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Building Blocks of the Invisible Wall in the Sahara

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Building Blocks of the Invisible Wall in the Sahara

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This wall is not made up of stones but of fact sheets, links to articles, quotes. Just check out for yourself how complex the system of the invisible border is.

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scan this QR Code

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How the EU Developmental Aid is used for scanning the African population

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The "EU Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa" (EUTF for Africa) isn't exactly headline news (and nor does it exactly roll off the tongue), but its influence is vast and will be felt for decades to come for millions of people across Africa.

Set up in the wake of the 2015 'migration crisis' in Europe and largely made up of money earmarked for development aid ( 80% of its budget comes from development and humanitarian aid funds), EUTF for Africa commits billions of euros to tackle and "manage" migration to Europe from African countries.

As well as equipping and training security agencies in surveillance, the Fund is being used to bankroll the development of mass-scale biometric identity systems across the African continent and is awarding lucrative contracts to well-connected European security companies in the process.

While such systems can have positive effects on human rights - facilitating the right to a legal identity being the most obvious example - they also pose serious threats to human rights, and divert money which could be used for things like schools or hospitals.

Below, using disclosures released to Privacy International by the Trust Fund under access to documents laws, we provide an analysis of these biometric systems, using Senegal as a case study.

They not only show a failure to adequately mitigate the huge risks posed by the systems, they also reveal how such systems will ultimately be used to facilitate deportations from the Union.

As a result, Privacy International together with other civil society is today calling on the Commission to enact urgent reforms to stop the facilitation of surveillance and diversion of aid money.

What are biometric identity systems?

Biometric identity systems collect (in addition to other personal information such as names, dates of birth, addresses) physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, face data, and/or iris scans and transform relatively fixed and unchangeable physical features into machine-readable identifiers for future use.

Essentially, identity systems provide for some kind of a centralised government identity scheme that links an individual's identity to a card or number, and in this case also biometric data. This identity will then be used within the system for the provision of public benefits and participation in public life.

Such centralised biometric systems can facilitate social and economic exclusion and discrimination and carry huge implications, including for the rights to privacy and data protection. Because of this, authorities must:

ensure that any such system is justified by taking into account the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality;

prove the biometric authentication's effectiveness and necessity;

develop safeguards to protect rights and mitigate the risks of function creep and data sharing;

address concerns regarding their impact on other rights, namely liberty, dignity, and equality.

Who is profiting building those databases? Meet Civipol

Civipol (or Civi.Pol Conseil) is heavily involved in the development of these biometric identity systems. In Senegal, it is the agency which conducted the entire diagnostic evaluation and management plan formulation process, and will now also be involved in implementing it together with the Belgian development agency, ENABEL. In Côte d'Ivoire, it will also be implementing the project by providing technical assistance.

Civipol and EU projects

Over the years, Civipol has been involved in various EU border management projects including organising the formation of a border guards. It wrote "an influential consultancy paper" called "Feasibility study on the control of the European Union's maritime borders" for the European Commission, that has gone on to provide the foundations for the EU's current policies on border externalisation.

In December 2016, before expanding to full biometric identity systems, Civipol was already involved in setting-up and deploying fingerprint databases in Mali and Senegal. It is also one of the executive partners of a project called 'Better Migration Management' implemented in the Horn of Africa.

Background on Civipol

Civipol was founded in 2001. It is a public limited company (societe Anonyme) that is 40% owned by the French state. It is further part-owned by large arms producers, including Thales, Airbus DS, and Safran.

The company positions itself as the technical cooperation operator of the French Ministry of the Interior. It doesn't sell equipment, but offers audit, project management, training and consulting in France and abroad.

The company's connections to the French state run deep. Prefect Jounot Yann, a former National Intelligence Coordinator, is chairman and chief executive of Civipol since June 2017. He is also the president of the Milipol trade show.

Civipol was formerly run by Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, who was appointed chief of Staff for Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin and served as national intelligence coordinator before that. Alexis Kohler, Chief of Staff of Emmanuel Macron, also had a seat at their board.

Civipol is the main shareholder (owns 40%) in the MILIPOL Economic Interest Grouping (EIG), which organises large Milipol security fairs in Paris, Singapore and Doha, regularly featuring surveillance companies such as Syneris, Ercom and NSO group

Civipol/EU Project in Senegal

Documents disclosed by the EUTF to Privacy International detailing the development of the €28 million biometric identity system in Senegal raise various concerns.

The declared aim of the project is to respect individuals' rights by facilitating the recognition of their identity through a biometric identity system. However, there is little reflection on why a biometric identification system is needed. While such systems can indeed help people access their right to a legal identity - which is an important Sustainable Development Goal - this is often used to justify the development of data-intensive mass-surveillance systems, when a simple non-biometric and non-centralised system of identity management would suffice.

Instead, the aspiration of EU authorities is that they will be able to access these identification systems in the future to accelerate the deportation process from the European continent. In Côte d'Ivoire, the €30m biometric identity system project description explicitly states that it is to be used to assist in the identification of Ivorians irregularly residing in Europe and to organise their return more easily.

Once an asylum seeker or other person on the move dares to cross the European border, or is identified by immigration enforcement agencies in Europe, authorities will be collecting their biometric data, compare them with data in the African systems and in their ideal fast track the return of the person to that country.

Documents relating to one of the projects repeatedly underline the need to ensure that any biometric collection will take into account the data of the Senegalese living abroad.

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Here's how a well-connected security company is quietly building mass biometric databases in West Africa with EU aid funds

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The "EU Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa" (EUTF for Africa) isn't exactly headline news (and nor does it exactly roll off the tongue), but its influence is vast and will be felt for decades to come for millions of people ac

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In Niger support of migrants
and stranded refugees is punishable by law Loi N° 2015-36

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Ibrahim Manzo Diallo spricht im Interview über Aufstände im sogenannten Hafen des Friedens - und erzählt, wie seine Regierung den Menschen am Drehkreuz der Migration Angst macht.
Interview: Markus Bickel
Im politischen Diskurs verschmilzt oft der Kampf gegen Terrorismus, Drogen- und Waffenhandel mit dem gegen Migranten, alles wird in einen Topf geworfen. Gibt es überhaupt einen Zusammenhang zwischen Terrorismus und Migration?
Es ist allein die Politik, die eine Verbindung zwischen Terrorismus und Migration zieht. Sie schafft damit einen Vorwand, um die Repression gegen Netzwerke zu rechtfertigen, die Menschen helfen, nach Norden Richtung Libyen aufzubrechen. So hat es Nigers Präsident Issoufou in einer Rede an die Nation im Dezember 2016 selbst formuliert. Damit ist es ihm gelungen, den Menschen Angst zu machen vor der Migration. Migranten werden als bewaffnete Kämpfer und Drogenhändler denunziert.
Auf Druck der Europäischen Union brachte Issoufous Regierung 2015 ein Gesetz ins Parlament ein, das den Transport von Menschen verbietet.
Bis zu dem Zeitpunkt lebten fast alle der 180.000 Einwohner von Agadez von der Migration. Sei es als Händler, als Chauffeure oder als Schmuggler. Selbst 2007, als es in Niger zu einem Aufstand kam, hielt die Regierung daran fest, dass der Transport von Menschen legal sei. Doch als 2015 weitaus mehr Migranten Europa erreichten als in den Vorjahren, bat Brüssel Niger darum, den Polizisten für Europa zu spielen. Und diese Rolle haben Regierung und Parlament mit Verabschiedung von Loi N° 2015-36 willig übernommen. Agadez bildet damit praktisch die neue EU-Außengrenze.
Im Gegenzug erhält Niger Hunderte Millionen Euro aus Europa, für Soziales, Sicherheit, gute Regierungsführung und eine bessere Stromversorgung.
Präsident Issoufou hat von seinem türkischen Amtskollegen gelernt: So wie Erdoğan die Syrien-Krise 2015 wie ein Pokerspieler genutzt hat, um viel Geld zu verdienen, erklärte dieser Niger zur Zitadelle, um Europa vor Migranten zu schützen. Das hat funktioniert: Erst im Dezember 2018 stockte die EU ihre Hilfe um weitere 105 Millionen Euro auf.
Profitiert die Bevölkerung davon?
Kaum. Denn es sind in erster Linie junge Menschen, die von der Migration lebten und die heute arbeitslos sind. Viele von ihnen unterstützten den Aufstand gegen die Regierung 2007. Sie wissen, wie man Waffen benutzt, sie haben eine militärische Ausbildung durchlaufen.

Was wir zurzeit erleben, ist eine Migration der Unsicherheit: Weil es in Libyen keine staatlichen Strukturen gibt, aber Milizen im Überfluss, bringen viele Rückkehrer die Gewalt zurück nach Niger. Doch auch die Militärbasen der Franzosen und der Amerikaner machen uns Angst - sie schüren ein Klima der Gewalt, dass dazu führen könnte, dass die Bewohner von Agadez wieder zu den Waffen greifen.
Bislang galt Niger als Hafen des Friedens.
Das stimmt. Zugleich ist es jedoch in Agadez immer wieder zu Aufständen gekommen, weil der Norden des Landes nicht vom Reichtum des restlichen Landes profitiert. Das zu ändern, ist eines der Ziele unseres Netzwerks Alternative Espaces Citoyens, das nicht nur die schlechte Regierungspraxis in der Hauptstadt Niamey kritisiert, sondern den Nepotismus vieler Bürgermeister auf dem Land, die sich auf die Seite von Issoufou geschlagen haben, um ihren Teil vom Kuchen abzubekommen.

Die Zivilgesellschaft hat eine klare Agenda: Sie kritisiert Korruption ebenso wie die Militarisierung der Region durch den Bau neuer Militärbasen. Amerikaner und Franzosen sind schon länger hier, jetzt wollen auch Italiener und Deutsche dafür sorgen, dass die Migration Richtung Europa aufgehalten wird.

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Ibrahim Manzo Diallo spricht im Interview über Aufstände im sogenannten Hafen des Friedens - und erzählt, wie seine Regierung den Menschen am Drehkreuz der Migration Angst macht. Interview: Markus Bickel Im politischen Diskurs verschmilzt oft der Kampf gegen Terrorismus, Drogen- und Waffenhandel mit dem gegen Migranten, alles wird in einen Topf geworfen.

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Cooperation with G5 Sahel intends to curb terrorist thread but is in fact a military build-up to block migration

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The European Border Agency has set up their first African outpost in Niger in November 2018

https://verfassungsblog.de/frontex-goes-africa-on-pre-emptive-border-control-and-migration-management/

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G5 Sahel and EU troups patrol the Sahara to control migration and combat terrorism - AU and ECOWAS want to join

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The EU Mission in NIger is training migration control officers.

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Der Rat ist übereingekommen, die zivile Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger als Teil der Maßnahmen der Europäischen Union zur Verhinderung der irregulären Migration zu stärken.

Die EU wird die nigrischen Behörden bei der Verhinderung der irregulären Einwanderung und der Bekämpfung damit verbundener Kriminalität unterstützen. Dazu gehören Beratung zu einer entsprechenden Strategie und Ausbildung für die nigrischen Sicherheitskräfte. EUCAP Sahel Niger wird auch über einen Außenposten in Agadez verfügen, ein wichtiges Schleuserdrehkreuz auf der Route nach Libyen.

Die Hohe Vertreterin der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und Vizepräsidentin der Kommission Federica Mogherini erklärte dazu Folgendes: "Die EU zeigt heute erneut, dass sie ihre Verantwortung in Partnerschaft mit zentralen Ländern und auf umfassende Weise wahrnimmt. Zwei Wochen nach der Aufforderung des Europäischen Rates, unsere Unterstützung für Partnerländer zur Verhinderung irregulärer Migrationsströme auszubauen, haben wir vereinbart, unsere Präsenz in Niger zu verstärken: 90 % aller Migranten aus Westafrika reisen durch Niger. Nur wenn wir mit den Herkunfts- und Transitländern, mit der Afrikanischen Union und den VN zusammenarbeiten, wird es uns gelingen, die Ursachen der katastrophalen Lage anzugehen und dabei kriminelle Organisationen zu bekämpfen und Migranten zu helfen, diesen Organisationen zu entgehen."

Niger hat für die Migrationsströme nach Europa eine kritische geografische Lage: 90 % aller Migranten aus Westafrika reisen auf ihrem Weg nach Libyen durch Niger. Die Hälfte der Migranten, die 2014 irregulär nach Italien gelangt sind, sind nach Angaben der EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex über Libyen gereist.

Im Rahmen der Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger werden bereits Beratung und Schulung zur Unterstützung der nigrischen Behörden bei der Stärkung ihrer Fähigkeiten zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus und der organisierten Kriminalität bereitgestellt. Mit der Mission sollen die Interoperabilität der nigrischen Sicherheitskräfte gefördert, die Strafverfolgungskapazitäten ausgebaut, die Koordinierung bei der Bekämpfung von Terrorismus und organisierter Kriminalität erleichtert und die dauerhafte Funktionsfähigkeit der Sicherheitskräfte verbessert werden. EUCAP Sahel Niger gehört zur Regionalstrategie der EU für Sicherheit und Entwicklung in der Sahelzone.

Gegenwärtig sind im Rahmen der Mission, die ihr Hauptquartier in Niamey hat, etwa 50 internationale Experten aus 12 EU-Mitgliedstaaten tätig. Filip de Ceuninck aus Belgien ist seit Mai 2014 Leiter der Mission.

Der Beschluss ist vom Politischen und Sicherheitspolitischen Komitee des Rates gefasst worden.

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EUCAP Sahel Niger: Beitrag zur Verhinderung der irregulären Migration

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Der Rat ist übereingekommen, die zivile Mission EUCAP Sahel Niger als Teil der Maßnahmen der Europäischen Union zur Verhinderung der irregulären Migration zu stärken. Die EU wird die nigrischen Behörden bei der Verhinderung der irregulären Einwanderung und der Bekämpfung damit verbundener Kriminalität unterstützen. Dazu gehören Beratung zu einer entsprechenden Strategie und Ausbildung für die nigrischen Sicherheitskräfte.

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IOM is organsing forced returns from countries bordering the EU to form a migrants free buffer zone

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Developmental Aid is used to stop migration, build border controls and fund deportation.

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A large part of that policy focused on Billions are spent there to ensure that potential African migrants do not become real migrants. The goal is fewer deaths in the Mediterranean and fewer arrivals in Europe.

However, on the basis of our The complete overview can be downloaded here if you want to work with the data yourself. We keep updating this data set so it can slightly vary from the graphs in the article. of 129 ongoing in Nigeria, we can certainly deduce some interesting points about how European migration money is spent. For the enthusiast, we present the most important findings and questions here.

What we found: more than €770m in Nigeria ...

The five largest migration projects in Nigeria have also all been paid for by the EU. Interestingly enough, two of these projects now seem to be at a standstill. We're still doing more research into these.

The lion's share of the money from individual countries goes to projects aimed at creating jobs in the country - at least €92m. The interesting thing about these projects is that they are often "restructured" versions of ones that previously tried to help underprivileged youths in Nigeria. Now they focus on potential migrants.

Border control is the second biggest expense for individual European countries, followed by projects aimed at combating human trafficking.

If you add EU funds and funds from individual countries, then this is what migration financing in Nigeria looks like.

... and €775m in the region

In addition to the projects entirely focused on Nigeria, there are These are also implemented in They account for some €775m. It is not possible to say exactly how much of that money

The focus of this regional money is mainly on migrants who are stranded along the way, returning and reintegrating them in their countries of origin, which amounts to more than €500m. Indeed, tens of thousands of migrants have been flown back to Nigeria after a failed journey in the past two years. They receive training and some start-up capital to get their lives back on track.

Awareness campaigns about the dangers of a trip to Europe also receive a relatively large amount of money in the region - at least €39m.

Which country does what?

The Netherlands is in third place, at some distance, with €6m.

The fairytale of more legal migration routes

All this money is part of a Read my previous explainer on it here. which has "better legal migration" as one of its

Just think: if there were more ways for migrants to (temporarily) come to Europe on work or study visas, fewer people would go on perilous journeys through the Sahara and Mediterranean. Moreover, this would allow Europe to fill gaps in its ageing labour market. It's a win-win.

Who gets to spend the money?

Most of the funds are not given directly to the Nigerian government. Instead, the projects are carried out by implementing agencies.

The difference between the implementing agencies of EU funds and of individual European countries is striking. European countries spend the majority of their money - 80% in total in Nigeria and the region - through their own agencies (for example, development agencies or police forces).

and private parties (such as consultants) received €89m in funds from the EU - about 13% of That is more than they receive from European countries - only €36m, or 9% of the total expenditure.

By far the largest implementing agency in Nigeria is the German development agency (GIZ). It is also the main recipient of regional funds that affect Nigeria. We found at least €438m in projects for GIZ in Nigeria and the region.

Finally, the UN migration organisation (IOM) is a crucial player in the Nigerian migration landscape. They are involved in about 20% of the projects we found in Nigeria. These projects are often aimed at border control - for example, Germany has two projects underway via the IOM to design a data system for the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS). With Dutch money, IOM is setting up a training and knowledge centre for the NIS. And Danish money will be used to introduce a better digital system for customs officers at Nigerian airports.

Is humanitarian aid a migration project?

To put the migration projects in context, we also documented all non-migration-related projects in Nigeria that we could find. That is still a lot more money - almost €4.9bn.

A large part of this, no less than a third, is humanitarian aid. And that's where it gets interesting.

But most countries give humanitarian aid to displaced persons or refugees and do not call it migration aid (in Nigeria, at least €90m).

And what about border control? Is development money allowed to be spent on that?

European countries don't agree on these questions yet.

Just the beginning ...

This update, of course, only touches - forgive the uninspired metaphor - the tip of the European migration iceberg. There are still a lot of questions that we can try to tackle answering with this overview as a starting point.

How much of this money goes to private parties, especially in the area of border control?

Is development aid that was previously spent on other purposes now being rerouted to stop migration? What effect does this have?

Does this money reach the set goals? How do you prove that an employment project in Nigeria leads to less migration to Europe?

Is this approach sustainable in the long term, or will migration become a bargaining chip for African leaders who are looking for European support?

And why are Germans so overwhelmingly present in Nigeria?

We'll continue to work on this. Are you a researcher yourself? Please let us know if you see opportunities to use our data - we're curious to hear everyone's input and results!
This article has been written with the support of the Money Trail project. Visit the website of the Money Trail project here.
Dig deeper

Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what's it used for? With the help of some flashy visuals, we tried to find out. But Europe certainly doesn't make it easy ... Read more here

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A breakdown of Europe's €1.5bn migration spending in Nigeria

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A large part of that policy focused on Billions are spent there to ensure that potential African migrants do not become real migrants. The goal is fewer deaths in the Mediterranean and fewer arrivals in Europe. However, on the basis of our The complete overview can be downloaded here if you want to work with the data yourself.

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EU is investing 5 million euros in the development of the Wapis police information system. Up to 17 countries between Mauritania and Nigeria will store the fingerprints collected in police investigations centrally and make them accessible to Interpol.

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EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa - European Commission

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En Afrique de l'Ouest, la propagation du Covid-19 s'accélère et s'ajoute à des crises en cours ou latentes. En date du 10 mai 2020, les chiffres officiels font état de 2.600 personnes infectées et de 165 décés dans les pays du G5 Sahel (Mauritanie, Mali, Burkina Faso,...

IOM

The EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, funded by the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), is one of the main sponsors of the 2019 IMD events organised in the city of Takoradi, Ghana.

On 18 December 2019, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), together with...

HD

"We are the next generation" exclaims Fatoumata Traore, a young Malian beneficiary of the EU funded project "The voices of young people in the Sahel".

In a region with galloping population growth and insufficient economic opportunities, numerous young people face a struggle to make a living and often feel forgotten...

UNHCR

Les traces du cauchemar sont toujours évidentes : la place où des islamistes exécutaient leurs victimes devant les yeux de citoyens obligés d'assister à cette cérémonie sanglante ; plusieurs immeubles détruits ou endommagés par un attentat à la bombe dans une voiture piégée le 12 novembre 2018 ; des patrouilles...

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In West Africa the WAPIS programme works to counter transnational organised crime - EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa - European Commission

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En Afrique de l'Ouest, la propagation du Covid-19 s'accélère et s'ajoute à des crises en cours ou latentes. En date du 10 mai 2020, les chiffres officiels font état de 2.600 personnes infectées et de 165 décés dans les pays du G5 Sahel (Mauritanie, Mali, Burkina Faso,...

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The new EU outpost in Niger is well researched - but there is no support of criminalised supporters of stranded people.

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A. Niger under the 'EU diktat': diminished flows, increased invisibility and risks, and political balances fragilized

Niger is the main transit country for sub-Saharan migrants heading to Libya, and to a lesser extent to Algeria, then eventually to Europe. The IOM estimated at least 333,891 migrants transited through northern Niger towards Libya, and to some degree to Algeria, in 2016, making it a peak year.﻿[36] That same year, the EU gave Niger EUR 140 million to curb migration through its territory; however, Niamey indicated that would not be enough and requested EUR 1 billion.﻿[37] By May 2018, the amount had been increased, with the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (or 'Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa') allocating EUR 230 million to Niger, shared out among 11 projects largely focusing on migration.﻿[38] The EU also earmarked EUR 600 million for more classical development aid in Niger between 2016 and 2020.﻿[39]

For the Nigerien government, addressing EU demands created practical, legal and political challenges. Practically, the northern Niger desert and its border with Libya are difficult to control. In 2015, Niamey passed a new law on 'illegal trafficking of migrants', which involved several legal challenges. First, most migrants transiting through Niger originate from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), a 15-member-state zone allowing its 350,000 million residents freedom of movement - without visas - and trade across its borders. Niger itself is a member and clearly benefits from those freedoms.﻿[40] But the new law, as its Nigerien and other critics argue, de facto violates ECOWAS residents' rights to enter and travel within Niger.

Further, given that there is practically no government in Libya and that the internationally recognised GNA has no control over the country's south, not to mention the rest of the Libyan territory, there is no proper Libyan visa system or border control which could prevent those West African migrants from entering Libya. Although the destination of migrants crossing the Libyan border is not, in principle, Niger's responsibility, the new law de facto prohibits exit from Niger, or ECOWAS, into Libya - thus opening another legal grey zone.

In a more practical sense, the criminalisation of both smugglers and migrants was at odds with the fact that transporting migrants was regarded as both a 'normal' and 'licit' occupation in northern Niger - and one that has contributed to economic development and stability in the region. Until implementation of the 2015 law began in mid-2016, migrants were travelling openly in buses legally operated by private companies, such as Rimbo, to and within Niger, as far as the Saharan transit town of Agadez. There, the difficulty of the roads across sandy plains obliged them to board the back of pickup trucks, which were operating openly and no less legally. Drivers were picking up their passengers from buses at Agadez autogare (bus station) then waiting for the weekly military escort allowing them, every Monday, to travel safely along the first stretch of the road to Puits Espoir (Hope's Well), in the middle, or even as far as the Dirkou oasis, mid-way to Libya - a stretch of road long made dangerous by chronic banditry.

The majority of the passengers travel voluntarily on this road.﻿[41] In spite of this, the new 2015 law assimilated assistance to any foreigner (no matter if the person is from ECOWAS) to enter or exit Niger to 'illegal trafficking of migrants'.﻿[42] Niger only began to enforce the law in mid-2016. The authorities targeted the transport of migrants from Agadez and onwards north, in spite of the fact the town lies 1,100km from the Libyan border. Between mid-2016 and April 2018, Niger's security forces arrested more than 282 drivers, car owners, 'coaxers' (intermediaries) and 'ghetto' owners housing migrants, and confiscated 300 to 350 vehicles, in Agadez and on the road to Libya.﻿[43] During the first half of 2017, when enforcement of the new law was at its peak, nearly 10,000 foreigners were sent back to the border or expelled from Niger.﻿[44]

The implementation of the 2015 law had various impacts. While migrant flows north of Agadez appear to have decreased, it is difficult to estimate by how much.﻿[45] The number of (non-Nigerien) migrants entering Agadez reportedly had declined from 350 per day in 2016 to 60-120 a week in 2018.﻿[46] At the Seguedine (also known as Segedim or Sow) checkpoint mid-way between Dirkou and the Libyan border, the number of registered people travelling north dropped from 290,000 in 2016 to 33,000 in 2017.﻿[47] The IOM estimated that migrant flows north of Agadez had gone down by 75%. However, this is likely to be an overestimate, as smugglers have stopped following the Monday convoy and taking the Agadez-Puits Espoir stretch of road.

Instead, smugglers now drive on various new or little-used roads. They avoid hubs such as Agadez and Dirkou, escaping government control and IOM counts in these places and along the normal route.﻿[48] The main new axes appear to skirt Agadez on all sides in order to reach and follow international borders, including the Niger-Algeria border and the Niger-Chad border, up to the border with Libya. Such itineraries are partly resurrecting older contraband itineraries used during the period of the UN air traffic embargo against Libya in the 1990s. They also partly merge with existing drug trafficking routes, reportedly occasioning new ties between drug traffickers and migrant smugglers, since both activities are now seen as similarly criminal. Migrant smugglers also now travel at night, because, as one of them explains, 'the Nigerien army rests after 6 pm.'﻿[49]

Those more difficult roads have proved to be more dangerous for both migrants and drivers. As a result, the number of cars and drivers involved has declined, with the less experienced abandoning the activity and only the most seasoned 'stuntmen', as a smuggler called them, ready to take the risks.﻿[50] The migration business is thus said to have become 'professionalised'﻿[51], and its revenues concentrated in fewer hands. Chased by either security forces or bandits, drivers more frequently abandon their passengers. The IOM reported more than 1,000 abandoned migrants in the first eight months of 2017.﻿[52] According to the organisation's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, the number of migrants dead in the desert on the roads between Agadez and southern Libya or southern Algeria rose from 71 in 2015, to 95 in 2016, and to 427 in 2017 (see fig. 1).

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During the first 18 months following the law becoming enforceable in mid-2016, 38 migrants died in the desert every month, versus 11 each month in the previous 18 months. Each year, the peak month for mortality appeared to be June: 40 migrants died in Niger in June 2015, 55 in June 2016, and more than 130 in June 2017. Further, in 2017, the peak period for mortality was not limited to June, with more than 70 migrants dead monthly in May, July and October (see fig. 2). In 2015, there had been very few serious incidents leading to more than ten casualties, while in 2017, 44 migrants reportedly died of dehydration near Dirkou on 31 May and 52 near Seguedine on 25 June.﻿[53]

Prices have risen alongside risks: between 2016 and 2017 the fee for the Agadez to Libya journey increased by at least a factor of two - commonly reaching EUR 400, and sometimes twice that amount.﻿[54] Bribes to security forces to get through checkpoints or escape control also reportedly doubled to reach XOF (West African franc) 300-600,000 (EUR 450-900) for the entire journey between Agadez and the Libyan border.﻿[55] New opportunities for corruption have also appeared. For instance, in June 2017, M.N., a migrant driver left Agadez for Libya in a convoy of four cars. As smugglers had already been arrested, he had taken some precautions, paying XOF 25,000 (EUR 38) to a member of the security forces who escorted the cars on a motorbike, at 3:00 AM, until they were out of town. But this bribe was not sufficient for the rest of the journey and the four vehicles were arrested, together with three others, mid-way between Agadez and Dirkou. The drivers were able to give the security forces XOF 1.5 million (EUR 2,300) each to escape.﻿[56]

Political, economic and security consequences, related to each other, were no less important than the new risks for migrants and smugglers. It was estimated that, prior to the implementation of the 2015 law, migration 'offered direct jobs for more than 6,000 people' in Agadez.﻿[57] By March 2017, the Agadez Regional Council counted around 3,000 vehicles used to transport migrants. It estimated that 100,000 people in the region (about a fifth of the population) were indirectly benefitting from this activity, and that 10,000 were directly making a living thanks to it - the figure was later reduced to a list of 6,565 individuals.﻿[58]

The implementation of the 2015 law took place in a context of economic hardship in northern Niger. The drop in global uranium prices led to the closure of mines and projects being abandoned. Several thousand miners were left jobless, some of whom reportedly became migrant smugglers.﻿[59] The lack of income-generating activities was aggravated later, in March 2017, by another government decision - to close the gold mines of Djado between Dirkou and Libya, which employed several thousand artisanal miners and drivers. Some Djado miners had been migrant smugglers, and others were migrants who stopped on their way to Libya, or gave up their plans to migrate, in the hope of finding gold.

'We're trying to persuade the youth to respect the law but we lack arguments,' regretfully noted Agadez Regional Council President Mohamed Anacko in March 2017.﻿[60] The Council estimated that compensating for loss of income and creating alternative activities would cost more than EUR 400 million and proposed a EUR 30-million project to the EU.﻿[61] In June 2017, Nigerien authorities announced they were allocating EUR 250,000 for redeployment - shortly afterwards the amount doubled, fixing the amount that would supposedly enable a 'smuggler' to change activities to EUR 1,200-2,200, which was far from the monthly income of some migrant smugglers.﻿[62] The project can, at best, involve some 400 smugglers, far from the 5,110 officially listed as potential beneficiaries.﻿[63] Some of the smugglers, usually more discreet then publicly, expressed their dissatisfaction: 'They think we're losers!', a driver called Alkassoum told La Nation newspaper.﻿[64]

Tensions also increased between the authorities and local Tuareg and Tubu communities. Over the last decade, the relative security and stability in northern Niger appeared to be due to a balance between three poles of power, all benefitting from migration: Tuareg and Tubu communities, including many former rebels, for which migration was a main income generating activity; security forces, taking bribes on migrants or smugglers; and civilian authorities, who rightly saw migration as a source of wealth not only for northern smugglers but also for the whole country, including private companies operating transnational bus lines or money transfer operators, whose owners are said to be among the main associates and funders of the ruling party.﻿[65] Migration also contributed to the coexistence of Tuareg and Tubu communities, who had to cooperate to cross each other's territories, in spite of being in conflict within Libya. The new migration policy threatens to upset these fragile balances.﻿[66]

Crucially, a significant number of northern Niger's migrant smugglers were former Tuareg rebels. After signing peace agreements in the late 1990s and the late 2000s, most of them had not been integrated into regular armed forces. With integration processes long delayed, successive governments had encouraged them to use their vehicles and their knowledge of desert roads to become migrant transporters. One of the rebel leaders recalls distributing his faction's vehicles to groups of ten ex-combatants, each with a specific assignment.﻿[67] Other ex-combatants were in charge of managing official 'departure points' at Agadez and Arlit bus stations.

As a result, not only was this activity transparent and considered to be legal, it was also considered to be the result of a peace deal.﻿[68] Former rebels thus feel that the new law is a violation of the peace agreements they signed, and some have openly threatened to start a rebellion again. Incidentally, in late 2016, Adam Tcheke, a former Tubu rebel, briefly announced he was starting a new rebellion, and among his main requests was that the (mostly Tubu) jailed drivers of migrants be liberated. Although no bullet was fired, the rebellion threat was taken seriously by the authorities. The people of Agadez also continued to ask for the release of the detained drivers.﻿[69] In late 2016, reports also circulated that disgruntled Tubu youths were about to use force to recover about 100 confiscated cars. As a precaution, the cars were moved from Agadez police station to the safer military garrison.﻿[70]

By late 2017, the authorities, while presenting the new law as a success, appeared to take this local discontent into account. They reportedly stopped arresting smugglers and gradually released those detained. But they still refused to return confiscated vehicles - reportedly, unless the owners could pay bribes of XOF 1 to 1.5 million (EUR 1,500-2,300).﻿[71] In September 2017, most likely in the realisation that the Nigerien forces' ability to curb flows was limited, Italy announced discussions with Niger on 'military collaboration (...) about training and border control'.﻿[72] Then in January 2018, Rome announced the deployment of 470 troops to Madama - the last military post before the Libyan border, 80km south of it - where 150 French soldiers were already stationed.﻿[73] However, Italy was publicly rebuffed by Niamey, which might have foreseen that such a deployment against migrants would not be welcomed locally.﻿[74]

While Tubu and Tuareg smugglers' threats of rebellion did not really materialise, at least on a large scale, all agree that the new migration policy provided strong arguments for those wanting to take up arms. Tuareg and Tubu communities saw migration policies as the 'diktat of Europe, to which the Nigerien authorities obeyed to hit the jackpot';﻿[75] they accused the government of diverting EU migration funding, including that earmarked for smugglers' redeployment, and the military authorities of continuing to benefit from, and raise the amounts of, bribes.﻿[76] Since early 2017, there have been reports of migrant smugglers turning, as a result of the ban, to road banditry and drug and alcohol trafficking.

Nigerien authorities admit the new law has been responsible for an upsurge of banditry.﻿[77] Migrant smugglers reportedly began trafficking the synthetic opioid tramadol between Nigeria and Libya along new less-controlled migrant routes. Some also left Niger to join or re-join militias in Libya. Some had already been members of Libyan forces under Qaddafi and during the revolution, before being encouraged by their Nigerien relatives to turn to more peaceful migration activities. Since 2017, possibly a hundred Tuareg as well as Tubu migrant smugglers joined their respective ethnic militias in Libya, taking taxes on roads or fighting in community conflicts, or they became mercenaries for one of northern Libya's rival powers. Possibly another hundred Tuareg migrant smugglers joined armed groups in Mali.﻿[78]

B. Effects on the Tubu

In Libya, the EU and EU member states largely saw the migration issue as too urgent to wait for the rebuilding of a functioning Libyan state, and decided to engage, directly and indirectly, with militia forces. Those forces included militias involved in migrant smuggling or trafficking, and were supposedly ready to stop and fight smuggling in exchange for financial support and political recognition. The possibility of such incentives also attracted some ethnic militias in the borderlands between Libya and Niger, and even contributed to the formation of a new armed group operating in this area. Like in northern Libya, it also raised the risk of new conflicts between pro- and anti-smuggling armed actors, in particular among Tubu forces largely controlling the Niger-Libya-Chad borderlands.

The Tubu (or Teda) community lives in northern Chad, north-eastern Niger and southern Libya.﻿[79] Tubu vehicle owners and drivers have long been involved in the transportation of migrants from Niger, and to a lesser extent from Chad, to Libya. This has been a major source of income for Nigerien Tubu of the Kawar oases, strategically positioned mid-way between Agadez and Fezzan. More recently, since 2011, it has also become a major activity for Libyan Tubu youths who obtained vehicles, legally or not, during or after the Libyan revolution. Among those youths are members, full time or part time, of Libyan Tubu militias. Some of those forces are led and composed of former goods and migrant smugglers, including Nigerien Tubu, with their good knowledge of the Libya-Niger border and past military experiences in Nigerien rebellions.﻿[80] In addition, Libyan Tubu militias, sometimes presenting themselves as official border guards, earned money by taxing migrants and migrant smugglers at checkpoints. Members of Libyan Tubu militias also remained directly involved in migrant smuggling as drivers and car owners, thus supplementing their militia salaries.﻿[81]

Other members of Libyan Tubu militias appear to have been involved in curbing the smuggling and expelling of migrants. This seems to have been the case for militias that were affiliated to one of northern Libya's successive or rival authorities or were looking for such recognition and the funding that it attracts. At times, funding for southern Libya's Tubu militias by northern Libya's authorities reportedly included specific allocations to arrest, detain and deport migrants. It may have included European funding given to one of the successive Tripoli-based governments, which was then transferred to Tubu militias. Thus in 2012-13, the katiba shuhada Um-el-Araneb (battalion of the martyrs of Um-el-Araneb), one of the strongest Tubu militias, received funding from the Ali Zeidan government in Tripoli to intercept migrants.﻿[82]

In 2015-16, Italian officials promised six vehicles to another main Tubu militia, Barka Wardougou's Dira' Sahara (Sahara Shield), who controlled the strategic Tomou post on the Niger-Libya border; the vehicles were never delivered. Later in April 2017, Italian government mediation between Tubu and Awlad Suleiman representatives on their conflict in Sebha managed to merge that issue with that of migration, more crucial to Rome, and reportedly convinced the negotiators to commit to the formation of a multi-tribal 'border guard'.﻿[83] On its side, Italy reportedly committed to funding the training and equipment of such a force, which led some Tubu to think Rome was ready to support Tubu militias. Some of the tribal representatives saw it as an opportunity to obtain international recognition and funding, but reportedly lost local support because of their commitment to such a project.﻿[84] Others appeared more sceptical, fearing it could create intra-Tubu fighting between the so-called border guards and other militias involved in smuggling.

In September 2017, Italy announced it was ready to send 100 troops to the Niger-Libya borderto train Libyan border guards. Since then, Rome seemed to have become more cautious, after increasing media coverage of abuses against migrants in Libya, as well as after warnings by the GNA, Niger and Chad against support of Tubu militias.﻿[85] However, in July 2018, Italy signed a new agreement with the GNA, again referring to the 2008 Qaddafi-Berlusconi Friendship Treaty. The new deal reportedly allows Rome to deploy troops in southern Libya.﻿[86]

In Niger, as mentioned above, the Tubu community appeared essentially hostile to the new anti-smuggling government policy. Yet it was also one of the reasons why, in mid-2017, Tubu leader Barka Sidimi took up arms. Unlike his former comrade Adam Tcheke (see above), Sidimi was not asking for the release of arrested smugglers. Rather he presented himself as a border force against migrant smuggling, obviously in the hope of obtaining European funding.

It appeared an odd position. Barka Sidimi had himself been a migrant smuggler, notably in 2009-10, at the time crossing between Niger and Libya through Wour in Chadian Tibesti. Prior to this in the 1990s, he had been, like Adam Tcheke, a leader of the Nigerien Tubu rebellion, known as the Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara (FARS, Sahara's Revolutionary Armed Forces), under Barka Wardougou. In the 2000s, while the FARS had signed a peace agreement with the Nigerien government, Sidimi had recreated an armed group against both Niger and Libya. He was then involved in attacks against drug traffickers in Niger as well as in a carjacking attempt against a Chinese oil project in Libya. Because of the latter, Qaddafi sentenced him to having a hand and a foot cut off.﻿[87]

In spite of this, in 2011, Barka Sidimi accepted Qaddafi's money to recruit a force to fight on his side. But because other Tubu leaders such as Barka Wardougou gradually sided with the revolution, and because Sidimi's men were in part Tuareg who were increasingly hostile to the Tubu, he gave up fighting and went back to Niger. It seems he was not involved in armed activities between 2011 and 2017. Unlike other Nigerien Tubu, he did not mobilise to fight Tuareg and Awlad Suleiman forces in Ubari and Sebha, respectively. In 2014, Sidimi was appointed, like other former rebels before him, as an adviser to Niger's Prime Minister Brigi Rafini, a Tuareg himself. In early 2017, he was presiding over a Tubu committee of 'wise men' in Agadez, one of several committees with the stated objective of opposing authorities' actions 'perturbating trade' and migrant smuggling.﻿[88]

It was thus a surprise for many when he recreated an armed group under the name Saqur Sahara ('Sahara Falcons') with a stated anti-smuggling agenda. Another part of his agenda was more popular - fighting against road bandits, not the least Chadian and Sudanese Zaghawa, who were increasingly active in the Niger-Libya borderlands. Those foreign bandits had also attacked drug traffickers and then been hired by them as escorts, replacing older Tubu escorts, which reportedly motivated some Tubu traffickers and combatants to support Sidimi. Thanks to this, he managed to recruit a force, including disgruntled migrant smugglers. He reportedly promised to enrol 500 youths, were he to obtain sufficient support.﻿[89] Khalifa Haftar, commander of the so-called 'Libyan National Army' controlling most of eastern Libya, allegedly recognised the new force and promised vehicles.﻿[90]

With 10 to 20 vehicles, Sidimi positioned himself in Libya near the border and arrested some foreigners, reportedly including in September 2017 three cars of possibly Chadian and Sudanese Zaghawa and Arab bandits. There were rumours that Sidimi has been offered Italian funding either through the intermediary of Zintan brigades, or through Chad, that he visited in January 2018. Contact between Sidimi's representatives and the EU also took place, mostly in late 2017. Sidimi's representatives notably argued, as other Libyan Tubu militias had done before, that migrants were bringing diseases such as AIDS and Ebola to Libya and Europe. In October, Sidimi reportedly requested EUR 3 million a year to finance his militia, but with no result.﻿[91]

All in all, Sidimi's story appears to be one of an old Tubu rebel who, failing to position himself in any post-Qaddafi new Libyan Tubu militias, tried to regain a leading role at the Niger-Libya border. For this, he instrumentalised the migration issue in the hope of obtaining Europe's sponsorship. Yet this strategy got Sidimi into trouble with the larger Tubu community.

In 2017, other, more important, Libyan Tubu militia leaders also met with EU officials to discuss collaboration, but they were reportedly more cautious about engaging with the anti-migration agenda. Between 2012 and 2015, some of us 'blocked the migrants in order to show we were serving the [Libyan] state,' one of them explained. 'But since 2015, because of the conflicts between communities in southern Libya, we lost hope in the Libyan state and fight for the [Tubu] community. We need a stable state before we can fight against migration."﻿[92] Another Tubu militia leader stated: 'Migrant smugglers are our brothers, we can't block them or force them to stop. We can only block those who are not Tubu.'﻿[93]

Sidimi's anti-migration agenda, and the fact that he pretended to close the border and began to tax even Tubu smugglers, made him unpopular within his own community.﻿[94] As Tubu leaders had warned over Italian anti-migration attempts, Sidimi's rise threatened to create a conflict between Tubu forces. In early 2018, existing Tubu militias formed a coalition under the name Hodh Murzuq ('Murzuq Basin') and deployed forces in the main smuggling hub of Um-el-Araneb, preventing - without violence - the Sahara Falcons from creating a checkpoint.﻿[95] Later, another Tubu militia reportedly prevented Sidimi from deploying his forces on the Chad-Libya border. Even if Sidimi did not benefit from European funding, Europe's apparent readiness to engage with militias or non-state armed groups to address migration and smuggling triggered competition between Tubu militias, which nearly led to violent conflict.

It is likely that European policies against migrants, in Niger, Chad or Libya, will continue encouraging some Tubu politicians and militia leaders, and even Chadian rebels based in Libya, to profess an anti-smuggling agenda in order to get European political and financial support. It is also likely that those leaders are in fact unwilling or unable to implement such an agenda, or if they try to do so, will be in conflict with other Tubu forces. The Tubu community is already deeply divided, but appears to remain eager to avoid internal conflicts, not the least because it is keen to remain united in the context of continuous conflicts with other communities in southern Libya. Until now, Tubu efforts to avoid violence among themselves have prevented conflicts between pro- and anti-smuggling Tubu forces. But policies against smuggling that are not conflict-sensitive may generate such conflicts in the future.

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Effects of EU policies in Niger | Multilateral Damage

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Niger is the main transit country for sub-Saharan migrants heading to Libya and to a lesser extent to Algeria. The smugglers avoid government control and drive on various new or little-used roads. The migration business is said to have become professionalised and its revenues concentrated in fewer hands.

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EU member states need urgently personal data to speed up deportation.

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With money and technology from Europe, Africa is biometricised - a joint project for african statehood and EU border guards.

People fleeing from Africa to Europe have two options: they can take the road across Libya and the Mediterranean Sea, where the mortality rate is around 1:40 this year. Or travel with a borrowed, rented or fake passport.

8,373 people have caught European border guards in 2015 when entering the Schengen area with such travel documents. The dark figure may be higher. In Germany, the quota of asylum procedures „without any identity documents" was more than 70 percent at the beginning of 2015, according to the number of the Central Register of Aliens (AZR). Missing documents are „still the most quantitatively important problem" for deportations, states in an evaluation of the federations of the Federal States AG repatriations.

Access to biometrics databases of the African countries of origin is therefore the dream of EU interior ministers. The problem: Many African countries know too little about their own citizens. According to latest figures from the World Bank, some one-third of the population of Africa is not registered by the state at all. Either a list is missing, the last census is decades ago, or the government does not issue identity cards. Or all together.

Because of the lack of digital databases in many of the African offices, folders and registers are piling up in damp cellars. The same goes for the borders: servers, fingerprint scanners, digital cameras, readers are missing. In some places, the data of the expatriates and arrivals are still registered by hand in large notebooks.

An action plan of the EU Commission

This is to change now. Europe has undertaken the biometrics of Africa. In September, the EU Commission announced an „action plan" for „more solid and intelligent information systems for border management". When EU leaders met with 30 African presidents on Malta last year, they promised „modern" reporting registers and „safe" ID documents. Money from a multi-billion dollar trust fund is expected.

In West Africa, the regional organization Ecowas (West African Economic Community) is just beginning with the introduction of biometric ID cards, which will enable visa-free border crossing in the future. At the same time, the EU is investing 5 million euros in the development of the Wapis police information system. Up to 17 countries between Mauritania and Nigeria will store the fingerprints collected in police investigations centrally and make Interpol accessible.

In Ghana, Mali, Niger and Benin, pilot projects have been running since 2015. The system is also intended for border controls and is intended to help identify fake documents. „This brings a collective comparison of the data of paperless African migrants for deportation purposes within reach", says Eric Töpfer from the Institute for Human Rights of the taz.

Commissioned Bundesdruckerei

How close, the German Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière at the beginning of the year on his Maghreb trip proved. Morocco agreed to a biometric data comparison for deportations, he announced. About two weeks later, Veridos, a joint-stock company of the Bundesdruckerei and the German IT company Giesecke & Devrient, announced that they had been commissioned by Morocco to develop and implement a national border control system. Among other things, biometric scanners, pass-through devices, control sluices and servers for 1,600 checkpoints are delivered.

Moreover, according to the Bundesdruckerei of the taz, it is currently printing raw passports for Libya's transitional government. A delegation from the Sudan Immigration Office paid a visit to her recently.

The market research institute MarketsandMarkets estimates that the global biometry industry will grow by almost 18 percent annually by 2020. Africa is the ideal sales market: the population there is to rise from 1.1 billion to 2.4 billion by the middle of the century, nowhere more people will need passports, passports or driving licenses - the best digital readability.

The UNHCR under pressure

More than a thousand people are currently rescuing daily from southern Sudan to the neighboring countries, mostly Uganda. When they are struck out with their belongings in a refugee camp of the UN refugee agency, they have to give their fingerprints, their photos are stored, and they are given a plastic card on which all the features are stored. Only then do they have the right to protection and access to help.

Over a million refugees, the UNHCR has already registered biometrically with its new registration system (BIMS) worldwide. Your data is stored centrally on a UN database in Geneva, Switzerland. Up to 34 million refugees from 125 countries could be registered here in the future, the Accenture system manufacturer estimates in a promotional brochure. BIMS has already been used in 14 African countries.

The UNHCR is always in conflict with the state authorities. Since Somali Islamists have committed attacks in Kenya, the Kenyan authorities are calling on the UNHCR databases, which contain information about 600,000 refugees in the country, including many Somalis. On taz's request states that the UNHCR „does not share data with states or institutions".

The fight against terror and irregular migration is increasingly affecting. In Europe it is feared that IS sleeper could have come with the Syrian refugees. As a countermeasure, incoming identity checks are recommended. In line with the EU guidelines, the Sahel states, bombed by Boko Haram and al-Qaeda, want to expand the initial biometrics as an anti-corruption measure.

Europe is happy to help

Many African countries can not afford the expensive printing presses. Europe is happy to help with money and technology. The world market leader in biometrics is the French-Dutch company Gemalto, which operates in four African countries. With an annual turnover of more than € 2 billion, Gemalto supplies a large number of African countries from Algeria to South Africa with biometrics and registered voters, a particularly sensitive issue.

European border protection and African governance policies are thus brought together. „We are cooperating with the African Union on biometrics," the EU Commission said. This also involved matters such as the better handling of elections, the registration of children or the establishment of registers of persons. „But of course the data must also be used for migration management."

In Nigeria, for example. The country is regarded as a high passport of the passport, Nigerians this year the second largest group of irregular migrants from Africa in the EU. Since 2014 the 180 million inhabitants have been equipped with biometric ID cards. The unambiguous identifiability of Nigerian citizens is likely to greatly simplify the implementation of the reintroduction agreement negotiated by the EU with Nigeria. In February 2016, the EU proposed European support for the expansion of the Nigerian registry with biometrics in an internal strategy paper.

So far, only the data of 11 million Nigerians have been recorded; now the Ecowas personnel ID has replaced the original project. It was controversial anyway: the cards should serve as an electronic payment card, with Mastercard as a partner.

Torn deal in Uganda

In other countries too, the contracts between governments and technology groups are a source of controversy because of the high costs and opaque procurement. In Gabon, the opposition to the government's overestimated contract with Gemalto complains. In Uganda, Bavarian technology company Mühlbauer hit the headlines in 2010 when company manager Josef Mühlbauer met with Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni in the middle of the night, accompanied by the German ambassador, to conclude a 64 million Euro biometric ID card. After the Germans until 2012, according to Ugandan data only 400 evasives delivered, the deal blown.

The largest Mühlbauer customer in Africa was until recently Algeria, which was now taken over by Gemalto. „Highly skeptical" the country is opposed to a return agreement with the EU, states in an internal strategy paper of the EU Commission, the taz is in possession of. Only a quarter of the planned deportations of Algerians in 2014 were actually carried out. The deportees do not want the country, but the biometrics pass. Here the interests reunited. How the EU wants to move more towards Algiers is also in the paper: Brussels wants to leverage money for a „biometric database".

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EU migration policy in Africa: Transparent Africans

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With money and technology from Europe, Africa is biometricised - a joint project for african statehood and EU border guards. People fleeing from Africa to Europe have two options: they can take the road across Libya and the Mediterranean Sea, where the mortality rate is around 1:40 this year.