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(DE)radical Manual - for youth workers in prevention of radicalization & extremism

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(DE)radical Manual - for youth workers in prevention of radicalization & extremism

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Get access to files anywhere through secure cloud storage and file backup for your photos, videos, files and more with Google Drive.

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Art Therapy is a Political Practice - Head Heart Therapy

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By: Alison Dowd As a psychotherapist with training in art […]

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Going Mainstream on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Going Mainstream

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Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists

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Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists

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By day, Julia Ebner works at a counter-extremism think tank, monitoring radical groups from the outside. But two years ago, she began to feel she was only seeing half the picture; she needed to get inside the groups to truly understand them. She decided to go undercover in her spare hours - late nights, holidays, weekends - adopting five different identities, and joining a dozen extremist groups from across the ideological spectrum.

Her journey would take her from a Generation Identity global strategy meeting in a pub in Mayfair, to a Neo- Music Festival on the border of Germany and Poland. She would get relationship advice from 'Trad Wives' and Jihadi Brides and hacking lessons from ISIS. She was in the channels when the alt-right began planning the lethal Charlottesville rally, and spent time in the networks that would radicalise the Christchurch .

In

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Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists

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Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists [Ebner, Julia] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists

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Contemporary Art and Political Violence: The Role of Art in the Rehabilitation and Healing of Communities Affected by Political Violence

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Contemporary Art and Political Violence: The Role of Art in the Rehabilitation and Healing of Communities Affected by Political Violence

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Art Therapy and Political Violence: With Art, Without Illusion

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Art Therapy and Political Violence: With Art, Without Illusion

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Art Therapy and Political Violence: With Art, Without Illusion

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Amazon.com: Art Therapy and Political Violence: With Art, Without Illusion: 9781583919552: Kalmanowitz, Debra, Lloyd, Bobby, Waller, Diane, McNiff, Shaun: Books

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Saudi De-Radicalization Center Uses Art Therapy to Tackle Extremists

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Saudi De-Radicalization Center Uses Art Therapy to Tackle Extremists

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Saudi De-Radicalization Center Uses Art Therapy to Tackle Extremists

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Saudi Arabia’s Mohammad Bin Nayef Center for Advice, Counseling and Care seeks to de-radicalize wannabe jihadists with therapy and painting.

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Exploration of Artistic Interventions to Avert Extremist Violent Behaviour inChildren from Conflict Stricken Areas

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Exploration of Artistic Interventions to Avert Extremist Violent Behaviour inChildren from Conflict Stricken Areas

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RESTORE_5th online session - SystemicAproach

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Covid- protests escalation in 2020 (try to storm Reichstag)

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Covid- protests escalation in 2020 (try to storm Reichstag)

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Germany has handled the pandemic well and its government enjoys high public trust. But the minority opposing coronavirus rules includes a far-right faction that worries officials.

Riot police officers in front of the Reichstag during a demonstration on Saturday. Hundreds of far-right protesters broke through the line and stormed the building. Credit... Omer Messinger/Getty Images

BERLIN - It was shortly after 7 p.m. when a self-described healer got on stage outside the German Parliament and urged the jeering crowd of protesters to storm the building: "There is no more police!" she shouted. "We have won!"

What followed was a scene many Germans thought had been confined to their history books: Hundreds of far-right activists waving the black, white and red flag of the pre-1918 German Empire that once inspired the Nazis broke through a police barrier and tried to force their way into the building.

It took only a few tense minutes before the police, though vastly outnumbered, managed to push them back. But Saturday's events marked an alarming escalation of the protests against Germany's response to the pandemic that have grown steadily bigger and - on the fringes at least - angrier.

Strikingly, that outpouring of anger comes at a time when Chancellor Angela Merkel's government is enjoying high levels of trust and popularity, and the great majority of Germans approve of its virus control measures. Germany has managed the pandemic well, keeping the number of deaths low, reopening schools and pumping billions of euros into welfare programs that so far have kept unemployment at bay.

Small as they are in numbers, though, the group who tried to take over the historic Parliament building, the Reichstag, prompted shocked responses and grim comparisons to Germany's past.

"The fact that Nazis with imperial war flags try to storm the Bundestag recalls the darkest period in German history," Robert Habeck, the co-leader of Germany's Green party, told the Funke media group.

"It is intolerable that the Reich flag should fly again at the German Parliament," said Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the head of Chancellor Angela Merkel's center-right party.

Germany's president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, called it "an unbearable attack on the heart of our democracy."

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Germany's president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, at a news conference on Monday, condemned the storming of the Reichstag building by far-right protesters. Credit... Tobias Schwarz/Agence France-Presse - Getty Images

Some 38,000 protesters from all over the country flocked to the German capital last weekend, the biggest number since the marches started in April. It was an eclectic crowd. There were anti-vaxxers like Robert F. Kennedy Jr., anticapitalists, esoterics, ordinary citizens angry at having to wear face masks - but also about 3,000 members of the far-right scene.

"We have everything from Hare Krishna fans to Adolf Hitler fans on the streets," said Matthias Quent, an expert on far-right extremism and the director of an institute that studies democracy and civil society. "It's a very disparate crowd but what unites people is an angry discontent with the establishment. It's a mix of populist and egoist outrage."

The far-right Alternative for Germany party, or AfD, has tried to exploit the pandemic in the same way it used the refugee crisis in 2015, when the government accepted more than one million migrants into the country, to feed a narrative of impending crisis and government failure.

The migrant wave helped propel the AfD into Parliament in the last election, but the issue has lost much of its political potency, as the resettlement has been broadly deemed a success. And with its own lawmakers and voters deeply split over the country's coronavirus measures, the party has seen its share of the vote dip below 10 percent in recent polls.

Although polls suggest few Germans support the protests, officials still worry about the radicalization of the far right. Credit... Achille Abboud/NurPhoto, via Getty Images

In all, only 9 percent of Germans support the protests, polls suggest. And only one in 10 Germans say they disagree with virus-prevention measures like the requirement to wear masks on public transport, in stores and in public buildings including schools and libraries.

Almost eight in ten Germans said they would like to see greater compliance with pandemic controls, and some 28 percent said the measures were not strict enough.

"They shout 'We are the people,' but they're not," Mr. Quent said of the protesters who swarmed the Reichstag.

"In Germany, like many other European countries, we see that far-right parties are losing ground, that there is growing trust in incumbent governments," Mr. Quent said. "In the short term the pandemic can't be exploited by far-right parties."

If the economy deteriorates further and unemployment rises, that equation may change, he said. Already, the AfD and more extreme far-right groups are trying to capitalize on the discontent as they begin positioning themselves for what may be a much uglier political scene some months from now.

What worries officials and extremism experts more immediately is that even if the far right is a minority at the protests, it is radicalizing. Among those calling on supporters to join the protest on Saturday were Björn Höcke, an AfD firebrand, and Martin Sellner, star of the extremist Generation Identity movement, both of whom have been classified as far-right extremists by the domestic intelligence service.

Message boards are flush with far-right conspiracy theories and prepper groups, which have long fantasized about a crisis so deep that it would lead to the collapse of Germany's liberal order. Ahead of Saturday's protest, which the city government had tried to block before being overruled by a court, several public groups on the messaging app Telegram had called for a "storm on Berlin."

Some had posted photos of themselves and their weapons. "That is very unusual for Germany," Mr. Quent said.

The authorities are on high alert. Over the past 14 months, far-right terrorists have assassinated a regional politician on his front porch near the central city of Kassel, attacked a synagogue in Halle, in the east, and in February, killed 10 people in the west, in Hanau. Even before the pandemic hit Germany, far-right extremism and far-right terrorism had been officially identified as the biggest danger to the country's democracy.

A memorial service in the Halle following the attack on a synagogue last year. Credit... Clemens Bilan/EPA, via Shutterstock

At a same time, senior intelligence officials have expressed concern about far-right extremists infiltrating Germany's security services. Cases of far-right extremists in the military and the police, some hoarding weapons and explosives, have multiplied alarmingly in recent years. In July, the government disbanded an entire company of the KSK, the country's special forces, because it was infested with far-right extremists.

At the coronavirus protests on Saturday, far-right activists actively courted police officers deployed to secure the march, urging them to switch sides.

There have been several cases of police officers joining such protests, according to Robert Andreasch, a journalist who has been documenting their appearances. Two active police officers, a retired officer and one who was recently suspended were speakers at the rally on Saturday, one of them referring to a "so-called pandemic" and urging protesters to seek information outside the "mainstream media." Another spoke of "mask slavery."

Meanwhile, it was three police officers who stood their ground on Saturday at the entrance to the Reichstag, the historic Parliament building, and held off the angry mob. A video of the three men pushing back against the demonstrators for several minutes before reinforcements arrived has gone viral in Germany.

It also ignited an uneasy debate about how to better protect the Reichstag. It is a point of pride that the building dedicated to "The German People," as the inscription above its portico reads, remains open to those very people.

The best-selling tabloid Bild has called the police officers who protected it "heroes" and on Monday, President Steinmeier received them at his residence to officially thank them.

"Far-right extremism has deep roots in our society," Mr. Steinmeier said. "It is a serious danger."

Christopher F. Schuetze contributed reporting.

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Far Right Germans Try to Storm Reichstag as Virus Protests Escalate

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Germany has handled the pandemic well and its government enjoys high public trust. But the minority opposing coronavirus rules includes a far-right faction that worries officials. BERLIN - It was shortly after 7 p.m. when a self-described healer got on stage outside the German Parliament and urged the jeering crowd of protesters to storm the building: "There is no more police!"

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Published February 20, 2020

Germany considers tougher gun laws after a suspected coup attempt linked to the far-right Reichsbürger group. DW looks at Germany's gun ownership laws.

German gun owners need a special pass

According to the Weapons Act, you need a weapons possession card ( Waffenbesitzkarte) to own or buy a firearm and a weapons license ( Waffenschein) to use or carry a loaded firearm. This means collectors, for instance, only need the first. Hunters don't need a weapons license as long as they have a hunting license ( Jagdschein) and only use their guns for hunting game.

A weapons possession card allows gun owners only to "transport" a firearm, rather than carry it. That means it must be unloaded and inside a locked case when taken out in public.

A license to carry a gun, or Waffenschein, is only granted in rare cases: Essentially when the applicant can prove that he or she is in greater danger than the general public and that carrying a gun will keep them safer. German law has no provision stipulating whether a gun must be concealed or loaded in public or not.

There is also a minor firearms certificate,( Kleiner Waffenschein) which is easier to obtain, and is needed to carry lower-powered weapons, such as starting pistols, flare guns or anything that can only shoot blanks or irritants. Low powered air guns (below 7.5 joules) also come under this definition.

Altogether, the costs for an application, including the required insurance, can run to around €500 ($540).

What kinds of guns are legal in Germany?

German law makes a distinction between weapons and war weapons, with the latter listed in the War Weapons Control Act.

In Germany, it is illegal to possess or use any war weapons. These include all fully automatic rifles, machine guns (unless antiques from World War II or earlier), or barrels or breeches for such weapons. Pump-action shotguns are also banned under the Weapons Act. Some, though not all, semi-automatic weapons are defined as war weapons.

Who is allowed to carry guns in Germany?

Applicants for a German gun license must

1) be at least 18 years old,

2) have the necessary "reliability" and "personal aptitude,"

3) demonstrate the necessary "specialized knowledge,"

4) demonstrate a "need," and

5) have liability insurance for personal injury and property damage of at least €1 million.

How do applicants demonstrate 'reliability' and 'personal aptitude'?

Local authorities are responsible for processing gun license applications and therefore verifying reliability, personal aptitude and need. Depending on where the applicant lives, the competent authority could be either the public order office ( Ordnungsamt) or the police.

Amongst other criteria, the law says that applicants are deemed unreliable or lacking personal aptitude, if:

They have been convicted of a crime in the last ten years

Their circumstances give reason to assume they will use weapons recklessly

They have been members of an organization that has been banned or deemed unconstitutional

They have in the last five years pursued or supported activities deemed a threat to Germany's foreign interests

They have been taken into preventive police custody more than once in the last five years

They are dependent on alcohol, drugs, or are mentally ill.

In addition, anyone under 25 applying for their first gun license must provide a certificate of "mental aptitude" from a public health officer or psychologist.

How do applicants demonstrate 'specialized knowledge'?

Applicants for a gun license must pass an examination or have undergone training to acquire a gun. State examinations cover the legal and technical aspects of firearms, safe handling, and shooting skills.

Specialized knowledge can also be verified with other examinations, as long as they cover the same areas: These include hunting license examinations, gunsmith's trade examinations, or full-time employment in the gun or arms trade for three years.

The completion of certain training courses involving firearms, which conclude with an examination, is also recognized as specialized knowledge.

In addition, officially recognized shooting associations can also carry out their own examinations.

How do applicants demonstrate 'need'?

The law states that gun license applicants must prove some need to obtain one, and defines this as "personal or economic interests meriting special recognition, above all as a hunter, marksman, traditional marksman, collector of weapons or ammunition, weapons or ammunition expert, endangered person, a weapons manufacturer, weapons dealer or a security firm."

People who show they are unusually likely to be the victim of a crime can also be deemed as having a need to carry a firearm.

Members of shooting associations and clubs can also demonstrate the "need" for a gun license if they submit a certificate from an association of sports shooters confirming that they need these weapons in order to maintain their tradition.
Edited by: Rina Goldenberg A version of this article was first published in 2020. It stated that hunters in Germany must carry a gun license (Waffenschein). In fact, they need a hunting license (Jagdschein). That has now been corrected. While you're here: Every Tuesday, DW editors round up what is happening in German politics and society. You can sign up here for the weekly email newsletter Berlin Briefing.

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Gun control and firearms possession in Germany - DW - 12/12/2022

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Germany considers tougher gun laws after a suspected coup attempt linked to the far-right Reichsbürger group. DW looks at Germany's gun ownership laws.

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Ban on anti-constitutional symbols in Germany

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Ban on anti-constitutional symbols in Germany

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Mara Bierbach | Karsten Kaminski

August 14, 2018

Illegally displaying Nazi symbols in Germany can be punished by three years in jail. The ban broadly exempts art, but which works are allowed to show swastikas, SS sig runes and such is often more a matter of the medium.

In the German version of the popular video game Wolfenstein II, swastikas have been replaced by triangular symbols and the fictional, mustacheless dictator Herr Heiler stands in for the English version's Adolf Hitler, angering many gamers. Until recently, the Entertainment Software Self-Regulation Body (USK) had not permitted Nazi symbols - including Hitler's face - anywhere in video games in Germany. Last week, the USK lifted its blanket ban, though symbols still must be approved.

Displaying Nazi emblems in Germany is, naturally, complicated, even without the USK's guidelines for age ratings and game content. "Most countries don't penalize the display of Nazi symbols," the lawyer Christian Solmecke told DW.

In Germany, the law considers swastikas and SS sig runes the "symbols of anti-constitutional organizations." Displaying them publicly or selling goods that sport them is illegal. The Nazi salute and statements such as "Heil Hitler" are also banned in public.

"There are similar bans - for example, in Austria - but those are a lot less tough," Solmecke said.

Swastikas and other banned symbols can, however, be displayed in Germany if they are used for "civic education, countering anti-constitutional activities, art and science, research and education, the coverage of historic and current events, or similar purposes," according to the Criminal Code.

That means that movies and TV shows - Quentin Tarantino's Inglourious Basterds and Amazon's The Man in the High Castle, among them - are usually allowed to be distributed in Germany even if they feature swastikas and other Nazi symbols.

Whether video games should be treated like movies and TV shows are has been controversial. Though many gamers argue that video games should be treated as art, others believe that they should be held to a different standard because of their interactive and immersive nature.
What about social media?
Posting a picture with a swastika in it or Nazi slogans on social media is illegal in Germany. In March, a 45-year-old man was sentenced to three months in prison after he repeatedly posted pictures of a masked man with tattoos of a swastika and other Nazi symbols on Facebook.

Exceptions also apply to social media, however. When heute-show, a weekly satirical news program, posted a picture of a swastika-shaped Schnitzel on Facebook along with a joke about the Austrian election in April 2016, state prosecutors did not take up the case - arguing that the swastika was used to illustrate a swing to the right in the Austrian election in an "exaggerated form" and that the post did not constitute an endorsement of an anti-constitutional organization.
Is owning things with swastikas on them illegal?
Though displaying anti-constitutional symbols publicly is illegal, people in Germany are allowed to own goods branded with the swastika, SS sig runes and other anti-constitutional symbols as long as they make sure that only a limited number of people can see them. It's legal to have a cellar full of Nazi memorabilia; displaying a flag visible to passersby through a window is deemed legal by some experts and illegal by others.

Selling goods with Nazi symbols is generally banned, but there are exceptions for artifacts if the dealer covers up the anti-constitutional symbols when displaying them publicly. So, it's perfectly legal to sell an SS helmet at a flea market if the sig rune has been covered with tape. It is, however, only legal to deal with antiques that were produced up until 1945: Selling relica Nazi military uniforms, for example, is not.
Who decides whether swastikas can be displayed?
In cases of controversy, it is usually up to courts to rule on whether the use of a Nazi symbol has educational, scientific, journalistic or artistic merit. One of the most prominent court decisions regarding the use of the swastika is a 2007 decision from the Federal Court of Justice. The judges ruled that the use of crossed-out swastikas was legal, overturning a previous decision from a local court that had ordered an activist to pay 3,600 euros because he had sold anti-Nazi merchandise featuring the swastika online. There are a lot of gray areas when it comes to the ban on anti-constitutional symbols in Germany: Rulings by various judges and courts can often even seem contradictory.
What's the punishment for displaying swastikas and the like illegally?
A fine or up to three years in prison under the Criminal Code. Demagoguery - the incitement of hatred against people of a certain race or religion - can even be punished with up to five years in jail in Germany. This also includes denying the Holocaust.
Are only Nazi symbols considered "anti-constitutional" in Germany?
No. To give just two examples: The logo of the banned communist party KPD and symbols associated with terrorist groups such as the Islamic State are also considered anti-constitutional and thus illegal.

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The selective penalty for swastikas in Germany - DW - 08/14/2018

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Illegally displaying Nazi symbols in Germany can be punished by three years in jail. The ban broadly exempts art, but which works are allowed to show swastikas, SS sig runes and such is often more a matter of the medium.

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What neo-Nazis have inherited from original Nazism | DW Documentary

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Germany's security agencies categorize crimes committed by far-right extremists as "politically-motivated right-wing crime." This includes violence perpetrated against foreigners, Jews, Muslims, political opponents or representatives of the state.

Since German reunification in 1990, authorities have collected data pertaining to the victims of far-right violence in the country. The official death toll is currently 94, but journalists and the Amadeu Antonio Foundation estimate that the figures are much higher - closer to 200. Critics accuse authorities of not always categorizing crimes as politically-motivated, but rather attributing them to private revenge, for instance, or motivated by other circumstances.
Two shisha bars attacked
Police reported that a gunman killed nine people in two different shisha bars in Hanau on Feb. 19. The suspect was found dead hours later at home, along with the body of his 72-year-old mother, in what appeared to be a murder-suicide. A letter of confession written by the suspect and a video in which he espouses far-right ideology were also found. Federal prosecutors said they had taken charge of the case due to its likely extremist motivation.
Halle attacks 2019
Last year on Oct. 9, a neo-Nazi called Stephan B. from Eisleben set out to commit a massacre at a synagogue in the eastern German city of Halle. It was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year in Judaism. After renting a car and packing it full of weapons and explosives, he arrived in combat gear at the synagogue, where dozens had gathered to pray. He was unable to get into the building, however. In his frustration, he killed a passerby before driving to a nearby kebab shop where he killed a customer. He had written a manifesto expressing anti-Semitic, racist and xenophobic hatred.
Read more: Walter Lübcke murder Germany boosts resources to fight far right Attacks on refugee centers in 2015 and 2016
The murder of the regional CDU politician Walter Lübcke on June 2 of last year also falls into the category of far-right violence. The suspect is the right-wing extremist Stephan E., who had been previously accused of convictions. Police believe a far-right extremist motive was behind the killing of the politician, who was supportive of Merkel's welcoming policy towards asylum-seekers.

As the number of refugees in Germany rose in 2015, amid much controversy, the number of hate-fueled attacks on refugee centers also increased. The authorities registered 995 such attacks in 2016.
Right-wing extremists in Germany
Read more: Violence against refugees in Germany drops dramatically

In 2015, a far-right terrorist group that named itself the " Gruppe Freital" carried out several attacks on refugees and their supporters. In 2018, eight members of the group were convicted of founding a terrorist organization.

Logo from the Facebook page of the 'Oldschool Society' in 2015.
Knife attacks on politicians in 2015 and 2017
In May 2015, members of the neo-Nazi " Oldschool Society" were arrested in five different German towns before they were able to carry out any attacks. They had allegedly planned attacks against refugee homes, mosques and schools.

The attacks on politicians in 2015 and 2017 involved lone perpetrators who were not connected with right-wing extremist terror networks.

In October 2015, a right-wing extremist stabbed Henriette Reker, an independent candidate for Cologne mayor, in the neck with a knife. She was targeted because of her views on refugees. Reker survived the attack and was elected Cologne mayor the next day.

Read more: Testifying against attacker, Cologne mayor Reker recounts brutal stabbing

"You let me die of thirst, but bring 200 foreigners to the city." These were the words a 56-year-old man used when he threatened the mayor of the town of Altena, Christian Democrat Andreas Hollstein, with a knife to the neck during an incident at a snack stand in November 2017. The snack stand manager intervened and Hollstein was only lightly injured.

In April 2017, German soldier Franco A. was arrested in a bizarre and confusing case. Investigators suspected him of planning a right-wing terrorist attack that he wanted to blame on Syrian refugees. Franco A. had even registered as a war refugee and applied for asylum in Germany.

However, the Frankfurt Higher Regional Court was unable to find sufficient suspicion for the "preparation of an act of violence that seriously endangered the state." The federal prosecutor has lodged an appeal. Franco A. compiled a list of possible victims, including SPD politicians and the current foreign minister, Heiko Maas. The case sparked a discussion in Germany about whether the military had a right-wing extremism problem within its own ranks.
Mass shooting at a Munich shopping mall
Read more: A German right-wing extremist soldier's double life
The NSU murders
For years it was debated whether the incident was a lone wolf shooting spree or a right-wing extremist attack. One thing is for sure: On July 22, 2016, an 18-year-old man killed nine people, many of them teenagers, in a mass shooting at the Olympia shopping mall in northern Munich before ultimately turning the gun on himself. It was not until the fall of 2019 that state police said the case was "politically motivated" because the shooter's "racist motives." Authorities noted he had written a manifesto and demonstrated right-wing extremist views in his online activity.

For 13 years, the neo-Nazi terrorist group National Socialist Underground (NSU) was unknown to the German public. Their members, Uwe Böhnhardt and Uwe Mundlos - who police knew to be neo-Nazis - carried out bombings and shootings between 2000 and 2007 that killed nine people of immigrant background and a police officer. When the group was forced to flee after a bank robbery in November 2011, Böhnhardt and Mundlos committed suicide. Beate Zschäpe, the third member of the group, was sentenced to life in prison in July 2018 for her role in the murders.

Read more: Neo-Nazi NSU member Beate Zschäpe found guilty of murder, sentenced to life in prison

The NSU affair raised questions in Germany over whether the authorities and the media had for too long overlooked the danger of right-wing terrorism in the country. For years, police had suspected the killers were people familiar to the NSU victims. The media made reference to the "Döner murders," because two of the victims worked at a Turkish fast food restaurant.
Arson attacks and riots in the 1990s

The victims of the neo-Nazi NSU murder spree

Michele Kiesewetter

Michele Kiesewetter, a 22-year-old police officer, was shot dead on April 25, 2007 in the southwestern city of Heilbronn. She was the NSU's 10th and final murder victim.

Author: Iveta Ondruskova

In the early 1990s, neo-Nazis set fire to multiple buildings housing asylum-seekers and foreigners. At the time, asylum law in Germany was hotly debated, and right-wing extremist violence rose to new levels. Asylum-seekers and other foreigners were increasingly injured in riots, such as during the 1992 xenophobic riots in Rostock.

That same year in Mölln, two young girls and their grandmother were killed when neo-Nazis set fire to their house. In May 1993, three young girls and two women of Turkish descent died in a similarly-motivated arson attack in Solingen.

From 1990 to 1993, 58 people were killed in right-wing extremist violence in Germany. Amadeu Antonio Kiowa of Angola is considered the first victim to die after German reunification. On November 24, 1990, a group of neo-Nazis brutally beat him and stomped on his head.
Every evening, DW sends out a selection of the day's news and features. Sign up here.

Right-wing extremist terror attacks: A timeline

New Zealand 2019: Twin terror attacks on mosques in Christchurch

At least 50 people were killed and dozens others were injured in twin terror attacks at mosques in Christchurch. Officials called it a "right-wing extremist attack" and the deadliest shooting in New Zealand's history. One of the gunmen livestreamed the attack and posted a racist manifesto online before the attack. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern called it "one of New Zealand's darkest days."

Author: Rebecca Staudenmaier, Nermin Ismail

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Right-wing terror in Germany: A timeline | DW | 20.02.2020

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Germany's security agencies categorize crimes committed by far-right extremists as "politically-motivated right-wing crime." This includes violence perpetrated against foreigners, Jews, Muslims, political opponents or representatives of the state. Since German reunification in 1990, authorities have collected data pertaining to the victims of far-right violence in the country.

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A study on broadcasting far-right extremist ideas on youtube

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A study on broadcasting far-right extremist ideas on youtube

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Making of a Youtube radical - youtube as a door opener? 

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Making of a Youtube radical - youtube as a door opener? 

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Kevin Roose 17 min read Published: Jun 10, 2019

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The Making Of A YouTube Radical - Forbes India

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Caleb Cain was a college dropout looking for direction. He turned to YouTube, where he was pulled into a world filled with conspiracy theories, misogyny and racism

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Case example Caleb Cain - Radicalization and Deradicalization on youtube 

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Case example Caleb Cain - Radicalization and Deradicalization on youtube 

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Caleb Cain Became Radicalized Watching YouTube | Amanpour and Company

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Online Radicalization: A guide to Symbols, Slogans & Slurs

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Online Radicalization: A guide to Symbols, Slogans & Slurs

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CEP Report on the transnationality of RWE

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CEP Report on the transnationality of RWE

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CEP Study_Violent Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism_Nov 2020

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Pete Simi on Recruitment & Radicalization

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Pete Simi on Recruitment & Radicalization

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Assesing US domestic extremism (short read)

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Assesing US domestic extremism (short read)

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International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT

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On 06 January 2021, of individuals converged on and broke into the United States (US) Capitol in an attempt to stop the confirmation of the Presidential election. In the immediate aftermath of the Capitol Riot the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has commenced the largest federal investigation in its history. Federal law enforcement's search for individuals who committed federal offenses during the riot has since amassed more than digital media tips, hours of body cam videos, and the contents of more than electronic devices. More broadly, the events of 06 January radically changed the US government's focus on counter-terrorism, which during the last two decades was, and continues to be, predominantly focused on international terrorism threats. After these events, the Biden Administration has taken significant steps to shift the focus to the burgeoning domestic terrorism threat. This Perspective reviews the current state of the federal investigation into the perpetrators of the Capitol Riot and provides an overview of the shifting US counter-terrorism landscape. It argues that immediately following the events of 06 January, the US embarked on a dramatic sea change in how it addressed terrorism investigations.
Current state of the federal investigation
As of 01 June 2022, federal prosecutors have charged over 800 people with a range of charges related to their participation in the Riot, from simple trespassing offenses triggered by merely stepping onto restricted Capitol grounds to more serious offenses, ranging from assault of law enforcement to rarely used sedition charges. The investigation is ongoing and new arrests are still occurring, as law enforcement continues to identify protesters based on their social media activity and tips from community members.

While united by a similar desire to prevent Joe Biden's certification, the Riot participants arrested so far are "by no means a homogenous group" : they hail from over 46 US states, are as young as 18 and as old as 80, and represent a variety of ideologies and organisational affiliations. While a majority of the 835 defendants are male, 115 women have also been arrested.

Additionally, over 100 arrested participants have some degree of military background , while mostly former veterans and not active duty. While at first, this number appears high, it is generally on par with the military affiliation of the general population. However, individuals with a military background present on 06 January were around four times more likely to be members of a domestic extremist organisation, such as the Oath Keepers, when compared to the total number of individuals charged for crimes committed that day. Thirty percent of currently arrested 06 January participants with military experience were also affiliated with domestic violent extremist (DVE) organisations, including some with combat experience.

Two main domestic extremist organisations were present at the Capitol that day: the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers. Members of each group arrived at the Capitol as a part of organised cells or groups who either planned to disrupt the election certification as an organisation, or as lone actors drawn to the siren call put out by politicians related to the conspiracy theory of 'Stop the Steal', which pushed a false narrative that the election was fraudulent. This wrong-headed belief allowed Riot participants to justify in their own minds the heinous attacks on law enforcement and storming of the Capitol. They believed that their country was being stolen by Democrats and, as such, they were participating in a righteous second revolution to save America.
The Proud Boys
Founded in 2016, the Proud Boys have a national leadership cadre with regional chapters that function semi-autonomously and take their own liberties. Members, who are largely young, male and white, share a purported core mission of defending what they see as "Western culture" while adamantly rejecting "foreign" influences, that into white superiority, misogyny, racism, antisemitism, and other hate-filled rhetoric and acts of violence against out-groups.

Notable Proud Boys members, including the group's former national chairman Enrique Tarrio, currently face federal charges related to the Capitol Riot. While Tarrio was not in Washington (DC) on 06 January, he was two days prior to the Riot for a 'Black Lives Matter' banner stolen from a DC church and was ordered to stay out of the District. Nonetheless, Tarrio was one of multiple individuals charged for conspiracy due to his alleged involvement in directing the Proud Boys to obstruct the congressional proceeding on 06 January. According to the FBI, Tarrio communicated with several other high-ranking Proud Boys members over an encrypted Telegram chat while they were present at the Capitol. Through this chat, Tarrio allegedly instructed members to follow the command of leadership in DC, including by avoiding their traditional Proud Boys colours or apparel and instead wearing all black attire to . While Tarrio's case is pending (and whose charges have been since increased to sedition), fifty-one other Proud Boys have been charged, of which a handful have already pleaded guilty, including several leaders of local chapters. For instance, Charles Donohue, the leader of a Proud Boys chapter in North Carolina, pleaded guilty in April 2022 to conspiring to obstruct the congressional proceeding and assaulting law enforcement, and is now obligated to investigations in addition to testifying against other charged Proud Boys members.
The Oath Keepers
The other main domestic violent extremist group whose members mobilised on 06 January was the Oath Keepers. Its founder, Stewart Rhodes, created the organisation in 2009 as a bulwark against perceived government tyranny and abuses, and quickly embraced right-wing conspiracies and narratives surrounding election fraud. By the fall of 2020, Rhodes was a true believer of the 'Stop the Steal' conspiracy, continually President Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act. Rhodes also called the Oath Keepers to action as a militia against left-wing activists. Similar to Rhodes, a sizeable portion of Oath Keeper members have backgrounds in law enforcement or the military. All told, twenty-nine individuals have been arrested from ten states. Of that, twenty-four were arrested on conspiracy charges, and eight others have pled guilty to a variety of charges ranging from obstruction to violence against law enforcement.

As Rhodes and multiple other Oath Keeper members will face federal trials in September 2022, convictions could set a precedent for future domestic extremism cases. As the US has few legal avenues to charge far-right extremists domestically with terrorism, a sedition precedent could provide the Justice Department with new criminal charging options for the next wave of domestic extremists.
Similarities and differences between both groups
Both the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers are distinctly different right-wing organisations, yet they have rallied behind common interests and goals. Both groups united under the slogan of former President Trump's campaign to 'Stop the Steal' in late December of 2019. Each embraces similar conspiracy theories and acted in a similar fashion during the Capitol Hill Riot. Indeed, 06 January was not the first time Proud Boys and Oath Keeper members protested side by side, as the Oath Keepers have acted as security enforcers during past Proud Boys rallies and other protests, ironically presenting themselves as peacekeepers while often having the opposite effect in reality.

The ways in which both groups have reacted to law enforcement pressure may provide a roadmap for future domestic extremist organisations. The Oath Keepers' structure was designed around the individual personality of Rhodes, and as such has relied heavily on a top-down leadership model, which can lead to the group fracturing and being relatively aimless without leadership direction. Conversely, national leadership of the Proud Boys provided a degree of hierarchy in major mobilisations such as on 06 January, but in the wake of federal law enforcement's arrests of major leadership figures, the individual chapters have since largely returned to a state level approach. In the wake of the Riot, this model has afforded the Proud Boys a degree of resiliency that is not necessarily tied to the arrests and convictions of its top management echelons, while the Oath Keepers have with keeping the organisation together.
The Unaffiliated
A majority of the individuals who came to the Capitol were unaffiliated with the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys. Many 06 January participants were inspired by widespread conspiracy theories such as which promotes a decidedly false belief system that a large number of US elites are trafficking children, and/or misinformation about the level of fraud in the US electoral system.

There are two ways to look at this phenomenon. One, that 06 January represents a mass radicalisation event of a large subset of the American populace that has concerning and lasting ramifications for domestic extremism in America. In that scenario, a narrowly focused law enforcement effort on only addressing the violent manifestations of extremism will have little to no impact in stemming the rising tide of domestic terrorism. In the alternative scenario, a significant number of the "merely curious" 06 January protestors have expressed remorse with their actions and may be less likely to participate in a similar event in the future. There is some evidence to suggest the latter assessment has weight, as subsequent proposed rallies on the Presidential Inauguration Day and the fall 2021 'Justice for January 6th' DC did not produce a large number of participants. Since 06 January, the 'unaffiliated' cadre have yet to find a sole flag or cause to rally behind, and the domestic extremism influencer echo chamber appears to be splintering and unable to encourage a large number of its former followers.

Nevertheless, even if organisationally unaffiliated domestic violent extremists are unlikely to group together in a mass event like 06 January in the future, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence assesses that there remains a significant concern about lone-actor violence as demonstrated by the tragic May 2022 events in a Buffalo supermarket.
The Significant Shift in US Counter-terrorism Approach
Immediately after taking office, the Biden Administration announced what was internally referred to as the "100 day review" of counter domestic terrorism capabilities. Led by the National Security Council, this assessment attempted to radically change the counter-terrorism apparatus. On 15 June 2021, the Biden Administration released the "National Strategy for Countering Terrorism" . Tellingly, this was the first time since 11 September 2001 that an administration produced a dedicated strategy to address domestic terrorism. The strategy has four main pillars: understanding and sharing domestic terrorism information, preventing domestic terrorism recruitment and mobilisation to violence, disrupting and deterring domestic terrorism activity, and confronting long-term contributors to domestic terrorism. An accompanying strategic implementation plan with identified departmental leads for each pillar was also developed but has not been released publicly.

Six months after the strategy was released, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) chief counter-terrorism official that the domestic terrorism threat landscape was more complex and still growing at a rapid pace. When many previous administrations have released policy and strategy documents that sit on a shelf, never to be read again, the Biden administration has made concrete changes at departments and agencies to try to slowly but surely steer the counter-terrorism ship from an international focus to a domestic one. This led to a massive undertaking primarily within the DHS and the DOJ. Shortly afterwards, The White House that domestic terrorism was now a DHS "national priority" which, as the name suggests, dramatically changes the ability for the department to award millions of new grant dollars to state and local officials in the fight against this threat. Additionally, DHS reconstituted a domestic terrorism analytic unit, one that had been largely dormant for the last decade.

There was also a change in prosecutorial strategies since 06 January. At the DOJ, prosecutors were reassigned from areas such as white-collar crime to prosecuting domestic terrorism. DOJ national headquarters, or Main Justice, as it is colloquially referred to within the Department, all of the ninety-four US Attorney Offices to immediately provide an accounting of ongoing domestic terrorism cases. Up until this point, certain cases involving identified domestic violent extremists who were arrested on charges unrelated to extremism or terrorism (for example, firearms violations, drug charges, etc.) were oftentimes siloed within US Attorney's offices and not counted towards the departmental total of domestic terrorism prosecutions. Without a methodologically complete count, there was often a lack of knowledge within the DOJ about how many ongoing domestic terrorism cases were being investigated and prosecuted, in turn leading to the Department's inability to properly account and advocate for additional resources from Congress.

The change in the DOJ's domestic terrorism approach can not only be measured in number, but also in kind. For the last year, the authors interviewed law enforcement officials in multiple field offices about the change in counter-terrorism approaches since 06 January. Interviewees claimed that prior to 06 January, Assistant US Attorneys would often hesitate to take domestic terrorism cases unless there was an overwhelming amount of evidence from undercover employees, confidential sources, or wiretaps. As a result, state-level district attorneys would often bear the brunt of the domestic extremism caseload. That is also beginning to change, as the DOJ now appears to be more willing to handle domestic extremism cases without an abundance of evidence.

These shifts at the federal level on domestic extremism cannot be divorced from the vast amount of time, effort, and resources spent on the Capitol Riot prosecutions. While the DOJ has secured more than 300 convictions to date, largely from pleas, one case has been by trial when the Judge sided with the defendant's argument that Capitol Police officers allowed him to enter the compound and thus, was unaware of his charged criminal act. As the discovery for these cases is voluminous, it may trigger some additional acquittals on technicalities given the delay of sharing information with the defence. As the DOJ works towards the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys members' prosecutions for seditious conspiracy in the upcoming months, a conviction could set legal precedent that may drastically change the course of future prosecutions of domestic violent extremist groups. Indeed, as the US has few legal avenues to charge far-right extremists domestically with terrorism, a sedition precedent could provide the DOJ with new criminal charging options for the next wave of domestic extremists. There is little to no appetite in Congress to expand terrorism charges to fully encompass domestic terrorism. As such, the DOJ will likely be creative in their charging options for domestic terrorism. Nonetheless, while the sedition charges brought against individuals such as Rhodes represent a relatively novel legal approach, these charges are likely to face significant, and possibly successful, legal pushback from their attorneys. As the US Department of Justice works towards the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys members' prosecutions for seditious conspiracy in the upcoming months, a conviction could set legal precedent that may drastically change the course of future prosecutions of domestic violent extremist groups.

Additionally, the FBI has leaned heavily on previously sparingly used law enforcement techniques such as 'geo-fencing', which provided them a list of cell phones that were near the Capitol that day to help them identify new individuals to criminally charge. 06 January has pushed the previous boundaries of domestic extremism investigations and will likely set a precedent for future efforts.
Conclusion
The events that took place on 06 January will continue to be a seminal point in American history. However, the days that followed may ultimately be the more important watershed moments of counter-terrorism posture in the US. While the Capitol Riot represents the largest federal criminal investigation in American history, it will be how the US government radically altered its counter-terrorism approach that will set the new direction for how the US addresses extremism in its midst.

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Assessing US Domestic Extremism in Light of Capitol Riot Investigations

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On 06 January 2021, hundreds of individuals converged on and broke into the United States (US) Capitol in an attempt to stop the confirmation of the Presidential election.

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Contemporary trends far-right violence in the US (short read)

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Contemporary trends far-right violence in the US (short read)

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International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT

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When the January 6th committee (formally known as the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol) released its final report on December 23rd (henceforth, Jan 6th report), most of the media and legal practitioners focused on the various ways in which President Trump and his associates facilitated and encouraged the events of that day. While the focus on the responsibility of the President is understandable, especially with the growing concerns about the quality and durability of the American political system, the report also provides important insights into contemporary dynamics within the violent factions of the American far-right and its ongoing threat to American democracy.

The findings of the Jan 6th report have shed new light on the scope and sophistication of many militant organisations on the far-right, who planned and coordinated the insurrection months in advance. Not less concerning are the revelations regarding the growth in the influence and impact of extreme far-right ideology on mainstream politics and media. When taken all together, the findings reinforce the growing consensus among law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as many policymakers, that in the last few years, the American far-right became a severe and growing threat to the country and that the government must take steps to address it.
Far-Right Violence and Mass Protest
From a scholarly and policy perspective, several aspects of the report should be especially notable for their reflection on important processes within the violent American far-right. The first is the increasing role of mass protest events in the facilitation of far-right violence. In some respects, the storming of the Capitol building on 6 January 2021 was unique in terms of its symbolism and the direct threat it posed to elected officials. In other respects, it demonstrated similar qualities to an increasing number of mass protest events that resulted in and facilitated severe acts of political violence. Such events can provide a strategic opportunity for far-right extremist groups to collaborate with like-minded organisations, enhance their organisational capabilities and profile, and empower their members to take violent action.

While such events usually begin with a collective gathering to protest specific policies or political events and attract participants who are and are not affiliated with organised groups, they may be eventually exploited by organised militant groups to escalate the protest to actual violence (usually against property and law enforcement) in a coordinated effort that follows a specific pre-planned progression, making these events traditionally difficult for experts and law enforcement to anticipate and identify. The Jan 6th report details a multitude of examples of such dynamics. The Proud Boys experienced substantial expansion and growth as its member took a prominent role in various 2020 events of anti-lockdown and BLM protests and as its members "...deputized themselves as agents of law and order-vigilantes against perceived threats" (p. 507). Similarly, the Oath Keepers exploited anti-BLM and anti-lockdown demonstrations in summer 2020 to form local armed groups which operated "to maintain law and order" but allowed, in reality, the mobilisation of many new members and the expansion of organisational capabilities (p. 513). Kellye SoRelle, a lawyer for the Oath Keepers, reflected on his group's participation in COVID protests and admitted indeed that they were a "coalescing moment" for different far-right groups (p. 513).

It is important to note that such dynamics are also visible in other countries. In Germany, PEGIDA rallies served as a recruitment reservoir for some Neo-Nazi associations. In 2015, a collaboration between local Neo-Nazis and PEGIDA protesters led to the formation of a group in Dresden ("Freie Kameradschaft Dresden") that planned multiple attacks against refugees in order to "bundle the national forces in and around Dresden in order to plan events together, as a closed group, to implement spontaneous actions, to achieve goals and to support other national alliances."
Operational, Organisational, and Discursive Convergence
The anti-BLM and COVID-related mass demonstrations and rallies did not just facilitate the growth of far-right groups but also accelerated a growing operational and organisational convergence. In the past, anti-government groups went to great lengths in order to disassociate themselves from white supremacy groups and other branches of the far-right. However, events such as the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville in 2017 and especially Jan 6th reflect how the growing political polarisation, combined with the growing consensus around the rhetoric and leadership of President Trump, forged willingness to enhance coordination and collaboration within the American far-right. Hence, the Jan 6th insurrection was not a spontaneous eruption of violence but coordinated efforts by members of groups such as Proud boys, Oath Keepers, III Percenters, as well as those ascribed to white supremacist and neo-Nazi ideologies. Highly illustrative, the report details how Nick Fuentes, leader of the Groypers, a white nationalist and Antisemitic movement, became a close collaborator with leaders of Proud boys, III Percenters, and Oath Keepers while all participated and led "Stop the Steal" rallies all over the country. Hence, it is not surprising that Fuentes's followers had a prominent role in the Jan 6th attack, including one of them who "took over" the Vice President's seat during the insurrection (p. 519). However, more importantly, it reflected how ideological and organisational distinctions between far-right groups became secondary under the banner of the struggle to keep Trump in office.

Scholars and practitioners warned in the last few years about the linkage between the proliferation and mainstreaming of toxic rhetoric and far-right narratives and the dramatic increase in far-right violence in the US. The Jan 6th report further illustrates how in the last few years, the interactions between the disseminators of extremist rhetoric, on the one hand, and militant groups - which aim to exploit such rhetoric to mobilise support for their violent practices - on the other hand, evolved into symbiotic relations, which contributed to both sides and further enhanced the ideological convergence within the far-right. The most significant example of such a relationship involved Alex Jones. The violent mob's descent on the Capitol was, in many ways, a continuation of the campaign he promoted on his own media platforms in the preceding weeks. For example, in multiple appearances on Alex Jones's InfoWars Show, Steward Rhodes, the leader of the Oath Keepers, stated that his group is preparing to mobilise and use force to "...stop the transfer of power." Jones himself "repeatedly told his InfoWars' viewers that January 6th would be a day of reckoning" (p. 501), and one of his co-hosts mentioned the idea of "storming right into the Capitol." Hence it is not surprising that the Jan 6th report also highlights communications between Rhodes and Alex Jones (and Roger Stone) during the insurrection and that the latter also directly called during the protest to "start a revolution..." and "...Fight..." (p. 650).
A Military Style Threat and Social Media as a Tactical Tool
The Jan 6th report also provides riveting details about the preparations, plans, and execution of the insurrection, thus confirming other concerns raised by scholars regarding the consequences of the growing popularity of anti-government organisations among military and law enforcement personnel. The fact that a substantial portion of members of such organisations has a professional background in the military or police and related operational capabilities enhances the ability of these groups to execute sophisticated and coordinated operations, which most far-right groups in the US lacked for many years.

Indeed, the committee illustrated how especially the Oath Keeper and Proud Boys leaders had been preparing for the insurrection for weeks in advance, including making plans to storm the Capitol and disrupt Congress's certification of the election results. Prior to Jan 6th, the Proud Boys reorganised and imposed a strict chain of command while guiding members to reduce their online visibility to avoid potential surveillance (p. 514-517). Oath Keeper members also engaged in tactical preparations, including mobilising recruits, stockpiling weapons, and discussing operational plans. The strong military background of the members was also manifested in the types of military equipment they gathered prior to Jan 6.th According to the Jan 6th report, "Rhodes amassed an arsenal of military-grade assault weapons... spent approximately $7,000 on two night-vision devices and a weapon sight...while traveling (to DC, AP), Rhodes spent an additional $6,000 on an AR-style rifle and firearms attachments" (p. 507-512).

The military-style preparations eventually translated to military-style operations during the insurrection, as the leaders of the groups coordinated their efforts and provided instructions in real-time to their followers. For example, Roads' real-time instructions allowed Oath Keepers Kelly Meggs and Michael Green to lead a dozen Oath Keepers up the East Steps and through the East Rotunda doors into the Capitol (p. 656-657). Similarly, groups of Proud Boys led by Ethan Nordean and Zachary Rehl (Presidents of the group's Seattle and Philadelphia chapters, respectively) strategically removed fencing around the Peace Circle and Pennsylvania Avenue, clearing the route for other protestors to access restricted Capitol grounds. At the next security barrier, the Proud Boys violently clashed with police officers, eventually overtaking them, and advancing toward the Capitol building. The committee is clear that the Proud Boys' actions were premeditated and coordinated to facilitate the advancement of the crowd to the Capitol building (p. 638, 644).

In this context, the committee analysis also provides an important lesson about the role of social media and related media platforms in the planning of events and mobilising activists to prepare for violent operations. While most scholars focus on the usage of social media as a propaganda tool and how it may facilitate radicalisation, the committee also emphasised its role in actual tactical planning and organisation of the execution of violence. While such practices were usually common in other arenas of terrorism (such as among Jihadi terrorist networks), they were never seen before in such volume among American far-right groups. The creation of group chats that used terms such as "Ministry of Self Defense" and were utilised by the Proud Boys to centralise their organisation and preparations for the January 6 attack is a case in point (p. 510). One of those group chats housed the "national rally planning committee" and used an encrypted chat to organise their activities, while another group chat shared tactical advice and intelligence about police preparations for the event. Similarly, various factions of III Percenters utilised Facebook and other social media platforms to strategise and coordinate their efforts before and during the attack (p. 522-524). On Jan 3rd, Jeremy Liggett, the leader of one of the Florida chapters of the III Percenters, posted a "safety video" on Facebook in which he and others instructed listeners about self-defense and the tools they (like him) could bring to Washington, DC, including "an expandable metal baton, a walking cane, and a folding knife" (p. 523).
Policy Implications
The Jan 6th report details the numerous early warnings regarding the intention of various groups to engage in violence during the Jan 6th rally and the following hours. It also confirms that many of the relevant law enforcement agencies were aware of those warning signs (p. 694). General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted in his testimony to the committee that "...everybody knew there was a probability, more than a possibility of violence" (p. 698). Nonetheless, the end result and the successfully forced entrance to the Capitol Building reflect the unpreparedness and incompetent preparations for the event and the failure to translate operational intelligence into an effective preventative plan.

In many ways, these factors which contributed to the failure, according to the Jan 6th committee, are related to organisational and operational challenges familiar to counter-terrorism practitioners. The findings highlight the need for better communication and coordination between the federal government, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies in order to better prevent and respond to domestic terrorism. They also suggest that there needs to be more public education and awareness of the threat of domestic terrorism and that new laws and policies must be adopted to address this threat. Lastly, the findings suggest that more resources must be devoted to counter-terrorism, including adequate funding and personnel.

However, those recommendations seem to be missing some additional important ingredients. After all, regional fusion centres, local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the NCTC (National Counter-Terrorism Center) were all established in the last 20 years in order to facilitate better collaboration, coordination, and intelligence sharing. Moreover, many of them transitioned their focus to domestic extremism in the last few years. Nonetheless, domestic extremist violence in the US continues to proliferate.

A review of the post-insurrection responses and other historical examples of state response to domestic extremism suggest some additional policies that should be considered. Their adoption by law enforcement has the potential to undermine the capabilities of far-right groups in the short term (some of them are already being employed on some level by different agencies), as well as curbing their ability to continue to expand their influence in the long term.

In the past, the usage of civil lawsuits for damages by victims of far-right violence was proved to be a highly effective tool in the fight against the far-right. Such lawsuits led to the collapse of the " Aryan Nations," (one of the most prominent Christian Identity/neo Nazi groups in US history), Robert Shelton's " United Klans of America," Thomas Metzger's " White Aryan Resistance," and more recently, Alex Jones's media platforms. Such legal initiatives are also, in many cases, promoted by human rights organisations such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center. Hence, in addition to the criminal charges, authorities should also encourage direct victims to pursue civil legal actions. Additionally, most Anti-government organisations have similar pre-attack practices, including the stockpiling of ammunition and firearms, paramilitary training, prep of safe houses, enhanced tactical online communications, etc. Such behaviours are highly visible and, thus, should not be difficult to monitor by law enforcement using advanced methods of data mining protocols, linguistic analysis, and broad Human Intelligence networks. Lastly, the focus of many far-right groups on local political targets makes it imperative to further invest in local law enforcement training and education in the ideological pillars, operational characteristics, and organisational structure of domestic militant groups.

A long-term approach should focus on the development of socialisation and behavioural processes and mechanisms which can reduce political polarisation and de-humanisation of political rivals, introducing modifications to the political system's protocols and regulations which will incentivise cross-partisan collaborations and cooperation. Lastly, there should be a further push for the development of mechanisms and solutions that can better address the dissemination of hate speech, disinformation, and extremisms in online spheres, as well as undermine their effectiveness by investing in the development of political literacy and efficacy among potential consumers.

The combination of long-term measures focusing on undercutting the elements of the political environment and culture, which are of benefit to the far-right, with effective short-term tactical practices, can provide a roadmap as political leaders, practitioners, and law enforcement fight to protect American citizens from far-right violence.

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Contextualising the Jan 6th Report: Contemporary Trends In Far-Right Violence in the US

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A schema of Right-Wing extremism in the US

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A schema of Right-Wing extremism in the US

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Mapping the global far-right (history & groups)

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Mapping the global far-right (history & groups)

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Domestic violent extremism poses one of the most significant terrorism-related threats to the United States.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2022

Report to the Secretary of Homeland Security Domestic Violent Extremism Internal Review: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations

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Domestic violent extremism poses one of the most significant terrorism-related threats to the United States. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2022 Report to the Secretary of Homeland Security Domestic Violent Extremism Internal Review: Observations, Findings, and Recommendations

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Kathleen Belew on how America's White Power Movement Coalesced After The Vietnam War

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Kathleen Belew on how America's White Power Movement Coalesced After The Vietnam War

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In Aug. 2017, many Americans were shocked to see neo-Nazis and members of the so called alt-right demonstrating in Charlottesville, Va. But author Kathleen Belew says the roots of the rally were actually decades in the making.

Belew, who has spent more than 10 years studying America's White Power movement, traces the movement's rise to the end of the Vietnam War, and the feeling among some "white power" veterans that the country had betrayed them.

"To be clear, I'm not arguing that this is at all representative of Vietnam veterans - this is a tiny, tiny percentage of returning veterans," Belew says. "But it is a large and instrumental number of people within the White Power movement - and they play really important roles in changing the course of movement action."

In her new book, Bring the War Home, Belew argues that as disparate racist groups came together, the movement's goal shifted from one of "vigilante activism" to something more wide-reaching: "It's aimed at unseating the federal government. ... It's aimed at undermining infrastructure and currency to foment race war."

Interview Highlights
On how the Vietnam War changed the White Power movement
The Vietnam War narrative works first of all to unite people who had previously not been able to be in a room together and to have a shared sense of mission. So, for instance, Klansmen and neo-Nazis after World War II had a very difficult time aligning, because Klansmen tended to see neo-Nazis as enemies ... the people they were confronting in World War II. But after Vietnam they see common cause around their betrayal by the government and around the failed project of the Vietnam War. So that's one function.

Another function of the Vietnam War is to provide a narrative that shapes the violence itself, and this is partly material in that veterans who are trained in Vietnam War boot camps come back and create boot camps to train other White Power activists. People who didn't serve in Vietnam War combat even use U.S. Army training manuals and other kind of paramilitary infrastructure to shape White Power violence and they even choose Vietnam War issue weapons, uniforms and material and even obtain stolen military weapons to foment activism.
On the White Power movement turning on the state
The turn on the state happened in 1983. It happened at the Aryan Nations World Congress, which was a meeting of many different factions of the White Power movement and the thing that's important about this turn on the state is that it's openly anti-state for the first time in the 20th century. Prior Klan mobilizations had really been organized about maintaining the status quo or maintaining what historians would call "systemic power," which is to say, state power and all of the other kinds of power that are bound up in state power.

So if you think about the Klan in the 1920s, which is the example that most people are familiar with, it's very overtly and properly nationalist. ... It was out in the mainstream. It was very social. It was very overt. It was purported to be "for America" and their slogan indeed was "100 percent Americanism."

So fast forward to 1983, and we're looking at something completely different. This is now a coalition of united racist groups that is openly anti-government, that is focused on a transnational white nation and that is using texts and ideologies that call for an apocalyptic confrontation with everybody else.
On the White Power movement's early use of the Internet
The White Power movement pioneered some of the early Internet social network connection that we see now as early as 1983, '84, with a series of computer message boards that were password protected and not decrypted by the FBI for several years. ... It was called Liberty Net and it was founded in 1983, '84. Liberty Net was a series of computer message boards that put forward everything from common ideologies of the movement to personal ads to connect activists with one another and romantic and other kinds of social relationships to hit lists of targets for the movement violence. The movement matched that kind of activist with distribution of funds to buy computers, so there was a targeted effort to distribute the movement's resources around the country, so that everyone could get onto these early message boards.
On how her research has changed during the Obama and Trump administrations
One of the things that has happened just in the last few years is that this book has moved from being a niche story about political extremism to a book that has become really important to how we see the mainstream. ... Many people thought that they were living through a real progress moment of American history, and we had this idea, even as historians, of a "post-racial" moment, or a colorblind moment, or a multicultural moment. And I think what this story shows us is where overt racism went during the time that we thought of as peaceful and race-neutral. And that instead we were looking at this submerging and resurging story.
Sam Briger and Seth Kelley produced and edited this interview for broadcast. Bridget Bentz and Molly Seavy-Nesper adapted it for the Web.

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How America's White Power Movement Coalesced After The Vietnam War

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In Aug. 2017, many Americans were shocked to see neo-Nazis and members of the so called alt-right demonstrating in Charlottesville, Va. But author Kathleen Belew says the roots of the rally were actually decades in the making.

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Kathleen Belew on the history of the white power movement and its current impact on American society and politics.

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Kathleen Belew on the history of the white power movement and its current impact on American society and politics.

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Kathleen Belew at Imagine Solutions 2023

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Violence Prevention Network's prison programm

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Violence Prevention Network's prison programm

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Shannon Reid on White Power Youth Gangs (Right Rising Podcast)

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Shannon Reid on White Power Youth Gangs (Right Rising Podcast)

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Youth Gangs and the White Power Movement

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Listen to this episode from Right Rising on Spotify. Guest Shannon Reid joins Right Rising to discuss youth gang activism within the white power movement in the U.S. - and our historical and contemporary conceptions of gang activity.

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selfcare assesment for professional helpers

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selfcare assesment for professional helpers

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Change happens easily when there are clear rewards and punishments. We stop touching hot stoves early on because we get hurt. If we find out that something makes us feel happy and there are no costs, we're going to do it more often. But sometimes, change can be more complex. Making the decision to leave a romantic partner, or to switch careers, might take years of thought and heartache. There are countless pros and cons that cannot easily be boiled down to "better" or "worse".

Psychotherapy is the art and science of helping others create change through psychological means, and the countless approaches give us a number of ways to achieve these goals. Some theories view change as a purely behavioral process. Someone who has a problem with alcohol must stop drinking--who cares how or why? Others suggest that the answer is education. If a person learns about the possible consequences of excessive alcohol use, they will quit.

One approach to counseling called motivational interviewing emphasizes the importance of a person's motivation for change. Someone who thinks about leaving their job and searching for a new career will likely be wrought with ambivalence. Their thought process might look something like this:

Pros of Current Career

Cons of Current Career

I'm good at what I do.

I'm unhappy at my job.

I have stable income.

This career requires too much time.

I worked hard to get where I am.

I feel unfulfilled in my job.

The person with these thoughts has a lot of ambivalence which leads to them lacking motivation for change. This is where motivational interviewing shines.

This treatment guide will give an overview of the theory and implementation of motivational interviewing. Because motivational interviewing is so commonly associated with substance use and addictions, they will be the focus of examples for the rest of the guide. However, keep in mind that this theory can be used when working with a variety of issues.

Theory

The seminal text on motivational interviewing (Motivational Interviewing: Preparing People for Change) by Miller & Rollnick defines the theory as a "client-centered, directive method for enhancing intrinsic motivation to change by exploring and resolving ambivalence" (1). Let's break the definition down to better understand the theoretical underpinnings of this approach.

Client-Centered

Using an empathetic style of interaction is a fundamental characteristic of motivational interviewing. This means expressing acceptance toward your client, even if you feel that their behaviors are harming them or their loved ones. You do not need to condone their behavior or agree--just accept. Acceptance shows your willingness to listen, understand, and to respect your client as a human being. Research indicates that empathic client-therapist relationships have a significant positive influence on treatment outcome (1).

Directive

Although the therapist will be acting in a way that expresses acceptance of the client's behavior, they will also be subtly directing them toward change. This will be achieved by encouraging change talk, which will be described later in the guide.

Enhancing Intrinsic MotivationOne goal of motivational interviewing is to increase a client's internal motivation for change. Enhancing motivation will also require your client to build confidence in their ability to make changes. If the goal of changing seems unattainable, it will be difficult to generate enough motivation to try. As motivation increases, your client will begin to make the desired changes to their behavior.

Exploring and Resolving Ambivalence

"Ambivalence" refers to a person's mixed feelings about change. Motivation can be increased by exploring and resolving these feelings of ambivalence. You will use reflection, empathy, and various other techniques to help your client better understand their ambivalence, while subtly directing them toward a resolution.

Building Motivation for Change

Initiating Change Talk

Directing a client toward change talk will help them overcome ambivalence. Change talk occurs when a client discusses the changes they would like to make in a positive light, such as identifying the benefits of quitting a harmful drug. Listed below are several techniques to help with this process:

Motivation Ruler

Ask your client to describe how motivated they are to make a change on a scale of 1 to 10. At 1, they have no motivation to change, and 10 they have no doubt about wanting to change. It can be helpful to present them with a ruler or the linked worksheet to help them visualize the task.

After the client responds--even if their number is low--you can ask why it isn't lower. Why did they choose "4" instead of "1"? Having the client verbalize why they have some motivation for change rather than none at all will lead them to speak in favor of making the change. As a follow-up question, you can ask: "How could we move you from a 4 to a 6 on the ruler?"

Asking About Extremes

Try asking some hypothetical questions about best and worst case scenarios. Here are some examples:

"If you continue using drugs, what's the worst that could happen over the next 5 years?"

"What do you worry about the most with regard to your alcohol use?"

"What would be the best possible outcome if you quit using drugs?"

Exploring Values

Assist a client in identifying and exploring their values to better understand which ones they are living up to, and which they are failing. If a client states that they value family and success, it can be meaningful when they realize these are two areas that are damaged by their drug use. Try using this worksheet to guide the process:

It will be important to keep in mind that your values might differ from the client's. For example, just because success in your career means a lot to you doesn't mean it will mean much to your client. Be sure to appeal to your client's values, not your own.

Continuing Change Talk

When a client begins to use change talk, it is the therapist's role to make sure it continues. This can be achieved in a number of ways:

Ask for more detail:
"In what ways will you feel better if you quit smoking?"

Reflect change talk:
"You're really starting to consider quitting cigarettes for good."

Affirm change talk with body language (head nod) or agreement:
"You're making a good point!"

The more time a client spends engaging in change talk, the more likely they are to actually make the changes.

Rolling with Resistance

"Resistance" in counseling refers to a client's behaviors that are in opposition to making desired changes. For example, a resistant client receiving treatment for an alcohol problem might argue that "everyone else drinks", or they might continue to put themselves in risky situations such as spending time with friends who are using alcohol. Although unproductive, it can be tempting to argue back with statements like: "No, not everyone drinks. And even if they do, it's still dangerous". This response to resistance creates a situation where the client and therapist are opposed to one another.

When using motivational interviewing, the clinician will attempt to roll with the client's resistance. This means, instead of engaging in an argument, you will continue to make sure the client feels heard through the use of reflections. During periods of resistance, you can use several different reflection techniques to continue moving the conversation forward.

Amplified Reflection

Reflect the client's statement in an exaggerated form. Be careful not to cross the line into sarcasm or condescension.

Client: "I don't know why my family keeps pushing for me to get help. I hardly ever drink."

Therapist: "Your family doesn't have anything to worry about because you barely drink."

Client: "Well, I mean, I do drink. And sometimes I make some pretty bad choices afterwards."

Reframing

Create a new and more positive interpretation of events that have been described by the client.

Client: "My parents are trying to get rid of me, that's why they want me to go to rehab."

Therapist: "It sounds like your parents are doing their best to help, but they've made some mistakes along the way. They aren't sure how to help you without hurting you too."

Double-sided Reflection

Reflect the client's statement, but also add information they have previously shared that is contrary to their current resistance.

Client: "I don't want to quit drinking. It just isn't a problem for me."

Therapist: "You don't feel that drinking is a big enough problem for you to worry about, except for those times--like shared last week--when you get really angry at your family."

Building Confidence

Would you like to reach your hands above your head, look up, and fly away like Superman? I'm guessing:yes. Do you believe you can actually do it? Hopefully not. This example illustrates the point that, no matter how badly someone wants to do something, they won't even try if they don't believe it's possible. When it comes to addictions and other major changes, many clients will feel totally helpless and incapable. Once someone has made the decision to change, it will be necessary to make sure they have the confidence to do so.

Ask Open Questions about Change

Help your client envision themselves making the desired change by asking open questions. Some examples are:

"What will be the first step to making this change?"

"What might trip you up, and how can you deal with that problem?"

"Even if it's tough, what might help you be successful?"

Identify Personal Strengths

Spend time discussing a client's strengths (especially those that will help them make a change). If your client has difficulty generating their own strengths, try to lead them in the right direction while still encouraging them to be the one to generate the answers. Keep the conversation going by asking the client to elaborate when they are able to come up with strengths.

Discuss Past Success

Search for examples of times when the client has made positive changes that they are proud of. Gather information such as what worked, what motivated them, and what skills they used to be successful. Again, keep the conversation going by asking for elaboration.

Strengthening the Commitment to Change

At some point you will recognize that your client has decided to change, and they've built the confidence to do so. Indications of a client reaching this point are decreased resistance, frequent change talk, experimenting with the change (for example, brief periods of sobriety between sessions), or asking questions about how to make the change.

During this final stage of treatment, it will be important to maintain your client-centered approach. Just because the client has made the choice to change doesn't mean the therapist should begin dishing out advice indiscriminately, lecturing, or taking over session. At this point, you will want to collaborate with the client to create a change plan.

Establish Goals

Work with your client to create clear goals for change. Sometimes your goals and the client's will not perfectly align. For example, you might believe that lifelong abstinence from all drugs will be necessary for recovery, while your client might want to have the option of drinking a beer, or a glass of wine with dinner. Arguing these points will usually result in taking a step backward as your client feels forced to defend their own goals in opposition to yours.

Create a Plan

Next, you will want to come up with a list of options of how to create change. Help the client generate their own ideas, or provide them with options to choose between. Strategies for change should include specific actions such as avoiding people who trigger the unwanted behavior, or reaching out to social support when necessary. Also consider obstacles, and how they can be managed.

Commit to the Plan

Finally, you want to make sure the client has bought into the plan. If the client doesn't feel ready, don't force them. Ask questions about where there are problems, and tweak the plan as necessary. If possible, it can be helpful to have your client share the plan with an important loved one to enhance their commitment and garner social support.

Once your client has agreed to a change plan, the process of motivational interviewing has been completed. Future sessions can be used to check in, tweak the change plan when there are difficulties, and maintaining motivation with change talk.

Other Resources

Motivational Interviewing: Helping People Change (3rd Edition) is an essential text for any clinician who hopes to use the intervention in their practice.

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Motivational Interviewing (Guide) | Therapist Aid

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Change happens easily when there are clear rewards and punishments. We stop touching hot stoves early on because we get hurt. If we find out that something makes us feel happy and there are no costs, we're going to do it more often. But sometimes, change can be more complex.

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RESTORE VPN US - biografical work homework (1)

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RESTORE VPN US -practice biographical assesment

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RESTORE VPN US - radicalization & biographic research

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RESTORE VPN US - social diagnostis toolkit

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The RESTORE project aims to connect powerful and trusted community leaders with evidence-based tools and methodologies for working with ideologically-motivated members of your communities.

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About Violence Prevention Network › Violence Prevention Network

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Violence Prevention Network gGmbH is an NGO that has been successfully active in the prevention of extremism as well as deradicalisation and disassociation support for two decades. Over the years, the Violence Prevention Network team has acquired internationally recognised expertise in working with…

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White Supremacy search trends US (by MOONSHOT & ADL)

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White Supremacy search trends US (by MOONSHOT & ADL)

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Ressources: Hate symbols data base (ADL)

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Ressources: Hate symbols data base (ADL)

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Hate on Display™ Hate Symbols Database

This database provides an overview of many of the symbols most frequently used by a variety of white supremacist groups and movements, as well as some other types of hate groups.

214 Results

Silent Aryan Warriors

Hate Symbol

The Silent Aryan Warriors (SAW) are a large white supremacist gang based in Utah. Their primary tattoo consists of an Iron Cross with SS lighting bolts and a curved swastika at the center. Four Totenkopfs surround the Iron Cross, while around the image are the German phrases "für immer weiss" and "für immer stolz," which translate to "forever white" and "forever proud."

Read more about Silent Aryan Warriors

Pepe the Frog

Hate Symbol

Pepe the Frog is a popular Internet meme used in a variety of contexts. In recent years it has also been appropriated by white supremacists, particularly those from the "alt right," who use in racist, anti-Semitic or other hateful contexts.

Read more about Pepe the Frog

Okay Hand Gesture

Hate Symbol

A common hand gesture that a 4chan trolling campaign claimed in 2017 had been appropriated as a symbol meaning "white power." Used by many on the right--not just extremists--for the purpose of trolling liberals, the symbol eventually came to be used by actual white supremacists as well. Caution must be used in evaluating instances of this symbol's use.

Read more about Okay Hand Gesture

13/52 & 13/90

Hate Symbol

13/52 and 13/90 are racist numeric codes used by white supremacists to portray African-Americans as savage and criminal. White supremacists claim that Blacks make up only 13% of the U.S. population but commit 52% of all murders and 90% of all violent interracial crime.

Read more about 13/52 &amp; 13/90

The figure 109 is white supremacist numeric shorthand for the number of countries anti-Semites claim Jews have been expelled from. In calling for the expulsion of Jews from the U.S., they often refer to the U.S. as the 110th.

Read more about 109/110

American Identity Movement (AIM)

Hate Symbol

American Identity Movement is a large white supremacist group formerly known as Identity Evropa. AIM’s logo consists of a blue and red shield with three white stars and the initials A-I-M. The shield is often combined with an American bald eagle.

Read more about American Identity Movement (AIM)

Anti-Antifa Images

Hate Symbol

“Anti-Antifa” images are white supremacist symbols and memes directed against antifa activists. Antifa (short for “anti-fascist”) are left-wing and anarchist activists who focus on directly confronting white supremacists.

Read more about Anti-Antifa Images

“Anudda Shoah” is an anti-Semitic phrase used by white supremacists to mock Jews, whom they claim bring up the Holocaust when confronted with anything they don’t like.

Read more about Anudda Shoah

Atomwaffen Division

Hate Symbol

Atomwaffen Division is a neo-Nazi group that emerged in 2016. “Atomwaffen” is the German word for atomic weapons and the group’s logo features a radiation warning symbol on a Waffen SS divisional insignia shield.

Read more about Atomwaffen Division

Bowlcut/Dylann Roof

Hate Symbol

The “Bowlcut” is an image of a bowl-shaped haircut resembling the one sported by white supremacist mass killer Dylan Roof. People who use the “bowlcut” image or other “bowl” references admire Roof and call for others to emulate his racist murders.

Read more about Bowlcut/Dylann Roof

Burning Neo-Nazi Symbols

Hate Symbol

Neo-Nazis have adopted the Ku Klux Klan practice of symbolic burnings, substituting swastikas, othala and life runes, triskeles and the Celtic cross for the traditional cross burned by Klan members.

Read more about Burning Neo-Nazi Symbols

Daily Stormer Book Club

Hate Symbol

Daily Stormer Book Clubs are mostly informal groups of supporters of white supremacist propagandist Andrew Anglin, who runs the Daily Stormer website.

Read more about Daily Stormer Book Club

Day of the Rope

Hate Symbol

“Day of the Rope” is a white supremacist slogan referring to mass murders of “race traitors” that occur in The Turner Diaries, a novel written by neo-Nazi William Pierce. The slogan is typically used to urge or promise some similar scenario in the real world.

Read more about Day of the Rope

Diversity = White Genocide

Hate Symbol

“Diversity = White Genocide” is a white supremacist slogan intended to suggest that multiculturalism will mean the death of the white race.

Read more about Diversity = White Genocide

Fasces are an ancient Roman symbol for authority and government coopted by Mussolini’s Fascist movement in Italy. Some white supremacists in the United States have recently adopted the symbol both because of its fascist connections and because it is more publicly acceptable than the swastika.

Read more about Fasces

GTKRWN is an acronym for a racist and anti-Semitic slogan created by white supremacists: “Gas the Kikes; Race War Now.”

Read more about GTKRWN

The Happy Merchant

Hate Symbol

The Happy Merchant is a very common anti-Semitic meme popularized by the alt right, featuring a person with exaggerated stereotypically Jewish features and grasping hands, meant to convey a “greedy Jew.”

Read more about The Happy Merchant

Identitarian Lambda

Hate Symbol

The Identitarian lambda is a symbol used by people who identify with Identitarianism, a racist and anti-immigrant European far right movement loosely analogous to the alt right in the United States.

Read more about Identitarian Lambda

Identity Evropa

Hate Symbol

Identity Evropa was one of the most active white supremacist groups in the U.S. from 2016-19. In 2019, it reformed itself as the American Identitarian Movement (AIM).

Read more about Identity Evropa

It's Okay To Be White

Hate Symbol

“It’s okay to be white” is a slogan popularized on the website 4chan in 2017 for trolling purposes and which was soon adopted by white supremacists (who had occasionally used the phrase themselves in the past).

Read more about It&#039;s Okay To Be White

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Submit a Hate Symbol to ADL at hate-symbols@adl.org

All the symbols depicted here must be evaluated in the context in which they appear. Few symbols represent just one idea or are used exclusively by one group. For example, the Confederate Flag is a symbol that is frequently used by white supremacists but which also has been used by people and groups that are not racist. Similarly, other symbols in this database may be significant to people who are not extreme or racist. The descriptions here point out significant multiple meanings but may not be able to relay every possible meaning of a particular symbol.

Hate on Display is a trademark of the Anti-Defamation League.

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All the symbols depicted here must be evaluated in the context in which they appear. Few symbols represent just one idea or are used exclusively by one group. For example, the Confederate Flag is a symbol that is frequently used by white supremacists but which also has been used by people and groups that are not racist.

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Tool to track hate: "Heat map" from ADL 

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Tool to track hate: "Heat map" from ADL 

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ADL Center on Extremism experts developed this unique visualization using data points from information sources including news and media reports, government documents (including police reports), victim reports, extremist-related sources, Center on Extremism investigations and more.

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ADL Center on Extremism experts developed this unique visualization using data points from information sources including news and media reports, government documents (including police reports), victim reports, extremist-related sources, Center on Extremism investigations and more.

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Tool to track hate: "Hate map" from the Southern Poverty Law Center

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Tool to track hate: "Hate map" from the Southern Poverty Law Center

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Subscribe to the https://soundslikehate.org/">Sounds Like Hate podcast to learn more about hate groups like the Proud Boys.​

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Further reading: Minimum methodological requirements for exit interventions

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Further reading: Minimum methodological requirements for exit interventions

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 Further Reading: FAQ Sheet - What are risk factors and indicators?

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 Further Reading: FAQ Sheet - What are risk factors and indicators?

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Former neo-Nazi removes swastika tattoos after unlikely friendship

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Derek Black once promoted a racist agenda by making speeches, hosting a radio show and starting a website. His father was a former grand wizard of the KKK. Derek's change of heart is the subject of a new book, 'Rising Out of Hatred,' written by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Eli Saslow. They speak with Terry Gross about the white nationalist movement - and what led Black to leave it behind.

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'The Awakening Of A Former White Nationalist' : Fresh Air

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Derek Black once promoted a racist agenda by making speeches, hosting a radio show and starting a website. His father was a former grand wizard of the KKK. Derek's change of heart is the subject of a new book, 'Rising Out of Hatred,' written by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Eli Saslow.

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MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:

If there's such a thing as a white nationalist prodigy, Derek Black might have been it. He was born to it, son of Don Black, the founder of the racist website Stormfront, the godson of former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke. He was deeply immersed through his homeschooling and his parents' activities into the philosophies of white supremacy. But the young Derek added his own touches, using tools like a daily radio show and rhetoric that avoided harsh racial slurs in favor of junk science and white grievance, all of that in an effort to win the hearts and minds of white Americans.

That is, until he enrolled at New College of Florida in 2010, when the worldview he had built up over a lifetime began to unravel. And, with the prodding of a surprisingly diverse group of friends, he began the painful process toward unlearning his beliefs. Washington Post reporter Eli Saslow has written a book about that journey. It's called "Rising Out Of Hatred: The Awakening Of A Former White Nationalist." He's with us now from the NPR bureau in New York.

Eli, welcome. Thanks for joining us.

ELI SASLOW: Thanks for having me.

MARTIN: And Derek Black is also with us from New York.

Derek, thank you so much for joining us as well.

DEREK BLACK: Yeah. Thanks for having me.

MARTIN: So I think a lot of people will find your story fascinating, but to you, it was all normal growing up, right? I mean, there was nothing you found strange about it?

BLACK: Yeah. It was very normal in the fact that it was what brought the family together. And we were a very close family and loved each other deeply and did a lot of stuff together. And the fact that we were all bound together by doing, you know, a political sort of thing felt extremely normal and did not feel at all unusual or incorrect.

MARTIN: So were you taught to be afraid of people who are different than you? Or was it more that we're just better than these people, and they need to leave?

BLACK: I'm not totally sure it was either. Like, that's complicated, really, because in the house, everybody would talk about the fact that, you know, we don't want anyone to have a worse life. We don't want to dominate anyone. It's just that everybody would be so much happier if they all had their own governments and their own nations and their own spaces. And there's a real strong sense that white people and probably East Asian people are just the most creative and the smartest.

But, you know, that's just an unfortunate fact of history, and that's just an unfortunate fact that people don't want to deal with. And that didn't feel like hate to me. Like, that felt like we were being misconstrued and misunderstood when people would say it was hate because that didn't sound like it.

MARTIN: So let's fast forward, though, and compress a lot here and say - you know, when did the cracks in that worldview start?

BLACK: Yeah. I think going to that college is also a sign of how confident we all were and that my family was in my conviction, my ability to think independently and to be curious. And I did not go there expecting to have my worldview challenged because I was quite confident that it was factually correct and that the arguments against it were ones that I had already heard and I had already figured out were wrong.

And there wasn't any one point at the college where I realized, oh, this is wrong. It was a long, slow engagement, both with the people who this belief system says shouldn't be in the country trying to wrestle with the fact that I'm friends with you. I don't quite see how I can reconcile saying in the long run you don't belong here. And then, bit by bit, having the evidence for it - all the stuff that sounds scientific and sounds factual - realizing that those things, one by one, weren't correct and we were abusing statistics. Like, that worked in concert over - what, two and a half years.

MARTIN: So, Eli, let's bring you into this conversation. Initially, when you reached out to Derek, and you wanted to talk to him about his story, he said, no. I want to disappear (laughter). I don't want to be part of this. I don't - well, how did you persuade him to - or how did it happen that he then decided that he did want to talk?

SASLOW: Yeah. I mean, when I first learned about Derek, he was sort of in hiding from his past. I mean, he changed his name at that point. He'd moved to a different part in the country, and he'd been very intentional about people not finding him. I think, for Derek, the thing that mostly did the persuading was our national rhetoric and our national politics. I mean, when I first reached out to Derek, and he said he was not interested, over the course of the next year, all of these talking points from his past and many of the talking points that he had worked to spread over the radio every day or during speeches - all of these seeds that he'd planted - they were growing all around him.

And he heard some of these very scary racist ideas surfaced in the presidential campaign in 2016 and in the rise of the far right in Europe and in the ways that the Black Lives Matter movement was talked about. And I think Derek on his own came to the conclusion that these were huge, powerful forces that needed to be confronted and reconciled with and that his silence, in some ways, was continuing to make him complicit.

MARTIN: So what's the takeaway, Derek? And, of course, Eli, I want to ask your take on that, too.

BLACK: Yeah. We absolutely do not have to accept society and the assumptions - the racist assumptions that people have. But they're also not going to go away. I think the disconcerting realization that I've had over these few years - I spent quite a few years trying to never talk about this again and thinking that the country was just going to fix itself and then realizing that that's not going to happen. It happens because we do stuff.

And I've been coming to the realization that it is harder to advocate for anti-racism than it is for white nationalisms. When you're saying that our society is fundamentally unjust, it is based on white supremacy, you're asking people to change and to do something and to sort of shoulder that burden. And that is a hard thing to ask of people, and it's a lot harder than telling them that things are fine and they don't need to do anything about it.

MARTIN: Eli, what's your takeaway from Derek's story?

SASLOW: I think, in addition to being - you know, to this book being the story of Derek's transformation, it's also the story of the people who he encountered who showed real, persistent courage to confront these very dangerous ideas.

MARTIN: Derek, before I let you go, can I ask you, what's your life now - to the degree that you feel comfortable saying?

BLACK: In my day to day life, I am a graduate student of history trying to pursue that and figure out how it integrates into my life. And before I met Eli, I wanted to never speak in front of anyone ever again. And I delved pretty deeply into history thinking that that could keep me away from talking about now and talking about our lives.

And since meeting Eli and these years of working with him to try to tell this story, I think I've come to realize that it's never that easy and that I have a responsibility to speak out about things that I have a weird platform to do. And sometimes that's not always pleasant. But I think it's important, and I'm still trying to figure out exactly how to do it.

MARTIN: And your parents?

BLACK: We have a relationship, and that's due in no small part to them. It was not always clear that we would be able to talk, and a lot of love on their part went into realizing that it's more important that we be able to speak as a family than that that be cut off just because of beliefs. But there's a gulf there, and a lot of those conversations are about how I'm making the country worse by advocating anti-racism and that I'm going to doom America if I keep advocating this stuff.

MARTIN: What do you do for Thanksgiving?

BLACK: I think, like a lot of college students, you left home, and then you come back, and you're hanging out, listening to the family conversations, and you're - have a new mindset, and you say, oh. I never really heard it that way before I left home.

MARTIN: That was Derek Black. He's the subject of a new book by journalist Eli Saslow called "Rising Out Of Hatred: The Awakening Of A Former White Nationalist." They were both with us from New York.

Derek Black, Eli Saslow, thanks so much for talking to us.

BLACK: Thanks a lot.

SASLOW: Thanks for your time.

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'Rising Out Of Hatred': Former White Nationalist On Unlearning His Beliefs

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Derek Black was an avowed white nationalist until his identity was discovered by classmates in college and he began the long journey towards repudiating his beliefs. NPR's Michel Martin talks with Black and reporter Eli Saslow about the new book Rising Out of Hatred: The Awakening of a Former White Nationalist.

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