# data[].attributes.body
Montesquieu believed that liberties are a right of doing whatever the law permits. If a citizen could do what they forbid, he would have no liberties because all his fellow citizens would have the same power. He thought that political liberty can only found in moderate governments and this is not always. It is only when there is no abuse of power that political liberties can be found and any man with power it apt to abuse it.
(source 1)

# data[].attributes.body
He favors religious toleration, and regards attempts to compel religious belief as both unwise and inhumane. He believes that Religion can help to ameliorate the effects of bad laws and institutions and it is the only thing capable of serving as a check on despotic power. This explains why he is in favor of people practicing their own religions. During this time period it was a very foreign idea for people to practice their own religion. However, Montesquieu knew that religion aims at the perfection of the individual and this will help the society as a whole.

# data[].attributes.body
Montesquieu believed in the equality of all men but not to the point at which it threatened individual liberty. He was even quoted sating "In a true state of nature, indeed, all men are born equal, but they cannot continue in this equality. Society makes them lose it, and they recover it only by the protection of laws." in The Spirit of Laws, Bk. VIII, Ch. 3. This ties to his idea of the abolition of slavery as well as later tying into desegregation in the United states.
(source 3)

# data[].attributes.body
Montesquieu had many different ideals and beliefs but one of the strongest was that a governments main purpose and focus should be to maintain law and order. Montesquieu opposed absolute monarchy because of its inability to maintain law and order. He thought that absolute monarchies allow one person to have too much power and man will always try to do what is best for himself and not the country. Instead, he favored the English system as the best form of government but he misinterpreted the English government. He favored this government because of what he thought was its ability to keep itself in check.

# data[].attributes.body
Montesquieu argued that the best form of government was one in which the legislative, executive, and judicial powers were separate and kept each other in check to prevent any branch from becoming too powerful. He thought that united these powers would form an absolute monarchy which he opposed.
This was later adopted into the U.S. constitution.

# data[].attributes.body
Montesquieu's belief of the separation of power within a government is among the key ideals of the founding fathers.  The first article of the Constitution states that "All legislative powers...shall be vested in a Congress."  The second article places "the executive power...in a President."  The third article places the "judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court" and "in such inferior Courts as the Congress...may establish."  Because his beliefs are stated in the first three articles of the constitution, this demonstrates how important his ideas were to the founding fathers.
(source 2)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Constitutional Government

CHAPTER 17 | Document 9

Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 6, CH. 2; BK. 11, CHS. 1--7, 20
1748
[Book 6]

2.--Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws in different Governments

We hear it generally said that justice ought to be administered with us as in Turkey. Is it possible, then, that the most ignorant of all nations should be the most clearsighted on a point which it most behooves mankind to know?

If we examine the set forms of justice with respect to the trouble the subject undergoes in recovering his property or in obtaining satisfaction for an injury or affront, we shall find them doubtless too numerous: but if we consider them in the relation they bear to the liberty and security of every individual, we shall often find them too few; and be convinced that the trouble, expense, delays, and even the very dangers of our judiciary proceedings are the price that each subject pays for his liberty.

In Turkey, where little regard is shown to the honor, life, or estate of the subject, all causes are speedily decided. The method of determining them is a matter of indifference, provided they be determined. The pasha, after a quick hearing, orders which party he pleases to be bastinadoed, and then sends them about their business.

Here it would be dangerous to be of a litigious disposition; this supposes a strong desire of obtaining justice, a settled aversion, an active mind, and a steadiness in pursuing one's point. All this should be avoided in a government where fear ought to be the only prevailing sentiment, and in which popular disturbances are frequently attended with sudden and unforeseen revolutions. Here every man ought to know that the magistrate must not hear his name mentioned, and that his security depends entirely on his being reduced to a kind of annihilation.

But in moderate governments, where the life of the meanest subject is deemed precious, no man is stripped of his honor or property until after a long inquiry; and no man is bereft of life till his very country has attacked him--an attack that is never made without leaving him all possible means of making his defence.

Hence it is that when a person renders himself absolute, he immediately thinks of reducing the number of laws. In a government thus constituted they are more affected with particular inconveniences than with the liberty of the subject, which is very little minded.

In republics, it is plain that as many formalities at least are necessary as in monarchies. In both governments they increase in proportion to the value which is set on the honor, fortune, liberty, and life of the subject.

In republican governments, men are all equal; equal they are also in despotic governments: in the former, because they are everything; in the latter, because they are nothing.

[Book 11]

1.--A general Idea

I make a distinction between the laws that establish political liberty as it relates to the constitution, and those by which it is established as it relates to the citizen. The former shall be the subject of this book; the latter I shall examine in the next.

2.--Different Significations of the word Liberty

There is no word that admits of more various significations, and has made more varied impressions on the human mind, than that of liberty. Some have taken it as a means of deposing a person on whom they had conferred a tyrannical authority; others for the power of choosing a superior whom they are obliged to obey; others for the right of bearing arms, and of being thereby enabled to use violence; others, in fine, for the privilege of being governed by a native of their own country, or by their own laws. A certain nation for a long time thought liberty consisted in the privilege of wearing a long beard. Some have annexed this name to one form of government exclusive of others: those who had a republican taste applied it to this species of polity; those who liked a monarchical state gave it to monarchy. Thus they have all applied the name of liberty to the government most suitable to their own customs and inclinations: and as in republics the people have not so constant and so present a view of the causes of their misery, and as the magistrates seem to act only in conformity to the laws, hence liberty is generally said to reside in republics, and to be banished from monarchies. In fine, as in democracies the people seem to act almost as they please, this sort of government has been deemed the most free, and the power of the people has been confounded with their liberty.

3.--In what Liberty consists

It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In governments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will.

We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.

4.--The same Subject continued

Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits?

To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits.

5.--Of the End or View of different Governments

Though all governments have the same general end, which is that of preservation, yet each has another particular object. Increase of dominion was the object of Rome; war, that of Sparta; religion, that of the Jewish laws; commerce, that of Marseilles; public tranquility, that of the laws of China: navigation, that of the laws of Rhodes; natural liberty, that of the policy of the Savages; in general, the pleasures of the prince, that of despotic states; that of monarchies, the prince's and the kingdom's glory; the independence of individuals is the end aimed at by the laws of Poland, thence results the oppression of the whole.

One nation there is also in the world that has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty. We shall presently examine the principles on which this liberty is founded; if they are sound, liberty will appear in its highest perfection.

To discover political liberty in a constitution, no great labor is requisite. If we are capable of seeing it where it exists, it is soon found, and we need not go far in search of it.

6.--Of the Constitution of England

In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.

By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.

The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.

There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.

Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government because the prince who is invested with the two first powers leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the Sultan's person, the subjects groan under the most dreadful oppression.

In the republics of Italy, where these three powers are united, there is less liberty than in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recourse to as violent methods for its support as even that of the Turks; witness the state inquisitors, and the lion's mouth into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accusations.

In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions.

The whole power is here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a despotic sway, yet the people feel the effects of it every moment.

Hence it is that many of the princes of Europe, whose aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have constantly set out with uniting in their own persons all the branches of magistracy, and all the great offices of state.

I allow indeed that the mere hereditary aristocracy of the Italian republics does not exactly answer to the despotic power of the Eastern princes. The number of magistrates sometimes moderate the power of the magistracy; the whole body of the nobles do not always concur in the same design; and different tribunals are erected, that temper each other. Thus at Venice the legislative power is in the council, the executive in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia. But the mischief is, that these different tribunals are composed of magistrates all belonging to the same body; which constitutes almost one and the same power.

The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people at certain times of the year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires.

By this method the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate.

In accusations of a deep and criminal nature, it is proper the person accused should have the privilege of choosing, in some measure, his judges, in concurrence with the law; or at least he should have a right to except against so great a number that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice.

The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general will.

But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society, without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations.

The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers; to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of persons inclined to treat him with rigor.

If the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good behavior, there is an end of liberty; unless they are taken up, in order to answer without delay to a capital crime, in which case they are really free, being subject only to the power of the law.

But should the legislature think itself in danger by some secret conspiracy against the state, or by a correspondence with a foreign enemy, it might authorize the executive power, for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons, who in that case would lose their liberty only for a while, to preserve it forever.

And this is the only reasonable method that can be substituted to the tyrannical magistracy of the Ephori, and to the state inquisitors of Venice, who are also despotic.

As in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own governor; the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves.

The inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests than with those of other places; and are better judges of the capacity of their neighbors than of that of the rest of their countrymen. The members, therefore, of the legislature should not be chosen from the general body of the nation; but it is proper that in every considerable place a representative should be elected by the inhabitants.

The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy.

It is not at all necessary that the representatives who have received a general instruction from their constituents should wait to be directed on each particular affair, as is practised in the diets of Germany. True it is that by this way of proceeding the speeches of the deputies might with greater propriety be called the voice of the nation; but, on the other hand, this would occasion infinite delays; would give each deputy a power of controlling the assembly; and, on the most urgent and pressing occasions, the wheels of government might be stopped by the caprice of a single person.

When the deputies, as Mr. Sidney well observes, represent a body of people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents; but it is a different thing in England, where they are deputed by boroughs.

All the inhabitants of the several districts ought to have a right of voting at the election of a representative, except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own.

One great fault there was in most of the ancient republics, that the people had a right to active resolutions, such as require some execution, a thing of which they are absolutely incapable. They ought to have no share in the government but for the choosing of representatives, which is within their reach. For though few can tell the exact degree of men's capacities, yet there are none but are capable of knowing in general whether the person they choose is better qualified than most of his neighbors.

Neither ought the representative body to be chosen for the executive part of government, for which it is not so fit; but for the enacting of laws, or to see whether the laws in being are duly executed, a thing suited to their abilities, and which none indeed but themselves can properly perform.

In such a state there are always persons distinguished by their birth, riches, or honors; but were they to be confounded with the common people, and to have only the weight of a single vote like the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and they would have no interest in supporting it, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The share they have, therefore, in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other advantages in the state; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to check the licentiousness of the people, as the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of theirs.

The legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the nobles, and to that which represents the people, each having their assemblies and deliberations apart, each their separate views and interests.

Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing: there remain, therefore, only two; and as these have need of a regulating power to moderate them, the part of the legislative body composed of the nobility is extremely proper for this purpose.

The body of the nobility ought to be hereditary. In the first place it is so in its own nature; and in the next there must be a considerable interest to preserve its privileges--privileges that in themselves are obnoxious to popular envy, and of course in a free state are always in danger.

But as a hereditary power might be tempted to pursue its own particular interests, and forget those of the people, it is proper that where a singular advantage may be gained by corrupting the nobility, as in the laws relating to the supplies, they should have no other share in the legislation than the power of rejecting, and not that of resolving.

By the power of resolving I mean the right of ordaining by their own authority, or of amending what has been ordained by others. By the power of rejecting I would be understood to mean the right of annulling a resolution taken by another; which was the power of the tribunes at Rome. And though the person possessed of the privilege of rejecting may likewise have the right of approving, yet this approbation passes for no more than a declaration, that he intends to make no use of his privilege of rejecting, and is derived from that very privilege.

The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of government, having need of despatch, is better administered by one than by many: on the other hand, whatever depends on the legislative power is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person.

But if there were no monarch, and the executive power should be committed to a certain number of persons selected from the legislative body, there would be an end then of liberty; by reason the two powers would be united, as the same persons would sometimes possess, and would be always able to possess, a share in both.

Were the legislative body to be a considerable time without meeting, this would likewise put an end to liberty. For of two things one would naturally follow: either that there would be no longer any legislative resolutions, and then the state would fall into anarchy; or that these resolutions would be taken by the executive power, which would render it absolute.

It would be needless for the legislative body to continue always assembled. This would be troublesome to the representatives, and, moreover, would cut out too much work for the executive power, so as to take off its attention to its office, and oblige it to think only of defending its own prerogatives, and the right it has to execute.

Again, were the legislative body to be always assembled, it might happen to be kept up only by filling the places of the deceased members with new representatives; and in that case, if the legislative body were once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy. When different legislative bodies succeed one another, the people who have a bad opinion of that which is actually sitting may reasonably entertain some hopes of the next: but were it to be always the same body, the people upon seeing it once corrupted would no longer expect any good from its laws; and of course they would either become desperate or fall into a state of indolence.

The legislative body should not meet of itself. For a body is supposed to have no will but when it is met; and besides, were it not to meet unanimously, it would be impossible to determine which was really the legislative body; the part assembled, or the other. And if it had a right to prorogue itself, it might happen never to be prorogued; which would be extremely dangerous, in case it should ever attempt to encroach on the executive power. Besides, there are seasons, some more proper than others, for assembling the legislative body: it is fit, therefore, that the executive power should regulate the time of meeting, as well as the duration of those assemblies, according to the circumstances and exigencies of a state known to itself.

Were the executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon destroy all the other powers.

But it is not proper, on the other hand, that the legislative power should have a right to stay the executive. For as the execution has its natural limits, it is useless to confine it; besides, the executive power is generally employed in momentary operations. The power, therefore, of the Roman tribunes was faulty, as it put a stop not only to the legislation, but likewise to the executive part of government; which was attended with infinite mischief.

But if the legislative power in a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have been executed; an advantage which this government has over that of Crete and Sparta, where the Cosmi and the Ephori gave no account of their administration.

But whatever may be the issue of that examination, the legislative body ought not to have a power of arraigning the person, nor, of course, the conduct, of him who is intrusted with the executive power. His person should be sacred, because as it is necessary for the good of the state to prevent the legislative body from rendering themselves arbitrary, the moment he is accused or tried there is an end of liberty.

In this case the state would be no longer a monarchy, but a kind of republic, though not a free government. But as the person intrusted with the executive power cannot abuse it without bad counsellors, and such as have the laws as ministers, though the laws protect them as subjects, these men may be examined and punished--an advantage which this government has over that of Gnidus, where the law allowed of no such thing as calling the Amymones to an account, even after their administration; and therefore the people could never obtain any satisfaction for the injuries done them.

Though, in general, the judiciary power ought not to be united with any part of the legislative, yet this is liable to three exceptions, founded on the particular interest of the party accused.

The great are always obnoxious to popular envy; and were they to be judged by the people, they might be in danger from their judges, and would, moreover, be deprived of the privilege which the meanest subject is possessed of in a free state, of being tried by his peers. The nobility, for this reason, ought not to be cited before the ordinary courts of judicature, but before that part of the legislature which is composed of their own body.

It is possible that the law, which is clear sighted in one sense, and blind in another, might, in some cases, be too severe. But as we have already observed, the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigor. That part, therefore, of the legislative body, which we have just now observed to be a necessary tribunal on another occasion, also is a necessary tribunal in this; it belongs to its supreme authority to moderate the law in favor of the law itself, by mitigating the sentence.

It might also happen that a subject intrusted with the administration of public affairs may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of crimes which the ordinary magistrates either could not or would not punish. But, in general, the legislative power cannot try causes: and much less can it try this particular case, where it represents the party aggrieved, which is the people. It can only, therefore, impeach. But before what court shall it bring its impeachment? Must it go and demean itself before the ordinary tribunals, which are its inferiors, and, being composed, moreover, of men who are chosen from the people as well as itself, will naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser? No: in order to preserve the dignity of the people and the security of the subject, the legislative part which represents the people must bring in its charge before the legislative part which represents the nobility, who have neither the same interests nor the same passions.

Here is an advantage which this government has over most of the ancient republics, where this abuse prevailed, that the people were at the same time both judge and accuser.

The executive power, pursuant of what has been already said, ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting; otherwise it would soon be stripped of its prerogative. But should the legislative power usurp a share of the executive, the latter would be equally undone.

If the prince were to have a part in the legislature by the power of resolving, liberty would be lost. But as it is necessary he should have a share in the legislature for the support of his own prerogative, this share must consist in the power of rejecting.

The change of government at Rome was owing to this, that neither the senate, who had one part of the executive power, nor the magistrates, who were intrusted with the other, had the right of rejecting, which was entirely lodged in the people.

Here, then, is the fundamental constitution of the government we are treating of. The legislative body being composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative.

These three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in concert.

As the executive power has no other part in the legislative than the privilege of rejecting, it can have no share in the public debates. It is not even necessary that it should propose, because as it may always disapprove of the resolutions that shall be taken, it may likewise reject the decisions on those proposals which were made against its will.

In some ancient commonwealths, where public debates were carried on by the people in a body, it was natural for the executive power to propose and debate in conjunction with the people, otherwise their resolutions must have been attended with a strange confusion.

Were the executive power to determine the raising of public money, otherwise than by giving its consent, liberty would be at an end; because it would become legislative in the most important point of legislation.

If the legislative power was to settle the subsidies, not from year to year, but forever, it would run the risk of losing its liberty, because the executive power would be no longer dependent; and when once it was possessed of such a perpetual right, it would be a matter of indifference whether it held it of itself or of another. The same may be said if it should come to a resolution of intrusting, not an annual, but a perpetual command of the fleets and armies to the executive power.

To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress, it is requisite that the armies with which it is intrusted should consist of the people, and have the same spirit as the people, as was the case at Rome till the time of Marius. To obtain this end, there are only two ways, either that the persons employed in the army should have sufficient property to answer for their conduct to their fellow-subjects, and be enlisted only for a year, as was customary at Rome; or if there should be a standing army, composed chiefly of the most despicable part of the nation, the legislative power should have a right to disband them as soon as it pleased; the soldiers should live in common with the rest of the people; and no separate camp, barracks, or fortress should be suffered.

When once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing, its business consisting more in action than in deliberation.

It is natural for mankind to set a higher value upon courage than timidity, on activity than prudence, on strength than counsel. Hence the army will ever despise a senate, and respect their own officers. They will naturally slight the orders sent them by a body of men whom they look upon as cowards, and therefore unworthy to command them. So that as soon as the troops depend entirely on the legislative body, it becomes a military government; and if the contrary has ever happened, it has been owing to some extraordinary circumstances. It is because the army was always kept divided; it is because it was composed of several bodies that depended each on a particular province: it is because the capital towns were strong places, defended by their natural situation, and not garrisoned with regular troops. Holland, for instance, is still safer than Venice; she might drown or starve the revolted troops; for as they are not quartered in towns capable of furnishing them with necessary subsistence, this subsistence is of course precarious.

In perusing the admirable treatise of Tacitus "On the Manners of the Germans," we find it is from that nation the English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful system was invented first in the woods.

As all humans things have an end, the state we are speaking of will lose its liberty, will perish. Have not Rome, Sparta, and Carthage perished? It will perish when the legislative power shall be more corrupt than the executive.

It is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this liberty or not. Sufficient it is for my purpose to observe that it is established by their laws; and I inquire no further.

Neither do I pretend by this to undervalue other governments, nor to say that this extreme political liberty ought to give uneasiness to those who have only a moderate share of it. How should I have any such design, I who think that even the highest refinement of reason is not always desirable, and that mankind generally find their account better in mediums than in extremes?

Harrington, in his "Oceana," has also inquired into the utmost degree of liberty to which the constitution of a state may be carried. But of him, indeed, it may be said that for want of knowing the nature of real liberty he busied himself in pursuit of an imaginary one; and that he built a Chalcedon, though he had a Byzantium before his eyes.

7.--Of the Monarchies we are acquainted with

The monarchies we are acquainted with have not, like that we have been speaking of, liberty for their direct view: the only aim is the glory of the subject, of the state, and of the sovereign. But hence there results a spirit of liberty, which in those states is capable of achieving as great things, and of contributing as much, perhaps, to happiness, as liberty itself.

Here the three powers are not distributed and founded on the model of the constitution above mentioned; they have each a particular distribution, according to which they border more or less on political liberty; and if they did not border upon it, monarchy would degenerate into despotic government.

20.--The End of this Book

I should be glad to inquire into the distribution of the three powers, in all the moderate governments we are acquainted with, in order to calculate the degrees of liberty which each may enjoy. But we must not always exhaust a subject, so as to leave no work at all for the reader. My business is not to make people read, but to make them think.

http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s9.html
The Founders' Constitution
Volume 1, Chapter 17, Document 9

The University of Chicago Press

The Spirit of Laws. 1748. Translated by Thomas Nugent, 1750.

Easy to print version.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Constitutional Government: Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 6, CH. 2; BK. 11, CHS. 1--7, 20

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Constitutional Government CHAPTER 17|Document 9 Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. 6, CH. 2; BK. 11, CHS. 1--7, 20 1748 [Book 6] 2.--Of the Simplicity of Criminal Laws in different Governments We hear it generally said that justice ought to be administered with us as in Turkey.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Charles de Secondat,
Baron de la Brde et de Montesquieu
(1689-1755)

Montesquieu:
Ideological Co-Founder of the American Constitution
along with John Locke

It is partly due to the brilliance of Montesquieu that the United States of America has descended into serious civil bloodshed only one time in over 200 years.

"Montesquieu advocated constitutionalism, the preservation of civil liberties, the abolition of slavery, gradualism, moderation, peace, internationalism, social and economic justice with due respect to national and local tradition. He believed in justice and the rule of law; detested all forms of extremism and fanaticism; put his faith in the balance of power and the division of authority as a weapon against despotic rule by individuals or groups or majorities; and approved of social equality, but not the point which it threatened individual liberty; and out of liberty, but not to the point where it threatened to disrupt orderly government."

Sir Isaiah Berlin
Against the Current
Montesquieu loved knowledge, science, law, toleration.
Montesquieu hated armies, conquests, tyrants, priests.

MONTESQUIEU QUOTES:

&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp"In republican governments, men are all equal; equal they are also in despotic governments: in the former, because they are everything; in the latter, because they are nothing."

Montesquieu
The Spirit of Laws
Bk. VI, Ch. 2
&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp"Luxury is therefore absolutely necessary in monarchies; as it is also in despotic states, In the former, it is the use of liberty, in the latter, it is the abuse of servitude...
&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp "Hence arrives a very natural reflection. Republics end with luxury; monarchies with poverty."

Montesquieu
The Spirit of Laws
Bk. VII, Ch. 4
&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp"As distant as heaven is from the earth, so is the true spirit of equality from that of extreme equality...
&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp "In a true state of nature, indeed, all men are born equal, but they cannot continue in this equality. Society makes them lose it, and they recover it only by the protection of laws."

Montesquieu
The Spirit of Laws
Bk. VIII, Ch. 3

Back to Thoughts Worth Thinking Page

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brde et de Montesquieu (1689-1755) It is partly due to the brilliance of Montesquieu that the United States of America has descended into serious civil bloodshed only one time in over 200 years.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Introduction

The Constitution contains no provision explicitly declaring that the powers of the three branches of the federal government shall be separated. James Madison, in his original draft of what would become the Bill of Rights, included a proposed amendment that would make the separation of powers explicit, but his proposal was rejected, largely because his fellow members of Congress thought the separation of powers principle to be implicit in the structure of government under the Constitution. Madison's proposed amendment, they concluded, would be a redundancy.

The first article of the Constitution says "ALL legislative powers...shall be vested in a Congress." The second article vests "the executive power...in a President." The third article places the "judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court" and "in such inferior Courts as the Congress...may establish."

Separation of powers serves several goals. Separation prevents concentration of power (seen as the root of tyranny) and provides each branch with weapons to fight off encroachment by the other two branches. As James Madison argued in the Federalist Papers (No. 51), "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." Clearly, our system of separated powers is not designed to maximize efficiency; it is designed to maximize freedom.

EXECUTIVE ENCROACHMENTS
Two very different views of executive power have been articulated by past presidents. One view, the "strong president" view, favored by presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt essentially held that presidents may do anything not specifically prohibited by the Constitution. The other, "weak president" view, favored by presidents such as Howard Taft, held that presidents may only exercise powers specifically granted by the Constitution or delegated to the president by Congress under one of its enumerated powers.
Our readings include two cases dealing with the breadth of executive power. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952) arose when President Harry Truman, responding to labor unrest at the nation's steel mills during the Korean War, seized control of the mills. Although a six-member majority of the Court concluded that Truman's action exceeded his authority under the Constitution, seven justices indicated that the power of the President is not limited to those powers expressly granted in Article II. Had the Congress not impliedly or expressly disapproved of Truman's seizure of the mills, the action would have been upheld.

President Harry Truman announcing the seizure of steel mills on April 8, 1952

Inland Steel president Clarence Randall responds to steel mill seizure

Dames and More v Regan (1981) considered the constitutionality of executive orders issued by President Jimmy Carter directing claims by Americans against Iran to a specially-created tribunal. The Court, using a pragmatic rather than literalist approach, found the executive orders to be a constitutional exercise of the President's Article II powers. The Court noted that similar restrictions on claims against foreign governments had been made at various times by prior presidents and the Congress had never in those incidents, or the present one, indicated its objection to the practice.

CONGRESSIONAL ENCROACHMENTS
In INS v Chadha (1983), the Court considered the constitutionality of "the legislative veto," a commonly-used practice authorized in 196 different statutes at the time. Legislative veto provisions authorized Congress to nullify by resolution a disapproved-of action by an agency of the executive branch. Chadha contended that congressional action overturning an INS decision suspending his deportation constituted legislative action that failed to comply with the requirements for legislation spelled out in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court agreed.

Jadish Rai Chadha and family [NY Times photo]

In Bowsher v Synar (1986), the Court invalidated a provision of the Balanced Budget Act that authorized Charles Bowsher, as Comptroller General of the U.S., to order the impoundment of funds appropriated for domestic or military use when he determined the federal budget was in a deficit situation. The Court concluded that allowing the exercise of this executive power by the Comptroller General, an officer--in the Court's view--in the legislative branch, would be "in essence, to permit a legislative veto."
Morrison v Olson considered the constitutionality of the "Independent Counsel" (or "special prosecutor") provisions in the Ethics in Government Act. The Court had considerable difficulty in identifying in which of the three branches of government the independent counsel belonged. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court inMorrison took a pragmatic view of government, upholding the independent counsel provisions. Rehnquist noted that the creation of the independent counsel position did not represent an attempt by any branch to increase its own powers at the expense of another branch, and that the executive branch maintained "meaningful" controls over the counsel's exercise of his or her authority. In an angry dissent, Justice Scalia called the Court's opinion "a revolution in constitutional law" and said "without separation of powers, the Bill of Rights is worthless." Justice Scalia dissented again inMistretta v U. S.(1989), a decision upholding legislation which delegated to the seven-member United States Sentencing Commission (a commission which included three federal judges) the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines

In 2020, in Seila Law v CFPB, the Court found that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Board violated the Constitution's separation of powers because it was an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercised substantial executive power, but who could be removed by the President only for cause.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITIES

President Nixon's attorney, James St. Clair, arguing the Watergate tapes
case before the U. S. Supreme Court

Executive privilege, the right of the President to withhold certain information sought by another branch of government, was first claimed by President Jefferson in response to a subpoena from John Marshall in the famous treason trial of Aaron Burr. The Supreme Court's first major pronouncement on the issue, however, did not come until 1974 in United States v Richard Nixon. The case involved the refusal of President Nixon to turn over to Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski several hours of Oval Office tapes believed to concern the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up. Although the Court unanimously concluded that the Constitution does indeed contain an executive privilege, the Court said the privilege was "presumptive" and not absolute. Balancing the interests in theNixon case, the Court found the privilege not to extend to the requested Watergate tapes. In Clinton v Jones (1997), the Court rejected President Clinton's argument that the Constitution immunizes him from suits for money damages for acts committed before assuming the presidency. The case arose when Paula Jones filed a suit alleging sexual harassment by Clinton in an Arkansas hotel room in 1991 while Clinton served as Governor of Arkansas.
Finally, in Trump v Mazars, the Court considered Congressional subpoenas demanding that the various parties turn over financial records relating to the activities of Donald Trump and his businesses. The Court unanimously rejected the president's claim of absolute privilege. By a 7 to 2 votes, with Chief Justice Roberts writing the opinion, the Court laid out a four-part test courts should use in determining whether to require that the subpoenaed documents be turned over. The test attempts to balance Congress's important interest in obtaining information relevant to its constitutional duties, and the president's interest in not being targeted for political reasons and thus hindered in his or her own ability to carry out duties under Article II.

Executive Privilege and the Treason Trial of Aaron Burr

In 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall sat as the trial judge in the treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr. Burr, who was accused of working with Spain to start a war in the Southern territories and Texas (with the suggestion that he would become the leader of a newly-created western empire), requested that the court subpoena certain letters of Thomas Jefferson that might demonstrate that his arrest was politically motivated. Marshall issued the subpoena stating, "Courts should issue subpoenas based on the character of the information sought, not the character of the person who holds it." In letters to John Marshall, Thomas Jefferson respectfully disagreed, but turned over the letters anyway, thus avoiding a constitutional showdown. To read more about the case, and to read Jefferson's letters to Marshall click on the following link:

CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY UNDER THE SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
The framers sought in various ways to guarantee the independence of each of the three branches. The President was protected against criminal prosecutions while in office, answerable only in an impeachment trial with a super-majority required to convict. Members of the federal judiciary were given lifetime tenure, with a guarantee that their compensation would not be reduced. To ensure free discussion of controversial issues in Congress, the framers immunized members of Congress from liability for statements made in House or Senate debate: for their "speech or debate" they "shall not be questioned in any other place." (Link)

Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin. Proxmire's awarding of his "Golden Fleece" award to Dr. Ronald Hutchinson led to a defamation suit-- and a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Speech and Debate Clause.

In 1979, in Hutchinson v Proxmire, the Court considered whether the immunity for Senate and House debate extended beyond the floor to cover press releases and statements made to the media. The Court concluded that the Speech and Debate Clause protected only official congressional business, not statements for public consumption.

CONGRESSIONAL ENCROACHMENT ON
JUDICIAL POWERS

Art. III, Section. 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority....In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

InEx Parte McCardle (1868) the Court decided it lacked jurisdiction to consider the habeas corpus petition of William McCardle, a Vicksburg, Mississippi newspaper editor arrested by military official for writing incendiary editorials about the federal officers then in control of Mississippi during Reconstruction. Although McCardle made his petition under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, Congress repealed the provision authorizing McCardle's petition AFTER the Court had heard arguments in his appeal. Although it was obvious that Congress repealed the provision in an attempt to specifically deprive McCardle of the opportunity to gain release from military custody, the Court nonetheless upheld the validity of the Act and found itself without jurisdiction. Many subsequent commentators, including conservative judge Robert Bork, have criticized the Court's decision in McCardle and have predicted that it would not be followed today.

Cases

Morrison v Olson (1988)
Seila Law v CFPB (2020)

Clinton v Jones (1997)
Trump v Mazars (2020)

Separation of Powers Provisions in the Constitution

Article I, Section. 1:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Article II, Section. 1:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.

Article III, Section. 1:
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Article I, Section. 7:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law....If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Questions

1. What are some of the weapons each branch is given by the Constitution to fend off encroachment by other branches?
2. Which view of presidential power under the Constitution makes the most sense to you--the "strong" view or the "weak" view? Why? Which view has the Court come closer to adopting?
3. How should a history of congressional inaction in response to an assertion of presidential power be interpreted?
4. Did the Constitution empower President Lincoln to issue his famous Emancipation Proclamation?
5. It is not obvious that the Court has the power to review presidential assertions of power. What do you think about the suggestion that the Court should refrain from reviewing these exercises of power under "the political question" doctrine?
6. Why do you think Congress came to rely so heavily on "legislative veto" provisions? What are the alternatives?
7. Among the many ways of evaluating justices, one is to measure their willingness to accept as constitutional "pragmatic" solutions to the problems of modern governance. On such a scale, with respect to recent justices, might Justice White be called the "most pragmatic" and Justice Scalia the "least pragmatic" justice?
8. The Court seems to view the power of removal as key to placing an official in one or another branch of government. Why is the power of removal so important?
9. Have special prosecutors made a positive or a negative contribution to public life?
10. Do you accept Justice Rehnquist's argument that the Court should be concerned when one branch seems intent on increasing its power at the expense of other branches, but much less so when that is not the intent of an alleged separation of powers violation?
11. Is Justice Scalia right in suggesting, after Morrison, we now have a "standardless judicial allocation of powers"?
12. What do you think about the guidelines of the U. S. Sentencing Commission? Have they served to provide more uniform sentencing? Have they taken too much sentencing discretion away from trial judges and juries?
13. Could it be argued that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure violate constitutional separation of powers principles?
14. Could Congress delegate all of its law-making power to a super agency and take a long vacation? Why would such a broad delegation violate the Constitution? How far can Congress go in delegating its law-making powers? When are standards for the exercise of administrative discretion sufficient for constitutional purposes?
15. What is the best argument for recognizing constitutional protection for claims of executive privilege?
16. What would happen if the President were to ignore a direct order from the Supreme Court to respond to a legislative or judicial branch request for information? President Nixon promised to obey "a definitive opinion of the Supreme Court." What do you think he meant by "definitive opinion"?
17. Should the doctrine of executive privilege apply differently in impeachment proceedings?
18. What's the case for making the President immune from suits for damages while in office?

Background on Ex Parte McCardle

An Example of one of McCardle's editorials in the Vicksburg Times (Nov. 6, 1867):
"There is not a single shade of difference between Schofield, Sickles, Sheridan, Pope and Ord [generals in charge of Reconstruction]:...They are all infamous, cowardly, and abandoned villains who, instead of wearing shoulder straps and ruling millions of people should have their heads shaved, their ears cropped, their foreheads branded, and their persons lodged in a penitentiary."

President Johnson's message in vetoing the Repeal Act (Johnson's Veto was subsequently overridden.):
"I cannot give my assent to a measure which proposes to deprive any person restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution...the right of appeal to the highest judicial authority known to our government....The Supreme Court combines judicial wisdom and impartiality to a higher degree than any authority known to the Constitution; any any act which may be construed into or mistaken for an attempt to prevent or evade its decision on a question which affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the country cannon fail to be attended with unpropitious consequences."

McCardle's attorney on the Supreme Court decision against his client:
"The Court stood still to be ravished and did not even hallo while the thing was getting done...The whole government is so rotten and dishonest that I can only protest. It is drunk with blood and vomits crime incessantly."

19. What should the Court have done in Ex Parte McCardle? Consider these options: (1) Conclude that it had already determined it had jurisdiction and ignore the repeal act; (2) Consider the act, but hold it inapplicable because it was enacted after oral argument had occurred; (3) Hold that the act violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 in that the suspension of habeas corpus was not required by public safety; (4) Hold the act violated the Fifth Amendment because it deprived McCardle of due process of law; (5) Hold the act violates basic separation of powers principles and that Congress cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the Court; (6) Uphold the act and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

Paula Jones

The impeachment saga of President Clinton has its origins in a sexual harassment lawsuit brought in Arkansas in May, 1994 by Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee. In her suit, Jones alleged that on May 8, 1991, while she helped to staff a state-sponsored management conference at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, a state trooper and member of Governor Clinton's security detail, Danny Ferguson, approached her and told her that the Governor would like to meet her in his hotel suite. Minutes later, Jones, seeing this as an opportunity to advance her career, took the elevator to Clinton's suite. There, according to her disputed account, Clinton made a series of increasingly aggressive moves, culminating in a request for oral sex. Jones claimed that she stood and told the Governor, "I'm not that kind of girl." As she left, Clinton allegedly stopped her by the door and said, "You're a smart girl, let's keep this between ourselves." (There is reason to question Jones's story, as Clinton's security guard reported that Jones seemed pleased when she left the hotel room--and that anything that happened inside appeared to be consensual.)

Lawyers for Clinton argued that the Jones suit would distract him from the important tasks of his office and should not be allowed to go forward while he occupied the White House. Clinton's immunity claim eventually reached the United States Supreme Court. The Court ruled unanimously in May, 1997 against the President, and allowed discovery in the case to proceed. As Federal Appeals Court Judge (and Reagan appointee) Richard A. Posner noted in An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton, the Court's "inept," "unpragmatic," and "backward-looking" decision in Clinton v Jones, and an earlier decision by the Court upholding the constitutionality of the act authorizing the appointment of independent counsels, had major consequences:

"Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, an affair intrinsically devoid of significance to anyone except Lewinsky, would have remained a secret from the public. The public would not have been worse for not knowing about it. There would have been no impeachment inquiry, no impeachment, no concerns about the motives behind the President's military actions against terrorists and rogue states in the summer and fall of 1998, no spectacle of the United States Senate play-acting at adjudication. The Supreme Court's decisions created a situation that led the President and his defenders into the pattern of cornered-rat behavior that engendered a constitutional storm and that may have embittered American politics, weakened the Presidency, distracted the federal government from essential business, and undermined the rule of law."

As a result of the Supreme Court's action, Judge Susan Weber Wright allowed discovery to proceed in the Paula Jones lawsuit. Judge Wright ruled that lawyers for Jones, in order to help prove her sexual harassment claim, could inquire into any sexual relationships that Clinton might have with subordinates either as Governor of Arkansas or as President of the United States. A critical moment in the cascade of events that would eventually lead to impeachment came on December 5, 1997 when Jones's lawyers submitted a list of women that they would like to depose. Included on the list the name of Monica Lewinsky.

For detailed information about what transpired after the Clinton v Jones litigation (which settled in 1999 for $850,000), including an account of the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton, click on the link below:

Court's 4-Part Test for Analyzing Appropriateness of Congressional Subpoena for Presidential Records (Trump v Mazars)

First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. [O]ccasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches should be avoided whenever possible. Congress may not rely on the Presidents information if other sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it needs in light of its particular legislative objective. The Presidents unique constitutional position means that Congress may not look to him as a case study for general legislation. . . . Second, to narrow the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congresss legislative objective. The specificity of the subpoenas request serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President. Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. The more detailed and substantial the evidence of Congresss legislative purpose, the better. That is particularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises sensitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the Presidency. In such cases, it is impossible to conclude that a subpoena is designed to advance a valid legislative purpose unless Congress adequately identifies its aims and explains why the Presidents information will advance its consideration of the possible legislation. Fourth, courts should be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena. We have held that burdens on the Presidents time and attention stemming from judicial process and litigation, without more, generally do not cross constitutional lines. But burdens imposed by a congressional subpoena should be carefully scrutinized, for they stem from a rival political branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage. Other considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Separation of Powers Under the United States Constitution

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Cases, notes, questions, and images relating to the separation of the powers.