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Police - law and legislation used by UK police officers..

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UK Cases: R. v. Sally Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 - 11 April 2003 [Part One]

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On 28 and 29 January 2003 this court heard the appeal and concluded that the convictions were unsafe and must be set aside. The Crown did not seek a re-trial and accordingly Mrs Clark was released.

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Sally Clark (August 1964 - 15 March 2007) was an English solicitor who, in November 1999, became the victim of a miscarriage of justice when she was found guilty of the murder of her two infant sons. Clark's first son died in December 1996 within a few weeks of his birth, and her second son died in similar circumstances in January 1998. A month later, Clark was arrested and tried for both deaths. The defense argued that the children had died of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The prosecution case relied on flawed statistical evidence presented by paediatrician Professor Sir Roy Meadow, who testified that the chance of two children from an affluent family suffering SIDS was 1 in 73 million. He had arrived at this figure by squaring his estimate of a chance of 1 in 8500 of an individual SIDS death in similar circumstances. The Royal Statistical Society later issued a statement arguing that there was no statistical basis for Meadow's claim, and expressed concern at the "misuse of statistics in the courts".

Clark was convicted in November 1999. The convictions were upheld on appeal in October 2000, but overturned in a second appeal in January 2003, after it emerged that Alan Williams, the prosecution forensic pathologist who examined both babies, had failed to disclose microbiological reports that suggested the second of her sons had died of natural causes. Clark was released from prison having served more than three years of her sentence. Journalist Geoffrey Wansell called Clark's experience "one of the great miscarriages of justice in modern British legal history". As a result of her case, the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith ordered a review of hundreds of other cases, and two other women had their convictions overturned. Clark's experience caused her to develop severe psychiatric problems and she died in her home in March 2007 from alcohol poisoning.

Sally Clark was born Sally Lockyer in Devizes, Wiltshire, and was an only child. Her father was a senior police officer with Wiltshire Constabulary and her mother was a hairdresser. She was educated at South Wilts Grammar School for Girls in Salisbury. She studied geography at Southampton University, and worked as a management trainee with Lloyds Bank and then at Citibank. She married solicitor Steve Clark in 1990, and left her job in the City of London to train in the same profession. She studied at City University, London, and trained at Macfarlanes, a city law firm. She moved with her husband to join the law firm Addleshaw Booth & Co in Manchester in 1994. They bought a house in Wilmslow in Cheshire.

Clark's first son, Christopher, was born on 22 September 1996. Court documents describe him as a healthy baby. On 13 December Clark called an ambulance to the family home. The baby had fallen unconscious after being put to bed, and was declared dead after being transported to the hospital. Clark had post-natal depression and received counselling at the Priory Clinic, but was in recovery by the time her second son, Harry, was born three weeks premature on 29 November 1997. However, he was also found dead on 26 January 1998, aged 8 weeks. On both occasions, Clark was at home alone with her baby and there was evidence of trauma, which could have been related to attempts to resuscitate them.

Clark and her husband were arrested on 23 February 1998 on suspicion of murdering their children. On the advice of her lawyers she twice refused to answer questions. She was later charged with two counts of murder while the case against her husband was dropped. Clark always denied the charge, and was supported throughout by her husband. During the court proceedings she gave birth to a third son.

Clark was tried at Chester Crown Court, before Mr Justice Harrison and a jury. The 17-day trial began on 11 October 1999. The prosecution, led by Robin Spencer QC, was controversial for its involvement of the paediatrician professor Sir Roy Meadow, former professor of paediatrics at the University of Leeds, who testified at Clark's trial that the chance of two children from an affluent family suffering cot death was 1 in 73 million. He likened the probability to the chances of backing an 80-1 outsider in the Grand National four years running, and winning each time.

Home Office pathologist Dr Alan Williams withheld the results of bacteriology tests on Clark's second baby which showed the presence of the bacterium Staphylococcus aureus in multiple sites including his cerebro-spinal fluid. During the trial the jury asked specifically if there were any 'blood' test results for this child. Williams returned to the witness box to deal with their query. He was specifically asked about an entry in the notes referring to 'C&S' results. These referred to samples taken for culture and sensitivity (bacteriology) tests. In his responses, he failed to reveal the existence of these withheld test results.

Clark was convicted by a 10-2 majority verdict on 9 November 1999, and given the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. She was widely reviled in the press as the murderer of her children. Despite recognition of the flaws in Meadow's statistical evidence, the convictions were upheld at appeal in October 2000. She was imprisoned at Styal women's prison, near her home in Wilmslow, and then Bullwood Hall women's prison in Hockley in Essex. The nature of her conviction as a child-killer, and her background as a solicitor and daughter of a police officer, made her a target for other prisoners. Her husband left his partnership at a Manchester law firm to work as a legal assistant nearer the prison, selling the family house to meet the legal bills from the trial and first appeal.

Later, it came to light that microbiological tests showed that Harry had a colonisation of Staphylococcus aureus bacteria, indicating that he had died from natural causes, but the evidence had not been disclosed to the defence. This exculpatory evidence had been known to the prosecution's pathologist, Alan Williams, since February 1998, but was not shared with other medical witnesses, police or lawyers. The evidence was unearthed by her husband from hospital records obtained by the divorce lawyer Marilyn Stowe, who provided her services free of charge because she felt that "something was not right about the case". It also became clearer that the statistical evidence presented at Clark's trial was seriously flawed.

For her second appeal a report regarding the medical evidence was provided by Sam Gulino, a prosecution forensic pathologist for the State of Florida, US. He commented scathingly about the poor quality of the pathologists' work in these cases:

Throughout my review, I was horrified by the shoddy fashion in which these cases were evaluated. It was clear that sound medical principles were abandoned in favour of over-simplification, over-interpretation, exclusion of relevant data and, in several instances, the imagining of non-existent findings.

Her case was referred back to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, and her convictions were overturned in a second appeal in January 2003. She was released from prison having served more than three years of her sentence.

Statistical evidence

The first trial was widely criticised for the misrepresentation of statistical evidence, particularly by Meadow. He stated in evidence as an expert witness that "one sudden infant death in a family is a tragedy, two is suspicious and three is murder unless proven otherwise" ( Meadow's law). He claimed that, for an affluent non-smoking family like the Clarks, the probability of a single cot death was 1 in 8,543, so the probability of two in the same family was around "1 in 73 million" (8543 × 8543). Given that there are around 700,000 live births in Britain each year, Meadow argued that a double cot death would be expected to occur once every hundred years.

In October 2001, the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) issued a public statement expressing its concern at the "misuse of statistics in the courts". It noted that there was "no statistical basis" for the "1 in 73 million" figure. In January 2002, the RSS wrote to the Lord Chancellor pointing out that "the calculation leading to 1 in 73 million is false".

Meadow's calculation was based on the assumption that two SIDS deaths in the same family are independent. The RSS argued that "there are very strong reasons for supposing that the assumption is false. There may well be unknown genetic or environmental factors that predispose families to SIDS, so that a second case within the family becomes much more likely than would be a case in another, apparently similar, family." The prosecution did not provide any evidence to support its different assumption. In a 2004 article in Paediatric and Perinatal Epidemiology, Professor of Mathematics Ray Hill of Salford University concluded, using extensive SIDS statistics for England, that "after a first cot death the chances of a second become greatly increased" by a dependency factor of between 5 and 10.

The ruling was also subject to a statistical error known as the " prosecutor's fallacy". Many press reports of the trial reported that the "1 in 73 million" figure was the probability that Clark was innocent. However, even if the "1 in 73 million" figure were valid, this should not have been interpreted as the probability of Clark's innocence. In order to calculate the probability of Clark's innocence, the jury needed to weigh up the relative likelihood of the two competing explanations for the children's deaths. In other words, murder was not the only alternative explanation for the deaths in the way that one might have inferred from asserted probability of double SIDS. Although double SIDS is very rare, double infant murder is likely to be rarer still, so the probability of Clark's innocence was quite high. Hill calculated the odds ratio for double SIDS to double homicide at between 4.5:1 and 9:1, that is double SIDS is twice as likely as double murder.

Hill raised a third objection to the "1 in 73 million" figure. Meadow arrived at the 1 in 8,500 figure by taking into account three key characteristics possessed by the Clark family, all of which make SIDS less likely. However, Hill said that Meadow "conveniently ignored factors such as both the Clark babies being boys - which make cot death more likely". Hill also argued:

When a cot death mother is accused of murder, the prosecution sometimes employs a tactic such as the following. If the parents are affluent, in a stable relationship and non-smoking, the prosecution will claim that the chances of the death being natural are greatly reduced, and by implication that the chances of the death being homicide are greatly increased. But this implication is totally false, because the very same factors which make a family low risk for cot death also make it low risk for murder.

During the second appeal, the court noted that Meadow's calculations were subject to a number of qualifications, but "none of these qualifications were referred to by Professor Meadow in his evidence to the jury and thus it was the headline figures of 1 in 73 million that would be uppermost in the jury's minds". The appeal court concluded that "the evidence should never have been before the jury in the way that it was when they considered their verdicts". The judges continued, "we rather suspect that with the graphic reference by Professor Meadow to the chances of backing long odds winners of the Grand National year after year it may have had a major effect on [the jury's] thinking notwithstanding the efforts of the trial judge to down play it".

Clark's release in January 2003 prompted the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith to order a review of hundreds of other cases. Two other women convicted of murdering their children, Donna Anthony and Angela Cannings, had their convictions overturned and were released from prison. Trupti Patel, who was also accused of murdering her three children, was acquitted in June 2003. In each case, Roy Meadow had testified about the unlikelihood of multiple cot deaths in a single family.

Meadow was struck off the medical register by the General Medical Council in 2005 for serious professional misconduct. It was during the GMC hearing that, when questioned directly, he made his first public apology for the effect of his 'misleading' evidence. He cited 'legal advice' and 'professional etiquette' as the reasons for the delay. Then current GMC professional conduct guidance did not support his 'professional etiquette' reason. He was reinstated in 2006 after he appealed and the court ruled (2 to 1) that his actions in court had amounted to misconduct though not serious enough to warrant him being struck off. The senior judge on the panel, Master of the Rolls Sir Anthony Clarke, dissented from the view of his two colleagues. In his opinion Meadow's actions had amounted to serious professional misconduct.

In June 2005, Alan Williams, the Home Office pathologist who conducted the postmortem examinations on both the Clark babies, was banned from Home Office pathology work and coroners' cases for three years after the General Medical Council found him guilty of "serious professional misconduct" in the Clark case. At the same time he had chosen to withhold evidence of infection as a possible cause of the death of the second baby, he changed his original opinion regarding the first baby from death caused by lower respiratory infection to unnatural death by smothering. He failed to give any good reason for this change in opinion and his competence was called into question. His conduct was severely criticised by other experts giving evidence and opinion to the court and in the judicial summing up of the successful second appeal. He was given the opportunity to address the court to explain his decision to withhold the laboratory results. He declined to do so. The decision of the GMC was upheld by the High Court in November 2007. Earlier that year he had successfully appealed against the decision to ban him from performing Home Office postmortem examinations; the ban was replaced by an 18-month suspension which by then had passed.

The nature of Sally Clark's wrongful conviction as a child-killer, and her background as a solicitor and daughter of a police officer, made her a target for other prisoners. According to her family, Clark was unable to recover from the effects of her conviction and imprisonment. After her release, her husband said she would "never be well again". A family spokesman stated "Sally was unable to come to terms with the false accusations, based on flawed medical evidence and the failures of the legal system, which debased everything she had been brought up to believe in and which she herself practised." It was stated in the later inquest that she was diagnosed with a number of severe psychiatric problems, "these problems included enduring personality change after catastrophic experience, protracted grief reaction and alcohol dependency syndrome." Clark was found dead in her home in Hatfield Peverel in Essex on 16 March 2007. It was originally thought that she had died of natural causes, but an inquest ruled that she had died of acute alcohol intoxication, though the coroner stressed that there was no evidence that she had intended to commit suicide.

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Sally Clark (August 1964 - 15 March 2007) was an English solicitor who, in November 1999, became the victim of a miscarriage of justice when she was found guilty of the murder of her two infant sons. Clark's first son died in December 1996 within a few weeks of his birth, and her second son died in similar circumstances in January 1998.

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"... we do not convict people in these courts on statistics.
It would be a terrible day if that were so."
Mr Justice Harrison, R v. Sally Clark. November 1999ii

Introduction

On the 9th November 1999, Sally Clark, then a solicitor and 35-year-old mother of one, was convicted of the murder of her first two children. Christopher, her first child, had died three years earlier, aged just under three months. His death had originally been treated as arising by natural causes, probably "Sudden Infant Death Syndrome" (or "SIDS"). Her second child, Harry, died just over a year later at the age of two months. His death was treated as suspicious by the Home Office pathologist who carried out the post mortem. He then revisited Christopher's death and determined that that too was suspicious. Sally Clark was arrested some weeks later and eventually tried at Chester Crown Court.

Since there were no witnesses to the actions Sally Clark was accused of, the evidence against her consisted primarily of evidence provided by a succession of highly qualified medical experts called by both the prosecution and the defence. The experts called by the prosecution looked at the medical evidence available, including the autopsy reports for both babies, and stated that these proved that both deaths were caused deliberately, either by shaking or smothering. Since Sally Clark was the only person with each child when he died, this evidence pointed to her. The experts called by the defence argued instead that the evidence was not conclusive and that the causes of the two deaths were simply unclear. At the end of the trial she was convicted of murdering both of her children and received two life sentences. She appealed to the Court of Appeal but her appeal was dismissed on the 2nd October 2000. It later transpired that essential evidence which could have provided an innocent explanation of Harry's death had not been disclosed to the defence. Following the discovery of this evidence she appealed a second time and in January 2003 her appeal was allowed and she was set free. It is now widely recognised that she was a victim of a spectacular miscarriage of justice. However, it appears that the experience caused lasting damage, and she died on the 16th March 2007 due to acute alcohol intoxication.

The trial and first appeal were also flawed in another, equally important respect. During the trial, statistical evidence and evidence relating to probabilities was given by one of the prosecution witnesses, Professor Sir Roy Meadow. This evidence was flawed, and although it is not possible to know whether this convicted Sally Clark, the judges at the second Court of Appeal stated that they would have reversed Sally Clark's conviction on these grounds alone, even in the absence of withheld medical evidence iv. On closer examination, some of the mistakes made were simply astonishing; all the more so since they were made (and not corrected) in the full glare of a very public murder trial and subsequent appeal. These mistakes were shared by prosecution witnesses, the prosecution and defence counsel, the trial judge, the three judges at the first appeal and very possibly the trial jury. And yet they were mistakes of the most basic kind, which any person with a limited understanding of probability theory would almost certainly have avoided. This article will consider four of these mistakes which arose in connection with the evidence of Professor Meadow, one of the principal expert witnesses who appeared for the prosecution.

Professor Sir Roy Meadow and the CESDI report

At the time of the trial, Professor Meadow was a highly respected expert in field of child abuse, the author of a leading textbook "The ABC of Child Abuse", and Emeritus Professor of Paediatrics and Child Health at St James's University Hospital in Leeds. His evidence in the trial of Sally Clark covered much of the medical evidence relating to both deaths, which he concluded suggested that neither child had died a natural death.

However, one crucial section of his evidence was not of a medical nature at all. At the time of the trial, Professor Meadow was writing a preface to a report of a government funded multi-disciplinary research team, the "Confidential Enquiry into Sudden Death in Infancy" (or "CESDI"), entitled "Sudden Unexpected Deaths in Infancy". This report covered an extensive study of infant deaths in the UK over a number of years, and had been undertaken in order to try to establish possible risk factors and associations for sudden and unexpected infant deaths. The report considered over 400 sudden infant death cases in the UK over a period of three years and, on the basis of these cases, identified a number of factors which might be associated with an increased risk of sudden unexpected infant death in a particular household. These factors included the presence of smokers in the relevant household, the age of the child's mother, and whether the household included a wage-earner. The CESDI study, in its draft form at the time of Sally Clark's trial, included the following table:

Table 3.6.1: SIDS rates for different factors based on the data from the CESDI SUDI Study

Table 3.6.1: SIDS rates for different factors based on the data from the CESDI SUDI Study

SIDS rate per 1000 livebirths*

SIDS incidence in this group*

Overall rate in the study population

in 1303

Rate for groups with different factors

Professor Meadow explained that the CESDI study showed that the risk of a child dying of SIDS in a household where none of the three risk factors listed above was present was 1 in 8,543 live births. It followed, therefore, that in order to quantify the risk of two children dying of SIDS in a household where none of these factors was present:

"you have to multiply 1 in 8,543 times 1 in 8,543 and I think it gives that in the penultimate paragraph, its (sic) points out that it's approximately a chance of 1 in 73 million"

which would happen "by chance" once every 100 years. Put another way:

"... it's the chance of backing that long odds outsider at the Grand National, you know; let's say it's a 80 to 1 chance, you back the winner last year, then the next year there's another horse at 80 to 1 and it is still 80 to 1 and you back it again and it wins. Now here we're in a situation that, you know, to get to these odds of 73 million you've got to back that 1 in 80 chance four years running, so yes, you might be very, very lucky because each time it's just been a 1 in 80 chance and you know, you've happened to have won it, but the chance of it happening four years running we all know is extraordinarily unlikely. So it's the same with these deaths. You have to say two unlikely events have happened and together it's very, very, very unlikely."

To the outside observer, the medical evidence in the trial of Sally Clark was extremely complicated. A number of different medical issues were debated by no fewer than nine specialists, who often reached different and contradictory conclusions. What is striking about the case is that, within this sea of complexity, the staggering figure of 1 in 73 million stands out like a beacon of simplicity. Unfortunately for Sally Clark, far from being a lighthouse to the truth, this figure managed the feat of being both irrelevant and wrong.

The mistakes

The first mistake that emerges directly from the paragraph quoted above is the assumption of independence. According to Professor Meadow, the risk of one SIDS death in a family without any of the three risk factors cited above was 1 in 8,543. So, he said, the probability of two SIDS death in a single family without any of these risk factors was simply 1 in 8,543 squared, or about 73 million; just as the probability of throwing a six is 1 in 6, and the probability of throwing a six followed immediately by another six is 1 in 36. He assumed that the death of Christopher Clark was independent of the death of Harry Clark. However, assuming that the figure of 8,543 was correct for one death, it clearly does not follow that 73 million is correct for two deaths. This would only be true if SIDS occurred randomly, without any chance of there being an unknown, hidden cause which might make a particular family more vulnerable to SIDS. Yet, and by its very nature, the cause (or causes) of SIDS is (or are) unknown. It was simply not possible for anyone to assume that SIDS is caused by random factors which are wholly independent of one another. Indeed, in a criminal trial, if the prosecution wishes to cite figures of this nature then it must prove - beyond all reasonable doubt - that the two events are entirely independent. This was just not possible in the circumstances.

Unsurprisingly, this was a point made by the authors of the CESDI study themselves, who stated that the figures "did not take account of possible familial incidence of factors other than those included" in the table. The report went on to say:

"When a second SIDS death occurs in the same family, in addition to careful search for inherited disorder, there must always be a very thorough investigation of the circumstances- though it would be inappropriate to assume maltreatment was always the cause".

It must surely be obvious to any person, whether a layman or a professional, that unexplained infant deaths may well have a genetic or hereditary cause which means that particular families are more likely to be afflicted by SIDS than the "average" family. The act of squaring the probabilities in order to reach the figure of one in 73 million was wholly illegitimate. Unfortunately, when this mistake was drawn to the attention of the judges at the first Court of Appeal hearing, they dismissed it as "[in]capable of affecting the safety of the convictions".

An article published in the British Medical Journal some weeks after the trial cited other studies which suggested that SIDS deaths are not random events, and that "recurrence" of SIDS in the same family would be much more frequent than 1 in 73 million live births. Recurrence might even occur in England about once every 18 months, rather than once every 100 years.

Prosecutor's Fallacy

The second mistake arising from Professor Meadow's evidence as to probabilities is known as the "Prosecutor's Fallacy". This consists of showing that the "innocent" explanation for certain facts is highly improbable - and then deducing that the "guilty" explanation is therefore the correct one. This type of mistake is particularly likely to occur in trials such as that of Sally Clark, where there are only two realistic options open to the jury - either the defendant committed murder, or her children died from unexplained, and comparatively rare, natural causes. For Sally Clark, once the jury accepted that there was only a 1 in 73 million chance that the deaths occurred due to SIDS, it was a short and easy step to conclude that this was the same probability as the probability of any other natural (but unexplained) cause of death; and that there was therefore a 1 in 73 million chance that she was not guilty of murder. It would be hard not to convict in those circumstances.

But, again, this reasoning is simply wrong. Even if we assume (for the purposes of this section, at least) that the probability of both of Sally Clark's children dying due to natural causes was 1 in 73 million, this is simply of no assistance in trying to work out whether they actually died of natural causes or foul play. The fact that it is unlikely that a particular event will occur is not relevant when, after that event, one is trying to work out the cause. Once it is known that the two children are dead, the relevant question is not: "what is the probability that these deaths were natural?" but "is it more likely that these deaths were natural rather than deliberate?" In order to answer this question, the court would also have needed to assess the probability of the alternative explanation - of a mother murdering her first two children - and to compare that with the probability of two natural deaths. Common sense suggests that double murders by natural parents are also highly unusual; and indeed one of the witnesses who provided evidence during the pre-trial "committal proceedings" stated that, according to his own research into "repeat" unexpected infant deaths (i.e. second deaths in the same family):

one third were caused by rare but known natural causes (therefore not SIDS) missed by the experts performing the necropsy;

one third were associated with child abuse; and

one third were true "SIDS" deaths.

So fully two thirds of the cases of repeat deaths arose due to natural causes, and only one third due to foul play. Looking solely at the data for sudden unexpected deaths, the relevant probability was therefore a 2 in 3 chance of innocence, rather than a 1 in 73 million chance of innocence. The 1 in 73 million statistic was simply not relevant. Separately, Professor Philip Dawid, an expert witness called by Sally Clark's team during the appeals process, pointed out that applying the same flawed method to the statistics for infant murder in England and Wales in 1996 could suggest that the probability of two babies in one family being murdered was 1 in 2,152,224,291 (that is one in 2.152 billion); a sum even more outlandish than 1 in 73 million. The first Court of Appeal was alive to this potential argument, but preferred to ignore its implications, stating that "... the exercise [of expressing the probability of infant murder by a mother] is not an exercise the courts would perform".

The first Court of Appeal accepted that this mistake had been made, and that the 1 in 73 million statistic, even if correct, should never have been introduced as it was simply not relevant to any of the issues which the jury had to decide. However, the appeal judges found that this was "merely a distraction" and was outweighed by the other evidence of guilt, which was "overwhelming". As far as they were concerned
"If there had been no error in relation to statistics at the trial, we are satisfied that the jury would still have convicted on each count. In the context of the trial as a whole, the point on statistics was of minimal significance and there is no possibility of the jury having been misled so as to reach verdicts that they might not otherwise have reached. Had the trial been free from legal error, the only reasonable and proper verdict would have been one of guilty."

This conclusion is clearly open to dispute. In a case with extremely complex, and heavily contested, medical evidence, it is not outlandish to wonder whether the jury was influenced by the statistic of 1 in 73 million, or the related concept of successfully backing an outsider to win the Grand National four years running. Far from being a distraction, it is entirely possible that this statistic was determinant.

The wrong expert

The two mistakes described above were sufficient on their own to justify a successful appeal in 2003. But at least two further errors were committed when the original trial heard the evidence of Professor Meadow.

Firstly, imagine that a statistician had been called to give evidence during the trial, and that her evidence included her opinion as to the presence, and relevance, of intra-retinal and petechial haemorrhages detected on the body of one of the children (one of the many medical questions hotly disputed in the case). Her evidence would have been stopped, the jury would have been told to disregard it, and she would probably find it hard to obtain further work as an expert witness - all because her evidence clearly moved from her field of competence to a completely different area of expertise. However, the reverse appears to have been allowed. The first Court of Appeal accepted that Professor Meadow "does not claim to be a statistician" and yet seemingly had no objection to him providing statistical evidence during the trial. The consequence was the introduction of a fallacious and irrelevant (yet highly damaging) statistic into a murder trial.

Ecological Fallacy

Lastly, let us look again at the CESDI study which was the ultimate source of the 1 in 73 million statistic. The purpose of this study was to identify possible causes of unexplained and sudden infant death. It did precisely that, and had much to say about the possibility of an increased risk of death in households with a smoker present, or no wage-earner, or where the mother was under a certain age. These findings were probably of substantial value in trying to identify groups of families at higher risk of sudden infant death. However, it is unlikely that the study was ever intended to provide evidence in a murder trial, and its use in the trial of Sally Clark was not appropriate. The trial of Sally Clark consisted of a detailed investigation into a specific allegation brought against a named individual, while the CESDI study was a wide-ranging study of 470,000 live births and could not, by definition, consider every aspect of every birth (or even every infant death) within that group. It was not permissible to make any inference about the specific facts relating to Sally Clark or her children on the basis of the findings of the CESDI study. Although the Clark family fell within a particular group identified within the CESDI study - no smoker, at least one wage earner, mother over 27 - this did not mean that the probability of an unexplained sudden infant death in their household was 1 in 8,543.

The assumption that data which is correct for a group is also correct for every individual within a group - a mistake known as the "Ecological Fallacy" - was clearly erroneous. If this mistake had been addressed at the outset then the 1 in 73 million statistic may never have been introduced at all.

Conclusion

Sally Clark was convicted of a double murder in the glare of national publicity. Her first appeal was turned down under international press scrutiny. The professionals involved in her trial and first appeal, including the expert witnesses, lawyers and judges, were the best available under English law. And yet it appears that nobody noticed the significance of the errors I have described above. It is possible, as the first Court of Appeal stated, that none of these errors were relevant and that the jury was swayed solely by the medical evidence presented by the prosecution. But that evidence was extremely complex, and it is not difficult to suppose that the jury found the 1 in 73 million statistic helpful in deciding to convict Sally Clark. Equally, the jury cannot really be blamed for this. But the same cannot be said of the criminal justice system which allowed this statistic to poison a trial and then failed to correct the mistake even after it had been identified.

But does the case have any wider implications? Has anyone else been convicted by bad statistics, or was Sally Clark just desperately unlucky? In April 2002, Angela Cannings was convicted of murdering two of her children in a case which bore a strong resemblance to the case against Sally Clark, not least in the presence yet again of Professor Meadow as an expert witness for the prosecution . Angela Cannings was released by the Court of Appeal in December 2003, after the second Court of Appeal freed Sally Clark; indeed, once Sally Clark had been freed, the case against Angel Cannings (and other cases against other women whose children had died of unknown causes, including Trupti Patel and Donna Anthony) simply became untenable.

But the wider question of whether mistakes of the kind made in the Sally Clark trial have been made in criminal cases of a very different type was answered on the 15th November 2007, when the Court of Appeal published its judgment in the case of R v Barry George.

Barry George

On the 26th April 1999, some three months before Sally Clark was charged with the double murder of her two children, Jill Dando was shot and killed outside her home in London. Ms Dando was a well known TV personality and her murder, committed in broad daylight, was immediately headline news. More than a year later, Barry George was arrested and later charged with her murder. Forensic scientists had found a single particle of firearm discharge residue inside the pocket of his coat, and this proved to be a core part of the prosecution's case. At the trial, experts for the prosecution and the defence argued long and hard about whether there was an innocent explanation for the presence of this residue inside the coat, by "innocent contamination" (instead of contamination because the wearer of the coat had fired a gun). The prosecution expert witnesses addressed the probability of innocent contamination in detail and concluded that it was "most unlikely" (which may well have been true). On this basis, the prosecution asked the jury to ignore the possibility of innocent contamination, leaving the only alternative explanation that Barry George was guilty of murder.

Mr George was convicted and given a life sentence. Unfortunately, it later transpired that at least one prosecution expert witness considered that the probability of the residue being deposited through non-innocent means was equally unlikely. This, however, had never been made clear to the jury during the trial; and indeed the logical inference to be drawn from the prosecution case was that the non-innocent explanation was much more likely than the innocent explanation. When this came to light, the Court of Appeal had no alternative but to quash Barry George's conviction for murder. A second trial was held during the summer of 2008, and more than seven years after he was originally convicted of murdering Jill Dando, Barry George was finally acquitted.

This was another example of the Prosecutor's Fallacy in action. (i) The prosecution sought to persuade the jury that the presence of firearm discharge residue in Barry George's coat pocket showed that he had fired a gun. (ii) In order to prove this, the prosecution showed that, before the event, it was highly unlikely that this residue would find its way into a person's pocket by innocent contamination. (iii) At the trial after the event, the court was therefore invited to discount that innocent explanation, in favour of a guilty explanation. (iv) Nobody told the jury that the guilty explanation was just as likely as the innocent explanation; and it appears that nobody asked that question.

Once again, this happened in a high profile murder trial, under even more scrutiny than the trial of Sally Clark. Who is to say how many other miscarriages of justice have taken place, based on the Prosecutor's Fallacy, which are yet to be corrected?

Some useful links

1. Judgments

2. Protagonists and Commentators

Information about the trial of Sally Clark and background data on cot deaths and related links can be found on the Sally Clark website.

The expert report in the Sally Clark case of Professor Philip Dawid of University College London can be found in this document.

The Royal Statistical Society issued a press release highlighting its concern about the Sally Clark trial in October 2001.

Stephen Watkins' article in the British Medical Journal entitled Conviction by mathematical error can be found on the BMJ's website (registration is required).

Professor Meadows' telling reply in the British Medical Journal to Mr Watkins' article, entitled A case of murder and the BMJ, can be found on the BMJ's website (registration is required):

All of the major UK broadsheets, together with the BBC News website, have extensive online archives covering the trials of Sally Clark and Barry George.

3. Prosecutor's Fallacy and other Fallacies
Wikipedia is always a useful starting point for a summary of mathematical concepts.

The source of the term "Prosecutor's Fallacy" is an article by William Thompson and Edward Schumann (not available for free download) at http://www.jstor.org/pss/1393631.

An interesting take on the Prosecutor's Fallacy in a No Limit Texas Hold'Em hand can be found at http://pokersleuth.com/fallacy-prosecutor.shtml

4. Expert Evidence
At the time of writing, the Law Commission is consulting on possible reforms to the rules governing expert evidence in criminal cases in England and Wales. Part 1 of the Law Commission's Consultation Paper No. 190 sets out a convenient summary of the current rules on expert evidence and can be found at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp190.pdf. (It also cites the Sally Clark and Angela Cannings cases as an example of an "ongoing problem" with expert evidence, which needs an "urgent solution").

5. DNA evidence
The increasing reliance on DNA evidence in criminal trials means that highly complex issues relating to statistics and probabilities will continue to trouble lawyers and juries for the foreseeable future. An interesting analysis of some of the issues involved in considering the rarity of DNA profiles, by Bruce Weir, can be found at: http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2585748

End notes

SCCA1 is the first Court of Appeal judgment in the case of R v Sally Clark.
SCCA1 is the second Court of Appeal judgment in the case of R v Sally Clark.
BGCA2 is the second Court of Appeal judgment in the case of R v Barry George.

1. With thanks to Ted Davison and Cécile Bouchet for their comments on the first draft.

2. SCCA1 at paragraph 128

3. Times Online article.

4. SCCA2 at paragraph 180

5. SCCA2 at paragraphs 46, 58 and 90

6. SCCA1 at paragraph 121. The central column is empty in the Court of Appeal judgment as well.

7. SCCA2 at paragraph 96

8. SCCA2 at paragraph 99

9. R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at page 840

10. SCCA1 at paragraph 142

11. "Conviction by mathematical error", Stephen Watkins, BMJ Volume 320 January 2000, to which Prof. Meadow responded in volume 324, but without defending the statistics he used.

12. Professor Emery, see SCCA1 at paragraph 116

13. Paragraph 16 of Professor Dawid's expert report

14. SCCA1 at paragraph 160

15. SCCA1 at paragraph 256

16. SCCA1 at paragraph 112

17. But without the 73m-1 statistic in this instance

18. BGCA2 at paragraphs 18 and 38

About the Author

Vincent Scheurer is a London-based lawyer with a long-standing interest in probability theory and statistics. He is currently writing a book on gambling and the law.

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"... we do not convict people in these courts on statistics. It would be a terrible day if that were so." Mr Justice Harrison, R v. Sally Clark. November 1999ii On the 9th November 1999, Sally Clark, then a solicitor and 35-year-old mother of one, was convicted of the murder of her first two children.

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In 1999 Sally Clark was convicted in the crown court at Chester of the murder of her infant sons, Christopher and Harry. In the absence of crucial evidence that was later forthcoming, Clark's first appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 2 October 2000, based in part upon judicial endorsement of a prosecution witness's opinion that the chances of two successive natural infant deaths is one in 73 million.

On 2 July 2002, the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred Clark's case back to the Court of Appeal as unsafe due to newly introduced evidence of natural causes of death. The court confirmed the convictions to be unsafe and set them aside. Mrs Clark was released, but sadly never recovered from her ordeal of three years' imprisonment, and died in 2006.

The new evidence comprised microbiological tests showing evidence of lethal infections in both infants.

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In 1999 Sally Clark was convicted in the crown court at Chester of the murder of her infant sons, Christopher and Harry. In the absence of crucial evidence that was later forthcoming, Clark's first appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 2 October 2000, based in part upon judicial endorsement of a prosecution witness's opinion that the chances of two successive natural infant deaths is one in 73 million.

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During the course of the reinvestigation, detectives established that Mr Hale had ignored many of his own notes, instead distorting information in an apparent attempt to blame others for Mrs Sewell's murder.

After consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service, however, Derbyshire Police have decided that "there are no grounds on which to base any further investigation nor indeed a prosecution for any offence".

Mr Hale said: "I am proud of the work I have done on the campaign. I made mistakes as any journalist would, but not intentionally. With hindsight, I would go back and do things differently.

"I did too much on my own for one, rather than sharing information. You do become obsessive with this. You hog the story and you want to see it through.

"If I had realised this was going to be a massive international murder inquiry I would have recorded every interview; I would have detailed things and had more people working with me."

Mr Hale's admission of his own shortcomings comes as the BBC begins work on a new drama-documentary called In Denial of Murder, which promises to shed new light on the Downing affair.

Mr Hale said: "I think people will appreciate the time and effort I have put in for someone like Stephen Downing. He has not helped my cause by some of the antics he has got up to before my involvement."

The drama has been five years in preparation and is based on a series of extensive interviews with Mr Hale, local police and friends and relatives of Mrs Sewell.

It will present a picture of the journalist, played by the Ballykissangel star Stephen Tompkinson, as a well-meaning but obsessive man.

Significantly, it will not feature crucial details from Mr Hale's own version of events: in particular his claims that a number of attempts were made on his life while he was trying to investigate the case. The alleged incidents, which Mr Hale said included him being run off the road by a lorry, were never reported to police.

Mr Hale wrote a script for Hat Trick, the company making the film for the BBC. The company, however, decided to write its own version taking into account events following Mr Downing's release.

The new version includes the results of the police reinvestigation into the original case, which concluded earlier this year that Mr Downing remained the only suspect for the crime. It will also highlight police concern about some of Mr Hale's methods.

Mr Hale said he was disappointed that the BBC would not be dramatising his claims of the death attempts on his life. He insisted, however, that such things were only being kept out of the drama because of time constraints.

He said: "People will make their own minds up. They might think I became paranoid or obsessive with the whole thing. Or they might come to a different view."

The drama, which is currently being filmed on location in Bakewell and is set to be screened next year, was written by Neil McKay, the author of the acclaimed documentary This is Personal: The Hunt for the Yorkshire Ripper.

Mike Dormer, who is producing the BBC drama, last night insisted that the programme would not be a "love letter" to either Mr Hale or Mr Downing. He said: "Although we are telling a story of how a basically decent person tried to uncover a miscarriage of justice we are not presenting a black and white story. This is a very complicated story. It is not the story of Don Hale the knight in shining armour fighting for truth and justice. Mr Hale is a man who made mistakes and they will be highlighted in the programe."

Mr Sewell, a secretary for the Forestry Commission, was 32 when she was attacked in Bakewell cemetery 30 years ago. Mr Downing, then a 17-year-old graveyard worker, admitted bludgeoning her and carrying out an indecent assault as she lay dying.

Although he made a signed confession and repeated his admission to doctors, at his trial he denied killing Mrs Sewell but admitted sexual assault. During his time in prison he further recanted, denying any role in Mrs Sewell's death. The conviction was eventually quashed last year when it was shown that he had not been properly cautioned. Afterwards, his supporters lionised him, although the Appeal Court had been very careful not to proclaim his innocence.

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Campaigner for Stephen Downing admits to errors

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During the course of the reinvestigation, detectives established that Mr Hale had ignored many of his own notes, instead distorting information in an apparent attempt to blame others for Mrs Sewell's murder. After consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service, however, Derbyshire Police have decided that "there are no grounds on which to base any further investigation nor indeed a prosecution for any offence".

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By Peter Gould
BBC News Online correspondent

Since his release from prison, Stephen Downing has been able to walk through the streets of Bakewell a free man.
In January last year the Court of Appeal decided that his conviction for the 1973 murder of Wendy Sewell was unsafe.

It was hailed as a triumph for campaigning journalism...and an end to one of the worst miscarriages of justice in English legal history.

In the small Derbyshire town, Mr Downing was suddenly a celebrity. People stopped him in the street to say hello. There were smiles, handshakes, and words of encouragement.

"When Stephen came home, he was treated almost like a cup final hero," says Don Hale, the editor of the local newspaper, who campaigned on his behalf.

I am just grateful it is all over and hopefully I will be able to go back into the community with my head held high

It was certainly a remarkable transformation, because Mr Downing served 27 years in prison for one of the most brutal murders ever committed in these parts.

The decision by the Court of Appeal to quash his conviction followed growing doubts about the way the investigation had been conducted.

Bloody body

The victim of the crime, Wendy Sewell, was a 22-year-old typist. In the grounds of the local cemetery, she was beaten with a pickaxe handle.

She died in hospital the following day without being able to reveal the identity of her attacker.

Mr Downing, who was then 17, worked in the cemetery as a groundsman.

He told police that he had found the woman lying on the ground, covered in blood.

Detectives did not believe him, and continued to question him for eight hours.

Eventually, the teenager signed a confession. Mr Downing's father, Ray, said later that his son's reaction had been: "If I sign this piece of paper they'll let me go home."

Retracted confession

At that stage, Wendy Sewell was still alive. It was only after Stephen Downing signed the confession that she died, turning a case of assault into a murder investigation.

Questioned for eight hours without a lawyer present

Was he properly advised of his legal rights?

Learning difficulties...he could barely read or write

Statement was written out by a police officer

The teenager retracted his confession, but it remained a key part of the prosecution's case against him.

And when the case came to trial, the jury took just one hour to return a unanimous verdict of guilty.

To many people in Bakewell, Mr Downing seemed an unlikely killer. His parents described him as a gentle boy. He had never had a girlfriend, and his learning difficulties meant he could barely read or write.

He was told he would have to serve a minimum of 17 years. In fact, he remained behind bars for a further ten. In all, he spent 27 years behind bars.

By continuing to maintain his innocence - he was "in denial of murder" according to the Home Office - he ruled himself out of consideration for parole.

Growing unease

For years Mr Downing was forgotten by everyone except his family and friends.

But eventually a letter landed on the desk of Don Hale, then the editor of the local newspaper, the Matlock Mercury. It appealed to him to help clear Mr Downing's name.
His initial reaction was "not to touch it with a bargepole". But the more he looked at the evidence, the more disturbed he became by the prosecution's case.
"My investigation was not to find the killer, but to try to clear Stephen Downing," he said later.

Mr Hale's campaign won him the OBE and a string of press awards. But the police have now pointed to "anomalies" in his research.

The legal challenge to Stephen Downing's conviction focused on the way detectives conducted the original investigation in 1973.

Conviction quashed

The teenager was questioned without a lawyer being present, and there were serious doubts about whether he had been properly advised of his legal rights.
He described how the statement he had signed, confessing to the crime, had been written out for him by a police officer.
None of these facts were made known to the jury that convicted him.

As a result of the growing unease over his conviction, the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case back to the Court of Appeal, and the conviction was quashed.

In his mid-40s, Stephen Downing was already trying to readjust to life outside prison. He got a job as a trainee chef in a local restaurant, making use of skills he learned in prison.

"I am just grateful it is all over," he said then.

"Hopefully I will be allowed to fit back into the community with my head held high and just try to live as normal a life as possible."

Mr Downing was told he could receive substantial compensation for the time he spent in prison, possibly making him a millionaire. But his family and friends said nothing could compensate him for losing the best years of his life.

Double jeopardy

But that was not to be the end of the story. After Stephen Downing's conviction was quashed, Derbyshire Police were obliged to re-open their files.

It is not for the police to speculate on the guilt or innocence of Stephen Downing

And after interviewing 1,600 witnesses, at an estimated cost of £500,000, they have failed to identify any alternative suspect for the murder of Wendy Sewell.

"Despite the lengthy investigation, we have not been able to eliminate Stephen Downing from the inquiry," said deputy chief constable Bob Wood.

According to the police, Mr Downing has so far refused to be interviewed as part of the new investigation.

Under the present "double jeopardy" rule, however, he cannot be re-arrested and charged with the same crime of murder.

The police say that if the law had been different, they would have submitted the results of their inquiries to the Crown Prosecution Service.

A year ago, after his conviction was quashed, Stephen Downing displayed no anger at having spent 27 years behind bars.

"There is no point in feeling bitter," he said.

"Who would I feel bitter against? The system? I think I would be punishing myself."

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BBC NEWS | UK | Still a suspect after 30 years

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By Peter Gould BBC News Online correspondent Since his release from prison, Stephen Downing has been able to walk through the streets of Bakewell a free man. In January last year the Court of Appeal decided that his conviction for the 1973 murder of Wendy Sewell was unsafe.

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The murder of Wendy Sewell was committed on 12 September 1973. Wendy Sewell, a 32-year-old legal secretary from Bakewell, Peak District in Derbyshire was found beaten, sexually assaulted and murdered. In 1974, 17-year-old Stephen Downing was convicted of the murder of Sewell. Following a campaign led by local newspaper editor Don Hale highlighting multiple breaches of legal rules and procedures in the police interrogation, Downing’s conviction was overturned in 2002. The case is thought to be the longest miscarriage of justice in British legal history, and attracted international media attention.[1][2][3]

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Stephen Downing | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers

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Murderpedia, the free online encyclopedic dictionary of murderers. The largest database about serial killers, mass murderers and spree killers around the world

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Barry George was born in Hammersmith Hospital, London. His parents had married in July 1954. He was the youngest of three children; they grew up in a high-rise flat in White City, London. His sister Michelle Diskin, who lives in Ireland, is five years older than he is; his sister Susan, three years older than he is, died of epilepsy aged 28.

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Useful for Ass 2!

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IMPACT Programme: 19 Apr 2006: Hansard Written Answers - TheyWorkForYou

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TheyWorkForYou is a website which makes it easy to keep track of your local MP's activities.

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National Policing Improvement Agency - Wikipedia

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The motivations for creating the National Policing Improvement Agency were laid out in the 2004 Police Reform white paper Building Communities, Beating Crime which stated: "...the mechanisms for national policing improvements are disparate and overlapping."

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Legislation is available in different versions:

Latest Available (revised): The latest available updated version of the legislation incorporating changes made by subsequent legislation and applied by our editorial team. Changes we have not yet applied to the text, can be found in the 'Changes to Legislation' area.

Original (As Enacted or Made): The original version of the legislation as it stood when it was enacted or made. No changes have been applied to the text.

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An Act to make further provision in relation to the powers and duties of the police, persons in police detention, criminal evidence, police discipline and complaints against the police; to provide for arrangements for obtaining the views of the community on policing and for a rank of deputy chief constable; to amend the law relating to the Police Federations and Police Forces and Police Cadets in Scotland; and for connected purposes.

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Principles

The fairness of the trial proceedings in criminal proceedings is guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Section 76 of PACE deals with challenges to the admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings see Archbold 15 352. Section 76(2) PACE directs the court to exclude confession evidence obtained by oppression; in circumstances which were likely to make the confession unreliable. Prosecutors should remember that, whilst the confession itself may be excluded, section 76(4) allows facts discovered as a result of the confession, or of the way in which defendants speak, write or express themselves, to be adduced where relevant.

Section 78 PACE provides a discretion for the court to exclude evidence which would otherwise be admissible against a defendant on the basis it would be unfair to adduce it.

PACE and the Codes of Practice issued under sections 66 and 67 of PACE are designed to allow the court to correct unfairness arising from criminal trials.

Admissibility of Confessions

Section 82(1) PACE defines a confession as including:

Any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it;

Whether made to a person in authority or not;

Whether made in words or otherwise.

Statements made by a suspect which do not contain admissions are not liable to exclusion under Section 76 PACE - see R v Sat-Bhambra 1989 88 Cr App R 55. They are not what section 82(1) PACE was aimed at, and prosecutors should note that simply because exculpatory statements are used against a defendant during the trial process on the basis they are false or inconsistent does not mean the statements become confessions for the purposes of section 76 PACE - see R v Park 99 Cr. App. R. 270.

Section 76(2) PACE directs the court to exclude from the trial process, confession evidence which has been obtained either as: a result of oppression; or: In circumstances which were likely to make the confession unreliable.

Prosecutors should also note that where the admissibility of confession evidence is challenged under section 76 of PACE, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was not in fact made as a result of oppression, nor in circumstances which were likely to have made it unreliable.

The term "Oppression" for the purposes of section 76 PACE includes "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence". This reflects the wording of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The meaning of the term was also considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of R v Fulling 1987 2 All E.R. 65. The court held that "oppression" was to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning and was likely to involve some impropriety on the part of the interrogator.

Unreliable Confessions

Unreliable confessions were given a broad interpretation by the Court of Appeal in R v Fulling (above).

This included:

Confessions obtained as the result of an inducement - for example a promise of bail or a promise that a prosecution would not arise from the confession;

Hostile and aggressive questioning;

Failure to record accurately what was said;

Failure to caution;

Failure to provide an appropriate adult where one is required;

Failure to comply with the Code of Practice in relation to the detention of the accused - for example a failure to allow sufficient rest prior to an interview;

Failure of the Defence Solicitor or Appropriate Adult to act properly - for example by making interjections during interview which are hostile to the defendant. It is important that prosecutors take into consideration whether confessions can be adduced to be reliable or not by the Courts.

Safeguards for those Suffering from a "Mental Handicap"

Section 77 PACE provides additional safeguards for those who suffer from a "mental handicap". This is defined as being in: "a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning".

The test is an objective one. The court should consider medical evidence as to the actual mental condition of the suspect. The disorder must be of a type which might render a suspect's confession unreliable and there must be a significant deviation from the norm. In addition, there must be a history of making admissions, which point toward, or explain the abnormality of mind suffered by the suspect and are not solely based on a history given by the suspect.

Review of Evidence

Confession evidence often forms a crucial part of the prosecution's case against a defendant. When reviewing cases, in which they intend to introduce evidence of a confession, prosecutors should examine carefully the circumstances in which the confession was made to decide on its admissibility.

If a challenge to the admissibility of a confession appears likely steps should be taken to obtain additional evidence covering the circumstances in which it was made. For example, the custody record and a statement from a forensic physician who examined the suspect during the relevant period may be useful to rebut any allegation that the suspect was abused by officers.

When relying on confession evidence, prosecutors should apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors and decide whether or not there is a realistic prospect of a conviction on the basis of the available evidence.

Unfairly Obtained Evidence

Section 78 PACE enables a court to exclude evidence which would otherwise be admissible against a defendant on the basis it would be unfair to adduce it . The nature of the courts discretion was explained by Lord Lane C.J. in the case of R v Quinn Crim L.R. 581:

"...The function of the judge is therefore to protect the fairness of the proceedings, and normally proceedings are fair if... all relevant evidence [is heard] which either side wishes to place before [ the court], but proceedings may become unfair if, for example, one side is allowed to adduce relevant evidence which, for one reason or another, the other side cannot properly challenge or meet."

Prosecutors should note that each case will turn on its own facts, and that the courts have resisted attempts to fetter their discretion - see for example R v Samuel 1988 Q.B 615 where the court held that because of the infinite variety of circumstances, it was undesirable to attempt any general guidance as to how the discretion under section 78 should be exercised.

Challenges to the Fairness of Evidence

Areas where successful challenges may be made include where evidence has been obtained as a result of:

Breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights;

Breaches of the Codes of Practice issued under PACE;

Bad faith on the part of the police.

Review of Evidence

Prosecutors should be familiar with the provisions of the Codes of Practice issued under PACE and alert to potential breaches. If the provisions of a relevant Code of Practice are not followed, the consequences of the failure to comply may result in evidence being excluded. However, not all breaches will render evidence inadmissible. The Court will look for a significant and substantial breach before going on to consider whether or not to exclude evidence obtained as a result of the breach.

When reviewing potential challenges under section 78 PACE, prosecutors should refer to Archbold from 15-483 for useful examples. Having identified evidence that is likely to be challenged prosecutors will need to:

establish the facts, and if necessary ask the police for an explanation as to their actions;

apply the relevant law and provisions of the Codes of Practice to the facts, and decide if the court is likely to find a significant and substantial breach of the defendant's rights.

In any event, prosecutors should apply the Code for Crown Prosecutors during the review process. In particular, if it appears probable that the Court will exclude the evidence, the Reviewing Lawyer will decide whether or not there is a realistic prospect of a conviction without it.

Challenging Admissiblity

Court Practice on Challenging Confessions, Unfairly Obtained Evidence and Breaches of the Codes of Practice

The admissibility of a confession may be challenged in the Crown Court or the magistrates court by the defence or by the court of its own volition - see section 76(3) PACE in the course of a "voire dire" (a trial within a trial). Section 76(2) provides that the Court "shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against [the defendant]" except in so far as proved admissible by the prosecution. This requires the calling of witnesses by the prosecution to support its case for the evidence to be admitted. The defendant is not obliged to give evidence or call witnesses in support of his or her case. Nor is the court concerned as to the truthfulness of the confession - see R v Davis 1990 Crim. L.R. 860.

Challenges under Section 78 PACE do not usually involve a trial within a trial unless the defence seek to challenge confession evidence under both section 76 and section 78 of PACE. Section 82(3) PACE preserves all the powers that existed at common law for a court to exclude evidence as a matter of discretion.

Useful Links
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

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Confessions, Unfairly Obtained Evidence and Breaches of PACE

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The fairness of the trial proceedings in criminal proceedings is guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 76 of PACE deals with challenges to the admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings see Archbold 15 352.

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What is PACE?

PACE is the short form for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This Act governs the major part of police powers of investigation including, arrest, detention, interrogation, entry and search of premises, personal search and the taking of samples. Also part of this legislation are the PACE Codes of Practice, which police officers should consider and refer to when carrying out various procedures associated with their work. The Act attempts to strike a fair balance between the exercise of power by those in authority and the rights of members of the public.

PACE Codes of Practice

The PACE Codes of Practice are set out under eight different sections labelled A to H. Each deal with a different aspect of the police's duties as follows:

Code A

Code A deals with a police officer's legal powers to search a person and or any vehicle prior to making any arrest. They must also make a note of the encounter.

Code B

Code B outlines the police's powers to enter and search premises and seize any possessions found on a person or premises. The powers under this code are conferred to find anyone wanted by police for questioning, arrest or, in relation to any crime; to find any property and material relating to the commission of a crime or; to find any children who should be in local authority custody where they have been remanded or placed following a court order.

Code C

Code C lays out the requirements for detaining suspects and how they should be treated and questioned while in custody. Includes the requirement to explain a person's rights while detained.

Code D

Code D relates to the processes used by police for the identification of persons in relation to the commission of a criminal offence and the police's obligation to maintain accurate and dependable information regarding criminal records.

Code E

Code E governs all audio recording of interviews carried out at the police station. Any interview concerning the following scenarios must be audio taped; interviews with a suspect who is cautioned in relation to a criminal offence; extra questions that may be put to a suspect after they have been charged with a criminal offence; when an interviewer wants to tell a person, after they have been charged with a criminal offence, about any other written statement or interview with another person.

Code F

Code F covers the visual recording with sound of an interview. An interview may be recorded visually in all the circumstances outlined under Code E or, in the presence of a deaf, or deaf/blind or speech impaired person who uses sign language to communicate; or in the presence of a minor or anyone else who requires an appropriate adult or; in any case where a visually recorded interview is requested by the suspect or their representative.

Code G

Code G deals with police powers to arrest any individual suspected of committing or connected with the commission of a criminal offence. Police powers of arrest are set out in s 24 of PACE (as amended by s 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) and they should only be exercised when absolutely necessary or, they risk interfering with a suspect's right to liberty as outlined in the Human Rights Act 1998.

Code H

Code H lays out the requirements for the detention of suspects arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 and how they should be treated and questioned whilst in custody. Includes the requirement to explain a person's rights while detained in connection with terrorism. This Code stops applying when a suspect is charged with an offence, released without charge or transferred to a prison.

What happens when the police fail to adhere to PACE and its Codes?

Failure by a police officer to adhere to the Codes of Practice does not render them liable to criminal or civil proceedings. However, their failure to adhere to what the Codes state can be introduced as evidence in civil and criminal proceedings (PACE, s 67). Additionally, any evidence obtained by the police in relation to the investigation of any criminal offence where they have failed to adhere to PACE, can be deemed inadmissible in court thus harming the case against the defendant.

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PACE: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 - InBrief.co.uk

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PACE is the short form for the Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This act governs the major part of police powers of investigation including, arrest, detention, interrogation, entry and search of premises, personal search and the taking of samples.

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Rachel Jane Nickell (23 November 1968 - 15 July 1992) was a British woman who was killed on Wimbledon Common, southwest London. Her murder resulted in a highly publicised and controversial police investigation.

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Rachel Nickell case: Missed clues that allowed Robert Napper to kill again

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How Robert Napper evaded justice for 16 years over the brutal killing of Rachel Nickell

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'I can still see the knife in the killer's hand and my mother covered in blood': Rachel Nickell's son - the only witness to her murder - breaks his 18-year silence

The memories are hazy now, but they still sometimes come. Alex Hanscombe was a month short of his third birthday when his mother Rachel Nickell was killed in front of him. And the fragmented sequence of horrifying images will never go away.

It is an effort for him to put those memories into words. But 18 years on, Alex is finally ready to speak publicly for the first time about one of Britain's most disturbing - and, until two years ago, unresolved - murder inquiries.

In a dignified, calm voice - bereft of any bitterness, self-pity or tears - he relives the day he lost his mother and his life changed for ever.

He is back on Wimbledon Common in South-West London that July morning in 1992, walking with his mother and their pet dog, Molly. He sees the white male, tall and slim with brown hair, appearing out of nowhere, before being knocked to the ground, then the flash of a knife blade and the blows raining down on his mother, until the man flees.

He pictures the bank notes on the ground, which have fallen out of his mother's pocket. He picks them up and tries to give them back to her, placing one note on her forehead as she lies on the ground.

He sees blood and, even though he is just a young child, he is aware she is never coming back. He runs towards a crowd of people in the distance.

Suddenly, he is surrounded by the concerned faces of adults. Then the police arrive.

He is placed in an ambulance and given a sedative to fall asleep, waking later that afternoon in hospital to see the face of his father Andre crying.

'I was only a small child, but I knew she was dead,' he says. 'I wasn't frightened, there was no time to be scared. I just remember the shock of knowing my mother was gone for ever.'

Alex Hanscombe is now 21 and has lived almost all of his childhood with the memory of what he witnessed on that July morning when his 23-year-old mother, Rachel, was stabbed 49 times and sexually assaulted by the man who would later - much later - be identified as paranoid schizophrenic and serial rapist Robert Napper.

Napper, who went on to kill and mutilate another young mother, Samantha Bisset, 28, and her four-year-old daughter, Jazmine, in November 1993, was finally convicted of Rachel's manslaughter in December 2008 on the grounds of diminished responsibility.

For many years, his mother's killer featured in Alex's nightmares, but he was so traumatised he could tell no one. Not the police, not the child psychologists, not even his father. He buried them as deep as he could.

So it is perhaps a sign of his newly-developed maturity - following a troubled, angry adolescence - that he feels able to give his first interview about his mother's killing.

He knows that, for many, he will always be the 'tragic tot' who was 'struck dumb' by his ordeal; his identity frozen in one awful moment of time. The little boy found by a woman passer-by, covered in blood, clinging to his mother, crying 'Get up, Mummy' - even though this isn't part of Alex's memory.

Few could believe that such a child could ever be happy again.

But now people will know how he has turned out, despite his loss and the shocking failings of the Metropolitan Police, which missed opportunities to apprehend Napper before he went on to kill.

Alex has a girlfriend, Alba, a 20-year-old Spanish student. He is also a talented guitarist and has studied at music school, including a spell in London.

He would certainly look the part of the rock star with his flowing mane of dark, curly hair and cool, laid-back air. People are always telling him he inherited the heart-melting smile of his mother, a former model.

Above all, he wants those people who worried about him as a child, who sent him letters and presents, to see that 'something positive can emerge from something negative'.

'I was only a small child, but I knew she was dead. I wasn't frightened, there was no time to be scared. I just remember the shock of knowing my mother was gone for ever'

'I forgave the person who killed my mother long before I even knew who it was. Until you forgive, you can never move on with your life,' he says. 'I don't feel damaged by what happened. I had my mum for the first few years of my life - the most important ones - and being angry or upset isn't the way to go.'

After his mother's death, Alex had a peripatetic childhood. Aged three-and-a-half, he was taken to France by his father, Andre, to escape the 'goldfish bowl' of public attention and moved again three years later to a small village in Spain, where he has since enjoyed a normal life.

Alex credits Andre, 47, a tennis coach who was working as a motorbike courier at the time of Rachel's death, with giving him the security and protection he needed, as he struggled to adapt to the loss of his mother.

He admits that during his childhood he took out much of his frustration and anger on his father at growing up without a mother.

He went through his teenage phases, drank too much beer and there were occasional disciplinary problems at school over his lack of interest in academic study. Since meeting his girlfriend Alba two years ago, however, Alex has calmed down and now enjoys a female influence, so lacking since his mother's death.

'I'm grateful to my father for taking me abroad to live when I was small, so I could grow up without the tag of being Rachel Nickell's son,' he says.

'If I had stayed in Britain I think it might have been a different story. I have never been back to Wimbledon Common and I don't visit my mother's grave. I'm not someone who broods on the past.

'If you are living in the past or the future it means you are not living in the moment. We have pictures of my mother around the home, but it is not a shrine. I have never read any books about the case, though I am aware of all the official documentation.

'Anyway, I don't need to know anyone else's version - I saw what happened that day in July. What more could anyone tell me?

'You don't remember everything from when you are small, but you remember the big things - those that change your life.

'I clearly remember walking in the park with my mother and Molly and being pushed over by a man, who then attacked my mother. I knew something bad was happening.

'I saw the knife in his hand and when I saw her lying on the ground covered in blood, I realised the consequences of that act. I wasn't quite three, but, even so, I knew my mother was never coming back. When I woke up in the hospital the next day, I remembered everything. I didn't ask for my mother once.

'When you see something like that there is no doubt. My father tells me that in the hospital I gave him a look, as if it was me telling him Mummy wasn't coming back, rather than the other way round.' All Alex can remember of his mother, apart from that final day, is her warm, loving presence.

But his father Andre has told him they were so close they were like two interlinking circles. They lived for each other.

Andre was so convinced Alex wouldn't want to live without his mother that, in his grief, he considered killing himself and his son. Holding little Alex, who had lost the confidence to walk after witnessing his mother's death, Andre asked his son if he wanted to go on.

Astonishingly, Andre says that, despite his young age, he remembers this question and understood clearly what his father was saying. 'I remember saying: "Yes, I want to go on." I understood what he was asking me. I have never wanted to die or end my life, no matter how difficult it might be.

'People think that when something like this happens, it's the actual incident that matters, but the biggest challenge is what happens, day to day, after that. That affects you far more.

'I was always aware that I was different from other children growing up, not having a mum. I wasn't envious of them, but I missed that female influence and sometimes took out that frustration on my dad.'

When Alex was 12, his extreme moods became worse, even though Andre had decided some years earlier to hire a live-in female tutor hoping he would benefit from a woman's presence and that he could enjoy more freedom.

It had some undeniable benefit but was not a complete success. Nor was the relationship with his father's occasional girlfriends any easier.

'I was a bit selfish at that age and had grown used to having all his attention. It was hard having a woman in the house, as it was a constant reminder that you do not have your own mother.

'I forgave the person who killed my mother long before I even knew who it was. Until you forgive, you can never move on with your life'

'Yes, I missed out on not having a mother, but I got plenty of cuddles and affection from my dad.'

Andre has given Alex some of the jewellery his mother owned and his grandparents gave him a bottle of her favourite perfume, Coco Chanel, which he was happy to play with as a child.

Alex is not close to Rachel's parents - his grandparents, Andrew and Monica Nickell - and has not seen them since he was eight.

Two years ago, after Robert Napper's conviction, they spoke of the way Rachel's death had changed their lives and complained they had been prevented from seeing their grandson by Andre.

But Alex insists it was his decision not to see his grandparents.

'There was a lot of tension between my father and my grandparents, as he felt they were overstepping certain boundaries, while they felt he was being neurotic and over-protective,' says Alex.

'But I wasn't banned from seeing them. I just found it upsetting being with them - I didn't feel comfortable. I don't think it's sad. If there are too many conflicts it is better to be apart.

'Last year I wrote to them asking for some videotapes they had of my mother. They sent them and said how nice it was to hear from me.

'Maybe one day we shall meet up again. I don't have anything against them, but they belong to a different world.'

What is most striking about Alex is his total lack of bitterness, even in the face of what he considers a lack of professionalism shown by the Metropolitan Police.

It failed to stop serial rapist Napper before he went on to kill his mother, and then took years to link him to her death. 'My mother would still be alive if the police had done their job properly,' he says.

'It's not a matter of opinion - the documented evidence speaks for itself. I don't have much trust in what comes from the police.'

For years, Andre and Alex were convinced - because the police told them so - that Colin Stagg, a loner from Roehampton who used to walk his dog on Wimbledon Common, was Rachel's killer.

With no forensic evidence linking him to the crime, detectives designed a honeytrap - Operation Edzell - in the hope Mr Stagg would confess to an undercover policewoman posing as a potential lover, using the pseudonym Lizzie James.

Stagg never admitted to the killing, yet was charged with murder in August 1993.

In September the following year, the trial collapsed when Mr Justice Ognall condemned the police honeytrap as 'deceptive conduct of the grossest kind'.

Stagg later received £706,000 in compensation, while Lizzie James took early retirement in 1998, aged 33, on health grounds after her 'traumatic' role in the investigation.

In 2001, she received £125,000 from the Met in an out-of-court settlement. In contrast - more than a decade ago - Alex Hanscombe received just £90,000 from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority.

But now, after finding out that his mother's death could have been prevented were it not for the mistakes made by the Metropolitan Police, he is seeking damages for negligence.

A complaint over the Met's alleged failure in its duty of care to Rachel, lodged by Alex and Andre, is being taking to the European Court of Human Rights.

'I don't begrudge Colin Stagg a penny of his compensation. He was wrongly accused and that had to be put right,' says Alex.

'I have little faith in the police. We were told one thing by them, then another, then another.

'It's like being told it's going to be sunny tomorrow and then waking up to rain, then being told it will snow and there are storms instead.

'For me, the court action isn't about the money. It's about the police being held to account. It's important that their errors are made public. I'm not angry, but they haven't done a good job and my mother died as a result.'

It was in 2003, 11 years after the murder, that a cold case review team using refined DNA techniques, linked Robert Napper - already convicted for the murders of the Bissets - to a DNA sample found on Rachel's clothes.

Andre Hanscombe travelled to the Old Bailey to see him convicted, but Alex chose not to.

'I didn't feel it had anything to offer me, but my dad wanted to go. He wanted finally to see justice done, after all the confusion,'
says Alex.

The night before the conviction, Andre Hanscombe was handed Napper's psychiatric reports and case history. Shocked by the documented mistakes the police had made, he lodged a complaint with the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

Last June, the IPCC released a damning report concluding the Met had committed 'bad decisions and errors' and 'missed opportunities' to stop Napper - linked to more than 83 sex attacks on women - before he killed Rachel.

Even though he'd raped a young mother in front of her child and went on to attack Samantha Bisset - like Rachel, a pretty blonde - the link with Rachel's killing was missed as detectives misguidedly pursued Colin Stagg instead.

Yet no one was disciplined or sacked as a result of the police's failing, the key detectives on the case having retired or died.

A Law Lords ruling states that the police cannot be sued for any mistakes they might make in an investigation because it would put undue pressure on them.

So unless the Met decides to make a voluntary payment to the Hanscombes, their only option is to take their case to the European Court.

Alex has no doubt about the consequences of the police's failure.

'If they'd done their job properly, my mother would still be alive. If you run through a red light, you get a ticket and fine.

'Yet still the police are saying they do not have to pay the consequences for their mistakes.'

So does Alex ever wonder how his life might have turned out had his mother lived?

'You could play "what if?" all day long if you wanted to,' he says.

'I owe it to myself and my mother to be happy with the life I have.'

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'I can still see the knife in the killer's hand and my mother covered in blood': Rachel Nickell's son - the only witness to her murder - breaks his 18-year silence

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The memories are hazy now, but they still sometimes come. Alex Hanscombe was a month short of his third birthday when his mother Rachel Nickell was killed in front of him. And the fragmented sequence of horrifying images will never go away. It is an effort for him to put those memories into words.

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One of the most important recommendations HMIC made was that the College of Policing review their method of risk assessment - the widely-used tool which identifies women as 'high', 'medium' or 'standard' risk.

We still await that review with great interest.

But, the problem really lies with the notion of using risk as the sole measure to assess a woman's need for support.

If being deemed 'high risk' is the only ticket to receiving support - as is increasingly the case both inside and outside the criminal justice system - then we are faced with a serious problem.

Where domestic violence is concerned, risk can change in a moment.

Managing risk is not at all the same thing as supporting recovery. Support for victims must be based on understanding their needs, and nurturing and building on their own resources - so they can, in time, live and support themselves independently.

That's why, one year on from HMIC's seminal report, we at Women's Aid are demanding a major rethink of the response to domestic violence, which works for every victim - whether she calls the police or not.

The charity Women's Aid, which I run, is committed to protecting, supporting and empowering women. The women that we work with - who have survived and thrived in spite of systematic physical and psychological abuse - are testament to the strength of human spirit.

But, sometimes, the very systems which exist to protect victims of domestic violence can actually hinder them, and make it almost impossible to for them to get away from their abusers.

In the very worst cases, these systems can fail them to the end, and they become part of that shocking statistic - one of the two murdered women a week.

We have listened to women who have suffered terrible abuse, and have heard their stories.

Last year, the charity celebrated its 40th anniversary. After four decades we know there is only one approach that will work to achieve the sort of lasting recovery that keeps women and their children safe in the long-term.

That is: to support women and enable them to use their own strengths and resources to work towards recovery. By listening to what will make them feel safe; knowing what is standing between them and freedom from abuse; and working together to overcome those obstacles.

This means understanding what support the woman needs in order to be independent and survive.

If these elements are taken care of? Risk will be, too.

But if we continue to focus, single-mindedly, on minimising risk alone? We neglect to adequately deal with a woman's needs.

Words alone cannot convey the positive impact that a needs-led approach can have. So, we have created some infographics to do that for us.

Take a moment to follow the journeys and true stories of the three women - Katrina, Sarah, and Yasmin - and discover the difference that a needs-led approach can make.

If we empower women - really empower them - we can transform their lives for good. They are no longer victims of domestic violence. They are survivors.

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Domestic violence: Women must not be considered 'at risk'. Here's why

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Exactly one year ago, a damning report criticised the way many of Britain's police forces treated victims of domestic violence. Head of Women's Aid, Polly Neate, calls for a shake up of a system that seeks to minimise risk above all else

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Contents

Government Ministries and Agencies

The Criminal Justice System comprises a number of agencies each responsible to a government department. The Ministry of Justice oversees the work of HM Prisons and Probation Service (HMPPS), covering prison and probation services; and HM Courts Service. The services which HMPPS are accountable for include HM Prison Service, National Probation Service, and Community Rehabilitation Companies.

The Home Office has responsibility for the 43 police forces in England and Wales and the Attorney General has responsibility for the Crown Prosecution Service.

Key roles in the Criminal Justice System

Police are responsible for keeping the peace and investigating offences reported to them. They provide information and advice to the Crown Prosecution Service about the alleged offence(s) committed by individuals.

Crown Prosecutors are responsible for deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to charge and prosecute an alleged offender. They also make representations to magistrates regarding suitability of bail prior to a trial or sentence hearing. If an offender is charged the CPS is responsible for prosecuting the offence in court.

Magistrates deal with cases in the magistrates courts including hearing trials. They usually sit in panels of three (known as the bench) and one of them is the chair of the bench.

Judges deal with cases in the Crown Court.

Defence lawyers are responsible for representing defendants accused of an offence.

Probation officers provide information and assessments on offenders appearing before the courts. They also have responsibility for supervising offenders on community orders and post-release licenses.

Prison officers are responsible for the security and welfare of prisoners in their establishments.

The Courts

The courts are divided into Magistrates Courts and Crown Courts. All cases are initially heard at the Magistrates Courts. There are some offences that are less serious and can only be dealt with at this level. There are other offences which can be heard at either the Magistrates or Crown Courts, and some are so serious that they can only be dealt with by the Crown Court. Magistrates are volunteers who have been trained and have the support and advice of legally qualified court clerks. Judges sit primarily in the Crown Courts and are qualified barristers who have been appointed to the judiciary.

The Process

Almost all criminal cases begin with an offence being reported to the police. After investigation they will arrest an alleged offender and if there is sufficient evidence they will recommend to the Crown Prosecution Service that the individual(s) are charged with a specific offence. There will also be a decision made as to whether the defendant is held in custody pending his/her trial or whether it is safe to release him/her on bail until the case is dealt with. This decision is made by the magistrates based on information provided by the National Probation Service (through pre-sentence reports), defence solicitor, and the Crown Prosecutor.

The Sentence

If a defendant pleads guilty, or is found guilty after a trial, the magistrates or the judge (depending on the seriousness of the offence) imposes a sentence. It is often the case that the National Probation Service will have been requested to prepare a Pre-Sentence Report on the defendant and the information, assessments, and recommendations in the report will be used to help the magistrate or judge arrive at a decision. Generally, the range of sentences that can be imposed include:

Conditional discharge - no further sanction so long as the offender stays out of trouble for the duration of the discharge period;

Fine - the level of the fine is usually related to the seriousness of the offence and must be paid within a set period of time;

Community Sentence - this places the offender under the supervision of the probation service and there will be a range of requirements that must be completed (e.g. attendance at group programmes, performing Unpaid Work, residing at a specific residence, etc.). Supervision can last from 6 months to 3 years depending on the seriousness of the offence.

Suspended Sentence - a prison sentence will be imposed but suspended for a defined period of time. As long as the offender stays out of trouble there is no further sanction;

Custodial Sentence - magistrates can only impose custodial sentences for up to 12 months. Only judges in the Crown Court can impose longer sentences including Life Sentences for very seriousness offences such as murder or manslaughter.

Release from prison

All those held in custody, with the exception of a very small number who have received 'whole life tariffs', will be released at some point.

Those sentenced to less than 12 months are released after serving half of their sentence are subject to supervision by Community Rehabilitation Companies (from June 2015).

Those serving between 12 months and 4 years are released at the half-way point in their sentence and are supervised on license until the three quarters stage of their sentence.

Those sentenced to more than 4 years are eligible to apply for parole at the half way stage of their sentence. If successful they are then supervised until the ¾ stage of their sentence. If not successful they are released at the ¾ stage and are 'at risk' until their sentence ends.

For those sentenced to Life imprisonment they are only eligible for release after their 'tariff' (the minimum period of punishment specified by the sentencing judge) has expired. Release after that point is dependent on the level of risk presented by the prisoner and a satisfactory resettlement plan.

Probation

Probation services are delivered by the National Probation Service, and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies covering each part of England and Wales.

The National Probation Service (NPS) oversees the writing of all Pre-sentence reports, conducts all initial risk-assessments, and manages offenders who are deemed to be of high risk of harm to the public.

Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) are responsible for the management of offenders who are assessed as low to medium risk of harm to the public.

Probation staff work in a variety of roles and organise and manage the different elements of community orders including Unpaid Work, group work programmes, and individual supervision and interventions. They also work with other public, private and voluntary organisations to provide offenders with help with accommodation, employment and education, drug treatment, and debt advice.

Within England and Wales, it is responsible for:

running prison and probation services

rehabilitation services for people in our care leaving prison

making sure support is available to stop people reoffending

contract managing private sector prisons and services such as:

the prisoner escort service

electronic tagging

Through HM Prison Service: it manages public sector prisons and the contract for private prisons in England and Wales. Through the National Probation Service: it oversees probation delivery in England and Wales including through community rehabilitation companies.

HM Prison Service

There are 142 prisons in England and Wales. Currently the prison estate is being reformed, with some men's prisons, and all women's prisons, being termed 'Resettlement Prisons'. The ambition is that these designated prisons will provide more focussed resettlement for offenders who live in the local area, and are nearing their release date (approximately four months before release). These prisons will work with Community Rehabilitation Companies and the National Probation Service to support resettlement.

The prison estate is broadly categorised according to the level of security each provides.

The High Security Estate (8 prisons) hold the most dangerous prisoners - Category A prisoners.

The rest of the prison estate comprises Category B prisons, Category C (training) prisons, Category D (open or resettlement) prisons. There are some Category B prisons which function as remand prisons, holding prisoners appearing before the courts for either trial or sentence. Prisoners serving sentences of less than 12 months usually remain in remand or local prisons.

Depending on the length of sentence and the type of offence, prison regimes will include opportunities for training, education, drug treatment, and help with resettlement back into the community. For prisoners serving longer than 12 months there is an expectation that relevant prison staff will liaise with the probation service in the prisoner's home area to implement plans for effective resettlement.

More information

You can find out how the voluntary sector is involved in the Criminal Justice System here, and find organisations working with offenders here.

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Government Ministries and Agencies The Criminal Justice System comprises a number of agencies each responsible to a government department. The Ministry of Justice oversees the work of HM Prisons and Probation Service (HMPPS), covering prison and probation services; and HM Courts Service.

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A magistrate (also known as a 'justice of the peace') is someone who lives in the local community, and has been trained to decide on cases heard in the magistrates' court. Magistrates are volunteers, and may also sit alongside a judge in the Crown Court for some cases. In the magistrates' court, there are normally three magistrates who are supported by a legally trained adviser.

Sometimes cases are tried by one magistrate, who is a lawyer. They are called a district judge. Magistrates' courts tend to be less formal places than the Crown Court - for example, magistrates do not wear the white wigs that lawyers and judges wear in the Crown Court.

The judge is responsible for overseeing the hearing, ruling on points of law and ensuring that the defendant gets a fair trial. Where the defendant is found 'guilty' or pleads 'guilty', the judge will pass a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the crime and takes into account the defendant's personal circumstances, and whether they have previously been convicted of similar offences.

There are 12 members of the public on a jury. After listening to all the evidence during the trial in the Crown Court, and any direction that the judge may give them, they decide whether the defendant is guilty. When all the jurors agree that a defendant is guilty or innocent, it is known as a unanimous verdict. If they can't all agree, they may be asked by the judge to pass a majority verdict where at least 10 of them agree.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) prosecutes most cases in the criminal courts. The CPS is independent - it's not part of the police or the courts. The CPS prosecutes cases on behalf of the Crown, and while it will listen to the views of victims, it makes its decision about prosecuting based on the admissible evidence that's available, and public interest factors. It is guided in its decision making by the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

The CPS employs lawyers who are called Crown Prosecutors or Crown Advocates. They also employ associate prosecutors who are not lawyers, but who are trained to present simple cases in the magistrate's court. In the Crown Court, the CPS may prosecute the case through one of its Crown Advocates, or instruct a local barrister to prosecute on its behalf. The CPS is not the only prosecutor; criminal prosecutions can be brought by other government agencies and designated bodies on matters such as TV licensing, and environmental or health and safety violations.

The defendant is entitled to be legally represented in criminal proceedings, whether they pay for their legal representation themselves, or they qualify for legal aid. The defence team will take instructions from the defendant and advise them on legal matters. This will include evaluating whether the defendant has a viable defence based on the evidence presented by the prosecution.

An expert witness is usually someone such as a doctor or forensic scientist, who uses their expertise to interpret the evidence, either in support of the prosecution or to help the defence case.

If a defendant pleads guilty, or is found guilty by the court or jury, the magistrates or a judge will decide on the most appropriate sentence to reflect the crime. The sentencing process is quite complicated, and has to follow sentencing guidelines. These guidelines help to ensure that there is a consistent approach to sentencing for similar offences across all courts.

Find out more about sentencing.

A person convicted by the Crown Court can appeal to the Court of Appeal (criminal division) against their conviction or the sentence. If their initial appeals are rejected, they can apply for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. Someone convicted by a magistrates' court or youth court can appeal against the conviction (provided they did not plead guilty) or sentence to the Crown Court. Their appeal will usually be heard by a judge sitting with two magistrates.

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Who's who in the criminal justice system

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A magistrate (also known as a 'justice of the peace') is someone who lives in the local community, and has been trained to decide on cases heard in the magistrates' court. Magistrates are volunteers, and may also sit alongside a judge in the Crown Court for some cases.

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The criminal justice process - Police.uk

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Restorative Justice (RJ) offers victims an opportunity to be heard and to have a say in the resolution of offences, including agreeing restorative or reparative activities for the offender. There are a number of types and levels of RJ and it can be used out of court, in addition to a prosecution, or to form part of a sentence.