often refer to this as the "bootstrap ideology," evoking the popular notion of "pulling" oneself "up by the bootstraps."

However, many challenge the validity of the position that Western societies are meritocracies, perhaps rightfully so. Widespread evidence exists, to varying degrees, within each of these societies of structural inequalities and systems of oppression designed and developed specifically to limit opportunities based on class, gender, race, ethnicity, ability, sexuality, and other social markers.

Aristotle's Ethos and Meritocracy

In discussions of rhetoric, Aristotle relates the epitome of his understanding of the word ethos as the mastery of a particular subject.

Rather than determining merit based on the modern state of affairs as exemplified by the political system in place at the time, Aristotle argued that it should come from a traditional understanding of aristocratic and oligarchical structures that define 'good' and 'knowledgeable.'

In 1958, Michael Young wrote a satirical paper mocking the Tripartite System of British education called "The Rise of the Meritocracy," declaring that "merit is equated with intelligence-plus-effort, its possessors are identified at an early age and selected for appropriate intensive education, and there is an obsession with quantification, test-scoring, and qualifications."

The term has come to frequently be described in modern day sociology and psychology as 'any act of judgment based on merit.' Although some disagree about what qualifies as true merit, most now agree that merit should be the primary concern for selecting an applicant for a position.

Social Inequality and Merit Disparity

In modern times, especially in the United States, the idea of a merit-based-only system of governance and business creates a disparity, as the availability of resources to cultivate merit are largely predicated upon one's current and historic socioeconomic status. Thus, those born into higher socioeconomic standing--those who have more wealth--have access to more resources than those born into lower standing.

Unequal access to resources has a direct and significant effect on the quality of education a child will receive all the way from kindergarten through university. The quality of one's education, among other factors related to inequalities and discrimination, directly affects the development of merit and how meritorious one will appear when applying for positions.

In his 2012 book Meritocratic Education and Social Worthlessness, Khen Lampert argues that a kinship exists between merit-based scholarships and education and social Darwinism, wherein only those given opportunities from birth are able to survive natural selection: By awarding only those who possess the means to afford a higher-quality education, either through intellectual or financial merit, a disparity is institutionally created between the impoverished and the wealthy, those born with inherent disadvantages and those born into socioeconomic prosperity.

While meritocracy is a noble ideal for any social system, achieving it first requires recognizing that social, economic, and political conditions may exist which make it impossible. To achieve it, then, such conditions must be corrected.

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Understanding Meritocracy From a Sociological Perspective

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A meritocracy is a social system in which people's success in life depends primarily on their talents, abilities, and effort.

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The belief that we live in a meritocracy is one of our oldest and most persistent illusions.

It justifies the gaping inequalities in our society by attributing them to the skill and hard work of successful peopleand the incompetence and shortcomings of unsuccessful people. But this has always been a fantasy, a way of glossing over how the world actually works.

A new book by Yale Law professor Daniel Markovits, The Meritocracy Trap, is a fascinating attempt to poke holes in our conventional understanding of meritocracy and, in the process, make the case for something better.

We typically think of meritocracy as a system that rewards the best and brightest. For Markovits, it is merely "a pretense, constructed to rationalize an unjust distribution of advantage."

Here's a clarifying stat: At two Ivy League schools that Markovits surveyed, "the share of students from households in the top quintile of the income distribution exceeds the share from the bottom two quintiles combined by a ratio of about three and a half to one." The point: Meritocracy is a mechanism for transferring wealth from one generation to the next. Call that what you want, but you can't call it fair or impartial.

What makes Markovits's book so interesting is that he doesn't just condemn meritocracy as unfair for non-elites; he argues that it's actually bad for the people benefiting from it. The "trap" of meritocracy ensnares all of us, he says, in ways that make life less satisfying for everyone.

I spoke to Markovits about how meritocracy works, what it's doing to us, and what a post-meritocratic society might look like. A lightly edited transcript of our conversation follows.

Sean Illing

What is a "meritocracy," and do we actually live in one?

Daniel Markovits

Meritocracy is the idea that people get ahead based on their own accomplishments rather than, for example, on their parents' social class. And the moral intuition behind meritocracy is that it creates an elite that is capable and effective and that it gives everybody a fair chance at success.

Do we live in a meritocracy? Well, maybe the best we can hope for is to live in an imperfect meritocracy. The problem, of course, is that elites cheat and they game the system and they engage in all kinds of self-dealing in order to get ahead.

On a purely descriptive level, though, I think we do live in something like a meritocracy. That is to say, the bulk of the reason why certain people have gotten ahead is that they have genuinely accomplished things. On the other hand, the moral intuition behind meritocracy is not at all realized. This system does not give everybody a fair chance at success and it hasn't been particularly good for society as a whole. And it hasn't even been good for the elite.

Sean Illing

We'll get to that last point, but first I want to be very precise about the claim you're making here. There's a simple critique of meritocracy that says the so-called "elites" aren't really elite; instead, they're beneficiaries of a rigged system.

I don't think you dispute this, but you make a deeper claim, which is that the problem is the kind of society we've built, a society that favors the sort of skills meritocrats are uniquely equipped to have. Can you say a bit about that?

Daniel Markovits

Let's just separate those two things out. And maybe the recent college admission scandal is a good way to illustrate this concretely. In that scandal, some rich and famous people paid bribes to get their kids into college.

Now, I'm not saying the scandal wasn't wrong - it absolutely was scandalous. But the bulk of the reason why our colleges, particularly our elite colleges, are filled with kids of rich parents isn't that. Instead, it's that rich parents spend enormous sums of money not on bribing anybody but on educating their children, on getting their children into prestigious kindergartens and high schools, on coaches and tutors and music teachers, and this means the children of rich people simply do better on the merits.

And so the big problem that we face isn't merely that the rich cheat, it's that the meritocracy favors the rich even when everybody plays by the rules.

Sean Illing

So you're saying that a world in which meritocracy works is, by definition, a bad world, a world that engineers and reproduces inequalities.

Daniel Markovits

Yes, it exacerbates and reproduces inequalities, so that one thing that's happened is that because the rich can afford to educate their children in a way nobody else can, when it comes time to evaluate people on the merits, rich kids just do better.

Sean Illing

Is the meritocratic system itself the greatest impediment to a fair society, which is to say a society in which equality of opportunity is a real thing?

Daniel Markovits

I wouldn't want to argue about whether meritocracy or racism, for example, is the greatest impediment to equality of opportunity.

But I'll say this: the SAT and the College Board reported data in 2016 from which you can figure out how many kids there were that year in the US who took SAT who scored 750 or above, which is roughly the Ivy League median, and whose parents had a graduate degree. And the answer is about 15,000.

You can also figure out how many kids there were who scored 750 or above whose parents had not graduated high school, much less earned graduate degrees. And the numbers are so small, the tail is so thin, that the statistical techniques become unreliable. But if you just grind out the math, the answer, I think, was 32.

So that's a case in which effectively what degrees your parents have determines whether you're going to get a high-enough SAT score to get into the Ivy League. And that's meritocratic in a way but it's an incredible block to equality of opportunity.

Sean Illing

Is there any way to organize a competitive society that doesn't inevitably tend toward these sorts of excesses?

Daniel Markovits

I think it's possible, yes. So one distinction I draw is between excellent education and superior education. Excellent education is education that makes a person good at something that's worth doing, and superior education is education that makes somebody better than other people at something, regardless of whether it's worth doing or not.

You can imagine a society which has widespread, excellent education and invests in training people to be good at all the tasks that the society needs and fills up its jobs with people who are excellent at them. And that would be a kind of a meritocratic society that structures its education and work so that once you're excellent, being a little bit better doesn't make that much of a difference.

Germany, I think, is a pretty good model for that kind of society. But our society focuses on superior education: It gives huge advantages to people who are better than somebody else or than everybody else in all sorts of things that probably aren't worth doing, like being great at high-tech finance, which most economists think has almost no social value.

But if you're really good at it you can make millions and millions of dollars a year, and to get really good at it you have to master all sorts of difficult skills and you have to get degrees at the top of your class in the very best universities in the country. And that's the kind of system that we have now.

Sean Illing

I want to circle back to something you alluded to earlier, which is that meritocracy is toxic even for those who profit from it. That will strike many readers as counterintuitive. Can you explain what you mean?

Daniel Markovits

It takes enormous effort to win and keep winning in this competition, so elite schooling has become enormously more intensive than it was 20 or 50 years ago. And elite jobs have become enormously more intensive. The toll that this takes is quite heavy and I think it's destructive of human well-being.

Meritocrats are constantly struggling and being evaluated and tested, and they constantly have to shape and manipulate themselves in order to pass the test. And in a way, it's like they're portfolio managers whose assets include just themselves, and they have kind of an instrumental and alienated attitude toward their own lives because they have to treat their life that way.

"People have to realize that the things that they want right now are not making them well"

Sean Illing

You teach at Yale Law. You're surrounded by elites. Do you find that most - or any - of them feel like they're suffering on account of their privilege? Because my sense is that the people with the most to lose from reordering society are usually the most committed to keeping the world the world the way it is. The idea that weary meritocrats will suddenly wake up and find solidarity with the besieged middle class seems a little quixotic to me.

Daniel Markovits

It's nuts, right? I can just give you some of my own anecdotes. There was a survey of the mental health climate at Yale Law School done last year or the year before, and something like 70 percent of respondents said that they felt the need to use and consult mental health services. And there are similar data from other elite institutions that show elite students are not happy, are not doing well.

Twenty years ago when I started teaching here, my students were feeling very good about themselves. They felt like they won the golden ticket. Today, that's just not the case. They feel as though they've run a gauntlet to get here, and they recognize that when they get out to the workforce, they're just going to have to run another gauntlet that's just like the one they ran. And they don't want that.

And they also increasingly recognize that their advantages are very closely intertwined with the exclusion of others, and they object to that morally. So I don't think that at the moment this is a student body that is thriving. It's got great career prospects, but the rest of its life as a whole is not going well and I think my students recognize that.

Sean Illing

And what is the price that non-elites are paying for the system? How are those marginalized by meritocracy suffering?

Daniel Markovitz

I think there are at least three kinds of prices. First, they can't compete and their children can't compete. What a poor or middle-class family is able to spend on education is absolutely dwarfed by what a wealthy family is able to spend.

A second harm is what elites have done to the labor market. They've remade jobs in a way that destroys the middle class by eliminating the high-paying positions for people who lack technocratic expertise. Think of a company like Kodak, which, at its peak, employed 140,000 people with good, secure jobs. Now that part of the economy is occupied by a company like Instagram, which had 13 employees when it was bought for a $1 billion by Facebook - and those were all super-skilled elite workers.

And then finally meritocracy adds a kind of a moral insult to this economic exclusion because it frames what is in fact structural inequality and structural exclusion as an individual failure to measure up, and then tells you if you're in the middle class, the reason you can't get the great high-paying job is because you're not good enough and the reason that your kids can't get into Harvard is that they're not good enough, which is complete nonsense. But that's what the ideology tells you.

Sean Illing

I take all your points and don't disagree, I just wonder what it would take to move beyond the meritocratic model. Are we not, after all, talking about a complete shift in how we think about political economy and morality?

Daniel Markovits

I think that's probably right. Look, one way to think about this is that if you take a longer historical view, meritocracy in its deeper origins came to the English-speaking world around 1833, which is the date in which the administrative division of the British East India Company entrance and promotion based on social class was replaced with entrance and promotion based on competitive examinations.

And so it took from 1833 to 1980 or so, 150 years, for the whole society and economy to be remade on this model. And that involved changes in institutions, in technology, in government, in policy. And it will take generations and imaginative changes to undo this thing or to get into the next phase of our collective existence.

So I know it sounds like I'm asking for something unobtainable, but the reality is that the current setup is increasingly unsustainable. There are going to be fundamental shifts in how we think about our ambitions, our lives, our institutions, and our production and consumption. And the trick in the face of that is to come up with a compelling critique of where we are and charismatic ideas of where we might go.

Sean Illing

The sort of change you're after will, for lack of a better word, demand a revolution of individual consciousness. Ultimately, people are going to have to want different things, fear different things, aspire to different things.

Daniel Markovits

People have to realize that the things that they want right now are not making them well. They have to recognize the sources of their dissatisfaction and the sources of their children's dissatisfaction and then they have to start finding alternatives.

And the job of policymakers is to try to create alternatives that will serve the needs of those who grab onto them. That's why, for example, one of the policy recommendations in the book is to massively expand enrollments in elite education. The trick is to get many, many more kids from non-rich families into not just the Ivy League, but elite private universities, elite private high schools, and elite private elementary schools, and to do it in a way that does not require excluding any currently rich kids, so that the schools themselves become genuine avenues of opportunity again.

Sean Illing

I'll close with a somewhat ominous question: If we don't unravel the meritocracy, if society continues to hum along as it is, if the inequalities persist, what will happen?

Daniel Markovits

I don't have a confident view about the particulars, but we know that societies that succumb to this level of concentrated wealth and privilege generally don't unwind it except through losing a foreign war or an internal revolution. And something like that is in the offing for us. I don't know when or how or what the details are, but that's the kind of fear that one should take very, very seriously.
This story was originally published on October 21, 2019.

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How meritocracy harms everyone - even the winners

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A new book challenges one of our most persistent illusions.

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: a system, organization, or society in which people are chosen and moved into positions of success, power, and influence on the basis of their demonstrated abilities and merit (see )

Only the elite, in that new meritocracy, would enjoy the opportunity for self-fulfillment ...

Though founded theoretically on principles of meritocracy, the public arena was parceled into spheres of personal influence ...

A paradox lies at the heart of this new American meritocracy. Merit has replaced the old system of inherited privilege ... . But merit, it turns out, is at least partly class-based. Parents with money, education and connections cultivate in their children the habits that the meritocracy rewards.

also : the people who are moved into such positions

a member of the meritocracy

France remains a tightly centralized nation, run by a governmental and business meritocracy carefully prepared for positions of power in elite graduate schools.

Examples of meritocracy in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'meritocracy.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

Note: The neologism meritocracy was apparently first used in print by the British industrial sociologist Alan Fox (1920-2002) in the article "Class and Equality," Socialist Commentary, May, 1956, pp. 11-13. The word is now closely associated with the book The Rise of the Meritocracy (London: Thames & Hudson, 1958) by the sociologist and politician Michael Young (1915-2002), who is often credited with its coinage.

1956, in the meaning defined above

The first known use of meritocracy was in 1956

Dictionary Entries Near meritocracy

Cite this Entry

"Meritocracy." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meritocracy. Accessed 12 Oct. 2023.

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Merriam-Webster unabridged

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a system, organization, or society in which people are chosen and moved into positions of success, power, and influence on the basis of their demonstrated abilities and merit; also : the people who are moved into such positions... See the full definition

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China's political meritocracy versus Western democracy

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Chinese meritocrats support democratic values but not elections, says Daniel Bell of Shandong University | Open Future

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In the United States, our form of government is a representative democracy, meaning citizens vote for their government officials. But Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders has other ideas.

"Of course the oligarchs run Russia. But guess what? Oligarchs run the United States as well," the 81-year-old Democratic Senator says. "And it's not just the United States, it's not just Russia; Europe, the UK, all over the world, we're seeing a small number of incredibly wealthy people running things in their favor."

Wondering what this means in the context of global governments? Here's everything you need to know about oligarchies, including examples.

What is an oligarchy?

The general definition of an oligarchy is a form of government involving the rule of a few persons or families. According to National Geographic, Greek philosopher Aristotle used the term in contrast to aristocracy (the elite upper class) to describe the rule of a few for "corrupt and unjust purposes."

One of the more modern uses is the phrase "iron law of oligarchy," a concept by German sociologist Robert Michels that says democracy is an oxymoron - that it will ultimately fall to the hands of an elite few.
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Examples of oligarchy

Because oligarchy is often used as a derogatory term for a corrupt government, several countries have been described as such throughout history.

The term oligarch has been most recently used to describe well-connected, influential wealthy Russian business leaders. Before Russian President Vladimir Putin's rule, a group of Russian oligarchs had control over most of the country's economy. When Putin rose to power, he offered them a choice of prison or loyalty - the loyal oligarchs "are making bank through extra fat government contracts," NPR writes.

In 2018, the Trump administration released a list of hundreds of Russian politicians and oligarchs that have "flourished" under Putin, created from publicly available sources of Russian billionaires.

This post-Soviet oligarchy also occurred in Ukraine, but the war is changing that. Many Ukrainian and U.S. analysts told The Washington Post financial losses and government pressure are diminishing the power of this wealthy group. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a "deoligarchization" law in 2021 that cracks down on monopolies and places limits on the political influence of the elite.

China defines itself as a communist "people's republic," though some have called it an oligarchy because leadership has remained in the hands of a few for several decades.

Iran has been called both a theocracy and a clerical oligarchy because of the power clerics hold. In Iran, a Supreme Leader (chosen by an "Assembly of Experts") runs the country with 2,000 clerical field operatives, according to National Geographic.
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Absolute monarchy: A monarch rules without being hindered by other governing bodies

Anarchy: Lack of governmental authority, a condition of lawlessness or political disorder

Authoritarian: State authority is imposed on citizens' lives

Communist: The state controls the economy with a single party in power. Private ownership is eliminated with a goal of all goods equally shared in a classless society

Democracy: Power is retained by the people

Democratic republic: Citizens vote for representatives who hold governing power

Dictatorship: A ruler or small group wield absolute power without a constitution or laws

Ecclesiastical: Church-administered government

Emirate: Power in the hands of the ruler of a Muslim state, an emir

Monarchy: Supreme power is in the hands of a monarch, usually a king or queen and usually hereditary

Socialism: A central government produces and distributes goods to seek a more just and equitable society

Sultanate: Supreme power rests in the hands of a sultan

Theocracy: A Deity is recognized as supreme leader

Totalitarian: Government subordinates individuals to the state, controlling political, economic and social attitudes, values and beliefs

In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte's claim of dismantling the country's oligarchy garnered criticism from several sides - from those who said there never was a problem, from those who said it's far from ended and from those who accused Duterte himself of associating with oligarchs, Philstar reports.

The United States has also been called an oligarchy in the past few decades, with one study determining the American economic elite representing business interests have more impact on U.S. policy than the average citizen. Still, others argue that America is more an "imperfect democracy" than an oligarchy.

What are the main forms of government?

While not an exhaustive list, here are some definitions of different types of government seen around the world:

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This form of government leaves power in the hands of a few: Oligarchies explained

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An oligarchy is a form of government, just as a democracy or monarchy is. Here's how it works and a few examples of countries some say it applies to.

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Oligarchy

Any system of government in which virtually all political power is held by a very small number of wealthy but otherwise unmeritorious people who shape public policy primarily to benefit themselves financially through direct subsidies to their agricultural estates or business firms, lucrative government contracts, and protectionist measures aimed at damaging their economic competitors - while displaying little or no concern for the broader interests of the rest of the citizenry. "Oligarchy" is also used as a collective term to denote all the individual members of the small corrupt ruling group in such a system. The term always has a negative or derogatory connotation in both contemporary and classical usage, in contrast to aristocracy (which sometimes has a derogatory connotation in modern usage, but never in classical).

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Oligarchy Any system of government in which virtually all political power is held by a very small number of wealthy but otherwise unmeritorious people who shape public policy primarily to benefit themselves financially through direct subsidies to their agricultural estates or business firms, lucrative government contracts, and protectionist measures aimed at damaging their economic competitors - while displaying little or no concern for the broader interests of the rest of the citizenry.

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Oligarchy (Greek Ὀλιγαρχία, Oligarkhía, from óligon, "few," and arkho, "rule" ) is a form of government in which political power effectively rests with a small, elite segment of society. The term was used by Aristotle to refer to despotic power exercised by a small and privileged group for often corrupt or selfish purposes. In most classic oligarchies, governing elites were recruited exclusively from a hereditary ruling caste, whose members tended to exercise power in the interests of their own class.

Oligarchies have sometimes been synonymous with aristocracies, which were ruled by members of a noble class, or with plutocracies, ruled by the wealthy members of a community. However, neither wealth nor noble birth are necessary conditions for belonging to the privileged group which rules an oligarchy. Historically, there have been organized oligarchies, and unofficial oligarchies in which a group of "advisers" dictated the policies of an official ruler. In practice, almost all governments, whatever their form, are run by a small minority of members of society, and it is necessary to further examine the ways in which these individuals acquire and retain power in order to correctly understand whether a system of government is a oligarchy.

Origins and meaning

The word oligarchy (l´ gärk) is derived from the Greek words for "few" (ὀλίγον, óligon) and "rule" (ἄρχω, arkho). Oligarchy (oligarchia, "rule by the few") refers to the limitation of political power to only a small portion of the community, such as a few families or individuals (the oligarchs). Ancient Greek oligarchs characteristically possessed greater wealth and influence than the rest of the community, but noble birth was not a necessary condition for belonging to the ruling elite. In Greece, the oligarchs were often a section of the old nobility which had excluded the poorer nobles from power. During the second half of the fifth century B.C.E., when Athenian ascendancy promoted democratic forms of government, there were still many oligarchic states in Greece, the most notable perhaps being at Corinth and at Thebes. The government of the Roman republic is often described as "oligarchical."

The classical definition of oligarchy, as given, for example, by Aristotle, is governance by a few, usually the wealthy, for corrupt or selfish purposes. It is compared with both aristocracy, which is defined as government by a few chosen for their virtue and ruling for the general good, and various forms of democracy, or rule by the people. In practice, however, almost all governments, whatever their form, are run by a small minority of members of society. From this perspective, the major distinction between oligarchy and democracy is that in the latter, elites compete with each other, gaining power by winning public support. In evaluating an oligarchic system of government, the extent to which those attempting join the ruling elite are excluded is also significant.

Oligarchy, aristocracy, and plutocracy

Historically, oligarchies have sometimes been synonymous with aristocracies, which were ruled by members of a noble class, or with plutocracies, in which wealthy members of a community reigned supreme. However, neither wealth nor noble birth are necessary conditions for belonging to the privileged group which rules an oligarchy. Oligarchies were often controlled by powerful families, whose children were raised and mentored to be heirs of the power of the oligarchy. In some cases, oligarchs chose not to exercise political power openly, but to remain "the power behind the throne," exerting control through economic or political pressure.

Aristotle used the term oligarchia in a negative sense to refer to a debased form of aristocracy, in which rule was in the hands of a few corrupt or inept individuals. In most classic oligarchies, governing elites were recruited exclusively from a ruling caste, a hereditary social grouping set apart from the rest of society by religion, kinship, economic status, prestige, or even language. Such elites tended to exercise power in the interests of their own class.

Oligarchy and monarchy

Oligarchy means "the rule of the few;" monarchy means "the rule of the one." Early societies became oligarchies as an outgrowth of an alliance between rival tribal chieftains, or as the result of a caste system. Oligarchies sometimes evolved into more autocratic or monarchist forms of government, if one family or tribe gained ascendancy over the others. Many of the European monarchies established during the late Middle Ages began in this way.

Monarchies sometimes function as oligarchies, when there is a powerful and influential group of "elder statesmen" or nobles who advise or even control the ruler. Examples of this were the imperial dynasties of China, in which the emperors were often dominated by eunuchs and members of the imperial family; the shogunate system in Japan; and the royal court in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France, in which nobles and aristocrats competed for influence over the king. If a hereditary ruler was weak or too young to rule, his power was effectively usurped by those surrounding him.

Historically, oligarchies have sometimes become instruments of political transformation, by insisting that monarchs or dictators share power with other elements of society, or by demanding some form of organization or constitution to protect the stability of the government. One example occurred when British nobles banded together in 1215 to force a reluctant King John of England to sign the Magna Carta, a tacit recognition both of King John's waning political power and of the existence of an incipient oligarchy (the nobility). The Magna Carta was repeatedly revised (1216, 1217, and 1225) to guarantee the rights of greater numbers of people, setting the stage for English constitutional monarchy. Another example is the Meiji Restoration (1868) in Japan, when a group of samurai forced the shogun to relinquish power to the hereditary emperor and established themselves as genro (elder statesmen) with the power to direct government affairs.

Examples of oligarchies

Historical examples of oligarchies are Sparta (which excluded the Helots, who made up the majority of the population, from voting); the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (in which only the nobility could vote); the English parliamentary system and execution of Charles I in 1649; and the restriction of the franchise to male property owners in young democracies, such as the early United States. A modern example of oligarchy, based on race, could be seen during the twentieth century in South Africa in the apartheid system, which became official government policy in 1948 and lasted until the democratic election of a government dominated by the black majority in 1994.

Russia has been labeled an oligarchy because, after the fall of Communism, political power became concentrated in the hands of certain individuals who amassed great wealth by taking advantage of the new system.

The social system of capitalism is sometimes described as an oligarchy. Critics argue that in a capitalist society, economic, cultural, and political power rests in the hands of the capitalist class. Communist states are also perceived as oligarchies, ruled by a class with special privileges, the nomenklatura.

The "Iron Law of Oligarchy"

It is a recurrent theory that all forms of government are, in the final analysis, reducible to the rule of a few. Whether the formal authority is vested in the people, a monarch, the proletariat, or a dictator, inevitably a small group of oligarchs will secure effective control. Some authors such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Thomas R. Dye, and Robert Michels, believe that any political system eventually evolves into an oligarchy.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels held that, throughout the history of capitalism, the government had been controlled by key capitalists, and coined the phrase, "the state is the executive committee of the exploiting class." The Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca similarly held that a "ruling class" always constituted the effective oligarchic control. Vilfredo Pareto elaborated the idea in his doctrine of the "elite."

The German sociologist Robert Michels devised the concept of the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" to refer to what he regarded as the inevitable tendency of political parties and trade unions to become bureaucratized, centralized, and conservative. He argued that in spite of the ideals of representative government, the practical demands of politics inevitably resulted in the concentration of authority in the hands of a small group who were able to direct power efficiently, and in the establishment of an organized bureaucracy and a rigorous order to control internal dissension.

According to this school of thought, modern democracies should be considered as elected oligarchies. In these systems, actual differences between viable political rivals are small, the oligarchic elite imposes strict limits on what constitutes an "acceptable" and "respectable" political position, and politicians' careers depend heavily on unelected economic and media elites.

Subsequent theorists have attempted either to expand on Michel's thesis by applying it to legislatures, religious orders, and other organizations. Critics insist that the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" is not universal and that some groups and political parties do maintain a viable system of democratic expression and governance.

The historian Spencer R. Weart, in his book Never at War, argues that oligarchies rarely make war with one another.

Political scientists and sociologists are beginning to differentiate more carefully between various types of control and power. The type of power held by a democratic leader, while much greater than that of any single individual, is very different from the power wielded by a dictator in a totalitarian and authoritarian government. In a democracy, the ruling "oligarchy" can be effectively challenged by outsiders at any time, while an oligarchy in an authoritarian government protects its position by force if necessary, and retains power indefinitely. In a democracy, effective control changes hands so frequently that it is difficult to identify those in power as a "class" or an "elite." In speaking of "rule by the few," the expression "the few" is difficult to define. In an actual democracy, oligarchic tendencies arise for several reasons, including a lack of active participation by many citizens. Only a small minority of those who are voting take the initiative to research the issues and learn about the candidates during an election, in order to make an informed choice. The majority of voters are vulnerable to the ideas propagated by expensive media campaigns. Few individual political candidates have the economic resources to purchase the advertising exposure required to capture public attention, with the result that they are often under obligation to special interest groups of various kinds.

References

Dahl, Robert Alan. 1961. Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. Yale studies in political science, 4. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hammer, Darrell P. 1986. The USSR: the politics of oligarchy. Boulder: Westview Press. ISBN 0813300517

Johnson, David G. 1977. The medieval Chinese oligarchy. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. ISBN 0891581405

Ostwald, M. 2000. Oligarchia: The Development of a Constitutional Form in Ancient Greece (Historia Einzelschirften; 144). Stuttgart: Steiner. ISBN 3515076808

Shaw, Christine. 2006. Popular government and oligarchy in Renaissance Italy. The medieval Mediterranean, v. 66. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 900415311X

Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson. 1947. The Puritan oligarchy; the founding of American civilization. New York: C. Scribner's Sons.

External links

All links retrieved December 19, 2018.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries:

General Philosophy Sources

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Oligarchy (Greek Ὀλιγαρχία, Oligarkhía, from óligon, "few," and arkho, "rule" ) is a form of government in which political power effectively rests with a small, elite segment of society. The term was used by Aristotle to refer to despotic power exercised by a small and privileged group for often corrupt or selfish purposes.

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Oligarchy means 'rule of the few.' It is a political system where a small group of elites amasses the power and wealth in a society.
It has the effect of disempowering the masses and entrenching privilege for some and disadvantage for others.

The term originates from ancient Greek (ὀλιγαρχίᾱ - oligarkhía). Aristotle used the term to mean an unfavorable version of an aristocratic government (Aristotle, 1932).

Oligarchies can exist within a range of political systems, including aristocracies, dictatorships, absolute monarchies, communist regimes, and even (debatably) American-style democracy.

The greatest example of oligarchy in history is probably the Kingdom of France, which was overthrown by the masses when the elites took their wealth and disassociated themselves from mainstream French concerns.

In modern times, the most cited example of an oligarchy is Russia.

Oligarchy Examples

Many of the following examples are debated, but there have been claims that each are oligarchic.

1. The Kingdom of France
The Kingdom of France was one of the most powerful states in Europe since the High Middle Ages.
At various times, it was either an absolute monarchy or a parliamentary constitutional monarchy. It can reasonably be argued, however, that the Kingdom of France always had oligarchic elements.

Let's take the example of the Bourbon Restoration. This was the period of French history during which the House of Bourbon returned to power after the first fall of Napoleon in 1814.

It was briefly interrupted in 1815 but ruled until the July Revolution of 1830. The regime was overthrown by the masses when the views and interests of the elites were no longer aligned with those of the new liberal majority (Alexander, 1999).

The overthrow of Charles X was largely influenced by a group of wealthy liberal journalists and proprietors led by Adolphe Thiers (Schroeder, 1994).
The government of China describes itself as communist. China is also called the "people's republic," but the governance of China is maintained not by the majority of citizens.
The country is ruled by a select few. Oligarchs of China include those who were part of the Communist Party in the 1950s or later, as well as those who came into wealth and power after the opening of China to the global market in the 1980s.

The Chinese government has been widely criticized for helping the wealthy and the powerful at the expense of the majority of average citizens.
The politics of Iran have also been characterized as oligarchic. It has been called a theocracy and a clerical oligarchy. Clerics in Iran have a lot of political power.
A Supreme Leader is at the top of the political hierarchy. The Leader runs the country alongside around 2,000 clerical field operatives.

86 of these clerics form an Assembly of Experts and choose the Supreme Leader every year. Iran does have a president, but the president is subordinate to the Supreme Leader.

Furthermore, there is a Council of Guardians consisting of six clerics and six parliamentary appointees.

The Council influences who can be elected to political office and which bills get passed by the Parliament.

4. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy (Cavendish, 2006), but its political arrangement does have elements of an oligarchy.
Most political decisions are made by the members of the House of Al Saud, but the ulama (Islamic religious leaders and jurists), tribal sheiks, and members of important families also have considerable influence on major issues (Teitelbaum et al., 2022).

5. Philippines
From 1965 to 1986, many monopolies emerged in the Philippines, particularly from the family and close circles of president Ferdinand Marcos.
This has led several analysts to describe the country as an oligarchy (Mendoza et al., 2022 & Hutchcroft, 1991).
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the economy in Russia was privatized.
Privately owned corporations, including producers of petroleum, gas, and metal, have led to the development of oligarchic elements in Russian politics (Scheidel, 2017, p. 51).

Many of these corporations are directly connected with high-ranking government officials and even the president (Scheidel, 2017, pp. 222-223).

Russian oligarchs are those business oligarchs who rapidly accumulated wealth in the period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

These oligarchs first emerged under Mikhail Gorbachev's rule as General Secretary.

After 2017, several Russian oligarchs and their companies have been hit by US sanctions because they supported "the Russian government's malign activity around the globe" ( Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity, n.d.).

The oligarchs targeted by US sanctions included Vladimir Bogdanov, Oleg Deripaska, Suleiman Kerimov, Igor Rotenberg, Kirill Shamalov, Andrei Skoch, and Viktor Vekselberg.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many Russian oligarchs were further targeted and sanctioned by many countries.
Turkey is not a conventional oligarchy, but it may be argued that it is one because two wealthy families (the Koc and the Sabanci) have considerable influence on political decisions.
These two families have close ties to the Justice and Development (AKP) party.
After the 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum, along with the transition to a market economy, Ukraine saw the emergence of business oligarchs.
The influence of Ukrainian oligarchs on the politics of the country, especially considering their links to Russia, has been criticized by pro-Western sources (Wilson, 2005).

Such concerns have been raised since the 2000s. The issue became more important after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Along with Russian oligarchs, Ukrainian oligarchs with ties to Russia were also sanctioned by countries around the globe. The influence of oligarchs in Ukrainian politics is, according to some analysts (Lavrov, 2011), out of the ordinary.

9. United States
Data often suggests that despite being democratic in many ways, US policies are generally determined by a small number of people-the political and economic elite (Gilens & Page, 2014).
This implies that the United States is, in many respects, oligarchic.

Some scholars suggest that a shift towards oligarchic rule is caused by the influence of corporations, wealthy individuals, and special interest groups (Piketty, 2014).

The researchers Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2014) analyzed nearly 1,800 US policies between 1981 and 2002. They concluded that most government policies tend to favor special interests and lobbying organizations.

According to the study, whenever the majority of citizens disagree with the economic elites on a policy, the elites tend to get their way:

"When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy " (Gilens & Page, 2014).

This does not make the US an oligarchy per se, but it does suggest that oligarchic elements exist within the government of the United States.

10. Venezuela
Venezuela is not a true oligarchy, but the new ruling class created by the Venezuelan government, known as the Bolibourgeoisie or Bolichicos, proves that there are oligarchic elements in Venezuelan politics.
This group is made up of people who became rich under the Chávez regime and continue to have considerable influence on politics (Romero, 2010).

Their dominance is maintained through many non-democratic means such as overthrowing of democratic norms and control of the media.

11. Zimbabwe
According to some analysts, Zimbabwe has been an oligarchy that is ruled by a small but influential network of political, military, and business elites (Magaisa, 2018).
The degree to which the nation is oligarchic is debated. It has alternated between limited democracy, coups, and political influences that have upheld the power of the elites.

More Examples

The following are often cited as examples of oligarchies, although as always, this is debated:

Conclusion

An oligarchy is a power structure in which power rests with a small number of people. It originated in ancient Greece and is often used when discussing historical and contemporary political arrangements. It is similar to an oligarchy, which refers to a market system where ownership of capital within markets (such as the oil, automotive, and telecommunications markets) rests with a small number of firms.

References

Alexander, M. S. (1999). French History Since Napoleon. Arnold.

Cavendish, M. (2006). World and Its Peoples. Marshall Cavendish.

Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics, 12(3), 564-581. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595

Hutchcroft, P. D. (1991). Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder. World Politics, 43(3), 414-450. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010401

Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press.

Scheidel, W. (2017). The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton University Press.

Schroeder, P. W. (1994). The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848. Clarendon Press.

Teitelbaum, J. , Philby, . Harry St. John Bridger and Ochsenwald, . William L. (2022, December 10). Saudi Arabia. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia

Wilson, A. (2005). Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Yale University Press.

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Tio Gabunia (B.Arch, M.Arch) and Peer Reviewed by Chris Drew (PhD)

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Oligarchy means 'rule of the few.' It is a political system where a small group of elites amasses the power and wealth in a society.

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An oligarchy is a power structure made up of a few elite individuals, families, or corporations that are allowed to control a country or organization. This article examines the characteristics of oligarchies, their evolution, and how common they are today.

Key Takeaways: What Is an Oligarchy?

Oligarchy Definition

Coming from the Greek word oligarkhes, meaning "few governing," an oligarchy is any power structure controlled by a small number of people called oligarchs. Oligarchs may be distinguished and related by their wealth, family ties, nobility, corporate interests, religion, politics, or military power.

All forms of government, including democracies, theocracies, and monarchies can be controlled by an oligarchy. The presence of a constitution or similar formative charter does not preclude the possibility of an oligarchy holding actual control. Under the theoretical "iron law of oligarchy," all political systems eventually evolve into oligarchies. In democracies, oligarchs use their wealth to influence elected officials. In monarchies, oligarchs use their military power or wealth to influence the king or queen. In general, leaders of oligarchies work to build their own power with little or no regard for the needs of society.

The terms oligarchy and plutocracy are often confused. The leaders of a plutocracy are always wealthy, while the leaders of an oligarchy need not be rich to command control. Thus, plutocracies are always oligarchies, but oligarchies are not always plutocracies.

Oligarchies date back the 600s BCE when the Greek city-states of Sparta and Athens were ruled by an elite group of educated aristocrats. During the 14th century, the city-state of Venice was controlled by rich nobles called "patricians." More recently, South Africa while under white apartheid rule until 1994, was a classic example of a country ruled by a racially-based oligarchy.

Modern Oligarchy Examples

A few examples of modern oligarchies are Russia, China, Iran, and perhaps the United States.

Though Russian President Vladimir Putin denies it, he functions as part of a wealth-based ruling oligarchy that had its beginnings in the 1400s. In Russia, as in many essentially anti-capitalist countries, accumulating personal wealth requires contacts inside the government. As a result, the Russian government tacitly allows the billionaire oligarchs to invest in democratic countries where the rule of law protects their property.

In January 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department released a list of some 200 Russian oligarchs, companies, and senior Russian government officials including Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev. "The Russian government operates for the disproportionate benefit of oligarchs and government elites," said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.

The religion-based Chinese oligarchy regained control after the death of Mao Tse-Tung in 1976. Claiming to be descendants of Taoism's "Eight Immortals," members of the so-called "Shanghai gang" oligarchs control most state-owned corporations, consult on and profit from business deals, and intermarry in order to maintain their relationship to the Immortals.

Saudi Arabia

The reigning monarch of Saudi Arabia is required to share his power with the descendants of the 44 sons and 17 wives of the country's founder and first monarch, King Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud (1853-1953). The current king, Salman bin Abdulaziz has appointed his son, Prince Mohammed bin Salman as defense minister and overseer of Saudi Aramco, the powerful state-owned oil monopoly.

Despite having a popularly elected president, Iran is controlled by a religion-based oligarchy of Islamic clerics and their relatives and friends. The Iranian constitution states that "the One God (Allah)" holds "exclusive sovereignty" over the country. The Islamic oligarchs took power after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989. His replacement, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has placed his family and allies into high government posts and controls the elected president.

The United States

Many economists contend that the United States is now or is becoming an oligarchy. In saying this, they point to the country's worsening income inequality and social stratification, two of the main characteristics of a wealth-based oligarchy. Between 1979 and 2005, the incomes of the top 1% of U.S. workers rose by 400%. According to a 2014 study by political scientists Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, the U.S. Congress passes legislation benefiting the wealthiest 10% of Americans more often than measures benefiting the poorest 50%.

Pros and Cons of Oligarchies

While oligarchies are often criticized, they do have some positive aspects.

Pros of Oligarchies

Oligarchies usually work efficiently. Power is placed in the hands of a few people whose expertise enables them to quickly make and apply decisions. In this way, oligarchies are more efficient than ruling systems in which many people must make all decisions in all cases.

As an outgrowth of efficiency, oligarchies allow most of the people to disregard issues that concern society and spend more time on their day-to-day lives. By trusting the wisdom of ruling oligarchs, the people are free to focus on their careers, families, and pastimes. In this manner, oligarchies can also allow more time for technological innovation.

Since one of the main objectives of an oligarchy is social stability-preserving the status quo-the oligarchs' decisions tend to be conservative in nature. As a result, people are less likely to be harmed by extreme and potentially dangerous changes in policy.

Cons of an Oligarchy

Oligarchies typically increase income inequality. Having grown used to their lavish, privileged lifestyles, the oligarchs and their close associates often pocket a disproportionately large share of the country's wealth.

Oligarchies can become stagnant. Oligarchs tend to be clannish, associating only with people who share their values. While this may provide stability, it also prevents people with new ideas and perspectives from entering the ruling class.

Oligarchies that gain too much power can harm the people by restricting the free market. With unlimited power, the oligarchs can agree among themselves to fix prices, deny certain benefits to lower classes or limit the quantities of goods available to the general population. These violations of the laws of supply and demand can have a devastating effect on society.

Oligarchies can cause social upheaval. When people realize they have no hope of ever joining the ruling class, they may feel frustrated and even resort to violence. Attempts to overthrow the oligarchy disrupt the economy, harming everyone in the society.

Sources and Further Reference

Michels, Robert. "Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy." Martino Fine Books. ISBN-10: 168422022X

Brown, Daniel. "The 25 richest Russian oligarchs on the 'Putin list.'" Business Insider (Jan. 30, 2018).

"Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity." US Treasury. (April 6, 2018).

Chan, John. "China's new leaders: Profiles of oligarchs." WSWS.org. (2012).

Cassidy, John. "Is America an Oligarchy?" The New Yorker (April 18, 2014).

Krugman, Paul. "Oligarchy, American Style." The New York Times (May 3, 2011)

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What Is an Oligarchy? Definition and Examples

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Learn what an oligarchy is, how it works, and the pros and cons of allowing a few elite people to control an entire country.

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Resource

ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY

Oligarchy is a form of government in which a small group of people hold most or all political power.

Subjects

Religion, Social Studies, Civics

Image

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

At times, other nations refer to Iran as an oligarchy, a derogatory term for governments ruled by a few individuals. The nation is led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (shown here in Mashhad in May 2007) largely in coordination with 2,000 clerics.

Photograph by AFP via Getty Images

Broadly speaking, an oligarchy is a form of government characterized by the rule of a few persons or families. More specifically, the term was used by Greek philosopher Aristotle in contrast to aristocracy, which was another term to describe rule by a privileged few. However, to Aristotle, an aristocracy signified rule by the best members of society, while an oligarchy was characterized by the rule of the few for corrupt and unjust purposes.

Although the term has, generally, fallen out of favor, oligarchy is sometimes used to describe a government or society in which rulers are selected from a small class of elites. These elites exercise power on behalf of their class rather than for the greater good. German-born, Italian sociologist Robert Michels coined the phrase "iron law of oligarchy," which holds that there is an inevitable tendency of organizations to become less democratic and more oligarchic over time.

In modern times, "oligarchy" is a term generally applied to China and Iran. China describes itself as a communist "people's republic," but leadership of the country has been maintained by a select few for several decades. Members of the oligarchy have included those who were part of the Communist Party and the revolution in 1949, as well as those who came into wealth and power since the opening of China to the global market in the 1980s (often descendants of the early revolutionaries). This system has helped the wealthy and powerful maintain their control, while providing relatively little power or freedom to most citizens.

Iran has been characterized as a theocracy and a clerical oligarchy. Clerics control much of the power structure. In Iran, a Supreme Leader is at the top of the power hierarchy. He (since the position's creation in 1979, there have only been two Supreme Leaders, both of them men) runs the country in conjunction with some 2,000 clerical field operatives. Eighty-six clerics form an Assembly of Experts who meet once a year for a week and choose the Supreme Leader. Iran also has a president, but the executive is subordinate to the Supreme Leader.

In addition, there is a Council of Guardians, which consists of six clerics and six parliamentary appointees. The Council has to approve bills passed by Parliament, and also has influence over who can be elected to political office (Parliament and the Assembly of Experts).

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Oligarchy is a form of government in which a small group of people hold most or all political power.

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A theocracy is a form of government in which one person or a group of people rules in the name of a deity or god (or multiple deities and/or gods). In most theocracies, government officials are considered divinely guided, and most laws are derived from sacred texts and religious teachings. Though it is ancient in origin, this form of government is still prevalent in some parts of the world.

History of Theocracies

Theocracies have changed over time as religions themselves have changed. However, multiple ancient societies are recorded as having been theocracies. For example, ancient emperors in multiple kingdoms across the world were considered to be extensions of gods themselves, predestined to rule. Then in the Dark Ages of Europe, bishops often ruled in the absence of "true monarchs", using religious teachings as law of the land. In the Middle Ages, multiple kings came forward claiming a divine right to the throne.

It is also worth mentioning that it wasn't until 1924 that Chinese emperors were no longer considered to have heavenly powers. Many Asian governments have been influenced by their religious histories but are not currently theocracies.

Comparisons with Other Forms of Government

A theocracy is different from other forms of government (namely republics and democracies) that make it a point to not be guided by religion. For example, the United States government observes no particular religion in order to allow individual citizens religious freedom. The Pledge of Allegiance does say "One nation, under God", but this was added in 1954 and has been attributed to everything from a knee-jerk response to Communism to corporations wanting the public to believe they were "blessed". It does not necessarily indicate the government observes any particular god.

It is also worth noting that theocracies greatly differ from governments that have a state religion or are religiously affiliated. For example, monarchs in the United Kingdom have a long history of practicing Christianity. However, the government itself does not make laws according to the Bible, nor does it view its officials as divinely guided or chosen.

Modern Theocracies

Vatican City is the most famous Christian theocracy, with the Pope as the head of state and voting limited to bishops. Numerous Islamic theocracies also exist, such as Afghanistan, Mauritania, Yemen, Iran and Somalia, where the Islamic teachings of "Sharia" are considered law. Saudi Arabia is another example, going so far as to have "religious police" that ensures compliance among citizens.

Sources:

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A theocracy is a form of government in which one person or a group of people rules in the name of a deity or god (or multiple deities and/or gods). In most theocracies, government officials are considered divinely guided, and most laws are derived from sacred texts and religious teachings.

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What Is Theocracy? Definition and Examples

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A theocracy is a form of government in which priests rule in the name of a deity or deities. Learn the history and traits of theocracy.

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Theocracy: Meaning, Examples & Characteristics | Vaia

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Theocracy: ✓ Meaning ✓ Examples ✓ Government ✓ Pros ✓ Cons ✓ Characteristics ✓ Vaia Original

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Theocracy is defined as "government of a state by immediate divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided" or "a state governed by a theocracy" (Merriam-Webster).

Theocracy countries include Vatican City, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, and Afghanistan.

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Research Guides: Forms of Government: Theocracy

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A topic guide with resources on the major forms of government and political thought.

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A theocracy is a government which features a religious person, being, or idea as the highest ruler within its structures. The population might elect a President, but the President would be viewed as required to report to a god. This type of structure tends to support the majority position within the country and allow for less overall societal conflict within that majority because everyone believes something similar.

A theocracy can also create discord because it is directly tied to religious beliefs. If someone disagrees with what the government is doing, their own religious ideas or freedoms can be placed at-risk.

Here are more pros and cons of a theocracy to consider.

What Are the Pros of a Theocracy?

1. It operates efficiently.
A theocracy keeps people united under one large umbrella. Because faith is directly tied into government operations, there are fewer delays in the implementation of operational policies. There is rarely an opportunity for debate when new policies are implemented or current policies are changed. The government decrees what needs to be accomplished. Religious institutions then implement this decree from the pulpit, classroom, or other location of influence.

2. Law enforcement efforts are streamlined.
In the United States, there are four basic levels of government: local, county, state, and national. Each has its own form of law enforcement. A community has police officers. Counties operate with a Sheriff's or Marshall's office. State law enforcement also exists. A national-level law enforcement entity would be like the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States. In the US, there are dozens of national-level government agencies that employ full-time officers who can make an arrest. Within a theocracy, this would become a centralized structure instead of having each be independent of one another.

3. It is a form of government which has higher levels of societal compliance.
Arguably, the greatest fear that humans have is of the unknown. There is nothing scarier, therefore, than what will happen to someone after they die. The hope that a religion offers for what happens after death can help to take that fear away, which is how compliance throughout a society is generated within this type of government. If a person's salvation is threatened because they won't comply with the government, a faithful person may choose to comply to limit their risks of eternal damnation.

4. A theocracy could do amazing things for people in need.
If a theocracy were to follow the edicts of their holy books to the letter, it could change the world in several incredible ways. Hunger could be eliminated because neighbors would share with neighbors. Everyone could have access to proper health care. No one would be living in poverty unless they consciously chose to do so. There would be more helping hands available to those in need.

5. There is no longer a need to find a compromise.
Because the majority is already on the same page for governmental policies and procedures, there is less time spent trying to find a compromise between ideas. Even if there is a "conflict" between two groups, the supreme overseeing the government would have the final say. People would come together, pray or worship, and come away with a common goal.

What Are the Cons of a Theocracy?

1. Minority groups are not often tolerated within a theocracy.
Theocracies demand conformity. One may be allowed to believe in a variation of the overall religious beliefs that form the backbone of the government, but not in something completely different. In a Christian theocracy, being a Baptist or a Catholic might be allowed, but being a Muslim may not be allowed.

2. It is a governmental structure which encourages discord.
In a theocracy, because a religious being or god is the head of the government, discord is invited within the population. These religious ideas are supernatural, even if a human is representing themselves as a god, so it becomes difficult to question the ideas that come from such a governmental structure. If you question the government, you question God - and that's a battle the faithful within a theocracy will not allow someone to win.

3. Businesses can operate only if they follow the same religious principles.
Hobby Lobby sued the Federal Government over the mandate to provide insurance that included birth control because it went against their organizational beliefs. In a theocracy, the ability to sue would be limited. If a business was not following the mandates of the government, then their activities would be against what the supreme being in charge would want and the government would simply shut the business down.

4. Unique individuals each have their own unique faith.
For this reason, conformity is either forced or impossible to achieve within a theocratic society. Everyone has their own reasons for believing what they do. Their faith, whether it is in God, science, or the lack of a supernatural being, comes from individualized perspectives, research, and philosophical pursuits. An attempt to bind different people together, even when they may believe in the same religious being, will eventually shatter because there isn't a "group" truth. There is only an "individual" truth.

5. A theocracy alters fundamental religious beliefs.
Going back to the Christian theocracy example, a New Testament command dictates that people should "love God" and "love their neighbor as themselves." The "sum of the law" is found in these. Is it loving to declare war on another nation? Does one serve God if they exclude one group from healthcare? Is testing for drug use something that is loving when people are hungry and need food, but have been unemployed for a lengthy period?

6. It is selfish.
People within a theocracy are looking out for their best interests first. They want to work on their own salvation before trying to help someone else achieve success. That is why this form of government often fails. The humans at the top of the government have the most power to ensure their own salvation, so they work on that before they help the rest of the people.

7. Facts are ignored if they don't agree with the holy book.
Imagine if the creationism vs evolutionism debate were held in a theocracy. Would the idea of evolution be able to exist if the process wasn't outlined in the holy book?

The pros and cons of a theocracy show us that it is an idea that might seem like it can bring people together, but what it tends to do is tear people apart. This is one of the reasons why the United States was founded on a principle of separating the church and the state from each other. Religious beliefs can work with government, but they struggle to be effective when working as government.

Blog Post Author Credentials
Louise Gaille is the author of this post. She received her B.A. in Economics from the University of Washington. In addition to being a seasoned writer, Louise has almost a decade of experience in Banking and Finance. If you have any suggestions on how to make this post better, then go here to contact our team.

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A theocracy is a government which features a religious person, being, or idea as the

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In the mid-nineteenth century, the word anarchy—from the Greek word anarchos, or “having no ruler”—carried few of the connotations of violent lawlessness it would acquire by the 1890s. Anarchism referred instead to a world without hierarchy or rules, without government or private property. Anarchists believed in a future of collective action, wherein equal individuals formed cooperative associations dedicated to mutual aid and common goals. Sustainable agriculture, fair industry, and craft—as well as ample leisure time—were essential elements in this new world order in which work was shouldered by all, and decisions would be made locally by people known to one another.

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Anarchy vs. Government - The Institute of World Politics

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From the time “recorded” history began (6,000 BC), all societies on earth have lived in something we call “government,” including aboriginals, tribes, and

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Anarchy is a situation in which a government either does not exist or has no authority or control over the people. The philosophy of anarchism suggests that societies can survive and thrive only when operating under alternatives to traditional government rule. While often misused in describing a state of violent lawlessness, chaos, and social collapse, anarchy is synonymous with concepts such as freedom, liberty, independence, and self-government. In theory, anarchism envisions a peaceful, kinder, and more equitable society.

Key Takeaways: Anarchy

Anarchy Definition

The term anarchy comes from the ancient Greek word anarchos, meaning "without rulers." As used today in political science and the area of international relations, anarchy can refer to the reduction or total absence of conventional government rule. It can also refer to any country or community that is temporarily or permanently under no system of governmental control. For example, when Black Lives Matter movement protestors took control of areas of Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, in the summer of 2020, President Donald Trump declared the cities to be in a state of anarchy and dispatched federal law enforcement agents to restore order. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has classified acts of violence in the pursuit of anarchy to be a form of domestic terrorism.

In reality, however, anarchy describes a peaceful utopian society in which the best aspects of communism and classical liberalism are combined to produce what sociologist and author Cindy Milstein has called a "free society of free individuals." That is a society that emphasizes individual freedom and equality.

Anarchism is a political philosophy and movement that questions authority and opposes government rule and the creation of bureaucratic enforcement systems. Often used negatively as a nickname for violent extremism, anarchism is characterized as a radical, left-wing belief calling for the abolishment of government and all government systems that enforce laws in unequal or unjust ways. Anarchism seeks to replace government-sanctioned power structures considered to be naturally unfair to minorities, such as capitalism or the prison industrial complex, with non-bureaucratic systems in which decisions are made by the people. Key tactics of anarchism include peaceful political protest and mutual aid-the voluntary sharing of economic and humanitarian resources among all members of the society.

Anarchists

Anarchists are individuals or groups that advocate anarchy. They believe that government authority is unnecessary and potentially harmful to society. Instead, they believe people should be allowed to rule themselves through voluntary political practices such as direct democracy. Anarchists feel that such practices embody the attributes of equality, individualism, economic self-reliance, and community interdependence.

The Occupy Movement

As one of the best-known examples of a modern anarchist organization, the Occupy movement opposes economic inequality resulting from what its members consider cases of "false democracy." Inspired in part by the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the Occupy movement strives to advance economic equality and the establishment of new, more progressive forms of democracy. Indicative of its cause, the movement uses the slogan, "We are the 99%" about its claim that the top 1% of income earners in America control a disproportionate share of the nation's wealth compared to the other 99%. According to a recent report from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the after-tax income of the top 1% of income earners has nearly tripled since 1987.

Occupy first gained widespread attention between September 17, and November 15, 2011, when an estimated 3,000 protestors taking part in its Occupy Wall Street movement established encampments in New York City's Zuccotti Park. By October 9, 2011, similar Occupy protests were underway in Oakland, California, Washington, D.C., and at least 600 other communities across the United States. By November 1, 2011, Occupy protests had spread to dozens of other countries.

Since the last Occupy Wall Street encampment was cleared, the Occupy movement is credited with making income inequality an issue that presidential candidates and lawmakers can no longer afford to avoid. One of Occupy's largely unrecognized victories is the momentum it has built for a progressively higher federal minimum wage in the United States.

The Foundations of Anarchism

In 1904, Italian anarchist composer and poet, Pietro Gori defined the foundations of anarchy as the creation of a new, fully liberated society through the application of the moral principles of mutual aid and social solidarity.

"The freedom of each is not possible without the freedom of all-as the health of every cell cannot to be without the health of the whole body. And society is not an organism? Once a part of it is ill, the whole social body will be affected, and suffering." -- Pietro Gori, 1904

In his writing, Gori strongly rejects the belief that violence is a tactic of the anarchist movement. Instead, he contends that the unjust application of overstepping government power is the source of violence, and the peoples' struggle to resist that power is a natural reaction.

Proposed by Russian philosopher and anarchist Peter Kropotkin in the late 1860s, mutual aid refers to the evolutionary tendency of human beings to work together as a community in overcoming shared problems, defending against shared enemies, and creating a society in which all people who contribute will equally share the benefits. Today, mutual aid as envisioned by Kropotkin is the basis for institutions such as labor unions and collective bargaining, credit unions, collective health insurance plans, and any number of organizations of people who volunteer to help other members of the community.

Solidarity

Closely related to mutual aid, social solidarity is the idea that evolution has left humans with a natural desire to form and participate in mutually beneficial groups or communities and to have a selfless and unshakable concern for each other's wellbeing. For example, when the Occupy Wallstreet movement protestors were arrested and jailed, other Occupy members assisted them by arranging for experienced defense lawyers, raising bail, and sending money and clothes to them in prison. Social solidarity also takes the form of working together to organize protest campaigns and other actions intended to influence public opinion. Finally, solidarity supports the anarchist argument that people are capable of governing themselves.

Anarchy Symbol

The best-known modern symbol for anarchy is the circle-A, the capital letter "A" displayed inside the capital letter "O." The "A" stands for the first letter of "anarchy." The "O" stands for the word "order." Placed together, the circle-A symbol stands for "society seeks order in anarchy," a phrase from Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's 1840 book What Is Property?

The circle-A was first used in the late 1860s as the logo for the International Workingmen's Association, a European labor movement dedicated to bringing together several similar left-wing socialist and communist trade unions to further the struggles of the working class. During the 1970s, several popular punk rock bands of the anarcho-punk movement used the circle-A on their album covers and posters, further raising public awareness of the symbol's meaning.

While anthropologists suggest that many prehistoric societies operated as anarchies, the first examples of formal anarchist thought emerged around 800 BCE when philosophers in ancient Greece and China began to question the authority of government to limit individual freedom. During the Middle Ages (500-1500 CE) and the Age of Enlightenment (1700-1790 CE), conflict among religious sects and the rise of scientific rationalism -the belief that the functions of society should be based on knowledge rather than on religion of emotion-set the stage for the development of modern anarchism.

The French Revolution, from1789 to 1802, marked a turning point in the history of anarchism. The revolutionary uprisings by masses of everyday citizens in events such as the Storming of the Bastille and the Women's March on Versailles would influence the thinking of future anarchists.

Partly as an outgrowth of Marxism, modern anarchism during the 19th century focused on the labor movement's struggle for workers' rights. The Industrial Revolution, objections to capitalism, and mass migration helped spread anarchism around the world. It was during this period that the major branches of anarchism-anarcho-communism and anarcho-socialism-sprang up. While anarchism played a key role in the 1917 Russian Revolution, the anarchists were brutally persecuted after the resulting Bolshevik government under Vladimir Lenin began to exert its authority. During Lenin's so-called Red Terror, as many as 500,000 former anarchists, suddenly declared enemies of the state, were jailed, tortured, and executed.

During the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, anarchists established their state of Catalonia. Featuring powerful labor unions and successful collective agriculture, the Catalonian anarchists and their allies were driven out during the rise of fascism in Spain under dictator Francisco Franco.

In the 1960s and 1970s, today's brand of anarchism emerged as activists of the New Left movement campaigned for social reforms such as civil rights, same-sex marriage, feminism, and women's reproductive rights.

Schools of Thought

While each has several variations, the two major schools of thought in anarchy are individualist anarchism and social anarchism.

Individualist

Individualist anarchists regard society as a group of separate self-governing individuals and thus value individual liberty above all other considerations. To gain and protect their liberty, individualist anarchists argue that because the conventional government has the power to impose taxes and restrictive laws, it must be abolished. They believe that free of government restrictions, people will naturally act rationally, working to better themselves by achieving their personal goals. The result, they say, would be a stable and peaceful society.

Individual anarchism has been the basis for several alternative lifestyle movements, such as the Yippies. Founded in late 1967, the Youth International Party, whose members were commonly called Yippies, was a radical youth-oriented countercultural revolutionary offshoot of the free speech and anti-war movements of the late 1960s. More recently, some advocates of bitcoin currency have described themselves as individualist anarchists.

Also known as "collectivism," social anarchism considers mutual aid, community support, and social equality as being essential to securing individual freedom.

In contrast to individualist anarchists, social anarchists embrace positive liberty-the ability to take control of one's life-rather than negative liberty, which is the total absence of obstacles, barriers, or limitations. According to the concept of positive liberty, freedom is not just the absence of government interference but the ability of individuals to realize their full potential when political power and economic resources are shared equally among all members of the community. In this manner, social anarchists favor direct democracy and shared ownership of wealth and the means of production.

When most people speak negatively about "anarchism," they are thinking of social anarchism. However, social anarchists say that rather than violence, chaos, and social disorder, they seek a "level playing field" of political, social, and economic power. As a process then, social anarchism seeks to empower the powerless, include the excluded, and share power and authority.

Types of Anarchism

Like most political ideologies, anarchism has proven to be far from a consistent concept. Instead, it has changed and taken different forms as people have interpreted and applied it in different ways according to their beliefs and needs.

Anarchist Capitalism

While most types of anarchism fall on the extreme left end of the political spectrum, there are surprising variants. Rather than unrestricted individual freedom, anarchist capitalism, or lasseiz-faire capitalism, embraces free-market capitalism as key to a free society. Unlike most anarchists, anarchist capitalists believe in the individual, rather than communal ownership of property, means of production, and wealth. They contend that private enterprise, if free of government control, could and would provide the people with all essential services, such as health care, education, road construction, and police protection. For example, American anarchist capitalists argue that the nation would be better served by a privately owned prison system.

Anarchist Communism

Also known as anarcho-communism, anarchist communism stresses social equality and the elimination of class discrimination caused by the unequal distribution of wealth. Anarchist communists call for replacing capitalism with an economy based on collective ownership of means of production and distribution of wealth through voluntary associations such as trade associations and trade unions. Government and private property do not exist under anarchist communism. Instead, individuals and groups are self-governed and are free to satisfy their needs through their voluntary contributions to economic productivity. Since people are free to engage in whatever activities best fulfill their needs, traditional wage-based work is unnecessary in anarchist communism.

A recent example of anarchist communism in practice is the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ), a six-city block area in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle, Washington, that was occupied by protestors from June 8, to July 1, 2020. Originally protesting the police shooting of George Floyd, the CHAZ occupiers went on to demand nationwide social reforms including lower rent, free medicine hospitals, the "abolition of imprisonment," and greatly reduced funding of police departments.

Anarchist Socialism

Anarchist Socialism, or anarcho-socialism, is a broad and ambiguous term that refers to the two major schools of anarchist theory-social anarchism and individualist anarchism. The first combines the basic principles of socialism and anarchism to create a collectivist society-s society that places the needs and goals of the group as a whole over those of each individual. The latter stresses individual liberty in a society that places the needs of each individual over those of a group as a whole.

Green Anarchism

Typically associated with the often confrontational actions of activist groups like Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd, green anarchism emphasizes environmental issues. Green anarchists extend anarchism's traditional focus on interactions between humans to include interactions between humans and non-humans. In this manner, they stand for not only for the liberation of humans but for various degrees of liberation for non-humans. Some animal rights activists, for example, argue that some non-human species with thinking and conscious minds and a sense of self-awareness be given the same basic rights as humans.

Crypto Anarchism

Crypto anarchists support the use of digital money, such as Bitcoin to get around the control, surveillance, and taxation by what they consider governments and financial institutions, thus permanently crippling their authority. Crypto anarchists argue that like the printing press reduced the power of medieval craft guilds and monarchies, the use of digital money will change the nature of big corporations and end government interference in economic transactions.

Famous Anarchists

Far from shadowy, bomb-throwing malcontents, the foundational figures in the creation of modern anarchist thought have been peaceful yet progressive philosophers, economists, and academics. While they all held decidedly negative views of traditional government, their many variations, interpretations, and methods for achieving societies free of government control continue to inspire anarchists today.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (January 5, 1809 - January 18, 1865) was a French socialist, politician, philosopher, and economist who was the first person to publicly call himself an anarchist. Widely considered the "father of anarchism," Proudhon is best remembered for his 1840 work What is Property? Or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government. In this seminal thesis, Proudhon asks the question, "What is property?" to which he memorably answers "it is robbery!"

Based on the foundational principle of mutual aid, Proudhon's philosophy of anarchism called for a cooperative society in which self-governed individuals or groups freely shared the goods and services they produced. These "producers" were able to borrow credit to start new businesses from a non-profit-making "Bank of the People." While Proudhon's theory rejected large-scale ownership of private property, in the form of wealth, as a form of theft, it allowed individuals to own enough property to maintain their livelihoods and independence. As his theories of anarchism evolved to combine elements of pure socialism with limited capitalism, Proudhon came to state that as a safeguard against government control, "Property is liberty."

Mikhail Bakunin

Mikhail Bakunin (May 30, 1814 - July 1, 1876) was a radical Russian revolutionary credited with creating social or "collectivist" anarchism. Bakunin's theories rejected all forms of hierarchical power and authority from God to government. In his 1882 manuscript God and the State, he wrote, "The liberty of man consists solely in this, that he obeys the laws of nature because he has himself recognized them as such, and not because they have been imposed upon him externally by any foreign will whatsoever, human or divine, collective or individual." Bakunin detested the privileged classes arising from social and economic inequality. In this vein, he considered both capitalism and government in any form to be the most dangerous threats to individual freedom.

Bakunin was deeply committed to orchestrating a universal revolution in which peasants and workers would rise up to form a utopian communal society in which all people were socially and economically equal. His outspoken dedication to this goal earned Bakunin the reputation as being the creator of the theory of revolutionary terrorism.

In his later life, Bakunin developed a feud with communist revolutionary Karl Marx who had called him "a man devoid of all theoretical knowledge." Bakunin, on the other hand, spoke of Marx as a man with no "instinct of liberty," who was "from head to foot, an authoritarian." Bakunin argued that Marxism could result only in a dictatorship that was nothing but "a sham expression of the people's will," adding that, "When the people are being beaten with a stick, they are not much happier if it is called 'the People's Stick.'"

Peter Kropotkin

Peter Kropotkin (December 9, 1842 - February 8, 1921) was a Russian anarchist and socialist widely credited with creating the most agreed-upon definition of anarchism in all of its many forms. "Anarchism," wrote Kropotkin in the 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, "is a name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government-harmony in such a society being obtained, not by the submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being."

As a proponent of a communist society based on self-governing communities, Kropotkin criticized what considered the shortcomings of capitalism-unequal distribution of wealth, poverty, and an economy manipulated by a false scarcity of goods and resources. Instead, he called for an economic system based on voluntary cooperation and mutual aid between individuals.

Emma Goldman

Emma Goldman (June 27, 1869 - May 14, 1940) was a Russian-born American activist and writer who played a key role in shaping anarchist political philosophy and activities in the United States from around 1890 to 1917. Attracted to anarchism by the 1886 Chicago Haymarket labor riot, Goldman became an acclaimed writer and speaker drawing thousands to her lectures on the use of extremist anarchist tactics to achieve women's rights and social equality in a classless society. In 1892 Goldman assisted her life partner Alexander Berkman in an attempt to assassinate anti-labor industrialist and financier Henry Clay Frick as an act of defiance. Frick survived, but Berkman was sentenced to 22 years in prison. Over the next serval years, Goldman was jailed several times for inciting riots and illegally handing out propaganda supporting the general use of birth control practices.

In 1906, Goldman founded Mother Earth, a magazine devoted to American anarchism. In 1917, Mother Earth ran an article opposing the United States' entry into World War I and urging American men to refuse to register for the military draft. On June 15, 1917, the U.S. Congress passed the Espionage Act, establishing harsh fines and prison terms of up to 20 years for anyone convicted of obstructing the draft or encouraging "disloyalty" to the U.S. government. Convicted of violating the Espionage Act, Goldman had her American citizenship revoked and was deported to the Soviet Union in 1919.

The fact that there are currently no developed countries in the world that operate as pure anarchies indicates that there are critical problems with anarchist theory. Some of the major criticisms of anarchism include:

It is Not Feasible

The very feasibility of a purely anarchist society is questionable. While anarchist practices can work in small city-states, regions, or villages, such as the rural Spanish settlement of Marinaleda, it is unlikely that anarchist organizations can take hold and sustain themselves on a national or global level. For example, history has shown that direct democracy, an essential element of anarchism, is simply too unmanageable to work among large, politically, and culturally diverse populations such as those of most countries.

It is Destructive

Critics contend that anarchism is merely a less-threatening name for chaos and civil disorder resulting from a rejection of structured order. Anarchists, they claim, are violent and nihilistic and dedicated to destroying everything, even morality itself. To be sure, history is filled with cases of violence being a tactic or a result of anarchism.

It is Unstable

Anarchy, critics say, is inherently unstable and will always evolve back into structured government rule. In developing the theory of the social contract, Thomas Hobbes and other political philosophers maintain that government naturally emerges as a corrective response to anarchy which maintains order and protects the interests of the people. Another theory holds that a so-called "night-watchman state" can emerge as a response to anarchism in which people protect their property by buying the services of a private protection agency, which eventually evolves into something resembling a government.

It is Utopian

Critics further suggest that exercises in anarchist thought are fruitless because it is simply impossible for individuals or small groups, no matter how dedicated, to destroy or deconstruct an established governmental structure. It would be better, they argue, to concentrate on the inequality, and threats to liberty posed by the ruling government and work for reforms through the existing political processes.

Sources and Further Reference

Kelly, Kim. "Stop blaming everything bad on anarchists." The Washington Post, June 4, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/04/stop-blaming-everything-bad-anarchists/.

Milstein, Cindy. "Anarchism and Its Aspirations." AK Press, January 5, 2010, ISBN-13: 9781849350013.

Thompson, Derek. "Occupy the World: The '99 Percent' Movement Goes Global." The Atlantic, October 15, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/10/occupy-the-world-the-99-percent-movement-goes-global/246757/.

"The Distribution of Household Income, 2017." U.S. Congressional Budget Office, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56575.

Oglesby, Carl. "The New Left Reader." Grove Press, 1969, ISBN 83-456-1536-8.

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph (1840). "What Is Property?: An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government." Whitlock Publishing, April 15, 2017, ISBN-13: 978-1943115235.

Bakunin, Mikhail (1882). "God And The State." AK Press, January 7, 1970, ISBN-13: 9780486224831.

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What Is Anarchy? Definition and Examples

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Anarchy is a situation in which a government either does not exist or has no authority or control over the people. The philosophy of anarchism suggests that societies can survive and thrive only when operating under alternatives to traditional government rule.

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What is Anarchism? What are the Pros and Cons of Anarchism? Anarchism Explained #anarchism

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anarchy, in political science and the study of international relations, the absence of any authority superior to nation-states and capable of arbitrating their disputes and enforcing international law. The term anarchy is derived from the ancient Greek root anarchos ("without authority"), denoting the absence of the rule of law or of settled government.

The prevalence of anarchy in the relations between states is the basic assumption of realism, a prominent school of thought in international relations theory. According to realists, international law in practice imposes few direct constraints on the behaviour of states, in part because there is almost no way of enforcing it. In the absence of a suprastate power or arbiter, there are no enforceable rules of conduct, especially for strong states. The harsh interstate environment is anarchic both in the strict sense of lacking enforceable international law and in the broader sense of being violently chaotic. The prevalence of this environment in turn requires that the primary goals of individual states be survival and security.

Some scholars, especially those associated with the liberal approach to international relations, believe that anarchy can be overcome, or "exited," through international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and through the widespread acceptance of international law, especially by strong states. For realists, however, the UN, at least in its present form, is incapable of fulfilling that promise, since it has no coercive power that is independent of the will of the major powers. Thus, according to realists, unless the UN is fundamentally transformed or a genuine world state is created, the state of anarchy will endure.

Consequences of anarchy

Realists have argued that the prevalence of anarchy in the state system requires individual states to be ruthlessly self-seeking. Because there is no suprastate actor capable of enforcing international law, each state must provide for its own security. Thus, a structural anarchy is also inevitably a self-help regime: every government reserves the right to decide what is just or necessary for itself and to take up arms to pursue or enforce that decision. Because the best way to achieve security under anarchy is to be powerful (both militarily and economically), self-help leads naturally to power-maximizing behaviour. In an anarchic state-system, power-maximizing behaviour is therefore the normal behaviour of all states.

The combination of anarchy, ruthless self-help, and power-maximizing behaviour by all states leads to another realist assertion: in such an environment "war is normal," as a leading realist theoretician, the American political scientist Kenneth Waltz, claimed. In other words, war, or the threat of war, is the primary means by which states under anarchy resolve conflicts of interest. The readiness of every state in an anarchic system to defend its interests through organized violence is the primary factor responsible for the development of internal cultures of militarism and bellicosity (and an emphasis on maintaining honour-i.e., international status).

Anarchy and the distribution of power

Political scientists also suggest that under anarchic conditions, there is a moment when the danger of large-scale war is most acute: when a sudden large shift in the distribution of power among states occurs. Political scientists refer to such a shift as a power-transition crisis. The shift can be either a dramatic increase in the capabilities of one of the main actors or a dramatic decrease in the capabilities of another main unit. But when the existing distribution of privilege, influence, and goods in a system becomes mismatched to the changing realities of power, the result tends to be large-scale war, which in turn creates a new structure, a new configuration of privilege, influence, and goods-one better matched to the actual distribution of power.

Thus, major realignments of power, influence, and status within anarchic state systems have tended to be accompanied by great violence-what political scientists call hegemonic war. World War I is a good example. Realists hold that power-transition crises and hegemonic wars often result from the attempt by a main actor to preserve its deteriorating position within the system; it acts while its governing elite feels it still can. But this is only a trend, for realists also agree that individual moments of decision making by governments are too idiosyncratic to be predictable. Hence, the power-transition crisis caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union was handled without war, thanks to good diplomacy on both sides. Historically, however, a power-transition crisis tends to lead to hegemonic war to establish new leaders within anarchic systems.

Critiques of the realist notion of anarchy

Modern realist thinking rose to prominence as a pessimistic response-first, to the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I and to the terrible international events of the 1930s, which were followed by the cataclysm of World War II and then the onset of the decadeslong Cold War, despite many diplomatic efforts at detente. However, the peaceful denouement of the Cold War, and the relatively high level of interstate cooperation that accompanied it (1989-91), led in the 1990s to a resurgence of liberal-institutionalist (also called neoliberal) criticism of anarchy theory as too pessimistic. Liberal institutionalists, who held that state behaviour can be positively modified by interaction with international institutions such as the UN and the European Union (EU), argued that the realist view of interstate behaviour underestimated the extent of communal interest, interdependence, and cooperation that exists among modern states and that it underestimated as well the human desire for peace.

Realists responded by arguing that perceived national interest and little else-certainly not altruism-determined state actions at the end of the Cold War and that the relative success and smooth working of international institutions in the 1990s merely reflected the fact that they were supported by (and were useful to) the overwhelming power and prestige of the United States. They also pointed to the reemergence after the Cold War of a more internationally assertive Russia, as well as the rise in power of an increasingly nationalistic and militarized China, as demonstrating the persistence, pervasiveness, and ferocity of international competition.

Another major criticism, based on the constructivist theory of international relations, is that the notion of anarchy as realists deploy it constitutes an artificial and arbitrary discourse of competition and violence. That discourse itself has a detrimental effect on the international system because of its destructive impact on the expectations and perceptions of national leaders. In other words, the harsh paradigms of realist discourse constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy. For constructivists, the world of states is not objectively given but rather socially constructed by human beings acting on specific ideas. The interstate system may indeed be anarchic, without a guiding authority or effective means of enforcing international law, but anarchy is, in the words of the American political scientist Alexander Wendt, what "states make of it," and the pessimistic theorizing of realism should be combated and replaced by a new communitarian discourse of interstate relations. Once such a discourse has replaced pessimistic and destructive anarchy discourse, a new and more benign international environment might be constructed-as similar communitarian discourses have accomplished in the past, according to constructivists, especially in the Middle Ages.

Realists, while acknowledging the impact of discourse on state action, have responded that such thinking gives too much power to words. They argue that the prevailing medieval communitarian discourse actually had little practical impact on the rivalrous and warlike real-world actions of medieval states within their anarchic state system. Moreover, the originators of constructivism were mostly American scholars writing in the 1990s, before the September 11 attacks of 2001, in a world that the United States dominated and in a society that (extraordinarily in history) had little experience of what it felt like to be acted on violently and decisively from the outside, by others. Only intellectuals ensconced in the safety of the American world of the 1990s, they argued, could have doubted a state's need to establish security against a hostile world without law and order.
Arthur M. Eckstein The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

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anarchy | Definition, Consequences, Examples, & Facts

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Anarchy, in political science and the study of international relations, the absence of any authority superior to nation-states and capable of arbitrating their disputes and enforcing international law. The term anarchy is derived from the ancient Greek root anarchos ('without authority').

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How the oligarchy wins: lessons from ancient Greece | Ganesh Sitaraman

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Ganesh Sitaraman looks at what two recent books – Classical Greek Oligarchy by Matthew Simonton and Oligarchy by Jeffrey Winters – can teach us about defending democracy from oligarchs